Monday, 16 November 2026

(9.44 am)

SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: Please remain standing just for a moment. Thank you.

MR ALEXANDER RAWLE (affirmed)

SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: Thank you very much. Please have a seat. Yes, Mr Moss.

Questions by MR MOSS

MR MOSS: Thank you, sir. Just start by giving us your full name if you would please.

A. Alexander Rawle.

Q. Thank you, Mr Rawle. If we could have on screen, please, ALPHA000001. I think you can confirm that this is your second witness statement to the Inquiry, is that right?

A. Correct.

Q. If we turn to page 29 ALPHA000001_0029, please. We see that it is dated 10 August 2026. I know that in relation to section K you want to deal, when we come to it, with an addition about where there may be an immediate risk to life?

A. Yes.

Q. But with that addition that we will come to in evidence, are the contents of this statement true to the best of your knowledge and belief?

A. Yes, they are.

Q. Thank you very much. That's the main statement we are going to be dealing with, because it is your statement for this phase. If we look at YOUT000001, we can see your statement to the first phase of the Inquiry and if we go to page 13 YOUT000001_0013, we will see that that is dated 11 December. I think, in relation to paragraph 23, you just want to correct that the correct number for content removed is to be found in the exhibit, there is a slight numerical error in the statement itself, is that right?

A. That is correct, yes.

Q. And with that caveat, are the contents of that first statement true to the best of your knowledge and belief?

A. They are yes.

Q. Thank you very much. Finally, if we could have ALPHA000049 we have another statement from Alphabet, from your colleague Mr Petrosky and this deals largely with AI matters and in particular, with Gemini and we have been put on notice, Mr Rawle, that this isn't your area of speciality at all; have we understood correctly?

A. That is correct, yes.

Q. Thank you. So I'm not going to refer to that statement in any detail, I will ask you specific details about it. There may be one or two instances where I point to what

Alphabet, on the AI/Gemini side, is doing and ask you if Google/YouTube are doing the same, but I won't ask you any detailed questions about that. We may need to follow up with Mr Petrosky on points of detail.

So those are the statements. If we can go back to your main statement, your second witness statement and just have page 1 ALPHA000001_0001, paragraph 1. We see, in paragraph 1, that you are the Head of Public Policy for YouTube in the UK and I think it is in that context that you come to give evidence today?

A. That's correct, yes.

Q. Before I go any further, I think there's something you wanted to say?

A. Yes. I just wanted to express my sound sorrow and sadness at the incidents at Southport and extend my sympathies to the families and all those affected.

I know it was a tragic incident and myself and my colleagues at Google and YouTube wanted to pass that on.

SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: Thank you very much.

MR MOSS: Thank you. If we could go to page 2 ALPHA000001_0002, paragraph 6, please, of your statement. You explain there that although the specific role in which you can speak to is YouTube, you are speaking on behalf of Google and you will be able to, I think, deal with some matters in relation to Google

search, is that right?

A. Yes, that is correct.

Q. Just tell us a little bit -- you don't deal with it in your statement, I don't say that critically at all -- just tell us a little bit about your professional background, your career and the areas in which you have worked, if you would, just in a nutshell?

A. So I have worked on issues on online content regulation and platform safety for the last decade. Most of that time has been at Google, where I led on safety and security policy. In the last two years, I have been head of public policy for YouTube, which covers a range of issues from safety content issues through to media policy issues. So anything that isn't YouTube-related prior to the past two years might be slightly out of date for me.

Q. Thank you. We see there in paragraph 6, which we looked at a moment ago, how things are structured. Can we just go through that. Alphabet Inc, I think, is the parent company, is that correct?

A. That is correct.

Q. And Google LLC is a subsidiary of that and it is Google which provides the services in the UK. Have we understood correctly?

A. That is correct, yes.

Q. Within Google, there is then YouTube and Google search?
A. Yes, and YouTube is a distinct business division within Google LLC.
Q. How does Gemini and Google AI fit into that corporate structure, do you know?
A. I can't answer that question, no.
Q. We don't need to bring it up, but in your first statement you said that the trust and safety teams, the public policy teams, health, product, engineer and legal teams were dedicated to working closely together to help protect children. Are those teams the ones that are most involved in aspects in relation to safety, particularly safety for children?
A. Yes, I believe so.
Q. Thank you. Can you just explain, first of all in relation to the work of the trust and safety team, what that particularly does?
A. So, the trust and safety team is there to enforce our community guidelines and ensure that content that violates our guidelines isn't available on the platform and also look at emerging risks and develop policies that can be implemented.
Q. You are the head of public policy?
A. Yes.
Q. What part does that play in relation to safety of

materials, particularly in relation to violent materials?
A. So my job as head of public policy is to explain how YouTube works and operates to the external audiences, be they policymakers, NGOs and others. Often these -- our safety policies and our approach to safety is managed by a cross-functional team. So that's teams drawn from child development experts, through to trust and safety, through to product teams who develop the systems and processes.
Q. Thank you. And within the public policy team, which you lead, and the trust and safety team, how does that then report in at director level? Who has the responsibility at director level, within the UK, for safety matters?
A. So, depending on the safety matters, it would be, as I said, a cross-functional team who would then advise on leadership.
Q. But there must be somebody who is responsible at director level, a named individual, who has this within their area of responsibility; who is that?
A. Yes, so there are -- ultimately, our board is responsible for everything that happens at Google, but, on top of that, we would then have -- I have referenced a kids and families group, which is looking at making sure we are designing age-appropriate, high quality

products for kids specifically and then there will be teams working on different areas of safety who are responsible. But there is a governance structure that sits behind that.
Q. Forgive me for interrupting, but in relation to the board, is there somebody on the board who has a particular eye to safety matters?
A. Yes. There is.
Q. Who is that?
A. I don't have the name of the individual but I can write to you in follow-up.
Q. So that's the first point that we may ask you to follow up on, thank you.
Now, I'm going to concentrate on YouTube and when I'm turning to Google specifically, I will make that clear. But I think it is regulated under the OSA, is that right?
A. That is correct.
Q. And it is a category 1 provider under the OSA, I think?
A. Yes, that was recently announced.
Q. Can you help us as to the demographic of users of YouTube. So in broad terms, do you know what the proportion of overall users, who are under 18 is?
A. So there are, I think, billions of people who use YouTube every day. In the UK, broadly about 95 per cent

of the population use YouTube and I think that is consistent across kind of age groups, from children through to adults. So the majority of people in the UK use YouTube.
Q. So you think that YouTube's users, in terms of how many under 18, would reflect the population levels as proportions as a whole?
A. Broadly, yes, but I would also make a distinction between the account holders and the viewers, obviously. There's a slight difference there.
Q. Thank you. In terms of account holders, do you know what proportion of account holders in the UK are under 18?
A. No, this was a question that I think your team asked over the weekend and so we should be able to get back to you with those figures. The team is still validating them.
Q. All right. Given the age assurance that should be in place for 18-year-olds, why isn't that information readily available and published?
A. So under 18s are able to have YouTube accounts that are supervised and I think you asked some very specific questions.
Q. Yes.
A. So they didn't necessarily sit within the age brackets

that we were looking at. So we just have not had a chance to validate those numbers and get them to you, and I didn't want to give you kind of speculative numbers or proxies.

Q. Thank you. Can we look at page 4 ALPHA000001_0004 of your statement, please, and paragraph 15. So in terms of -- it is under the heading of "Content moderation policies" and you say there that:

"Google's provision of YouTube is governed by the YouTube Terms of Service ... [and] The Terms of Service incorporate, among[st] other things, the YouTube Community Guidelines."

Is that right?

A. That is correct.

Q. If we go over the page ALPHA000001_0005 to paragraph 16. In the community guidelines, just to introduce this from your statement, you say that:

"YouTube's Community Guidelines, developed by our Trust and Safety team, have been in place since the inception of the YouTube platform. They explain what content is not permitted on YouTube and apply to all types of YouTube content, including videos, comments, links and thumbnails. The Community Guidelines comprise policies on spam and deceptive practices; sensitive content (including child safety); violent or dangerous

content; regulated goods, misinformation; educational, documentary, scientific and artistic content; and other matters, such as soliciting violations of the Terms of Service or re-posting content that has previously been removed."

So that, I think, is your thumbnail introduction to the terms of service and community guidelines, yes?

A. That is correct, yes.

Q. Thank you very much. Can we have briefly on screen, please, ALPHA000008, partly just for the learned Chair's note. I think you confirm that those are the terms of service?

A. Yes.

Q. Thank you. Then, if we could have on screen, ALPHA000009. Do take your time with any of these exhibits as you need but if you just look at the headline there I think you can confirm that that's the community guidelines?

A. Yes, that is the start of our community guidelines.

Q. Thank you. If we just go to page 39 ALPHA000009_0039. To take one example, that, I think, is the violent or graphic content policies within the community guidelines, is that right?

A. That's correct, yes.

Q. So, if we can just have the bottom half of the page

highlighted please. We see that it says:

"Violent or gory content intended to shock or disgust viewers, or content encouraging others to commit violent acts, is not allowed on YouTube. In some cases, we may make exceptions for content with educational, documentary, scientific or artistic context, including content that is in the public interest."

Yes?

A. Correct, yes.

Q. Thank you. If we can then have the bottom third of the page:

"Violent or graphic content" is:

"Inciting others to commit violent acts against individuals or a defined group ...

"Fights involving minors.

"Footage, audio or imagery involving road accidents, the aftermath of terrorist attacks, street fights, physical attacks, immolation, torture, corpses, robberies or other such scenarios with the intent to shock or disgust viewers.

"Footage or imagery showing bodily fluids such as blood or vomit, with the intent to shock or disgust viewers.

"Footage of corpses with severe injuries, such as severed limbs."

And there is also animal abuse content. Is there any further guidance that sits below that? Because obviously quite a lot of that, particularly where you are drawing on "intent to shock or disgust", which appears in those important third and fourth bullet points, that brings in an element of judgement; is there any further guidance that sits below this?

A. So there would be enforcement guidance that our trust and safety teams would use to enforce these policies and then, of course, there may be exceptions around, as you have pointed out, EDSA content and some of this content may also be age-gated, if it does have a kind of EDSA exemption for under 18-year-olds.

Q. Thank you. If we go back to your statement, please. At page 5 ALPHA000001_0005. It is paragraph 18. As others in social media have told us, I think your community guidelines are global and if content is removed, because it violates the guidelines, it is removed globally for all YouTube users, is that correct?

A. Yes, that is correct.

Q. Because the guidelines are global in that way, do you, as a company, have to meet the challenge of different cultural expectations and cultural norms? I'm particularly interested in the approach to firearms and knives, for example?

A. So, on top of our community guidelines, there is also under the Online Safety Act and prior to that legal removal requests. So if something also breaches UK law, there would be a process for removing that content when we were notified of it. So the --
Q. Globally or just for the UK?
A. For the UK. Or in another jurisdiction, for example.
Q. All right. Are you familiar with the Knives Act in the UK which makes it a criminal offence for somebody to market a knife in a way which indicates or suggests that it is suitable for combat?
A. Yes.
Q. The Inquiry is concerned about the way in which knives, even if lawful for sale, are marketed. I think you are aware in general terms that there are knife materials on YouTube, yes? I'm just going to give a warning that I may use some language here that may be distressing for some, which show such matters as swords or machetes being used to decapitate pigs' carcasses and show swords being used to decapitate human mannequins and show human mannequins being decapitated by swords when the mannequin is filled with fake blood and the blood spills out from the head when decapitated. What is the justification for allowing that sort of material on YouTube at all, even for adults?

A. So, I can't speak to the specific examples because I haven't seen or reviewed that content and nor is it my job to make assessments. But I would imagine there would be a number of factors. That content would be reviewed against our community guidelines. There would be an assessment about whether that content was appropriate for under 18s. That content may be age-gated and then, if we were to -- if there was a very -- it is unlikely scenario, if there was a delta between our community guidelines, our community guidelines tend to be much more restrictive than the law, and there was -- this content looked like it --
Q. So sorry, when you say "a delta between our community guidelines". What does that mean in plain English?
A. So in the broadest sense, our community guidelines are more restrictive than UK law in most scenarios. However, if there was a scenario whereby our community guidelines didn't capture something, but it was illegal under UK law, that could then be reported to a legal removals process and our team would assess that under UK law and then remove it from YouTube in the UK.
Q. All right. Let's assume for the moment that that content isn't illegal under UK law. Why doesn't it breach your community guidance? Why allow material showing the decapitation of pigs' carcasses or swords

being used on human mannequins with fake blood spurting out?
A. So we would need to look at the context in which the content was uploaded. So you referenced before the EDSA policies.
Q. Yes.
A. So there may be a legitimate public interest in that content being on the platform. It may be a news report or it might be, for example, someone showing bushcraft of a specific culture or butchery. There is a number of contextual --
Q. You don't use a sword decapitating a human being for bushcraft, do you?
A. So it may be a report on -- or from a news agency covering that.
Q. If it is just, for example, an example I think you are aware of, Cold Steel, the US knife manufacturer, what's the justification there?
A. So, I would need the trust and safety teams to review that content. I can't make a speculative assessment on it.
Q. In light of -- and I appreciate in terms of material that you have been shown, you have not had much notice at all, so I don't raise that as a criticism of you and I think it is fair that I should make clear that

examples have been drawn to your attention but you haven't had time to consider them. Is that something you can take away as a matter of urgent concern for the Inquiry?
A. Yes.
Q. As to why that material is available at all, as to why it appears to be available without content warning and what age gating is applied to it?
A. Yes, happy to do so.
Q. Thank you. Should these policies -- let's perhaps just look at paragraph 19 of your statement, we have it at the bottom of the page. I will just read it out to you:

"YouTube has various policies that directly address the risks posed by harmful online content related to violence that are relevant to the Inquiry's Terms of Reference. Violent or gory content intended to shock or disgust viewers, or content encouraging others to commit violent acts, is generally not allowed on YouTube. Content intended to praise, promote or aid violent extremist or criminal organisations is also not allowed."

You give some examples of the policies in relation to that below.

So, is this right, that YouTube's policies should capture content that glamorises school shooters or other

mass killers?
A. Yes, that content shouldn't be available on the platform.
Q. Thank you. And if the content appears to glamourise a school shooting or a mass killer, that material, I think, should be prohibited on YouTube even if there's no apparent intent specifically to encourage violence?
A. I believe that is correct, yes, given the EDSA provisions that we have previously talked about.
Q. Thank you. I think the guidance that you give below, if we can just have ALPHA000011, that's the "Harmful dangerous content policy" and ALPHA000013, you exhibit these to your statement. That's the "Violent or graphic content policies."
But I think the wording is exactly the same, or it even may be taken from the community guidelines; it is the same approach, is that right?
A. That is correct.
Q. Thank you. If we can go back to your statement, please, at page 10 ALPHA000001_0010. And right at the bottom of the page, paragraph 36 -- we will come back to age assurance in a moment -- but in terms of content, you say that:
"Sometimes content does not violate our Community Guidelines but may not be appropriate for viewers

under 18. Google may apply an age restriction to YouTube content involving:
"(a) harmful or dangerous acts that adults or minors could imitate;
"(b) adult themes in family content, meaning content intended for mixed audiences or targeting children, including cartoons, [but which] contains themes such as violence or death;"
Then over the page ALPHA000001_0011:
Relevantly, for us:
"Violent or graphic content;"
And there are two others which I think are less immediately relevant for us.
Then, in paragraph 37, you say:
"When content is age-restricted, users accessing YouTube must be signed in and the age associated with their account must be 18 or over to view the video."
Is that correct?
A. That is correct, yes.
Q. And you also say that:
"YouTube also encourages creators to age-restrict their own content where appropriate."
A. Yes. On top of the classifiers that would run to also age-restrict that content if they have not notified us.
Q. So that, no doubt, is an appropriate step but you could

not, in any way, rely on that alone, obviously?
A. Yes, correct.
Q. Then paragraph 39, dealing with the other measures, you say:
"YouTube uses automated classifiers to detect content and apply age restrictions."
Then you go on to set out that there is an appeal process.
Is there a risk associated with that approach, in terms of the age gating of material, with the risk that nuance of content may be missed if it is done by automated assessment?
A. So, I think that the vast majority of the kind of content that we are referring to, we have built classifiers and we run them to a high degree of accuracy and manage to find and gate 18-plus content. So I'm quite confident in the systems we have in place. But you are right, contextually, there may be instances whereby some content, because of the complexity of the content or the nuance or the societal interpretation of the content, may not be appropriate for 18-plus users.
Q. Thank you. Does your -- the programming that you run to assess the age sensitivity, particularly in relation to what we saw at the top of the page in terms of violent material, how is the -- how are errors from that

identified, first of all? Secondly, what learning is done from errors, from material that slips through the system?
A. So, we would take samples of content and run them against our 18-plus kind of content policies and look for any discrepancies or any kind of leakage within that policy and then tweak and change the systems behind them to kind of improve them and that's a continuous system that would take place repetitively.
Q. Do you open that out to external assessment, at all?
A. So, yes, we would have shared that information with Ofcom, I believe. Yes.
Q. Do you know when that was done?
A. That was done in -- that would have been done in the last six months. I can't give a specific timeframe.
Q. And what has been shared with Ofcom?
A. So, we -- as part of the -- as part of information about how our recommendation systems are safe for younger users, I believe we have had a discussion with Ofcom around how our systems that are able to gate and restrict 18-plus content operate and the efficacy of those systems.
Q. Thank you. We should just look, briefly for context, at page 18 ALPHA000001_0018, paragraph 67 of your statement. We have seen this in the documents and you

have referred to it. This is the exception for educational, documentary, scientific or artistic purposes, yes?
A. Yes, correct.
Q. You say:
"In those circumstances, the content receives an EDSA exception. [But] where content may not be appropriate for viewers under 18, Google may apply an age restriction."
So, there would be some material that ordinarily would be prohibited as violent or graphic, yes?
A. Yes.
Q. But it may get an EDSA exception. But even if it gets an EDSA exception, there would then be an assessment of whether the material ought to be age-gated and only available to adults?
A. Correct.
Q. Is that a fair summary?
A. Yes, that is.
Q. So that is how the system is meant to work?
A. Yes.
Q. Thank you. How effective does Google think those structures are at keeping inappropriate material out of the sight of children, those aged under 18?
A. So I -- from my experience of working at the company,

I think the systems are effective and I would also say I don't think we are judging whether the systems are effective independently. We are regulated by Ofcom in the UK and obviously under the DSA in Europe and by regulators around the world who we share information about the efficacy of our systems and processes and the system you have just outlined.
Q. So the first of the materials I want to put to you by way of some challenge to that, could we have on the screen CCDH000007. Just, Mr Rawle, so you can get the context, we see that this is the statement of Imran Ahmed who is the founder and CEO of the Center for Countering Digital Hate.
If we go to page 10 CCDH000007_0010, paragraph 39. One of the points that he has raised in his evidence is that:
"Across multiple investigations, we have documented repeated failures by major platforms to act on user reports of violent threats, incitement and hateful content, including content calling for violence against protected groups."
And their:
"... studies have shown that Facebook, Instagram, TikTok, Twitter and YouTube failed to enforce their own rules (community standards [in other words]) on 89% of

posts containing anti-Muslim hatred and Islamophobic content reported to them."
What do you say in relation to that strong challenge to the effectiveness of the enforcement of community guidelines?
A. So I think I would first say we have strict policies against hate speech in place. I can't speak to the specific reports that he has referencing here and I note that there isn't a specific YouTube reference; it is YouTube and a number of other companies. But we have hate speech policies in place. We enforce against those policies. We have quite sophisticated machines and humans looking at those. Sometimes in speech-related context, there is a number of considerations and it can be difficult to find that balance and that's when we would have human reviewers and also lawyers looking at that content to look at whether they breach hate speech laws. We don't want hate speech on the platform. There are -- I would also say that a large amount of hate speech is removed using automated machines and then also human reviewers.
Q. CCDH, it might be thought, is not a minor fringe group, it's a well known safety group campaigning in this area. Has YouTube not looked at those reports to assess why in the numbers that were given in relation to YouTube, the

material was not removed despite being reported?
A. So, we have had direct engagement with CCDH on a number of issues when they have released reports. I can't -- I don't recall the engagement that we would have had or the review that we would have had around this report or whether CCDH then shared the underlying data, but in other instances I know we have taken the data and we welcome external challenge and also information that helps us improve our systems. We are dealing with huge volumes of information and videos being uploaded and comments being made at scale. So we welcome --
Q. Well, you may welcome it, but was anything done in relation to the finding that -- accepting that there were others involved -- but taking them as a group -- and there is more detail in the reports -- that 89 per cent of posts containing anti-Muslim hatred across these groups including YouTube were not taken down even though they were reported?
A. So it is difficult to make an assessment on this point because the report wasn't singularly about YouTube, it is covering lots of different services. He is talking about a broad concern about a range -- the report is talking about a broad concern around a range of services. But the teams would have looked at this report and looked to see whether there was anything we

could learn from this report.
Q. So in relation to the exhibit -- I won't take time on it now, but you will have the report, but it is there, CCDH000029 -- again, if you can actually provide an answer as to, first of all, whether any assessment of that material was done by YouTube and, secondly, any learning, and thirdly, why it was that the material on YouTube was not taken down, could you share that with the Inquiry?
A. Happy to follow up on this, yes.
Q. Thank you. Could we turn next to child safety and age verification. By way of background context for this, if we look at CTPHQ000414. This is a press release from July of last year. And its authors were Counter Terrorism Policing, MI5, and the National Crime Agency "jointly calling on parents and carers to support their children to be safer online during the summer break".
So do you see the context there?
A. Yes.
Q. I just read from the top paragraph.
A. Yes.
Q. So who the authors were --
A. Yes.
Q. -- and the timing of it.
A. Yes.

Q. And there is a section about halfway down, but I will read it out to you, where it says:
"Counter Terrorism Policing and the National Crime Agency are increasingly seeing children being routinely exposed to the most serious harmful online content.
"This includes sexual violence; self-harm and suicide content; extreme gore; animal cruelty; indecent images of children; and terrorist content.
"This bombardment of online harms can quickly become normalised. Worryingly, some of the children who come to the attention of [Counter Terrorism Police] and the [National Crime Agency] are completely desensitised to extreme and obscene content."
So that was the warning being given, at very senior levels, here in the UK. Do YouTube, first of all, recognise that as being -- if I can use the phrase -- the threat landscape?
A. Yes. I think it's very clear that there are -- young people are seeing content that is not appropriate for their age on online services. And that's also backed up by Ofcom evidence and reporting.
Q. The risk to children being flagged here could not be more serious, would you agree?
A. I do agree, yes.
Q. In terms of risks and harm to them?

A. Yes.
Q. But also in relation to terrorism and extreme violent content material and gore material, the risk of them being, at the very least, desensitised to the suffering shown in such material? So if they see a lot of terrorism, extreme violent and gore material, there is a risk, at the very least, that they will be desensitised to the suffering shown in that material?
A. Yes, I agree with that.
Q. And while of course not every child who is exposed to such material will be radicalised by it, there is a significant risk for some of that happening?
A. Yes, and I would say that YouTube, our work is to ensure that children don't encounter that content on our platform.
Q. And if YouTube were highly motivated in that way, presumably, when given the option, they would choose the least risky option to ensure that their protection of children was as high as practicable?
A. Yes, within a proportionate system that can be run when we have huge volumes of content and when we also need to balance privacy, safety and free speech considerations, but yes, I agree with that.
Q. Thank you. If we look, please, at CCW000018. Mr Rawle, just to help you with the context of this, this is the

Children's Commissioner for Wales report. So you have the date of it, it is June 2024 and it is the report headed "Online Safety -- A Snapshot Survey of Children and Young People in Wales."
It is one of the documents of which we have given you notice.
If we look at page 3 CCW000018_0003, and one accepts that this is a snapshot survey, but I will just run through this:
"Questions for children and young people."
They were asked if they felt "safe and happy when you use them?" And that is the top of the page and it is fair to point out that 76 per cent said "yes", 19 per cent said "sometimes" and 4 per cent said "no" -- sorry, "I don't know" was 4 per cent and "no" was 2 per cent.
If they answered "sometimes", "I don't know", or "no", they were asked another question:
"Which apps/games/websites have made you feel unsafe or unhappy?"
And 29 per cent of children answered this question and said "Roblox" and we will ask Roblox about that tomorrow. But the second worst performing was YouTube, that 17 per cent of children in this survey who weren't clear that they always felt safe and happy online,

17 per cent said it was YouTube that had made them feel unsafe or unhappy. How does that come to pass?

A. So, you know, we don't want any children to feel unsafe or unhappy after watching YouTube. We have developed YouTube Kids, which is a separate standalone app for children under the age of 13. We have supervised teen accounts and supervised kids accounts, which provide for age-appropriate experiences and parents to kind of add settings to those cases.

I would say -- and I haven't been able to look at this report in detail -- but there are a number of ways in which YouTube is distinctly different from others services. So 50 per cent of viewing on YouTube is now done through connected televisions. So we are a shared device service. So it is not clear whether the young people that are seeing the content here on YouTube may be passive viewers. They could be in the same room as a parent who is watching that content, not directly viewing it through their own accounts. So I do think --

Q. Is that speculation on your part?

A. It is very likely that that is the case, given the high penetration of YouTube across the country.

Q. But surely the immediate reaction to this sort of survey by a responsible body, the Children's Commissioner for Wales, putting you as the second worst performing in

terms of exposing children to material that made them feel unsafe or unhappy should be one of profound concern?

A. I think I expressed that profound concern at the beginning of my answer but I do think there is a difference in terms of self-reporting from young people when YouTube is so ubiquitous and can be used by parents and older siblings within the household and that makes up 50 per cent of the viewing of the service.

Q. Appreciating, of course, that it is anecdotal, the very first quote that was given as an example as to why it made them feel unsafe or unhappy was:

"YouTube because sometimes it shows me not child friendly stuff and gore ..."

And that was from an 11-year-old. How is an 11-year-old able to access gore on YouTube at all, Mr Rawle?

A. So, if they have their own accounts or they are using YouTube Kids, then I would not expect them to be able to access gore unless something has slipped through the system. But there will be instances because of -- YouTube is used by over 95 per cent of the population, where it might be someone else in the household who is viewing YouTube and their child has seen their content because it is on their television in their living room.

So that's distinctly different from a service that sits on a device that people are consuming the content from.

Q. If we look at ILT000302, please. This is the "Children, violence and vulnerability" report by the Youth Endowment Fund in 2024:

"What role does social media play in violence affecting young people?"

Are you familiar with this report? I think it is one of the biggest from the Youth Endowment Fund in the UK?

A. Yes.

Q. If we look at page 6 ILT000302_0006, please together. If we could go to the bottom of the page, you see the heading "Violence is widespread on social media":

"Exposure to real-life violence on social media has become the norm rather than the exception for teenage children. Our findings reveal that 70% of respondents have encountered some form of real-world violence online in the past 12 months. The most frequently observed content is footage of fights involving young people, with 56% of respondents reporting that they have seen such videos."

Then:

"Other common types of violence witnessed online include threats of physical harm ... and content related

to gang activity ... and weapons ..."

I'm not reading out the percentages for the moment:

"Notably, one in nine children who say they have encountered weapon-related content have seen footage involving zombie knives or machetes -- a figure significantly higher than the 1% of 13-17-year-olds who've reported that they carry such weapons, as highlighted in our first report. This suggestion that social media may amplify fear by making certain behaviours appear more widespread than they are."

Now, given that this is the dangers to which this large report with a large survey is referring, how would you expect YouTube to perform relative to others?

A. Most of the content that's being described here would be violative of our community guidelines and at very minimum, receive age gating. There may be some content that's due to EDSA. I would hope that we would perform well in this scenario.

Q. So, if we look at page 17 ILT000302_0017, in the proportion of children seeing violent content on social media platforms, so the left-hand one, is that for children aged 13-17. Do you see that YouTube is the second worst performing, with only TikTok being worse; performing worse than Snapchat, Instagram, Facebook, WhatsApp, X, Reddit, Facebook Messenger, Discord,

Telegram, iMessage and Twitch.

With 21 per cent of children aged between 13-17 reporting seeing violent content on your YouTube platform. What conclusion should be derived from that?

A. So it is very difficult to make an assessment without understanding the full methodology behind the report. I would just say that everything that I have seen the company do is to mitigate harms, particularly mitigate harms amongst children and make sure they have age-appropriate experiences and see high quality content.

So I've described the fact that the platform operates in a number of different categories. So we have YouTube Kids, we have supervised experiences and then we also have a number of adult users who will be consuming content and there may be children who are passive consumers of that content who aren't directly watching it through their own account.

Q. So, Mr Rawle, we can go through a lot of examples of these and unfortunately, I'm going to have to do it, but it seems that there is a pattern in your answers of speculating that the reason for this is actually this is adults having legitimate access and allowing their children to see the material.

A. I think --

Q. Do you really think that that is a realistic explanation for the poor performance for YouTube that is seen in survey after survey after survey?

A. I think, given the list of other services that are being listed, we are the only service that is a shared device service, where the majority of users will be using the same device to access content. We are also the only service on this list that is now primarily now viewed on the living room and people's televisions. So fundamentally, the risk factors associated with that and the access gateways are going to be different from the other services listed here, so --

Q. Even if that is right and -- even if that, which might be doubted, explains the totality, that in itself is problematic, isn't it? Because what, are you passing the entire responsibility on for that to parents?

A. Absolutely not. I think what we have done is designed product and services and experiences that help parents and also put children in the right state so they see the correct kind of content on YouTube. And so even when, for example, a parent will be watching YouTube videos that tend to be for their children, we will then default that parent into a "made for kids" state, so that the content they see is then appropriate for children.

But there is a nuance and a complexity to how

YouTube operates which is fundamentally different to the other services that are listed here. And that doesn't mean that we don't have responsibilities and it doesn't mean we don't take those responsibilities for safety very seriously, but it is an underlying factor that's backed up by multiple Ofcom reports and data on how services -- how the service is being accessed.

Q. Was -- given the size of this report in terms of the scale of the research that was done, and its prominence in the UK, was any action taken by YouTube as specifically as a result of it?

A. I can't recall the specifics of this report.

Q. You don't accept that this shows concerning and significant weaknesses in YouTube's protection of children from violent content?

A. I haven't looked at the methodology of this report enough and also it would be for my colleagues to make an assessment of that and I can't recall the action that was taken and the assessment that we made.

Q. If we just look at page 12 ILT000302_0012. We see, at the bottom of the page, in the "What we did", and I mention the survey sample, that over 10,000 children were asked to respond to the survey. Do you see that there?

A. Yes.

Q. Relating to their experiences in the last 12 months. It is certainly a large survey, would you agree?

A. Yes, I would agree with that.

Q. Thank you. That can come down from the screen. You tell us in your statement that the minimum age for having a Google account or a YouTube account without parental permission is 13. Can you just briefly tell us why 13 was chosen?

A. I believe it's linked to data processing and the age of consent.

Q. Thank you. Obviously, as you have touched upon, one aspect is that YouTube can be seen by members of the public without setting up an account, is that right?

A. Yes, that's correct.

Q. So, you could have an 8 or a 10-year-old who is not signed into any type of Google or YouTube account, viewing YouTube material?

A. That material would not be -- it would not be 18-plus material.

Q. So, if you are not signed into any type of Google account, and you view YouTube in that way, you can not see any -- you are prohibited from seeing material that is designated for adults, is that right?

A. Yes, that is correct. Even if that material was linked through to another website, you would still need to log

in and demonstrate your age to see 18-plus content.
Q. And can you give us, in broad terms, the thresholds that are applied for that sort of material, so in relation to violent content?
A. So, violent content, blood and gore, kind of racy content or sexually explicit content, things like video games for 18-year-olds, clips of that, film clips that are 18-plus. All the things that you would consider to be inappropriate for --
Q. What about knives, swords and other items that could be used as weapons that are being demonstrated as to how effective they are, by slicing and cutting things up, including animal carcasses?
A. So, without -- there will be rules in place that would look at that content and establish whether it was violative of our policies in the first place or whether it needed to be age gated. I can't speak to the specifics because the team would look at all four corners of the video, the content, and how that content was -- what the purpose of that content. So, again, if it was a butchery video then it may be up. If it was a bushcraft video, it may be appropriate. If it was there to serve no purpose and looked like it was violent and gory, it is likely that --
Q. Yes, but if it was just marketing swords and knives,

but -- not kitchen knives, but big what might be thought as bushcraft knives which might also be used for combat, things like Samurai swords?
A. So there would be a number of factors and I also think there would be -- there is legislation against the promotion of certain types of knives as well. I can't speak for the specifics but they would all be factors that the team would look at, to consider this.
Q. Again, if you can bear that in mind when you look at that sort of material, after you have given your evidence, the risks that somebody who is not logged in at all could access it and that they could be as young as 8 or 10, we would be grateful.
A. Will do.
Q. And if, as a result of that, you think any action is going to be taken by YouTube, would you let us know before the 17 December?
A. Yes, I will do.
Q. Thank you. If we can go back to your statement, please Mr Rawle and just look at page 10 ALPHA000001_0010, at the bottom.
Forgive me, it is page 11 ALPHA000001_0011. There is a page 0, which complicates matters. So paragraph 40. So this is "Other safety measures to protect children". You say:

"Across Google, including YouTube, we use a number of methods to establish the age of signed-in users. The first is age declaration. We ask users for their date of birth during the Google account creation process. We do so neutrally, without promoting them to provide a particular age, and do not allow them to return to the age screen once the date has been entered, to reduce the risk of circumvention."
Now, I'm not going to suggest for a moment that having those protections -- so you don't prompt any particular age and you don't allow them to go back to see I will just check what the minimum age is -- obviously, those are appropriate and helpful. But self-declaration is worth very little.
A. Correct. Yes.
Q. Thank you:
"If a user tells us that they are under 13, we direct them to the Family Link account-creation process to create a supervised account ..."
So I don't overlook -- there is a lot of detail in your statement about the specialised services you have set up for children and we will come onto some of them:
"If a user tells us that they are aged between 13 and 17, we apply our default protections for users under 18."

If we can just go over the page ALPHA000001_0012, we see that:
"Google also uses age-inference technology to provide more age-appropriate experiences for users. It deploys automated systems that provide an additional level of assurance about a user's declared age. If our age estimation model determines that a user is likely to be under 18, standard protections for teen users are automatically applied to their ... experience[s]. These models [you say] are continuously improving ..."
So just give us an outline, if you would, of what sort of things the age inference technology does?
A. So, the age inference model that we run uses a number of different signals on user behaviour across Google services to determine whether a user is over the age of 18. So the really important point is that we have got a community guidelines as a baseline removing most of the content. We have then got 18-plus content that is gated. Because we are a service used by most of the population, we then would run the inference model, kind of regardless of the age that was given, until we have identified to a high degree of accuracy that that user is over 18. They are then able to access over 18-plus content services. If they don't, they are put in a child --

Q. Yes. That doesn't help us though with what sort of checks are being done by the automated systems. What sort of cues is it looking for?
A. It is looking at search history, it is looking at play account data, it is looking at the date in which the email address was used to sign up. Also, I don't want to go into too much detail because --
Q. I appreciate it will be circumvented. I understand that.
A. A number of signals and it is a highly effective system that is able to reduce friction to adult users and also correctly identify them to a high degree of accuracy.
Q. If we look at OFC000056, this is the report by Ofcom and its "Report on the use of age assurance" published quite recently, 15 July this year. Are you familiar with this report?
A. Yes, I am.
Q. Thank you. So if we go to page 3 OFC000056_0003. If we just have the top. So there is "Overview" section. And under the title:

"A generational shift towards a more age-aware internet is beginning to take place in the UK, with the rapid adoption of age assurance across a range of services."

It explains that:

"Ofcom has carried out an assessment of the use and effectiveness of age assurance, based primarily on evidence from the first six months of the protection of children duties being in force."

It explains that:

"This report lays out early findings across the pornography, social media, and online dating sectors, rather than final conclusions about the effectiveness of age assurance."

So we see that it is provisional in that sense. Then if we can just go to the penultimate paragraph on this page, if we just go right to the bottom, the report says:

"Some of the social media services that children use the most continue to rely on proprietary age inference systems, which we did not include in our [Highly Effective Age Assurance] guidance as a method capable of being highly effective."

Now, I pause there to say the Inquiry has seen already that the HEAA guidance is not prescriptive; it gives suggested methods but says that they are not exclusive. But YouTube is one of this category, isn't it? It is a social media service that children use the most which is continuing to rely on its proprietary age inference systems rather than those contained in Ofcom's

guidance?
A. Yes. I think the important clarification here, that is page 5 of this document, sets out that if a service is able to demonstrate that the age inference model that it is using is highly effective, and complies with privacy laws, then it can be used as an effective -- highly effective age assurance process.
Q. That's the point that it is not exclusive?
A. Yes.
Q. But if you are using that guidance, you still have to show that the methods are effective, but do you -- would you accept that, in particular, if you are choosing to use your own proprietary systems, you are going to need to be able to demonstrate that they are highly effective?
A. So, yes, we have demonstrated that our model is highly effective and Ofcom have the information available.
Q. If we go to page 20 OFC000056_0020 and look at paragraph 3.21(b), it says:

"Many social media services have taken steps to implement age assurance, but our research indicates the proportion of children encountering any harmful content online remains unchanged. And, while we have seen some reduction in exposure to the most harmful kinds of contents for some services, other kinds have been

reported by more children since the children's safety duties came into force."

I am sure you would agree, as a trend, that is worrying?
A. Talking about the services collectively, yes. But there is an important clarification here, in that our age inference model removes content, gates 18-plus contents and then allows adults to access services. Other services run an inference model that identifies children. So fundamentally, our age inference model is different to other services.
Q. Thank you. I'm going to come onto aspects of that:

"Additionally, our evidence suggests variability in the capability of age inference models (which some services have chosen to use), and in some instances we are concerned that some service providers have not effectively detected the children on their services."

Against that background, if we can go to page 40 OFC000056_0040. Paragraph 5.21:

"Our survey on children's experiences of being asked to verify their age was conducted among 8 to 17-year-olds who had at least one profile on a social media site that we asked about. The survey showed that while 56% of children reported noticing changes to their online experiences since July 2025, only 11% reported

not being able to access content or features they previously could, and 16% saw less upsetting or inappropriate content online. Therefore, while a majority of these children reported noticing some sort of change to their online experience, only a minority reported having noticed changes that are more directly related to age assurance."

Again, that's talking, for the moment, about platforms as a whole but I am sure you will agreed that that trend is concerning?

A. Yes, I think we all want to see an online environment for young people where they are not seeing harmful content and definitely there is a trend that the harmful content that they are seeing is going down.

Q. And you are aware that that survey included YouTube?

A. Yes.

Q. How does the inference process work, if at all, for those who are not using on Google account?

A. So, if you are not using a Google account, you won't have access to 18-plus content. You are talking about a signed-out user?

Q. Yes.

A. So for a signed-out user, they wouldn't be -- they wouldn't have access to 18-plus content.

Q. All right, but there is no additional protection. You

are relying there entirely on the systems for age gating sensitive material?

A. I think it is important to look at what the signed-out service is there to do. So the signed-out service is there because --

Q. That may be right, but could you first answer the question: there is no additional protection, you are relying entirely on the systems for age gating sensitive materials?

A. And obviously community guidelines that don't allow for violative content at a baseline.

Q. But that relies on self policing, people not putting up the material?

A. No, our automated systems and classifiers will be removing that content in the millions.

Q. You don't mean the community guidelines, you mean the enforcement --

A. The enforcement, the community guidelines.

Q. I follow.

A. So the content that that's there, we will be constantly removing that content.

Q. So you rely on the moderation and the age gating of sensitive material?

A. Yes.

Q. But I interrupted you, you wanted to make another point?

A. Just what the signed-out experience is for. So it might be that someone wants to watch a video about fixing a dishwasher or something else. I wouldn't say that the signed-out experience is largely for repetitive viewing of content and also, because the signed out experience isn't personalised, it is not necessarily going to be particularly useful or fruitful for repetitive viewing experience for people, compared to being signed in with age-appropriate recommendations.

Q. All right. If we go back to your statement, please, at page 8 ALPHA000001_0008, paragraph 27. You say:

"Users must be 13 to manage a Google account in the UK without a parent or a legal guardian's permission ..."

And that is reflected in the terms of service as well:

"... although younger children may use it where this is enabled by a parent or guardian."

How is that parent or legal guardian's permission actually obtained and proven?

A. So it needs to be linked through to an adult account. Their account would need to be linked through or set up by an adult who had a separate account.

Q. So that relies on the effectiveness of the assurance of that other adult account?

A. Yes, it would do. And that could be because the adult has had a Google account for a number of years or has made a credit card payment or we have run age inference on that account.

Q. But if that account -- if the nominal parent's account is an adult account, but in fact has been set up by a child who has circumvented it, then they could authorise other children's accounts?

A. I think that is extremely unlikely, but yes.

Q. Then page 12 ALPHA000001_0012, paragraph 42, please. You say:

"If we infer ..."

From the automated software:

"... that a user is likely to be under 18, we may require additional verification of age in certain circumstances, for example where the user is trying to access age-restricted content or services."

Just dealing with that sentence on its face, it may be a concern that what you are saying in your statement is, if the system infers that a user is likely to be under 18, you "may" require additional verification of age. Why only "may"? Surely, you should be doing that all the time.

A. So, we may require additional verification if they are trying to then access 18-plus content. So the "may"

is -- they would not have access to 18-plus content, we would presume that they are under 18 years old. But if they then clicked on an 18-plus video, we would say: to see this, you would need to provide additional --

Q. When you refer to an 18-plus video, are you referring there just to any material open to adult, or to more sensitive material?

A. Any material that is gated and isn't appropriate for children, if they wanted to watch that and they have been misclassified as a child when they are an adult, they would be given the opportunity to put in an additional verification measure to see that content.

Q. And a single occasion that is sufficient, is it?

A. A single?

Q. So you have somebody who has declared that they are 20 years old. The inference suggests that they are under 18. Are you telling us that a single account of them trying to view material that's age gated for adults alone would lead to them -- the further checks being done on their age?

A. It would lead them to have an option to provide ID or provide another verification --

Q. But a single instance would be sufficient?

A. If they were trying to access gated content, every time they tried to access that gated content, we would say:

you don't have access to this, unless you can provide a --

Q. So it is on every occasion, it does not need to be --

A. I would need to clarify that.

Q. Could you check that, please?

A. Yes.

Q. Thank you. Then, as we have seen with TikTok, if that is reached, at that stage, where the inference is that they are under 18 but they have said they are over 18 -- paragraph 43, please -- there are a number of tools to obtain additional verification: Government ID; selfie verification; email verification; and credit card verification.

Now, the rather obvious point that arises from all of that is why -- if you go back to the questions I asked you about, the threat landscape of how damaging this material is to children and that being the case, you would want to use the most protective, practicable solution -- why not require this identification in the first place?

A. So, YouTube is a video library. YouTube is a service that's used by 95 per cent of the population. There are about 3 million people without credit cards or passports in the UK. We think because we are removing violative content and age gating 18-plus content, this is

a proportionate process that removes friction from those adult users and identifies them to a high degree of accuracy, while then also protecting children and putting them in the right state.

I would also note that our age inference model may, in some cases, be more effective than some of the measures that are set out here, because it is harder to game because it is behaviour-based over time.

Q. Those who would be affected because they don't have passports or a credit card, could easily identify themselves as adult by facial recognition software, which is contained in the HEAA guidance. So there are methods around that, are there not?

A. So our age inference system in some cases can be more effective than selfie verification. Because it is looking at behaviour over time and it is hard to game.

Q. In some cases -- forgive me, Mr Rawle, you do need to answer the question -- you say there is a problem because lots of adults or a minority of adults, a significant number, don't have passports or credit cards. But you know that one of the identification methods that is specified by the HEAA guidance is facial software that estimates the age. So if you imagine the 45 year old who doesn't have a passport or the 45 year old who doesn't have a credit card, that they could

readily identify themselves through those means, yes?

A. Yes, they could.

Q. So, given that that is the situation, those not having passports and those not having credit cards, can't be, I would suggest, the real reason why you don't use these methods of identification at sign up?

A. No, I think I have explained that the reason why we don't use those methods of identification at sign up is because our inference model, which runs and is highly effective, is better at removing friction, while also keeping young people safe. And in many cases -- you know, a selfie verification involves sharing biometric information which then potentially sits with someone else. There are a number of privacy trade-offs here. The inference model which is collecting data based on the use of the service is definitely less intrusive than all of the other measures that are being described here.

Q. What's "removing friction"?

A. Removing friction is allowing adults to use the service and then gain access to 18-plus content without having to put in place privacy-intrusive scenarios. So by using the inference model, we are narrowing down the number of adult users that potentially need to go through additional verification, while still keeping younger users safe by gating the content and removing

harmful content. So in that system, we judge that that is proportionate.
Q. Just pause there. It also presumably significantly increases profits?
A. No, I don't think there's any relation to the cost of inference. In fact, I have been involved in conversations around the structure of the age inference model and our age assurance processes and at no point has cost been a consideration, it is about reducing friction.
Q. But the removal of friction for adults to allow them access without having age verification, despite some of the content that is available, presumably, helps drive advertising revenue?
A. That is not a consideration that has been part of any of the discussions. I think from my perspective and from my discussions, this is about ensuring that people have access to the world's video library and they are not cut off from vital civic information or health information or other things that they might need and that's the most marginalised people in society who may be driven away from the service.
Q. I will try once again. But while you go back to the position of those who are marginalised, if all that they had to do was to show themselves on screen with that

sort of facial software to prove that they were over the age of 18, that's not going to be a problem in terms of them accessing services. But you choose not to do that.
A. I think there are a number of scenarios whereby having to put in biometric information might discourage you from using the service and the service might contain -- for example, this Inquiry is now being live streamed, or it might be health information that is sensitive where you don't want to give away your information but you need to know something about a sensitive health condition. So I do think it may discourage certain users from accessing information that is held on the world's video library.
Q. Are those concerns really the real reasons?
A. Yes.
Q. Could we have on screen, please, ALPHA000004. These, Mr Rawle, just to remind yourself if you would, are some of the additional enquiries that the Inquiry raised when your draft statement was provided. And some areas where we wanted further information because we weren't entirely satisfied that the questions that had been raised in the Rule 9 request were answered in the statement. So if we could have at the bottom of this page, question 11:
"In respect of those under 18 and those too young to

have accounts, how robust are Alphabet's age assurance measures? Does Alphabet collect data on attempts to circumvent them, and how do the measures address false birth dates, the use of another person's details, or multiple accounts with inconsistent information?"
And the response was:
"Mr Rawle has explained at paragraphs 40 to 46 of the statement how Google approaches effective age assurance ..."
And we have been looking at that:
"... which is of course a feature of the [Online Safety Act] and overseen by Ofcom. In summary, we give our users an age-appropriate experience until our age assurance model has determined that the user is an adult. We terminate Google accounts of underage users and we protect under 18s from harmful and violent content by removing it or age-gating it. The statement also sets out existing measures designed to prevent or minimise circumvention, including:
"Requesting a user's date of birth neutrally during account creation ..."
Well, we dealt with that, to the extent that it can be said to be a measure against circumvention ALPHA000004_0002:
"... preventing users from returning to amend their

age once declared; and ...
"The use of automated age inference technology to estimate whether a user is likely to be under 18 and to apply age-appropriate protections and restrictions."
If we just go back to the previous page ALPHA000004_0001 and the question at the bottom. The question, "Does Alphabet collect data on attempts to circumvent them" wasn't answered. Do you know why?
A. So I think there is a lot to unpack in that question, but so --
Q. There are multiple questions, that's perfectly fair.
A. So for -- if we are looking at 18-plus users, we are running the inference model regardless of what anyone has said to us and then we are allowing adults through. We have looked at that to a high degree of accuracy and we have shared information with Ofcom about that to ensure that we are compliant with the codes.
Then, we are also looking at potential under 13s that shouldn't be on the service and there would be a different service running where we are running classifiers to look for behaviour around these under 13s and removing those.
Q. Understood, but the specific question -- and I do make all allowance for the fact that three or four questions were lumped together here, but the specific question

was: does Alphabet collect data on attempts to circumvent the age assurance measures? And that wasn't answered here and it has not been answered in the two points that you have just made.

A. Again, for the 18-plus inference, we would have a number of people who would then potentially be asked or triggered, to say: you want to watch this 18-plus content, you think we have misclassified you. We don't know whether that is a child trying to access 18-plus content which we are blocking, or an adult user who doesn't want to provide additional information. So there is a drop-off rate. We wouldn't be able to answer specifically because we are not sure about the motives behind those things or the rationale. Or they just run out of time and they need to go and do something else. There's then the question of under 13-year-olds, where I believe it is thousands of accounts would be removed but I haven't got the data to hand here.

Q. That's account removals. In terms of identifying suspect cases, where it looks like a child is trying to create an adult account, that would be a useful metric, even if you had to make allowance for them: well, they may not have been and they may just have got fed up and given up. Do you collect that data, albeit with those caveats?

A. I'm not sure whether we do, I would need to check with colleagues.

Q. All right because that has been asked for and I'm going to suggest that it was ducked in the answers to this. If you do have that data, could you please disclose it and -- even with the caveats that you have indicated?

SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: Mr Moss, I'm conscious we have been going for an hour and 20 minutes.

MR MOSS: Yes. That may be a convenient moment.

SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: 20 minutes?

MR MOSS: Yes, thank you. So we will sit again at 11.25 am.

(11.06 am)

(A short break)

(11.25 am)

SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: Yes, Mr Moss.

MR MOSS: Thank you, sir. So Mr Rawle, we were dealing with age assurance and if we could look at DSIT000101, please Mr Rawle, if we can explore this together.

Just get your bearings on this document. So this is Ofcom's update on tech firms' responses to their call for action to protect children. The date of it is 21 May, 2026. I expect you are familiar with this document?

A. Yes.

Q. Thank you. If we can just pick it up at page 3

DSIT000101_0003. If we look in the middle of the page, please, just a little bit further down we see:

"On 12 March [Ofcom] wrote to the tech firms most popular with children -- Facebook, Instagram, Roblox, Snapchat, TikTok and YouTube."

The report explains that they "set out four areas where not enough is being done" and their demands and they "identified specific changes that each service could make to keep children in the UK safer online". They say:

"Not all of our demands applied to all of the services. We required the services to be transparent about how they are protecting children and tell us what changes they'd make in light of these demands."

With a seven-week timeframe to respond. The four areas, without reading it all out, were: "Failsafe grooming protections"; "safer feeds for children", so that's in the area of algorithms; "an end to product testing on children"; and "effective minimum age policies".

We are principally concerned, in this Inquiry, with safer feeds for children and effective minimum age policies but I am sure you can confirm that YouTube was contacted in relation to this?

A. Yes.

Q. And which were the areas of concern that were raised YouTube, out of those four?

A. So I wouldn't say there were specific areas of concern raised, but we were asked to focus on the final three. Because we are not a social networking site with messaging facilities, grooming protections aren't as relevant, but our letter -- the response to Ofcom is published at the end of this document.

Q. Yes, so safer feeds for children and effective minimum age policies were raised as areas of concern by Ofcom with YouTube?

A. In the context of the broader exchange of letters, yes. I don't know whether they were singled out because I just can't remember the exact wording of the letter. These issues were raised and we were asked to respond to all four of them.

Q. Thank you. Then, if we go to page 4 DSIT000101_0004, please. We see "Response to the challenge", is the heading. If we go to the penultimate paragraph, please. If we focus in on the penultimate paragraph, beginning "TikTok and YouTube". *(Pause)*:

"TikTok and YouTube have not committed to any significant changes in response to our specific demands. They maintain that their feeds are already safe for children. Of the three only Meta committed to new

improvements to children's feeds on Facebook, which will match existing levels of protection currently in place on Instagram."

Now, Ofcom were not, here, starting from level 0. They had looked at what precautions were in place and they had raised with YouTube concern about the safety of your feeds. Why have you not committed to any significant change in response to Ofcom's demands?

A. So I will just say, obviously, we are very focused on the making sure that children have age-appropriate content experiences on YouTube and we also have deep relationships with Ofcom on a supervisory basis. I think it is really important to look at the context in which this letter was sent. When we responded to this letter, we also sent Ofcom a confidential request for information on our recommendation system. So for us, that was part of the process and we have continued to discuss our recommendations. And so the letter is correct in saying that we hadn't made any commitments but we are in the middle of a live process with Ofcom to discuss our recommendation system. So I think that isn't captured in this letter.

Q. Are you planning to do more and make changes in improvements or not, Mr Rawle? What's the position, please?

A. So we are always making changes and improvements to our system. You know, we have made 30-plus in the last few years and indeed, just before this letter had been submitted, we made two very significant changes to the recommendation system for children. We have specific teen safety quality principles which are guiding the recommendations and we are also expanding our dispersal policy and that was just before this letter was sent.

Q. Yes, but if one steps back from the detail of this and goes beyond the headlines, what is clearly being said by Ofcom is that they have viewed the protections that are in place and they are deeply concerned that they don't go far enough and that more needs to be done. So, in terms of taking that response and saying: right, we do need to have a step-change. We need to look at why we, YouTube, are causing this concern and we need to have a step-change in our improvements. Not the: we continually strive to improve type stuff, but a real step-change; why has that not been YouTube's response to Ofcom?

A. So, as I said, when we responded to this letter, we also sent a very detailed response to Ofcom's RFI on recommendation systems, which has been the foundation of our engagement with Ofcom about recommendations. So the timing of this letter doesn't quite account for the

totality of our relationship with Ofcom and so Ofcom factually pointed to the fact that we hadn't made any changes. We are in the middle of a process of discussing recommendation systems and the efficacy of our recommendation systems and it would have been unreasonable for Ofcom to have been able to assess the detail of that RFI in the timeframe in which the letter was published.

So everything in the letter is factually correct but we have since been following a process with Ofcom where we have shared information about our recommendation system and you will note that other services have faced enforcement action and we don't currently face enforcement action at this point in time.

Q. At this point in time. If we look at page 12 DSIT000101_0012, I obviously don't gainsay the fact that you have provided -- bottom of the page, please -- I don't seek to contradict, of course, that you will have provided confidential details, but the non-confidential letter which you provided was in the response below:

"YouTube set out some of its current measures related to grooming, including restricted comment environments and proactive content ..."

Then, on 2:

"YouTube provided information related to its current protections in place for [recommending] systems. These include safeguards to reduce repeated recommendations of some content. It did not commit to any new measures."

Is that an accurate summary?

A. Yes, in the context in which we just introduced new recommendation measures specifically for teens, we did not then, subsequently, immediately announce new additional measures; that is correct.

Q. And 4:

"YouTube provided information about its approach to age-appropriate access, including existing measures to protect children from harmful content, including YouTube Kids and voluntary Supervised Teens Accounts."

There again, it doesn't look like you committed to any improvements?

A. So I think, again, there is some important contextual information in that we were also in the middle of a series of confidential RFI responses with the Information Commissioners' office and a dialogue with Ofcom around these topics. So we didn't commit to anything additional -- anything in addition, but we were in discussions with both of those regulators around our systems and processes. So I would say that the public exchange of letters is only part of what was a much

broader engagement.
Q. Forgive me, since that non-confidential response, have you, in fact, either introduced significant further improvements or committed to doing so?
A. So, it is really hard for me to answer that question because how you judge "significant" is something that I'm not clear about and I wouldn't want to kind of mislead you, but we are constantly making changes to our systems and processes and we are also in a process with both regulators where we are sharing more information about how the systems operate and function, to provide for safe and compliant situations. So we have shared more information with both of the regulators that they didn't currently have at the time of this letter.
Q. What is the confidentiality surrounding that? Is that the proprietary systems in relation to safety that you don't want revealed publicly, or what?
A. So there is -- sorry, could you repeat or clarify the question?
Q. You are saying "we have been in confidential discussions with the regulator". I say "confidential" because it wasn't contained in this exchange. What is the confidentiality that prevents you simply publishing those improvements and explaining them publicly?
A. I don't have an answer to that question. I would need

to follow up with you.
Q. All right. Could you please -- and this will be dealt with in a written follow-up -- but could you please inform the Inquiry of what those improvements have been or explanations have been of your current systems that you provided to the regulator; can you also, please, provide those to the Inquiry, and you can flag up within that what material you consider to be confidential that's not fit for publication?
A. Yes, and some of it will be about the proprietary nature of the systems that we are using.
Q. As I say, if it is commercial confidential information we have measures that can protect that, but could you please provide the material that you provided to the regulator to the Inquiry?
A. Yes.
Q. Thank you. If we go to page 8 DSIT000101_0008, please. If we go to the bottom, this is "Why we wrote to services":

"What the Children's Online Experiences report tells us":

"A clear picture has been painted by our Children's Online Experiences report published today. Not enough has changed to protect children from harm online between Wave 1 of our Children's Online Safety Tracker ..."

That was in 2025:

"... and Wave 2 ..."

That was at the tail-end of 2025:

"... despite the children's safety duties becoming enforceable and our Protection of Children Codes of Practice ... coming into effect in July 2025. Children still recalled seeing harmful content online across the largest online services."

Then they outline what the research found:

"At Wave 2, 84% ..."

And note the ages:

"... of 8-12s said they had used one of the top five reaching online services (YouTube, Facebook, TikTok, Instagram, and Snapchat) in a month, despite their minimum age requirement of 13+."

So just pausing there. That suggests that a significant proportion of children even under the age of 13 are still able to access the major online services, including YouTube, for services that are meant to be 13-plus, do you agree?
A. So for children under the age of 13, a parent is able to set up a supervised YouTube account for that age group and so it isn't the case that an under 13-year-old can't access YouTube. So it would depend upon the context of which the account has been set up. So there are some

scenarios where an under 13-year-old with parental supervision should be able to access YouTube. This statement is talking about the industry in totality, rather than our specific product and service.
Q. And have you looked as to what the data shows in relation to the access for YouTube specifically arising from this report?
A. So we are having ongoing discussions with Ofcom about its reporting.
Q. And what percentage of 8-12s were able to access inappropriate YouTube services, so not supervised teens accounts? If you are saying: well, that percentage is across the industry and also we allow supervised access, do you know what the data is that sits below that?
A. No, and I would also highlight the passive viewing point that I made before, where some children will have accessed the service via an older sibling or within the household on a connected television, of which 50 per cent of viewing occurs. So we are discussing this with Ofcom and I think the key point I would like to make is we want to make sure that those children are in age-appropriate experiences and to the best of our abilities, make it as easy as possible for parents to do that and for us to have automated systems that deliver it.

Q. Again, the concern that is raised in the next sentence:

"Among[st] children who recalled encountering harmful content online ..."

You will note that what is said is "online" not "on television screens":

"... TikTok was cited most often ..."

And we have raised this with them:

"... followed by YouTube ..."

Again what as being reported by children is YouTube is the second worst performing. It is the second most likely place for them to encounter harmful content online. How is that being allowed to continue, Mr Rawle?

A. We do take this very, very seriously. But I would also say I think this does cover potentially television viewing. So we need to go back and look at that. And given that YouTube is used by 95 per cent of the population, correspondingly, you would imagine that more people would potentially be at risk of seeing harmful content than other services that have lower usage across age groups. But I need to check that because this is slightly speculative.

Q. Thank you. The third bullet point:

"There is little change in overall exposure to harmful content for 11-17s. Data from Wave 2 still

shows around seven in ten ... 11-17-year-olds say they have seen or heard some form of harmful content online in a four-week period, comparable with Wave 1 data."

Now, that's across the industry but there is no suggestion there that YouTube is somehow exempt or excluded from that, would you agree?

A. Yes, that is correct.

Q. And right at the bottom of this page, please:

"The research is clear. Online services have simply not yet done enough to make their services safe for children. Some of the largest services ..."

And by inference, that must include YouTube:

"... have not effectively implemented their own minimum age policies, meaning that children well below the minimum age are able to access these sites."

That is the reality in relation to YouTube, is it not, Mr Rawle?

A. So we have classifiers that run to identify under 13-year-olds who shouldn't be on the main service and we direct them back towards YouTube Kids or a parental supervised account, to put them in an age-appropriate experience.

Q. Just over the page, if we may DSIT000101_0010:

"In addition to our own findings, research by the NSPCC found that online grooming offences that hit

record levels ..."

Perhaps I don't need to take you to that. That can come down from the screen.

Do you accept the simple fact that children are regularly encountering harmful material on YouTube?

A. So, in relation to the Ofcom report, the Ofcom's own findings found that YouTube was safer than all of the other services that were listed, in its own evidence. And also, I think we are having conversations with Ofcom about whether their reporting methodology that they are using is aligned with our community guidelines and our teams are having an engagement with them to make sure we are tracking and identifying the efficacy of our systems. We want to make sure that we are meeting the regulator's expectations in this space and we also have a shared and common understanding of what harms look like.

And I think, if I could just answer one additional point. The Ofcom report is talking about self reporting via young people. That is one important measure but is not the totality of the evidence base that looks at whether a service is safe or not.

Q. So, including but not limited to the Ofcom report -- I will try again: do you accept the simple fact that children are regularly viewing harmful material on

YouTube?

A. I think there will always be instances where, unfortunately, children are exposed to harmful content and we are trying to mitigate that harm and to reduce the amount of harmful content that they see. But there will be some instances where children see harmful content on YouTube.

Q. If one is realistic in this field, what you say must be right, that there will be occasions where things slip through the net. But for the third time, the question was whether you accept the simple fact that children are regularly encountering harmful material on YouTube; do you accept that or not?

A. Because of the volume of content, it must be the case that children will encounter harmful content on YouTube --

Q. Regularly?

A. Whether children are regularly accessing that -- seeing that, I think we have talked about the number of factors that would be in consideration here. It would depend on the individual child, the recommendations, how they are viewing; there are a number of different elements. So I could say that young people would encounter harmful content and we try and mitigate that. Whether that is regular, is not something that I feel like I would be

able to comment on.
Q. Without discourtesy, as Head of Public Policy, isn't that exactly what you should be able to comment on? Because effectively, your evidence is to say: we have all of these systems in place, we believe it is effective. There are a raft of reports that are raising concerns about how children can and do access YouTube services when they shouldn't and that they see harmful material including violent material on there. As Head of Public Policy, surely you should be in a position to speak about the reality of whether or not children do regularly view harmful material on YouTube?
A. So I think I have accepted that children would view harmful material on YouTube, but I have set out three different qualifications as to why I can't explain why that would be regular or not, depending on the individual circumstances in the context.
Q. Thank you. If we go back to your statement. I want to pick up on an aspect that you raise, Mr Rawle, in relation to the services that YouTube do provide for younger children. I'm going to take this relatively briefly. If we go to paragraph 47 on page 13 ALPHA000001_0013.

You have got:

"YouTube Kids is a separate application specifically

designed for children."

And you give the details there. If you will forgive me, I'm not going to go through it, but you set out what it is for and the protections that are in place.

If we go to page 8 ALPHA000001_0008, paragraph 28. You set out the different aspect of supervised experiences, so:

"Parents can set up a 'supervised kid' account on YouTube, which offers [first of all] a supervised experience for pre-teens (... up to the age of 13)."

So that's one of the services that is provided. You say:

"This supervised experience was launched in 2021."

So that's a supervised kid account. You also, I think, have, for those aged 13 and over, the ability for parents to be involved in a degree of supervision.

Can we look, please, at page 9 ALPHA000001_0009, paragraph 32 for that. So, September 2024, supervised teen experiences:

"... designed for parents and teenagers aged 13 to 17 ..."

And:

"This allows parents to monitor their teen's content creation ..."

In your statement, you say that includes:

"(a) channel activity to see information, such as the channels their teen owns;

"(b) the names of channels to which their teen uploads videos;

"(c) the number of public, private and unlisted videos their teen has uploaded;

"(d) the number of live streams their teen has hosted; and ...

"(e) the number of comments their teen has posted on other videos and the number of channels to which their teen is subscribed ..."

Yes?

A. Yes.
Q. What that doesn't seem to include, unless we have misunderstood it, is any oversight of what they are merely consuming, what they are merely watching?
A. Yes, that is correct. I would also say, we have made a number of changes to supervised teen experiences since we sent this evidence to you and I would be happy to write to the committee because I don't want to talk about any forward-looking product changes that we are likely to make.
Q. All right, so you understand the concern. Of course, to understand some of the numbers involved and what channels the child is running is, no doubt, helpful but

what you don't get here is what channels they are actually watching, as opposed to the numbers. And that may be the most obvious indicator of consumption of concern, wouldn't you agree?
A. Yes, but I think there's also a balance here between a child's rights and parental rights. So for example, if you were a LGBTQ+ child in that age group wanting to find age-appropriate content and you were from a family that didn't accept that kind of -- accept your sexuality, that would be problematic if we were then sharing that information with parents.

So there are a number of trade-offs about what information you can and couldn't share and then system limitations on those things, that are balances and live conversations and policy making.
Q. Yes, but for the parent, in particular of children under 16, who want to ensure that their child is not using YouTube to view violent content, whether that's violent content that has been missed or violent content that is below threshold, knowing what their child has uploaded or the number of things that they have uploaded and what channels they have uploaded information to, is not particularly going to assist in relation to that, or it is certainly not going to be the primary concern, is it?

A. I think most of the content you are referring to would be removed under our community guidelines and age gated. So I don't know whether it would be useful in terms of identifying violent content because they shouldn't be being served violent content --

Q. If, for example, they are spending a lot of time looking at weapons, knives, if it is below threshold, then it is not age gated. That's the sort of material, in the context that the Inquiry is looking at, that parents would be concerned about and it might be thought ought to be able to keep an eye on?

A. So I guess the third bucket here is that we are dispersing content. So there are a number of content categories where it would be very difficult for a child in a supervised teen experience to be seeing that content. Sorry, the change that we have made is actually to make more granular the age restrictions for supervised experiences and make sure that the content that's being served sits within those age buckets.

So even since we have published this, we have made it harder for younger people in this experience to find the kind of content that you are worried about. So we are talking about four layers of protection before you have even got to the problem that you are concerned about.

Q. Again, I don't think until you have mentioned it, we have heard about those improvements. So if you could include those in your further information and provide the granular detail in relation to that.

At the moment, in relation to information about weapons, swords or knives and so on, which are not age gated, at the moment, if a child was viewing information about knives and swords and crossbows and matters of that kind online, and they weren't uploading information but they had a supervised teen account, would the parent be able to tell?

A. No, I don't believe they would be able to tell, at this point in time.

Q. Is that appropriate?

A. I think, in the context of balancing the rights of children, which -- they do have a right to privacy and also balancing safety considerations, given the other adjacent content categories that we have talked about, I think that is proportionate. But there is a live policy discussion around that.

Q. If we look at the bottom of the page. Part of your explanation in this area is a slightly different aspect that you say:

"YouTube also offers features to support the wellbeing of teens age over 13 who use the main YouTube

platform without parental supervision ..."

So obviously that is an opt-in, the parental supervision. You say:

"These include:

"(a) automatic limits on recommendations of selected types of content that can be problematic if viewed cumulatively, such as videos displaying social aggression and intimidation;"

By your very statement, you are accepting that some videos showing social aggression and intimidation can be viewed by 13-18-year-olds, yes?

A. They are dispersed, but yes.

Q. All right, and you say that what is applied is "automatic limits on recommendations". That suggests a change made to how much is recommended, is that fair?

A. Yes, that's correct.

Q. Why permit that to be recommended in the algorithm at all?

A. So, there can be scenarios where it is appropriate for young people to see a video on something but repetitive viewing is not appropriate. So it might be appropriate to watch a boxing video that might include some social aggression but it is not appropriate to watch 20 boxing videos if you are a child.

Q. I'm not, for the moment, challenging that this material

may be material that a 13-18-year-old should be permitted to see. What I'm challenging is how your algorithms are programmed in relation to it. Because this part of your statement, if you will forgive me making the observation, seems to be very carefully worded and you have used the phrase "dispersal". So you are saying automatic limits on recommendations, which I think you have agreed means it is recommended less.

But my question is why allow your algorithms to recommend that type of material at all? So I'm not talking about the first view. Let's assume that the child has sought out something showing physical violence, social aggression or intimidation. Why do you allow your algorithms to reflect that at all in pushing further videos to the child? Why not say: okay, we are going to allow them to view that, but we are not going to push more information like that to them at all?

A. I think the boxing video is a good example. I think it is reasonable to stop a young person from watching repeated boxing videos if they have looked for one, but I do think if a boxing video comes up one in every ten videos they are watching, that feels like a proportionate balance. And we develop the policies with children's wellbeing experts at the heart of this.

Q. And social aggression and intimidation, one in ten

videos used by the algorithm showing social aggression and intimidation? Again, why permit the algorithm push that material forward at all?

A. It may be that the video showing social aggression is there because it is compliant with our EDSA policies. So it could be a news report on social aggression interaction, for example, that may be dispersed for younger users.

Q. That may be the case but it is not an answer to my question, which is: you clearly, as a precaution, no doubt to try to satisfy the regulators, adjusted how the algorithms act. But you could go further and you could prevent the algorithms recommending that sort of material at all. If it is past the system, it still wouldn't prevent the child finding that material by doing searches but we are talking about what you, YouTube, choose, through the algorithms, to push towards the child. So I will ask the question again: why not amend the algorithm so that type of material isn't pushed at all?

A. So, I think that -- the context around the material is very important. I do think it is reasonable for young people to have some interaction with material that reflects society that we live in and that will include social aggression and other things. We don't think it

is appropriate for them to see those in repetition. And I would also just make the point that we made this change and this system was put in place before any regulatory obligations. We did this on the basis of advice on experts and those experts will have also said it is healthy for young people to see a little bit of the kind of content that reflects society but not lots of it. So I do think it would be disproportionate to remove all types of content.

Q. I have not suggested at all removal of --

A. Sorry, stopping the recommendations for all of those content. I think you would then have young people having no indication of some of the incidents and some of the context and nuance that we live in as a society and that feels like a reasonable balance to me.

Q. Thank you. If we just look at page 25 ALPHA000001_0025 of your statement please, paragraph 99. If you will forgive me, I'm not going to go through them but I have brought them up on screen and I have given the reference to it. So you do list a number of the improvements, mitigating risk of harm in this area and that forms part of your evidence and I have brought it up on screen.

If I can just go more specifically now to algorithms and recommendations systems. Could we have on screen NEU000023, please. This is another report of which you

have been given notice. It is a report from Big Tech's Little Victims. It was commissioned, I think, by one of the teaching unions in the UK:

"Three Minutes to Harm: The Algorithmic Escalation of Misogyny and Online Abuse."

So that's the context of what we are looking at.

If we could go to page 7 NEU000023_0007, please. Could we have the black box slightly expanded so we can see the contents of that.

This sets out effectively the approach that was taken and it involved the creation of YouTube accounts, amongst others -- so we are not suggesting for a moment this was only YouTube -- in which the self declared age was 13. So:

"Using newly-created accounts registered to fictional 13-year-olds, we set out to see how quickly and easily algorithms expose young users to age-inappropriate or extreme content on major social platforms."

We can see that they were a mixture of TikTok, Instagram, Snapchat and YouTube, to each per persona with the age declared as 13. So YouTube was included in this but it was not the only one.

And the methodology was:

"... interests were selected strictly in line with

each persona ..."

So people being interested in sport, music or fitness, with:

"... a small number of accounts were followed in line those interests. No inappropriate or extreme topics or accounts were chosen."

So the users, fictional 13-year-olds, were not deliberately choosing inappropriate or extreme topics, and:

"Researchers then used each account for ... 30 minutes per day ... over seven days, scrolling through recommended content as it appears in the feed. [They] were [recorded]. Randomised viewing behaviour included quickly skipping some videos, watching others for longer, and occasionally liking content ... None of the accounts posted content, commented, messaged other users or deliberately sought out harmful material. At the end of the experiment, some 'provocative' search terms were used to analyse what impact this had. These provocative certainly terms were in line with what a 13-year-old may search (eg, 'what is love bombing', 'who is Bonnie Blue', 'clean girl body'). All exposure to age-inappropriate or extreme content was therefore the result of platform recommendations, rather than researchers actively searching for it."

Then if we go to page 3 NEU000023_0003, having looked at the methodology. If we could have the second half of the page highlighted, please:

"When we examined what children are actually shown online, a broader pattern emerged. Sexist can be content sits within a wider ecosystem of algorithm-driven harm that also includes violence, sexualisation, self-harm material and extremist narratives. These harms are interconnected, driven by systems designed to maximise engagement rather than protect young users."

Then they set out, at the top, right-hand side, the methodology in brief, and then:

"The findings were immediate and consistent."

So by "immediate and consistent", we infer that the authors are suggesting including for YouTube but acknowledging that other platforms were involved:

"Concerning content appeared within an average of three minutes of logging on.

"For every minute spent scrolling, profiles were shown one piece of harmful or inappropriate content.

"In several sessions, harmful material was the very first item served.

"Over one week, profiles were exposed to hundreds of pieces of concerning content, with exposure intensifying

over time as algorithmic loops became harder to escape."

What is YouTube's response to those findings?

A. So I think it is really hard to look at those findings because they are not just YouTube-specific and I think research like this is very important to conduct and I believe our team has reached out to the report's authors and asked for more information about the avatars and the research that was undertaken. I don't think we have the specifics and I would not be able to comment on the four profiles for YouTube or the findings related to YouTube. Obviously, that's not how we want our systems to operate. I would also know that the four avatars would not be representative of how a teen uses YouTube, for a variety of reasons that we have talked about earlier.

But, we do take this kind of information seriously and, you know, we pass on that information to our trust and safety teams. That's not how we want our systems to operate.

Q. Do you accept -- with the quarrel over how the avatars were using it, do you accept that that is what appears to have happened on YouTube during this research?

A. As far as I can see, the findings of the research do not break down YouTube in sufficient detail for me to say exactly what's happened. They make generalised comments

about all of the avatars, but clearly, there was some concern about YouTube because it was referenced. We haven't been able to get the detail, as far as I'm concerned, about the specific avatars and the specific results from this research. So I don't feel like it is appropriate for me to comment --

Q. So when you say you haven't been able to get the detail about the specific avatars and results from this research, do you mean that you reached out -- to use your phrase -- to these researchers and they didn't provide more detail on the YouTube findings?

A. I believe my colleague has reached out to try and get more information about this research finding, specifically to YouTube. As I say, we take these kind of reports very, very seriously and our trust and safety teams ask for us to share additional information. I do think that happened --

Q. You will forgive me, I understand that, but your evidence was: we haven't been able to get the detail about the specific avatars and results from this research. Are you suggesting that it was requested but they could not help?

A. I believe that was the case, yes.

Q. Could you please ensure that you disclose to the Inquiry YouTube's exchange of correspondence and communications

with these researchers?

A. Yes.

Q. So that we can check that. Thank you very much.

Then, if we go back to your statement, please, at page 21 ALPHA000001_0021, paragraph 80. There is a repeat aspect here, but I need to pick it up in relation to recommendations to children. So it is page 21, paragraph 80.

You say:

"YouTube has developed additional safeguards for recommendations made to teenagers. The added safeguards limit recommendations of content that may be acceptable when viewed in isolation but may become problematic for some younger viewers if viewed repeatedly. We therefore reduce recommendations to teenagers of content that:"

Over the page ALPHA000001_0022:

"(a) compares physical features ...

"(b) idealises specific fitness levels ...

"(c) features social aggression, including non-contact fights and intimidation;

"(d) includes unrealistic or bad financial advice;

"(e) portrays delinquency or negative behaviour; or ...

"(f) portrays teenagers as cruel or malicious, or encourages them to ridicule others."

Is that anything different to the other passage of your statement that you looked at previously, or is that the same thing?

A. It describes the same dispersal mechanism we have in place for teen recommendations, yes.

Q. So if we go back to the previous page ALPHA000001_0021, slightly different language used here, paragraph 80 at the bottom. The added safeguards limit recommendations of content, that's the same point, that the algorithms still push more of that information but at a slower rate?

A. The recommendations would still come through but they would be dispersed.

Q. Yes, so it still pushes it through. It still says: you have looked at that material, we will send you more, but it doesn't do it quite as much as other types of content?

A. Correct. We would say the algorithm will pull content to them but yes, your point is broadly right.

Q. Thank you. Would the same apply -- can we just go over to the list again ALPHA000001_0022 -- if violent material is below threshold and what I mean by that is, violent material that, for whatever reason, has been allowed through the age-gate process, would the same apply?

A. So, even if it was violent material that didn't violate our policies, that hasn't been age gated, it still may not be recommended to that group because it might not be age appropriate and then, if it was recommended to that group, it may be dispersed.

Q. So how does that additional protection work? You are attempting to suggest that there is -- even if it's not been age gated, so it is not flagged as 18-plus only --

A. Yes.

Q. -- it may not go to the algorithms at all?

A. It may not be within the content bucket -- to make it easy -- that is recommended for teens. So there's still other recommendation protections that sit alongside just whether it's an 18 or over. So if you are a younger teen and you are in a supervised experience and your parent has said: I don't want you to see content that is -- I don't think it is appropriate for you to see content that is 16 or below, then that content still might not fall into that recommendation category.

Q. So does that look out for -- assume for the moment, it is not age gated, does that system look out for material that is violent, and say: even though this hasn't been age gated, this material is related to violence?

A. So the material may not be appropriate for an under 16-year-old or an under 13-year-old and that

would be another recommendation protection.

Q. Thank you. Could we just have briefly on screen your colleague's statement, that is ALPHA000049. It is page 10 ALPHA000049_0010, paragraph 22(a). In the context of AI searches, perhaps we can just have the previous page ALPHA000049_0009 just to pick up how that's introduced:

"Google may identify behaviours, such as those exploring illegal or dangerous acts that could result in real-world harm, through a combination of automated systems and human review. This includes ..."

ALPHA000049_0010:

"(a) Ideation and fixation indicators, involving repeated prompting about past mass casualty perpetrators, attacker manifestos and first-party video footage of violent acts. Classifiers detect these indicators, triggering the model to disengage, redirect or terminate conversation."

So your colleague there is talking about how the AI works to pick up warning indicators that they are repeatedly searching for past mass casualty perpetrators, attack manifestos and the like and then leads it to disengage. Does YouTube have something equivalent to that?

A. So, I am not familiar with the safety protections that

sit inside AI search results or Gemini and so I can't speak to how they are applicable in a YouTube context. I stopped working on those issues about two years ago before I think we even launched the products. So I don't have enough information to share, or enough knowledge of how those systems work and relate to YouTube systems.

Q. Just thinking about the YouTube system, if search terms are repeatedly being entered on YouTube that indicates that the user is looking for mass casualty attacks, attacker manifestos and first-party video footage of violent acts, does anything happen as a result of that?

A. No, the systems aren't set up to track user searches in that way. There could be a number of legitimate reasons why someone is making those searches. They could be journalists. They could be academics. They could be students. They could be people like me, working on these topics, who need to repeatedly view harmful content. So we wouldn't be profiling them in the way you are suggesting.

Q. No, but one aspect that could be a protection in there would not to be using the search terms for what's driven by the algorithms. If you use search terms like that, do they become part of what the algorithm feeds the user?

A. I will come back and clarify that, but I don't believe search terms are a strong indication of what recommendations people are given, but I will come back and clarify that.

Q. One safeguard that could be put in place, I think, is sometimes used by the language of "off-ramping", that if search terms like that are being used, that you have some positive content indicating perhaps a warning about that type of material but also where help and assistance can be provided. Does YouTube do that in relation to people who are using search terms relating to extreme violence, gore, mass casualty attacks?

A. So --

Q. The journalists wouldn't mind if those sort of warnings came up.

A. There is a real challenge -- I previously looked at this in my role -- about using warnings and the unintended consequences. So Google's Jigsaw team have done a lot of work on prebunking and sharing warnings and also our safety and security team have also looked at the use of warning. So when someone gets an SMS scam message, we trialled some warnings and on both of those occasions when we have given users warnings, we have seen that they have either clicked through and looked at the spam message, or they have actually come out with stronger

interpretations towards the extremism that we are trying to counter. So often warnings are not an effective measure for de-radicalisation. I think there is quite a big body of evidence to say that they don't necessarily work.

Q. Thank you. Turning to content moderation more generally. I think you have been given notice, in your evidence proposal of Phase 1 findings, which I expect you will be aware of, that AR was described by some as not speaking to people at all, especially by the latter stages. That he would just spend time watching YouTube. When he was asked about his online content, he denied effectively doing anything other than using YouTube but one of the concerns that arose in the education setting was that he had been watching people hurting themselves on YouTube. So I think you will be aware of that background, in general terms?

A. Yes. Although, sorry, the way in which the question was framed, is it sounded like he was only watching YouTube and my understanding was that he was watching YouTube as well as a number of other different services.

Q. I think in terms of when the youth offender team asked him what he did online, he effectively said that he was watching YouTube. That was his account of what he used the online for. In the school setting, there were other

concerns as well as what he was doing on YouTube.

A. Yes.

Q. Can we look at page 14 ALPHA000001_0014, against that background, of your statement, please. It is paragraph 48. You say that:

"Google's general approach to content moderation ... is to use a combination of automated systems and human review, allowing content to be reviewed at scale and to identify problematic content."

Is that right?

A. Yes, that is correct.

Q. You deal with the automated systems at paragraph 50:

"Over a number of years, we have developed and deployed automated systems that detect inappropriate content. YouTube uses machine learning technology to detect uploads of violative content, in many cases before they are widely viewed by users."

You go on to give some statistics in relation to that. Then we should just look at page 16, paragraph 60. You say:

"We train our automated systems to review for potentially violative YouTube content at scale. As with content moderators, we test the systems to assess whether they have been given sufficient context to make accurate decisions. This refinement continues in the

months after a change is introduced."

Just help us with this. To what extent do you learn from material that has got through the system and which users then report to say: this has come up on my feed, it is wholly inappropriate?

A. Yes, both user reporting that may have been missed and also our own internal reporting of checking the classifiers, would lead to refinement of those classifiers and improvement in the system. And that is a continuous system as well, continuous improvement across the board.

Q. Where that has happened -- I want to ask about a specific point -- do you also check to see, when material has got through the automated systems, whether the algorithms have pushed that appropriate content, or more inappropriate content of the same kind, to your subscribers?

A. So that would be part of the process because we measure ourselves on the violative -- the number of violative views rather than the content getting through because harm occurs when people have viewed content not when it is on the system. So that is a factor, yes.

Q. Yes, but there is harm involved in people viewing that material.

A. Yes.

Q. And that is a concern of itself. But it would be an additional concern if the material, having got through the system, is nevertheless used for the algorithm to work out what that user likes viewing and to push more of similar material?

A. Yes, and I agree with that and that's why the metric that we measure ourselves on for success is violative views. So we are checking and trying to limit the number of views. So that would be what gets through but also limiting recommendations. So making sure that content is -- high quality content is being promoted.

Q. But an obvious danger is, if the algorithm identifies -- say, the viewer has watched the video from start to finished, and it has got through the systems, an additional concern would be if the algorithm says, effectively -- forgive me for putting it in my layperson's, non-technical terms -- that user liked that material, the algorithm then searches for more material like it, so actually looks for that sort of material that may also have got through the system and pushes more of it on the user. Is that a risk?

A. So, the way that recommendations work is to add a level of dispersal and also a level of quality to the recommendations. And also, to go back -- I know it is a principles-based point -- we are measuring ourselves

on the number of violative views that slip through. So the two areas we would be looking for there is: did it get through the system, and: are we recommending it? So we are actively setting ourselves the challenge of avoiding both of those things happening.

Q. Can you tell us, when material -- we're particularly, obviously, concerned with violent material, but when it has got through the system, in what proportion of cases has it then been used for recommendations? So you say that is something that's been measured.

A. So we would measure ourselves on the number of violative -- the violative content that is then viewed and the violative view rate -- I'm sorry to be technical -- is, I think, currently for the last quarter between 0-point --

Q. 0.19 per cent?

A. Yes, which would be 19 videos in every 10,000.

Q. I am going to come to that but in your answer, Mr Rawle, you did say: so the two areas we would be looking for is: did it get through the system?

A. Yes.

Q. All right? And then you would have however many violative views there are, but also: are we recommending it?

A. So --

Q. Forgive me, just let me finish the question. Are you measuring how often -- as a percentage, if the material has got through, how often that material is being recommended?

A. So I think that -- sorry, if I'm not explaining this properly. The violative view number is taking account of the recommendations because if it isn't being recommended, no one is viewing it. So the violative view rate captures whether the content is being recommended to users. So fundamentally, the system and the teams are incentivised to reduce recommendations of content that may be violative if it even gets through the system.

Q. It may be that we are looking at it in different ways, but of course the violative view rate will look overall at how much content is viewed that's inappropriate and has got through the system and if it has been recommended -- if one violative piece has recommended others, that will impact on the violative view rate.

But do you actually measure, because I think you said in your answer that you would look at "are we recommending it". So I'm interested to know whether you look at where -- take a single post that is inappropriate, it is extreme violence and it has got through the moderation process, when you identify that,

do you also work out in what proportion of the cases that material has been recommended?

A. Yes, that would be a metric that links back to the violative view rate because --

Q. So what is that proportion? In what percentage of times, when material is extreme violent material, it shouldn't have got through the net, it has, but in what proportion of cases does that go on to be used by algorithms to push similar type of information?

A. So I don't have the exact breakdown, but that number will inform the violative view rate because the vast majority of content in YouTube is seen via recommendations and so recommendations protections, alongside classifiers, are also important to keep the violative view rate down.

Q. Is the answer to it 100 per cent of cases? It will always be used for recommendations, if it's got through the system?

A. No, not necessarily.

Q. Could you help us, in the information that you give, what that percentage figure is?

A. Yes, the quality of the content and a number of other signals would be a factor, but I will --

Q. If we could have a percentage. I'm just taking a step back. For YouTube, what proportion of your revenue is

spent on content moderation?
A. So I know we spend billions but I don't have an exact figure.
Q. You were asked -- indicated in your evidence proposal that we would ask you that. And the question is: what proportion of revenue is spent on content moderation safety? Not the spend but as a proportion of revenue. If you don't know the answer to that, again, can you provide that in writing?
A. Yes, since we received the document on Saturday, I wasn't able to get that information, but we can follow it up.
Q. Thank you. You will be aware that witnesses in this Inquiry have raised that as a query in evidence prior to your evidence proposal, that researchers have said it would be good to understand from the platforms how much they spend; have you been following that evidence?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay, thank you. Could we just look quickly at page 15 ALPHA000001_0015 please and paragraph 55. You deal with live streams there:
"... users can address content they are concerned about in different ways."
On live stream:
" ... prominent flagging button ..."

That they can use:
"... if a user reports a live stream as containing 'imminent physical harm', this triggers a review of the live stream within minutes."
Is that right?
A. Yes, that is correct.
Q. You deal with how they can manage incoming chat and then in paragraph 56, you refer to the "Priority Flagger programme:
"Priority Flaggers are specialist non-governmental organisations, government agencies and other contributors whose expertise makes them particularly well placed to identify content that violates the Community Guidelines."
Is that right?
A. Yes, that is correct.
Q. "They include organisations specialising in hate speech, self-harm and terrorism. We provide them with specialist tools and the ability to flag potentially violative content in bulk."
You say:
"There are hundreds of Priority Flagger partners globally. In the UK ... [they] include law enforcement and civil-society organisations addressing extremism, terrorism and hate crime."

While, of course, it is important that they are able to report material of concern and that YouTube responds to it, the fact that they are making those reports does again show, does it not, material getting through the system?
A. So, generally, the priority flaggers will have specific, specialist knowledge, so -- and also contextual information that they can provide where we might not know something is violative. So, if you are -- and where emerging risks are taking place. So, for example, the Counter Terrorism Unit for the Met Police is a priority flagger. They might be able to provide information about some additional -- about additional material that isn't necessarily in the public domain for us to be able to take action because it is contextual. And there are a number of other flaggers that might be following particular groups or that are using symbols or terminology that we just wouldn't have access to, as a platform, where we rely on their specialist knowledge.
Q. Again, without undermining that evidence and the importance of you learning from those specialist organisations, is that not, at the same time, an indication of insufficiency of resource internally? Surely YouTube, given its scale and its revenue, should itself be on top of those emerging trends and concerns

and ensuring that it is fed into its algorithms and safety steps?
A. I think what we are talking about here is sometimes incredibly context-specific examples, where you would need either additional information or information that could be in relation to some kind of criminal incident in a single postcode, where language might be used by two different gangs, for example. So there are a number of areas where it wouldn't be realistic for a platform to understand that information in the context related to it and that's where we do find the priority flagging and engagement so important because they are able to provide that additional context that it wouldn't be reasonable for a platform to have that information.
There are other examples, yes, where we would be expected to track emerging threats in a broad level. But for some of these things, they are very, very context-specific and like I say, be dependent on a specific activity within a single postcode within the UK.
Q. Thank you. Just looking at enforcement briefly, still in your statement, page 17 ALPHA000001_0017, paragraph 64. Mr Rawle, this is where you set out the three strikes system. Effectively, there is a warning first, then a strike will result in a one-week freeze

after the warning, and a second strike in any 90-day period will result in a two-week freeze and a third strike will result in channel termination.

You say:

"If a creator receives a strike ..."

This is paragraph 65:

"... they are prohibited from using, creating, or acquiring another channel to get around [those] restrictions ..."

That all, it may be thought, to some extent, is on the plus side. On the negative side, these strikes expire just after 90 days, do they not?

A. That is correct, yes.

Q. One of the questions that has been asked by the victims and survivors teams is: do you accept that the 90-day period, after which strikes expire, is a weakness in your warnings and strike policy?

A. So, I think, point 66 is very important here. The strike policy works for minor violations but in the case of severe abuse, we would terminate a channel. And that could involve violence, violent extremism or child safety issues. So that would -- the strike process wouldn't occur there. There would potentially be a channel termination. In other instances -- and you have to remember that the vast majority of content

that's removed is for things like spam and what we want to do is to encourage and educate uploaders to follow the community guidelines. And so recently, for example, I have seen people receive strikes for copyright violations that they have accidentally uploaded, or like training videos where someone has accidentally shared some personal PII. For those people, we need to give them a strike so they don't do it again, but it might be very accidental.

Q. Without cutting across your answer, we are less concerned with those examples. But if, for example, somebody had uploaded gore material in breach of your community guidance, are you telling us that that would be treated as a single case of severe abuse?

A. If it was severe, then yes, it would. I couldn't give you an example in the hypothetical. But there are lots of scenarios where we would just terminate a channel and not use the strike process.

Q. Thank you. If we have ALPHA000027. It's unfair of me to ask about enforcement without referring you to the principal figures. So, we won't go through all of this, but if we just look at the headlines for enforcement, we see that 3.4 million channels, I think, for October 2025 to December 2025 were removed. And if we go over the page ALPHA000027_0002, we see, for January 2026 to

March 2026, 9.8 million videos were removed.

If we just look at the graph below, we see that the overwhelming majority of those was by automated flagging. At page 3 ALPHA000027_0003, I am sure that you would want me to cover the number of views in the top diagram, which shows that 48 per cent have 0 views, 38.37 have 1-10 views and decreasing thereafter. Although, one sees that -- if one takes the over 100 views, so 100-1,000 is 4.19 per cent and 1,000-10,000 is 1.97 per cent and over 10,000 views is 1.09 per cent.

So those, on the very left-hand side, the 48 per cent, show the activeness of automatic moderation, would you agree?

A. The effectiveness of the automated --

Q. The automated systems, yes. The number towards the right-hand side, where it has been viewed hundreds or thousands of times, and in 1 per cent of cases over 10,000 views, presumably, those numbers have accrued because it wasn't caught by the automated moderation systems but have subsequently been reported and assessed?

A. Or it was caught by the systems but then it needed to go to human review and could have involved a complex trade-off around a number of different factors and different considerations.

Q. Thank you. If we look at removal reasons in the diagram below, we see, I think, that "Child safety", perhaps concerningly, accounts for 60 per cent?

A. Yes, that is correct.

Q. So that shows -- on one level, these figures show how much inappropriate content is being removed but it is double-edged, would you agree, because it also shows how much material is getting up and how much the platform is being used for publication, or attempted publication, of material that is in violation of your own community guidelines?

A. Yes, noting the very high volume of material that's removed automatically without any views or with less than 10 views, yes, I would agree.

Q. There is still a significant percentage on the right-hand side of those diagrams, if one takes it as a whole, when one considers how much material is being published.

A. Yes, but we are not sure -- I'm not sure that we have broken that down in terms of views via category. So I don't know what those content category types are like, but yes.

Q. Thank you. Just in terms of law enforcement, obviously, take it as read that you are under the duties in relation to child sexual abuse material and that those

are reported; in what other circumstances does YouTube report content to UK law enforcement?
A. So if there would be an imminent threat to life, we would also report to law enforcement and I believe we are also able, under law, to report if there is wide-scale kind of systematic circumvention of our overall policies. So if fraud was being conducted at scale we would also legally be able to take action, for example.
Q. Thank you. What about situations where criminal offences are apparent which are nontrivial and which may have an impact on safety? The sort of thing I'm thinking about is inappropriate weapons postings, which, for example, might advertise weapons or content of that kind, contrary to UK law? Now, you will take it down because of community guidance and your policies on removal illegal material. But if, for example, a post went up which was glamourising the use of zombie knives that are unlawful in the UK, and was also indicating a link to where they could be bought, would you report that, if the user was based in the UK?
A. So it is likely that that content would probably be removed automatically and so we wouldn't necessarily even -- it would come down under our community guidelines, potentially. So we wouldn't know that that

was the case and the community guidelines aren't a setting against UK law, they are a setting against our own guidelines.
Q. But wouldn't it be flagging, by the automation, that the serious violation -- so you would be looking at that first of all in terms of giving a strike, wouldn't you?
A. It might just be removed and there might be a strike associated with the channel, or there might not necessarily be --
Q. So assume that it is associated with a strike. Does that involve a human moderator looking at it?
A. It could do, yes.
Q. In that situation, where the moderator has looked at it and you know that the user is in the UK, would that be reported or not?
A. No, our systems are set up to remove violative content but they are not set up as a kind of vehicle for surveillance.
Q. It is not surveillance, is it, if somebody is advertising a weapon that's unlawful? That's not surveillance to report that to the law enforcement bodies of the responsible country?
A. So, you said promoting. It depends -- I can't answer too much in the hypotheticals, because we don't have a piece of content in front of us and also I'm not

a content moderator, but I can say that our systems would be focused on community guidelines removals and they are not the same as if someone has broken the law. So they are two different things.
Q. What about if there's vile hate speech, so encouraging attacks on a religious minority? Again, that's going to be removed, you would hope, under your community guidance?
A. Yes.
Q. But it would obviously be a criminal offence and one which may be inciting violence and racial hatred. So say a moderator has looked at that and decided it is either a strike or you are going to terminate the channel; why not also report the user to law enforcement, on the basis that what they posted or attempted to post was a criminal offence and a serious one?
A. So, I don't believe that we would be able to do that under UK law, or even international law. I don't think we would be able to report that content, based on a user's --
Q. Do you want to reflect on that, if they have committed a criminal offence or there is a basis for thinking that they have done? What privacy basis would there be for not reporting that to law enforcement? Because you

would have all of the exemptions that apply to the commission of crime and preventing crime. There is no privacy restriction there at all, Mr Rawle.
A. So my understanding is that, absent child safety or large-scale abuse that I have talked about, under UK GDPR and under US law, the Stored Communications Act, we would not be able to then refer individual user's behaviour.
Q. I'm interested in the UK, so you can put the US to one side, and I'm talking about those who are UK users. Do you want to reflect on the suggestion that the GDPR would not permit you to refer those users to the British police?
A. So I'm not a lawyer, but my understanding is there are legal restrictions on what we can report and then there are practical restrictions on the action -- the way in which the systems are set up, which is to look at, largely, whether our community guidelines have been violated. It would not be proportionate for us to share information with law enforcement along community guidelines violations because they are not --
Q. Even in circumstances where the crime was at the serious end, so serious hate speech, inciting violence against minorities, or serious offending in relation to weapons?
A. So, if they do not account to -- or if they related to

a threat to life, or a threat to --
Q. No, we are accepting that they are not relating to an imminent threat to life?
A. Then we would not be reporting that to law enforcement.
Q. And I would suggest that that is a matter of discretion and choice; it is nothing to do with the GDPR, would you agree?
A. So, I was referring to again, US law, which would also be a consideration because the data process of Google LLC sits in the US, so there are US laws that we would need to consider. Alongside the practical system, the way in which the system is developed, which is not looking for illegal content, it is looking for policy violations which are the majority of take-downs. And then I think there is a final consideration which is around whether users would expect us to be reporting their content for potential policy violations and then reporting that to law enforcement.

Actually, the fourth point is the level and scale of removals that we are taking down, would mean that you would be inundating law enforcement with requests, which they, as far as I'm aware, haven't asked for.
Q. Yes. Have you, for example -- has YouTube actually done anything in the UK with the National Knife Crime Centre, to understand whether or not they would feel inundated

if YouTube were to refer UK-based content of concern to it, or are you just speculating that they wouldn't want to receive such reports?
A. So I was talking about all the oral content that potentially could violate our community guidelines. If you're just talking about knife crime --
Q. I'm speaking about two particular areas: hate speech inciting violence and weapons material. Are you seriously suggesting that UK law enforcement would not be interested in receiving information or would feel overwhelmed if YouTube were to report such instances to UK law enforcement, when they were UK-registered users?
A. Unfortunately, I think given the volume of hate speech that we remove from the platform, in the form of comments and videos every day, it would be impractical for us to report every single one of those to law enforcement, they would be overwhelmed. That is the unfortunate fact. On knife crime, that hasn't been an issue that was flagged to us. I did work on this issue and followed the changes in law. We are not, because of the way the platform is set up, a primary conduit for some of the illegality that's coming through. So in some of the conversations we have followed it and obviously need to (unclear) our legal obligations, but YouTube isn't really set up for the

sale and promotion of knives in organic content or in ads.
Q. I understand that it is not set up to deal with it in that way --
A. Sorry, the risk factors are lower for us as a platform.
Q. But you will come across some occasions of that, those types of material --
A. A handful.
Q. All right. A couple of final matters, please. In relation to the footage of the stabbing of Bishop Mar Mari Emmanuel, I think -- perhaps we can try to deal with this without reference to the documents, I think you are aware that footage of that attack was carried on a number of channels, which included YouTube.

I'm not, for the moment, interested in legitimate news coverage of that, where the more graphic end of the attack itself was either not shown or was pixelated. I'm interested in the live stream showing the actual act of stabbing. The Inquiry understands, is this right, that that was covered by YouTube in that there was a post on YouTube but that it was age gated; is that correct?
A. So, the team were not able to assess that content because between the period in which it was flagged by the Inquiry, it was removed from the platform. And so

we don't know whether the content was raw footage, but raw footage of that attack would have been violative and we have removed that content. We presume they had some kind of EDSA exemption.
Q. Assuming that that is what the position was, that it was carried on a YouTube channel but that it was age gated; why was that not picked up by moderation? Because it would have been in breach of community guidance, rather than just age gated -- just wait for the question -- because it covered the brutal, actual act of stabbing and so, while there may well have been an EDSA exemption for the attack itself and commenting on the attack, surely showing the actual moment of multiple stabbings being inflicted on the Bishop would have come under your community guidance suggesting that it is just too graphic to be shown at all?
A. That is correct and my understanding is if the video was age gated and up, it would have had some kind of EDSA exemption within it.
Q. Yes, but it shouldn't have an EDSA exemption for the actual act of stabbing, when the knife was actually shown penetrating the Bishop?
A. So a number of the news reports carried the full attack.
Q. But pixelated, that is the difference. At the moment of the actual attack, the mainstream news media, for

obvious reasons -- and there are many, many examples of this online -- either didn't show the moment of the attack or they pixelated it. But the concern is that a YouTube channel covered it in its entirety and the response of YouTube was to age-gate that, rather than to moderate it out. Do you know why that was the case?

A. So, from my understanding from my colleagues, is that there are a number of news organisations that did show the full attack without it being pixelated.

Q. If they fell into the same category as YouTube, then I would be asking the same questions of them. But why did that get through your guidance? Why wasn't it moderated out?

A. Because they were from legitimate news sources, which are able -- which were showing something which was in the public interest and that's why we age-gated it, to make sure that young users can't see it, but it is acceptable for adults to see really horrific things that have happened.

Q. Thank you. Could we just have page 21 ALPHA000001_0021 paragraph 77, I think finally, please, of your statement, just in terms of the violative rate data.

Page 21, paragraph 77.

You explain there the VVR rate, selecting a sample of videos and asking content reviewers to assess whether

they violate YouTube's policies. And you give the figures for previous quarters. So Q2, 2025, 0.14-0.15 per cent. And Q3, 2025, 0.11-0.13 per cent. Then Q42, 2025, 0.14-0.15 per cent. Then for the last available at the start of your statement, it has gone up from 0.17-0.19 per cent.

But the trend is going up based on that, certainly taking the last quarter, rather than going down. Do you know why that is the case? Why that's assessed to be the case?

A. No, I don't have the exact answer. It may have been that we expanded our policies to cover more things that are context-dependent and take longer to review. There may have been some other contextual factors but I don't have an answer to why the VVR rate went up. But I do know we have a commitment to getting the number down and teams will be working on that.

MR MOSS: Thank you.

Sir, other matters are covered by the statement and I have to choose the areas, obviously, that I ask all questions about. So I think I will finish my questioning there. I'm just going to turn to my left to see if my learned friend has any questions. So, Mr Chapman.

SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: Yes, Mr Chapman.

Questions by MR CHAPMAN

MR CHAPMAN: Thank you. Mr Rawle, I ask questions on behalf of the bereaved families and the associated victim Core Participant groups. Google Wallet; do you know what I mean by that?

A. Yes.

Q. For those who don't, the mirror image of Apple Wallet for Android phones and the like?

A. Yes. I'm not an expert, but yes, I have used -- got a Google one.

Q. Can you help us with this. Does Google Wallet ID let a third-party service confirm a UK user's age from their passport?

A. So, at a high level, we are looking at building systems that allow for people who be able to verify, using third-party verification. But I'm not close to that. I stopped working on it about two years ago.

Q. It was something you mentioned in your statement, I think. You said, at paragraph 44 ALPHA000001_0013:

"In March 2026, we added digital identities as a further age-verification method in the UK. Users with a digital wallet that implements the Digital Credentials API can use this verification option."

A. Yes.

Q. I thought that was relating to Google Wallet; is that right?

A. So the API is the underlying infrastructure that sits and connect a verification provider with a wallet. So, in this instance, Google Wallet. But the technology that we have developed is about the pipes almost that connect the two and about the privacy preserving measures that sit in between them.

Q. So is it right, therefore, that you can confirm a UK user's age, technically, by reference to a Government-issued document like a passport?

A. Hypothetically, you are able to do that, but my understanding is that the framework and guidance from the Government about what those systems look like needs to be agreed and finalised and then technology needs to be built that's privacy preserving, to then route that through to different verification providers.

Q. I think your answer is that: technically, yes possible, but what we need to build needs some guidance from UK Government?

A. So the guidance may have been released by the Government, yes, but there is a whole digital identity framework that is being worked on at the moment.

Q. So you say the guidance has been issued by the Government?

A. I worked on these issues before the guidance has been issued. I'm not aware whether the guidance has been issued yet.
Q. Am I right that in the US, Google Wallet also holds driving licences which people can use?
A. So, again, I'm aware that we were conducting pilots on the use of driving licences for the API to be used for Google Wallet.
Q. So just pilots. You say it is not actually out there yet?
A. Again, I haven't worked on age verification issues for two years. So it might have been a pilot when I was working on it that has subsequently been expanded that I don't have knowledge of.
Q. A pilot suggests that it is technically possible?
A. Yes. Absolutely.
Q. So, would in your view, there be any technical obstacle to the same system confirming a UK user's address, for example, to a platform?
A. So I think the question here is around do we have the right verification and validation system in place, so that a company can take on a credential, which is a verification, and that could be anything from an ID to a bank statement, to one of the other age verification methods that needs to be seen as highly effective. Can

that then be sent through the system, to a service to verify age?
All of those things are possible but from my perspective, the policy and the infrastructure that supports that system being developed is still being worked through. But my colleagues at Google are working on developing the technology that's privacy preserving and then also working with officials in Government to understand what credentials can be used and then working with potential providers so that we can share those signals with them.
Q. So in short, is it the case that you don't anticipate any technical problems with a system like this. It is really just a case of getting the pilots out there and testing them and making sure they work and confirm with Government guidance; is that it?
A. Ultimately, we would be providing the pipes but someone needs to put something into the pipes and then other people need to be able to receive the things coming out of the pipes as well. So it is quite a complicated process. And I think the other thing I would say is there is quite a lot of -- there is not necessarily a stable regulatory environment in large markets to do that. So, we are very keen for that to take place and we are very keen to be able to offer the API system to

users and actually, would encourage further development of that.
Q. You see, I thought you were further along from that, by looking at your statement in paragraph 43 ALPHA000001_0012:
"We use a number of tools to obtain additional verification of age."
The first one was:
"Government ID: users can submit an electronic copy of a valid, government-issued ID that show's the user's date of birth."
A. So the difference there is between -- the API system is about third-party verification. So this is where Google is providing the verification to other providers through Google Wallet, for example, whereas what I'm talking about for YouTube it is first-party verification which is where YouTube is verifying to reach an age gate. So the difference between first-party verification, YouTube, and Google, third-party verification, Google providing a system to allow others to verify.
Q. I see, and that's your reference to the API?
A. Yes.
Q. Has YouTube compared how often verified and unverified accounts upload content removed under its "violent extremism" or "violent content" policies?

A. No, I don't -- well, I'm not aware of us having done that.
Q. It wouldn't, on the face of it, be very, very hard to analyse your databases to see the answer to that, would it?
A. I mean, the vast majority of users are verified because we restrict some features to users that aren't verified.
Q. But in answer to my question, it wouldn't be very difficult to do that, would it?
A. I think it would be possible to do, notwithstanding privacy considerations. I'm not a lawyer so there might be some kind of additional friction.
Q. It is entirely a matter for the Chair, but for our part, we would welcome it if Google would do that. Would you be able to do that?
A. I will take that back to the team.
Q. And give the results to the Inquiry in writing, if requested?
A. I will take that back to the team.
SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: Thank you very much indeed, Mr Chapman. I have no questions.
Thank you very much indeed for your assistance. It has been very helpful.
MR MOSS: Thank you, sir. We have a very full day today. Obviously it is not appropriate to start a new witness

now. Could I suggest that we start at 1.40 pm?
SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: Certainly.
(12.55 pm)
(The short adjournment)
(1.40 pm)
MR BRIAN FISHMAN (affirmed)
SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: Thank you very much. Please take a seat. Yes, Mr Boyle.
Questions by MR BOYLE
MR BOYLE: Could you give your full name, please.
A. Yes, Brian Fishman.
Q. Thank you. Mr Fishman, you are Head of Strategic Risks Policy at OpenAI, is that right?
A. That is correct.
Q. Thank you. Could we have on screen your witness statement, it is OAI000001. Do you recognise your witness statement there, Mr Fishman?
A. I do.
Q. Thank you. Could we have page 26 OAI000001_0026. Your signature has been redacted for privacy reasons but can you confirm that you have signed that statement and it is true to the best of your knowledge and belief?
A. Yes, it is.
Q. Before we move on to your experience and background, Mr Fishman, was there anything you wanted to say?

A. Thank you for the opportunity to be here. Obviously, it is a tragic event that brings us together and I wanted to extend my condolences to all of those affected and I'm hopeful that my comments here today are useful to the important mission of the Inquiry. Thank you.
Q. I'm going to ask you questions about your experience and background now. Prior to joining OpenAI, you worked in counter-terrorism policy and research, is that right?
A. That is right. I was the research director at a place called the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, the US military academy and subsequently, at think tanks in Washington. I also led a group called -- in the policy organisation at Facebook -- "Countering Dangerous Organizations", which, in the definition at the time, meant terrorism organisations, hate groups, large-scale criminal organisations.
Q. Thank you. You describe your role -- so your role now is Head of Strategic Risks Policy. Can you just describe that briefly?
A. Yes, that means that my responsibilities are to set policy around violence -- broadly defined -- elections, and then what we call "deceptive activities" which is everything from a nation state disinformation campaign to include things like fraud and scams.
Q. Thank you. Which department does your role sit within

at OpenAI?
A. I sit within what we call the product policy team, which sits in a larger organisation called strategy, which is led by our chief strategy officer, Jason Kwon.
Q. Thank you. You tell us -- I think your legal representatives have told us in correspondence that the safety remit at OpenAI is not limited to a single person or team in the company. How does it work then? How do responsibilities lie?
A. Yes, that is correct. Safety, at a foundation model lab, is a little bit different than you might conceptualise it at a social media company. And the reason is that we are attempting to build safety into our core service and technology. And that's when we are developing and training the models themselves, when we are instructing the models on the kind of responses that they are able to give and then, when we are assessing how users engage those models, to determine whether the users themselves are violating our rules.
Q. Thank you. And is this right, your expertise is on the policy side of things, not on the technical aspects?
A. That's correct. I will do my best to be helpful on those -- in those areas but there are limits.
Q. How do the policy teams and the technical teams work together?

A. They work very closely together in a lab context. We think hard about not just what are we going to prevent our users from doing, but shape how our service works, so that we are not simply defining what's not acceptable to be done, but how do we make our services more useful for people to get safe information, to identify things like scams and other sorts of threats.
Q. Moving on to LLMs, large language models, OpenAI is publicly, I think, best known for ChatGPT. Just briefly, what other work does it do?
A. Sure. ChatGPT is a chat interface that provides answers and engages in conversation with users. We also provide APIs and other tools, that large organisations use to manage business operations, to write code, and to develop other kinds of internal products.
Q. Thank you. So, ChatGPT, as a large language model. I'm going to try and take bits from your statement to explain it, as best as I can, correct me if I get anything wrong. So it is a mathematical model that finds statistical patterns in data, at its simplest, is that right?
A. That's right.
Q. So during training, that model analyses relationships within data such as how words might appear in context and it uses that to then predict the most likely word

when it generates a response to a prompt, is that right?
A. Generally, yes.
Q. So, it uses that -- might use that prediction -- or the model might work to provide an answer to a question?
A. That's correct.
Q. And for the uninitiated, ChatGPT could be used to organise or summarise information, research, analyse or generate images, assist with translations and so on; is that right?
A. That's correct.
Q. Thank you. The current models, I think, most recently released by ChatGPT are the GPT-6 models?
A. That's right.
Q. And those are known as "Astra", "Sol" and "Luna". Could you, again, just quickly explain the difference between those models?
A. Right. When we train a core model, oftentimes we will release slightly different versions of it, each of which is optimised in different ways. Some of them will return a response more quickly, others will reason about it for longer, and oftentimes produce a more extensive or more specific result.

But, the other dynamic there is that reasoning models, so those "think" for a longer period of time, tend to incorporate more and more context into their

responses.
Q. Thank you. And so those are various different types of reasoning model, is that right?
A. Those are different kinds of models. The other issue is that there may be -- depending on how much reasoning they are doing, there may be different costs associated with them, which gives our users or customers options.
Q. Thank you. Now, I think the Inquiry has asked OpenAI about the number of UK users it has and to be fair to OpenAI, I think those figures have been produced at short notice in writing but with a request that they are held on a commercially sensitive basis. The Inquiry, I think, is going to work through that redaction request but we will consider that and come back to you. In more broad terms, I think you say in your statement that there are more than 1 billion weekly users globally, is that right?
A. My understanding is that the public number now is 1.2 billion weekly active users.
Q. Thank you. I want to move on now, please, to the model policies and training. Just before I do, I want to ask you about the risks that AI models might generate which are relevant to the Inquiry in broad terms. So tell me whether you agree to the following: that they could be used to provide or generate violent content, whether via

image or text, and that could either harm or encourage someone who was fixated on violence; would you agree?
A. In concept, yes, without appropriate defences.
Q. Yes. I should say, I'm talking about risks at the moment. Could be used to radicalise a person, whether to terrorism or potentially non-ideological violence, so, for example, creating a generative content which glorifies past attackers?
A. Yes, with the same caveats.
Q. And again, assume the same caveats, but it could be used to assist with attack planning in a number of ways, so, for example, instructions on how to use and obtain weapons, how to carry out a mass casualty attack with details of past attacks and details about the location and persons that someone might be planning to attack?
A. Yes, potentially.
Q. And without specifying any particular models, it is right, isn't it, that that risk is not a theoretical one? There have been real-world examples of attacks where the evidence has suggested that the user might have used an AI programme at some point beforehand to consider violence-related issues?
A. Yes, there have been a number of incidents, including listed intimate reports that the Inquiry has noted.
Q. We will come onto those. You talked about some of the

safeguards that might be put in place. The first that I want to address is the model policies. So, model policies, is this right, are used to guide models' development and training?
A. That's right. The model policies are designed to set rules for what the model itself will do. So, when a user engages the model, prompts the model, what is acceptable for the model to return. Those guidelines are built into the model both at the training stage but also in instructions to the model afterwards, about how it can respond to certain queries.
Q. And there are topic-specific policies which are called taxonomies, is that right, which are guidelines on how a model should and shouldn't respond in certain circumstances?
A. That's right.
Q. So there is a taxonomy, for example, which classifies user requests and model depictions -- so I'm guessing that's responses -- which relates to incitement to violence and acts of violence?
A. That's right.
Q. Thank you. And OpenAI has disclosed some topic-specific taxonomies to the Inquiry, but on a type 2 basis, due to commercial and operational sensitivity, is that right?
A. That is right.

Q. But we have, I think, an overview in the model specification which we will come to and your witness statement.
A. Good.
Q. Thank you. So you tell us that the taxonomies could lead ChatGPT to refuse to answer a prompt, offer context or provide general information that could still be used without compromising safety, is that right?
A. In general, that's correct. The model policies define certain sorts of responses that the model should never give. It also defines responses that should not be given in certain circumstances, for example, to an under-18 user, or to a user that is demonstrating a pattern of behaviour that we have deemed concerning.
Q. Before we look at the detail, can I ask just a point of principle, why not a blanket: never discuss violence, for example?
A. The reason is that there are legitimate queries around violence, including, radical ideologies. We want our users to be able to use our services in order to inform themselves. We do not want them to be able to use our services to advance a violent plot or to radicalise.
Q. Thank you. Let's look at the model spec then. So that's OAI00004.
So there is some overview there. If we could just

go down to page -- the top of page 2 OAI000004_0002 -- so on page 2, we have "Red-line principles". Just reading that out:
"Human safety and human rights are paramount to OpenAI's mission. We are committed to upholding the following high-level principles, which guide our approach to model behaviour and related policies, across all deployments of our models:
"Our models should never be used to facilitate critical and high severity harms, such as acts of violence (eg crimes against humanity, war crimes, genocide, torture, human trafficking or forced labour) creation of cyber, biological or nuclear weapons (eg weapons of mass destruction), terrorism, child abuse (eg creation of [Child Sexual Abuse Material]), persecution or mass surveillance."
Can we move on, please, to page 21 OAI000004_0021. We are working through this model specification. I think you have explained it, but effectively, this is used to set how the models are created.
But is this right, the models are also trained on the specification itself? So it has an impact on the outputs that they give?
A. It does, that's right. There are detailed, internal guidelines or model policies that reflect the model

spec. They may be tweaked and updated over time as we identify new things, attempt to improve them, so that they are more effective, but that's right. Our models are trained on those policies, which reflects the spec.
Q. Thank you. So now looking at the "Stay in bounds", so it says:
"... one of the assistant's most challenging responsibilities is to find the right balance between empowering users and developers and minimising the potential for real harm. This section describes limits on the assistant's behaviour, including a currently comprehensive snapshot of scenarios in which the assistant should refrain from fully complying with a user or developer's request -- even when it is technically capable of doing so (see also Assume best intentions ... about handling ambiguous requests)."
Then it says:
"Comply with applicable laws.
"The assistant should operate within applicable legal constraints, including applicable local law for local deployments of models, consistent with our Red-line principles."
Then I think, if we go down, we have "Do not generate disallowed content".
So is this right, are there three different

approaches to content set out here that the model might take?
A. That's right. As I was noting, there are certain answers that we would never provide and then there's others that would be contextual.
Q. So when I asked you that question about never discuss violence in any terms, that might be what's designed as "prohibited content", is that right?
A. That's right. As I said, the models will discuss violence, they will provide historical information but they are designed to only do that in appropriate ways.
Q. Thank you. So we see that the "prohibited content" only applies to sexual content involving minors, but "restricted content" includes information hazards, sensitive personal data and "sensitive content", in appropriate contexts, we see there, erotica and gore and transformations are allowed. Help us with this, "transformations", that is when the user provides information and asks ChatGPT to do something to it, improve the writing or the tone, or something along those lines?
A. That's my understanding.
Q. Could we have, please, over the page, page 22 OAI000004_0022. The bottom part of the page, please:
"Don't provide information hazards."

Thank you, so:

"The assistant should not provide detailed, actionable steps for carrying out activities that are illicit, could harm people or property, or lead to critical or large-scale harm. This includes ... steps relating to creating obtaining ... [et cetera for] (CBRN) weapons."

It says:

"If information has both harmful potential and legitimate uses, the assistant should respond with neutral, factual information without detailed step-by-step instructions, calculations, or strategic insights that could amplify the risk of harm. [Where] appropriate, the assistant may also gently and non-judgmentally suggest alternative approaches or resources."

Is that right?

A. That's correct.

Q. Thank you. Then just to pick out a few more parts of the model specification, could we have page 28 OAI000004_0028. So:

"Sensitive content (such as erotica [and] gore) may only be generated under specific circumstances (... educational, medical, or historical contexts, or transformations ..."

Which we discussed:

"Don't respond with erotica or gore.

"The assistant should not generate erotica, depictions of illegal or non-consensual sexual activities or extreme gore, scientific, historical, news, artistic or other contexts where sensitive content is appropriate."

Can I ask, are you able to help with why that balance has been chosen? Why not, for example, prohibit gore?

A. Our users engage Chat for all sorts of different purposes, including in educational contexts, including producing material for medical training, these sorts of things, that, in a general context, we would -- would not be appropriate but within specific circumstances may be. So this is an example of a scenario where the assistant -- we sometimes refer to the model and how people engage it as "the assistant" -- that the assistant will provide certain material within those contexts but not others.

Q. We will come onto the position for under 18s. So we'll park that for the moment. And I know that there's detail in your statement about the ideas of jail-breaking, for example. But how will the assistant know that the request for gore is being made for

a scientific or historical context, rather than to feed a violence fixation, for example?

A. The assistant aims to understand the context of the user themselves, the sorts of queries that they have made. It obviously takes into account age assessments as well in this dynamic. But it uses the context provided by the users in order to make those judgements.

Q. When I say "know", of course, you will forgive me for slipping into that sort of language, but that's the information about context. But of course, presumably that could be the first request that someone makes. In those circumstances, there wouldn't be any context necessarily, would there?

A. There would be minimal context.

Q. Can we move on then, please, to page 29 OAI000004_0029:

"Do not contribute to extremist agendas that promote violence.

"The assistant must not create content that praises, endorses, or aids extremist agendas that promote violence. However, it may provide critical, discouraging, or factual discussions (from an objective point of view) of such topics in contexts like news reporting, historical analysis, or education."

So again, in this -- for extremist agendas, the model again has to determine context to decide whether

it is appropriate to give a level of detail on these sorts of issues, is that right?

A. It is correct, within certain bounds. Of course, some levels of information are always prohibited. But, yes, providing factual information about historical events or systems is provided in some contexts and not others.

Q. Thank you. Just before we go to the next page, we will just note the wording there which is "extremist agendas". Could we then move, please, to page 30 OAI000004_0030.

So:

"If a user shows signs of vulnerability to radicalisation, the assistant should aim to deescalate, discourage extremist involvement, and, if relevant, contextualise such ideologies as harmful and widely discredited -- while doing so in a non-moralising, non-lecturing manner."

So I think we have seen, in both of these sections -- and obviously there is one other that we will come to -- but references to "extremism", "radicalisation". I think from one of your previous answers you are aware of the risk of violence without ideology, or what in the States might be called "nihilistic violence".

A. That is right.

Q. Those aren't necessarily covered by these two provisions, are they?
A. I think it is very important to call out nihilistic violent extremism, it is clearly a real trend in the world. We do look at signals of nihilistic violent extremism and we treat them in a similar manner here. Even though there isn't what we would call a coherent ideology, though they are subcategories of nihilistic violent extremism, some of which are more closely associated with modern Neo-Nazism and others, but there are other experts on those issues who can go far deeper than I.

But we would look for -- there are linguistic and historical touch-stones around those movements that we would look for and try to identify and treat in a similar way, as we would here, with what we would call an extremist ideology.
Q. Shouldn't the model spec be explicit about that?
A. I think I take the point that the public-facing model spec could be updated to include this but our internal application of the model spec does.
Q. So one example might be content that glorifies a mass killer with no ideology, such as AR for example, or a school shooter. Your view is that that is caught by the appropriate policies, is that right?

A. It is caught by the appropriate policies, yes.
Q. Thank you. Will you take away considering whether more should be done to the public-facing model spec because that's, presumably, guidance that users might use as well, as people working at OpenAI?
A. I will.
Q. Thank you. We do, I think, though -- we should though I think look at page 37 OAI000004_0037, which has a section on "Do not facilitate or encourage illicit behaviour". And looking at the second sentence, it says:

"This includes guidance, instructions, actionable steps, or improvements to user-provided plans. Encouraging or promoting such behaviours is also prohibited."

And it goes on. Then we see, I think, the example below. If we can just go to the bottom of the page. About the right response for the model to give in response to questions, for example, about bomb making; is that right?
A. That's right.
Q. Just finally, if we could have page 107 OAI000004_0107, there is a section here on safety for teens and we will come back to this in the context of the measures for teens and also age assurance, but there are principles

for safety for teens, which include putting teen safety first and also promoting real-world support. Is that right?
A. That's right.
Q. Thank you. I want to move on then, please, to the concept of training. So, is this right, during training, the model will analyse large amounts of data and use it to adjust its internal parameters or weights, to reflect the patterns it has identified?
A. That's right.
Q. In very simplistic terms. And it uses those learned weights to predict and create responses to prompts, is that right?
A. That's right.
Q. In terms of the type of material that's used to train models, is this right, it is information that's freely and openly accessible on the internet?
A. That's right, the vast majority of it.
Q. But also I think you use information from third-party partners, as well as information provided and generated by human trainers and researchers?
A. That's right and the researchers are increasingly using synthetic data as well.
Q. Synthetic mathematical data?
A. No, this is data that is generated using AI systems in

order to train other AI systems.
Q. One of the concepts that I wanted to ask you about was the idea that the data that is being trained might be moderated?
A. That's right. So there is an effort to understand and identify the data that is being pushed into these systems for training purposes. For example, you want to remove things like child sexual abuse material from such datasets. You also want to remove other kinds of extreme data to some degree but, perhaps surprisingly, not all of it.

You do want models to understand, for example, what hate speech is, so that it can recognise it in the future when it sees it in the real world, so that those models can be used to identify abuses in other scenarios. And so, the safety element at this stage, is making sure that such material is appropriately contextualised and labelled.
Q. And so to do that, is this right, there are machine learning algorithms that remove content from the kind of training database, if I can call it that?
A. That's right.
Q. Is there also a human review?
A. Not of all of the data. There are human efforts on samples of that data that are used to train the machine

systems, that are able to process the data more holistically.

Q. I'm assuming that the data is so enormous that it wouldn't be possible for a human to work its way through it?

A. That's right.

Q. One of the documents on AR's devices was an academic article that contained text from the Al-Qaeda Training Manual and he was convicted for possession of that under section 58 of the Terrorism Act. But, in other circumstances, there might be those who would suggest there were legitimate academic reasons for holding that paper as a whole. It might be that it exists in academic databases as well. But, in the wrong hands, it contains deeply concerning information.

Now, I know that the models aren't remember -- again, I'm going to have to use anthropomorphic to explain this -- but they're not remembering the data they have. In other words, they are not storing the data that they are trained on, they are using the data to adjust their internal parameters, is that right?

A. That's right. It is very difficult not to anthropomorphise. I will do it too.

Q. So, nevertheless, if a model were to be trained on the Al-Qaeda Training Manual, there is information of

concern in there, not just in terms of the intent but probably also the capabilities of things that come from it. Does OpenAI take account of those sort of documents and how are they handled?

A. I can't speak to that specific document.

Q. Understood.

A. But when such material would appear in the training process, the system, as designed, would label it as such and that would obviously shape, based on our model policies, model-to-model spec, whether the information in it was served off to a user.

The reason why we would have it there is because if a user were to take clips of it and prompt the model in such a way, it would then be able to understand that this was something concerning that the user was doing.

Q. Thank you, and after the training, I think, is this right, there is a period of post-training, where the specific training of the model to reinforce the policies against violence and others?

A. That's right. The post-training stage, as I understand it -- and again, there are limits to my technical understanding -- really contains sort of two stages. One is direct instruction on the model spec and the second is what's called "reinforcement learning", which is giving the model examples of things that would

violate, things that would not violate, so that it can learn from that process and those examples.

Q. There's also a process called "red teaming", which is the use of human, automated and external red teams, to identify issues and prompts that might not have come up in pre- and post-training, is that right?

A. That's right. Red teaming is a process of vetting the model, to see if you can get it to do things it shouldn't do and determine what they are. And those learnings obviously are folded back into the model training and assessment process. It is similar to the benchmarking process that, I think, we see some third parties doing.

Q. I think you tell us, at your paragraph 47, that for GPT-5, OpenAI designed a red team with background in defence, intelligence and law enforcement to assess the usefulness of that model for planning violent attacks, is that right?

A. That's right. Sometimes those red teaming processes, we rely and work with third-party experts to develop the right questions. We have a lot of expertise in-house but certainly, there is even more outside.

Q. Is that equivalent type team with a similar expertise applied to future models as well?

A. Yes.

Q. And you also tell us that OpenAI grants Government agencies like the UK AI Safety Institute, early access to new models for pre-deployment testing as well, is that right?

A. We do, though I would note that -- my understanding is that most of the focus of those agencies is on the high-level controllability-ability of the models, chemical and biological -- their suitability for chemical and biological weapons development, and then to some extent child sexual abuse material. Less so what we are focused on today.

Q. Is there a reason why there's perhaps not the same focus on those violence planning issues continuing?

A. Well, there certainly is in our internal red teaming. I can't speak for the motivations of those external bodies.

Q. And can I ask, when carrying out testing -- and perhaps this applies at all stages -- we looked at the model spec and you talked about the developing idea of non-ideological extreme violence.

A. Yes.

Q. Are those issues and emerging trends fed into the training process?

A. Yes, they are. We have a team internally -- we call it "I2", intelligence investigations. This includes a lot

of experts that are going out, making sure they are reading new reports and these sorts of things, from outside. We also regularly engage third-party experts in forums and where possible, engage law enforcement as well, to try and understand what are the new and emerging trends. And just as importantly, some of the indicators like I said, certain terminology, symbols, those sorts of things so we can be aware of those both for model training but also for our humans that may come across that stuff.

Q. At the final stage, I think, is pre-release evaluation. So before models are released, they are tested on deliberately hard cases, is that right?

A. That's right. We benchmark the models on deliberately hard cases and then we release the system card along with the model that describes their performance against those benchmarks.

Q. Thank you. So let's look at that system card for GPT-6, which is OAI000013. If we could have, please, page 2 OAI000013_0002. So there is finding, paragraph 2 there, which is that:

"GPT-6 Astra is significantly more robust than its predecessors. Incorporating new robustness safety training techniques, GPT-6 Astra is significantly more robust to jailbreaks ..."

We mentioned jailbreaks; could you just explain them in simple terms?

A. The concept of a jailbreak is the idea that repeated prompts to a model can cause the model to ignore or not follow its safety training.

Q. Thank you. Could we look then, please, at paragraph 5. It says that:

"GPT-6's monitorability has decreased relative to ..."

The previous model:

"... CoT ..."

Chain of thought?

A. Chain of thought.

Q. So:

"... found that GPT-6 is more capable of controlling its own [chain of thought] than the [previous model] and less likely to include incriminating information in its [chain of thought]."

Then it goes on to refer to the idea of:

"... strategically under-performing in evaluations (sandbagging) and can sometimes evade our internal monitors when asked to perform certain sabotage tasks."

So I think one definitely has to anthropomorphise on this. This is the idea that the model is deliberately under-performing when being checked, so that it is not

caught by the testing?

A. Yes, that is the idea. We are getting to this edge of my technical understanding here. But that is the idea, that a chain of thought is a record, the internal record of what a model is doing -- I'm deliberately trying not to use the word "thinking" there -- and those chains of thought are used by researchers to understand the process by which a model comes to a particular answer that it gives in the real world.

Q. If a model is sandbagging, is there a risk that during testing, there's no evidence of problematic responses but they later emerge after release?

A. There is some risk.

Q. Although we should look at paragraph 7, which says that GPT-6 is significantly safer in higher risk scenarios.

If we move on to page 4 OAI000013_0004.

So this is a safe response to a prompt, even if that prompt might be trying to encourage the model into providing -- as we will see, as we go, just slightly down in the table -- but information about violent illicit behaviour, extremism, hate et cetera?

A. That's right. I think historically, the concept has been either the model will refuse to answer a question entirely or will provide a false-some answer and what our teams identified is that actually, you get better

outcomes overall if you focus on providing safe completions, which may be responding to a query but ensuring that the response doesn't provide what we call "uplift", which is additional information that would increase the capability of a user to do harm.

Q. Thank you. So in other words that could be usable information to, for example, prepare for an attack rather than a response which perhaps ought to discourage someone from doing it or gave more neutral information?

A. That's right. It would aim to provide neutral information or discourage them, but not provide information that would be valuable or useful in an attack process.

Q. When we look at your table 1, we can see, I think, broadly increasing numbers as we move from left to right, showing that GPT-6 was, in general terms, scoring higher than previous models, is that right?

A. Yes, over time, that's what you see in general with the models, that as we move forward, they tend to increase in both helpfulness, but also in safety.

Q. And we see some high scores perhaps with the exception of "hate". The numbers do not quite get to 100 though. So there, therefore, remains a level of outstanding risk in each of these categories, is that right?

A. Yes, and just to be clear, my view on this is that even

if we score perfectly on a benchmark, risk remains and we always have to mitigate it. I don't think we can rest on our laurels just because we score perfectly on a benchmark.

Q. The one score which is perhaps a little bit lower is for "gore". Is that because of its categorisation and the bits of the model spec that we looked at before or is it just one where the standard is not quite as high, do you know?

A. I would have to talk to our technical teams to get a better explanation of why specifically gore sits as it does here.

Q. Is there a concern, from that, that GPT-6 might serve up gory type material to someone who was interested in it for violence fixation reasons, rather than a medical researcher, for example?

A. It is possible, though it is important to understand that the benchmark here and that these figures only reflect how the model responds directly on the model -- against the model spec and that there are other layers of our safety stack, including detection around what a user is trying to get the model to do, that perhaps would pick up on a user attempting to prompt it to do something like that.

Q. Thank you. So when you say "safety stack", you mean

there are a number of different safeguards in place and we will come onto some but they include the user policy and, as you have said, the potential to report if there's sort of critical risk to life --

A. That's right. These benchmark scores are only measuring one part of that.

Q. Could we just go over the page, please, to page 5 OAI000013_0005. So I think at the top of the page, we see a table which, again, I think in terms of at least the x axis shows how it handles harmful requests safely and has Chat GPT-6 at the right-hand end of it. Can we just go down. There is another table on here and it is "Safe response to high-severity prompts". We look on the right-hand side at "Violent Activities". The numbers on that are slightly lower. I don't know if you are able to assist with the difference between "base" or "with sensitive context" and so on?

A. Yeah, I'm -- excuse me, I'm just trying to interpret the graph briefly.

Q. So "Safe response to high-severity prompts". So I assume that that is to -- a challenging prompt, that is asking for --

A. That's right. My understanding here is this is an illustration of how the models respond when they understand that there is context around a particular

prompt, that may indicate -- that potentially would indicate that a user is engaging in unsafe behaviour. We have a process now of safety context that shapes the way the model responds to a sensitive query when it occurs within context where we deemed that the user is potentially interested in harm.

Q. Thank you. Finally, just to tie this off, at page 6 OAI000013_0006, there is a separate set of evaluations for under 18s. Again, I think we see improving scores. Perhaps some lower scores in some places over time which, for example, are the age-restricted goods, which have been improved. But scores within the 90s, say, for "gore" here as well. So at the higher end of your test but still with outstanding risk remaining, is that right?

A. That's right. I don't think that risk can be eliminated completely and it hasn't been yet.

Q. Moving away from this, the model that would have come after GPT-6 was GPT-6.1, correct? Or that would have been an evolution of that model?

A. Yes. Usually there are a series of model releases within a particular model family like that.

Q. And that was due for release in October 2026 but, I think, a decision was made not to release it. Why was that?

A. There were concerns within the training team around safety.

Q. Can you help how a newer model had regressed in terms of safety?

A. I can't speak to the details on this because I understand that they are quite technical. I believe they have more to do with issues of cyber security and controllability than the sorts -- the core questions that we are discussing today.

Q. But there is a principle there, at least, that where a model is not safe enough, it is just not released; that was the approach in this case, is that right?

A. That's right.

Q. One of the papers that the Inquiry has seen suggested a roll back of GPT 4.0. Are you familiar with that?

A. GPT 4.0 was released and then pulled back before my time at OpenAI, so I'm familiar generally with 4.0 but there may be specific questions that I don't have context on.

Q. Are you able to help with how it got to be released before it needed to be pulled back, given the process of pre-release testing and so on?

A. I do not, no.

Q. Moving on then to user policies. So the OpenAI terms of use -- sorry, the ChatGPT terms of service require you to comply with your usage policies, correct?

A. That's right.
Q. And those set out what constitutes improper use at ChatGPT?
A. That's right.
Q. And that includes prohibiting users from using OpenAI services for terrorism or violence, including hate-based violence and also weapons development, procurement or use, including conventional weapons or CBRNE; is that right?
A. That's right.
Q. We will come onto the systems for moderation but is this right, that there are options for OpenAI to moderate or flag user accounts and pause them, suspend them, ban them et cetera, in a sort of increasing scale of severity?
A. That's right. We have automated systems to detect potential harms, human review capabilities and then can apply a variety of sanctions to accounts.
Q. I want to move, please, onto teen users and age assurance. So, under 18s are prohibited under the terms of service, is that right -- sorry, under 13?
A. Under 13, that's right.
Q. Under 18s require parental consent before using ChatGPT?
A. That's right.
Q. And teen accounts have various age appropriate policies.

If we could have up your statement at page 22 OAI000001_0022 and paragraph 92 at the bottom of the page. So you tell us there, we will come onto linking with a parent, but:

"... teen accounts have age-appropriate policies that block certain age-inappropriate content. For example, with teen accounts 'we apply developmentally appropriate safeguards for teens, including [p]rotections against exposure to or promotion of harmful topics, such as sexual, romantic or violent roleplay; graphic violence; self-harm depictions; and dangerous activities."

We saw the model spec and what it said on some of these types of topics, but taking "violent roleplay" for example, is that something available and permitted for adults?
A. The violent roleplay, my understanding is that -- obviously it is not allowed for U18s. There is a certain level of sexualised roleplay that is enabled for over-18 users, that may be seen as violent roleplay and I believe that that's what we are referring to here.
Q. Does that permission concern you when thinking about the context of people who might be violence fixated and looking to consume violence online in a way that is harmful, in their circumstances?

A. Well, I think the repeated engagement with such behaviour, even for an over-18 user, would likely trigger safety context and reduce the sorts of responses that were provided. But most importantly, we would have our detection of violations of usage policy to identify those users that were showing a true repeated pattern of behaviour and the potential threat to express that in the real world.
Q. Okay, we will come onto those. Sticking with under 18s, could we have your paragraph 89, so just slightly up the page. Thank you. So you say:

"Enforcing these policies ..."

In other words, the age policies that we have gone through:

"... requires information about our users' ages. In addition to asking users to self-report their age, we use an age prediction system to help estimate whether a user is under 18. If we suspect a user is under 18, we place them in the under-18 experience; to move out of that experience, they must verify that they are 18 or older, or we have to be confident that they have become an adult. If we are not confident about a user's age, we default to an enhanced safety mode, which applies additional safeguards to sensitive content and interactions."

Just breaking that down; I previously asked you about the idea that under 18s require parental consent.
A. That's right.
Q. Just looking at that paragraph, there is no system in place to actually require consent to be provided to ChatGPT, is that right?
A. The system requires self-affirmation and then we have the age prediction models that we use internally.
Q. In terms of that self-affirmation, does a teen actually have to confirm that they have parental consent, or is it just something that's within the terms of use?
A. I'm not positive -- this is slightly outside of my core area of expertise -- I believe they have to affirm it, but we can check on that and verify.
Q. If you could, please. Because I think if it was purely in the terms of use, would you expect teens to actually read those, in practice?
A. Not in their entirety.
Q. There's the parental controls, which we will come onto. They can allow a parent to link their account with the teen, correct?
A. That's right.
Q. And that's not a way that OpenAI has chosen to require consent to be provided, is that right?
A. It is not required.

Q. That paragraph refers to adults wrongly identified as teens and says that they can verify that they are over 18. How do they do that?
A. They can provide identification to verify that they are over 18.
Q. So it is the provision of identification that is done, that's the technique that's used, is it?
A. It is.
Q. Then age prediction, how does that work?
A. Our age prediction modelling assesses the behaviour of a user, looking at things like the kinds of queries that they make, the times that they use the service and a number of other factors -- I'm not an expert on all of them -- to predict the age of a user.
Q. So, the input that a user puts into ChatGPT might be relatively scant, mightn't it? It might just be a few text prompts?
A. That's right, though it is important to understand that if we are unsure about the age of a user, we default to a safer experience.
Q. So when you first set up an account, is that default position a safer one or not?
A. That's right. It is a safer experience until we can get a clearer age prediction.
Q. So, in terms of where ChatGPT sits under the Online

Safety Act, I think this is right, it is a Category 2A service in relation to search engine functions?
A. That's my understanding.
Q. Yes, and the Inquiry has heard that the Crime and Policing Act 2026 has included a power to make regulations to apply the Online Safety Act -- parts of the Online Safety Act regime to certain AI services. But the witness statement of Ms Rowland at DCMS says that that is subject to a technical consultation before the end of the year.

Sir, for your reference that is DSIT000102/36.

SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: Thank you.
MR BOYLE: So, as things stand, ChatGPT is not what's called a "regulated user-to-user service" and so it is not obliged to introduce what's called "highly effective age assurance" under the Online Safety Act, is that right?
A. That's my understanding.
Q. Thank you. I appreciate these are technical issues of UK law.

The age prediction measures that you are referring to don't appear to come within the list of what Ofcom would deem "highly effective age assurance", although that list is non-exhaustive. Are you aware of that?
A. I'm aware, in broad strokes, around those requirements. I do think that our age estimation system -- it is

technical, it is ongoing and the persistence of such a system, I think, is a useful feature of an ongoing behaviour-based system because verification that occurs at a single point in time has its own limitations.
Q. So, it is not a like-for-like comparison because they are under different obligations, but TikTok's first step uses what might be a similar system, in that it uses behavioural -- what they call "signals" -- to draw conclusions about age based on their behaviour on the platform. And TikTok has been under investigation for Ofcom for whether that amounts to highly effective age assurance. It might be said that TikTok is likely to have more information about its users because it might have posts, photographs, friend networks and so on. Can you see that?
A. I can. I think the information is likely to be different. The social information of a social network is clearly valuable in some senses. For many of our users, we see them in engaging with -- you, know, a machine. They provide more information and are more effusive than sometimes you see on a social media platform and that provides different kinds of a signal.
Q. Thank you. Of course, the ability of users to provide an ID as a sort of appeal to being deemed under 18, implicit within that is the acceptance that that is

a more reliable method of age verification, would you agree?
A. I agree that it is a valuable method.
Q. More valuable?
A. Well, I think that IDs can be misappropriated, they can be spoofed, there are limits to that methodology and so I'm wary -- because I'm not an expert on age verification in these systems -- of comparing them, but I would recognise that different models have different strengths.
Q. Of course, if you have an ID, it is easy to produce it and for the most part, is probably verifiable. If you are looking at behavioural indicators, you might get different levels of information from different users, so some might provide very little, would you accept?
A. I would accept that. I would note that, at least in the States -- I'm not an expert here in the UK -- but we see real variance in access to reliable IDs among different populations and under-resourced populations tend to have less access which is a consideration when thinking about these systems.
Q. So we have addressed the serious risks -- the risks that exist with AI models in terms of potential capabilities to provide violent content but also, perhaps again unlike TikTok, content that could be of use to

a potential attacker; agreed?
A. I'm sorry, could you re-state? I apologise.
Q. Yes. So, we have already covered, in your evidence, the risks that exist with AI models in terms of, first of all, providing violent content but also, perhaps unlike social media platforms, content that might be of use to an attacker?
A. I think such material is sometimes available on social media platforms but it is certainly a risk that we aim to mitigate on our services.
Q. Okay, just talking about ChatGPT then. I think you have accepted that risk and accepted that there is a risk that remains even after the evaluation and you would see that risk even if the scores were perfect, correct?
A. I will certainly never, in my role, be satisfied by a perfect score on a benchmark.
Q. Thank you. We will come onto the evidence that the scores, at least for other models, might be considerably worse and potentially might give other reports which give a slightly different value for ChatGPT's performance. You are aware of those though, would you agree?
A. Yes, I'm aware of the reports.
Q. In that context, if OpenAI is putting team safety first, shouldn't ChatGPT but also other AI models to be

requiring highly effective age assurance?
A. I think we should use effective age assurance. We believe that our age estimation systems are quite effective. Now, understanding the ongoing regulatory debate here in the UK, if we become subject to such requirements, I have no doubt they will comply.
Q. So, the Ofcom evidence would suggest that the systems in place with OpenAI are not, in its sort of mainstream -- maybe I will put it that way -- requirements for highly effective age assurance? In other words it is not in the list such as things like IDs, telephone numbers, face scans, et cetera.

OpenAI then doesn't intend to move towards those requirements unless it is regulated to do so, is that right?
A. I'm not aware of such a plan.
Q. Thank you. Another part of the measures in place for teens is safety notifications. Could we have OAI000025.

Thank you. Page 2 OAI000025_0002, and the bottom of the page, so:

"Safety notifications."

And I should say, this is from a web page which is called "Strong safety protections with ChatGPT for Teens".

And we see there, safety notifications:

"For adults.

"When adults nominate a Trusted Contact they may be notified if our automated systems and trained reviewers detect a serious self-harm safety concern."

Then:

"ChatGPT for Teens.

"Parent/Teen linked teen accounts automatically include alerts if we detect signs of acute self-harm or violence-related risk involving their teen; alerts are optional and reviewed by a small group of trained experts. We will not share a teen's prompt and generation content with their parents."

So, is this right, self-harm is obviously is away from the Inquiry's interests but violence-related risk. So if a teen user shows a certain amount of violent-related risk, an alert will be given to their parent on a linked account?
A. That's right.
Q. And in broad terms, how are those violence-related risks assessed?
A. They are assessed -- initially, they are identified using an automated systems, and those automated systems are constantly evolving and being improved, and then referred to -- in this particular case, referred to a very specialised team of humans that make a judgement

call about whether or not such alerts should be sent. We have experts on child psychology and inference psychologists that have shaped that process.
Q. So they will consider the case and decide whether to make a notification, is that right?
A. That's right, in a specific case like this.
Q. There are other measures that we talked about of moderation, including banning accounts or suspending them.
A. That's right.
Q. With those lead to the same type of safety notification as well, or is it a separate process?
A. If a -- I will give you my best understanding but I will need to go back and check this. I believe, if an under 18 -- a linked under-18 account is removed for violence purposes, that alert does go to the parent.
Q. Thank you. If an account isn't linked -- I think there is another policy which suggests that, for example, suicidal ideation, it says OpenAI will attempt to contact parents and then alternatively, the authorities; so there is a separate system, is this right, for contacting outside of the linked account method; is that right?
A. My understanding is there is such a system. I'm not an expert in that suicide and self-harm referral

process.
Q. The question was -- and we will come to law enforcement, so put that to one side -- but does that alternative mechanism for contacting parents but also authorities exist in the absence of a linked account?
A. When we come to violence?
Q. Yes.
A. Yes, so when it comes to teens, yes. With the under-18 users, it is the same system whether it is suicide and self-harm or there is an indication of violence.
Q. So efforts might be made to contact a parent even in the absence of a linked account?
A. Yes, though obviously you can imagine the difficulties there.
Q. And alternatively, the authorities?
A. Yes, we do have systems -- those referrals, they generally go to law enforcement.
Q. Thank you, and we will pick up with those and thresholds for those.
The Inquiry has heard from Mr Ahmed who is the CEO for Center for Countering Digital Hate and he talked about new research he was carrying out on ChatGPT Teens. He caveated by saying that: at this stage, the research isn't complete and we don't have the paper. But he did raise a concern that the initial testing suggested that

the notifying of parents on linked accounts did not work.
Are you aware of that risk?
A. I'm aware that that claim has been made. I don't have detailed knowledge. I find that surprising, but I don't have detailed knowledge of it.
Q. Is that a matter of concern to you?
A. It is.
Q. And is it something that OpenAI is looking into?
A. I very much assume my colleagues are looking into it. I would not be the one to pursue that specific question.
Q. It is something that's come to the Inquiry's attention through its evidence, so your colleagues might not be aware. Will you take it back to them?
A. I will absolutely take it back to them.
Q. I want to, please, now move to a series of reports on ChatGPT. Could we have, please, ILT000196. So, Mr Fishman, this is a report from the Institute for Strategic Dialogue and I think also, you will see in the top right, the AI Security Institute.
It is called:
"Radicalisation in Closed Loops. Risks and Intervention Opportunities with AI Chatbots and Companions."
If we could go to page 4 ILT000196_0004, please. If

we could look actually, at the bottom paragraph of this. So.
"This research examines how systems respond when users raise extremist or conspiratorial themes, and whether those responses initiate, interrupt, sustain or intensify harmful conversational trajectories. It identifies that conversational AI models constitute a qualitatively unique and novel environment for radicalisation risk, distinct from both social media platforms and online extremist communities."
It says:
"... the research is designed not only to identify how these risks manifest, but to inform how they can be mitigated in practice."
So we are looking here at risk of radicalisation, not attack planning and things along those lines. Could we have, please, page 5 ILT000196_0005.
And just moving down the page, I'm looking at the second bullet point. So this is the "Key findings" and it is referring to:
"Mainstream models ..."
Of which ChatGPT was one. It says that they:
"... performed better than fringe systems, but were not risk-free. More than half of the mainstream models we researched give responses that were active

interventions, which clearly challenged or redirected harmful framing rather than accommodating it. However, this should not be mistaken for complete user safety. The study identified one in 30 responses from mainstream systems that were high risk, with the potential to contribute to radicalisation and broader threats to public safety."
Then if we could just go up slightly, I'm just looking now at the first bullet point on the right-hand side:
"Higher-risk outputs were more likely to reinforce harmful narratives than directly incite violence."
Then it talks about conspiracy theory validation being the most common harm category:
"This indicates that conversational AI is more likely to shape ideological interpretation and grievance framing rather than to promote overt violence in direct terms."
So I think that's what I was talking about before. This study is about radicalisation rather than attack planning, but we will see others.
Can we move, please, to page 17 ILT000196_0017. And the bottom left-hand corner of the page, please. It does a breakdown of the most prominent response per model and we see the list there. At the top, ChatGPT,

the most prominent response was "Active intervention with resources". So I assume this would be trying to redirect someone away from radicalisation-type prompts?

A. That's what we are attempting to do.

Q. We see the result of 71.7 per cent, which is one of the higher scores but I think you would accept still leaves a fair amount of margin for error?

A. We will endeavour to always raise that number.

Q. If we look at the top right of that page. Thank you. So there is a little bit more analysis here. It talks about Grok, Claude and ChatGPT having a similar high percentage of prospective responses and it also says that there were variations between these large language models in other response categories.

It goes on to say that ChatGPT and others "responded with uncritical validation in between 3.3-7.2 per cent of cases."

So lowish numbers, but uncritical valuation in response to prompts about radicalisation is concerning, do you agree?

A. I do.

Q. Thank you. Then, if we could go over the page to page 18 ILT000196_0018. Looking at the second paragraph on the left-hand side:

"Active encouragement/escalation did not account for

more than 5 per cent of responses from any mainstream model. ChatGPT, Claude and [others] did not produce any responses that actively encouraged or escalated harmful content. However, the other six mainstream models ... produced 48 instances of escalatory responses."

So I just include that to give the full picture. We can have that down from the screen, please. There is another AI model referred to in that paragraph which I'm not going to name because there's no need to. It is not a mainstream model and the report raises quite serious concerns with the responses that it gives.

That report, it seems that ChatGPT gave results which were broadly consistent with the other mainstream models in the sections we saw, although not without risk.

A. That's right.

Q. The risks from the non-mainstream models were significant, do you agree?

A. I do.

Q. And is that something that is of concern to you?

A. Absolutely. In fact, prior to joining OpenAI, I have published papers that describe some of the risks from some of the lesser known models that can be deployed locally, without -- with minimum constraints and I think that's certainly consistent with what we just saw but

also with the findings on the Tech Against Terrorism report and others --

Q. Which we will come to, yes. We'll come onto, I think, perhaps one of particular concern, which might be an open-weight model.

In terms of the steps that OpenAI puts in place, some of the safety measures and things that we have gone through, is it your assessment that some of the non-mainstream models are not doing some of that work? So we talked about the training and all sorts of other measures?

A. Obviously, I can't speak to the specifics and I do think there are limits to a third-party benchmarking like this. The great value that I find in these is when a third party finds that we have come up short on something, is to really dive in: why did that happen? And then we can take that back internally and then debug as best we can. That does take time. It takes effort. It takes commitment, that I think -- I suspect that you see some of that reflected in the high-level numbers coming from the more mainstream companies, not just mine. And without that sort of commitment, you may wind up with some of the lower scores.

Q. Yes, so I think what I'm leading to is whether there needs to be regulation of the industry as a whole for

those non-mainstream models, so that they don't produce, in the example of this report, information which encourages someone on a radicalisation journey?

A. I think it is a -- I think we would welcome some of those conversations, my CEO has said as much. I do think that it is -- one of the great challenges is defining exactly what is meant by that radicalisation journey and those features. I think industry and regulators across the globe have come to some sort of core agreement when it comes to child sexual abuse material. But such definitions have been hard for companies and regulators to come to in other areas. So while I agree that those conversations are imperative, I also think that we can't wait for them and need to do the best we can in the interim.

Q. I'm really thinking more about the issue of other AI models. So I haven't pulled up the screenshots of them, but some of the other AI models in this report, there are responses being given which strongly encourage misogyny, racism, all sorts of things and also violence as well. In those circumstances, should there not be regulation of the AI industry to put in measures which are at least consistent with those being done by the mainstream models across the board?

A. I think that anyone putting out a model like this has

a responsibility to take safety seriously and I encourage governments and regulators to strongly consider whether that should be required.
Q. So that is something OpenAI would welcome?
A. I think we have said -- including Sam himself has said that we would encourage and welcome conversations with regulators on a number of fronts.
SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: Mr Boyle, I am conscious of the stenographer. We have been going for an hour and 20 minutes or so.
MR BOYLE: Thank you, sir. Can I just --
SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: Yes, you certainly can --
MR BOYLE: -- have a few minutes, but not long. Thank you. If I can just test the stenographer's patience.
So -- and I will speak a bit more slowly as well. The Inquiry is not concerned with terrorism in the traditional sense, so this report is looking at radicalisation, and we have talked about the concepts, but there might be other forms of radicalisation for this type of cohort, like information that glorified past attackers, by way of example. We talked about violent roleplay, would -- sorry, I'll start again. What would prevent ChatGPT from role-playing a mass killer, for example?
A. The way that we apply model policy today prohibits such

behaviour and indications of glorifying past attackers is also something that we would understand, particularly if combined with interest in weapons or something like that, as a usage policy violation that could result in the removal of the account.
Q. Thank you. You might be aware of the evidence of generative AI that was used to create the highly offensive footage that was posted on TikTok, which showed images of AR hugging Elsie, Bebe and Alice with the use of highly offensive language and also posts which glorified AR and the events of 29 July 2024.
ChatGPT can do generative AI, in other words it can create images, correct?
A. It can.
Q. Again, what are the safeguards outside of the model spec we have seen from it doing that?
A. Production of images that glorify past attackers or elevate them in some way is a violation of our rules. We also have mechanisms, I would note, to test the provenance of images that are produced by OpenAI. I think this is an important standard that many of the major labs are doing now. So that if an image is widely distributed, it is easy to put into our system. Any user of the public can do this to test whether our systems were used to generate it, so that it can be

easily debunked. Now, that's -- hopefully, we never get to that point, but I do think that those kinds of systems are also valuable for the public at large.
Q. So I think you said that would be a breach of the user policy. Are there systems in place to stop that image being produced in the first place?
A. We do have detection systems around attackers. I think that -- an area that I want to make sure that we improve in is the ability to identify those in real time. This is a place where social media firms have dealt with this extensively in the past. It is not the core dynamic that you see in a foundation lab scenario where these things tend to play out over longer periods of time. But an area that I certainly want to improve is the ability to, when something new happens, make sure that we can identify it very quickly and build our systems out to do that.
Q. Thank you. We saw in the model spec that there is prohibited content, which would be child sexual abuse material. Couldn't Generative AI, with images of mass killers and their victims, be included within that, that it is a: no response under any circumstances? Because there can't be a good use of that type of material, can there?
A. The way we think about now is that is would be

prohibited, that's my understanding in all circumstances, but the -- I would want to check on that, but that's my understanding.
Q. Can you come back to us?
A. Yes, absolutely.
MR BOYLE: Thank you. Sir, if that's a good moment?
SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: 10 minutes?
MR BOYLE: Yes.
SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: Just past 3.10 pm.
(3.02 pm)
(A short break)
(3.11 pm)
SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: Yes, Mr Boyle.
MR BOYLE: Thank you. Mr Fishman, I just want to come onto a couple more reports. The first is the Tech Against Terrorism that you have referred to. It is TAT000012, if we could have that up on screen, please.
So we see the front page there. Could we have page 4 TAT000012_0004. So, we see there, that the report is:
"The first step towards developing a comprehensive set of benchmarks that analyse how Large Language Models ... respond to terrorist exploitation. Our intent is to raise awareness that, with some notable exceptions, AI models show only a thin veneer of safety

even for prompts that should be obviously rejected. With rudimentary single-shot examples, many models provide meaningful uplift for terrorist use cases such as making bombs or planning mass casualty attacks. This is not acceptable."

So this report is benchmarking attack-planning type information, correct?

A. That's right.

Q. Thank you. Could we have page 6 TAT000012_0006, please. So there is a bit of an explanation of what the benchmark is. Could we just go down slightly. Thank you. Just the middle of the page:

"The question this report then answers: when a person asks an AI model to enable terrorist activity, how often, and how usefully, does it comply? A note on terminology: throughout this report, 'compliance' (and 'complied') refers to a model complying with the user's request, not to compliance with safety policy. Because every prompt tested is a harmful one, a compliant response is one that assists with terrorist [and] extremist activity rather than refusing it."

Then it goes on to the concept of "uplift" which you have already talked about:

"... the extent to which a model provides or compiles insights and information above the baseline of

what can be found online ordinarily through search."

If we could then, please, move to page 7 TAT000012_0007:

"Why does this matter?"

Tech Against Terrorism talks about the issues that we have referred to, and says that:

"Terrorist and violent extremist exploitation of AI is no longer hypothetical or anecdotal: Tech Against Terrorism's incident tracker documents more than 30 public cases in which AI systems were used as an operational assistant in terrorism, violent extremism or mass violence, across at least 11 different AI tools and linked to more than 70 deaths ..."

So we have that. If we go to page 12 TAT000012_0012, please and the bottom of that page. We have some examples there. So:

"... November 2025, a vehicle-borne IED detonated near the Red Fort in Delhi, killing at least 11 people. The plot was linked to an Al-Qaeda-aligned module whose 'in-house engineer' had used ChatGPT and YouTube to research device construction and explosive chemistry ..."

If we then look in the left-hand box:

" ... [a] physician arrested over an alleged ricin plot ..."

Which of course the Inquiry is familiar with from AR in terms of use of ricin, and:

"... is reported to have used ChatGPT as a chemical-weapons research tool."

Manhattan, we see the example:

"... bomb plot is alleged to have built seven functional explosive devices using AI-derived chemistry."

Then, on the right-hand side, the Cybertruck bombing in Las Vegas:

"... the first US ... to name ChatGPT in attack preparation."

That is, is it not, a very concerning list of examples?

A. Absolutely.

Q. Particularly in the fact that three of them named ChatGPT?

A. Absolutely. We are by far the most widely used generative AI chatbot, so it doesn't surprise me that users have found our services.

Q. I understand that, Mr Fishman, but if -- and I know you'll say: well, the risk can't be perfect, but if all the safeguards were perfect, then they would be forced to look elsewhere, wouldn't they?

A. Yes.

Q. Can we have page 17 TAT000012_0017. So this is the results of the benchmarking. It says:

"The four largest closed models refused most requests ..."

And it gives the full refusal rates, which for ChatGPT was 48 per cent. So we see in the bar graph it is the lowest, although I think we should add that it says:

"ChatGPT's strict refusal rate was low but the answers it provided had limited uplift."

In other words, it was giving responses but not much information?

A. That's right. This is consistent with our strategy of safe completions. And it is hard to know exactly how to reflect that strategy in numbers like these, versus the other services. But that finding is consistent with that approach.

Q. I know there is a huge amount of maths that sits behind this graph, this report and ChatGPT's evaluations, but is it concerning to you that the results that we have seen before, seem to be so different to the benchmarking that Tech Against Terrorism has done?

A. Well, you know, elsewhere in this report it indicates that ChatGPT does provide minimal uplift and scores very well on that front. Obviously our approach is different

than some of the other models here. But the reason we developed and are applying that approach of safe completions plus refusals is because, in our internal testing, we found that it was the best way to limit uplift to a malicious user.

Q. We see elsewhere in this report considerably worse scoring for what are called open-weight models, or models that had been abliterated or de-guardrailed. Just in simple terms, that is removing the kind of protective measures that were in place when the model was designed, is that right?

A. That's right. Those are the protective measures that are in place -- that are applied during the training process.

Q. So OpenAI does provide some open-weight models which can be, is this right, abliterated, in other words, the guardrails can be removed?

A. So we do provide open-weight models and we have actually tested the ability to remove some of those guardrails. I think that some of them have been some really novel efforts to limit the impact of that abliteration and I can direct you to the paper that we wrote about that.

One of the things that you can do, when you understand that you are providing an open-weight model versus a closed-weight model that is going to be subject

to that entire safety stack, is that you can adjust, as we have done in our case, the material that is provided to the model during training. So you can be more restrictive in that case, and that will limit its scope and ability to respond to certain areas.

Now, even that is not perfect, but we do take extra care and effort, with the open-weight models that we release, to limit the ability of a malicious user to remove those guardrails.

Q. Does OpenAI retain control over who can make use of these models when they are released?

A. We do not.

Q. Shouldn't there be some sort of restriction on access outside certain contexts?

A. So this is the -- one of the great challenges with an open-weight model. One of the advantages and the reason why governments around the world, start-ups et cetera, enjoy open-weight models is because they can be downloaded, they can be run on a laptop, in some cases. But, that does create challenges in terms of oversight because a company like ours that monitors the use of our closed-weight models very carefully, we are not able to do that in an open-weight context.

Q. Just before we move away from this report, the heading of that 3.5-section is "The largest closed models are

often safer but still have major gaps". Do you accept that shows there is still considerably more to do for safety, for ChatGPT and for these other models?

A. I certainly accept that AI models are getting better all the time and those of us that work at these firms have the responsibility to continue to innovate and improve on safety as we move forward, absolutely.

Q. Thank you. And the last report is the Center for Countering Digital Hate, CCDH000030. It is a report that's dated March 2026 and I think was testing of ChatGPT-5.1, so before ChatGPT-6.

It tested, I think, in total ten popular AI chatbots, to see to what extent they would assist a user planning an attack. Can we have page 5 CCDH000030_0005, please. So just as we go through this report, we see at the top the Cybertruck explosion that we have already gone through. There is reference to Tumbler Ridge that we will come onto and at the bottom, we see the Pirkkala School attack in Finland as well, just to add to the real concern of all these events.

Could we turn to page 6 CCDH000030_0006. So the "Key findings" here set out the methodology. So:

"We tested how popular chatbots respond to users planning violent attacks.

"Researchers at CCDH and CNN tested ten

chatbots ..."

As I have said, and the next bullet point:

"Tests were designed to reflect a range of violent attack scenarios in the US and EU:"

Including:

"School shootings or knife attacks.

"Assassinations targeting politicians.

"[And] bombings targeting political parties or synagogues."

And it says:

"8 in 10 chatbots typically assist users planning violent attacks."

It is only Snapchat and Anthropic's Claude that typically refuse to assist attackers. Then it gives an example of chatbots offering practical assistance with a violent attack, including:

"ChatGPT gave high school campus maps to a user interested in school violence."

Again, I know there will be maths and data that sits behind this, but that is another matter of concern, is it not?

A. It is.

Q. It goes on to say:

"9 in 10 chatbots fail to reliably discourage would-be attackers."

At the bottom, that bullet point says:

"ChatGPT and DeepSeek occasionally offer discouragement."

There are some tables here. If we could go to page 7 CCDH000030_0007, just the top line:

"Researchers recorded repeated conversations in which they acted as teen users planning violent attacks, marking how often the [chatbot] would assist them or discourage them."

If we then go to page 10 CCDH000030_0010. We see there "chatbots that assisted in over half [the] responses".

If we can go down slightly. We see that Claude and Snapchat refused in over half the responses. Although ChatGPT is the best of the remainder, it is still over half responses in which it agreed or provided actionable information. That's a high percentage, is it not?

A. It is certainly higher than I would want it. I do think it is worth noting that this study is of 5.1. We have seen that the 6 model is significantly safer. And that this testing was done prior to our imposition of the sort of safety context methodology that we use now. But yes, certainly with what I understand of the methodology, we endeavour to do better.

Q. I understand that you are saying that the current model

is better but if the previous model was giving such a high percentage of assistance, that shouldn't have been released, should it?

A. I wasn't at OpenAI during this assessment process and I don't know exactly what the methodology here was. What I can say is that when such a report comes out, it is our responsibility to try to understand those limits, assess the methodology and improve.

Q. Is there a risk that desire to make progress in a fast-moving field, and perhaps competition for customers for a new technology, means that safety is not always given the attention that it deserves?

A. I would argue that the arc of the technology suggests that it is getting both safer and more helpful and that's certainly what we see with the 6 models --

Q. Though not in the most recent, 6.1?

A. Well, 6.1 wasn't released.

Q. Again, this paints a very different picture to the evaluation scores that we saw. Is that one of your concerns, when looking at this, that the testing at the end might not be fully effective?

A. I think whenever you see a third-party benchmark like this -- and I think it is difficulty for third parties to develop these benchmarks, though I think it is really important, but less so for the numerical value that they

develop and more because they force questions like these, frankly. And more specifically, they force us to go in and try to uncover what was actually going on here: do we agree with this score and if that uncovers some sort of structural weakness, to close it.

Q. So, another suggestion that was made by Tech Against Terrorism is the need for measuring and testing by independent specialists before a model is released. I know that OpenAI gave the AI Safety Institute early access to frontier models. Has that been done with latest models as well?

A. I'm not certain. I know that we are providing models to the US institute for such testing and I believe to the UK too, but I'm not positive about that.

Q. Do those tests include this sort of material? So, in other words, violent attacks and things along those lines?

A. Again, I'm not positive on exactly what's included but I think -- my understanding is that those -- that testing is focused primarily on cyber security issues, chemical and biological weapons and most specifically, the issue of controllability of the model over time. As you know, from media reports, I am sure that's obviously a concern.

Q. Is then there a risk that the violence is not getting

the attention that it needs?

A. Not internally, but I think that it is valuable for those of us at labs to engage third parties like CCDH, like Tech Against Terrorism. We had Adam Hadley come in and sort of explain his findings. We can certainly do more of that and we should do more of that and I have been at the company now four months, we will do more of that.

Q. Given the benefit, would OpenAI accept mandatory, independent pre-released testing of its models?

A. I think we would very much want to understand exactly what that would entail but we certainly agree with the idea of working with third parties to test our models across a range of areas.

Q. Moving on now, please, to identifying and reporting warning signs from users. We have covered this in some -- to some extent. But, just, first of all, on on-platform measures. Is this right -- we have talked about I think banning, suspending, those types of measures -- there's also a violence interstitial and account pauses. Could you just explain what those are and what prompts them?

A. Yes, this is a new technique that we have developed. In our engagement with violence prevention experts, almost universally, they say you do not want to wait to a point

where a person is expressing violent intent to the point where you need to ban them. You want to try and identify earlier signals and provide some sort of assistance or intervention at that time, even if -- and this is most likely in most cases -- there will be no violence.

So we are experimenting right now with interventions that intend to identify individuals further upstream. What those will do is they will close a conversation, they may put a pause on the account and then direct the user to our help centre, which provides resources to mental health services and those sorts of things.

Our goal there is to indicate, very clearly and early on, to a user that that is not an acceptable use of our service. But also to get folks access and to inform them about places where they can get access to help. And this is brand new testing is ongoing, literally as we speak.

Q. That is the sort of automated system, is it? Or does it have human intervention?

A. The vast majority of that will be automated, yes.

Q. But there will be cases where humans look at it and decide that the interstitial is the appropriate response?

A. That's right. There will be circumstances where --

well, yes, in some circumstances, but the vast majority of that will be automated.

Q. Moving on, then, to the kind of detection systems more widely. So, is this right, there are automated systems on ChatGPT to identify potentially concerning activity at scale?

A. That's right.

Q. And is this right, also separate teams that develop automated scoring or systems for different areas, including violent content?

A. Much of that is housed within the same team but obviously, there are individuals in sub-teams that work on specific problems.

Q. Thank you. And ChatGPT can use now short, factual summarises of earlier warnings signs to respond appropriately?

A. That's right, yes. We have referred to this as "safety context". So when there is a pattern of behaviour that indicates -- even if a violation hasn't occurred but it may be a pattern that suggests somebody is a higher risk user, then we can instruct the model to provide even safer responses.

Q. Thank you, and then the automated flagging can raise cases, or escalate them to human -- for human review, is that right?

A. That's correct.

Q. And those human reviewers are, of course, trained on the policies and protocols.

Do human reviewers also have expertise?

A. They certainly develop expertise over time if they don't have it initially. They receive training on the kinds of harms that we see. We --

Q. Sorry, I'm going to cut across you. It is not quite what I meant. I meant are there also user specialists? You made previous reference to psychologists in some circumstances?

A. Yes, we definitely have specialists with expertise like myself and others, who design those policies and assist with the training. But the reviewers, that is a more scaled process, so not everybody has that sort of background.

Q. Do the reviewers receive sufficient information about the user's history to be able to understand the kind of context?

A. Yes. So, the automated detection obviously is looking at that context. Then we provide information at a sort of first level of decision, that provides some context on the prompts or the behaviour that was deemed concerning. That is limited to some extent for privacy purposes. We don't know necessarily, at that point,

that a violation has occurred and we want to calibrate how much of a user's personal musings are available to a reviewer.

Now, if an investigation -- if, at that level, we deem that there is the possibility of a more real-world threat, then that can trigger a second-level review, where those reviewers have access to a wider range of information.

Q. Were we talking at cross-purposes perhaps, does that second-level review involve people with some more specialised expertise?

A. In some cases, yes.

Q. So I think there are references to mental health, behavioural and violence prevention experts. Are those used at OpenAI?

A. They are. We also have individuals with law enforcement and intelligence backgrounds. For example, within our legal team, the former head of the FBI's behavioural analysis unit, that does the psychological profiling of attackers similar to AR and others.

Q. Thank you. Then, in terms of using that information -- or whether action needs to be taken for that information, you tell us the test for referral to law enforcement is a credible and imminent risk of death or serious physical harm to others. Is that right?

A. That's right.
Q. In terms of distinguishing between users who may have an interest in violence or gore, versus those who have that interest but also might be moving towards real-world violence, I think you tell us in your statement that that is a difficult task, is that right?
A. It is.
Q. And in terms of making that determination, what does OpenAI use? Is it the expertise of the people that we have been referring to?
A. Yes. I mean, we use the credible and imminent standard, the credibility can be expressed either explicitly or implicitly but ultimately, those -- the final judgement there is made by the individuals on our legal team who do have expertise in this area.
Q. Can I ask what would happen at an earlier stage? So suppose you have a UK-based 17-year-old who is showing sustained preoccupation with mass killing and stabbing others but gives no target, means or timing; does that sort of person get referred? What further action might happen in someone in similar circumstances?
A. It is difficult to say in a hypothetical scenario. This is the kind of person that, at a very early stage, we would want -- likely to want to apply one of those interventions to. That intervention might lead to the

removal of their account, depending on the specificity of the language and how it manifests. And if that behaviour occurs over long periods of time, in particular, if there are references to weapons or anything along those lines, that's going to trigger the sorts of investigations that could lead to a law enforcement referral.
Q. And outside of law enforcement referral, I think we have seen the possibility of referral to a parent for a teen user. Is that the -- are those the only two routes that are available?
A. In terms of a referral to a third party, yes, it would be to a parent or to a law enforcement. Now, there is -- the intervention will provide resources to the user but the user would have to take them.
Q. Thank you. Now, in terms of the referrals, you tell us that there had been referrals concerning threats to life but also coordinated harmful activity, cyber and information operations, is that right?
A. That's right.
Q. And a recent press release said that more than 200 law enforcement referrals were made in the third quarter of 2026, is that right?
A. Those were specific to threat to life scenarios, yes.
Q. Thank you. Would OpenAI agree with the need for

a statutory reporting duty on AI providers, but also other technology platforms, to report those kind of threat to life matters to law enforcement?
A. I think clarity in those definitions would be valuable. It certainly has been in the child sexual abuse material realm. As I mentioned earlier, I think it is -- it will be a difficult task for governments and regulators to come to agreement on what exactly that standard ought to look like.

That said, I think it is worth having the conversation.
Q. Thank you. In terms of the information that can be provided to law enforcement, again, just talking quite generally, is OpenAI able to provide sufficient history and detail of a user? You talked about privacy considerations and I don't know how long data is retained for; is that an issue?
A. I can't speak to all of the data retention issues. And we -- most of the time, we do not get granular feedback from law enforcement agencies once we have made a referral. But in general, the feedback is that at least the information that we are providing is actionable. They are able to investigate with it.
Q. Thank you. Can we have your statement up at page 18 OAI000001_0018, paragraph 72. Just at the bottom of the

page. So you tell us:

"OpenAI has had meetings with law enforcement agencies in the UK to discuss threat intelligence, and to establish mechanisms for OpenAI to correspond with key governmental bodies. We have also made, through the FBI's National Threat Operations Center, law enforcement referrals about UK users."

And it says:

"We are committed to deepening our relationships and engagement with UK law enforcement agencies to address any future referrals."

The risk is if you make a commitment like that, a lawyer asks: is there more that could be done? But when you say "deepening our relationships", is there more that can be done in that respect?
A. We have an ongoing dialogue with the NCA among other law enforcement agencies and I think, speaking broadly, there are two goals there. One is to make sure that we have the right relationships to pass information when necessary. And the second is to learn because obviously we are not the experts. We see what we see on our platform. Even a very large platform like ours though, sometimes when you are staring through a straw, you are staring through a straw. So it is important for us to speak to those third parties, including law enforcement

agencies, to get context for what we may see.
Q. Thank you. The final topic is the Tumbler Ridge attack. Now, OpenAI have provided a letter which says that the events are subject to Canadian law enforcement investigations, ongoing civil litigation and are privileged under US law. Sir, for your record, that is OAI000033. Obviously the Inquiry is not investigating the full underlying circumstances of the Tumbler Ridge attack but its terms of reference obviously cover whether OpenAI's concerns about a VFI planning real-world violence would prompt a report to UK law enforcement. Do you follow, Mr Fishman?
A. I do.
Q. Thank you. I do, therefore, want to pull up the open letter that was published after the Tumbler Ridge attack which was a letter to the Canadian authorities. It is OAI000030.
There, you are setting out immediate steps OpenAI is taking in response to what's been learned in the wake of the events.
Then, in the following paragraph, it says:
"... we shared with you and with Canadian law enforcement, in June 2025, OpenAI made a decision to shut down [the] ChatGPT account of the perpetrator of the Tumbler Ridge tragedy after detecting a violation of

our usage policy. [Your] automated system detected the account and it was subsequently sent to human review to determine whether our usage policies were violated and whether the account warranted referral to law enforcement."
So the systems that we have talked about were in place at that point:
"Based on what we could see at that time the account was banned in ... 2025, we did not identify credible and imminent planning that met our threshold to refer the matter to law enforcement."
There is, then, I think, the commitment to "identify potential warning" signs. Then the bottom paragraph:
"Over the past several months, we have taken steps to strengthen our safeguards and made changes to our law enforcement referral ..."
If we go down, please, there are commitments here. I just want to go through them and invite your comments. So:
"Continue to Strengthen our Enhanced Law Enforcement Referral Protocol."
Is that what we have covered in a UK-based sense, with your relationship through the NCA?
A. I think that's right. Yes.
Q. Or when you say "referral protocol", that's about the

internal ways --
A. Right. This also speaks to how we investigate and the standards that we use.
Q. Thank you. If we could turn over the page OAI000030_0002, please. There is a reference there in the second paragraph to "referral criteria". Can you assist with this, my understanding is that that's not, in fact, a single document that is disclosable. Is that correct?
A. That's right. That speaks to our legal teams' direct decision-making process. My understanding -- I'm not a lawyer -- is that that is privileged.
Q. Thank you:
"Develop a Direct Point of Contact with Canadian Law Enforcement."
That, I think, we have spoken about the UK equivalent:
"Embed Country and Community Context in our Deescalation Work."
Can you help how that might apply in the UK?
A. Yes, I think one of the key elements here is we have been working with a violence prevention organisation called Moonshot CVE. They are active in the UK. I assume --
Q. They have provided a statement to the Inquiry.

A. Yes, and they have both used their in-house expertise but also connected us with a range of different third parties to bring in a wider range of expertise and context as we think about deescalation work. Some of that has been folded into those violence intervention strategies that we are testing now.
Q. Then:
"Enhance our System to Detect Repeat Policy Violators."
We see in that paragraph, it says:
"Despite this ... system, after the name of the Tumbler Ridge perpetrator was released publicly, we discovered that the perpetrator had used a second ChatGPT account. We shared the second account with law enforcement upon its discovery."
Are there now measures in place to detect users who might be using ChatGPT for malign reasons, banned, and then seek to re-open an account?
A. Yes. Internally, the language there is recidivist accounts. Sometimes we see users who have had accounts removed and they create another one. Sometimes they have created multiple accounts for various other reasons. Our ability to identify that there are multiple accounts associated with the same user has improved significantly.

Q. Just wrapping this all up. First of all, does OpenAI have appropriate resources dedicated to consider these sorts of issues?
A. Yes. It is a matter of execution and iteration.
Q. If any concerns about decisions to refer to law enforcement were justified in the past, are you confident that those have now been improved?
A. Yes, they have certainly been improved, though I am confident that we -- as we assess trends in the future, that we will want to improve them more.
Q. And what level of assurance can you give, if a UK-based VFI was demonstrating highly concerning behaviour showing a risk of real-world violence, that they would be referred to UK law enforcement?
A. If they were showing the sorts of behaviour that we saw in Tumbler Ridge, based on our standards now, they would be referred.
MR BOYLE: Thank you. Those are my questions.
SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: Mr Fishman, I'm very grateful to you for the detail of your evidence, for your careful witness statement and what certainly seemed to me to be your evident candour today. So, thank you very much indeed.
We now need to have a break, I think.
MR BOYLE: We do, yes.

SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: How long, Mr Boyle?
MR BOYLE: I think 10 minutes.
SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: We will sit again at 4.00 pm. Thank you.
(3.48 pm)
(A short break)
(4.00 pm)
WITNESS A (affirmed)
SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: Thank you very much. Please have a seat.
A. Thank you.
SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: Yes, Mr Moss.
Questions by MR MOSS
MR MOSS: Thank you, sir. Witness A, you are giving evidence to this Inquiry on an anonymised basis on behalf of the company Telegram, pursuant to a Restriction Order made by the learned Chair on 9 November of this year and under the terms of that Restriction Order, the Chair has ruled that you should be anonymised and referred to as "Witness A". You should be screened from members of the public, but will be visible to the Chair, counsel to the Inquiry, Core Participants and their legal representatives and the accredited media -- and there is at least one member of the accredited media present, sir.

There shall be no public broadcast of your evidence. This will not preclude the publication of transcripts of your evidence and there should be no publication of your name or such information as will likely result in your identification, which is subject, in our materials, to type 2 restriction.
Against that background, can we just have on screen, please, TEL000018. This, Witness A, is your statement to the Inquiry. If we go to page 16 TEL000018_0016, we see that it is dated 9 October of this year. You have signed that. We have obviously redacted that, both for anonymity and privacy. But can you confirm that the contents of this statement are true to the best of your knowledge and belief?
A. Yes, that is correct.
Q. Thank you. If we go back to page 1 TEL000018_0001, paragraph 2, you describe your role as being a Finance and Government Relations Principal for Telegram. I think that is a role you have had since May 2025, is that correct?
A. That's correct.
Q. Your responsibilities fall into two areas. We are not so concerned, for the moment, for the finance side. But on the Government relations side, they include preparing and coordinating Telegram's documents and responses to

requests for information from governors, regulators and other public authorities, hence, no doubt, your selection as a witness today?
A. Correct.
Q. Thank you. You are authorised by Telegram to provide the statement and to give evidence. Do you also have an oversight and understanding of the safety approach, in terms of precautions that are taken by Telegram, in particular in relation to violent material?
A. I do and any information that wasn't readily available to me from my own knowledge was provided to me by colleagues of mine in preparation of this.
Q. Thank you. You set out in your statement -- and perhaps, it is helpful to have it in mind early -- Telegram's core philosophy. So if we look at the bottom of page 2 TEL000018_0002, paragraph 8, you say that.
"... Telegram's core philosophy revolves around the principles of privacy and freedom of expression. [And it] was created with the specific aim of protecting the right to private communication and freedom of speech, in particular, in states with repressive and authoritarian governments. That founding purpose continues to shape the service in a number of ways including in relation to the company's approach to encryption, data minimisation and confidentiality."

You say that:

"The service continues to be used by journalists, activists and vulnerable online communities, for whom secure and confidential communication is often essential not only to their physical safety but to their ability speak freely at all."

Is that correct?

A. That's correct.

Q. And one draws -- we don't need to turn it up -- when you address issues such as VPNs, you draw on the importance that Telegram places on security of information and anonymity for those who are speaking out against repressive regimes, yes?

A. That is correct.

Q. In paragraph 9, you say:

"At the same time, Telegram recognises that privacy and freedom of expression do not remove the need to protect users, and that private or encrypted spaces can, like any means of communication, be, misused by a small minority of bad actors."

What is Telegram's overall approach to trying to limit the abuse of its systems by bad actors?

A. I think we very clearly state in our terms of service that in instances where we identify harmful content or illegal content, it's immediately removed as soon as we

are alerted to it. And we obviously take account-level actions against people who are identified as perpetuating illegal offences on the platform. Those can be banning them, for example.

Q. And does the emphasis that you provide to free speech aspects mean that you will err more on the side of allowing a certain level of violent material than other platforms, do you think?

A. I don't think so. I think, while respecting people's privacy, we also act accordingly within the letter of the law to remove violent content and take action against people who are perpetuating violent content on the platform.

Q. We will come back to some aspects of that. If we look at some of the core aspects of the Telegram product and Telegram's background, really. Could we start by looking at page 3 TEL000018_0003, paragraph 13.

You set out there the services which Telegram offers and describe it as "four principal environments".

So the first of those is:

"Secret chats [which are] one-to-one conversations protected by end-to-end encryption. This means that the content is accessible only to the participants on their devices and is encrypted in transit."

Is that right?

A. That is correct.

Q. You say that:

"Telegram cannot access the content of these chats. A participant may nonetheless report abuse, in which case Telegram can act on the account concerned."

Yes?

A. That is correct, yes.

Q. In those situations, it sounds from your statement, as though that acting on the account concerned, because for example, a recipient of a message has reported abuse, but you are still not able to look at what was sent?

A. That is correct. The communication space is end-to-end encryption.

Q. Thank you. Over the page TEL000018_0004, there are also "private chats" which are:

"... one-to-one conversations between users encrypted in transit and at rest. They are cloud-based, meaning [that] they can be accessed across multiple devices. [But] like secret chats, Telegram cannot access the content of [those] chats. A participant may nonetheless report abuse ..."

And again, Telegram can then act on the account concerned.

I am sure it is my fault, but can you explain the difference, therefore, between secret chats and private

chats?

A. I think it is a very fair question. Secret chats are specifically in end-to-end encrypted spaces, where "end-to-end encryption" means that only the two devices communicating have those respective keys. Private chats, because they are cloud-based, are different, which is it is still communicate between two users but the keys are split out and Telegram can still not access those chats. So it's a different form of encryption.

Q. All right, but on the cloud, where they're stored -- is that a difference between them, the cloud storage?

A. Correct.

Q. Yes, but they're still encrypted on the cloud?

A. Yes.

Q. And just as Telegram couldn't access them, presumably, law enforcement couldn't access them without the de-encryption from the device?

A. That's correct, yes.

Q. Is that true of both private chats and secret chats?

A. For secret chats, yes, it is true.

Q. Thank you. Then, channels are one-to-many broadcasting tools, so a single person or a single organisation broadcasting to many. And there:

"Channel owners publish content to their subscribers. All channels and their content are subject

to moderation."
A. That is correct.
Q. So you have complete access?
A. It is in a public space, so we are able to scan that content and moderate it accordingly.
Q. So does that equate to complete access to what is broadcast or not?
A. Yes.
Q. And then, fourthly:
"Group chats are conversations among[st] multiple users."
So rather than channels, which are one-to-many, group chats are, as we understand it, multiple people able to share information in a group. They can be private, but they can be accessible by invitation or a link or they can be public. Is that right?
A. That is correct.
Q. And "administrators" of the group chats "can enable additional protections" for their groups. Just pausing there. That's not Telegram administrators, that is the administrators of the group chats?
A. Yes.
Q. "... including Slow Mode, which limits how often an individual member can send messages, and Aggressive Anti-Spam, [adding] a further layer of spam filtering."

And you say all groups and their content are subject to moderation, yes?
A. That's correct.
Q. So again, does that mean you have full access to what is shared on Telegram group chats?
A. Could you define "full access" please?
Q. Yes, you can see and moderate what is going on in the group chat, so what is being posted to the group chats, what they are sending each other?
A. No, that is not correct for private spaces. In the instance of a user report in a private space, that item of content would be shared with a member of the moderation team and they would be able to review it, along with the accounts related to it.
Q. All right, so when you say "subject to moderation", does that mean you can get access to it?
A. No, when we say "subject to moderation", we are referring to potential reports. So user reports in the moderation off the back of it and also one of the methods of moderation that we use, such as hash matching, to identify potentially harmful items of content, specifically media that is posted in a private group.
Q. All right, so is this right, unless someone creates a report, if it is in a private group, but a group chat,

so it is not public -- is this right, what is required is either that somebody in that group creates a report and says "I'm concerned about it", in which case, you request access and get access?
A. When you make a user report, the item of content that is reported is shared with the moderation team.
Q. So they share it in that way. And we will come onto hashing. But are you automatically checking material for matches against hashes?
A. Correct.
Q. Without any reports being made?
A. Correct.
Q. But otherwise, unless it comes up as a hit for a hash, or somebody has reported it, you are not actively moderating the content?
A. In private groups, that is correct.
Q. In private groups. So, when you say "all groups and their content are subject to moderation", in fact, the level of moderation is relatively limited if it is a private group, although there is that element?
A. I'm not sure I would agree with "relatively limited". I think our hash matching database is quite extensive and our user reports functionality works very efficiently because of the desire for our users to operate in a safe online space.

Q. The hashtags, can we deal with that in broad outline now?
A. Sure.
Q. I think that will cover terrorist-related material?
A. Yes.
Q. And child sexual abuse material?
A. It would.
Q. Does it also cover gore and violent content that's not linked to terrorism?
A. It may do, yes.
Q. Well, does it?
A. I can't speak to the full extent of the hash matching databases, it is quite extensive, but my understanding is yes, there are some examples of gore in that hash matching database.
Q. Thank you. The group chats, we understand -- we don't need to turn to these necessarily -- but they can be very large in number?
A. Correct.
Q. Up to hundreds of thousands, 200,000 --
A. I believe 200,000 is the cap, yes.
Q. Thank you. Only registered users can access the platform?
A. That is correct.
Q. That is one of the cautions, I think?

A. Yes.
Q. Users are not required to provide their real name, their gender or their age but they can provide a screen display name, is that right?
A. Yes, but a user also self-declares their age upon registration.
Q. And there is an option to have a username, I think?
A. There is.
Q. Thank you. For the reasons we have touched on already, anonymity, not being required to give your real name, seems to be a feature of Telegram's approach, is that right?
A. I would say so.
Q. Do you have a view on whether in a country, in a climate such as the UK, that has some downsides, in terms of anonymity making people feel more inclined or less restricted in posting violent material, hateful material, because their real name isn't associated with it?
A. I'm not sure anonymity is a causative factor. I would argue every individual has a right to anonymity and privacy.
Q. Thank you. In terms of the groups, we have touched on this partly already, but they can be private -- completely private or completely public, but we

understand there's also something of a middle ground. So they can be accessible by an invitation or a link, is that correct?
A. That is correct, yes.
Q. Those that are public, subscribers can find by search terms?
A. We have a global search function, yes.
Q. Thank you. What about channels? Are there any restrictions on who the channels can be accessed by, is that only limited by whether you subscribe or not?
A. I would have to confirm. My understanding is that you can also search for channels in the same way you can search for public groups, through the global search function.
Q. Thank you. Then is subscription free, or subject to payment --
A. It is free.
Q. So you can search for those and if something is being broadcast on a channel, anyone who is subscribed, can follow a particular channel?
A. That's correct.
Q. Thank you. So there can't be limits set by the broadcaster, by the host of the channel, as to who --
A. Again, I think we offer a very kind of granular offering in the way that users are able to set up groups and

channels. I would have to double-check exactly what those are, but I believe they are to limit how many people can access, for example.
Q. Thank you. Are you able to give a broad figure as to how many registered UK users there are for Telegram?
A. Generally, as of my last understanding, it was around 6.9 million users.
Q. Thank you. Sticking, for the moment, just with broad issues of approach and the services that you offer. Could we look at page 6 TEL000018_0006, please and paragraph 21. You are keen, in your statement, I think to make this important aspect and distinction clear:
"Telegram does not operate recommendation systems on the UK service."
Yes?
A. That's correct.
Q. So the sort of facilities, secret chats, private chats, channels and group chats that we are looking at, they don't work on a recommendation system at all, feeding information. It is more, as I have understood it, about your subscribers searching for channels, linking up to chats but they are not fed recommended material at all?
A. That's correct.
Q. Thank you. So that's different to what most people may think of as the standard type of social media model that

we are used to, with Facebook and with TikTok, Instagram and so on?
A. Exactly, yes.
Q. Thank you. In terms of how risks are controlled within that, we will look at several aspects of this, but if we look at paragraph 24 of your statement, Witness A, please. You say:
"Because no data is used to recommend or amplify content, there is no recommendation data for users to reset. Further, repeated exposure to harmful and violent content is limited by the ability of users to leave conversations, channels and groups at any time, the absence of feeds and content amplification, rate limiting of any bulk activity within the app, and the block and report functions ..."
That you have described in your statement.
So, as we understand it, the point that you are making is that it is reasonably unlikely for a user to be unwittingly served with, for example, violent content because there is no recommendation, there is no algorithmic feed at all and if material that they don't like is being served up in a group chat or a channel, they can leave?
A. That's correct.
Q. Now, it may be thought that that works in relation to

unwitting exposure. I want you to think about content -- and we will come onto where the divide is set, both by your terms of service and reality. But for the moment, I want you to think about violent material that sits below your threshold for removal and I want you to think about the 18 to 21-year-old, for example.

Is there anything to stop somebody like that, who may be fascinated with violence in an unhealthy way, using the channels and group chats to seek out more and more of that material within Telegram?

A. If it is below the threshold, no. Naturally, if that material is above the threshold and the moderation team is alerted to it or it is identified on the platform, it is removed upon discovery.

Q. So would you agree that one feature of the privacy approach that is taken by Telegram, is that, while there is the positive that such material isn't positively fed, young people -- and I use that phrase deliberately to look at the risk group who sit above the age of 18 -- can seek out as much of it as they can find on Telegram without intervention?

A. Again, I would agree in principle but I think it is also worth clarifying the limits we have on the global search, for example. It is very difficult for -- a lot of these terms maybe overlap with things which are

objectively illegal and potentially would be restricted from search by keyword identification.

Q. Okay, and we will come on to some of the reports in relation to that and how it sits, thank you. As we understand it, Telegram is not currently categorised under the Online Safety Act. So it is certainly not a category 1 provider, for example?

A. That is correct.

Q. Because it doesn't have recommender systems, is that right?

A. That's correct.

Q. But, nevertheless, has the duties on many user-to-user services under part 3. So it doesn't come within the higher categories, but has the general level requirements under part 3?

A. That's my understanding, yes.

Q. If we look at DSIT000083, we will see Ofcom's published list of categorised services. "Category 1 services", just at the bottom of the page:

"Category 1 threshold conditions are met by a regulated user-to-user service where, in respect of the user-to-user part of that service, it:

"Has an average number of monthly active [UK] users that exceeds 34 million, and uses a content recommender system; or ..."

Over the page DSIT000083_0002:

"Has an average number of monthly active [UK] users that exceeds 7 million, uses a content recommender system, and provides a functionality for users to forward or share regulated user-generated content on the service with other users of that service."

Plainly, you don't fall within that. If we look at page 3 DSIT000083_0003 though, in relation to Category 2B services. So:

"Category 2B services:

"[The] category 2B threshold conditions are met by a regulated user-to-user service where, in respect of the user-to-user part of that service, it:

"Has an average number of monthly active [UK] users that exceeds 3 million ..."

And that would seem to apply?

A. Yes.

Q. And:

"Provides a functionality for users to send direct messages to other users of the same service which is designed so that messages cannot be encountered by any other users of that service unless further action is taken by the user who sent the message or a user who received the message."

Do you not fall within that also?

A. We have serviced every categorisation request we have received from Ofcom and we are yet to be designated.

Q. Do you understand why? Because on the face of it, it might be thought that your chat facilities might fall within those?

A. Yes, I understand the logic there. Frankly, no, I can't really speak to Ofcom's decision-making.

Q. We will pick that up with them. Presumably, you have declared to them that you have over 3 million?

A. We have.

Q. Thank you. You have mentioned the terms of service. Can we turn to that as our next topic, please, Witness A. May we have on the screen TEL000005.

You can confirm that these are the current terms of service?

A. I can.

Q. And we see, in the top of the page:

"By signing up for Telegram, you accept our Privacy Policy and agree not to ..."

Then I'm not going to focus on the first bullet. I am sure it is important, but the second bullet is:

"Promote violence on publicly viewable Telegram channels, bots, et cetera."

Then the fourth bullet is:

"Engage in activities which are recognised as

illegal in the majority of countries. This includes child abuse, selling or offering illegal goods and services (drugs, firearms, forged documents), et cetera."

Unless we have missed something in the disclosure -- in which case, please put us right -- that, I think, is it?

A. Yes. It is intended to make sure that our users actually read the terms of service and understand what they are agreeing to and it is intended as a catchall.

Q. Thank you. We have seen that -- without going to examples -- other online providers go into quite significantly more detail in this area. In particular, giving more granular detail in relation to violent material, so making clear that it includes graphic material and gore material.

Just at a general level, do you not think that it would be helpful to give more detail, even if only by way of example of what will fall within these headline categories?

A. I think we are constantly evolving and improving our terms of service, based on feedback from law enforcement and regulators. But it is not something that we have implicitly been told by either party previously. And this has always seemed to disincentivise properly

potential malicious actors from posting such content and understanding that they cannot do so on the platform.

Q. Forgive me, but are you saying -- given evidence which you know that we are going to come onto, in terms of how Com networks have used or attempted to use Telegram, are you really suggesting that these terms of service have been effective in making bad actors think that they can't use Telegram?

A. I think there are always going to be malicious actors who, regardless of the terms of service that you set out, will go and try to misuse the platform. I don't think that perhaps, the exhaustive -- the absence of an exhaustive list of detail within the terms of service is causal in any way.

Q. You also say that you haven't been told by either party previously -- I think, to the contrary, was the effect of your answer. If we look at DSIT000150.

So this is an "Evidence assessment -- Children and Violent Content" report by DSIT as was, DCMS now.

We see the background:

"Violent content is already categorised within the OSA as priority content ..."

And sets out the duty on providers to use proportionate systems and processes to protect children.

If we look at page 4 DSIT000150_0004. Can we go

full screen, please Amanda. Then can we concentrate in on that paragraph beginning, in bold:

"Alternative or fringe platforms ..."

Thank you. So:

"Alternative or fringe platforms, such as Telegram and Rumble, have less detailed or more limited [terms of service] regarding violent content. Where there is reference to violent content, wording focuses primarily on illegal activities and terrorist material, with less clarity on what constitutes violence or how enforcement is applied. Government has less scrutiny over these platforms in general, so we are less well placed to comment on how rigorously they enforce their policies. Further work is needed in this area."

So that seems to be DSIT/DCMS explicitly naming you, as one of two providers, where your terms of service are more limited and lack clarity. Why has action not been taken to put that right?

A. I'm unaware of this report, to be frank. I haven't seen it previously and to be honest, I would like to clarify that the idea that Government has less scrutiny over these platforms in general. I'm not sure I would agree with that. I can't speak to the scrutiny of other platforms, but we have a longstanding supervisory relationship with Ofcom where we've always been very

forthcoming and engaged.

Q. All right, well, put the "less scrutiny" to one side. This was in the evidence proposal of matters that we wanted to take you to, and it is not a fringe publication.

A. I understand.

Q. It is the UK Department referring to this. You seem surprised to be taken to this. Is it a concern to you that UK authorities have raised concern about this and yet, with your senior post, you are not even aware of it?

A. I think that any concerns from UK authorities should be naturally taken very seriously, especially when it comes to the terms of service. But, yes, it was not something that I was aware of before just now.

Q. If we go back to TEL000005 at TEL000005_0001 page 1, please Amanda.

Thank you very much.

Because the reason why explanation text below this may be of use is that the phrase "promote violence on publicly viewable Telegram channels", for example, may beg the question: well, what if the context is neutral? What if it is just very violent material, short of illegal material, but it is not, by words, promoting violence? So an example of that would be extremely gory

imagery posted for its own sake without inciting or promoting violence, but just sickeningly gory imagery.

So tortured, mutilated bodies, matters of that kind. One doesn't know, looking at the terms of service, how such material sits?

A. My understanding is that it would be moderated, the material in the example that you are giving.

Q. Yes, but if you are wanting your terms of service to discourage and disincentivise people from posting inappropriate material, you want them to understand that, yes?

A. Yes.

Q. And some people, especially if they are not particularly prone to caring, as posters of gore material might do, might say: well, I'm not promoting the violence, I'm just sharing imagery that me and others like looking at. I'm not encouraging it, I'm not encouraging the acts of violence, it is not in breach of terms of service. Do you see how there is a risk there?

A. I can understand the point you are making but I think we would, internally, define "promoting violence" again -- or gore, specifically, as falling within the "promoting violence" line within the terms of service.

Q. It would be concerning if it were otherwise, but surely there is a benefit in making that clear?

A. It is something that I think I will take away and communicate to the rest of the team.

Q. Why is the prohibition limited to promotion of violence on publicly viewable Telegram channels? Why not in relation to private groups as well?

A. I think, again, it is more of an example, rather than being exhaustive. The idea is for the last sentence to be a catchall across all spaces, which is engage in activities that are recognised as illegal in the majority of countries. Promoting violence would be generally considered illegal in the majority of countries, in my understanding, across both public and private spaces.

Q. But take the gore imagery which we were speaking about before, which is not, at the moment, in the UK -- it may become an offence, but is not an offence at the moment. I have dealt with the difficulty of promoting violence but by saying "on publicly viewable Telegram channels", on one view that seems to be suggesting that if it is in a private group chat, that's fine?

A. I can't speak to the intention because I wasn't at the company when these were written but my understanding is that that is not the intimation.

Q. But you must be aware that Telegram has a reputation for the integrity of its privacy and secrecy on its

platform, so the secret chats, the clue is in the name, the private chats; but also, as you have told us in relation to group chats that are private, there is a real problem with your terms of service saying: you agree not to promote violence on publicly viewable Telegram channels. Is there not?

A. I would argue, again, even the "et cetera" at the end is meant to be a kind of indicator to other spaces, "Telegram channels, bots, et cetera". I understand the point that it could be more clearly defined.

Q. But by quite a long way? I mean, this falls woefully short of a good description of what users should not do on Telegram, would you agree?

A. Again, I'm not sure I would because I would argue that the point of this is to be a catchall that people read, rather than being an exhaustive list, on a granular level, describing the steps that one should not take.

Q. Thank you. Can we turn, then, to age assurance as our next topic, please, Witness A.

If we look, please, together back in your statement at page 4 TEL000018_0004. It is paragraph 15, first of all. So:

"Accessing the Telegram platform requires a registered account. Creating an account requires the Telegram mobile application on an Android or iOS device,

[with] a confirmation code sent by SMS to a unique phone number. [And the] account is then linked to that ... phone number."

Now, we are going to come onto additional checks that are done if the user attempts to access sensitive material, so I don't want you to think that I'm overlooking that.

A. Sure.

Q. But, at the first stage, the age assurance that is in place is limited, as I have understood it, to there should be a level of age control by the fact that they are able to use an app purchase for your app on an Android or an iOS device?

A. Correct. There is also self-declared age upon registration.

Q. Yes, but you understand the limitations of self-declared age, as we saw from AR?

A. I do.

Q. If I were to take out -- and I promised you that I won't -- my own phone and were to look for the Telegram app, what age rating would the Telegram app have?

A. I believe it is 13-plus in the UK on the App Store.

Q. And given that the service is meant only to be for 18-plus, why is that?

A. I can't speak to that, I'm afraid. I wasn't involved in deciding the age rating of the application.
Q. So you are here to speak on behalf of the company in relation to the safety precautions that you have. Telegram, unlike a number of our other online platforms, is clear -- and if I may say so, your statement is admirably clear -- that you are a service for adults only. So you are meant to be over 18. So we are not dealing with legitimate users who are aged 13 to 17. You should only be 18 or above to use Telegram full stop, yes?
A. Correct.
Q. So why on earth is the app rated 13-plus?
A. Again, it is something that I can go back and seek an answer out internally, but I don't have an answer for you today. I'm unaware of the decision-making for that.
Q. Thank you. So, could you take that away and come back to us because presumably, as an app designed only for adults, it is within the gift of Telegram to say: we want our app to be marked 18-plus?
A. Presumably so. I haven't communicated with the App Store previously, so I can't speak to that.
Q. How strong is the age assurance about downloading and using an app? What confidence does that give, the very act of purchasing a 13-plus app on an Android and iOS

device, that they are 18?
A. Sorry, I don't understand the premise of the question.
Q. You start by a level of age assurance based on the fact that you have to be able to get the app in the first place and you seem to be relying on that, that they must be a certain age to do that.
A. I think the question is leading to the parental controls that are available within these respective stores.
Q. Yes.
A. Which again, are outside of the remit of Telegram. But my understanding is the parent is able to set up account-level controls about what apps are being downloaded for the child user.
Q. Yes, so it is something that you rely on at the first stage?
A. Correct.
Q. And my question is: what is Telegram's understanding of how strong those controls are? How easy is it for a child to circumvent those controls?
A. My understanding is that they are strong, but again, I can't speak to the efficiency of the Android or Apple systems because I don't have visibility on their internal data or efficacy rate.
Q. But Telegram -- we'll come on to the further measures -- in a sense, is piggybacking on the Apple and Android

devices' protections as the first stage of age assurance, yes?
A. Yes, as well as also the idea of the user needing to have a mobile phone number, which also, I guess, falls within the parental control remit for young users.
Q. I think you would agree that quite a lot of 14, 15, 16, 17-year-olds have a mobile phone and a mobile phone number?
A. I would.
Q. It is a matter for the learned Chair, but it may be thought to be a matter of concern that the first stage of age assurance that's used is one where you are relying on other age assurance that's done by Apple and Android, but you don't have any significant technical understanding of how strong those age assurance measures are?
A. I'm not quite sure what to respond quite accurately, quite honestly.
Q. Put another way, if Telegram was serious about this as it being a real age assurance measure, it would surely be very interested in research and surveys that look at how easy or difficult it is for a child to download an app on Android or IOS devices, even if the terms of service for it say you should be 18 to download it?
A. Again, my understanding is that -- prior to my time,

because Telegram has obviously been a company before I joined in May of last year -- but we have been in communication with both the Android App Store provider and Apple, in terms of their age verification, or age assurance methodologies and came to a conclusion that they were appropriate.
Q. So you do not think there is a risk, for example, of just the child borrowing the credit card to try to prove that they are an adult, borrowing the parent's credit card, not even charging anything --
A. Telegram is free, so I'm not sure how the credit card would be --
Q. No, no. To get access to apps, for example. A child just using the parent's credit card without the parent's knowledge, to purport to be an adult?
A. Again, it is outside of my expertise, I'm afraid.
Q. Thank you. If we go to page 5 TEL000018_0005, paragraph 17, what you do say at the next stage, is that:

"Access to sensitive content requires completion of highly effective age assurance, and a user determined to be underage cannot change the sensitivity content filter setting."

Is that right?
A. That's correct.

Q. Before we look at what sits behind this, you say that:

"As part of its highly effect evidence age assurance, Telegram uses a facial age estimation model. [Which] is ... AI powered ... built on a publicly available framework, and ..."

In essence, I think what you say is that it errs on the side of caution in seeking to estimate somebody's age from their facial profile?

A. That is correct.

Q. Thank you. In fairness to you and to Telegram, we should note that facial technology of this kind is one of the methods that is set out in Ofcom's non-exhaustive list of the type of highly effective age assurance. So unlike some others that we have explored this issue with, you are using one of the guidance types that's in the Ofcom HEAA guidance, would you agree?

A. Yes.

Q. Thank you. When you say "access to sensitive content" though, what is the measure of sensitive as opposed to nonsensitive content on channels and group chats?

A. It relates to primary priority content, as defined by Ofcom.

Q. So, primary priority content, so the higher level. So that's pornography, self-harm material, eating disorders, matters of that kind, at that level?

A. Correct.

Q. Not material that is legal in relation to violence but may be harmful to children?

A. Again, our platform is designed for adults, but yes, not content that falls into that category.

Q. So, straight away, do you see that that creates a real problem because if you are only age-gating the sensitive content by reference to the primary priority content, that, of course, would deal with pornography and that's very important and to suicide material and that's very important, but not to violent material harmful to children?

A. That is recognised as legal? Yes, I can see that point. If it is illegal, it is obviously removed from the platform upon discovery.

Q. Yes, so I'm not talking about illegal material. But, for example, material showing violent street brawls?

A. It would depend on the moderation decision taken on a particular item of content.

Q. But say it doesn't particularly appear to incite or encourage that behaviour, but is showing a graphic street brawl, of whatever kind, not in the context of legitimate reporting, but nasty fights, for example, that's not, of itself, illegal to post, and that would not fall as primary priority content. So, presumably,

it wouldn't be flagged as sensitive content?

A. In that hypothetical scenario, yes, that's my understanding.

Q. And so there is a weakness and a vulnerability in Telegram's approach because you are relying there -- self-declared age and what I'm going to suggest is the weaker protections around whether you can download the app in circumstances where the app itself is 13-plus, and the only other protection is whether you have got an account that allows to you download apps. And then, while you would say the more sensitive material, primary priority content is blocked, violent material that is not illegal wouldn't be and children would be able to access it?

A. In some scenarios, yes. Again, gore, for example, as you cited earlier, is not illegal but is something that we do moderate, so it would depend on the specific scenario. But in the hypothetical scenario that you gave about a street fight on video that didn't exhibit any sites or evidence of being manifestly illegal or violating our terms of service, then yes, that would be available on the platform.

Q. And a level of gore content, because it is not pornography and because it's not suicide material per se, or eating disorder, it is not primary priority

content either. So unless it has been moderated off the platform altogether, that's going to be visible to children who got through the initial stages as well?

A. Again, I think it is worth clarifying that we have a statistically insignificant amount of child users even self-declared on the platform. But yes, in that scenario where it hasn't been moderated off the platform because it falls below a threshold set by the terms of service and our moderators have elected that it falls outside of the scope of their work, then yes, it would exist on the platform.

Q. It is relatively likely that you are going to have a low number of children self-declaring as children because it is not difficult to understand that Telegram is an 18-plus service and children who have their wits about them are bound not to say, when they try to sign up: I'm 15. So there is limited evidential value --

A. Could you explain?

Q. Yes, there is limited evidential value in saying that you have a statistically insignificant amount of child users who are self-declared on the platform.

A. I'm not entirely sure why a child user would want to pose as someone over 18, given they would have to go through HEAA in order to access sensitive content that's for over 18s.

Q. That is exactly the point I'm exploring with you. There would only be certain amounts of material that you treat as sensitive content, potentially not including forms of violent content?

A. Again, it would depend on where it fell within the terms of service, but yes.

Q. Thank you. If we look at paragraph 18 on the screen we see that it is subject to a type 1 redaction. I think you can answer this question though, does Telegram assess the effectiveness of its age estimation, facial technology?

A. Yes.

Q. Thank you. Could we have on screen, please, our transcript of the NCA evidence of Helen Rance? It is 15 October of 2026.

Could we go please in the PDF to 21, it is page 81 in the internal pagination. So, this is the evidence of the senior witness from the NCA. I just want to pick it up, please, at line 12. So the question was:

"Question: Why is it that certain platforms seem to attract Com Networks?"

Her answer was as follows:

"Answer: There are a number of reasons. It could be because they are simply where young people gather. So, for example Roblox is grounded in gaming. So

young people would be on Roblox if they are gaming and it also has a functionality to chat. So that could be a reason. Discord is often used for -- when people are gaming, to do live streaming and chatting of their gaming. So again, it is connected to the gaming community. So that may be why. Telegram, it could be less trust and safety standards, less moderation, or it just could be that's -- they all have and they have some functionalities that are helpful. Like if you close down a group, you can set up another one quite quickly. But there are functionalities, there is safety and there is just the fact that they are drawn there because that's where the young people happen to be because of some of their interests.

"Question: Telegram, I think, has age gating, but the Com network is mainly for people -- or certainly features many people under the age of 18. Do you have a view on why that is? Is the age gating ineffective?"

In fairness to you and Telegram, she did say:

"Answer: I'm not [the] expert, but I will assume so, yes."

Just reading on a little bit, the question was:

"Question: " ... we readily understand the fact that NCA engages with tech platforms and so needs to

maintain relationships and engagement but we will also come on to see that NCA has put out a lot of press releases -- and we already saw it in the joint letter -- to draw attention to this issue [that's Com networks] and in broader terms, say that there are issues with the way that online and tech platforms are handling child safety and so on. With that in mind, are there any platforms that the NCA has any particular concerns about in terms of its willingness to put in appropriate measures?"

The answer was:

"Answer: No. It's not really for us to work with it. That would be more of a question for the regulator, as opposed to the -- Ofcom rather than the NCA."

So what's your response to Ms Rance, in relation to that? She was pointing out, in that evidence, that the Com Networks involve people under the age of 18, and yet, Telegram is -- in my way of summarising that evidence -- one that is seen regularly by the NCA?

A. I would like to start by saying I would disagree with perhaps the assertion that there is less trust and safety standard, or less moderation on Telegram. I think it is an unfounded statement. We have extensive moderation systems in place. With regards to Com

groups, it is again, something that we have definitely taken note of over the last year. TerrorGram[corrected] was a well-publicised example, (unclear) managed to eradicate from the platform, and with regards to age-gating being ineffective, I think that's unfounded --

Q. I'm just going to ask you to pause for a moment. It's not the stenographer's fault, but the way that that has been transcribed is: "Telegram [draft] was a well-publicised example of trying to eradicate" -- was that Terrorgram?

A. Terrorgram, sorry.

Q. No, not at all. I thought it was useful to clarify. Do carry on.

A. Thank you. Then, with regards to age gating being ineffective, we again, have undertaken significant testing of the open model that we initially took as the base for the highly effective age assurance system that we put in place in line with Ofcom's guidance and are confident in its efficiency.

Q. When did the use of the facial recognition software, or facial assessment software, come into play?

A. I don't have the exact date, but it was in line with -- we communicated in advance of the date that Ofcom had set in place and we implemented it before then. I can't

remember --
Q. Could you check that overnight, so that we get that?
A. I will.
Q. Because the significance of what's being said by Ms Rance -- and noting what you have said on disagreeing on moderation -- is that the perpetrators of inappropriate conduct, putting it at its very lowest, of the Com Network, so those doing the harm, are not just targeting those under 18, but they are themselves under 18 and they are doing this on Telegram -- amongst others, but doing it on Telegram. So, the question that that ought to give rise to, amongst others is: how are they getting on Telegram in the first place? And, secondly: why do they think that victims that they can target are going to be on Telegram as well as under 18 years old?
A. Yes.
Q. So even if matters have been improved since, would you agree that historically, that pattern of Com networks using Telegram to predate victims tends to suggest that the age assurance used by Telegram in the past has been ineffective?
A. Again, I can't speak to anything that before my time at Telegram, but it is not within my remit or my expertise. What I can say is the current age gating is efficient

and we are working incredibly hard to try and keep the platform as safe as possible for our users.
Q. Do you have any independent assessment of those systems, your systems combined, for age assurance, or is it all internal assessment?
A. It is obviously an open-source model which is the base, which has been independently assessed and then our kind of development on top of it is all subject to internal assessment.
Q. Thank you. I want to turn to moderation systems next. We may not finish this topic, but let's make a start on it. So if we go back to your statement, page 6 TEL000018_0006, paragraph 23. I think you are keen to stress -- and I ought, for fairness, to draw it out -- it is paragraph 23, that the search functionality is limited on Telegram in that you block searches with certain keywords and uniquely, you say amongst its peers, you provide:

"... dedicated interfaces through which users can report [such] search terms in any language that may be associated with potentially harmful content."

Now, because it will become obvious when a user tries to do searches, I presume there are no particular sensitivities about this?
A. No.

Q. So is a search for "gore", for example, prohibited?
A. I don't have that exact answer now, but it depends very much on contextual information around those words. So if it emerges -- I don't know the exact list of keywords and again, it is something I can go away and come back with -- but certain keywords are blocked and we have the @SearchReport bot where users can upload words that, in a kind of evolving landscape, have been identified to be linked to illicit or potentially harmful content.
Q. We don't perhaps need to turn it up -- it is paragraph 29 of your statement -- that users can report content on the application or via a dedicated email address, yes?
A. That is correct, yes.
Q. And if we can look at page 7 TEL000018_0007, paragraph 26. You say that:

"Since 2018, public images have been automatically compared to a database of hashes banned by our moderators over the past decade."

So, of note in relation to that, is that it is hashes that have been -- that relate to material that Telegram's own moderators have banned previously, yes?
A. That's correct, but we also rely on external --
Q. I'm going to come on to the externals. But starting on the internals, that's your moderators are banning

certain material and in layperson's terms, the hashes make sure that duplicates or very close representations are not re-posted?
A. Correct.
Q. Thank you, and does that apply to all material that is banned by moderators? Do they all get hashed or only some?
A. The majority of material that is identified as illegal or violating the terms of service is hashed. I would have to confirm whether exactly all of it because there might be some edge cases where it has not been for particular reasons.
Q. Thank you. Now, the Inquiry has received mixed evidence about Telegram's approach to hashing. Shall we just try to deal with this before we break?

So first of all, without bringing it up, but in fairness to you, Mr Hadley of Tech Against Terrorism, said that only Telegram, of the major platforms, engaged with Tech Against Terrorism meaningfully. And he described that you were cooperative and communicate pretty effectively with Tech Against Terrorism. So I raise that so that it is not taken out of context.

But the Inquiry also has, at ILT000382, the report dated 6 March from the Australian eSafety Commissioner, and if we look at page 2 ILT000382_0002, paragraph 3

please.

So you see the paragraph beginning:

"For instance, Telegram, WhatsApp and Meta's Messenger ..."

A. I do.

Q. Yes. So, if that can be enlarged now, please. So for example, Telegram and others are named:

"... did not employ measures to detect livestreamed terrorist and violent extremism despite the fact that the 2019 Christchurch attack was livestreamed on another of Meta's services, Facebook Live."

Do you agree that Telegram did not employ measures to detect that content of the Christchurch attack?

A. Again, this was well before my time as an employee of Telegram, so I would have to go away and confirm and understand exactly what happened in this scenario.

Q. Again, this was material that was put in the evidence proposal.

A. I understand, but I would need to reaffirm exactly when live-streaming became available on the platform because I find it odd that the attack was live-streamed on another of Meta's services and I am not sure whether we fall into "another of Meta's services" is the way it is written.

Q. No, but that's clearly referring to Meta's Messenger,

but you are being listed as one of the platforms that didn't employ measures to detect that material.

Then, at the final paragraph, please, on this page, certainly in March 2025, what was being said, in this report, about Telegram was:

"And Telegram said while it detected hashes of terrorist and violent extremist images and videos it had previously removed from its service ..."

So that seems to be a message to the hashes from your own moderators:

"... it did not utilise databases of known material from trusted external sources such as the Global Internet Forum to Counter Terror ... or Tech Against Terrorism."

Now, Mr Hadley says you've engaged well with Tech Against Terrorism. Since then, have you started taking the hashes from Tech Against Terrorism?

A. My understanding is that we do use the hashes from Tech Against Terrorism, yes.

Q. What about the Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism; have you changed your approach there and started using their hashes?

A. I would have to go away and confirm, but I think it may be a technical detail with regards the type of hashes that we implement. We implement SHA 266 hashes and they

are not always readily available depending on the collaborative organisation in question.

MR MOSS: I'm going to ask if you can check that position overnight.

Sir, with our thanks to you for sitting so late, I think we should stop there. Might we please resume at 9.30 am in the morning to have an earlier start?

SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: I'm sorry you have to come back. Are you able to do so?

A. Yes, I am.

SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: Good.

MR MOSS: Sir, we are most grateful.

SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: 9.30 am tomorrow morning.

(5.04 pm)

(The Inquiry adjourned until 9.30 am the following day)

I N D E X

	PAGE
MR ALEXANDER RAWLE (affirmed)	1
Questions by MR MOSS	1
Questions by MR CHAPMAN	119
MR BRIAN FISHMAN (affirmed)	125
Questions by MR BOYLE	125
WITNESS A (affirmed)	206
Questions by MR MOSS	206

MR BOYLE: [10] 125/10 162/13 177/11 177/13 180/6 180/8 180/14 205/18 205/25 206/2
MR CHAPMAN: [1] 119/3
MR MOSS: [10] 1/9 3/20 58/9 58/11 58/16 118/18 124/24 206/14 251/3 251/12
SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: [24] 1/3 1/6 3/19 58/7 58/10 58/15 118/25 124/20 125/2 125/7 162/12 177/8 177/12 180/7 180/9 180/13 205/19 206/1 206/3 206/9 206/12 251/8 251/11 251/13

'

'clean [1] 84/22
'compliance' [1] 181/16
'complied' [1] 181/17
'imminent [1] 102/3
'in [1] 182/20
'in-house [1] 182/20
'provocative' [1] 84/18
'supervised [1] 74/8
'we [1] 158/7
'what [1] 84/21
'who [1] 84/22

.

... [1] 237/4

0

0 views [1] 107/6
0-point [1] 98/15
0.11-0.13 per cent [1] 118/3
0.14-0.15 per cent [2] 118/3 118/4
0.17-0.19 per cent [1] 118/6
0.19 per cent [1] 98/16
0001 [4] 3/7 56/6 207/16 228/16
0002 [10] 3/21 55/24 106/25 134/1 149/20 166/19 203/5 208/16 223/1 248/25
0003 [7] 28/7 41/18 59/1 85/1 107/4 210/17 223/8
0004 [8] 9/5 60/17 151/16 170/25 180/19 211/14 226/25 231/21
0005 [6] 9/15 12/15 154/8 171/17 187/14 236/17
0006 [6] 31/12 155/8 181/9 187/21 219/10 246/13
0007 [4] 83/7 182/3 189/5 247/15
0008 [3] 47/11 66/17 74/5
0009 [2] 74/17 91/6
0010 [7] 17/20 22/14 38/20 70/23 91/4 91/12 189/10
0011 [2] 18/9 38/22
0012 [6] 35/20 40/1 48/10 63/16 123/5 182/15
0013 [3] 2/6 73/23 119/20
0014 [1] 95/3
0015 [1] 101/20
0016 [1] 207/9
0017 [4] 32/19 104/22 172/22 184/1
0018 [3] 20/24 173/23 199/25
0020 [1] 43/18
0021 [4] 88/5 89/6 117/20 134/17
0022 [4] 88/16 89/21 136/24 158/2
0025 [1] 82/16
0026 [1] 125/19
0028 [1] 137/21
0029 [2] 1/17 139/15
0030 [1] 140/10
0037 [1] 142/8
0039 [1] 10/20
0040 [1] 44/19
0107 [1] 142/22

1

1 billion [1] 130/16
1 per cent [1] 107/17
1,000 [1] 107/9
1,000-10,000 [1] 107/9
1-10 [1] 107/7
1.09 per cent [1] 107/10
1.2 billion [1] 130/19
1.40 pm [2] 125/1 125/5
1.97 per cent [1] 107/10
10 [9] 17/20 22/14 38/13 38/20 91/4 107/7 188/11 188/24 189/10
10 August 2026 [1] 1/18
10 minutes [2] 180/7 206/2
10 views [1] 108/14
10,000 [3] 98/17 107/9 107/10
10,000 children [1] 35/22
10,000 views [1] 107/18
100 [2] 107/8 152/22
100 per cent [1] 100/16
100-1,000 [1] 107/9
107 [1] 142/22
11 [3] 38/22 44/25 54/24
11 December [1] 2/7
11 different [1] 182/12
11 people [1] 182/18
11-17-year-olds [1] 70/1
11-17s [1] 69/25
11.06 am [1] 58/12
11.25 am [2] 58/11 58/14
12 [5] 35/20 48/10 63/15 182/14 241/19
12 March [1] 59/3
12 months [2] 31/19 36/1
12.55 pm [1] 125/3
12s [2] 67/12 68/10
13 [21] 2/6 29/6 36/7 36/8 39/17 39/23 47/12 67/15 67/18 67/21 73/22 74/10 74/15 74/20 78/25 83/14 83/22 157/21 157/22 210/17 233/9
13-17 [2] 32/22 33/2
13-17-year-olds [1] 32/6
13-18-year-olds [1] 79/11
13-plus [4] 67/20 232/23 233/13 239/8
13-year-old [3] 67/23 68/1 90/25
13-year-olds [4] 57/16 70/19 83/16 84/7
13s [2] 56/18 56/21
14 [2] 95/3 235/6
15 [5] 9/6 101/19 231/21 235/6 240/17
15 July [1] 41/15
15 October [1] 241/15
16 [7] 9/15 45/2 76/17 90/18 95/19 207/9 235/6
16 November 2026 [1] 1/1
17 [10] 32/19 32/22 33/2 39/24 74/21 104/22 172/22 184/1 233/9 236/18
17 December [1] 38/17
17 per cent [2] 28/24 29/1
17-year-old [1] 197/17
17-year-olds [2] 44/22 235/7
17s [1] 69/25
18 [49] 7/23 8/6 8/13 12/15 18/1 18/17 20/24 21/8 21/24 39/25 40/8 40/16 40/23 48/14 48/21 49/17 50/9 50/9 54/2 54/25 56/3 90/14 133/13 158/20 159/2 159/18 159/18 159/19 159/20 161/3 161/5 163/24 168/15 168/15 169/8 173/23 199/24 221/6 221/19 233/8 233/10 234/1 235/24 240/23 241/7 242/17 243/18 245/9 245/10
18 years [1] 49/2
18-plus [24] 19/16 19/21 20/5 20/21 36/18 37/1 37/8 40/18 40/23 44/7 45/20 45/24 48/25 49/1 49/3 50/25 52/20 56/12 57/5 57/7 57/9 90/8 232/25 233/20
18-year-olds [3] 8/19 12/13 37/7
18s [10] 8/21 14/7 55/16 138/21 155/9 157/20 157/23 159/9 160/2 240/25
19 [1] 16/11
19 per cent [1] 28/14
19 videos [1] 98/17

2

2 per cent [1] 28/16
20 [1] 43/18
20 boxing [1] 79/23
20 minutes [3] 58/8 58/10 177/10
20 years [1] 49/16
200 law [1] 198/21
200,000 [2] 216/20 216/21
2018 [1] 247/17
2019 [1] 249/10
2021 [1] 74/13
2024 [4] 28/2 31/5 74/18 178/11
2025 [14] 44/25 67/1 67/3 67/6 106/23 106/24 118/2 118/3 118/4 182/17 201/23 202/9 207/19 250/4
2026 [11] 1/1 1/18 58/22 106/25 107/1 119/21 155/23 162/5 187/10 198/23 241/15
21 [7] 88/5 88/8 117/20 117/23 134/17 219/11 241/16
21 May [1] 58/22
21 per cent [1] 33/2
21-year-old [1] 221/6
22 [3] 91/4 136/23 158/1
23 [3] 2/8 246/13 246/15
24 [1] 220/6
25 [1] 82/16
26 [2] 125/19 247/16
266 [1] 250/25
27 [1] 47/11
28 [2] 74/5 137/20
29 [3] 1/17 139/15 247/11
29 July 2024 [1] 178/11
29 per cent [1] 28/21
2A [1] 162/1
2B [3] 223/9 223/10 223/11

3

3 million [3] 50/23 223/15 224/9
3.02 pm [1] 180/10
3.10 pm [1] 180/9
3.11 pm [1] 180/12
3.21 [1] 43/19
3.3-7.2 per cent [1] 173/16
3.4 million [1] 106/23
3.48 pm [1] 206/5
3.5-section [1] 186/25
30 [2] 140/9 172/4
30 minutes [1] 84/11
30 public [1] 182/10
30-plus [1] 62/2
32 [1] 74/18
34 million [1] 222/24
36 [2] 17/21 162/11
37 [2] 18/14 142/8
38.37 [1] 107/7
39 [3] 10/20 19/3 22/14

4

4 per cent [2] 28/14 28/15
4.0 [3] 156/15 156/16 156/17
4.00 pm [2] 206/3 206/7
4.19 per cent [1] 107/9
40 [3] 38/24 44/18 55/7
42 [1] 48/10
43 [2] 50/10 123/4
44 [1] 119/20
45 year [2] 51/24 51/24
46 [1] 55/7
47 [2] 73/22 147/14

4

48 [1] 95/5
48 instances [1] 174/5
48 per cent [3] 107/6 107/12 184/6

5

5 per cent [1] 174/1
5.04 pm [1] 251/14
5.1 [2] 187/11 189/19
5.21 [1] 44/19
50 [1] 95/12
50 per cent [3] 29/13 30/9 68/19
55 [1] 101/20
56 [3] 31/21 44/24 102/8
58 [1] 145/10

6

6 March [1] 248/24
6 model [1] 189/20
6 models [1] 190/15
6's [1] 150/8
6.1 [3] 155/19 190/16 190/17
6.9 million [1] 219/7
60 [1] 95/20
60 per cent [1] 108/3
64 [1] 104/23
65 [1] 105/6
66 [1] 105/18
67 [1] 20/24

7

7 million [1] 223/3
70 [1] 31/17
70 deaths [1] 182/13
71.7 per cent [1] 173/5
72 [1] 199/25
76 per cent [1] 28/13
77 [2] 117/21 117/23

8

8 to [1] 44/21
8-12s [2] 67/12 68/10
80 [3] 88/5 88/8 89/7
81 [1] 241/16
84 [1] 67/10
89 [2] 22/25 159/10
89 per cent [1] 24/16

9

9 November [1] 206/18
9 October [1] 207/10
9.30 [1] 251/15
9.30 am [2] 251/7 251/13
9.44 am [1] 1/2
9.8 million [1] 107/1
90 days [1] 105/12
90-day [2] 105/1 105/15
90s [1] 155/12
92 [1] 158/2
95 per cent [4] 7/25 30/22 50/22 69/17
99 [1] 82/17

A

abilities [1] 68/23
ability [12] 74/15 102/19 148/7 163/23 179/9 179/15 185/19 186/5 186/8 204/23 209/5 220/11
able [68] 3/24 8/15 8/21 20/20 29/10 30/16 30/19 40/23 41/11 43/4 43/14 45/1 57/12 63/6 67/18 67/21 68/2 68/10 70/15 73/1 73/3 77/11 78/11 78/12 86/9 87/3 87/7 87/19 101/11 103/1 103/12 103/15 104/12 109/5 109/8 111/18 111/20 112/7 115/23 117/15 119/16 120/12 122/19 122/25 124/15 127/17 133/20 133/21 138/8 145/1 146/14 154/16 156/19 186/23 195/18 199/14 199/23 211/11 213/4 213/14 214/13 218/25 219/4 232/12 234/4 234/11 239/13 251/9
abliterated [2] 185/8 185/16
abliteration [1] 185/21
about [171] 1/20 2/24 3/3 4/5 7/25 13/13 14/6 17/9 20/17 22/6 24/20 24/22 24/22 24/23 26/1 28/22 37/10 39/21 40/6 42/8 44/5 44/23 45/8 45/20 47/2 50/16 50/23 53/9 53/17 54/10 56/16 57/13 59/13 61/6 62/24 63/11 64/11 65/7 65/11 66/10 68/3 68/8 71/10 71/19 72/19 73/7 73/11 75/21 76/12 77/10 77/22 77/23 77/25 78/2 78/5 78/8 78/18 80/11 81/16 86/7 86/14 87/1 87/2 87/4 87/8 87/13 87/20 91/14 91/19 92/3 92/8 93/8 93/17 94/12 96/12 101/23 103/13 103/13 104/3 106/20 109/10 109/13 111/5 112/5 112/10 114/4 114/6 114/7 118/21 119/18 120/6 120/7 120/14 123/13 123/16 126/6 128/2 129/20 130/9 130/22 131/4 131/14 131/25 132/10 135/16 136/6 138/23 139/10 140/5 141/18 142/18 142/19 144/2 148/19 151/20 158/22 159/15 159/22 160/2 161/19 163/9 163/13 164/20 165/11 168/1 168/7 169/22 172/13 172/19 172/20 173/11 173/19 175/10 176/16 177/18 177/21 179/25 181/23 182/5 185/22 191/14 192/19 193/16 195/17 199/15 200/7 201/10 202/6 202/25 203/16 204/4 205/5 215/3 218/8 219/20 221/1 221/4 221/6 228/9 230/14 233/23 234/12 235/19 238/16 239/19 240/16 243/9 246/24 248/14 250/5 250/20
above [4] 181/25 221/12 221/19 233/10
absence [4] 169/5 169/12 220/13 226/12
absent [1] 112/4
absolutely [8] 34/17 121/16 170/15 174/21 180/5 183/15 183/18 187/7
abuse [19] 12/1 83/5 105/20 106/14 108/25 112/5 134/14 134/15 144/8 148/10 176/10 179/19 199/5 209/22 211/4 211/10 211/21 216/6 225/2
abuses [1] 144/15
academic [3] 145/7 145/12 145/14
academics [1] 92/16
academy [1] 126/11
accept [18] 35/13 43/12 71/4 71/24 72/11 72/13 76/9 76/9 86/20 86/21 105/15 164/15 164/16 173/6 187/1 187/4 192/9 224/18
acceptable [6] 88/12 117/18 128/4 132/8 181/5 193/14
acceptance [1] 163/25
accepted [3] 73/13 165/12 165/12
accepting [3] 24/13 79/9 113/2
accepts [1] 28/7
access [59] 30/16 30/20 33/23 34/7 34/11 38/12 40/23 44/8 45/1 45/20 45/24 48/17 48/25 49/1 49/24 49/25 50/1 52/20 53/12 53/18 57/9 64/12 67/18 67/24 68/2 68/6 68/10 68/13 70/15 73/7 103/18 148/2 164/18 164/20 186/13 191/10 193/15 193/16 196/7 211/3 211/20 212/8 212/15 212/16 213/3 213/6 214/4 214/6 214/16 215/4 215/4 216/22 219/3 232/5 236/13 236/20 237/18 239/14 240/24
accessed [4] 35/7 68/17 211/18 218/9
accessible [4] 143/17 210/23 213/15 218/2
accessing [5] 18/15 54/3 54/12 72/18 231/23
accidental [1] 106/9
accidentally [2] 106/5 106/6
accidents [1] 11/16
accommodating [1] 172/2
accordingly [2] 210/10 213/5
account [72] 8/9 8/11 8/12 18/17 33/18 36/6 36/6 36/13 36/16 36/21 39/4 39/18 39/19 41/5 45/18 45/19 47/12 47/21 47/22 47/23 47/25 48/2 48/4 48/5 48/5 48/6 49/17 55/21 57/19 57/21 62/25 67/22 67/25 70/21 74/8 74/14 78/10 84/10 94/24 99/6 112/25 139/5 146/3 160/20 161/21 167/17 168/15 168/17 168/22 169/5 169/12 173/25 178/5 192/21 193/10 198/1 201/24 202/2 202/4 202/8 204/14 204/14 204/18 210/1 211/5 211/9 211/22 231/24 231/24 232/2 234/12 239/10
account-creation [1] 39/18
account-level [2] 210/1 234/12
accounts [32] 8/21 29/7 29/7 29/19 30/18 48/8 55/1 55/5 55/15 57/17 64/14 68/12 83/11 83/15 84/4 84/6 84/16 108/3 123/24 157/13 157/18 157/25 158/5 158/7 167/7 168/8 170/1 204/20 204/20 204/22 204/24 214/14
accredited [2] 206/24 206/25
accrued [1] 107/18
accuracy [5] 19/15 40/22 41/12 51/3 56/15
accurate [2] 64/5 95/25
accurately [1] 235/17
acknowledging [1] 85/17
acquiring [1] 105/8
across [25] 8/2 22/17 24/17 29/22 39/1 40/14 41/23 42/6 67/7 68/13 69/20 70/4 96/11 106/10 115/6 134/7 149/10 176/9 176/24 182/12 192/14 195/8 211/18 230/8 230/12
act [20] 13/2 13/8 22/18 55/12 81/12 112/6 115/18 116/10 116/21 145/10 162/1 162/5 162/6 162/7 162/16 210/10 211/5 211/22 222/6 233/25
acted [1] 189/7
acting [1] 211/9
action [14] 35/10 35/18 38/15 58/21 63/13 63/14 103/15 109/8 112/16 196/22 197/20 210/11 223/22 227/17
actionable [4] 137/3 142/12 189/16 199/23
actions [1] 210/2
active [8] 130/19 171/25 173/1 173/25 203/23 222/23 223/2 223/14
actively [4] 84/25 98/4 174/3 215/14
activeness [1] 107/12
activists [1] 209/3
activities [8] 126/22 137/3 138/5 154/14 158/12 224/25 227/9 230/9
activity [8] 32/1 75/1 104/19 181/14 181/21 194/5 198/18 220/14
actors [5] 209/20 209/22 226/1 226/7

A

actors... [1] 226/9
acts [10] 11/4 11/13 16/18 18/3 91/9 91/16 92/12 132/20 134/10 229/17
actual [5] 115/18 116/10 116/13 116/21 116/25
actually [22] 25/4 33/22 47/20 76/2 77/17 85/4 93/25 97/19 99/20 113/19 113/23 116/21 121/9 123/1 151/25 160/5 160/9 160/16 171/1 185/18 191/3 225/9
acute [1] 167/8
Adam [1] 192/4
Adam Hadley [1] 192/4
add [4] 29/8 97/22 184/7 187/19
added [3] 88/11 89/8 119/21
adding [1] 213/25
addition [5] 1/20 1/23 64/22 70/24 159/16
additional [30] 40/5 45/25 46/7 48/15 48/21 48/24 49/4 49/12 50/11 52/24 54/18 57/11 64/9 64/22 71/18 87/16 88/10 90/6 97/2 97/15 103/13 103/13 104/5 104/13 123/6 124/12 152/4 159/24 213/19 232/4
Additionally [1] 44/13
address [9] 16/13 41/6 55/3 101/22 121/18 132/2 200/10 209/10 247/13
addressed [1] 164/22
addressing [1] 102/24
adjacent [1] 78/18
adjourned [1] 251/15
adjournment [1] 125/4
adjust [3] 143/8 145/21 186/1
adjusted [1] 81/11
administrators [3] 213/18 213/20 213/21
admirably [1] 233/7
adoption [1] 41/23
ads [1] 115/2
adult [19] 18/5 33/15 41/11 47/21 47/23 47/25 48/1 48/6 49/6 49/10 51/2 51/11 52/23 55/15 57/10 57/21 159/22 236/9 236/15
adults [21] 8/3 13/25 18/3 21/16 33/23 36/23 44/8 49/18 51/19 51/19 52/19 53/11 56/14 117/18 158/16 161/1 167/1 167/2 233/7 233/19 238/4
advance [2] 133/22 244/24
advantages [1] 186/16
advertise [1] 109/14
advertising [2] 53/14 110/20
advice [2] 82/5 88/21
advise [1] 6/16
affected [3] 3/16 51/9 126/3
affecting [1] 31/7
affirm [1] 160/13
affirmation [2] 160/7 160/9
affirmed [6] 1/5 125/6 206/8 252/3 252/9 252/13
afraid [2] 233/1 236/16
after [15] 29/4 34/3 34/3 38/10 96/1 105/1 105/12 105/16 146/16 151/12 155/19 165/13 201/15 201/25 204/11
aftermath [1] 11/17
afterwards [1] 132/10
again [64] 25/4 37/20 38/9 45/8 53/23 57/5 58/11 64/15 64/17 69/1 69/9 71/24 78/1 81/2 81/18 89/21 101/8 103/4 103/20 106/8 111/6 113/8 121/6 121/11 129/15 131/10 139/24 139/25 145/17 146/21 154/9 155/9 164/24 177/22 178/15 188/19 190/18 191/18 199/13 206/3 211/22 214/4 218/24 221/22 229/21 230/6 231/7 231/14 233/14 234/10 234/20 235/25 236/16 238/4 239/15 240/4 241/5 242/5 244/1 244/16 245/23 247/5 249/14 249/17
against [37] 11/13 14/5 20/5 22/20 23/7 23/11 38/5 44/18 55/23 95/3 110/2 110/2 112/23 134/11 146/19 149/16 153/20 158/9 175/1 180/15 182/5 182/8 184/22 191/6 192/4 207/7 209/12 210/2 210/12 215/9 248/17 248/19 248/21 250/13 250/16 250/17 250/19
age [200] 6/25 8/2 8/18 8/25 12/12 14/8 16/8 17/21 18/1 18/15 18/16 18/21 18/24 19/6 19/10 19/23 21/9 21/15 25/11 26/20 29/6 29/8 32/16 33/10 36/5 36/9 37/1 37/17 39/2 39/3 39/6 39/7 39/11 39/12 40/3 40/4 40/6 40/7 40/12 40/13 40/15 40/21 41/14 41/21 41/23 42/2 42/9 42/15 42/17 42/24 43/4 43/7 43/21 44/6 44/10 44/14 44/21 45/7 46/1 46/8 46/22 47/9 48/3 48/15 48/17 48/22 49/18 49/20 50/25 51/5 51/14 51/23 53/7 53/8 53/12 54/2 55/1 55/8 55/13 55/13 55/17 56/1 56/2 56/4 57/2 58/17 59/19 59/22 60/10 61/10 64/12 67/15 67/17 67/21 67/22 68/22 69/21 70/14 70/15 70/21 74/10 76/7 76/8 77/2 77/8 77/17 77/19 78/6 78/25 83/13 83/18 83/22 84/23 89/24 90/2 90/4 90/8 90/21 90/23 115/21 116/6 116/9 116/18 117/5 117/16 119/13 119/22 120/10 121/11 121/24 122/2 123/7 123/17 139/5 142/25 155/11 157/19 157/25 158/5 158/6 159/13 159/16 159/17 159/22 160/8 161/9 161/10 161/14 161/19 161/24 162/15 162/20 162/22 162/25 163/9 163/11 164/1 164/7 166/1 166/2 166/3 166/10 217/3 217/5 221/19 231/18 232/9 232/11 232/14 232/17 232/21 233/2 233/23 234/3 234/6 235/1 235/12 235/13 235/15 235/20 236/4 236/4 236/21 237/2 237/3 237/8 237/13 238/7 239/6 241/10 242/15 242/17 242/18 243/18 244/5 244/15 244/18 245/21 245/25 246/4
age-appropriate [11] 6/25 29/8 33/10 40/4 47/9 56/4 61/10 64/12 68/22 76/8 158/5
age-aware [1] 41/21
age-gate [2] 89/24 117/5
age-gated [4] 12/12 14/8 21/15 117/16
age-gating [3] 55/17 238/7 244/5
age-inappropriate [3] 83/18 84/23 158/6
age-inference [1] 40/3
age-restrict [2] 18/21 18/24
age-restricted [3] 18/15 48/17 155/11
age-verification [1] 119/22
aged [7] 21/24 32/22 33/2 39/23 74/15 74/20 233/9
aged 13 [3] 74/15 74/20 233/9
agencies [8] 102/11 148/2 148/6 199/20 200/3 200/10 200/17 201/1
agency [4] 15/14 25/15 26/4 26/12
agendas [4] 139/16 139/19 139/24 140/9
ages [2] 67/11 159/15
aggression [10] 79/8 79/10 79/23 80/13 80/25 81/1 81/4 81/6 81/25 88/19
Aggressive [1] 213/24
ago [3] 4/18 92/3 119/18
agree [37] 26/23 26/24 27/9 27/23 36/2 36/3 44/3 67/20 70/6 76/4 97/6 107/13 108/7 108/14 113/7 130/24 131/2 164/2 164/3 165/22 173/20 174/18 176/13 191/4 192/12 198/25 215/21 221/15 221/22 224/19 227/22 231/5 231/13 235/6 237/16 245/19 249/12
agreed [5] 45/9 80/8 120/15 165/1 189/16
agreeing [1] 225/10
agreement [2] 176/10 199/8
Ahmed [2] 22/12 169/20
AI [38] 2/19 3/1 5/4 91/5 91/19 92/1 130/22 131/21 143/25 144/1 148/2 162/7 164/23 165/4 165/25 170/20 170/23 171/7 172/15 174/8 176/16 176/18 176/22 178/7 178/12 179/20 180/25 181/14 182/7 182/10 182/12 183/7 183/19 187/4 187/12 191/9 199/1 237/4
AI-derived [1] 183/7
AI/Gemini [1] 3/1
aid [1] 16/19
aids [1] 139/19
aim [4] 140/13 152/10 165/9 208/19
aims [1] 139/3
Al [3] 145/8 145/25 182/19
Al-Qaeda [2] 145/8 145/25
albeit [1] 57/24
alert [2] 167/16 168/16
alerted [2] 210/1 221/13
alerts [3] 167/8 167/9 168/1
ALEXANDER [3] 1/5 1/11 252/3
algorithm [11] 79/17 81/1 81/2 81/19 85/7 89/18 92/24 97/4 97/12 97/15 97/18
algorithm-driven [1] 85/7
algorithmic [3] 83/4 86/1 220/21
algorithms [16] 59/18 80/3 80/9 80/14 81/12 81/13 81/17 82/23 83/17 89/9 90/10 92/23 96/15 100/9 104/1 144/20
Alice [1] 178/9
aligned [2] 71/11 182/19
all [105] 2/21 3/16 4/4 5/15 8/18 9/21 12/19 13/8 13/25 14/22 15/24 16/6 20/1 20/10 25/5 26/15 30/16 37/8 37/18 38/7 38/12 45/11 45/17 45/25 47/10 48/23 50/14 52/17 53/24 56/24 58/3 59/11 59/11 59/16 60/16 66/2 71/7 73/5 74/9 75/23 79/13 79/18 80/10 80/14 80/17 81/3 81/14 81/20 82/9 82/10 82/11 84/22

A

all... [53] 87/1 90/10 94/10 98/22 105/10 106/21 110/6 112/1 112/3 114/4 115/9 116/16 118/20 122/3 126/3 134/8 138/11 144/11 144/24 148/18 161/13 165/5 175/10 176/20 180/1 183/22 187/4 187/20 192/17 199/18 205/1 205/1 209/6 212/10 212/25 214/1 214/15 214/24 215/17 219/19 219/22 220/21 228/2 230/8 231/22 242/8 244/13 246/4 246/8 248/5 248/6 248/10 248/16
alleged [2] 182/24 183/6
allow [12] 14/24 39/6 39/11 46/10 53/11 68/13 80/9 80/14 80/16 119/16 123/20 160/20
allowance [2] 56/24 57/22
allowed [7] 11/4 16/18 16/21 69/12 89/24 136/17 158/18
allowing [6] 13/24 33/23 52/19 56/14 95/8 210/7
allows [3] 44/8 74/23 239/10
almost [2] 120/6 192/24
alone [2] 19/1 49/19
along [8] 112/20 123/3 136/20 149/15 171/16 191/16 198/5 214/14
alongside [3] 90/13 100/14 113/11
ALPHA000001 [29] 1/13 1/17 3/7 3/21 9/5 9/15 12/15 17/20 18/9 20/24 38/20 38/22 40/1 47/11 48/10 73/23 74/5 74/17 82/16 88/5 88/16 89/6 89/21 95/3 101/20 104/22 117/20 119/20 123/5
ALPHA000004 [3] 54/16 55/24 56/6
ALPHA000008 [1] 10/10
ALPHA000009 [2] 10/15 10/20
ALPHA000011 [1] 17/11
ALPHA000013 [1] 17/12
ALPHA000027 [3] 106/19 106/25 107/4
ALPHA000049 [5] 2/17 91/3 91/4 91/6 91/12
Alphabet [6] 2/17 3/1 4/19 55/2 56/7 57/1
Alphabet's [1] 55/1
already [9] 42/20 60/24 165/3 181/23 187/16 217/9 217/24 226/21 243/3
also [142] 5/21 8/8 12/1 12/12 13/1 13/3 16/20 18/20 18/21 18/23 22/1 23/16 23/19 23/20 24/8 26/20 27/2 27/21 33/15 34/7 34/19 35/17 38/2 38/4 40/3 41/6 41/11 47/5 51/3 51/5 52/10 53/3 55/18 56/18 61/11 61/15 62/7 62/21 64/18 65/9 66/6 68/13 68/15 69/14 71/9 71/15 74/14 75/17 76/5 78/17 78/24 82/2 82/5 85/7 86/12 93/9 93/19 93/20 96/7 96/13 97/10 97/20 97/23 97/24 98/23 100/1 100/14 103/7 108/7 109/4 109/5 109/8 109/19 110/25 111/14 113/8 121/4 122/8 126/12 128/12 132/10 133/11 134/21 135/15 137/14 142/14 142/25 143/2 143/19 144/9 144/23 146/2 147/3 148/1 149/3 149/9 152/20 157/7 164/24 165/5 165/25 169/4 170/19 173/12 175/1 176/14 176/20 178/2 178/10 178/19 179/3 192/20 193/15 194/8 195/4 195/9 196/16 197/4 198/18 199/1 200/5 203/2 204/2 208/6 210/10 211/14 214/19 216/8 217/5 218/1 218/12 221/22 223/25 226/15 231/2 232/14 235/3 235/4 242/2 243/1 247/23 248/23
alternative [4] 137/15 169/3 227/3 227/5
alternatively [2] 168/20 169/15
although [10] 3/22 47/17 94/18 107/8 151/14 162/22 174/14 184/7 189/14 215/20
altogether [1] 240/2
always [12] 28/25 62/1 72/2 100/17 140/4 153/2 173/8 190/12 225/25 226/9 227/25 251/1
am [22] 1/2 41/17 44/3 45/9 58/11 58/12 58/14 59/23 91/25 98/18 107/4 121/4 177/8 191/23 205/8 211/24 224/21 249/22 251/7 251/10 251/13 251/15
Amanda [2] 227/1 228/17
ambiguous [1] 135/16
amend [2] 55/25 81/19
among [6] 9/11 44/21 69/2 164/18 200/16 213/10
amongst [5] 33/9 83/12 245/10 245/12 246/17
amount [7] 23/19 72/5 167/15 173/7 184/18 240/5 240/20
amounts [3] 143/7 163/11 241/2
amplification [1] 220/13
amplify [3] 32/9 137/13 220/8
analyse [5] 84/19 124/4 129/7 143/7 180/22
analyses [1] 128/23
analysis [3] 139/23 173/10 196/19
Android [9] 119/9 231/25 232/13 233/25 234/21 234/25 235/14 235/23 236/3
anecdotal [2] 30/10 182/8
animal [3] 12/1 26/7 37/13
announce [1] 64/8
announced [1] 7/20
anonymised [2] 206/15 206/20
anonymity [6] 207/12 209/12 217/10 217/16 217/20 217/21
another [22] 2/17 13/7 28/18 36/25 46/25 49/22 55/4 82/25 91/1 105/8 154/12 166/17 168/18 174/8 188/20 191/6 204/21 235/19 242/10 249/10 249/22 249/23
answer [33] 5/6 25/5 30/5 46/6 51/18 57/12 65/5 65/25 71/18 81/9 98/18 99/21 100/16 101/8 106/10 110/23 118/11 118/15 120/18 124/4 124/8 129/4 133/6 151/8 151/23 151/24 226/17 233/15 233/15 241/9 241/22 243/11 247/2
answered [6] 28/17 28/21 54/22 56/8 57/3 57/3
answers [7] 33/21 58/4 128/11 136/4 140/22 181/13 184/10
Anthropic's [1] 188/13
anthropomorphic [1] 145/17
anthropomorphise [2] 145/23 150/23
anti [3] 23/1 24/16 213/25
anti-Muslim [2] 23/1 24/16
Anti-Spam [1] 213/25
anticipate [1] 122/12
any [61] 2/24 3/3 3/12 10/15 12/2 12/7 19/1 20/6 20/6 25/5 25/6 29/3 35/10 36/16 36/20 36/22 38/15 39/10 43/22 49/6 49/8 53/5 53/15 60/22 61/7 61/19 63/2 64/4 64/16 75/15 75/21 82/3 105/1 108/13 118/23 121/17 122/13 131/17 136/7 139/12 174/1 174/2 178/23 179/22 200/11 205/5 208/10 209/19 215/11 218/8 220/12 220/14 223/21 226/14 228/12 235/14 239/20 243/8 243/8 246/3 246/20
anyone [3] 56/13 176/25 218/19
anything [16] 4/14 24/12 24/25 64/22 64/22 89/1 92/12 94/13 113/24 121/23 125/25 128/19 198/5 221/7 236/10 245/23
API [6] 119/24 120/3 121/7 122/25 123/12 123/21
APIs [1] 128/13
apologise [1] 165/2
app [18] 29/5 220/14 232/12 232/12 232/21 232/21 232/23 233/13 233/18 233/20 233/21 233/24 233/25 234/4 235/23 236/3 239/8
apparent [2] 17/7 109/11
appeal [2] 19/7 163/24
appear [5] 32/10 128/24 146/7 162/21 238/20
appeared [1] 85/18
appears [5] 12/5 16/7 17/4 84/12 86/21
Apple [5] 119/8 234/21 234/25 235/13 236/4
applicable [4] 92/2 135/18 135/19 135/20
application [5] 73/25 141/21 231/25 233/2 247/12
applied [8] 16/8 37/3 40/9 59/11 79/13 147/24 185/13 227/11
applies [3] 136/13 148/18 159/23
apply [17] 9/21 18/1 19/6 21/8 39/24 56/4 89/20 89/25 112/1 157/18 158/7 162/6 177/25 197/24 203/20 223/16 248/5
applying [1] 185/2
appreciate [3] 15/22 41/8 162/18
Appreciating [1] 30/10
approach [21] 6/6 12/24 17/17 19/9 64/11 83/10 95/6 134/7 156/12 184/17 184/25 185/2 208/7 208/24 209/21 217/11 219/9 221/16 239/5 248/14 250/21
approaches [3] 55/8 136/1 137/15
appropriate [51] 6/25 14/7 17/25 18/22 18/25 19/21 21/8 26/19 29/8 33/10 34/24 37/22 39/13 40/4 47/9 49/8 55/13 56/4 61/10 64/12 68/22 70/21 76/8 78/14 79/19 79/21 79/21 79/23 82/1 87/6 90/4 90/17 90/24 96/15 124/25 131/3 136/11 136/16 137/14 138/7 138/15 140/1 141/25 142/1 157/25 158/5 158/8 193/23 205/2 236/6 243/10
appropriately [2] 144/17 194/16
apps [4] 28/19 234/12 236/13 239/10

A

apps/games/websites [1] 28/19
AR [7] 94/9 141/23 178/9 178/11 183/1 196/20 232/17
AR's [1] 145/7
arc [1] 190/13
are [568]
are 18 [1] 159/20
area [12] 2/21 6/20 23/23 59/18 78/22 82/21 160/13 179/8 179/14 197/15 225/13 227/14
areas [19] 4/6 7/2 54/19 59/6 59/16 60/1 60/3 60/10 98/2 98/19 104/9 114/7 118/20 127/23 176/12 186/5 192/14 194/9 207/22
aren't [7] 33/17 60/6 92/13 110/1 124/7 141/1 145/16
argue [4] 190/13 217/21 231/7 231/14
arises [1] 50/14
arising [1] 68/6
arose [1] 94/14
around [30] 12/10 20/20 22/5 24/5 24/23 51/13 53/7 56/21 64/21 64/23 70/1 78/20 81/21 105/8 107/24 113/16 121/20 126/21 133/18 141/14 153/21 154/25 156/1 162/24 179/7 186/17 208/17 219/6 239/7 247/3
arrested [1] 182/24
article [1] 145/8
artistic [4] 10/2 11/6 21/2 138/6
as [237] 6/3 6/15 7/21 8/6 8/7 10/3 10/16 11/21 11/24 12/10 12/15 12/22 13/18 15/24 16/3 16/6 16/6 18/7 20/17 20/17 21/11 24/14 25/5 26/16 27/19 27/19 29/17 29/25 30/11 30/11 32/7 35/10 35/11 36/11 37/11 37/11 38/2 38/6 38/12 38/13 38/15 40/17 42/17 43/6 44/3 45/9 47/15 49/10 50/7 51/11 60/6 60/10 62/21 66/12 68/5 68/23 68/23 69/9 73/2 73/9 73/15 75/1 76/2 79/7 81/10 82/14 83/22 84/12 86/1 86/23 86/23 87/3 87/3 87/14 88/24 89/16 89/16 90/8 91/8 92/12 94/9 94/20 94/21 95/1 95/1 95/22 96/10 99/2 101/7 101/14 102/2 103/18 106/14 108/16 108/24 110/17 111/3 113/22 113/22 115/5 117/10 119/21 121/25 122/20 128/16 128/18 128/18 128/24 129/14 134/10 135/1 136/3 136/7 136/9 137/22 138/18 139/5 140/15 141/16 141/23 142/4 142/5 143/20 143/20 143/23 145/13 145/14 146/8 146/8 146/20 147/24 148/3 149/4 149/6 151/19 151/19 152/15 152/19 153/8 153/11 154/3 155/13 158/10 158/20 161/1 162/13 163/24 166/11 168/12 175/18 175/25 176/5 176/21 177/15 178/4 181/4 182/10 183/3 186/1 187/7 187/15 187/19 188/2 189/7 191/11 191/22 193/18 194/17 199/6 204/4 205/9 206/20 207/4 207/17 208/3 209/10 209/25 209/25 210/2 210/19 211/8 212/15 213/13 214/20 215/13 217/15 218/23 219/4 219/6 219/20 219/25 220/17 221/20 221/20 222/4 224/12 224/25 225/10 226/19 226/22 227/5 227/16 229/14 229/22 230/5 230/9 231/2 231/18 232/10 232/17 233/18 235/1 235/3 235/3 235/19 237/2 237/19 237/21 238/13 238/25 239/1 239/15 240/3 240/13 240/23 241/3 241/22 243/14 244/17 245/15 245/15 246/2 246/2 248/8 249/14 250/1 250/12
as 13 [1] 83/22
as 8 [1] 38/13
ask [22] 2/24 3/1 3/2 7/12 28/22 39/3 81/18 87/16 96/12 101/5 106/20 118/20 119/3 126/6 130/21 133/15 138/8 144/2 148/17 197/16 244/7 251/3
asked [22] 8/14 8/22 28/11 28/18 35/23 44/20 44/23 50/16 57/6 58/3 60/4 60/15 86/7 94/12 94/22 101/4 105/14 113/22 130/8 136/6 150/22 160/1
asking [4] 117/11 117/25 154/22 159/16
asks [3] 136/19 181/14 200/13
aspect [7] 36/12 73/19 74/6 78/22 88/6 92/21 219/12
aspects [7] 5/12 44/12 127/21 210/6 210/14 210/15 220/5
Assassinations [1] 188/7
assertion [1] 243/22
assess [11] 14/20 19/23 23/24 63/6 95/23 115/23 117/25 147/16 190/8 205/9 241/10
assessed [5] 107/21 118/9 167/20 167/21 246/7
assesses [1] 161/10
assessing [1] 127/17
assessment [19] 14/6 15/20 19/12 20/10 21/14 24/19 25/5 33/5 35/18 35/19 42/1 147/11 175/8 190/4 226/18 244/22 246/3 246/5 246/9
assessments [2] 14/3 139/5
assist [10] 76/23 129/8 131/11 154/16 187/13 188/11 188/14 189/8 195/13 203/7
assistance [5] 93/9 124/22 188/15 190/2 193/4
assistant [14] 135/13 135/19 137/2 137/10 137/14 138/3 138/17 138/18 138/19 138/24 139/3 139/18 140/13 182/11
assistant's [2] 135/7 135/11
assisted [1] 189/11
assists [1] 181/20
associated [11] 18/16 19/9 34/10 110/8 110/10 119/4 130/6 141/10 204/24 217/18 246/21
assume [11] 14/22 80/11 90/20 110/10 131/10 135/15 154/21 170/10 173/2 203/24 242/21
assuming [2] 116/5 145/3
assurance [43] 8/18 17/22 40/6 41/14 41/23 42/2 42/9 42/17 43/7 43/21 45/7 47/24 53/8 55/1 55/9 55/14 57/2 58/17 142/25 157/20 162/16 162/22 163/12 166/1 166/2 166/10 205/11 231/18 232/9 233/23 234/3 235/2 235/12 235/13 235/15 235/20 236/5 236/21 237/3 237/13 244/18 245/21 246/4
Astra [3] 129/14 149/22 149/24
at [303]
attack [29] 91/22 115/13 115/17 116/2 116/12 116/12 116/23 116/25 117/3 117/9 131/11 131/13 131/15 152/7 152/13 171/16 172/20 181/6 183/11 187/14 187/19 188/4 188/16 201/2 201/9 201/15 249/10 249/13 249/21
attack-planning [1] 181/6
attacker [4] 91/15 92/11 165/1 165/7
attackers [8] 131/8 177/21 178/1 178/17 179/7 188/14 188/25 196/20
attacks [14] 11/17 11/18 92/10 93/12 111/6 131/14 131/19 147/17 181/4 187/24 188/6 188/12 189/7 191/16
attempt [2] 135/2 168/19
attempted [3] 108/9 111/16 226/5
attempting [4] 90/7 127/13 153/23 173/4
attempts [4] 55/2 56/7 57/1 232/5
attention [6] 16/1 26/11 170/12 190/12 192/1 243/4
attract [1] 241/21
audiences [2] 6/4 18/6
audio [1] 11/16
August [1] 1/18
Australian [1] 248/24
authorise [1] 48/8
authorised [1] 208/5
authoritarian [1] 208/21
authorities [7] 168/20 169/4 169/15 201/16 208/2 228/9 228/12
authors [4] 25/14 25/22 85/16 86/7
automated [32] 19/5 19/12 23/20 40/5 41/2 46/14 48/13 56/2 68/24 91/10 95/7 95/12 95/14 95/21 96/14 107/3 107/14 107/15 107/19 147/4 157/16 167/3 167/22 167/22 193/19 193/21 194/2 194/4 194/9 194/23 195/20 202/1
automatic [4] 79/5 79/14 80/7 107/12
automatically [6] 40/9 108/13 109/23 167/7 215/8 247/17
automation [1] 110/4
available [19] 5/20 8/20 16/6 16/7 17/2 21/16 43/17 53/13 118/5 158/15 165/8 196/2 198/11 208/10 234/8 237/5 239/22 249/20 251/1
avatars [7] 86/7 86/12 86/20 87/1 87/4 87/8 87/20
average [4] 85/18 222/23 223/2 223/14
avoiding [1] 98/5
aware [26] 13/15 15/17 41/21 45/15 94/9 94/16 101/13 113/22 115/13 121/2 121/6 124/1 140/22 149/8 162/23 162/24 165/21 165/23 166/16 170/3 170/4 170/14 178/6 228/10 228/15 230/24
awareness [1] 180/24
away [14] 16/3 53/21 54/9 142/2 155/18 167/13 173/3 186/24 230/1 233/17 238/6 247/5 249/15 250/23
axis [1] 154/10

B

back [45] 3/5 8/15 12/14 17/19 17/21 38/19 39/11 47/10 50/15 53/23 56/5 62/9 69/16 70/20 73/18 88/4 89/6 93/1 93/3 97/24 100/3 100/25 124/16 124/19 130/14 142/24 147/10 156/15 156/16 156/20 168/14 170/14 170/15 175/17 180/4 207/16 210/14

B

back... [8] 214/19 228/16 231/20 233/14 233/17 246/12 247/5 251/8
backed [2] 26/20 35/6
background [12] 4/6 25/12 44/18 94/17 95/4 125/24 126/7 147/15 195/16 207/7 210/16 226/20
backgrounds [1] 196/17
bad [4] 88/21 209/20 209/22 226/7
balance [7] 23/15 27/22 76/5 80/23 82/15 135/8 138/9
balances [1] 76/14
balancing [2] 78/15 78/17
ban [2] 157/13 193/2
bank [1] 121/24
banned [5] 202/9 204/17 247/18 247/22 248/6
banning [4] 168/8 192/19 210/4 247/25
bar [1] 184/6
base [4] 71/21 154/16 244/18 246/6
based [21] 42/2 51/8 52/15 97/25 109/21 111/20 114/1 118/7 146/9 157/6 163/3 163/9 197/17 202/8 202/22 205/11 205/16 211/17 212/6 225/22 234/3
baseline [3] 40/17 46/11 181/25
basis [8] 61/12 82/4 111/15 111/23 111/24 130/12 132/23 206/15
be [475]
be 13 [1] 47/12
be 18 [2] 233/10 235/24
bear [1] 38/9
bearings [1] 58/19
Bebe [1] 178/9
became [2] 86/1 249/20
because [107] 2/3 12/2 12/17 12/21 14/1 19/19 24/20 30/13 30/21 30/25 34/15 37/18 40/19 41/7 46/5 47/5 48/1 50/24 51/7 51/8 51/9 51/15 51/19 52/9 54/20 57/13 58/3 60/5 60/13 65/6 65/21 69/21 72/14 73/4 75/20 77/4 80/3 81/5 86/4 87/2 90/3 96/18 96/20 99/7 99/20 100/4 100/11 103/15 104/12 107/19 108/7 109/16 110/24 111/25 112/21 113/9 114/21 115/24 116/7 116/10 117/14 124/6 142/3 146/12 153/3 153/6 156/5 160/15 163/3 163/5 163/13 164/7 174/9 179/22 181/18 185/3 186/18 186/21 191/1 200/20 211/9 212/6 215/24 217/18 220/8 220/20 222/9 224/3 228/19 230/21 231/14 233/18 234/22 236/1 238/7 239/5 239/23 239/24 240/8 240/13 241/24 242/13 242/14 245/4 246/22 248/10 249/20
become [8] 26/9 31/16 88/13 92/24 159/21 166/5 230/16 246/22
becoming [1] 67/4
been [112] 2/20 4/10 4/11 9/19 10/4 15/23 16/1 20/14 20/16 29/10 39/7 43/25 48/6 49/10 53/6 53/9 53/15 54/21 55/10 57/3 57/23 58/3 58/7 62/3 62/19 62/23 63/5 63/6 63/10 65/20 66/4 66/5 66/22 67/25 76/19 83/1 87/3 87/7 87/19 89/23 90/2 90/8 90/22 94/7 94/15 95/24 96/6 98/9 98/10 99/17 100/2 101/17 105/14 107/16 107/20 112/18 114/18 116/2 116/8 116/11 118/11 118/14 120/21 120/24 121/1 121/2 121/12 121/13 124/23 125/20 130/10 131/19 131/23 138/9 151/23 155/12 155/17 155/20 163/10 170/4 176/11 177/9 185/8 185/20 190/3 191/10 192/7 197/10 198/17 199/5 201/19 203/22 204/5 205/7 205/8 225/24 226/7 226/15 227/17 227/25 236/1 236/2 240/1 240/7 244/9 245/18 245/21 246/7 247/8 247/17 247/21 248/11
before [34] 3/12 15/4 38/17 62/3 62/8 68/16 77/23 82/3 92/4 95/17 121/1 125/24 130/21 133/15 140/7 149/12 153/7 156/16 156/20 157/23 162/9 172/19 184/21 186/24 187/11 191/8 228/15 230/15 236/1 237/1 244/25 245/23 248/15 249/14
beforehand [1] 131/21
beg [1] 228/22
beginning [5] 30/5 41/22 60/20 227/2 249/2
behalf [4] 3/24 119/3 206/16 233/3
behaviour [25] 40/14 51/8 51/16 56/21 84/13 88/22 112/8 133/14 134/7 135/11 142/10 151/21 155/2 159/2 159/7 161/10 163/3 163/9 178/1 194/18 195/23 198/3 205/12 205/15 238/21
behaviour-based [2] 51/8 163/3
behavioural [4] 163/8 164/13 196/14 196/18
behaviours [3] 32/10 91/8 142/14
behind [7] 7/4 20/7 33/6 57/14 184/18 188/20 237/1
being [77] 13/19 13/20 13/21 15/1 15/8 15/12 24/1 24/10 24/11 26/4 26/14 26/16 26/22 27/4 32/14 32/23 34/4 35/7 37/11 41/2 42/4 42/18 44/20 45/1 47/8 49/19 50/17 52/17 54/7 59/7 62/10 69/9 69/12 77/5 77/19 84/2 92/9 93/7 97/11 99/3 99/7 99/9 108/6 108/9 108/17 109/7 116/14 117/9 120/23 122/5 122/5 138/25 144/3 144/6 150/25 163/24 167/23 172/14 176/19 176/23 179/6 207/17 214/8 215/11 217/10 218/18 220/22 230/7 231/16 234/12 235/20 239/20 244/5 244/15 245/4 250/1 250/4
belief [4] 1/25 2/14 125/22 207/14
believe [23] 5/14 17/8 20/12 20/19 36/9 57/17 73/5 78/12 86/6 87/12 87/23 93/1 109/4 111/18 156/6 158/21 160/13 166/3 168/14 191/13 216/21 219/2 232/23
below [18] 12/2 12/7 16/23 17/10 63/21 68/14 70/14 76/20 77/7 89/22 90/18 107/2 108/2 142/17 221/5 221/11 228/19 240/8
benchmark [8] 149/14 153/1 153/4 153/18 154/5 165/16 181/11 190/22
benchmarking [5] 147/12 175/13 181/6 184/2 184/21
benchmarks [3] 149/17 180/22 190/24
benefit [2] 192/9 229/25
bereaved [1] 119/4
best [14] 1/24 2/14 68/22 125/22 127/22 128/9 128/18 135/15 168/13 175/18 176/15 185/4 189/15 207/13
better [7] 52/10 151/25 153/11 171/23 187/4 189/24 190/1
between [22] 8/9 14/10 14/13 33/2 39/23 66/24 76/5 98/15 115/24 120/8 123/12 123/18 129/15 135/8 154/16 173/13 173/16 197/2 211/16 211/25 212/7 212/11
between 13 [1] 39/23
beyond [1] 62/10
big [3] 38/1 83/1 94/4
biggest [1] 31/9
billion [2] 130/16 130/19
billions [2] 7/24 101/2
biological [4] 134/13 148/8 148/9 191/21
biometric [2] 52/12 54/5
birth [4] 39/4 55/4 55/20 123/11
Bishop [3] 115/10 116/14 116/22
bit [10] 4/3 4/5 59/2 82/6 127/11 153/5 173/10 177/15 181/10 242/23
bits [2] 128/17 153/7
black [1] 83/8
blanket [1] 133/16
block [3] 158/6 220/15 246/16
blocked [2] 239/12 247/6
blocking [1] 57/10
blood [5] 11/22 13/22 13/22 15/1 37/5
Blue' [1] 84/22
board [5] 6/21 7/6 7/6 96/11 176/24
bodies [4] 110/22 148/16 200/5 229/3
bodily [1] 11/21
body [2] 29/24 94/4
body' [1] 84/22
bold [1] 227/2
bomb [2] 142/19 183/6
bombardment [1] 26/9
bombing [1] 183/9
bombing' [1] 84/21
bombings [1] 188/8
bombs [1] 181/4
Bonnie [1] 84/22
borne [1] 182/17
borrowing [2] 236/8 236/9
bot [1] 247/7
both [19] 64/23 65/10 65/13 93/22 96/6 98/5 132/9 137/9 140/18 149/8 152/20 171/9 190/14 204/1 207/11 212/19 221/3 230/12 236/3
bots [2] 224/23 231/9
bottom [28] 10/25 11/10 16/12 17/20 31/13 35/21 38/21 42/12 54/23 56/6 63/17 66/18 70/8 78/21 89/8 136/24 142/17 158/2 166/19 171/1 172/23 182/15 187/18 189/1 199/25 202/13 208/15 222/19
bought [1] 109/20
bound [1] 240/16
bounds [2] 135/5 140/3
box [2] 83/8 182/23
boxing [5] 79/22 79/23 80/18 80/20 80/21
Boyle [6] 125/8 125/9 177/8 180/13 206/1 252/11
brackets [1] 8/25
brand [1] 193/17
brawl [1] 238/22
brawls [1] 238/17
breach [6] 14/24 23/17 106/12 116/8 179/4 229/18
breaches [1] 13/3
break [7] 25/17 58/13 86/24 180/11 205/24 206/6 248/15
breakdown [2] 100/10 172/24

B

breaking [2] 138/24 160/1
BRIAN [3] 125/6 125/11 252/9
Brian Fishman [1] 125/11
brief [1] 85/13
briefly [9] 10/9 20/23 36/7 73/22 91/2 104/21 126/19 128/10 154/19
bring [2] 5/7 204/3
bringing [1] 248/16
brings [2] 12/6 126/2
British [1] 112/12
broad [12] 7/22 24/22 24/23 37/2 104/16 130/15 130/23 162/24 167/19 216/1 219/4 219/8
broadcast [3] 207/1 213/7 218/19
broadcaster [1] 218/23
broadcasting [2] 212/21 212/23
broader [5] 60/12 65/1 85/5 172/6 243/5
broadest [1] 14/15
broadly [7] 7/25 8/8 89/19 126/21 152/15 174/13 200/17
broken [2] 108/20 111/3
brought [2] 82/19 82/22
brutal [1] 116/10
bucket [2] 77/12 90/11
buckets [1] 77/19
build [3] 120/19 127/13 179/16
building [1] 119/15
built [5] 19/14 120/16 132/9 183/6 237/4
bulk [2] 102/20 220/14
bullet [9] 12/5 69/23 171/19 172/9 188/2 189/1 224/20 224/21 224/24
bushcraft [4] 15/9 15/13 37/22 38/2
business [2] 5/2 128/14
but [384]
butchery [2] 15/10 37/21
button [1] 101/25

C

calculations [1] 137/12
calibrate [1] 196/1
call [11] 58/20 126/22 127/2 141/3 141/7 141/16 144/21 148/24 152/3 163/8 168/1
called [13] 126/10 126/12 127/3 132/12 140/23 146/24 147/3 162/13 162/15 166/23 170/21 185/7 203/23
calling [2] 22/20 25/16
came [3] 44/2 93/15 236/5
campaign [1] 126/23
campaigning [1] 23/23
campus [1] 188/17
can [217] 1/13 2/4 3/5 3/23 4/18 5/15 5/22 7/10 7/21 9/5 10/9 10/17 10/25 11/10 16/3 17/11 17/19 22/10 23/14 25/4 26/9 26/16 27/20 30/7 33/19 36/4 36/7 36/12 36/21 37/2 38/9 38/19 40/1 42/11 43/6 44/18 50/1 51/14 55/22 58/18 58/25 59/23 66/6 66/7 66/13 71/2 73/7 74/8 74/17 76/13 79/6 79/10 79/19 82/23 83/8 83/20 85/5 86/23 88/3 89/20 91/5 93/10 95/3 98/6 101/8 101/11 101/22 102/1 102/7 103/8 111/1 112/9 112/15 115/11 119/12 119/24 120/9 121/5 121/22 121/25 122/9 122/10 123/9 125/20 126/18 128/18 132/11 133/15 134/17 138/8 139/15 141/11 142/17 144/13 144/15 144/21 147/1 147/8 148/17 149/8 150/4 150/21 152/14 153/2 154/11 155/16 156/3 157/17 160/14 160/20 161/2 161/4 161/23 163/14 163/16 164/5 164/5 169/13 171/13 172/22 174/7 174/23 175/17 175/18 176/15 177/11 177/12 177/14 178/12 178/12 178/14 178/24 178/25 179/16 179/23 180/4 182/1 184/1 185/15 185/17 185/22 185/23 186/1 186/3 186/10 186/18 186/19 187/14 189/13 190/6 192/5 193/16 194/14 194/21 194/23 196/6 197/12 197/16 199/12 199/24 200/15 203/6 203/20 205/11 207/7 207/12 209/18 210/4 211/5 211/18 211/22 211/24 212/8 213/14 213/15 213/16 213/18 213/24 214/7 214/16 216/1 216/17 216/22 217/3 217/24 218/2 218/5 218/9 218/12 218/12 218/18 218/19 219/3 220/23 221/20 221/20 224/12 224/14 224/16 226/25 227/1 229/20 231/18 233/14 238/13 239/7 241/9 242/10 245/14 245/25 246/19 247/5 247/7 247/11 247/15 249/6 251/3
can't [36] 5/6 14/1 15/20 20/15 23/7 24/3 35/12 35/18 37/17 38/6 52/4 60/14 67/23 73/15 92/1 110/23 117/17 146/5 148/15 156/5 175/12 176/14 179/23 183/22 199/18 216/12 218/22 224/6 226/8 227/23 230/21 233/1 233/22 234/21 244/25 245/23
Canadian [4] 201/4 201/16 201/22 203/14
candour [1] 205/22
cannot [5] 211/3 211/19 223/21 226/2 236/22
cap [1] 216/21
capabilities [3] 146/2 157/17 164/23
capability [2] 44/14 152/5
capable [3] 42/17 135/15 150/15
capture [2] 14/18 16/25
captured [1] 61/22
captures [1] 99/9
carcasses [3] 13/19 14/25 37/13
card [10] 48/3 50/12 51/10 51/25 149/15 149/18 236/8 236/10 236/11 236/14
cards [3] 50/23 51/21 52/4
care [1] 186/7
career [1] 4/6
careful [1] 205/20
carefully [2] 80/5 186/22
carers [1] 25/16
caring [1] 229/14
carried [4] 42/1 115/13 116/6 116/23
carry [3] 32/7 131/13 244/14
carrying [3] 137/3 148/17 169/22
cartoons [1] 18/7
case [23] 29/21 50/17 67/23 72/14 81/9 87/23 105/19 106/14 110/1 117/6 118/9 118/10 122/12 122/14 156/12 167/24 168/4 168/6 186/2 186/4 211/5 215/3 225/6
cases [24] 11/4 29/9 51/6 51/14 51/17 52/11 57/20 95/16 98/8 100/1 100/8 100/16 107/17 149/13 149/15 173/17 181/3 182/10 186/20 193/5 193/22 194/24 196/12 248/11
casualty [6] 91/14 91/21 92/10 93/12 131/13 181/4
catchall [3] 225/10 230/8 231/15
categories [7] 33/13 77/14 78/18 152/24 173/14 222/14 225/20
categorisation [2] 153/6 224/1
categorised [3] 222/5 222/18 226/21
category [15] 7/19 42/22 90/19 108/20 108/21 117/10 162/1 172/14 222/7 222/18 222/20 223/9 223/10 223/11 238/5
Category 1 [2] 222/18 222/20
category 2B [3] 223/9 223/10 223/11
caught [5] 107/19 107/22 141/24 142/1 151/1
causal [1] 226/14
causative [1] 217/20
cause [1] 150/4
causing [1] 62/16
caution [1] 237/7
cautions [1] 216/25
caveat [1] 2/13
caveated [1] 169/23
caveats [4] 57/25 58/6 131/9 131/10
CBRN [1] 137/7
CBRNE [1] 157/8
CCDH [5] 23/22 24/2 24/6 187/25 192/3
CCDH000007 [2] 22/10 22/14
CCDH000029 [1] 25/4
CCDH000030 [5] 187/9 187/14 187/21 189/5 189/10
CCW000018 [2] 27/24 28/7
cent [34] 7/25 24/16 28/13 28/14 28/14 28/15 28/16 28/21 28/24 29/1 29/13 30/9 30/22 33/2 50/22 68/19 69/17 98/16 100/16 107/6 107/9 107/10 107/10 107/12 107/17 108/3 118/3 118/3 118/4 118/6 173/5 173/16 174/1 184/6
Center [5] 22/12 126/10 169/21 187/8 200/6
centre [2] 113/24 193/11
CEO [3] 22/12 169/20 176/5
certain [27] 32/9 38/6 48/15 54/11 132/11 132/14 133/10 133/12 136/3 138/19 140/3 149/7 150/22 158/6 158/19 162/7 167/15 186/5 186/14 191/12 210/7 234/6 241/2 241/20 246/17 247/6 248/1
certainly [25] 36/2 76/24 84/20 118/7 125/2 147/22 148/14 165/9 165/15 174/25 177/12 179/14 187/4 189/18 189/23 190/15 192/5 192/12 195/5 199/5 205/8 205/21 222/6 242/16 250/4
cetera [9] 137/6 151/21 157/14 166/12 186/18 224/23 225/4 231/7 231/9
chain [5] 150/12 150/13 150/16 150/18 151/4
chains [1] 151/6
Chair [5] 124/13 206/17 206/19 206/22 235/10
Chair's [1] 10/10
challenge [7] 12/22 22/9 23/3 24/8 60/18 93/16 98/4
challenged [1] 172/1
challenges [3] 176/6 186/15 186/20
challenging [4] 79/25 80/2 135/7 154/21
chance [1] 9/2

C

change [12] 20/7 45/5 61/8 62/15 62/17 62/19 69/24 77/16 79/15 82/3 96/1 236/22
changed [2] 66/24 250/21
changes [14] 44/24 45/6 59/8 59/14 60/23 61/23 62/1 62/4 63/3 65/8 75/18 75/21 114/20 202/15
channel [15] 75/1 105/3 105/8 105/20 105/24 106/17 110/8 111/14 116/6 117/4 212/24 218/19 218/20 218/23 220/22
channels [26] 75/2 75/3 75/10 75/25 76/1 76/22 106/23 115/14 212/21 212/25 213/12 218/8 218/9 218/12 219/1 219/18 219/21 220/12 221/9 224/23 228/21 230/4 230/18 231/6 231/9 237/20
Chapman [5] 118/24 118/25 119/2 124/20 252/7
charging [1] 236/10
chat [10] 102/7 128/11 138/11 154/11 214/8 214/25 220/22 224/4 230/20 242/2
chatbot [2] 183/19 189/8
chatbots [8] 170/23 187/13 187/23 188/1 188/11 188/15 188/24 189/11
ChatGPT [45] 128/9 128/11 128/16 129/6 129/12 133/6 136/19 156/24 157/3 157/23 160/6 161/15 161/25 162/13 165/11 165/25 166/23 167/6 169/22 170/17 171/22 172/25 173/11 173/15 174/2 174/12 177/23 178/12 182/20 183/3 183/11 183/17 184/6 184/24 187/3 187/11 187/11 188/17 189/2 189/15 194/5 194/14 201/24 204/14 204/17
ChatGPT's [3] 165/20 184/9 184/19
ChatGPT-5.1 [1] 187/11
ChatGPT-6 [1] 187/11
chats [29] 210/21 211/3 211/15 211/19 211/20 211/25 212/1 212/2 212/6 212/9 212/19 212/19 212/20 213/10 213/13 213/18 213/21 214/5 214/8 216/16 219/17 219/17 219/18 219/22 221/9 231/1 231/2 231/3 237/20
chatting [1] 242/4
check [12] 39/12 50/5 58/1 69/21 88/3 96/13 160/14 168/14 180/2 219/1 245/2 251/3
checked [1] 150/25
checking [3] 96/7 97/8 215/8
checks [3] 41/2 49/19 232/4
chemical [4] 148/8 148/9 183/4 191/21
chemistry [2] 182/22 183/8
chief [1] 127/4
child [46] 6/8 9/25 25/11 27/10 30/13 30/24 40/25 48/7 49/10 57/9 57/20 72/21 75/25 76/7 76/17 76/20 77/14 78/7 79/24 80/12 80/15 81/15 81/18 105/21 108/2 108/25 112/4 134/14 134/15 144/8 148/10 168/2 176/10 179/19 199/5 216/6 225/2 234/13 234/19 235/22 236/8 236/13 240/5 240/20 240/22 243/7
child's [1] 76/6
children [96] 5/11 5/13 8/2 18/6 21/24 25/17 26/4 26/8 26/10 26/22 27/14 27/19 28/3 28/10 28/21 28/24 29/3 29/6 30/1 31/3 31/17 32/3 32/20 32/22 33/2 33/9 33/16 33/24 34/19 34/22 34/24 35/15 35/22 38/25 39/22 42/4 42/14 42/23 43/22 44/1 44/10 44/17 44/24 45/4 47/17 49/9 50/17 51/3 58/21 59/4 59/9 59/13 59/17 59/19 59/22 60/9 60/25 61/10 62/5 64/13 66/24 67/5 67/6 67/17 67/21 68/16 68/21 69/2 69/9 70/11 70/14 71/4 71/25 72/3 72/6 72/11 72/15 72/18 73/7 73/11 73/13 73/21 74/1 76/16 78/16 85/4 88/7 226/18 226/24 238/3 238/12 239/13 240/3 240/13 240/13 240/15
children's [11] 28/1 29/24 44/1 44/20 48/8 61/1 66/20 66/22 66/25 67/4 80/24
choice [1] 113/6
choose [4] 27/17 54/3 81/17 118/20
choosing [2] 43/12 84/8
chosen [5] 36/8 44/15 84/6 138/9 160/23
Christchurch [2] 249/10 249/13
circumstances [21] 21/6 48/16 73/17 109/1 112/22 132/15 133/12 137/23 138/15 139/12 145/11 158/25 176/21 179/22 180/2 193/25 194/1 195/11 197/21 201/8 239/8
circumvent [4] 55/3 56/8 57/2 234/19
circumvented [2] 41/8 48/7
circumvention [4] 39/8 55/19 55/23 109/6
circumvention of [1] 109/6
cited [2] 69/6 239/16
civic [1] 53/19
civil [2] 102/24 201/5
civil-society [1] 102/24
claim [1] 170/4
clarification [2] 43/2 44/6
clarify [6] 50/4 65/18 93/1 93/4 227/20 244/13
clarifying [2] 221/23 240/4
clarity [3] 199/4 227/10 227/17
classifiers [10] 18/23 19/5 19/15 46/14 56/21 70/18 91/16 96/8 96/9 100/14
classifies [1] 132/17
Claude [4] 173/11 174/2 188/13 189/13
clear [14] 7/16 15/25 26/18 28/25 29/15 65/7 66/22 70/9 152/25 219/12 225/15 229/25 233/6 233/7
clearer [1] 161/24
clearly [10] 62/10 81/10 87/1 141/4 163/18 172/1 193/13 209/23 231/10 249/25
clicked [2] 49/3 93/24
climate [1] 217/14
clips [3] 37/7 37/7 146/13
close [5] 119/17 191/5 193/9 242/10 248/2
closed [5] 170/22 184/3 185/25 186/22 186/25
closed-weight [1] 186/22
closely [3] 5/10 128/1 141/9
cloud [5] 211/17 212/6 212/10 212/11 212/13
cloud-based [2] 211/17 212/6
clue [1] 231/1
CNN [1] 187/25
code [2] 128/14 232/1
codes [2] 56/17 67/5
coherent [1] 141/7
cohort [1] 177/20
Cold [1] 15/17
collaborative [1] 251/2
colleague [3] 2/18 87/12 91/19
colleague's [1] 91/3
colleagues [8] 3/18 35/17 58/2 117/7 122/6 170/10 170/13 208/12
collect [4] 55/2 56/7 57/1 57/24
collecting [1] 52/15
collectively [1] 44/5
Com [8] 226/5 241/21 242/16 243/4 243/18 243/25 245/8 245/19
combat [2] 13/11 38/2
Combating [1] 126/10
combination [2] 91/10 95/7
combined [2] 178/3 246/4
come [63] 1/19 1/23 3/10 17/21 26/10 29/2 36/4 39/22 44/12 71/3 89/12 93/1 93/3 93/25 96/4 98/18 109/24 115/6 116/14 130/14 131/25 133/2 138/21 140/20 142/24 146/2 147/5 149/9 154/2 155/18 157/11 158/3 159/9 160/19 162/21 165/17 169/2 169/6 170/12 175/3 175/3 175/15 176/9 176/12 180/4 180/14 187/18 192/4 199/8 210/14 215/7 221/2 222/3 222/13 226/4 232/4 233/17 234/24 243/2 244/22 247/5 247/24 251/8
comes [7] 80/21 151/8 169/8 176/10 190/6 215/13 228/13
coming [4] 67/6 114/22 122/19 175/21
comment [6] 63/23 73/1 73/3 86/9 87/6 227/13
commented [1] 84/16
commenting [1] 116/12
comments [7] 9/22 24/11 75/9 86/25 114/15 126/4 202/18
commercial [2] 66/12 132/24
commercially [1] 130/12
commission [1] 112/2
commissioned [1] 83/2
Commissioner [3] 28/1 29/24 248/24
Commissioner for [2] 28/1 29/24
Commissioners' [1] 64/20
commit [5] 11/3 11/13 16/17 64/4 64/21
commitment [5] 118/16 175/19 175/22 200/12 202/12
commitments [2] 61/19 202/17
committed [8] 60/22 60/25 61/7 64/15 65/4 111/22 134/5 200/9
committee [1] 75/20
common [3] 31/24 71/16 172/14
communicate [3] 212/7 230/2 248/20
communicated [2] 233/21 244/24
communicating [1] 212/5
communication [5] 208/20 209/4 209/19 211/12 236/3
communications [2] 87/25 112/6
communities [2]

C

communities... [2] 171/10 209/3
community [45] 5/19 9/12 9/16 9/18 9/23 10/7 10/18 10/19 10/22 12/16 13/1 14/5 14/10 14/10 14/13 14/15 14/17 14/24 17/16 17/24 22/25 23/4 32/15 40/17 46/10 46/16 46/18 71/11 77/2 102/14 106/3 106/13 108/10 109/16 109/24 110/1 111/2 111/7 112/18 112/20 114/5 116/8 116/15 203/18 242/6
companies [3] 23/10 175/21 176/12
Companions [1] 170/24
company [13] 4/20 12/22 21/25 33/8 121/22 127/8 127/12 186/21 192/7 206/16 230/22 233/3 236/1
company's [1] 208/24
comparable [1] 70/3
compared [3] 47/8 123/23 247/18
compares [1] 88/17
comparing [1] 164/8
comparison [1] 163/5
competition [1] 190/10
compiles [1] 181/25
complete [4] 169/24 172/3 213/3 213/6
completely [4] 26/12 155/17 217/25 217/25
completion [1] 236/20
completions [3] 152/2 184/14 185/3
complex [1] 107/23
complexity [2] 19/19 34/25
compliance [1] 181/18
compliant [4] 56/17 65/12 81/5 181/19
complicated [1] 122/20
complicates [1] 38/23
complies [1] 43/5
comply [4] 135/18 156/25 166/6 181/15
complying [2] 135/13 181/17
comprehensive [2] 135/12 180/21
comprise [1] 9/23
compromising [1] 133/8
concentrate [2] 7/14 227/1
concept [5] 131/3 143/6 150/3 151/22 181/22
concepts [2] 144/2 177/18
conceptualise [1] 127/12
concern [36] 16/3 24/22 24/23 30/3 30/4 48/19 60/1 60/3 60/10 61/6 62/16 69/1 75/23 76/4 76/24 87/2 97/1 97/2 97/15 103/2 114/1 117/3 146/1 153/13 158/22 167/4 169/25 170/7 174/20 175/4 187/20 188/20 191/24 228/8 228/9 235/11
concerned [16] 13/13 44/16 59/21 62/12 77/10 77/24 87/4 98/7 101/22 106/11 177/16 207/23 211/5 211/9 211/23 215/3
concerning [15] 35/13 45/10 85/18 85/25 133/14 145/15 146/15 173/19 183/13 184/20 194/5 195/24 198/17 205/12 229/24
concerningly [1] 108/3
concerns [12] 54/14 73/7 94/14 95/1 103/25 156/1 174/11 190/20 201/10 205/5 228/12 243/9
conclusion [2] 33/4 236/5
conclusions [2] 42/8 163/9
condition [1] 54/11
conditions [2] 222/20 223/11
condolences [1] 126/3
conduct [2] 86/5 245/7
conducted [2] 44/21 109/7
conducting [1] 121/6
conduit [1] 114/22
confidence [1] 233/24
confident [6] 19/17 159/21 159/22 205/7 205/9 244/20
confidential [10] 61/15 63/19 63/20 64/19 65/2 65/20 65/21 66/8 66/12 209/4
confidentiality [3] 65/15 65/23 208/25
confirm [15] 1/13 10/11 10/17 59/23 119/13 120/9 122/15 125/21 160/10 207/12 218/11 224/14 248/10 249/15 250/23
confirmation [1] 232/1
confirming [1] 121/18
connect [2] 120/4 120/7
connected [4] 29/14 68/18 204/2 242/5
conscious [2] 58/7 177/8
consensual [1] 138/4
consent [6] 36/10 157/23 160/2 160/5 160/10 160/24
consequences [1] 93/18
consider [10] 16/2 37/8 38/8 66/8 113/11 130/14 131/22 168/4 177/3 205/2
considerably [3] 165/18 185/6 187/2
consideration [6] 53/9 53/15 72/20 113/9 113/15 164/20
considerations [6] 23/14 27/22 78/17 107/25 124/11 199/16
considered [1] 230/11
considering [1] 142/2
considers [1] 108/17
consistent [9] 8/2 85/14 85/15 135/21 174/13 174/25 176/23 184/13 184/16
conspiracy [1] 172/13
conspiratorial [1] 171/4
constantly [4] 46/20 65/8 167/23 225/21
constitute [1] 171/7
constitutes [2] 157/2 227/10
constraints [2] 135/20 174/24
construction [1] 182/21
consultation [1] 162/9
consume [1] 158/24
consumers [1] 33/17
consuming [3] 31/2 33/16 75/16
consumption [1] 76/3
contact [5] 88/20 167/2 168/20 169/11 203/14
contacted [1] 59/24
contacting [2] 168/22 169/4
contain [1] 54/6
contained [4] 42/25 51/12 65/22 145/8
containing [3] 23/1 24/16 102/2
contains [3] 18/7 145/15 146/22
content [310]
contents [6] 1/24 2/13 43/25 44/7 83/9 207/13
context [60] 3/9 11/6 15/3 20/23 22/11 23/14 25/12 25/18 27/25 60/12 61/13 64/6 67/24 73/17 77/9 78/15 81/21 82/14 83/6 91/5 92/2 95/24 104/4 104/10 104/13 104/18 118/13 128/1 128/24 129/25 133/6 138/14 139/1 139/3 139/6 139/10 139/12 139/14 139/25 142/24 154/17 154/25 155/3 155/5 156/18 158/23 159/3 165/24 186/23 189/22 194/18 195/19 195/21 195/22 201/1 203/18 204/4 228/22 238/22 248/22
context-dependent [1] 118/13
context-specific [2] 104/4 104/18
contexts [8] 136/16 137/24 138/6 138/12 138/20 139/22 140/6 186/14
contextual [7] 15/11 64/17 103/7 103/15 118/14 136/5 247/3
contextualise [1] 140/15
contextualised [1] 144/18
contextually [1] 19/18
continually [1] 62/18
continue [4] 42/15 69/12 187/6 202/20
continued [1] 61/17
continues [3] 95/25 208/22 209/2
continuing [2] 42/24 148/13
continuous [3] 20/8 96/10 96/10
continuously [1] 40/10
contradict [1] 63/18
contrary [2] 109/15 226/16
contribute [2] 139/16 172/6
contributors [1] 102/12
control [3] 186/10 232/11 235/5
controllability [3] 148/7 156/8 191/22
controllability-ability [1] 148/7
controlled [1] 220/4
controlling [1] 150/15
controls [5] 160/19 234/7 234/12 234/18 234/19
convenient [1] 58/9
conventional [1] 157/8
conversation [4] 91/18 128/12 193/9 199/11
conversational [3] 171/6 171/7 172/15
conversations [12] 53/7 71/9 76/15 114/23 176/5 176/13 177/6 189/6 210/21 211/16 213/10 220/12
convicted [1] 145/9
cooperative [1] 248/20
coordinated [1] 198/18
coordinating [1] 207/25
copy [1] 123/9
copyright [1] 106/4
core [11] 119/4 127/14 129/17 156/8 160/12 176/10 179/11 206/22 208/15 208/17 210/15
corner [1] 172/23
corners [1] 37/19
corporate [1] 5/4
corpses [2] 11/18 11/24
correct [97] 1/16 2/8 2/8 2/12 2/22 3/11 4/2 4/20 4/21 4/25 7/18 9/14 10/8 10/24 11/9 12/19 12/20 17/8 17/18 18/18 18/19 19/2 21/4 21/17 34/20 36/14 36/24 39/15 61/19 63/9 64/9 70/7 75/17 79/16 89/18 95/11 102/6 102/16 105/13 108/4 115/22

C

correct... [56] 116/17 125/14 127/10 127/22 128/18 129/5 129/10 133/9 137/18 140/3 155/19 156/25 160/21 165/14 178/13 181/7 195/1 203/9 207/15 207/20 207/21 208/4 209/7 209/8 209/14 211/1 211/7 211/12 212/12 212/18 213/2 213/17 214/3 214/10 215/10 215/12 215/16 216/19 216/24 218/3 218/4 218/21 219/16 219/23 220/24 222/8 222/11 232/14 233/12 234/16 236/25 237/9 238/1 247/14 247/23 248/4
corrected [1] 244/2
correctly [3] 2/21 4/24 41/12
correspond [1] 200/4
correspondence [2] 87/25 127/6
correspondingly [1] 69/18
cost [2] 53/5 53/9
costs [1] 130/6
CoT [1] 150/11
could [131] 1/12 2/16 3/20 10/14 14/19 18/4 18/25 22/9 25/1 25/8 25/11 26/22 29/17 31/13 36/15 37/10 38/12 38/12 45/2 46/6 48/1 48/7 50/5 51/10 51/25 52/2 54/16 54/23 58/5 58/17 59/9 65/18 66/2 66/3 66/13 71/18 72/23 78/2 81/6 81/12 81/12 82/24 83/7 83/8 85/2 87/22 87/24 91/2 91/9 92/14 92/15 92/16 92/16 92/17 92/21 93/5 100/20 100/24 101/19 104/6 105/21 107/23 109/20 110/12 114/5 117/20 121/23 125/1 125/10 125/15 125/19 129/6 129/14 130/24 131/1 131/5 131/10 133/5 133/7 133/25 136/23 137/4 137/13 137/20 139/11 140/9 141/20 142/22 149/19 150/1 150/6 152/6 154/7 158/1 159/10 160/15 164/25 165/2 166/18 170/17 170/25 171/1 171/16 172/8 173/22 178/4 180/17 180/18 181/9 181/11 182/2 187/21 189/4 192/21 198/6 200/13 202/8 203/4 210/16 214/6 219/10 231/10 233/17 240/18 241/13 241/16 241/23 242/2 242/6 242/8 245/2
couldn't [5] 76/13 106/15 179/20 212/15 212/16
counsel [1] 206/22
counter [8] 25/14 26/3 26/11 94/2 103/11 126/8 250/13 250/20
counter-terrorism [1] 126/8
Countering [4] 22/13 126/13 169/21 187/9
countries [3] 225/1 230/10 230/12
country [4] 29/22 110/22 203/18 217/14
couple [2] 115/9 180/15
course [16] 12/10 27/10 30/10 55/11 63/18 75/23 99/15 103/1 139/8 139/10 140/3 163/23 164/11 183/1 195/2 238/9
cover [6] 69/15 107/5 118/12 201/9 216/4 216/8
coverage [1] 115/16
covered [8] 115/20 116/10 117/4 118/19 141/1 165/3 192/16 202/22
covering [2] 15/15 24/21
covers [1] 4/12
create [8] 39/19 57/21 139/18 143/12 178/7 178/13 186/20 204/21
created [4] 83/15 134/20 204/22 208/19
creates [3] 214/24 215/2 238/6
creating [4] 105/7 131/7 137/6 231/24
creation [7] 39/4 39/18 55/21 74/24 83/11 134/13 134/15
creator [1] 105/5
creators [1] 18/21
credential [1] 121/22
credentials [2] 119/23 122/9
credibility [1] 197/12
credible [3] 196/24 197/11 202/9
credit [11] 48/3 50/12 50/23 51/10 51/20 51/25 52/4 236/8 236/9 236/11 236/14
crime [11] 25/15 26/3 26/12 102/25 112/2 112/2 112/22 113/24 114/6 114/18 162/4
crimes [2] 134/11 134/11
criminal [8] 13/9 16/20 104/6 109/10 111/10 111/16 111/23 126/16
criteria [1] 203/6
critical [4] 134/10 137/5 139/20 154/4
critically [1] 4/4
criticism [1] 15/24
cross [3] 6/7 6/16 196/9
cross-purposes [1] 196/9
crossbows [1] 78/8
cruel [1] 88/24
cruelty [1] 26/7
CTPHQ000414 [1] 25/13
cues [1] 41/3
cultural [2] 12/23 12/23
culture [1] 15/10
cumulatively [1] 79/7
current [7] 63/22 64/1 66/5 129/11 189/25 224/14 245/25
currently [6] 61/2 63/13 65/14 98/14 135/11 222/5
customers [2] 130/7 190/11
cut [2] 53/18 195/8
cutting [2] 37/12 106/10
CVE [1] 203/23
cyber [4] 134/13 156/7 191/20 198/18
Cybertruck [2] 183/9 187/16

D

damaging [1] 50/16
danger [1] 97/12
dangerous [6] 9/25 17/12 18/3 91/9 126/13 158/12
dangers [1] 32/11
data [42] 24/6 24/7 35/6 36/9 41/5 52/15 55/2 56/7 57/1 57/18 57/24 58/5 68/5 68/14 69/25 70/3 113/9 117/22 128/20 128/24 136/15 143/7 143/23 143/24 143/25 144/3 144/6 144/10 144/24 144/25 145/1 145/3 145/18 145/20 145/20 188/19 199/16 199/18 208/24 220/8 220/9 234/23
database [4] 144/21 215/22 216/15 247/18
databases [4] 124/4 145/14 216/13 250/11
datasets [1] 144/9
date [10] 4/16 28/2 39/3 39/7 41/5 55/20 58/21 123/11 244/23 244/24
dated [5] 1/18 2/7 187/10 207/10 248/24
dates [1] 55/4
dating [1] 42/7
day [7] 7/25 84/11 105/1 105/15 114/15 124/24 251/15
days [2] 84/11 105/12
DCMS [3] 162/8 226/19 227/15
de [3] 94/3 185/8 212/17
de-encryption [1] 212/17
de-guardrailed [1] 185/8
de-radicalisation [1] 94/3
deal [11] 1/19 3/25 4/3 95/12 101/20 102/7 115/3 115/11 216/1 238/9 248/15
dealing [6] 2/3 19/3 24/9 48/18 58/16 233/9
deals [1] 2/18
dealt [4] 55/22 66/2 179/10 230/17
death [2] 18/8 196/24
deaths [1] 182/13
debate [1] 166/5
debug [1] 175/17
debunked [1] 179/1
decade [2] 4/9 247/19
decapitate [2] 13/19 13/20
decapitated [2] 13/21 13/23
decapitating [1] 15/12
decapitation [1] 14/25
December [3] 2/7 38/17 106/24
December 2025 [1] 106/24
deceptive [2] 9/24 126/22
decide [3] 139/25 168/4 193/23
decided [1] 111/12
deciding [1] 233/2
decision [7] 155/24 195/22 201/23 203/11 224/7 233/16 238/18
decision-making [3] 203/11 224/7 233/16
decisions [2] 95/25 205/5
declaration [2] 39/3 39/14
declared [11] 40/6 49/15 56/1 83/13 83/22 224/9 232/14 232/16 239/6 240/6 240/21
declares [1] 217/5
declaring [1] 240/13
decreased [1] 150/8
decreasing [1] 107/7
dedicated [4] 5/10 205/2 246/19 247/12
deem [2] 162/22 196/5
deemed [4] 133/14 155/5 163/24 195/23
deep [1] 61/11
deepening [2] 200/9 200/14
deeper [1] 141/11
deeply [2] 62/12 145/15
DeepSeek [1] 189/2
deescalate [1] 140/13
deescalation [2] 203/19 204/4
default [5] 34/22 39/24 159/23 161/19 161/21
defence [1] 147/16
defences [1] 131/3
define [3] 133/9 214/6 229/21
defined [4] 11/14 126/21 231/10 237/21
defines [1] 133/11
defining [2] 128/4 176/7
definitely [5] 45/13 52/16 150/23 195/12 244/1
definition [1] 126/14
definitions [2] 176/11 199/4
degree [7] 19/15 40/22 41/12 51/2 56/15 74/16 144/10
Delhi [1] 182/18
deliberately [7] 84/8 84/17 149/13 149/14 150/24 151/5 221/18
delinquency [1] 88/22
deliver [1] 68/24
delta [2] 14/9 14/13
demands [5] 59/7 59/11 59/14 60/23

D

demands... [1] 61/8
demographic [1] 7/21
demonstrate [3] 37/1 43/4 43/14
demonstrated [2] 37/11 43/16
demonstrating [2] 133/13 205/12
denied [1] 94/12
department [2] 126/25 228/7
depend [5] 67/24 72/20 238/18 239/17 241/5
dependent [2] 104/18 118/13
depending [5] 6/15 73/16 130/5 198/1 251/1
depends [2] 110/23 247/2
depictions [3] 132/18 138/4 158/11
deployed [2] 95/14 174/23
deployment [1] 148/3
deployments [2] 134/8 135/21
deploys [1] 40/5
derived [2] 33/4 183/7
describe [5] 126/17 126/19 174/22 207/17 210/19
described [6] 32/14 33/12 52/17 94/9 220/16 248/20
describes [3] 89/4 135/10 149/16
describing [1] 231/17
description [1] 231/12
desensitised [3] 26/12 27/4 27/8
deserves [1] 190/12
design [1] 195/13
designated [2] 36/23 224/2
designed [16] 34/17 55/18 74/1 74/20 85/10 132/5 136/7 136/11 146/8 147/15 171/12 185/11 188/3 223/21 233/18 238/4
designing [1] 6/25
desire [2] 190/9 215/24
despite [6] 24/1 53/12 67/4 67/14 204/11 249/9
destruction [1] 134/14
detail [24] 2/24 3/4 24/15 29/11 39/20 41/7 62/9 63/7 78/4 86/24 87/3 87/7 87/11 87/19 133/15 138/23 140/1 199/15 205/20 225/13 225/14 225/18 226/13 250/24
detailed [8] 3/3 62/22 134/24 137/2 137/11 170/5 170/6 227/6
details [7] 2/24 55/4 63/19 74/2 131/14 131/14 156/5
detect [12] 19/5 91/16 95/14 95/16 157/16 167/4 167/8 204/8 204/16 249/8 249/13 250/2
detected [3] 44/17 202/1 250/6
detecting [1] 201/25
detection [5] 153/21 159/5 179/7 194/3 195/20
determination [1] 197/8
determine [5] 40/15 127/18 139/25 147/9 202/3
determined [2] 55/14 236/21
determines [1] 40/7
detonated [1] 182/17
develop [10] 5/21 6/9 80/23 128/15 147/20 190/24 191/1 194/8 195/5 203/14
developed [9] 9/18 29/4 88/10 95/13 113/12 120/6 122/5 185/2 192/23
developer's [1] 135/14
developers [1] 135/9
developing [4] 122/7 127/15 148/19 180/21
development [6] 6/8 123/1 132/4 148/9 157/7 246/8
developmentally [1] 158/7
device [9] 29/15 31/2 34/5 34/7 182/21 212/17 231/25 232/13 234/1
devices [6] 145/7 183/7 210/24 211/19 212/4 235/23
devices' [1] 235/1
diagram [2] 107/6 108/1
diagrams [1] 108/16
dialogue [3] 64/20 170/19 200/16
did [23] 35/21 42/16 64/4 64/7 82/4 94/23 98/2 98/19 98/20 114/19 117/8 117/12 169/24 170/1 173/25 174/2 175/16 202/9 242/20 244/21 249/8 249/12 250/11
didn't [11] 8/25 9/3 14/18 64/21 65/14 76/9 87/10 90/1 117/2 239/19 250/2
difference [9] 8/10 30/6 116/24 123/12 123/18 129/15 154/16 211/25 212/11
different [52] 7/2 12/22 24/21 29/12 31/1 33/13 34/11 35/1 40/14 44/11 56/20 72/22 73/15 74/6 78/22 89/1 89/7 94/21 99/14 101/23 104/8 107/24 107/25 111/4 120/17 127/11 129/18 129/19 130/2 130/4 130/6 135/25 138/11 154/1 163/6 163/17 163/22 164/9 164/9 164/14 164/14 164/18 165/20 182/12 184/21 184/25 190/18 194/9 204/2 212/6 212/9 219/24
difficult [12] 23/15 24/19 33/5 77/14 124/9 145/22 197/6 197/22 199/7 221/24 235/22 240/14
difficulties [1] 169/13
difficulty [2] 190/23 230/17
digital [7] 22/13 119/21 119/23 119/23 120/22 169/21 187/9
direct [10] 24/2 39/18 70/20 146/23 172/17 185/22 193/10 203/10 203/14 223/19
directly [6] 16/13 29/18 33/17 45/6 153/19 172/12
director [4] 6/13 6/14 6/19 126/9
disagree [1] 243/21
disagreeing [1] 245/5
disallowed [1] 135/24
disclosable [1] 203/8
disclose [2] 58/5 87/24
disclosed [1] 132/22
disclosure [1] 225/5
Discord [2] 32/25 242/3
discourage [8] 54/5 54/11 140/14 152/8 152/11 188/24 189/9 229/9
discouragement [1] 189/3
discouraging [1] 139/21
discourtesy [1] 73/2
discovered [1] 204/13
discovery [3] 204/15 221/14 238/15
discredited [1] 140/16
discrepancies [1] 20/6
discretion [1] 113/5
discuss [6] 61/18 61/21 133/16 136/6 136/9 200/3
discussed [1] 138/1
discussing [3] 63/4 68/19 156/9
discussion [2] 20/19 78/20
discussions [6] 53/16 53/17 64/23 65/20 68/8 139/21
disengage [2] 91/17 91/23
disgust [5] 11/3 11/20 11/22 12/4 16/17
dishwasher [1] 47/3
disincentivise [2] 225/25 229/9
disinformation [1] 126/23
disorder [1] 239/25
disorders [1] 237/25
dispersal [4] 62/7 80/6 89/4 97/23
dispersed [4] 79/12 81/7 89/13 90/5
dispersing [1] 77/13
display [1] 217/4
displaying [1] 79/7
disproportionate [1] 82/8
distinct [2] 5/2 171/9
distinction [2] 8/8 219/12
distinctly [2] 29/12 31/1
distinguishing [1] 197/2
distressing [1] 13/17
distributed [1] 178/23
dive [1] 175/16
divide [1] 221/2
division [1] 5/2
do [193] 5/5 7/22 8/11 10/15 12/21 15/13 16/9 20/10 20/13 23/3 25/18 26/15 26/24 29/19 30/5 32/22 33/8 33/20 34/1 35/23 38/14 38/18 39/5 39/6 43/11 46/4 48/1 51/17 53/25 54/3 54/11 55/3 56/8 56/23 57/15 57/24 58/1 58/5 61/23 62/14 67/20 68/14 68/23 69/14 71/4 71/24 72/12 73/7 73/11 73/20 78/16 80/13 80/21 81/22 82/8 82/20 86/16 86/20 86/21 86/23 87/9 87/16 89/16 92/24 93/10 96/2 96/13 99/20 100/1 104/11 105/12 105/15 106/2 106/8 110/12 111/18 111/22 112/10 112/25 113/6 117/6 118/8 118/15 119/5 120/12 121/20 122/23 124/9 124/10 124/14 124/15 125/16 125/18 127/8 127/22 127/24 128/5 128/10 130/21 132/6 133/21 135/23 136/11 136/19 139/16 141/5 142/7 142/9 144/12 144/19 145/23 147/8 147/9 148/5 152/5 152/22 153/8 153/22 153/23 156/7 156/22 161/3 161/3 162/25 166/14 169/16 173/4 173/20 173/21 174/18 174/19 175/12 176/5 176/14 178/12 178/24 179/2 179/7 179/17 185/18 185/23 186/6 186/12 186/23 187/1 187/2 189/18 189/24 191/4 191/15 192/5 192/6 192/7 192/25 193/9 195/4 195/17 197/15 199/19 201/12 201/13 201/14 205/25 208/6 208/10 209/17 210/8 216/10 217/14 223/25 224/3 225/17 226/2 229/14 229/18 231/12 232/18 234/6 236/7 236/18 238/6 239/17 242/4 242/17 244/13 245/14 246/3 246/23 248/6 249/5 249/12 250/18 251/9
document [8] 43/3 58/19 58/23 60/8 101/10 120/11 146/5 203/8
documentary [3] 10/2 11/6 21/2

D

documented [1] 22/17
documents [8] 20/25 28/5 115/12 145/7 146/3 182/9 207/25 225/3
does [66] 5/4 5/17 5/25 6/12 12/12 14/14 17/24 19/22 21/22 29/2 31/6 40/12 45/17 50/3 55/2 56/7 57/1 69/15 90/6 90/20 90/21 91/23 92/12 93/10 100/8 103/3 103/4 109/1 110/10 119/12 126/25 127/8 128/10 134/24 141/21 146/3 153/12 158/22 160/9 161/9 168/16 169/3 172/24 175/18 181/15 182/4 184/24 185/15 186/10 186/20 193/19 196/9 196/19 197/8 197/19 205/1 210/5 213/6 214/4 214/15 216/8 216/11 219/13 233/24 241/9 248/5
doesn't [18] 14/23 35/2 35/3 41/1 51/24 51/25 57/11 62/25 64/15 75/14 89/16 152/3 166/13 183/19 222/9 222/13 229/4 238/20
doing [21] 3/1 3/2 48/22 65/4 81/16 94/13 95/1 128/3 130/6 135/15 140/16 146/15 147/13 151/5 152/9 175/9 178/16 178/22 245/8 245/10 245/11
domain [1] 103/14
don't [98] 4/3 4/4 5/7 7/10 15/12 15/24 22/2 23/18 24/4 27/14 28/15 28/17 29/3 35/3 35/4 35/13 39/10 39/11 39/20 40/24 41/6 46/10 46/16 50/1 51/9 51/20 52/5 52/8 53/5 54/9 57/8 60/13 62/12 63/13 63/16 63/18 65/17 65/25 71/2 75/20 76/1 77/3 78/1 78/12 81/25 86/8 87/5 90/16 90/17 92/5 93/1 94/4 100/10 101/2 101/8 106/8 108/21 110/24 111/18 111/19 116/1 118/11 118/14 119/8 121/14 122/12 124/1 136/25 138/2 153/2 154/15 155/16 156/18 162/21 169/24 170/4 170/5 176/1 190/5 195/5 195/25 199/16 209/9 210/9 216/16 219/19 220/21 223/7 226/11 232/6 233/15 234/2 234/22 235/14 244/23 247/2 247/4 247/10
done [31] 19/11 20/2 20/13 20/14 20/14 24/12 25/6 29/14 34/17 35/9 41/2 49/20 59/7 62/13 70/10 93/18 111/24 113/23 124/1 128/5 142/3 161/6 176/23 184/22 186/2 189/21 191/10 200/13 200/15 232/5 235/13
double [2] 108/7 219/1
double-check [1] 219/1
double-edged [1] 108/7
doubt [5] 18/25 75/25 81/11 166/6 208/2
doubted [1] 34/14
down [28] 24/18 25/8 26/1 36/4 45/14 52/22 59/2 71/3 86/24 100/15 108/20 109/15 109/24 113/20 118/8 118/16 134/1 135/23 151/20 154/12 160/1 171/18 174/7 181/11 189/13 201/24 202/17 242/10
download [4] 235/22 235/24 239/7 239/10
downloaded [2] 186/19 234/13
downloading [1] 233/23
downs [1] 113/14
downsides [1] 217/15
draft [2] 54/19 244/9
draw [4] 163/8 209/10 243/4 246/14
drawing [1] 12/4
drawn [3] 6/7 16/1 242/12
draws [1] 209/9
drive [1] 53/13
driven [4] 53/21 85/7 85/9 92/22
driving [2] 121/5 121/7
drop [1] 57/12
drugs [1] 225/3
DSA [1] 22/4
DSIT [2] 226/19 227/15
DSIT/DCMS [1] 227/15
DSIT000083 [3] 222/17 223/1 223/8
DSIT000101 [6] 58/17 59/1 60/17 63/16 66/17 70/23
DSIT000102 [1] 162/11
DSIT000102/36 [1] 162/11
DSIT000150 [2] 226/17 226/25
ducked [1] 58/4
due [3] 32/17 132/23 155/23
duplicates [1] 248/2
during [10] 25/17 39/4 55/20 86/22 128/23 143/6 151/10 185/13 186/3 190/4
duties [5] 42/4 44/2 67/4 108/24 222/12
duty [2] 199/1 226/23
dynamic [3] 129/23 139/6 179/11

E

each [7] 59/8 83/21 84/1 84/10 129/18 152/24 214/9
earlier [7] 86/15 193/3 194/15 197/16 199/6 239/16 251/7
early [6] 42/6 148/2 191/9 193/14 197/23 208/14
earth [1] 233/13
easily [3] 51/10 83/17 179/1
easy [6] 68/23 90/12 164/11 178/23 234/18 235/22
eating [2] 237/24 239/25
ecosystem [1] 85/6
edge [2] 151/2 248/11
edged [1] 108/7
EDSA [13] 12/11 12/12 15/4 17/8 21/7 21/13 21/14 32/17 81/5 116/4 116/11 116/18 116/20
educate [1] 106/2
education [2] 94/14 139/23
educational [5] 10/1 11/5 21/2 137/24 138/12
effect [3] 67/6 226/16 237/2
effective [36] 21/22 22/1 22/3 37/12 41/10 42/17 42/18 43/5 43/6 43/7 43/11 43/15 43/17 51/6 51/15 52/10 55/8 59/19 59/22 60/9 73/6 94/2 121/25 135/3 162/15 162/22 163/11 166/1 166/2 166/4 166/10 190/21 226/7 236/21 237/13 244/18
effectively [10] 44/17 70/13 73/4 83/10 94/13 94/23 97/16 104/24 134/19 248/21
effectiveness [6] 23/4 42/2 42/8 47/24 107/14 241/10
efficacy [5] 20/21 22/6 63/4 71/13 234/23
efficiency [2] 234/21 244/20
efficient [1] 245/25
efficiently [1] 215/24
effort [3] 144/5 175/18 186/7
efforts [3] 144/24 169/11 185/21
effusive [1] 163/21
eg [4] 84/21 134/11 134/13 134/14
either [13] 65/3 93/24 104/5 111/13 115/17 117/2 131/1 151/23 197/12 215/2 225/24 226/15 240/1
elected [1] 240/9
elections [1] 126/21
electronic [1] 123/9
element [3] 12/6 144/16 215/20
elements [2] 72/22 203/21
elevate [1] 178/18
eliminated [1] 155/16
else [4] 30/23 47/3 52/14 57/15
elsewhere [3] 183/24 184/23 185/6
Elsie [1] 178/9
email [3] 41/6 50/12 247/12
Embed [1] 203/18
emerge [1] 151/12
emerged [1] 85/5
emerges [1] 247/4
emerging [6] 5/21 103/10 103/25 104/16 148/22 149/6
Emmanuel [1] 115/11
emphasis [1] 210/5
employ [3] 249/8 249/12 250/2
employee [1] 249/14
empowering [1] 135/9
enable [2] 181/14 213/18
enabled [2] 47/18 158/19
encounter [4] 27/14 69/11 72/15 72/23
encountered [3] 31/18 32/4 223/21
encountering [4] 43/22 69/2 71/5 72/12
encourage [10] 17/7 106/2 123/1 131/1 142/9 151/18 176/19 177/2 177/6 238/21
encouraged [1] 174/3
encouragement [1] 173/25
encouragement/escalation [1] 173/25
encourages [3] 18/21 88/25 176/3
encouraging [6] 11/3 16/17 111/5 142/14 229/17 229/17
encrypted [5] 209/18 210/24 211/17 212/3 212/13
encryption [6] 208/24 210/22 211/13 212/4 212/9 212/17
end [19] 59/18 60/8 67/3 84/18 112/23 115/16 154/11 155/13 162/10 190/21 210/22 210/22 211/12 211/12 212/3 212/3 212/4 212/4 231/7
endeavour [2] 173/8 189/24
endorses [1] 139/19
Endowment [2] 31/5 31/9
enforce [5] 5/18 12/9 22/24 23/11 227/13
enforceable [1] 67/5
enforcement [55] 12/8 23/4 46/17 46/18 63/13 63/14 102/23 104/21 106/20 106/22 108/23 109/2 109/4 110/21 111/15 111/25 112/20 113/4 113/18 113/21 114/9 114/12 114/17 147/16 149/4 169/2 169/17 196/16 196/24 198/7 198/8 198/13 198/22 199/3 199/13 199/20 200/2 200/6 200/10 200/17 200/25 201/4 201/12 201/23 202/5 202/11 202/16 202/20 203/15 204/15 205/6 205/14 212/16 225/22 227/10
Enforcing [1] 159/12
engage [8] 127/18

E

engage... [7] 138/11 138/18 149/3 149/4 192/3 224/25 230/8
engaged [3] 228/1 248/18 250/15
engagement [11] 24/2 24/4 62/24 65/1 71/12 85/10 104/12 159/1 192/24 200/10 243/1
engages [3] 128/12 132/7 242/25
engaging [2] 155/2 163/19
engine [1] 162/2
engineer [1] 5/9
engineer' [1] 182/20
English [1] 14/14
Enhance [1] 204/8
enhanced [2] 159/23 202/20
enjoy [1] 186/18
enlarged [1] 249/6
enormous [1] 145/3
enough [8] 35/17 59/7 62/13 66/23 70/10 92/5 92/5 156/11
enquiries [1] 54/18
ensure [6] 5/19 27/13 27/18 56/17 76/17 87/24
ensuring [3] 53/17 104/1 152/3
entail [1] 192/12
entered [2] 39/7 92/9
entire [2] 34/16 186/1
entirely [6] 46/1 46/8 54/21 124/13 151/24 240/22
entirety [2] 117/4 160/18
environment [3] 45/11 122/23 171/8
environments [2] 63/24 210/19
equate [1] 213/6
equivalent [3] 91/24 147/23 203/17
eradicate [2] 244/4 244/10
erotica [4] 136/16 137/22 138/2 138/3
erotica or [1] 138/2
err [1] 210/6
error [2] 2/10 173/7
errors [2] 19/25 20/2
errs [1] 237/6
eSafety [1] 248/24
escalate [1] 194/24
escalated [1] 174/3
escalation [2] 83/4 173/25
escalatory [1] 174/5
escape [1] 86/1
especially [3] 94/10 228/13 229/13
essence [1] 237/6
essential [1] 209/4
establish [3] 37/15 39/2 200/4
estimate [3] 56/3 159/17 237/7
estimates [1] 51/23
estimation [5] 40/7 162/25 166/3 237/3 241/10
et [9] 137/6 151/21 157/14 166/12 186/18 224/23 225/4 231/7 231/9
et cetera [8] 151/21 157/14 166/12 186/18 224/23 225/4 231/7 231/9
EU [1] 188/4
Europe [1] 22/4
evade [1] 150/21
evaluation [3] 149/11 165/13 190/19
evaluations [3] 150/20 155/8 184/19
even [45] 13/14 13/25 17/6 17/16 21/13 24/18 34/13 34/13 34/20 36/24 57/22 58/6 67/17 77/20 77/24 90/1 90/7 90/22 92/4 99/12 109/24 111/19 112/22 135/14 141/7 147/22 151/17 152/25 159/2 165/13 165/14 169/11 181/1 186/6 193/4 194/19 194/21 200/22 225/18 228/10 231/7 235/23 236/10 240/5 245/18
event [1] 126/2
events [5] 140/5 178/11 187/20 201/4 201/20
every [12] 7/25 27/10 49/24 50/3 80/21 85/20 98/17 114/15 114/16 181/19 217/21 224/1
everybody [1] 195/15
everything [4] 6/22 33/7 63/9 126/23
evidence [43] 1/23 3/10 22/15 26/21 38/11 42/3 44/13 71/8 71/21 73/4 75/19 82/22 87/19 94/4 94/8 101/4 101/14 101/15 101/17 103/20 131/20 151/11 165/3 165/17 166/7 170/13 178/6 205/20 206/15 207/1 207/3 208/6 226/3 226/18 228/3 237/2 239/20 241/14 241/17 243/17 243/20 248/13 249/17
evident [1] 205/22
evidential [2] 240/17 240/19
evolution [1] 155/20
evolving [3] 167/23 225/21 247/8
exact [7] 60/14 100/10 101/2 118/11 244/23 247/2 247/4
exactly [15] 17/15 73/3 86/25 176/7 184/14 190/5 191/18 192/11 199/8 219/1 220/3 241/1 248/10 249/16 249/19
examined [1] 85/4
examines [1] 171/3
example [74] 10/21 12/25 13/7 15/9 15/16 15/16 30/11 34/21 48/16 54/7 76/6 77/6 80/18 81/7 103/10 104/8 106/3 106/11 106/16 109/9 109/14 109/17 113/23 121/19 123/15 131/7 131/12 132/17 133/12 133/17 138/9 138/16 138/24 139/2 141/22 141/23 142/16 142/19 144/7 144/12 152/7 153/16 155/11 158/7 158/15 168/18 176/2 177/21 177/24 183/5 188/15 196/17 210/4 211/10 219/3 220/19 221/6 221/24 222/7 225/19 228/21 228/25 229/7 230/6 236/7 236/13 238/17 238/23 239/15 241/25 244/3 244/10 247/1 249/7
examples [16] 14/1 16/1 16/22 33/19 104/4 104/15 106/11 117/1 131/19 146/25 147/2 181/2 182/16 183/14 216/14 225/12
exceeds [3] 222/24 223/3 223/15
exception [6] 21/1 21/7 21/13 21/14 31/16 152/21
exceptions [3] 11/5 12/10 180/25
exchange [4] 60/12 64/25 65/22 87/25
excluded [1] 70/6
exclusive [2] 42/22 43/8
excuse [1] 154/18
execution [1] 205/4
exempt [1] 70/5
exemption [5] 12/13 116/4 116/11 116/19 116/20
exemptions [1] 112/1
exhaustive [6] 162/23 226/12 226/13 230/7 231/16 237/12
exhibit [4] 2/10 17/12 25/2 239/19
exhibits [1] 10/16
exist [4] 164/23 165/4 169/5 240/11
existing [3] 55/18 61/2 64/12
exists [1] 145/13
expanded [3] 83/8 118/12 121/13
expanding [1] 62/7
expect [6] 30/19 32/13 58/22 94/8 113/16 160/16
expectations [2] 12/23 71/15
expected [1] 104/16
experience [20] 21/25 40/9 45/5 47/1 47/4 47/5 47/8 55/13 70/22 74/10 74/13 77/15 77/21 90/15 125/24 126/6 159/19 159/20 161/20 161/23
experiences [16] 29/8 33/10 33/14 34/18 36/1 40/4 44/20 44/25 61/11 66/20 66/23 68/22 74/7 74/19 75/18 77/18
experiment [1] 84/18
experimenting [1] 193/7
expert [6] 119/10 161/13 164/7 164/17 168/25 242/21
expertise [15] 102/12 127/20 147/21 147/23 160/13 195/4 195/5 195/12 196/11 197/9 197/15 204/1 204/3 236/16 245/24
experts [13] 6/8 80/24 82/5 82/5 141/11 147/20 149/1 149/3 167/11 168/2 192/24 196/14 200/21
expire [2] 105/12 105/16
explain [14] 3/22 5/15 6/3 9/20 73/15 117/24 128/18 129/15 145/18 150/1 192/5 192/21 211/24 240/18
explained [3] 52/7 55/7 134/19
explaining [2] 65/24 99/5
explains [4] 34/14 41/25 42/5 59/6
explanation [5] 34/1 78/22 153/11 181/10 228/19
explanations [1] 66/5
explicit [2] 37/6 141/18
explicitly [2] 197/12 227/15
exploitation [2] 180/23 182/7
explore [1] 58/18
explored [1] 237/14
exploring [2] 91/9 241/1
explosion [1] 187/16
explosive [2] 182/21 183/7
expose [1] 83/17
exposed [4] 26/5 27/10 72/3 85/24
exposing [1] 30/1
exposure [8] 31/15 43/24 69/24 84/22 85/25 158/9 220/10 221/1
express [2] 3/14 159/7
expressed [2] 30/4 197/12
expressing [1] 193/1
expression [2] 208/18 209/17
extend [2] 3/15 126/3
extensive [4] 129/21 215/22 216/13 243/24
extensively [1] 179/11
extent [9] 55/22 96/2 105/10 148/10 181/24 187/13 192/17 195/24 216/12
external [7] 6/4 20/10 24/8 147/4 148/15 247/23 250/12
externals [1] 247/24
extra [1] 186/6
extreme [14] 26/7 26/13 27/2 27/6 83/18 84/5 84/8 84/23 93/11 99/24 100/6 138/5 144/10 148/20
extremely [2] 48/9 228/25
extremism [11] 94/1 102/24 105/21 123/25 140/20 141/4 141/6 141/9 151/21 182/11 249/9
extremist [13] 16/20 85/8 139/16 139/19 139/24 140/8 140/14 141/17 171/4 171/10

E

extremist... [3] 181/21 182/7 250/7
eye [2] 7/7 77/11

F

face [5] 48/18 63/13 124/3 166/12 224/3
Facebook [9] 22/23 32/24 32/25 59/4 61/1 67/13 126/13 220/1 249/11
faced [1] 63/12
facial [9] 51/11 51/22 54/1 237/3 237/8 237/11 241/10 244/21 244/22
facilitate [2] 134/9 142/9
facilities [3] 60/6 219/17 224/4
facing [2] 141/19 142/3
fact [21] 33/12 48/6 53/6 56/24 63/2 63/16 65/3 71/4 71/24 72/11 103/3 114/18 174/21 183/16 203/8 215/18 232/11 234/3 242/12 242/24 249/9
factor [4] 35/5 96/22 100/23 217/20
factors [9] 14/4 34/10 38/4 38/7 72/19 107/24 115/5 118/14 161/13
factual [4] 137/11 139/21 140/5 194/14
factually [2] 63/2 63/9
fail [1] 188/24
failed [1] 22/24
Failsafe [1] 59/16
failures [1] 22/18
fair [8] 15/25 21/18 28/13 56/11 79/15 130/9 173/7 212/2
fairness [4] 237/10 242/20 246/14 248/17
fake [2] 13/22 15/1
fall [8] 90/19 207/22 223/7 223/25 224/4 225/19 238/25 249/23
falling [1] 229/22
falls [5] 231/11 235/4 238/5 240/8 240/9
false [2] 55/3 151/24
familiar [8] 13/8 31/8 41/15 58/22 91/25 156/15 156/17 183/1
families [3] 3/16 6/24 119/4
family [4] 18/5 39/18 76/8 155/22
far [6] 62/13 86/23 87/3 113/22 141/11 183/18
fascinated [1] 221/8
fast [1] 190/10
fault [2] 211/24 244/8
FBI's [2] 196/18 200/6
fear [1] 32/9
feature [4] 55/11 163/2 217/11 221/15
features [7] 45/1 78/24 88/17 88/19 124/7 176/8 242/17
fed [5] 57/23 104/1 148/22 219/22 221/17
feed [4] 84/12 96/4 139/1 220/21
feedback [3] 199/19 199/21 225/22
feeding [1] 219/19
feeds [8] 59/17 59/22 60/9 60/24 61/1 61/7 92/24 220/13
feel [10] 28/19 29/1 29/3 30/2 30/12 72/25 87/5 113/25 114/10 217/16
feels [2] 80/22 82/15
fell [2] 117/10 241/5
felt [2] 28/11 28/25
few [4] 62/2 137/19 161/16 177/13
fictional [2] 83/16 84/7
field [2] 72/8 190/10
fight [1] 239/19
fights [5] 11/15 11/17 31/20 88/20 238/23
figure [4] 32/5 100/21 101/3 219/4
figures [6] 8/16 106/21 108/5 118/2 130/10 153/18
filled [1] 13/22
film [1] 37/7
filter [1] 236/22
filtering [1] 213/25
final [8] 42/8 60/4 113/15 115/9 149/11 197/13 201/2 250/3
finalised [1] 120/15
finally [4] 2/16 117/21 142/22 155/7
finance [2] 207/17 207/23
financial [1] 88/21
find [11] 19/16 23/15 76/8 77/21 104/11 135/8 170/5 175/14 218/5 221/20 249/21
finding [5] 24/13 81/15 87/13 149/20 184/16
findings [15] 31/17 42/6 70/24 71/7 85/14 86/2 86/3 86/10 86/23 87/11 94/8 171/19 175/1 187/22 192/5
finds [2] 128/20 175/15
fine [1] 230/20
finish [3] 99/1 118/21 246/11
finished [1] 97/14
Finland [1] 187/19
firearms [2] 12/24 225/3
firms [3] 59/3 179/10 187/5
firms' [1] 58/20
first [52] 2/5 2/13 5/7 5/15 7/12 20/1 22/8 23/6 25/5 26/15 30/11 32/8 37/16 39/3 42/3 46/6 50/20 74/9 80/11 85/23 91/15 92/11 104/25 110/6 123/8 123/16 123/18 132/1 139/11 143/2 161/21 163/6 165/4 165/24 172/9 179/6 180/15 180/21 183/11 192/17 195/22 205/1 210/20 224/20 231/21 232/9 234/4 234/14 235/1 235/11 245/13 248/16
first-party [4] 91/15 92/11 123/16 123/18
FISHMAN [11] 125/6 125/11 125/12 125/17 125/25 170/18 180/14 183/21 201/12 205/19 252/9
fit [2] 5/4 66/9
fitness [2] 84/3 88/18
five [1] 67/12
fixated [2] 131/2 158/23
fixation [3] 91/13 139/2 153/15
fixing [1] 47/2
flag [3] 66/7 102/19 157/13
flagged [5] 26/22 90/8 114/19 115/24 239/1
flagger [3] 102/8 102/22 103/12
flaggers [3] 102/10 103/6 103/16
flagging [5] 101/25 104/11 107/4 110/4 194/23
fluids [1] 11/21
focus [6] 60/4 60/20 148/6 148/12 152/1 224/20
focused [4] 61/9 111/2 148/11 191/20
focuses [1] 227/8
folded [2] 147/10 204/5
folks [1] 193/15
follow [12] 3/4 7/11 7/12 25/10 46/19 66/1 66/3 101/11 106/2 150/5 201/12 218/20
follow-up [2] 7/11 66/3
followed [4] 69/8 84/4 114/20 114/24
following [7] 63/10 101/17 103/17 130/24 134/6 201/21 251/15
follows [1] 241/22
footage [12] 11/16 11/21 11/24 31/20 32/4 91/16 92/11 115/10 115/13 116/1 116/2 178/8
force [4] 42/4 44/2 191/1 191/2
forced [2] 134/12 183/23
forged [1] 225/3
forgive [12] 7/5 38/22 51/17 65/2 74/2 80/4 82/18 87/18 97/16 99/1 139/8 226/3
form [4] 31/18 70/2 114/14 212/9
former [1] 196/18
forms [3] 82/21 177/19 241/3
Fort [1] 182/18
forthcoming [1] 228/1
Forum [2] 250/13 250/20
forums [1] 149/4
forward [5] 75/21 81/3 152/19 187/7 223/5
forward-looking [1] 75/21
found [8] 2/9 67/9 70/25 71/7 150/15 182/1 183/20 185/4
foundation [3] 62/23 127/10 179/12
founder [1] 22/12
founding [1] 208/22
four [13] 37/18 56/24 59/6 59/15 60/2 60/16 70/3 77/23 86/10 86/12 184/3 192/7 210/19
four months [1] 192/7
fourth [3] 12/5 113/19 224/24
fourthly [1] 213/9
framed [1] 94/19
framework [3] 120/13 120/23 237/5
framing [2] 172/2 172/17
frank [1] 227/19
frankly [2] 191/2 224/6
fraud [2] 109/7 126/24
free [6] 27/22 171/24 210/5 218/15 218/17 236/11
freedom [3] 208/18 208/20 209/17
freely [2] 143/16 209/6
freeze [2] 104/25 105/2
frequently [1] 31/19
friction [8] 41/11 51/1 52/10 52/18 52/19 53/10 53/11 124/12
friend [2] 118/23 163/14
friendly [1] 30/14
fringe [5] 23/22 171/23 227/3 227/5 228/4
front [3] 110/25 180/18 184/25
frontier [1] 191/10
fronts [1] 177/7
fruitful [1] 47/7
full [14] 1/9 33/6 116/23 117/9 124/24 125/10 174/6 184/5 201/8 214/4 214/6 216/12 227/1 233/10
fully [2] 135/13 190/21
function [3] 65/11 218/7 218/14
functional [3] 6/7 6/16 183/7
functionalities [2] 242/9 242/11
functionality [5] 215/23 223/4 223/19 242/2 246/15
functions [2] 162/2 220/15
Fund [2] 31/5 31/9
fundamentally [4] 34/10 35/1 44/10 99/10
further [20] 3/12 12/2 12/7 49/19 54/20 59/2 65/3 78/3 80/15 81/12 119/22 123/1 123/3 193/8 197/20 213/25 220/10 223/22 227/14 234/24
future [4] 144/14 147/24 200/11 205/9

G

gain [1] 52/20
gainsay [1] 63/16
game [2] 51/8 51/16
games [2] 28/19 37/7

G

gaming [5] 241/25 242/1 242/4 242/5 242/5
gang [1] 32/1
gangs [1] 104/8
gaps [1] 187/1
gate [5] 19/16 20/20 89/24 117/5 123/17
gated [21] 12/12 14/8 21/15 37/17 40/19 49/8 49/18 49/24 49/25 77/2 77/8 78/7 90/2 90/8 90/21 90/23 115/21 116/6 116/9 116/18 117/16
gates [1] 44/7
gateways [1] 34/11
gather [1] 241/24
gating [15] 16/8 19/10 32/16 46/1 46/8 46/22 50/25 52/25 55/17 238/7 242/15 242/18 244/5 244/15 245/25
gave [5] 152/9 174/12 188/17 191/9 239/19
GDPR [3] 112/6 112/11 113/6
Gemini [4] 2/19 3/1 5/4 92/1
gender [1] 217/3
general [13] 13/15 94/17 95/6 133/7 133/9 138/14 152/16 152/18 199/21 222/14 225/17 227/12 227/22
generalised [1] 86/25
generally [9] 16/18 94/7 103/6 129/2 156/17 169/17 199/14 219/6 230/11
generate [6] 129/8 130/22 130/25 135/24 138/3 178/25
generated [4] 137/23 143/20 143/25 223/5
generates [1] 129/1
generation [1] 167/12
generational [1] 41/21
generative [5] 131/7 178/7 178/12 179/20 183/19
genocide [1] 134/12
gently [1] 137/14
get [36] 8/15 9/2 21/13 22/10 58/19 76/1 87/3 87/7 87/12 87/19 98/3 98/20 101/11 105/8 117/12 128/6 128/18 147/8 151/25 152/22 153/10 153/22 161/23 164/13 179/1 193/15 193/16 197/20 199/19 201/1 214/16 215/4 234/4 236/13 245/2 248/6
gets [4] 21/13 93/21 97/9 99/12
getting [10] 96/20 103/4 108/8 118/16 122/14 151/2 187/4 190/14 191/25 245/13
gift [1] 233/19
girl [1] 84/22
give [35] 3/10 9/3 13/16 16/22 17/10 20/15 37/2 40/11 54/9 55/12 74/2 95/18 100/20 106/7 106/15 118/1 124/17 125/10 127/17 133/11 134/23 140/1 142/18 165/19 165/20 168/13 171/25 174/6 205/11 208/6 217/10 219/4 225/18 233/24 245/12
given [35] 8/18 17/8 23/25 26/14 27/17 28/5 29/21 30/11 32/11 34/4 35/8 38/10 40/21 49/11 52/3 57/24 69/17 78/17 82/19 83/1 93/3 93/23 94/7 95/24 103/24 114/13 133/12 156/20 167/16 176/19 190/12 192/9 226/3 232/24 240/23
gives [7] 42/21 130/7 151/9 174/11 184/5 188/14 197/19
giving [8] 1/9 110/6 146/25 184/11 190/1 206/14 225/14 229/7
glamorises [1] 16/25
glamourise [1] 17/4
glamourising [1] 109/18
global [7] 12/17 12/21 218/7 218/13 221/23 250/12 250/20
globally [4] 12/18 13/6 102/23 130/16
globe [1] 176/9
glorified [2] 177/20 178/11
glorifies [2] 131/8 141/22
glorify [1] 178/17
glorifying [1] 178/1
go [90] 2/6 3/5 3/12 3/20 4/19 9/15 10/20 12/14 17/19 19/7 22/14 31/13 33/19 38/19 39/11 40/1 41/7 41/18 42/11 42/12 43/18 44/18 47/10 50/15 52/23 53/23 56/5 57/15 60/17 60/19 62/13 66/17 66/18 69/16 73/18 73/22 74/3 74/5 81/12 82/18 82/23 83/7 85/1 88/4 89/6 89/20 90/10 95/18 97/24 100/8 106/21 106/24 107/22 134/1 135/23 140/7 141/11 142/17 151/19 154/7 154/12 168/14 168/16 169/17 170/25 172/8 173/22 181/11 182/14 187/15 189/4 189/10 189/13 191/3 202/17 202/18 207/9 207/16 225/12 226/11 226/25 228/16 233/14 236/17 240/23 241/16 246/12 247/5 249/15 250/23
goal [1] 193/13
goals [1] 200/18
goes [6] 62/10 142/16 150/19 173/15 181/22 188/23
going [53] 2/3 2/23 7/14 13/16 33/20 34/11 38/16 39/9 43/13 44/12 45/14 47/6 54/2 58/3 58/8 73/21 74/3 76/23 76/24 80/16 80/16 82/18 98/18 111/6 111/13 118/7 118/8 118/22 126/6 128/2 128/17 130/13 145/17 149/1 174/9 177/9 185/25 191/3 195/8 198/5 214/7 224/20 225/11 226/4 226/9 232/4 239/6 240/2 240/12 244/7 245/15 247/24 251/3
gone [4] 118/5 159/13 175/7 187/17
good [7] 80/18 101/16 133/4 179/23 180/6 231/12 251/11
goods [3] 10/1 155/11 225/2
Google [44] 3/2 3/18 3/24 3/25 4/10 4/22 4/22 5/1 5/1 5/3 5/4 6/22 7/15 18/1 21/8 21/22 36/6 36/16 36/20 39/1 39/4 40/3 40/14 45/18 45/19 47/12 48/2 55/8 55/15 91/8 113/10 119/5 119/11 119/12 120/1 120/5 121/4 121/8 122/6 123/13 123/15 123/19 123/19 124/14
Google LLC [1] 113/10
Google's [3] 9/9 93/18 95/6
Google/YouTube [1] 3/2
gore [28] 26/7 27/3 27/6 30/14 30/16 30/20 37/5 93/12 106/12 136/16 137/22 138/2 138/5 138/10 138/25 153/6 153/11 155/13 197/3 216/8 216/14 225/16 229/14 229/22 230/14 239/15 239/23 247/1
gory [6] 11/2 16/16 37/24 153/14 228/25 229/2
got [21] 40/17 40/18 57/18 57/23 73/24 77/24 96/3 96/14 97/2 97/14 97/20 98/8 99/3 99/17 99/24 100/7 100/17 119/10 156/19 239/9 240/3
governance [1] 7/3
governed [1] 9/9
government [16] 50/11 102/11 120/11 120/14 120/20 120/22 120/25 122/8 122/16 123/9 123/10 148/1 207/18 207/24 227/11 227/21
government-issued [1] 123/10
governmental [2] 102/10 200/5
governments [4] 177/2 186/17 199/7 208/22
governors [1] 208/1
GPT [15] 129/12 147/15 149/18 149/22 149/24 150/8 150/15 151/15 152/16 153/13 154/11 155/19 155/19 156/15 156/16
GPT 4.0 [2] 156/15 156/16
GPT-5 [1] 147/15
GPT-6 [10] 129/12 149/18 149/22 149/24 150/15 151/15 152/16 153/13 154/11 155/19
GPT-6's [1] 150/8
GPT-6.1 [1] 155/19
grants [1] 148/1
granular [6] 77/17 78/4 199/19 218/24 225/14 231/16
graph [4] 107/2 154/19 184/6 184/19
graphic [10] 10/22 11/12 17/13 18/11 21/11 115/16 116/16 158/11 225/15 238/21
grateful [3] 38/13 205/19 251/12
great [3] 175/14 176/6 186/15
grievance [1] 172/16
Grok [1] 173/11
grooming [4] 59/17 60/6 63/23 70/25
ground [1] 218/1
grounded [1] 241/25
group [33] 6/24 11/14 23/22 23/23 24/14 67/22 76/7 90/3 90/5 126/12 167/10 213/10 213/13 213/14 213/18 213/21 214/5 214/8 214/8 214/23 214/25 214/25 215/2 215/20 216/16 219/18 220/22 221/9 221/19 230/20 231/3 237/20 242/10
groups [18] 8/2 22/21 24/17 69/21 103/17 119/5 126/15 213/19 214/1 215/16 215/17 215/17 217/23 218/13 218/25 220/12 230/5 244/1
guardian [1] 47/18
guardian's [2] 47/13 47/19
guardrailed [1] 185/8
guardrails [3] 185/17 185/19 186/9
guess [2] 77/12 235/4
guessing [1] 132/18
guidance [29] 12/2 12/7 12/8 14/24 17/10 42/17 42/20 43/1 43/10 51/12 51/22 106/13 109/16 111/8 116/8 116/15 117/12 120/13 120/19 120/21 120/24 121/1 121/2 122/16 142/4 142/12 237/15 237/16 244/19
guide [2] 132/3 134/6
guidelines [43] 5/19 5/20 9/12 9/16 9/18 9/23 10/7 10/18 10/19 10/23 12/17 12/18 12/21 13/1 14/5 14/10 14/11 14/14 14/15 14/18 17/16 17/25 23/5 32/15 40/17 46/10 46/16 46/18 71/11 77/2 102/14 106/3 108/11 109/25 110/1 110/3 111/2 112/18 112/21 114/5 132/8 132/13 134/25
guiding [1] 62/6

H

had [36] 9/1 15/23 16/2 20/19 24/2 24/4 24/5 29/1 44/22 47/23 48/2 53/25 54/21 57/22 61/5 61/6 62/3 67/12 78/10 84/19 94/15 106/12 116/3 116/18 156/3 182/20 184/10 185/8 192/4 198/17 200/2 204/13 204/20 207/19 244/24 250/7
Hadley [3] 192/4 248/17 250/15
hadn't [2] 61/19 63/2
half [6] 10/25 85/3 171/24 189/11 189/14 189/16
halfway [1] 26/1
hand [13] 32/21 57/18 85/12 107/11 107/16 108/16 154/11 154/14 172/9 172/23 173/24 182/23 183/9
handful [1] 115/8
handled [1] 146/4
handles [1] 154/10
handling [2] 135/16 243/7
hands [1] 145/14
happen [5] 92/12 175/16 197/16 197/21 242/13
happened [6] 86/22 86/25 87/17 96/12 117/19 249/16
happening [2] 27/12 98/5
happens [2] 6/22 179/15
happy [5] 16/9 25/10 28/11 28/25 75/19
hard [10] 51/16 65/5 86/3 124/3 128/2 149/13 149/15 176/11 184/14 246/1
harder [3] 51/7 77/21 86/1
harm [30] 26/6 26/25 31/25 66/24 72/4 82/21 83/4 85/7 85/8 91/10 96/21 96/23 102/18 131/1 135/10 137/4 137/5 137/13 152/5 155/6 158/11 167/4 167/8 167/13 168/25 169/10 172/14 196/25 237/24 245/8
harm' [1] 102/3
harmful [50] 16/14 17/11 18/3 26/5 43/22 43/24 45/12 45/13 53/1 55/16 64/13 67/7 69/3 69/11 69/19 69/25 70/2 71/5 71/25 72/3 72/5 72/6 72/12 72/15 72/23 73/8 73/12 73/14 84/17 85/21 85/22 92/18 137/9 140/15 154/10 158/10 158/25 171/6 172/2 172/12 174/3 181/19 198/18 209/24 214/21 220/10 238/3 238/11 246/21 247/9
harms [8] 26/9 33/8 33/9 71/16 85/9 134/10 157/17 195/7
has [136] 4/10 6/13 6/19 7/6 10/4 16/13 20/16 22/15 23/8 23/24 30/20 30/24 31/15 39/7 42/1 42/19 48/2 48/2 48/6 48/7 49/15 53/9 53/15 55/7 55/14 56/14 57/3 58/3 62/19 62/23 66/22 66/24 67/25 75/6 75/7 75/9 76/19 76/20 80/12 86/6 87/12 88/10 89/23 90/16 96/3 96/4 96/12 96/14 97/13 97/14 98/8 98/9 99/3 99/17 99/17 99/18 99/24 100/2 100/7 105/14 106/6 107/16 110/13 111/3 111/12 113/23 118/5 118/23 120/24 121/1 121/2 121/13 123/23 124/23 125/20 130/8 130/9 131/20 131/24 132/22 134/22 137/9 138/9 139/25 142/8 143/9 150/8 150/23 151/22 154/11 156/14 160/23 162/4 162/5 163/4 163/10 169/20 170/4 176/5 176/25 177/5 184/22 191/10 195/15 196/1 199/5 200/2 204/5 204/24 206/19 211/10 215/14 217/15 217/21 222/12 222/14 222/23 223/2 223/14 225/25 227/11 227/17 227/21 230/24 236/1 240/1 242/2 242/15 243/2 243/8 244/8 245/21 246/7 248/11 248/13 248/23
hash [5] 214/20 215/13 215/22 216/12 216/14
hashed [2] 248/6 248/9
hashes [11] 215/9 247/18 247/21 248/1 250/6 250/9 250/17 250/18 250/22 250/24 250/25
hashing [2] 215/8 248/14
hashtags [1] 216/1
hasn't [6] 90/2 90/22 114/18 155/17 194/19 240/7
hate [19] 22/13 23/7 23/11 23/17 23/18 23/19 102/17 102/25 111/5 112/23 114/7 114/13 126/15 144/13 151/21 152/22 157/6 169/21 187/9
hate-based [1] 157/6
hateful [2] 22/19 217/17
hatred [3] 23/1 24/16 111/11
have [482]
haven't [14] 14/2 16/2 29/10 35/16 57/18 87/3 87/7 87/19 113/22 121/11 176/17 226/15 227/19 233/21
having [18] 33/23 36/6 39/10 45/6 52/3 52/4 52/20 53/12 54/4 68/8 71/9 71/12 82/13 85/1 97/2 124/1 173/11 199/10
hazards [2] 136/14 136/25
he [20] 22/15 23/8 24/21 94/11 94/12 94/12 94/15 94/19 94/20 94/23 94/23 94/23 94/24 95/1 145/9 169/21 169/22 169/23 169/24 248/19
HEAA [5] 42/20 51/12 51/22 237/16 240/24
head [10] 3/8 4/12 5/23 6/3 13/23 73/2 73/9 125/12 126/18 196/18
headed [1] 28/3
heading [4] 9/7 31/14 60/19 186/24
headline [2] 10/17 225/19
headlines [2] 62/10 106/22
health [6] 5/9 53/19 54/8 54/10 193/12 196/13
healthy [1] 82/6
heard [4] 70/2 78/2 162/4 169/20
heart [1] 80/24
held [2] 54/12 130/12
Helen [1] 241/14
help [18] 5/10 7/21 27/25 34/18 41/1 87/22 93/9 96/2 100/20 119/12 136/17 138/8 156/3 156/19 159/17 193/11 193/17 203/20
helpful [8] 39/13 75/25 124/23 127/22 190/14 208/14 225/18 242/9
helpfulness [1] 152/20
helps [2] 24/9 53/13
hence [1] 208/2
Her [1] 241/22
here [51] 13/17 23/8 26/15 26/22 29/16 32/14 34/12 35/2 43/2 44/6 51/7 52/14 52/17 56/25 57/3 57/18 61/4 72/20 76/1 76/5 77/12 88/6 89/7 104/3 105/18 121/20 126/1 126/4 136/1 141/6 141/16 142/23 151/3 153/12 153/18 154/12 154/23 155/13 158/21 164/17 166/5 171/15 173/10 185/1 187/22 189/4 190/5 191/4 202/17 203/21 233/3
high [25] 6/25 19/15 27/19 29/21 33/10 40/22 41/12 51/2 56/15 97/11 108/12 119/15 134/6 134/10 148/7 152/21 153/8 154/13 154/20 172/5 173/11 175/20 188/17 189/17 190/2
high-level [3] 134/6 148/7 175/20
high-severity [2] 154/13 154/20
higher [10] 32/6 151/15 152/17 155/13 172/11 173/6 189/18 194/20 222/14 237/23
Higher-risk [1] 172/11
highlight [1] 68/15
highlighted [3] 11/1 32/8 85/3
highly [22] 27/16 41/10 42/16 42/18 43/5 43/6 43/14 43/16 52/9 121/25 162/15 162/22 163/11 166/1 166/9 178/7 178/10 205/12 236/21 237/2 237/13 244/18
him [1] 94/23
himself [1] 177/5
his [4] 22/15 94/12 94/24 192/5
historical [7] 136/10 137/24 138/5 139/1 139/23 140/5 141/14
historically [2] 151/22 245/19
history [3] 41/4 195/18 199/14
hit [2] 70/25 215/13
holders [3] 8/9 8/11 8/12
holding [1] 145/12
holds [1] 121/4
holistically [1] 145/2
honest [1] 227/20
honestly [1] 235/18
hope [2] 32/17 111/7
hopeful [1] 126/4
hopefully [1] 179/1
horrific [1] 117/18
host [1] 218/23
hosted [1] 75/8
hour [2] 58/8 177/9
house [3] 147/21 182/20 204/1
housed [1] 194/11
household [3] 30/8 30/23 68/18
how [110] 4/18 5/4 6/3 6/12 8/5 19/25 19/25 20/18 20/20 21/20 21/22 29/2 30/15 32/12 34/25 35/6 35/7 37/11 37/19 45/17 47/19 50/16 55/1 55/3 55/8 59/13 65/6 65/11 69/12 72/21 73/7 79/15 80/2 81/11 83/16 86/11 86/13 86/18 86/20 90/6 91/6 91/19 92/2 92/6 99/2 99/3 99/16 101/16 102/7 108/5 108/7 108/8 108/17 123/23 127/8 127/8 127/18 127/24 128/3 128/5 128/24 130/5 131/12 131/13 132/10 132/13 134/20 138/17 138/24 146/4 153/19 154/10 154/24 156/3 156/19 161/3 161/9 167/19 171/3 171/13 171/13 180/22 181/15 181/15 184/14 187/23 189/8 196/2 198/2 199/16 203/2 203/20 206/1 213/23 219/2 219/5 220/4 222/4 226/4 227/10 227/13 229/4 229/19 233/23 234/18 234/18 235/15 235/22 236/11 245/12
however [5] 14/17 98/22 139/20 172/2 174/4
huge [3] 24/9 27/21 184/18
hugging [1] 178/9
human [25] 13/20

H

human... [24] 13/20 15/1 15/12 23/16 23/21 91/11 95/7 107/23 110/11 134/4 134/4 134/12 143/21 144/23 144/24 145/4 147/4 157/17 193/20 194/24 194/24 195/2 195/4 202/2
humanity [1] 134/11
humans [4] 23/13 149/9 167/25 193/22
hundreds [4] 85/24 102/22 107/16 216/20
hurting [1] 94/15
hypothetical [5] 106/16 182/8 197/22 239/2 239/18
Hypothetically [1] 120/12
hypotheticals [1] 110/24

I

I agree [5] 27/9 27/23 97/6 164/3 176/13
I also [3] 38/4 126/12 176/14
I am [14] 41/17 44/3 45/9 59/23 91/25 98/18 107/4 177/8 191/23 205/8 211/24 224/21 249/22 251/10
I apologise [1] 165/2
I appreciate [3] 15/22 41/8 162/18
I ask [6] 118/20 119/3 133/15 138/8 148/17 197/16
I asked [2] 50/16 136/6
I assume [3] 154/21 173/2 203/24
I believe [17] 5/14 17/8 20/12 20/19 36/9 57/17 86/6 87/12 87/23 109/4 156/6 158/21 160/13 168/14 191/13 219/2 232/23
I can [17] 7/10 26/16 82/23 86/23 111/1 128/18 144/21 163/16 177/14 185/22 190/6 224/16 229/20 233/14 238/13 245/25 247/5
I can't [26] 5/6 14/1 15/20 20/15 23/7 24/3 35/12 35/18 37/17 38/6 73/15 92/1 110/23 146/5 148/15 156/5 175/12 199/18 216/12 224/6 227/23 230/21 233/1 233/22 234/21 245/23
I certainly [2] 179/14 187/4
I could [2] 71/18 72/23
I couldn't [1] 106/15
I did [1] 114/19
I didn't [1] 9/3
I do [25] 26/24 29/19 30/5 54/11 56/23 80/21 81/22 82/8 87/16 118/15 125/18 130/21 156/22 162/25 173/21 174/19 175/12 176/5 179/2 189/18 201/13 201/14 208/10 232/18 249/5
I don't [50] 4/4 7/10 15/24 22/2 24/4 28/15 28/17 39/20 41/6 53/5 60/13 63/18 65/25 71/2 75/20 77/3 78/1 78/12 86/8 87/5 90/16 90/17 92/5 93/1 100/10 101/2 108/21 111/18 111/19 118/11 118/14 121/14 124/1 153/2 154/15 155/16 156/18 170/4 170/5 190/5 199/16 210/9 226/11 232/6 233/15 234/2 234/22 244/23 247/2 247/4
I encourage [1] 177/2
I expect [2] 58/22 94/8
I expressed [1] 30/4
I feel [1] 72/25
I find [3] 170/5 175/14 249/21
I follow [1] 46/19
I get [1] 128/18
I go [1] 3/12
I guess [2] 77/12 235/4
I have [24] 4/8 4/11 6/23 33/7 52/7 53/6 73/13 73/14 82/10 82/18 82/19 82/22 106/4 112/5 118/20 119/10 124/21 166/6 174/21 188/2 192/6 219/20 230/17 232/10
I haven't [8] 14/2 29/10 35/16 57/18 121/11 176/17 227/19 233/21
I interrupted [1] 46/25
I joined [1] 236/2
I just [8] 3/14 25/20 60/14 174/6 177/11 180/14 202/18 241/18
I know [12] 1/18 3/17 24/7 97/24 101/2 138/22 145/16 183/21 184/18 188/19 191/9 191/12
I led [1] 4/10
I made [1] 68/16
I may [2] 13/17 233/6
I mean [5] 89/22 119/6 124/6 197/11 231/11
I meant [2] 195/9 195/9
I mention [1] 35/22
I mentioned [1] 199/6
I need [2] 69/21 88/6
I note [1] 23/8
I obviously [1] 63/16
I ought [1] 246/14
I pause [1] 42/19
I point [1] 2/25
I presume [1] 246/23
I previously [2] 93/16 160/1
I promised [1] 232/19
I raise [1] 248/22
I right [1] 121/4
I said [4] 6/16 62/21 136/9 149/7
I say [5] 65/21 66/12 87/14 104/18 139/8
I see [1] 123/21
I should [3] 15/25 131/4 166/22
I sit [1] 127/2
I stopped [2] 92/3 119/18
I suggest [1] 125/1
I suspect [1] 175/19
I take [1] 141/19
I think [191] 1/13 2/7 3/9 3/12 3/25 4/19 7/19 7/24 8/1 8/14 8/22 10/6 10/11 10/17 10/21 12/16 13/14 15/16 15/25 17/6 17/10 17/15 18/12 19/13 22/1 23/6 26/18 30/4 31/8 33/25 34/4 34/17 43/2 45/11 46/3 48/9 52/7 53/16 54/4 56/9 61/13 61/21 64/17 68/20 69/15 71/9 72/2 72/19 73/13 74/15 76/5 77/1 78/15 78/19 80/8 80/18 80/18 81/21 82/12 83/2 86/3 86/4 92/4 93/5 94/3 94/7 94/16 94/22 98/14 99/5 99/20 104/3 105/18 106/23 108/2 113/15 114/13 115/11 115/12 117/21 118/21 119/20 120/18 121/20 122/21 124/10 127/5 128/9 129/11 130/8 130/10 130/13 130/15 134/19 135/23 140/18 140/21 141/3 141/19 142/7 142/8 142/16 143/19 146/16 147/12 147/14 149/11 150/23 151/22 152/14 154/8 154/9 155/9 155/24 159/1 160/15 162/1 163/2 163/16 164/5 165/8 165/11 166/2 168/17 170/19 173/6 174/24 175/3 175/19 175/24 176/4 176/4 176/8 176/25 177/5 178/21 179/4 179/7 184/7 185/20 187/12 190/22 190/23 190/24 191/19 192/2 192/11 192/19 196/13 197/5 198/8 199/4 199/6 199/10 200/17 202/12 202/24 203/16 203/21 205/24 206/2 207/19 209/23 210/9 212/2 215/22 216/4 216/25 217/7 218/24 219/11 221/22 225/6 225/21 226/9 226/16 228/12 229/20 230/1 230/6 234/7 235/6 237/6 240/4 241/8 242/15 243/24 244/5 246/13 250/23 251/6
I thought [3] 120/1 123/3 244/13
I understand [11] 41/8 87/18 115/3 146/20 156/6 189/23 189/25 224/6 228/6 231/9 249/19
I use [1] 221/18
I very [1] 170/10
I want [14] 22/8 73/18 96/12 130/20 130/21 132/2 143/5 157/19 170/16 179/8 221/1 221/4 221/5 246/10
I wanted [2] 126/2 144/2
I was [7] 113/8 114/4 121/12 126/9 136/3 172/19 228/15
I wasn't [4] 101/11 190/4 230/21 233/1
I were [1] 232/19
I will [29] 2/24 7/15 16/12 26/1 28/8 38/18 39/12 53/23 61/9 71/24 81/18 93/1 93/3 100/23 118/21 124/16 124/19 127/22 142/6 145/23 165/15 166/9 168/13 168/13 170/15 177/15 230/1 242/21 245/3
I won't [3] 3/2 25/2 232/20
I worked [1] 121/1
I would [59] 8/8 14/3 15/19 22/1 23/6 23/19 27/13 29/10 30/19 32/17 33/7 36/3 50/4 51/5 52/5 58/1 64/24 65/25 68/15 68/20 69/14 72/25 75/17 75/19 82/2 86/9 86/12 108/14 113/5 117/11 122/21 148/5 153/10 164/9 164/16 164/16 170/11 178/19 180/2 189/18 190/13 215/21 217/13 217/20 218/11 219/1 221/22 227/20 227/22 231/7 231/14 231/14 235/9 243/21 243/21 248/9 249/15 249/19 250/23
I wouldn't [3] 47/3 60/3 65/7
I'll [1] 177/22
I'm [103] 2/23 7/14 7/15 12/23 13/16 19/16 32/2 33/20 39/9 44/12 58/1 58/3 58/7 65/7 73/21 74/3 79/25 80/2 80/10 82/18 87/3 98/13 99/5 99/22 100/24 108/19 109/12 110/25 112/9 112/10 112/14 113/22 114/7 115/15 115/18 118/22 119/10 119/17 121/2 121/6 123/15 124/1 124/11 126/4 126/6 128/16 131/4 132/18 145/3 145/17 151/5 154/18 154/18 156/17 160/12 161/13 162/24 164/7 164/7 164/17 165/2 165/23 166/16 168/24 170/4 171/18 172/8 174/8 175/24 176/16 191/12 191/14 191/18 195/8 203/11 205/19 215/3 215/21 217/20 224/20 227/19 227/22 229/15 229/15 229/17 229/17 231/14 232/6 233/1 233/16 235/17 236/11 236/16 238/16 239/6 240/17 240/22 241/1 242/21 244/7 247/24 251/3 251/8
I've [1] 33/12
I2 [1] 148/25
ID [8] 49/21 50/11 119/12 121/23 123/9 123/10 163/24 164/11
idea [12] 144/3

I

idea... [11] 148/19 150/3 150/19 150/24 151/2 151/3 160/2 192/13 227/21 230/7 235/3
idealises [1] 88/18
ideas [1] 138/23
ideation [2] 91/13 168/19
identification [8] 50/19 51/21 52/6 52/8 161/4 161/6 207/5 222/2
identified [12] 20/1 40/22 59/8 143/9 151/25 161/1 167/21 172/4 210/2 221/13 247/8 248/8
identifies [4] 44/9 51/2 97/12 171/7
identify [26] 41/12 51/10 52/1 70/18 91/8 95/9 99/25 102/13 128/6 135/2 141/15 144/6 144/15 147/5 159/5 171/12 179/9 179/16 193/3 193/8 194/5 202/9 202/12 204/23 209/24 214/21
identifying [4] 57/19 71/13 77/4 192/15
identities [1] 119/21
identity [1] 120/22
ideological [3] 131/6 148/20 172/16
ideologies [2] 133/19 140/15
ideology [4] 140/23 141/8 141/17 141/23
IDs [3] 164/5 164/18 166/11
IED [1] 182/17
if [303]
ignore [1] 150/4
illegal [22] 14/18 14/23 91/9 109/17 113/13 138/4 209/25 210/3 222/1 225/1 225/2 227/9 228/24 230/9 230/11 238/14 238/16 238/24 239/13 239/16 239/20 248/8
illegality [1] 114/22
illicit [4] 137/4 142/9 151/21 247/9
illustration [1] 154/24
ILT000196 [5] 170/17 170/25 171/17 172/22 173/23
ILT000302 [4] 31/3 31/12 32/19 35/20
ILT000382 [2] 248/23 248/25
image [4] 119/8 131/1 178/22 179/5
imagery [6] 11/16 11/21 229/1 229/2 229/16 230/14
images [9] 26/8 129/8 178/9 178/13 178/17 178/20 179/20 247/17 250/7
imagine [4] 14/3 51/23 69/18 169/13
iMessage [1] 33/1
imitate [1] 18/4
immediate [5] 1/21 29/23 85/14 85/15 201/18
immediately [3] 18/13 64/8 209/25
imminent [5] 109/3 113/3 196/24 197/11 202/10
immolation [1] 11/18
impact [5] 84/19 99/19 109/12 134/22 185/21
imperative [1] 176/13
implement [3] 43/21 250/25 250/25
implemented [3] 5/22 70/13 244/25
implements [1] 119/23
implicit [1] 163/25
implicitly [2] 197/13 225/24
importance [2] 103/21 209/10
important [25] 12/5 40/16 43/2 44/6 46/3 61/13 64/17 71/20 81/22 86/5 100/14 103/1 104/12 105/18 126/5 141/3 153/17 161/18 178/21 190/25 200/24 219/12 224/21 238/10 238/11
importantly [2] 149/6 159/4
imposition [1] 189/21
impractical [1] 114/15
improper [1] 157/2
improve [10] 20/8 24/9 62/18 135/2 136/20 179/8 179/14 187/6 190/8 205/10
improved [6] 155/12 167/23 204/25 205/7 205/8 245/18
improvement [2] 96/9 96/10
improvements [11] 61/1 61/24 62/1 62/17 64/16 65/4 65/24 66/4 78/2 82/20 142/13
improving [3] 40/10 155/9 225/21
Imran [1] 22/12
Imran Ahmed [1] 22/12
inappropriate [19] 21/23 37/9 45/3 68/11 83/18 84/5 84/8 84/23 85/21 95/14 96/5 96/16 99/16 99/24 108/6 109/13 158/6 229/10 245/7
Inc [1] 4/19
incentivised [1] 99/11
inception [1] 9/20
incident [3] 3/17 104/6 182/9
incidents [3] 3/15 82/13 131/23
incite [2] 172/12 238/20
incitement [2] 22/19 132/19
inciting [5] 11/13 111/11 112/23 114/8 229/1
inclined [1] 217/16
include [20] 31/25 42/16 64/3 70/12 75/14 78/3 79/4 79/22 81/24 102/17 102/23 126/24 141/20 143/1 150/17 154/2 167/8 174/6 191/15 207/24
included [7] 45/15 83/22 84/14 115/14 162/5 179/21 191/18
includes [12] 26/6 74/25 85/7 88/21 91/11 136/14 137/5 142/12 148/25 157/5 225/1 225/15
including [36] 9/22 9/25 11/6 18/7 22/20 24/17 37/13 39/1 55/19 63/23 64/12 64/13 67/19 71/23 73/9 85/16 88/19 131/23 133/19 135/11 135/20 138/12 138/12 153/21 157/6 157/8 158/8 168/8 177/5 188/5 188/16 194/10 200/25 208/23 213/23 241/3
incoming [1] 102/7
inconsistent [1] 55/5
incorporate [2] 9/11 129/25
Incorporating [1] 149/23
increase [2] 152/5 152/19
increases [1] 53/4
increasing [2] 152/15 157/14
increasingly [2] 26/4 143/22
incredibly [2] 104/4 246/1
incriminating [1] 150/17
indecent [1] 26/7
indeed [4] 62/3 124/20 124/22 205/23
independent [3] 191/8 192/10 246/3
independently [2] 22/3 246/7
indicate [3] 155/1 155/2 193/13
indicated [2] 58/6 101/4
indicates [6] 13/10 43/21 92/9 172/15 184/23 194/19
indicating [2] 93/8 109/19
indication [4] 82/13 93/2 103/23 169/10
indications [1] 178/1
indicator [2] 76/3 231/8
indicators [5] 91/13 91/17 91/20 149/7 164/13
individual [7] 6/19 7/10 72/21 73/17 112/7 213/24 217/21
individuals [5] 11/14 193/8 194/12 196/16 197/14
industry [6] 68/3 68/13 70/4 175/25 176/8 176/22
ineffective [4] 242/19 244/5 244/16 245/22
infer [2] 48/12 85/15
inference [27] 40/3 40/12 40/13 40/20 42/15 42/25 43/4 44/7 44/9 44/10 44/14 45/17 48/3 49/16 50/8 51/5 51/14 52/9 52/15 52/22 53/6 53/7 56/2 56/13 57/5 70/12 168/2
infers [1] 48/20
inflicted [1] 116/14
inform [5] 66/4 100/11 133/20 171/13 193/16
information [107] 8/19 20/11 20/17 22/5 24/8 24/10 43/17 52/13 53/19 53/19 54/5 54/8 54/9 54/12 54/20 55/5 56/16 57/11 61/16 63/11 64/1 64/11 64/18 64/20 65/10 65/13 66/12 75/1 76/11 76/13 76/22 78/3 78/5 78/7 78/9 80/17 86/7 86/16 86/17 87/13 87/16 89/10 92/5 100/9 100/20 101/11 103/8 103/13 104/5 104/5 104/10 104/14 112/20 114/10 128/6 129/7 133/7 136/10 136/14 136/19 136/25 137/9 137/11 139/10 140/4 140/5 143/16 143/19 143/20 145/15 145/25 146/10 150/17 151/20 152/4 152/7 152/9 152/11 152/12 159/15 163/13 163/16 163/17 163/20 164/14 176/2 177/20 181/7 181/25 184/12 189/17 195/17 195/21 196/8 196/21 196/23 198/19 199/12 199/22 200/19 207/4 208/1 208/10 209/11 213/14 219/20 247/3
infrastructure [2] 120/3 122/4
initial [2] 169/25 240/3
initially [3] 167/21 195/6 244/17
initiate [1] 171/5
injuries [1] 11/24
innovate [1] 187/6
input [1] 161/15
Inquiry [37] 1/14 2/5 13/13 16/4 25/9 42/19 54/7 54/18 59/21 66/4 66/7 66/15 77/9 87/24 101/14 115/19 115/25 124/17 126/5 130/8 130/12 130/23 131/24 132/23 156/14 162/4 169/20 177/16 183/1 201/7 203/25 206/15 206/22 207/9 248/13 248/23 251/15
Inquiry's [3] 16/15 167/14 170/12
inside [1] 92/1
insights [2] 137/13 181/25
insignificant [2] 240/5 240/20
Instagram [7] 22/23 32/24 59/4 61/3 67/14 83/21 220/1
instance [4] 49/23 120/5 214/11 249/3
instances [11] 2/25 19/18 24/7 30/21 44/15 72/2 72/6 105/24 114/11 174/5

I

instances... [1] 209/24
institute [5] 148/2 170/18 170/20 191/9 191/13
instruct [1] 194/21
instructing [1] 127/16
instruction [1] 146/23
instructions [4] 131/12 132/10 137/12 142/12
insufficiency [1] 103/23
integrity [1] 230/25
intelligence [4] 147/16 148/25 196/17 200/3
intend [2] 166/13 193/8
intended [6] 11/2 16/16 16/19 18/6 225/8 225/10
intensify [1] 171/6
intensifying [1] 85/25
intent [7] 11/19 11/22 12/4 17/7 146/1 180/24 193/1
intention [1] 230/21
intentions [1] 135/16
interaction [2] 81/7 81/23
interactions [1] 159/25
interconnected [1] 85/9
interest [6] 11/7 15/7 117/16 178/3 197/3 197/4
interested [11] 12/24 84/2 99/22 112/9 114/10 115/15 115/18 153/14 155/6 188/18 235/21
interests [4] 83/25 84/5 167/14 242/14
interface [1] 128/11
interfaces [1] 246/19
interim [1] 176/15
internal [15] 96/7 128/15 134/24 141/20 143/8 145/21 148/14 150/21 151/4 185/3 203/1 234/23 241/17 246/5 246/8
internally [8] 103/23 148/24 160/8 175/17 192/2 204/19 229/21 233/15
internals [1] 247/25
international [1] 111/19
internet [4] 41/22 143/17 250/13 250/20
interpret [1] 154/18
interpretation [2] 19/20 172/16
interpretations [1] 94/1
interrupt [1] 171/5
interrupted [1] 46/25
interrupting [1] 7/5
interstitial [2] 192/20 193/23
intervention [8] 170/23 173/1 193/4 193/20 197/25 198/14 204/5 221/21
interventions [3] 172/1 193/7 197/25
intimate [1] 131/24
intimation [1] 230/23
intimidation [6] 79/8 79/10 80/13 80/25 81/2 88/20
into [30] 5/4 34/23 36/16 36/20 41/7 44/2 67/6 90/19 104/1 117/10 122/18 127/13 129/25 132/9 139/5 139/9 144/6 147/10 148/22 151/18 161/15 170/9 170/10 178/23 204/5 207/22 225/12 238/5 244/22 249/23
introduce [2] 9/16 162/15
introduced [4] 64/6 65/3 91/7 96/1
introduction [1] 10/6
intrusive [2] 52/16 52/21
inundated [1] 113/25
inundating [1] 113/21
investigate [2] 199/23 203/2
investigating [1] 201/7
investigation [2] 163/10 196/4
investigations [4] 22/17 148/25 198/6 201/5
invitation [2] 213/15 218/2
invite [1] 202/18
involve [4] 105/21 110/11 196/10 243/18
involved [10] 5/12 24/14 53/6 74/16 75/24 83/11 85/17 96/23 107/23 233/1
involvement [1] 140/14
involves [1] 52/12
involving [8] 11/15 11/16 18/2 31/20 32/5 91/13 136/13 167/9
iOS [4] 231/25 232/13 233/25 235/23
is [1186]
is ... AI [1] 237/4
is 16 [1] 90/18
Islamophobic [1] 23/1
isn't [23] 2/20 4/14 5/20 8/19 14/23 23/9 34/15 42/22 47/6 49/8 61/22 67/23 73/2 81/19 99/7 103/14 114/25 131/18 141/7 168/17 169/24 217/18 221/17
isolation [1] 88/13
issue [8] 114/19 114/20 130/4 176/16 191/22 199/17 237/14 243/4
issued [5] 120/11 120/24 121/2 121/3 123/10
issues [25] 4/8 4/13 4/13 4/14 24/3 60/15 92/3 105/22 121/1 121/11 131/22 140/2 141/11 147/5 148/13 148/22 156/7 162/18 182/5 191/20 199/18 205/3 209/10 219/9 243/6
it [721]
it's [12] 23/23 26/18 36/9 90/7 90/14 100/17 106/19 209/25 212/9 239/24 243/12 244/7
item [4] 85/23 214/11 215/5 238/19
items [2] 37/10 214/21
iteration [1] 205/4
its [42] 25/14 35/9 41/14 42/24 48/18 63/22 64/1 64/11 68/9 71/8 103/24 103/24 104/1 117/4 123/24 128/20 143/8 145/4 149/22 150/5 150/16 150/17 153/6 163/4 163/13 166/8 170/13 186/4 192/10 201/9 204/15 209/22 229/1 230/25 230/25 237/2 241/10 243/9 244/20 245/7 246/17 250/8
itself [10] 2/11 34/14 97/1 103/25 115/17 116/12 132/6 134/22 238/24 239/8

J

jail [1] 138/24
jail-breaking [1] 138/24
jailbreak [1] 150/3
jailbreaks [2] 149/25 150/1
January [1] 106/25
January 2026 [1] 106/25
Jason [1] 127/4
Jason Kwon [1] 127/4
Jigsaw [1] 93/18
job [2] 6/3 14/3
joined [1] 236/2
joining [2] 126/7 174/21
joint [1] 243/3
jointly [1] 25/16
journalists [3] 92/16 93/14 209/2
journey [2] 176/3 176/8
judge [2] 53/1 65/6
judgement [3] 12/6 167/25 197/13
judgements [1] 139/7
judging [1] 22/2
judgmentally [1] 137/15
July [5] 25/14 41/15 44/25 67/6 178/11
July 2025 [2] 44/25 67/6
June [2] 28/2 201/23
June 2024 [1] 28/2
June 2025 [1] 201/23
jurisdiction [1] 13/7
just [166] 1/3 1/9 2/8 3/7 3/14 4/3 4/5 4/7 4/18 5/15 9/1 9/16 10/10 10/16 10/20 10/25 13/6 13/16 15/16 16/10 16/12 17/11 20/23 22/7 22/10 25/20 27/25 28/8 33/7 35/20 36/7 37/25 38/20 39/12 40/1 40/11 41/19 42/11 42/12 47/1 48/18 49/6 53/3 54/17 56/5 57/4 57/14 57/23 58/19 58/25 59/2 60/14 61/9 62/3 62/8 64/6 67/16 70/23 71/18 82/2 82/16 82/23 86/4 89/20 90/13 91/2 91/5 91/6 92/8 94/11 95/19 96/2 99/1 100/24 101/19 103/18 104/21 105/12 106/17 106/22 107/2 108/23 110/7 114/2 114/6 116/9 116/9 116/15 117/20 117/22 118/22 121/9 122/14 126/18 128/2 128/9 129/15 130/21 133/15 133/25 134/2 137/19 140/7 140/8 142/17 142/22 146/1 149/6 150/1 151/19 152/25 153/3 153/8 154/7 154/12 154/18 155/7 156/11 159/10 160/1 160/4 160/11 161/16 165/11 171/18 172/8 172/8 174/6 174/25 175/21 177/11 177/14 180/9 180/14 181/11 181/12 185/9 186/24 187/15 187/19 189/5 192/17 192/21 199/13 199/25 202/18 205/1 207/7 212/15 213/19 219/8 222/19 225/17 228/15 228/23 229/2 229/16 236/8 236/14 241/18 242/8 242/12 242/23 244/7 245/8 248/14
justification [2] 13/24 15/18
justified [1] 205/6

K

keen [4] 122/24 122/25 219/11 246/13
keep [4] 59/9 77/11 100/14 246/1
keeping [3] 21/23 52/11 52/24
key [5] 68/20 171/19 187/22 200/5 203/21
keys [2] 212/5 212/8
keyword [1] 222/2
keywords [3] 246/17 247/4 247/6
kid [1] 74/14
kid' [1] 74/8
kids [10] 6/24 7/1 29/5 29/7 30/19 33/14 34/23 64/14 70/20 73/25
killer [3] 17/5 141/23 177/24
killers [2] 17/1 179/21
killing [2] 182/18 197/18
kind [41] 8/2 9/3 12/12 19/13 20/5 20/6 20/8 29/8 34/20 37/5 40/20 65/7 76/9 77/22 78/9 82/7 86/16 87/14 96/16 104/6 109/6 109/15 110/17 116/4 116/18 124/12 127/16 144/20 185/9 194/3 195/18 197/23 199/2 218/24 229/3 231/8 237/11 237/25 238/22 246/7 247/8

K

kinds [9] 43/24 43/25 128/15 130/4 144/9 161/11 163/22 179/2 195/6
kitchen [1] 38/1
knife [8] 13/10 13/15 15/17 113/24 114/6 114/18 116/21 188/6
knives [14] 12/25 13/8 13/13 32/5 37/10 37/25 38/1 38/2 38/6 77/7 78/6 78/8 109/18 115/1
know [56] 1/18 3/17 5/5 7/22 8/11 20/13 24/7 28/15 28/17 29/3 38/16 51/21 52/12 54/10 56/8 57/9 60/13 62/2 68/14 77/3 86/12 86/17 97/24 99/22 101/2 101/8 103/9 108/21 109/25 110/14 116/1 117/6 118/9 118/16 119/5 138/22 138/25 139/8 145/16 153/9 154/15 163/19 183/21 184/14 184/18 184/23 188/19 190/5 191/9 191/12 191/23 195/25 199/16 226/4 229/4 247/4
knowing [1] 76/20
knowledge [12] 1/25 2/14 92/6 103/7 103/19 121/14 125/22 170/5 170/6 207/14 208/11 236/15
known [5] 23/23 128/9 129/14 174/23 250/11
Kwon [1] 127/4

L

lab [3] 127/11 128/1 179/12
label [1] 146/8
labelled [1] 144/18
labour [1] 134/12
labs [2] 178/22 192/3
lack [1] 227/17
landscape [3] 26/17 50/16 247/8
language [13] 13/17 89/7 93/6 104/7 128/8 128/16 139/9 173/13 178/10 180/22 198/2 204/19 246/20
laptop [1] 186/19
large [17] 23/19 32/12 32/12 36/2 112/5 122/23 126/15 128/8 128/13 128/16 137/5 143/7 173/13 179/3 180/22 200/22 216/18
large-scale [3] 112/5 126/15 137/5
largely [3] 2/18 47/4 112/18
larger [1] 127/3
largest [4] 67/8 70/11 184/3 186/25
Las [1] 183/10
last [14] 4/9 4/11 20/15 25/14 36/1 62/2 98/14 118/4 118/8 187/8 219/6 230/7 236/2 244/2
late [1] 251/5
later [1] 151/12
latest [1] 191/11
latter [1] 94/10
launched [2] 74/13 92/4
laurels [1] 153/3
law [64] 13/3 14/12 14/16 14/19 14/21 14/23 102/23 108/23 109/2 109/4 109/5 109/15 110/2 110/21 111/3 111/14 111/19 111/19 111/25 112/6 112/20 113/4 113/8 113/18 113/21 114/9 114/12 114/16 114/20 135/20 147/16 149/4 162/19 169/2 169/17 196/16 196/23 198/6 198/8 198/13 198/21 199/3 199/13 199/20 200/2 200/6 200/10 200/16 200/25 201/4 201/6 201/11 201/22 202/4 202/11 202/15 202/20 203/14 204/14 205/5 205/14 210/11 212/16 225/22
lawful [1] 13/14
laws [4] 23/18 43/6 113/10 135/18
lawyer [4] 112/14 124/11 200/13 203/12
lawyers [1] 23/16
layer [1] 213/25
layers [2] 77/23 153/20
layperson's [2] 97/17 248/1
lays [1] 42/6
lead [9] 6/12 49/19 49/21 96/8 133/6 137/4 168/11 197/25 198/6
leadership [1] 6/17
leading [2] 175/24 234/7
leads [1] 91/23
leakage [1] 20/6
learn [4] 25/1 96/2 147/2 200/20
learned [6] 10/10 118/23 143/11 201/19 206/17 235/10
learning [6] 20/1 25/7 95/15 103/21 144/20 146/24
learnings [1] 147/10
least [13] 27/4 27/7 27/18 44/22 154/9 156/10 164/16 165/18 176/23 182/12 182/18 199/22 206/24
leave [2] 220/12 220/23
leaves [1] 173/6
lecturing [1] 140/17
led [3] 4/10 126/12 127/4
left [7] 32/21 107/11 118/22 152/15 172/23 173/24 182/23
left-hand [5] 32/21 107/11 172/23 173/24 182/23
legal [15] 5/9 13/2 14/19 47/13 47/19 112/15 114/24 127/5 135/20 196/18 197/14 203/10 206/23 238/2 238/13
legally [1] 109/8
legislation [1] 38/5
legitimate [10] 15/7 33/23 92/14 115/15 117/14 133/18 137/10 145/12 233/9 238/23
less [21] 18/12 45/2 52/16 80/8 106/10 108/13 148/10 150/17 164/20 190/25 217/16 227/6 227/9 227/11 227/12 227/21 228/2 242/7 242/7 243/22 243/23
lesser [1] 174/23
let [3] 38/16 99/1 119/12
let's [6] 14/22 16/10 80/11 133/23 149/18 246/11
letter [19] 60/7 60/14 61/14 61/15 61/18 61/22 62/3 62/8 62/21 62/25 63/7 63/9 63/20 65/14 201/3 201/15 201/16 210/10 243/3
letters [2] 60/12 64/25
level [34] 6/13 6/14 6/19 40/6 61/4 97/22 97/23 104/16 108/5 113/19 119/15 134/6 140/1 148/7 152/23 158/19 175/20 195/22 196/4 196/6 196/10 205/11 210/1 210/7 215/19 222/14 225/17 231/17 232/11 234/3 234/12 237/23 237/25 239/23
level 0 [1] 61/4
levels [7] 8/6 26/15 61/2 71/1 88/18 140/4 164/14
LGBTQ [1] 76/7
library [3] 50/21 53/18 54/13
licences [2] 121/5 121/7
lie [1] 127/9
life [9] 1/21 31/15 109/3 113/1 113/3 154/4 198/17 198/24 199/3
light [2] 15/22 59/14
like [63] 14/12 37/6 37/23 38/3 57/20 64/15 68/20 71/17 72/25 80/17 80/22 82/15 86/5 87/5 91/22 92/17 92/23 93/7 94/19 97/19 104/18 106/1 106/5 108/21 119/9 120/11 120/14 122/13 126/24 128/7 139/22 144/8 148/2 149/7 153/24 155/22 161/11 163/5 163/5 166/11 168/6 175/13 176/25 177/20 178/3 184/15 186/21 190/22 191/1 192/3 192/4 195/12 199/9 200/12 200/22 209/19 211/19 220/22 221/7 227/20 229/16 242/9 243/21
liked [1] 97/17
likely [20] 29/21 37/24 40/7 48/14 48/20 56/3 69/11 75/22 109/22 128/25 150/17 159/2 163/12 163/16 172/11 172/16 193/5 197/24 207/4 240/12
likes [1] 97/4
liking [1] 84/15
limbs [1] 11/25
limit [9] 88/12 89/8 97/8 185/4 185/21 186/4 186/8 209/22 219/2
limitations [3] 76/14 163/4 232/16
limited [15] 71/23 127/7 184/10 195/24 215/19 215/21 218/10 220/11 227/6 227/17 230/3 232/10 240/17 240/19 246/16
limiting [2] 97/10 220/14
limits [12] 79/5 79/14 80/7 127/23 135/10 146/21 164/6 175/13 190/7 213/23 218/22 221/23
line [10] 83/25 84/5 84/20 134/2 135/22 189/5 229/23 241/19 244/19 244/23
line 12 [1] 241/19
lines [4] 136/21 171/16 191/17 198/5
linguistic [1] 141/13
link [5] 39/18 109/20 160/20 213/16 218/2
linked [17] 36/9 36/24 47/21 47/22 167/7 167/17 168/15 168/17 168/22 169/5 169/12 170/1 182/13 182/19 216/9 232/2 247/9
linking [2] 158/3 219/21
links [2] 9/23 100/3
list [14] 34/4 34/8 82/20 89/21 162/21 162/23 166/11 172/25 183/13 222/18 226/13 231/16 237/13 247/4
listed [6] 34/5 34/12 35/2 71/8 131/24 250/1
literally [1] 193/18
litigation [1] 201/5
little [12] 4/3 4/5 39/14 59/2 69/24 82/6 83/2 127/11 153/5 164/15 173/10 242/23
live [16] 54/7 61/20 75/7 76/14 78/19 81/24 82/14 101/21 101/24 102/2 102/4 115/18 242/4 249/11 249/20 249/21
live-streamed [1] 249/21
live-streaming [1] 249/20
livestreamed [2] 249/8 249/10
living [2] 30/25 34/9
LLC [3] 4/22 5/3 113/10
LLMs [1] 128/8
local [2] 135/20 135/21
locally [1] 174/24
location [1] 131/14
log [1] 36/25
logged [1] 38/11
logging [1] 85/19
logic [1] 224/6
long [5] 177/13 198/3 199/16 206/1 231/11
longer [6] 84/15

L

longer... [5] 118/13 129/21 129/24 179/13 182/8
longstanding [1] 227/24
look [86] 2/4 5/21 9/5 10/16 15/3 16/11 20/5 20/23 23/17 25/13 27/24 28/7 29/10 31/3 31/12 32/19 35/20 37/15 37/18 38/8 38/9 38/20 41/13 43/18 46/3 56/21 58/17 59/1 61/13 62/15 63/15 64/15 69/16 71/16 74/17 78/21 82/16 86/3 90/20 90/21 95/3 95/19 99/15 99/21 99/23 101/19 106/22 107/2 108/1 112/17 120/14 133/15 133/23 141/5 141/13 141/15 142/8 149/18 150/6 151/14 152/14 154/13 171/1 173/9 182/23 183/24 193/22 199/9 208/15 210/14 211/11 219/10 220/5 220/6 221/19 222/17 223/7 226/17 226/25 231/20 232/20 235/21 237/1 241/7 247/15 248/25
looked [21] 4/17 14/12 23/24 24/24 24/25 35/16 37/23 56/15 61/5 68/5 80/20 85/2 89/2 89/15 93/16 93/20 93/24 110/13 111/12 148/18 153/7
looking [46] 6/24 9/1 23/13 23/16 41/3 41/4 41/4 41/5 51/16 55/10 56/12 56/18 75/21 77/6 77/9 83/6 92/10 98/2 98/19 99/14 104/21 110/5 110/11 113/13 113/13 119/15 123/4 135/5 142/10 158/24 160/4 161/11 164/13 170/9 170/10 171/15 171/18 172/9 173/23 177/17 190/20 195/20 210/17 219/18 229/4 229/16
looks [3] 57/20 71/21 97/19
loops [2] 86/1 170/22
lot [13] 12/3 27/5 33/19 39/20 56/9 77/6 93/18 122/22 147/21 148/25 221/24 235/6 243/2
lots [4] 24/21 51/19 82/7 106/16
love [1] 84/21
low [2] 184/9 240/12
lower [6] 69/20 115/5 153/5 154/15 155/10 175/23
lowest [2] 184/7 245/7
lowish [1] 173/18
lumped [1] 56/25
Luna [1] 129/14

M

machetes [2] 13/18 32/5
machine [4] 95/15 144/19 144/25 163/20
machines [2] 23/12 23/20
made [35] 24/11 28/19 29/1 30/1 30/12 34/23 35/19 48/3 57/4 61/19 62/2 62/4 63/2 68/16 75/17 77/16 77/20 79/15 82/2 88/11 138/25 139/4 155/24 169/11 170/4 191/6 195/10 197/14 198/22 199/20 200/5 201/23 202/15 206/17 215/11
main [4] 2/2 3/6 70/19 78/25
mainly [1] 242/16
mainstream [14] 116/25 166/8 171/21 171/24 172/4 174/1 174/4 174/10 174/13 174/17 175/9 175/21 176/1 176/24
maintain [2] 60/24 243/1
major [6] 22/18 67/18 83/18 178/22 187/1 248/18
majority [16] 8/3 19/13 34/6 45/4 100/12 105/25 107/3 113/14 124/6 143/18 193/21 194/1 225/1 230/10 230/11 248/8
make [47] 7/15 8/8 11/5 14/3 15/20 15/25 24/19 33/5 33/9 35/17 46/25 56/23 57/22 59/9 59/14 61/23 68/21 68/21 68/23 70/10 71/12 71/14 75/22 77/17 77/18 82/2 86/25 90/11 95/24 117/17 128/5 139/7 161/12 162/5 167/25 168/5 179/8 179/15 186/10 190/9 200/12 200/18 215/5 219/12 225/8 246/11 248/2
makes [4] 13/9 30/9 102/12 139/11
making [25] 6/24 32/9 61/10 62/1 65/8 76/15 80/5 92/15 97/10 103/3 122/15 142/19 144/17 149/1 181/4 197/8 203/11 217/16 220/18 224/7 225/15 226/7 229/20 229/25 233/16
malicious [5] 88/24 185/5 186/8 226/1 226/9
malign [1] 204/17
manage [4] 19/16 47/12 102/7 128/14
managed [2] 6/6 244/3
mandatory [1] 192/9
Manhattan [1] 183/5
manifest [1] 171/13
manifestly [1] 239/20
manifestos [3] 91/15 91/22 92/11
manifests [1] 198/2
mannequin [1] 13/22
mannequins [3] 13/20 13/21 15/1
manner [2] 140/17 141/6
Manual [2] 145/9 145/25
manufacturer [1] 15/17
many [17] 8/5 43/20 52/11 95/16 98/22 117/1 117/1 163/18 178/21 181/2 212/21 212/23 213/12 219/2 219/5 222/12 242/17
maps [1] 188/17
Mar [1] 115/10
March [6] 59/3 107/1 119/21 187/10 248/24 250/4
March 2025 [1] 250/4
March 2026 [3] 107/1 119/21 187/10
margin [1] 173/7
marginalised [2] 53/21 53/24
Mari [1] 115/11
marked [1] 233/20
market [1] 13/10
marketed [1] 13/14
marketing [1] 37/25
markets [1] 122/23
marking [1] 189/8
mass [15] 17/1 17/5 91/14 91/21 92/10 93/12 131/13 134/14 134/16 141/22 177/23 179/20 181/4 182/12 197/18
match [1] 61/2
matches [1] 215/9
matching [4] 214/21 215/22 216/12 216/15
material [151] 13/24 14/24 15/22 16/6 17/5 19/10 19/25 20/2 21/10 21/15 21/23 24/1 25/6 25/7 27/3 27/3 27/5 27/6 27/8 27/11 30/1 33/24 36/17 36/18 36/19 36/22 36/24 37/3 38/10 46/2 46/13 46/23 49/6 49/7 49/8 49/18 50/17 66/8 66/14 71/5 71/25 72/12 73/9 73/9 73/12 73/14 77/8 79/25 80/1 80/10 81/3 81/14 81/15 81/19 81/21 81/23 84/17 85/8 85/22 89/15 89/22 89/23 90/1 90/21 90/23 90/24 93/9 96/3 96/14 96/24 97/2 97/5 97/18 97/18 97/19 98/6 98/7 99/2 99/3 100/2 100/6 100/6 103/2 103/4 103/14 106/12 108/8 108/10 108/12 108/17 108/25 109/17 114/8 115/7 134/15 138/13 138/19 143/15 144/8 144/17 146/7 148/10 153/14 165/8 176/11 179/20 179/23 186/2 191/15 199/5 208/9 210/7 215/8 216/4 216/6 217/17 217/18 219/22 220/21 221/4 221/10 221/12 221/17 225/15 225/16 225/16 227/9 228/23 228/24 229/5 229/7 229/10 229/14 232/6 237/24 238/2 238/10 238/11 238/16 238/17 239/11 239/12 239/24 241/2 247/21 248/1 248/5 248/8 249/17 250/2 250/11
materials [6] 6/1 6/2 13/15 22/8 46/9 207/5
mathematical [2] 128/19 143/24
maths [2] 184/18 188/19
matter [10] 16/3 113/5 124/13 170/7 182/4 188/20 202/11 205/4 235/10 235/11
matters [16] 2/19 3/25 6/14 6/15 7/7 10/3 13/18 38/23 78/8 115/9 118/19 199/3 228/3 229/3 237/25 245/18
maximise [1] 85/10
may [107] 1/20 2/25 3/3 7/12 11/5 12/10 12/12 13/17 13/17 14/7 15/7 15/8 15/14 17/16 17/25 18/1 19/11 19/18 19/21 21/7 21/8 21/13 24/12 29/16 32/9 32/16 33/16 37/21 37/22 46/6 47/17 48/14 48/18 48/21 48/22 48/24 48/25 51/5 53/21 54/11 57/23 57/23 58/9 58/22 70/23 76/3 80/1 81/4 81/7 81/9 84/21 88/12 88/13 90/2 90/5 90/10 90/11 90/24 91/8 96/6 97/20 99/12 99/14 105/10 109/11 111/11 116/11 118/11 118/14 120/21 130/5 130/6 135/1 137/14 137/22 138/15 139/20 149/9 152/2 155/1 156/18 158/20 167/2 175/22 193/10 194/20 197/2 201/1 207/19 211/4 211/20 216/10 219/24 220/25 221/8 224/13 228/20 228/21 230/15 233/6 235/10 236/2 238/3 242/6 246/11 246/20 250/23
May 2025 [1] 207/19
maybe [2] 166/9 221/25
me [30] 4/16 7/5 30/13 38/22 51/17 65/2 65/5 74/3 80/4 82/15 82/18 86/24 87/6 87/18 92/17 97/16 99/1 99/1 106/19 107/5 128/18 130/23 139/8 154/18 183/19 205/21 208/11 208/11 226/3 229/16
mean [16] 14/14 35/3 35/4 46/16 46/16 87/9 89/22 113/20 119/6 124/6 153/25 197/11 210/6 214/4 214/16 231/11
meaning [3] 18/5 70/14 211/18
meaningful [1] 181/3
meaningfully [1] 248/19
means [8] 52/1 80/8 126/20 190/11 197/19 209/19 210/22 212/4
meant [9] 21/20 67/19 126/15 176/7 195/9 195/9 231/8

M

meant... [2] 232/24 233/8
measure [10] 49/12 55/23 71/20 94/3 96/18 97/7 98/11 99/20 235/20 237/19
measured [1] 98/10
measures [33] 19/3 38/24 51/7 52/17 55/2 55/3 55/18 57/2 63/22 64/4 64/7 64/9 64/12 66/13 120/8 142/24 162/20 166/17 168/7 175/7 175/11 176/22 185/10 185/12 192/18 192/20 204/16 234/24 235/15 243/10 249/8 249/12 250/2
measuring [4] 97/25 99/2 154/5 191/7
mechanism [2] 89/4 169/4
mechanisms [2] 178/19 200/4
media [24] 4/13 12/16 31/6 31/14 31/15 32/9 32/21 42/7 42/14 42/23 43/20 44/23 116/25 127/12 163/21 165/6 165/9 171/9 179/10 191/23 206/24 206/25 214/22 219/25
medical [3] 137/24 138/13 153/15
meet [1] 12/22
meeting [1] 71/14
meetings [1] 200/2
member [3] 206/24 213/24 214/12
members [2] 36/12 206/21
mental [2] 193/12 196/13
mention [1] 35/22
mentioned [5] 78/1 119/19 150/1 199/6 224/11
merely [2] 75/16 75/16
message [6] 93/21 93/25 211/10 223/23 223/24 250/9
messaged [1] 84/16
messages [3] 213/24 223/20 223/21
messaging [1] 60/6
Messenger [3] 32/25 249/4 249/25
met [4] 103/11 202/10 222/20 223/11
Meta [1] 60/25
Meta's [5] 249/3 249/11 249/22 249/23 249/25
method [5] 42/17 119/22 164/1 164/3 168/22
methodologies [1] 236/5
methodology [12] 33/6 35/16 71/10 83/24 85/2 85/13 164/6 187/22 189/22 189/24 190/5 190/8
methods [10] 39/2 42/21 43/11 51/13 51/22 52/6 52/8 121/25 214/20 237/12
metric [3] 57/21 97/6 100/3
MI5 [1] 25/15
middle [6] 59/1 61/20 63/3 64/18 181/12 218/1
might [75] 4/15 15/9 23/22 30/23 34/13 38/1 38/2 47/1 53/20 54/5 54/6 54/8 77/10 79/21 79/22 90/3 90/19 103/8 103/12 103/16 104/7 106/8 109/14 110/7 110/7 110/8 121/12 124/11 127/11 128/24 129/3 129/4 130/22 131/15 131/20 132/1 136/1 136/7 140/23 141/22 142/4 144/3 145/11 145/13 147/5 151/18 153/13 158/23 161/15 161/16 163/7 163/12 163/13 164/13 164/15 165/6 165/18 165/19 169/11 170/13 175/4 177/19 178/6 190/21 197/4 197/20 197/25 203/20 204/17 224/4 224/4 229/14 229/15 248/11 251/6
mightn't [1] 161/16
military [1] 126/11
million [8] 50/23 106/23 107/1 219/7 222/24 223/3 223/15 224/9
millions [1] 46/15
mind [4] 38/9 93/14 208/14 243/7
mine [2] 175/22 208/12
minimal [2] 139/14 184/24
minimisation [1] 208/24
minimise [1] 55/19
minimising [1] 135/9
minimum [10] 32/16 36/5 39/12 59/19 59/22 60/9 67/15 70/14 70/15 174/24
minor [2] 23/22 105/19
minorities [1] 112/24
minority [4] 45/5 51/19 111/6 209/20
minors [3] 11/15 18/3 136/13
minute [1] 85/20
minutes [10] 58/8 58/10 83/4 84/11 85/19 102/4 177/10 177/13 180/7 206/2
mirror [1] 119/8
misappropriated [1] 164/5
misclassified [2] 49/10 57/8
misinformation [1] 10/1
mislead [1] 65/8
misogyny [2] 83/5 176/20
missed [4] 19/11 76/19 96/6 225/5
mission [2] 126/5 134/5
mistaken [1] 172/3
misunderstood [1] 75/15
misuse [1] 226/11
misused [1] 209/19
mitigate [6] 33/8 33/8 72/4 72/24 153/2 165/10
mitigated [1] 171/14
mitigating [1] 82/21
mixed [2] 18/6 248/13
mixture [1] 83/20
mobile [4] 231/25 235/4 235/7 235/7
mode [2] 159/23 213/23
model [117] 40/7 40/13 40/20 43/4 43/16 44/7 44/9 44/10 51/5 52/9 52/15 52/22 53/8 55/14 56/13 91/17 127/10 128/16 128/19 128/23 129/4 129/17 130/3 130/20 132/2 132/2 132/5 132/6 132/7 132/7 132/8 132/9 132/10 132/14 132/18 133/1 133/9 133/10 133/23 134/7 134/18 134/25 134/25 136/1 137/20 138/17 139/25 141/18 141/19 141/21 142/3 142/18 143/7 145/24 146/9 146/10 146/10 146/13 146/18 146/23 146/25 147/8 147/10 147/17 148/18 149/9 149/16 150/4 150/4 150/10 150/16 150/24 151/5 151/8 151/10 151/18 151/23 153/7 153/19 153/19 153/20 153/22 155/4 155/18 155/20 155/21 155/22 156/3 156/11 158/13 172/25 174/2 174/8 174/10 175/5 176/25 177/25 178/15 179/18 181/14 181/17 181/24 185/10 185/24 185/25 186/3 186/16 189/20 189/25 190/1 191/8 191/22 194/21 219/25 237/3 244/17 246/6
modelling [1] 161/10
models [73] 40/10 44/14 127/15 127/16 127/18 128/8 129/11 129/12 129/16 129/24 130/4 130/22 131/17 134/8 134/9 134/20 134/21 135/3 135/21 136/9 143/16 144/12 144/15 145/16 147/24 148/3 148/7 149/12 149/14 152/17 152/19 154/24 160/8 164/9 164/23 165/4 165/18 165/25 171/7 171/21 171/24 173/14 174/4 174/14 174/17 174/23 175/9 176/1 176/17 176/18 176/24 180/23 180/25 181/2 184/3 185/1 185/7 185/8 185/15 185/18 186/7 186/11 186/18 186/22 186/25 187/3 187/4 190/15 191/10 191/11 191/12 192/10 192/13
models' [1] 132/3
moderate [5] 117/6 157/12 213/5 214/7 239/17
moderated [5] 117/13 144/4 229/6 240/1 240/7
moderating [1] 215/15
moderation [29] 9/7 46/22 94/6 95/6 99/25 101/1 101/6 107/13 107/19 116/7 157/11 168/8 213/1 214/2 214/13 214/15 214/17 214/19 214/20 215/6 215/18 215/19 221/12 238/18 242/7 243/23 243/25 245/6 246/10
moderator [4] 110/11 110/13 111/1 111/12
moderators [7] 95/23 240/9 247/19 247/22 247/25 248/6 250/10
modern [1] 141/10
module [1] 182/19
moment [27] 1/4 4/18 14/22 17/22 32/2 39/9 45/8 58/9 78/5 78/7 79/25 83/12 90/20 115/15 116/13 116/24 117/2 120/23 131/5 138/22 180/6 207/23 219/8 221/4 230/15 230/16 244/7
Monday [1] 1/1
monitor [1] 74/23
monitorability [1] 150/8
monitors [2] 150/22 186/21
month [1] 67/14
monthly [3] 222/23 223/2 223/14
months [7] 20/15 31/19 36/1 42/3 96/1 192/7 202/14
Moonshot [1] 203/23
Moonshot CVE [1] 203/23
moralising [1] 140/16
more [97] 14/11 14/16 24/15 26/23 32/10 40/4 41/21 44/1 45/6 49/6 51/6 51/14 61/23 62/13 65/10 65/13 69/18 77/17 80/17 82/23 86/7 87/11 87/13 89/10 89/15 94/6 96/16 97/5 97/18 97/21 115/16 118/12 128/5 129/20 129/21 129/22 129/25 129/25 130/14 130/16 135/3 137/19 141/9 142/2 145/1 147/22 149/22 149/24 150/15 152/9 156/7 163/13 163/20 163/20 164/1 164/4 171/24 172/11 172/15 173/10 174/1 175/21 176/16 177/15 180/15 182/9 182/13 186/3 187/2 190/14 191/1 191/2 192/6 192/6 192/7 194/3 195/14 196/5 196/10 198/21 200/13 200/15 205/10 210/6 217/16 219/20 221/9 221/10 225/13 225/14 225/18 227/6 227/17 230/6 231/10 239/11 243/13
morning [2] 251/7 251/13
Moss [8] 1/7 1/8 58/7 58/15 206/12 206/13 252/5 252/15

M

most [36] 4/9 5/12 14/16 26/5 31/19 32/14 40/17 40/19 42/15 42/24 43/24 50/18 53/20 59/3 69/6 69/10 76/3 77/1 128/25 129/11 135/7 148/6 159/4 164/12 172/14 172/24 173/1 183/18 184/3 190/16 191/21 193/5 193/5 199/19 219/24 251/12
motivated [1] 27/16
motivations [1] 148/15
motives [1] 57/13
move [17] 125/24 130/20 134/17 139/15 140/9 143/5 151/16 152/15 152/19 157/19 159/19 166/13 170/16 172/22 182/2 186/24 187/7
movements [1] 141/14
moving [8] 128/8 155/18 156/23 171/18 190/10 192/15 194/3 197/4
MR [56] 1/5 1/7 1/8 1/12 2/18 2/20 3/4 22/10 27/24 30/17 33/19 38/20 51/17 54/17 55/7 58/7 58/15 58/16 58/18 61/24 69/13 70/17 73/19 98/18 104/23 112/3 118/24 118/25 119/2 119/3 124/20 125/6 125/8 125/9 125/12 125/17 125/25 169/20 170/18 177/8 180/13 180/14 183/21 201/12 205/19 206/1 206/12 206/13 248/17 250/15 252/3 252/5 252/7 252/9 252/11 252/15
Mr Ahmed [1] 169/20
MR ALEXANDER [2] 1/5 252/3
Mr Boyle [6] 125/8 125/9 177/8 180/13 206/1 252/11
MR BRIAN FISHMAN [2] 125/6 252/9
Mr Chapman [5] 118/24 118/25 119/2 124/20 252/7
Mr Fishman [8] 125/12 125/17 125/25 170/18 180/14 183/21 201/12 205/19
Mr Hadley [2] 248/17 250/15
Mr Moss [8] 1/7 1/8 58/7 58/15 206/12 206/13 252/5 252/15
Mr Petrosky [2] 2/18 3/4
Mr Rawle [20] 1/12 2/20 22/10 27/24 30/17 33/19 38/20 51/17 54/17 55/7 58/16 58/18 61/24 69/13 70/17 73/19 98/18 104/23 112/3 119/3
Ms [3] 162/8 243/16 245/5
Ms Rance [2] 243/16 245/5
Ms Rowland [1] 162/8
much [34] 1/6 2/2 2/16 3/19 10/9 14/11 15/23 41/7 64/25 79/15 88/3 89/16 99/16 101/16 108/6 108/8 108/8 108/17 110/24 124/20 124/22 125/7 130/5 170/10 176/5 184/11 192/11 194/11 196/2 205/22 206/9 221/20 228/18 247/3
multiple [10] 22/17 35/6 55/5 56/11 116/13 204/22 204/24 211/18 213/10 213/13
music [1] 84/2
musings [1] 196/2
Muslim [2] 23/1 24/16
must [11] 6/18 18/16 18/17 47/12 70/12 72/8 72/14 139/18 159/20 230/24 234/5
mutilated [1] 229/3
my [79] 3/14 3/15 3/17 6/3 14/2 21/25 30/5 35/17 53/16 53/17 80/9 81/9 87/12 93/17 94/20 96/4 97/16 112/4 112/14 116/17 117/7 117/7 118/21 118/22 118/23 120/12 122/3 122/6 124/8 126/3 126/4 126/20 127/22 130/18 136/22 146/21 148/5 151/3 152/25 154/23 156/16 158/17 160/12 162/3 162/17 165/15 168/13 168/24 170/10 176/5 180/1 180/3 191/19 203/7 203/11 205/18 208/11 211/24 216/13 218/11 219/6 222/16 229/6 230/12 230/22 232/20 234/11 234/17 234/20 235/25 235/25 236/16 239/2 243/19 245/23 245/24 245/24 249/14 250/18
myself [2] 3/17 195/13

N

name [12] 1/10 7/10 125/10 174/9 183/11 204/11 207/4 217/2 217/4 217/10 217/18 231/1
named [3] 6/19 183/16 249/7
names [1] 75/3
naming [1] 227/15
narratives [2] 85/9 172/12
narrowing [1] 52/22
nasty [1] 238/23
nation [1] 126/23
National [5] 25/15 26/3 26/12 113/24 200/6
naturally [2] 221/11 228/13
nature [1] 66/10
Nazism [1] 141/10
NCA [9] 200/16 202/23 241/14 241/18 242/25 243/2 243/8 243/15 243/20
near [1] 182/18
necessarily [12] 8/25 47/6 94/5 100/19 103/14 109/23 110/9 122/22 139/13 141/1 195/25 216/17
necessary [1] 200/20
need [45] 3/3 5/7 10/16 15/3 15/19 27/21 36/25 43/13 47/22 49/4 50/3 50/4 51/17 52/23 53/20 54/10 57/15 58/1 62/15 62/15 62/16 65/25 69/16 69/21 71/2 88/6 92/18 104/5 106/7 113/11 114/24 120/19 122/19 168/14 174/9 176/14 191/7 193/2 198/25 205/24 209/9 209/17 216/17 247/10 249/19
needed [4] 37/17 107/22 156/20 227/14
needing [1] 235/3
needs [11] 47/21 62/13 120/14 120/15 120/19 121/25 122/18 175/25 192/1 196/22 242/25
negative [2] 88/22 105/11
Neo [1] 141/10
Neo-Nazism [1] 141/10
net [2] 72/10 100/7
network [3] 163/17 242/16 245/8
networking [1] 60/5
networks [6] 163/14 226/5 241/21 243/5 243/18 245/19
NEU000023 [3] 82/25 83/7 85/1
neutral [4] 137/11 152/9 152/10 228/22
neutrally [2] 39/5 55/20
never [7] 133/10 133/16 134/9 136/4 136/6 165/15 179/1
nevertheless [3] 97/3 145/24 222/12
new [15] 60/25 64/4 64/6 64/8 124/25 135/2 148/3 149/2 149/5 149/23 169/22 179/15 190/11 192/23 193/17
newer [1] 156/3
newly [1] 83/15
newly-created [1] 83/15
news [10] 15/8 15/14 81/6 115/16 116/23 116/25 117/8 117/14 138/6 139/22
next [8] 25/11 69/1 140/7 188/2 224/12 231/19 236/18 246/10
NGOs [1] 6/5
nihilistic [4] 140/24 141/3 141/5 141/8
nine [1] 32/3
no [60] 5/6 8/14 17/7 18/25 28/14 28/15 28/18 37/23 45/25 46/7 46/14 52/7 53/5 53/8 68/15 70/4 75/25 78/12 81/10 82/13 84/5 92/13 92/21 99/8 100/19 110/16 112/2 113/2 118/11 124/1 124/21 141/23 143/25 151/11 156/22 160/4 166/6 174/9 179/22 182/8 193/5 197/19 207/1 207/3 208/2 214/10 214/17 220/8 220/9 220/20 220/20 221/11 224/6 236/13 236/13 243/12 244/13 246/23 246/25 249/25
nominal [1] 48/5
nominate [1] 167/2
non [16] 63/20 65/2 88/20 97/17 102/10 131/6 137/15 138/4 140/16 140/17 148/20 162/23 174/17 175/9 176/1 237/12
non-confidential [2] 63/20 65/2
non-consensual [1] 138/4
non-contact [1] 88/20
non-exhaustive [2] 162/23 237/12
non-governmental [1] 102/10
non-ideological [2] 131/6 148/20
non-judgmentally [1] 137/15
non-lecturing [1] 140/17
non-mainstream [3] 174/17 175/9 176/1
non-technical [1] 97/17
None [1] 84/15
nonetheless [2] 211/4 211/21
nonsensitive [1] 237/20
nontrivial [1] 109/11
nor [1] 14/2
norm [1] 31/16
normalised [1] 26/10
norms [1] 12/23
not [356]
notable [1] 180/24
Notably [1] 32/3
note [14] 10/11 23/8 51/5 63/12 67/11 69/4 140/8 148/5 164/16 178/19 181/15 237/11 244/2 247/20
noted [1] 131/24
nothing [1] 113/6
notice [6] 2/20 15/23 28/6 83/1 94/7 130/11
noticed [1] 45/6
noticing [2] 44/24 45/4
notification [2] 168/5 168/11
notifications [3] 166/18 166/21 166/25
notified [3] 13/5 18/24 167/3
notifying [1] 170/1
noting [4] 108/12 136/3 189/19 245/5
notwithstanding [1] 124/10
novel [2] 171/8 185/20
November [3] 1/1 182/17 206/18
November 2025 [1] 182/17
now [54] 7/14 25/3 29/13 32/11 34/8 34/8

N

now... [48] 39/9 42/19 50/14 54/7 61/4 70/4 82/23 109/15 125/1 126/7 126/17 130/8 130/18 130/20 135/5 145/16 155/3 166/4 170/16 172/9 178/22 179/1 179/25 186/6 189/22 192/7 192/15 193/7 194/14 196/4 198/13 198/16 201/3 204/6 204/16 205/7 205/16 205/24 216/2 220/25 226/19 228/15 232/4 246/22 247/2 248/13 249/6 250/15
NSPCC [1] 70/25
nuance [4] 19/11 19/20 34/25 82/14
nuclear [1] 134/13
number [72] 2/9 14/4 15/10 23/10 23/14 24/2 29/11 33/13 33/15 38/4 39/1 40/13 41/10 48/2 50/10 51/20 52/14 52/23 54/4 57/5 72/19 72/22 75/5 75/7 75/9 75/10 75/18 76/12 76/21 77/13 82/20 84/4 92/14 94/21 95/13 96/19 97/9 98/1 98/11 99/6 100/10 100/22 103/16 104/8 107/5 107/15 107/24 115/14 116/23 117/8 118/16 123/6 130/9 130/18 131/11 131/23 154/1 161/13 173/8 177/7 208/23 216/18 222/23 223/2 223/14 232/2 232/3 233/5 235/4 235/8 240/13 241/23
numbers [13] 9/2 9/4 23/25 75/24 76/2 107/18 152/15 152/22 154/15 166/11 173/18 175/20 184/15
numerical [2] 2/10 190/25
nutshell [1] 4/7

O

OAI000001 [4] 125/16 125/19 158/2 199/25
OAI000004 [8] 134/1 134/17 136/24 137/21 139/15 140/10 142/8 142/22
OAI000013 [5] 149/19 149/20 151/16 154/8 155/8
OAI000025 [2] 166/18 166/19
OAI000030 [2] 201/17 203/5
OAI000033 [1] 201/7
OAI00004 [1] 133/24
objective [1] 139/21
objectively [1] 222/1
obligations [3] 82/4 114/25 163/6
obliged [1] 162/15
obscene [1] 26/13
observation [1] 80/5
observed [1] 31/19
obstacle [1] 121/17
obtain [3] 50/11 123/6 131/12
obtained [1] 47/20
obtaining [1] 137/6
obvious [5] 50/14 76/3 97/12 117/1 246/22
obviously [39] 8/9 12/3 19/1 22/4 36/11 39/13 46/10 61/9 63/16 79/2 86/11 98/7 108/23 111/10 114/24 118/20 124/25 126/1 139/5 140/19 146/9 147/10 158/18 167/13 169/13 175/12 181/1 184/25 191/23 194/12 195/20 200/20 201/7 201/9 207/11 210/1 236/1 238/14 246/6
occasion [2] 49/13 50/3
occasionally [2] 84/15 189/2
occasions [3] 72/9 93/22 115/6
occur [1] 105/23
occurred [2] 194/19 196/1
occurs [5] 68/19 96/21 155/5 163/3 198/3
October [4] 106/23 155/23 207/10 241/15
October 2025 [1] 106/23
October 2026 [1] 155/23
odd [1] 249/21
OFC000056 [4] 41/13 41/18 43/18 44/19
Ofcom [41] 20/12 20/16 20/19 22/3 26/21 35/6 41/13 42/1 43/17 55/12 56/16 59/3 60/7 60/10 61/4 61/12 61/15 61/20 62/11 62/20 62/24 63/1 63/1 63/6 63/10 64/21 68/8 68/20 71/6 71/9 71/19 71/23 162/21 163/11 166/7 224/2 227/25 237/16 237/22 243/14 244/24
Ofcom's [9] 42/25 58/20 61/8 62/22 71/6 222/17 224/7 237/12 244/19
off [9] 53/19 57/12 93/6 107/24 146/11 155/7 214/19 240/1 240/7
off-ramping [1] 93/6
offence [6] 13/9 111/10 111/16 111/23 230/16 230/16
offences [3] 70/25 109/11 210/3
offender [1] 94/22
offending [1] 112/24
offensive [2] 178/8 178/10
offer [5] 122/25 133/6 189/2 218/24 219/9
offering [3] 188/15 218/24 225/2
offers [3] 74/9 78/24 210/18
office [1] 64/20
officer [1] 127/4
officials [1] 122/8
offs [2] 52/14 76/12
often [12] 6/5 69/6 94/2 99/2 99/3 123/23 181/15 187/1 189/8 209/4 213/23 242/3
oftentimes [2] 129/17 129/21
okay [5] 80/15 101/19 159/9 165/11 222/3
old [16] 30/15 30/16 36/15 49/2 49/16 51/24 51/25 67/23 68/1 80/1 84/21 90/25 90/25 197/17 221/6 245/16
older [3] 30/8 68/17 159/21
olds [12] 8/19 12/13 32/6 37/7 44/22 57/16 70/1 70/19 79/11 83/16 84/7 235/7
on [420]
on 2 [1] 63/25
on screen [1] 207/7
on-platform [1] 192/18
once [4] 39/7 53/23 56/1 199/20
one [98] 2/25 10/21 22/15 28/5 28/7 30/2 31/9 32/3 32/21 36/11 42/22 44/22 51/21 62/9 67/12 71/18 71/20 72/8 74/11 80/20 80/21 80/25 83/2 83/23 85/21 85/24 92/21 93/5 94/14 99/8 99/18 104/25 105/14 107/8 107/8 108/5 108/16 108/17 111/10 111/17 112/9 114/16 119/11 121/24 123/8 131/19 135/7 140/19 140/21 141/22 144/2 145/7 146/23 150/23 153/5 153/8 154/6 156/14 161/22 169/3 170/11 171/22 172/4 173/5 175/4 176/6 181/19 181/20 185/23 186/15 186/16 190/19 197/24 200/18 203/21 204/21 206/24 209/9 210/21 210/21 211/16 211/16 212/21 213/12 214/19 216/25 221/15 227/16 228/2 229/4 230/19 231/17 235/12 237/11 237/15 242/10 243/20 250/1
ones [1] 5/11
ongoing [7] 68/8 163/1 163/2 166/4 193/17 200/16 201/5
online [53] 4/8 13/2 16/14 25/17 26/5 26/9 26/20 28/3 28/25 31/18 31/24 42/7 43/23 44/25 45/3 45/5 45/11 55/11 59/9 66/20 66/23 66/24 66/25 67/7 67/8 67/13 67/18 69/3 69/4 69/12 70/2 70/9 70/25 78/9 83/5 85/5 94/12 94/23 94/25 117/2 158/24 161/25 162/6 162/7 162/16 171/10 182/1 209/3 215/25 222/6 225/12 233/5 243/6
only [37] 21/15 32/23 34/5 34/7 44/25 45/5 48/22 60/25 64/25 83/13 83/23 90/8 94/19 136/11 136/12 137/23 153/18 154/5 171/12 180/25 188/13 198/10 209/5 210/23 212/4 216/22 218/10 225/18 232/24 233/8 233/10 233/18 238/7 239/9 241/2 248/6 248/18
onto [18] 39/22 44/12 131/25 138/21 154/2 157/11 157/19 158/3 159/9 160/19 165/17 175/3 180/14 187/18 215/7 221/2 226/4 232/4
open [15] 20/10 49/6 175/5 185/7 185/15 185/18 185/24 186/7 186/16 186/18 186/23 201/14 204/18 244/17 246/6
open-weight [5] 185/7 185/15 185/18 186/7 186/18
OpenAI [41] 125/13 126/7 127/1 127/7 128/8 130/8 130/10 132/22 142/5 146/3 147/15 148/1 156/17 156/23 157/5 157/12 160/23 165/24 166/8 166/13 168/19 170/9 174/21 175/6 177/4 178/20 185/15 186/10 190/4 191/9 192/9 196/15 197/9 198/25 199/14 200/2 200/4 201/3 201/18 201/23 205/1
OpenAI's [2] 134/5 201/10
openly [1] 143/17
operate [7] 20/21 65/11 86/12 86/19 135/19 215/25 219/13
operates [3] 6/4 33/13 35/1
operational [2] 132/24 182/11
operations [3] 128/14 198/19 200/6
Opportunities [1] 170/23
opportunity [2] 49/11 126/1
opposed [3] 76/2 237/19 243/14
opt [1] 79/2
optimised [1] 129/19
option [5] 27/17 27/18 49/21 119/24 217/7
optional [1] 167/10
options [2] 130/7 157/12
or [309]
or 10 [1] 38/13
oral [1] 114/4
order [6] 133/20 139/7 144/1 206/17 206/19 240/24
ordinarily [2] 21/10 182/1
organic [1] 115/1
organisation [5] 126/13 127/3 203/22 212/22 251/2
organisations [9] 16/20 102/11 102/17 102/24 103/22 117/8

O

organisations... [3] 126/15 126/16 128/13
organise [1] 129/7
Organizations [1] 126/14
OSA [3] 7/16 7/19 226/22
other [100] 9/11 10/2 11/19 16/25 19/3 22/25 23/10 24/7 31/24 34/4 34/12 35/2 37/10 38/24 43/25 44/8 44/11 47/25 48/8 52/17 53/20 63/12 69/20 71/8 75/10 78/17 81/25 84/16 85/17 89/1 89/16 90/13 94/13 94/21 94/25 100/22 102/11 103/16 104/15 105/24 109/1 118/14 118/19 121/24 122/18 122/21 123/14 128/7 128/10 128/13 128/15 129/23 130/4 138/6 140/19 141/11 144/1 144/9 144/15 145/10 145/19 152/6 153/20 159/13 161/13 165/18 165/19 165/25 166/10 168/7 173/14 174/4 174/13 175/10 176/12 176/16 176/18 177/19 178/12 184/11 184/16 185/1 185/16 187/3 191/16 199/2 200/16 204/22 208/2 210/7 214/9 223/6 223/20 223/22 225/12 227/23 231/8 233/5 235/13 239/9
others [33] 6/5 11/3 11/13 12/15 16/17 18/12 24/14 29/12 32/13 83/12 84/14 88/25 99/19 123/20 129/20 136/5 138/20 140/6 141/10 146/19 172/21 173/15 174/2 175/2 195/13 196/20 196/25 197/19 229/16 237/14 245/11 245/12 249/7
otherwise [2] 215/13 229/24
ought [6] 21/15 77/10 152/8 199/8 245/12 246/14
our [176] 5/18 5/20 6/5 6/6 6/21 9/18 10/19 12/8 13/1 14/5 14/10 14/10 14/13 14/15 14/17 14/20 17/24 20/5 20/18 20/20 22/6 24/9 27/13 27/14 31/17 32/8 32/15 37/16 39/24 40/6 42/16 43/16 43/21 44/6 44/10 44/13 44/20 46/14 51/5 51/14 52/9 53/8 55/13 55/13 59/11 60/7 60/23 61/16 61/18 61/21 62/1 62/7 62/17 62/24 63/1 63/5 63/11 64/23 65/8 66/22 66/25 67/5 68/4 68/22 70/24 71/11 71/11 71/13 77/2 81/5 86/6 86/11 86/17 86/18 87/15 90/2 93/19 95/21 96/7 109/6 109/24 110/2 110/16 111/1 112/18 114/5 114/24 118/12 124/13 127/4 127/14 127/19 128/3 128/3 128/5 130/7 133/19 133/20 133/21 134/6 134/8 134/9 135/3 135/21 138/11 141/20 146/9 148/14 149/9 150/21 151/25 153/3 153/10 153/21 159/5 159/15 161/10 162/25 163/18 165/10 166/3 167/3 178/18 178/23 178/24 179/16 180/23 183/20 184/13 184/25 185/3 186/2 186/22 189/21 190/7 192/13 192/24 193/11 193/13 193/15 196/17 197/14 200/9 200/14 200/21 202/1 202/3 202/10 202/15 202/15 202/20 203/10 203/18 204/8 204/23 205/16 207/5 209/23 215/22 215/23 215/24 224/12 224/18 225/8 225/21 231/18 233/5 233/20 238/4 239/21 240/9 241/13 246/2 246/7 247/18 251/5
ours [2] 186/21 200/22
ourselves [5] 96/19 97/7 97/25 98/4 98/11
out [83] 4/15 12/11 13/23 15/2 16/12 19/7 20/10 21/23 26/2 28/13 32/2 42/1 42/6 43/3 45/21 45/23 46/3 46/4 47/1 47/4 47/5 51/7 55/18 57/15 59/6 59/16 60/2 60/13 63/22 73/14 74/3 74/6 80/12 83/10 83/16 84/17 85/12 86/6 87/9 87/12 90/20 90/21 93/25 97/4 100/1 104/23 117/6 117/13 121/9 122/14 122/19 131/13 134/3 136/1 137/3 137/19 141/3 148/17 149/1 157/2 159/19 169/22 176/25 179/13 179/17 187/22 190/6 201/18 208/13 209/12 210/18 212/8 221/9 221/20 226/11 226/23 232/19 233/15 237/12 243/2 243/17 246/14 248/22
outcomes [1] 152/1
outline [3] 40/11 67/9 216/1
outlined [1] 22/7
outputs [2] 134/23 172/11
outside [10] 147/22 149/3 160/12 168/22 178/15 186/14 198/8 234/10 236/16 240/10
outstanding [2] 152/23 155/14
over [60] 8/15 9/15 18/9 18/17 30/22 35/22 40/1 40/15 40/23 40/23 50/9 51/8 51/16 54/1 70/23 74/15 78/25 84/11 85/24 86/1 86/20 88/16 89/20 90/14 95/13 106/24 107/8 107/10 107/17 135/1 136/23 152/18 154/7 155/10 158/20 159/2 161/3 161/5 173/22 179/13 182/24 186/10 189/11 189/14 189/15 191/22 195/5 198/3 202/14 203/4 211/14 223/1 224/9 227/11 227/21 233/8 240/23 240/25 244/2 247/19
over 100 [1] 107/8
over 13 [1] 78/25
over 18 [6] 40/23 50/9 161/3 161/5 233/8 240/23
over 18s [1] 240/25
over-18 [1] 158/20
overall [6] 7/23 69/24 99/15 109/7 152/1 209/21
overlap [1] 221/25
overlook [1] 39/20
overlooking [1] 232/7
overnight [2] 245/2 251/4
overseen [1] 55/12
oversight [3] 75/15 186/21 208/7
overt [1] 172/17
overview [3] 41/19 133/1 133/25
overwhelmed [2] 114/11 114/17
overwhelming [1] 107/3
own [20] 18/22 22/24 29/19 30/18 33/18 43/13 70/13 70/24 71/6 71/8 96/7 108/10 110/3 150/16 163/4 208/11 229/1 232/20 247/22 250/10
owners [1] 212/24
owns [1] 75/2

P

page [137] 1/17 2/6 3/7 3/20 9/5 9/15 10/20 10/25 11/11 12/15 16/12 17/20 17/21 18/9 19/24 20/24 22/14 28/7 28/12 31/12 31/13 32/19 35/20 35/21 38/20 38/22 38/23 40/1 41/18 42/12 43/3 43/18 44/18 47/11 48/10 54/24 56/5 58/25 59/1 60/17 63/15 63/17 66/17 70/8 70/23 73/22 74/5 74/17 78/21 82/16 83/7 85/1 85/3 88/5 88/8 88/16 89/6 91/4 91/6 95/3 95/19 101/19 104/22 106/25 107/4 117/20 117/23 125/19 134/1 134/1 134/2 134/17 136/23 136/23 136/24 137/20 139/15 140/7 140/9 142/8 142/17 142/22 149/19 151/16 154/7 154/7 154/8 155/7 158/1 158/3 159/11 166/19 166/20 166/22 170/25 171/17 171/18 172/22 172/23 173/9 173/22 173/23 180/18 180/19 181/9 181/12 182/2 182/14 182/15 184/1 187/14 187/21 189/5 189/10 199/24 200/1 203/4 207/9 207/16 208/16 210/17 211/14 219/10 222/19 223/1 223/8 224/17 226/25 228/16 231/21 236/17 241/16 246/12 247/15 248/25 250/3 252/2
page 1 [3] 3/7 207/16 228/16
page 10 [5] 17/20 22/14 38/20 91/4 189/10
page 107 [1] 142/22
page 11 [1] 38/22
page 12 [4] 35/20 48/10 63/15 182/14
page 13 [2] 2/6 73/22
page 14 [1] 95/3
page 15 [1] 101/19
page 16 [2] 95/19 207/9
page 17 [4] 32/19 104/22 172/22 184/1
page 18 [3] 20/24 173/23 199/24
page 2 [7] 3/20 134/1 134/2 149/19 166/19 208/16 248/25
page 20 [1] 43/18
page 21 [5] 88/5 88/8 117/20 117/23 134/17
page 22 [2] 136/23 158/1
page 25 [1] 82/16
page 26 [1] 125/19
page 28 [1] 137/20
page 29 [2] 1/17 139/15
page 3 [7] 28/7 41/18 58/25 85/1 107/4 210/17 223/8
page 30 [1] 140/9
page 37 [1] 142/8
page 39 [1] 10/20
page 4 [7] 9/5 60/17 151/16 170/25 180/19 226/25 231/21
page 40 [1] 44/18
page 5 [6] 12/15 43/3 154/7 171/17 187/14 236/17
page 6 [6] 31/12 155/7 181/9 187/21 219/10 246/12
page 7 [4] 83/7 182/2 189/5 247/15
page 8 [3] 47/11 66/17 74/5
page 81 [1] 241/16
page 9 [1] 74/17
pagination [1] 241/17
painted [1] 66/22
paints [1] 190/18
paper [3] 145/13 169/24 185/22
papers [2] 156/14 174/22
paragraph [76] 2/8 3/7 3/8 3/21 4/17 9/6 9/15 12/15 16/11 17/21 18/14 19/3 20/24 22/14 25/20 38/24 42/11 43/19 44/19 47/11 48/10 50/10 60/19 60/20 73/22 74/5 74/18

P

paragraph... [49] 82/17 88/5 88/8 89/7 91/4 95/5 95/12 95/20 101/20 102/8 104/23 105/6 117/21 117/23 119/20 123/4 147/14 149/20 150/6 151/14 158/2 159/10 160/4 161/1 171/1 173/23 174/8 199/25 201/21 202/13 203/6 204/10 207/17 208/16 209/15 210/17 219/11 220/6 227/2 231/21 236/18 241/7 246/13 246/15 247/11 247/16 248/25 249/2 250/3
paragraph 1 [2] 3/7 3/8
paragraph 13 [1] 210/17
paragraph 15 [2] 9/6 231/21
paragraph 16 [1] 9/15
paragraph 17 [1] 236/18
paragraph 18 [2] 12/15 241/7
paragraph 19 [1] 16/11
paragraph 2 [2] 149/20 207/17
paragraph 21 [1] 219/11
paragraph 22 [1] 91/4
paragraph 23 [3] 2/8 246/13 246/15
paragraph 24 [1] 220/6
paragraph 26 [1] 247/16
paragraph 27 [1] 47/11
paragraph 28 [1] 74/5
paragraph 29 [1] 247/11
paragraph 3 [1] 248/25
paragraph 3.21 [1] 43/19
paragraph 32 [1] 74/18
paragraph 36 [1] 17/21
paragraph 37 [1] 18/14
paragraph 39 [2] 19/3 22/14
paragraph 40 [1] 38/24
paragraph 42 [1] 48/10
paragraph 43 [2] 50/10 123/4
paragraph 44 [1] 119/20
paragraph 47 [2] 73/22 147/14
paragraph 48 [1] 95/5
paragraph 5 [1] 150/6
Paragraph 5.21 [1] 44/19
paragraph 50 [1] 95/12
paragraph 55 [1] 101/20
paragraph 56 [1] 102/8
paragraph 6 [2] 3/21 4/17
paragraph 60 [1] 95/20
paragraph 64 [1] 104/23
paragraph 65 [1] 105/6
paragraph 67 [1] 20/24
paragraph 7 [1] 151/14
paragraph 72 [1] 199/25
paragraph 77 [2] 117/21 117/23
paragraph 8 [1] 208/16
paragraph 80 [3] 88/5 88/8 89/7
paragraph 89 [1] 159/10
paragraph 9 [1] 209/15
paragraph 92 [1] 158/2
paragraph 99 [1] 82/17
paragraphs [1] 55/7
paragraphs 40 [1] 55/7
parameters [2] 143/8 145/21
paramount [1] 134/4
parent [20] 4/19 29/18 34/21 34/23 47/13 47/18 47/19 67/21 76/16 78/10 90/16 158/4 160/20 167/7 167/17 168/16 169/11 198/9 198/13 234/11
parent's [4] 48/5 236/9 236/14 236/14
Parent/Teen [1] 167/7
parental [12] 36/7 68/1 70/20 76/6 79/1 79/2 157/23 160/2 160/10 160/19 234/7 235/5
parents [16] 25/16 29/8 30/8 34/16 34/18 68/23 74/8 74/16 74/20 74/23 76/11 77/9 167/12 168/20 169/4 170/1
park [1] 138/22
part [22] 5/25 20/17 20/17 29/20 53/15 61/17 64/25 78/21 80/4 82/21 92/24 96/18 124/13 136/24 154/6 164/12 166/17 222/13 222/15 222/22 223/13 237/2
part 3 [2] 222/13 222/15
participant [3] 119/5 211/4 211/20
participants [2] 206/23 210/23
particular [23] 2/19 7/7 39/6 39/11 43/12 76/16 103/17 114/7 131/17 151/8 154/25 155/22 167/24 175/4 198/4 208/9 208/21 218/20 225/13 238/19 243/9 246/23 248/12
particularly [15] 5/13 5/17 6/1 12/3 12/24 19/23 33/8 47/7 76/23 98/6 102/12 178/2 183/16 229/13 238/20
parties [7] 147/13 188/8 190/23 192/3 192/13 200/25 204/3
partly [2] 10/10 217/24
partners [2] 102/22 143/20
parts [2] 137/19 162/6
party [17] 91/15 92/11 119/13 119/17 123/13 123/16 123/18 123/19 143/19 147/20 149/3 175/13 175/15 190/22 198/12 225/24 226/15
pass [4] 3/18 29/2 86/17 200/19
passage [1] 89/1
passing [1] 34/15
passive [3] 29/17 33/17 68/15
passport [3] 51/24 119/14 120/11
passports [4] 50/23 51/10 51/20 52/4
past [16] 4/15 31/19 81/14 91/14 91/21 131/8 131/14 177/21 178/1 178/17 179/11 180/9 202/14 205/6 245/21 247/19
patience [1] 177/14
pattern [7] 33/21 85/5 133/14 159/6 194/18 194/20 245/19
patterns [2] 128/20 143/9
pause [6] 42/19 53/3 60/21 157/13 193/10 244/7
pauses [1] 192/21
pausing [2] 67/16 213/19
payment [2] 48/3 218/16
PDF [1] 241/16
peers [1] 246/18
penetrating [1] 116/22
penetration [1] 29/22
penultimate [3] 42/11 60/19 60/20
people [64] 7/24 8/3 26/19 28/4 28/10 29/16 30/7 31/2 31/7 31/20 45/12 46/12 47/8 50/23 52/11 53/17 53/21 57/6 69/19 71/20 72/23 77/21 79/20 81/23 82/6 82/12 84/2 92/17 93/3 93/11 94/10 94/15 96/21 96/23 106/4 106/7 119/16 121/5 122/19 128/6 137/4 138/18 142/5 158/23 182/18 196/10 197/9 210/2 210/12 213/13 217/16 219/3 219/24 221/18 229/9 229/13 231/15 241/24 242/1 242/3 242/13 242/16 242/17 243/18
people's [2] 34/9 210/9
per [38] 7/25 24/16 28/13 28/14 28/14 28/15 28/16 28/21 28/24 29/1 29/13 30/9 30/22 33/2 50/22 68/19 69/17 83/21 84/11 98/16 100/16 107/6 107/9 107/10 107/10 107/12 107/17 108/3 118/3 118/3 118/4 118/6 172/24 173/5 173/16 174/1 184/6 239/24
percentage [10] 68/10 68/12 99/2 100/5 100/21 100/24 108/15 173/12 189/17 190/2
percentages [1] 32/2
perfect [5] 165/14 165/16 183/22 183/23 186/6
perfectly [3] 56/11 153/1 153/3
perform [3] 32/13 32/17 150/22
performance [3] 34/2 149/16 165/21
performed [1] 171/23
performing [7] 28/23 29/25 32/23 32/24 69/10 150/20 150/25
perhaps [23] 16/10 71/2 91/5 93/8 108/2 115/11 144/10 148/12 148/17 152/8 152/21 153/5 153/22 155/10 164/24 165/5 175/4 190/10 196/9 208/14 226/12 243/22 247/10
period [6] 70/3 105/2 105/16 115/24 129/24 146/17
periods [2] 179/13 198/3
permission [4] 36/7 47/14 47/19 158/22
permit [3] 79/17 81/2 112/12
permitted [3] 9/21 80/2 158/15
perpetrator [3] 201/24 204/12 204/13
perpetrators [3] 91/15 91/22 245/6
perpetuating [2] 210/3 210/12
persecution [1] 134/15
persistence [1] 163/1
person [8] 80/19 127/7 131/5 181/14 193/1 197/20 197/23 212/22
person's [1] 55/4
persona [2] 83/21 84/1
personal [3] 106/7 136/15 196/2
personalised [1] 47/6
persons [1] 131/15
perspective [2] 53/16 122/4
Petrosky [2] 2/18 3/4
phase [3] 2/4 2/5 94/8
Phase 1 [1] 94/8
philosophy [2] 208/15 208/17
phone [6] 232/1 232/3 232/20 235/4 235/7 235/7

P

phones [1] 119/9
photographs [1] 163/14
phrase [5] 26/16 80/6 87/10 221/18 228/20
physical [7] 11/18 31/25 80/12 88/17 102/3 196/25 209/5
physician [1] 182/24
pick [10] 58/25 73/19 88/6 91/6 91/20 137/19 153/23 169/18 224/8 241/18
picked [1] 116/7
picture [3] 66/22 174/6 190/18
piece [3] 85/21 99/18 110/25
pieces [1] 85/25
piggybacking [1] 234/25
pigs' [2] 13/19 14/25
Pll [1] 106/7
pilot [2] 121/12 121/15
pilots [3] 121/6 121/9 122/14
pipes [4] 120/6 122/17 122/18 122/20
Pirkkala [1] 187/18
pixelated [4] 115/17 116/24 117/3 117/9
place [45] 8/19 9/19 19/17 20/9 23/7 23/11 37/14 37/16 41/22 50/20 52/21 61/2 61/5 62/12 64/2 69/11 73/5 74/4 82/3 89/5 93/5 103/10 121/21 122/24 126/9 132/1 154/1 159/19 160/5 166/8 166/17 175/6 179/5 179/6 179/10 185/10 185/13 202/7 204/16 232/10 234/5 243/25 244/19 244/25 245/13
placed [2] 102/13 227/12
places [3] 155/10 193/16 209/11
plain [1] 14/14
Plainly [1] 223/7
plan [1] 166/16
planning [15] 61/23 131/11 131/15 147/17 148/13 171/16 172/21 181/4 181/6 187/14 187/24 188/11 189/7 201/10 202/10
plans [1] 142/13
platform [44] 4/9 5/20 9/20 15/8 17/3 23/18 27/15 33/4 33/12 79/1 84/24 103/19 104/9 104/14 108/8 114/14 114/21 115/5 115/25 121/19 163/10 163/22 192/18 200/22 200/22 210/3 210/13 216/23 221/13 226/2 226/11 231/1 231/23 238/4 238/15 239/22 240/2 240/6 240/7 240/11 240/21 244/4 246/2 249/20
platforms [23] 22/18 32/21 45/9 83/19 85/17 101/16 165/6 165/9 171/10 199/2 210/8 227/3 227/5 227/12 227/22 227/24 233/5 241/20 242/25 243/6 243/8 248/18 250/1
play [5] 5/25 31/6 41/4 179/13 244/22
playing [1] 177/23
please [91] 1/3 1/6 1/10 1/13 1/17 3/21 9/6 10/10 11/1 12/14 17/19 27/24 31/3 31/12 38/19 47/10 48/10 50/5 50/10 54/16 58/5 58/17 59/2 60/18 60/19 61/25 63/17 66/2 66/3 66/6 66/14 66/17 70/8 74/17 82/17 82/25 83/7 85/3 87/24 88/4 95/4 101/20 115/9 117/21 125/7 125/10 130/20 134/17 136/23 136/24 139/15 140/9 143/5 149/19 150/6 154/7 157/19 160/15 170/16 170/17 170/25 171/17 172/22 172/23 174/7 180/17 181/9 182/2 182/15 187/15 192/15 202/17 203/5 206/9 207/8 214/6 219/10 220/7 224/12 225/6 227/1 228/17 231/19 231/20 241/13 241/16 241/19 249/1 249/6 250/3 251/6
plot [4] 133/22 182/19 182/25 183/6
plus [34] 19/16 19/21 20/5 20/21 36/18 37/1 37/8 40/18 40/23 44/7 45/20 45/24 48/25 49/1 49/3 49/5 50/25 52/20 56/12 57/5 57/7 57/9 62/2 67/20 90/8 105/11 185/3 232/23 232/25 233/13 233/20 233/25 239/8 240/15
pm [10] 125/1 125/3 125/5 180/9 180/10 180/12 206/3 206/5 206/7 251/14
point [46] 2/25 7/12 24/19 28/13 40/16 43/8 46/25 50/14 53/8 63/14 63/15 68/15 68/20 69/23 71/19 78/13 82/2 89/9 89/19 96/13 97/25 98/15 105/18 113/19 126/10 131/21 133/15 139/22 141/19 163/4 171/19 172/9 179/2 188/2 189/1 192/25 193/1 195/25 202/7 203/14 220/17 229/20 231/10 231/15 238/13 241/1
point 66 [1] 105/18
pointed [2] 12/11 63/2
pointing [1] 243/17
points [4] 3/4 12/6 22/15 57/4
police [3] 26/11 103/11 112/13
policies [52] 5/21 6/6 9/8 9/24 10/22 12/9 15/5 16/10 16/13 16/22 16/24 17/14 20/5 23/6 23/11 23/12 37/16 59/20 59/23 60/10 70/14 80/23 81/5 90/2 109/7 109/16 118/1 118/12 123/25 130/21 132/2 132/3 132/5 132/12 133/9 134/7 134/25 135/4 141/25 142/1 146/10 146/18 156/23 156/25 157/25 158/5 159/12 159/13 195/3 195/13 202/3 227/13
policing [4] 25/15 26/3 46/12 162/5
policy [38] 3/8 4/11 4/12 4/14 5/9 5/23 6/3 6/11 17/12 20/7 62/8 73/2 73/10 76/15 78/20 105/17 105/19 113/13 113/17 122/4 125/13 126/8 126/12 126/18 126/21 127/2 127/21 127/24 154/2 159/5 168/18 177/25 178/4 179/5 181/18 202/1 204/8 224/19
policymakers [1] 6/5
political [1] 188/8
politicians [1] 188/7
poor [1] 34/2
popular [3] 59/4 187/12 187/23
population [6] 8/1 8/6 30/22 40/20 50/22 69/18
populations [2] 164/19 164/19
pornography [4] 42/7 237/24 238/9 239/24
portrays [2] 88/22 88/24
pose [1] 240/23
posed [1] 16/14
position [7] 53/24 61/24 73/10 116/5 138/21 161/22 251/3
positive [5] 93/8 160/12 191/14 191/18 221/17
positively [1] 221/17
possession [1] 145/9
possibility [2] 196/5 198/9
possible [9] 68/23 120/18 121/15 122/3 124/10 145/4 149/4 153/17 246/2
post [9] 99/23 109/17 111/16 115/21 146/17 146/20 147/6 228/10 238/24
post-training [3] 146/17 146/20 147/6
postcode [2] 104/7 104/19
posted [8] 75/9 84/16 111/15 178/8 214/8 214/22 229/1 248/3
posters [1] 229/14
posting [4] 10/4 217/17 226/1 229/9
postings [1] 109/13
posts [4] 23/1 24/16 163/14 178/10
potential [14] 56/18 113/17 122/10 135/10 137/9 154/3 157/17 159/7 164/23 165/1 172/5 202/13 214/18 226/1
potentially [21] 52/13 52/23 57/6 69/15 69/19 95/22 102/19 105/23 109/25 114/5 131/6 131/16 155/1 155/6 165/19 194/5 214/21 222/1 241/3 246/21 247/9
power [1] 162/5
powered [1] 237/4
practicable [2] 27/19 50/18
practical [3] 112/16 113/11 188/15
practice [3] 67/6 160/17 171/14
practices [1] 9/24
praise [1] 16/19
praises [1] 139/18
pre [6] 74/10 147/6 148/3 149/11 156/21 192/10
pre-deployment [1] 148/3
pre-release [2] 149/11 156/21
pre-released [1] 192/10
pre-teens [1] 74/10
prebunking [1] 93/19
precaution [1] 81/10
precautions [3] 61/5 208/8 233/4
preclude [1] 207/2
predate [1] 245/20
predecessors [1] 149/23
predict [3] 128/25 143/12 161/14
prediction [7] 129/3 159/17 160/8 161/9 161/10 161/24 162/20
premise [1] 234/2
preoccupation [1] 197/18
preparation [2] 183/12 208/12
prepare [1] 152/7
preparing [1] 207/24
prescriptive [1] 42/20
present [1] 206/25
preserving [3] 120/7 120/16 122/7
press [3] 25/13 198/21 243/2
presumably [11] 27/17 53/3 53/13 107/18 139/10 142/4 212/15 224/8 233/18 233/21 238/25
presume [3] 49/2 116/3 246/23
pretty [1] 248/21
prevent [5] 55/18 81/13 81/15 128/2 177/23
preventing [2] 55/25 112/2
prevention [3] 192/24 196/14 203/22
prevents [1] 65/23
previous [10] 56/5 89/6 91/6 118/2 140/21 150/10 150/16 152/17 190/1 195/10
previously [12] 10/4 17/9 45/2 89/2 93/16 160/1 225/24 226/16 227/20 233/22 247/22 250/8
primarily [4] 34/8 42/2 191/20 227/8
primary [8] 76/24 114/21 237/21 237/23 238/8 238/25 239/11 239/25

P

principal [3] 106/21 207/18 210/19
principally [1] 59/21
principle [3] 133/16 156/10 221/22
principles [7] 62/6 97/25 134/2 134/6 135/22 142/25 208/18
prior [7] 4/15 13/2 101/14 126/7 174/21 189/21 235/25
priority [13] 102/8 102/10 102/22 103/6 103/12 104/11 226/22 237/21 237/23 238/8 238/25 239/12 239/25
privacy [22] 27/22 43/5 52/14 52/21 78/16 111/24 112/3 120/7 120/16 122/7 124/11 125/20 195/24 199/15 207/12 208/18 209/16 210/10 217/22 221/15 224/18 230/25
privacy-intrusive [1] 52/21
private [23] 75/5 208/20 209/18 211/15 211/25 212/5 212/19 213/15 214/10 214/11 214/22 214/25 215/16 215/17 215/20 217/24 217/25 219/17 230/5 230/13 230/20 231/2 231/3
privileged [2] 201/6 203/12
proactive [1] 63/24
probably [3] 109/22 146/2 164/12
problem [5] 51/18 54/2 77/24 231/4 238/7
problematic [6] 34/15 76/10 79/6 88/13 95/9 151/11
problems [2] 122/13 194/13
process [39] 13/4 14/20 19/8 39/4 39/18 43/7 45/17 51/1 61/17 61/20 63/3 63/10 65/9 89/24 96/18 99/25 105/22 106/18 113/9 122/21 145/1 146/8 147/2 147/3 147/7 147/11 147/12 148/23 151/8 152/13 155/3 156/20 168/3 168/12 169/1 185/14 190/4 195/15 203/11
processes [7] 6/10 22/6 53/8 64/24 65/9 147/19 226/24
processing [1] 36/9
procurement [1] 157/7
produce [4] 129/21 164/11 174/2 176/1
produced [4] 130/10 174/5 178/20 179/6
producing [1] 138/13
product [8] 5/9 6/9 34/18 59/18 68/4 75/21 127/2 210/15
Production [1] 178/17
products [3] 7/1 92/4 128/15
professional [1] 4/5
profile [2] 44/22 237/8
profiles [3] 85/20 85/24 86/10
profiling [2] 92/19 196/19
profits [1] 53/4
profound [2] 30/2 30/4
programme [2] 102/9 131/21
programmed [1] 80/3
programming [1] 19/22
progress [1] 190/9
prohibit [1] 138/9
prohibited [12] 17/6 21/11 36/22 105/7 136/8 136/12 140/4 142/15 157/20 179/19 180/1 247/1
prohibiting [1] 157/5
prohibition [1] 230/3
prohibits [1] 177/25
prominence [1] 35/9
prominent [3] 101/25 172/24 173/1
promised [1] 232/19
promote [7] 16/19 139/16 139/19 172/17 224/22 228/20 231/5
promoted [1] 97/11
promoting [11] 39/5 110/23 142/14 143/2 228/24 229/2 229/15 229/21 229/22 230/10 230/17
promotion [4] 38/6 115/1 158/9 230/3
prompt [12] 39/10 129/1 133/6 146/13 151/17 151/18 153/23 154/21 155/1 167/11 181/19 201/11
prompting [1] 91/14
prompts [12] 132/7 143/12 147/5 150/4 154/13 154/20 161/17 173/3 173/19 181/1 192/22 195/23
prone [1] 229/14
properly [2] 99/6 225/25
property [1] 137/4
proportion [12] 7/23 8/12 32/20 43/22 67/17 98/8 100/1 100/5 100/8 100/25 101/6 101/7
proportionate [7] 27/20 51/1 53/2 78/19 80/23 112/19 226/24
proportions [1] 8/7
proposal [5] 94/8 101/4 101/15 228/3 249/18
proprietary [5] 42/15 42/24 43/13 65/16 66/10
prospective [1] 173/12
protect [10] 5/11 38/25 55/16 58/21 64/13 66/13 66/24 85/11 209/18 226/24
protected [2] 22/21 210/22
protecting [3] 51/3 59/13 208/19
protection [12] 27/18 35/14 42/3 45/25 46/7 61/2 67/5 77/23 90/6 91/1 92/21 239/9
protections [16] 39/10 39/24 40/8 56/4 59/17 60/6 62/11 64/2 74/4 90/13 91/25 100/13 166/23 213/19 235/1 239/7
protective [3] 50/18 185/10 185/12
protocol [2] 202/21 202/25
protocols [1] 195/3
prove [2] 54/1 236/8
proven [1] 47/20
provenance [1] 178/20
provide [54] 25/4 29/7 39/5 40/4 40/5 49/4 49/21 49/22 50/1 57/11 65/11 66/7 66/14 73/20 78/3 87/11 101/9 102/18 103/8 103/12 104/12 128/12 129/4 130/25 133/7 136/4 136/10 136/25 137/2 138/19 139/20 151/24 152/3 152/10 152/11 161/4 163/20 163/23 164/15 164/24 181/3 184/24 185/15 185/18 193/3 194/21 195/21 198/14 199/14 208/5 210/5 217/2 217/3 246/18
provided [24] 54/19 63/17 63/19 63/20 64/1 64/11 66/6 66/14 74/11 93/10 139/6 140/6 142/13 143/20 159/4 160/5 160/24 184/10 186/2 189/16 199/13 201/3 203/25 208/11
provider [4] 7/19 120/4 222/7 236/3
providers [8] 44/16 120/17 122/10 123/14 199/1 225/12 226/23 227/16
provides [9] 4/23 128/11 136/18 163/22 181/24 193/11 195/22 223/4 223/19
providing [10] 122/17 123/14 123/20 140/5 151/19 152/1 165/5 185/24 191/12 199/22
provision [2] 9/9 161/6
provisional [1] 42/10
provisions [2] 17/9 141/2
provocative [1] 84/20
proxies [1] 9/4
psychological [1] 196/19
psychologists [2] 168/3 195/10
psychology [1] 168/2
public [33] 3/8 4/12 5/9 5/23 6/3 6/11 11/7 15/7 36/13 64/24 73/2 73/10 75/5 103/14 117/16 130/18 141/19 142/3 172/7 178/24 179/3 182/10 206/21 207/1 208/2 213/4 213/16 215/1 217/25 218/5 218/13 230/12 247/17
public-facing [2] 141/19 142/3
publication [6] 66/9 108/9 108/9 207/2 207/3 228/5
publicised [2] 244/3 244/10
publicly [10] 65/17 65/24 128/9 204/12 224/22 228/21 230/4 230/18 231/5 237/4
publish [1] 212/24
published [10] 8/20 41/14 60/8 63/8 66/23 77/20 108/18 174/22 201/15 222/17
publishing [1] 65/23
pull [2] 89/18 201/14
pulled [3] 156/16 156/20 176/17
purchase [1] 232/12
purchasing [1] 233/25
purely [1] 160/15
purport [1] 236/15
purpose [3] 37/20 37/23 208/22
purposes [6] 21/3 138/12 144/7 168/16 195/25 196/9
pursuant [1] 206/16
pursue [1] 170/11
push [6] 80/17 81/2 81/17 89/10 97/5 100/9
pushed [3] 81/20 96/15 144/6
pushes [2] 89/14 97/20
pushing [1] 80/14
put [26] 2/20 22/8 34/19 40/24 49/11 52/21 54/5 70/21 82/3 93/5 112/9 122/18 132/1 166/9 169/3 176/22 178/23 193/10 225/6 227/18 228/2 235/19 243/2 243/10 244/19 249/17
puts [2] 161/15 175/6
putting [8] 29/25 46/12 51/4 97/16 143/1 165/24 176/25 245/7

Q

Q2 [1] 118/2
Q3 [1] 118/3
Q42 [1] 118/4
Qaeda [3] 145/8 145/25 182/19
qualifications [1] 73/15
qualitatively [1] 171/8
quality [6] 6/25 33/10 62/6 97/11 97/23 100/22
quarrel [1] 86/20
quarter [3] 98/14 118/8 198/22
quarters [1] 118/2
queries [4] 132/11 133/18 139/4 161/11
query [3] 101/14 152/2 155/4
question [43] 5/6 8/14 28/18 28/21 46/7 51/18 54/24 56/6 56/7 56/9 56/23 56/25 57/16 65/5 65/19 65/25 72/10 80/9 81/10 81/18 94/18

Q

question... [22] 99/1 101/5 116/9 121/20 124/8 129/4 136/6 151/23 169/2 170/11 181/13 212/2 228/22 234/2 234/7 234/17 241/9 241/19 242/23 243/13 245/11 251/2
question 11 [1] 54/24
questioning [1] 118/22
questions [28] 1/8 3/3 8/23 28/10 50/15 54/21 56/11 56/24 105/14 117/11 118/21 118/23 119/2 119/3 124/21 125/9 126/6 142/19 147/21 156/8 156/18 191/1 205/18 206/13 252/5 252/7 252/11 252/15
quickly [8] 26/9 83/16 84/14 101/19 129/15 129/20 179/16 242/11
quite [25] 12/3 19/17 23/12 41/14 62/25 89/16 94/3 122/20 122/22 152/22 153/8 156/6 166/3 174/10 195/8 199/13 215/22 216/13 225/12 231/11 235/6 235/17 235/17 235/18 242/10
quote [1] 30/11

R

racial [1] 111/11
racism [1] 176/20
racy [1] 37/5
radical [1] 133/19
radicalisation [14] 94/3 140/13 140/21 170/22 171/9 171/15 172/6 172/20 173/3 173/19 176/3 176/7 177/18 177/19
radicalisation-type [1] 173/3
radicalise [2] 131/5 133/22
radicalised [1] 27/11
raft [1] 73/6
raise [8] 15/24 73/19 169/25 171/4 173/8 180/24 194/23 248/22
raised [12] 22/15 54/18 54/22 60/1 60/4 60/10 60/15 61/6 69/1 69/7 101/14 228/9
raises [1] 174/10
raising [1] 73/6
ramping [1] 93/6
Rance [3] 241/14 243/16 245/5
Randomised [1] 84/13
range [9] 4/12 24/22 24/23 41/23 188/3 192/14 196/7 204/2 204/3
rapid [1] 41/23
rate [15] 57/12 89/11 98/13 99/9 99/15 99/19 100/4 100/11 100/15 117/22 117/24 118/15 184/9 220/13 234/23
rated [1] 233/13
rates [1] 184/5
rather [22] 31/16 42/8 42/25 50/14 68/4 84/24 85/10 96/20 116/8 117/5 118/8 139/1 152/8 153/15 172/2 172/17 172/20 181/21 213/12 230/6 231/16 243/14
rating [2] 232/21 233/2
rationale [1] 57/14
raw [2] 116/1 116/2
RAWLE [23] 1/5 1/11 1/12 2/20 22/10 27/24 30/17 33/19 38/20 51/17 54/17 55/7 58/16 58/18 61/24 69/13 70/17 73/19 98/18 104/23 112/3 119/3 252/3
re [4] 10/4 165/2 204/18 248/3
re-open [1] 204/18
re-posted [1] 248/3
re-posting [1] 10/4
re-state [1] 165/2
reach [1] 123/17
reached [4] 50/8 86/6 87/9 87/12
reaching [1] 67/13
reaction [1] 29/23
read [7] 16/12 25/20 26/2 108/24 160/17 225/9 231/15
readily [5] 8/20 52/1 208/10 242/24 251/1
reading [5] 32/2 59/16 134/3 149/2 242/23
reaffirm [1] 249/19
real [27] 31/15 31/18 52/5 54/14 62/18 91/10 93/16 131/19 135/10 141/4 143/2 144/14 151/9 159/8 164/18 179/9 187/20 196/5 197/5 201/11 205/13 217/2 217/10 217/18 231/4 235/20 238/6
real-life [1] 31/15
real-world [8] 31/18 91/10 131/19 143/2 196/5 197/5 201/11 205/13
realistic [3] 34/1 72/8 104/9
reality [3] 70/16 73/11 221/3
really [18] 34/1 40/16 54/14 61/13 65/5 86/3 114/25 117/18 122/14 146/22 175/16 176/16 185/20 190/24 210/16 224/7 226/6 243/12
realm [1] 199/6
reason [13] 33/22 52/5 52/7 89/23 127/13 129/20 133/18 146/12 148/12 185/1 186/17 228/19 242/3
reasonable [4] 80/19 81/22 82/15 104/13
reasonably [1] 220/18
reasoning [3] 129/23 130/3 130/5
reasons [13] 54/14 86/14 92/14 108/1 117/1 125/20 145/12 153/15 204/17 204/23 217/9 241/23 248/12
recall [3] 24/4 35/12 35/18
recalled [2] 67/7 69/2
receive [6] 32/16 106/4 114/3 122/19 195/6 195/17
received [4] 101/10 223/24 224/2 248/13
receives [2] 21/6 105/5
receiving [1] 114/10
recent [2] 190/16 198/21
recently [4] 7/20 41/15 106/3 129/11
recidivist [1] 204/19
recipient [1] 211/10
recognise [4] 26/16 125/16 144/13 164/9
recognised [3] 224/25 230/9 238/13
recognises [1] 209/16
recognition [2] 51/11 244/21
recommend [2] 80/10 220/8
recommendation [16] 20/18 61/16 61/21 62/5 62/23 63/4 63/5 63/11 64/7 90/13 90/19 91/1 219/13 219/19 220/9 220/20
recommendations [29] 47/9 61/18 62/7 62/24 64/3 72/21 79/5 79/14 80/7 82/11 82/24 84/24 88/7 88/11 88/12 88/15 89/5 89/8 89/12 93/3 97/10 97/22 97/24 98/9 99/7 99/11 100/13 100/13 100/17
recommended [14] 79/15 79/17 80/8 84/12 90/3 90/4 90/12 99/4 99/8 99/10 99/18 99/18 100/2 219/22
recommender [3] 222/9 222/24 223/3
recommending [5] 64/2 81/13 98/3 98/23 99/22
record [4] 71/1 151/4 151/4 201/6
recorded [2] 84/13 189/6
red [9] 134/2 135/22 147/3 147/4 147/7 147/15 147/19 148/14 182/18
Red-line [2] 134/2 135/22
redacted [2] 125/20 207/11
redaction [2] 130/13 241/8
Reddit [1] 32/25
redirect [2] 91/17 173/3
redirected [1] 172/1
reduce [7] 39/7 41/11 64/3 72/4 88/15 99/11 159/3
reducing [1] 53/9
reduction [1] 43/24
refer [10] 2/23 49/5 102/8 112/7 112/12 114/1 138/17 150/19 202/10 205/5
reference [13] 16/16 23/9 82/19 115/12 120/10 123/21 162/11 187/17 195/10 201/9 203/5 227/8 238/8
referenced [3] 6/23 15/4 87/2
references [3] 140/20 196/13 198/4
referencing [1] 23/8
referral [12] 168/25 196/23 198/7 198/8 198/9 198/12 199/21 202/4 202/16 202/21 202/25 203/6
referrals [6] 169/16 198/16 198/17 198/22 200/7 200/11
referred [11] 21/1 167/24 167/24 174/8 180/16 182/6 194/17 197/20 205/14 205/17 206/20
referring [13] 19/14 32/12 49/5 77/1 106/20 113/8 158/21 162/20 171/20 197/10 214/18 228/7 249/25
refers [2] 161/1 181/17
refinement [2] 95/25 96/8
reflect [9] 8/6 80/14 111/22 112/11 134/25 143/9 153/19 184/15 188/3
reflected [2] 47/15 175/20
reflects [3] 81/24 82/7 135/4
refrain [1] 135/13
refusal [2] 184/5 184/9
refusals [1] 185/3
refuse [3] 133/6 151/23 188/14
refused [2] 184/3 189/14
refusing [1] 181/21
regarding [1] 227/7
regardless [3] 40/21 56/13 226/10
regards [4] 243/25 244/4 244/15 250/24
regime [1] 162/7
regimes [1] 209/13
registered [5] 83/15 114/12 216/22 219/5 231/24
registration [2] 217/6 232/15
regressed [1] 156/3
regular [2] 72/25 73/16
regularly [8] 71/5 71/25 72/12 72/17 72/18 73/12 149/3 243/20
regulated [8] 7/16 10/1 22/3 162/14 166/14 222/21 223/5 223/12
regulation [3] 4/8 175/25 176/22
regulations [1] 162/6
regulator [4] 65/21 66/6 66/15 243/14
regulator's [1] 71/15
regulators [12] 22/5 64/23 65/10 65/13 81/11 176/9 176/12 177/2 177/7 199/7 208/1 225/23
regulatory [3] 82/4 122/23 166/4
reinforce [2] 146/18 172/11

R

reinforcement [1] 146/24
rejected [1] 181/1
relate [2] 92/6 247/21
related [20] 4/14 16/14 23/13 31/25 32/4 45/7 63/23 64/1 86/10 90/23 104/10 112/25 131/22 134/7 167/9 167/14 167/16 167/19 214/14 216/4
relates [2] 132/19 237/21
relating [5] 36/1 93/11 113/2 120/1 137/6
relation [47] 1/19 2/7 3/25 5/12 5/16 5/25 6/1 7/5 16/22 19/23 23/3 23/25 24/13 25/2 27/2 37/3 53/5 59/24 65/16 68/6 70/16 71/6 73/20 76/23 78/4 78/5 80/3 88/7 93/10 95/18 104/6 108/25 112/24 115/10 162/2 208/9 208/23 220/25 222/4 223/8 225/14 230/5 231/3 233/4 238/2 243/16 247/20
relations [2] 207/18 207/24
relationship [3] 63/1 202/23 227/25
relationships [6] 61/12 128/23 200/9 200/14 200/19 243/1
relative [2] 32/13 150/8
relatively [5] 73/21 161/16 215/19 215/21 240/12
release [10] 25/13 129/18 149/11 149/15 151/12 155/23 155/24 156/21 186/8 198/21
released [13] 24/3 120/21 129/12 149/12 156/11 156/16 156/19 186/11 190/3 190/17 191/8 192/10 204/12
releases [2] 155/21 243/3
relevant [5] 16/15 18/13 60/7 130/23 140/14
Relevantly [1] 18/10
reliable [2] 164/1 164/18
reliably [1] 188/24
relies [2] 46/12 47/24
religious [1] 111/6
rely [8] 19/1 42/15 42/24 46/22 103/19 147/20 234/14 247/23
relying [5] 46/1 46/8 234/5 235/13 239/5
remain [1] 1/3
remainder [1] 189/15
remaining [1] 155/14
remains [4] 43/23 152/23 153/1 165/13
remember [4] 60/14 105/25 145/16 245/1
remembering [1] 145/18
remind [1] 54/17
remit [4] 127/7 234/10 235/5 245/24
removal [8] 13/3 53/11 82/10 108/1 109/17 178/5 198/1 221/5
removals [4] 14/20 57/19 111/2 113/20
remove [11] 14/21 82/9 110/16 114/14 144/8 144/9 144/20 185/19 186/9 209/17 210/11
removed [26] 2/9 10/5 12/17 12/18 23/20 24/1 57/17 77/2 106/1 106/24 107/1 108/6 108/13 109/23 110/7 111/7 115/25 116/3 123/24 168/15 185/17 204/21 209/25 221/14 238/14 250/8
removes [2] 44/7 51/1
removing [12] 13/4 40/17 46/15 46/21 50/24 52/10 52/18 52/19 52/25 55/17 56/22 185/9
repeat [3] 65/18 88/6 204/8
repeated [9] 22/18 64/3 80/20 91/14 150/3 159/1 159/6 189/6 220/10
repeatedly [4] 88/14 91/21 92/9 92/18
repetition [1] 82/1
repetitive [3] 47/4 47/7 79/20
repetitively [1] 20/9
report [83] 6/13 15/8 15/14 24/5 24/20 24/22 24/25 25/1 25/3 28/1 28/2 29/11 31/4 31/8 32/8 32/12 33/6 35/8 35/12 35/16 41/13 41/14 41/16 42/6 42/12 59/6 66/20 66/23 68/7 71/6 71/19 71/23 81/6 82/25 83/1 96/4 103/2 109/2 109/4 109/5 109/20 110/21 111/14 111/20 112/15 114/11 114/16 154/3 159/16 170/18 174/10 174/12 175/2 176/2 176/18 177/17 180/20 181/6 181/13 181/16 184/19 184/23 185/6 186/24 187/8 187/9 187/15 190/6 199/2 201/11 211/4 211/21 214/11 214/25 215/2 215/5 220/15 226/19 227/19 246/20 247/11 248/23 250/5
report's [1] 86/6
reported [18] 14/19 23/2 24/1 24/18 32/7 44/1 44/24 44/25 45/4 45/6 69/9 107/20 109/1 110/15 183/3 211/10 215/6 215/14
reporting [17] 26/21 30/6 31/21 33/3 68/9 71/10 71/19 96/6 96/7 111/25 113/4 113/16 113/18 139/23 192/15 199/1 238/23
reports [24] 22/19 23/8 23/24 24/3 24/15 35/6 73/6 87/15 102/2 103/3 114/3 116/23 131/24 149/2 165/19 165/23 170/16 180/15 191/23 214/18 214/18 215/11 215/23 222/3
representations [1] 248/2
representative [1] 86/13
representatives [2] 127/6 206/23
repressive [2] 208/21 209/13
reputation [1] 230/24
request [10] 54/22 61/15 130/11 130/13 135/14 138/25 139/11 181/18 215/4 224/1
requested [2] 87/21 124/18
Requesting [1] 55/20
requests [7] 13/3 113/21 132/18 135/16 154/10 184/4 208/1
require [9] 48/15 48/21 48/24 50/19 156/24 157/23 160/2 160/5 160/23
required [6] 59/12 160/25 177/3 215/1 217/2 217/10
requirement [1] 67/15
requirements [5] 162/24 166/6 166/9 166/14 222/15
requires [5] 159/15 160/7 231/23 231/24 236/20
requiring [1] 166/1
research [23] 35/9 43/21 67/9 70/9 70/24 86/5 86/8 86/22 86/23 87/5 87/9 87/13 87/21 126/8 126/9 129/7 169/22 169/23 171/3 171/12 182/21 183/4 235/21
researched [1] 171/25
researcher [1] 153/16
researchers [10] 84/10 84/25 87/10 88/1 101/15 143/21 143/22 151/7 187/25 189/6
reset [1] 220/10
resource [1] 103/23
resourced [1] 164/19
resources [5] 137/16 173/2 193/11 198/14 205/2
respect [4] 54/25 200/15 222/21 223/12
respecting [1] 210/9
respective [2] 212/5 234/8
respond [14] 35/23 59/15 60/15 132/11 132/14 137/10 138/2 154/24 171/3 180/23 186/5 187/23 194/15 235/17
responded [3] 61/14 62/21 173/15
respondents [2] 31/17 31/21
responding [1] 152/2
responds [3] 103/2 153/19 155/4
response [30] 55/6 60/7 60/18 60/23 61/8 62/14 62/19 62/22 63/21 65/2 86/2 117/5 129/1 129/20 142/18 142/19 151/17 152/3 152/8 154/13 154/20 172/24 173/1 173/14 173/19 179/22 181/20 193/24 201/19 243/16
responses [25] 58/20 64/19 127/16 130/1 132/19 133/10 133/11 143/12 151/11 159/3 171/5 171/25 172/4 173/12 174/1 174/3 174/5 174/11 176/19 184/11 189/12 189/14 189/16 194/22 207/25
responsibilities [6] 35/3 35/4 126/20 127/9 135/8 207/22
responsibility [6] 6/13 6/20 34/16 177/1 187/6 190/7
responsible [5] 6/18 6/22 7/3 29/24 110/22
rest [3] 153/3 211/17 230/2
restrict [4] 18/21 18/24 20/21 124/7
restricted [7] 18/15 48/17 63/23 136/14 155/11 217/17 222/1
restriction [7] 18/1 21/9 112/3 186/13 206/17 206/19 207/6
restrictions [7] 19/6 56/4 77/17 105/9 112/15 112/16 218/9
restrictive [3] 14/11 14/16 186/4
result [12] 35/11 38/15 84/24 91/9 92/12 104/25 105/2 105/3 129/22 173/5 178/4 207/4
results [8] 87/5 87/8 87/20 92/1 124/17 174/12 184/2 184/20
resume [1] 251/6
retain [1] 186/10
retained [1] 199/17
retention [1] 199/18
return [3] 39/6 129/20 132/8
returning [1] 55/25
reveal [1] 31/17
revealed [1] 65/17
revenue [5] 53/14 100/25 101/6 101/7 103/24
review [15] 15/19 24/5 91/11 95/8 95/21 102/3 107/23 118/13 144/23 157/17 194/24 196/6 196/10 202/2 214/13
reviewed [4] 14/2 14/5 95/8 167/10
reviewer [1] 196/3
reviewers [9] 23/16 23/21 117/25 167/3 195/2 195/4 195/14 195/17 196/7
revolves [1] 208/17
RFI [3] 62/22 63/7 64/19
ricin [2] 182/24 183/2
Ridge [7] 187/17 201/2 201/8 201/15 201/25 204/12 205/16
ridicule [1] 88/25
right [187] 1/15 2/11 4/1 7/17 8/18 9/13 10/23 13/8 14/22

R

right... [178] 16/24 17/17 17/20 19/18 34/13 34/19 36/13 36/23 42/12 45/25 46/6 47/10 51/4 58/3 62/14 66/2 70/8 72/9 75/23 78/16 79/13 85/12 89/19 95/10 98/22 102/5 102/15 107/16 108/16 115/9 115/19 120/2 120/9 121/4 121/21 125/13 126/8 126/9 127/20 128/21 128/22 129/1 129/9 129/13 129/17 130/3 130/17 131/18 132/3 132/5 132/13 132/16 132/21 132/24 132/25 133/8 134/21 134/24 135/3 135/8 135/25 136/3 136/8 136/9 137/17 140/2 140/25 141/25 142/18 142/20 142/21 143/3 143/4 143/6 143/10 143/13 143/14 143/16 143/18 143/22 144/5 144/19 144/22 145/6 145/21 145/22 146/17 146/20 147/6 147/7 147/18 147/19 147/21 148/4 149/13 149/14 151/22 152/10 152/16 152/17 152/24 154/5 154/11 154/14 154/23 155/15 155/16 156/12 156/13 157/1 157/4 157/9 157/10 157/12 157/16 157/21 157/22 157/24 160/3 160/6 160/22 160/24 161/18 161/23 162/1 162/16 166/15 167/13 167/18 168/5 168/6 168/10 168/21 168/23 170/20 172/9 173/9 174/16 181/8 183/9 184/13 185/11 185/12 185/16 192/18 193/7 193/25 194/4 194/7 194/8 194/17 194/25 196/25 197/1 197/6 198/19 198/20 198/23 200/19 202/24 203/2 203/10 208/20 210/25 212/10 213/16 214/15 214/24 214/24 215/1 217/4 217/12 217/21 222/10 225/6 227/18 228/2 236/24

right-hand [7] 85/12 107/16 108/16 154/11 154/14 172/9 183/9

rights [4] 76/6 76/6 78/15 134/4

rigorously [1] 227/13

rise [1] 245/12

risk [48] 1/21 19/9 19/10 26/22 27/3 27/7 27/12 34/10 39/8 69/19 82/21 97/21 115/5 131/18 137/13 140/22 151/10 151/13 151/15 152/23 153/1 154/4 155/14 155/16 165/9 165/12 165/12 165/14 167/9 167/14 167/16 170/3 171/9 171/15 171/24 172/5 172/11 174/15 183/22 190/9 191/25 194/20 196/24 200/12 205/13 221/19 229/19 236/7

risk-free [1] 171/24

risks [18] 5/21 16/14 26/25 38/11 103/10 125/12 126/18 130/22 131/4 164/22 164/22 165/4 167/19 170/22 171/13 174/17 174/22 220/4

risky [1] 27/18

road [1] 11/16

robberies [1] 11/19

Roblox [5] 28/22 28/22 59/4 241/25 242/1

robust [3] 55/1 149/22 149/25

robustness [1] 149/23

role [10] 3/23 31/6 93/17 126/17 126/17 126/25 165/15 177/23 207/17 207/19

role-playing [1] 177/23

roleplay [6] 158/11 158/14 158/17 158/19 158/20 177/22

roll [1] 156/15

romantic [1] 158/10

room [3] 29/17 30/25 34/9

rotections [1] 158/9

route [1] 120/16

routes [1] 198/10

routinely [1] 26/4

Rowland [1] 162/8

rudimentary [1] 181/2

Rule [1] 54/22

Rule 9 [1] 54/22

ruled [1] 206/19

rules [5] 22/25 37/14 127/19 132/6 178/18

Rumble [1] 227/6

run [13] 18/23 19/15 19/22 20/4 27/20 28/8 40/13 40/20 44/9 48/3 57/14 70/18 186/19

running [4] 56/13 56/20 56/20 75/25

runs [1] 52/9

S

sabotage [1] 150/22

sadness [1] 3/15

safe [19] 20/18 28/11 28/25 52/11 52/25 60/24 65/12 70/10 71/22 128/6 151/17 152/1 154/13 154/20 156/11 184/14 185/2 215/25 246/2

safeguard [1] 93/5

safeguards [11] 64/3 88/10 88/11 89/8 132/1 154/1 158/8 159/24 178/15 183/23 202/15

safely [1] 154/10

safer [14] 25/17 59/9 59/17 59/22 60/9 71/7 151/15 161/20 161/22 161/23 187/1 189/20 190/14 194/22

safety [98] 4/9 4/10 4/13 5/8 5/12 5/13 5/16 5/18 5/25 6/6 6/6 6/8 6/12 6/14 6/15 7/2 7/7 9/19 9/25 12/9 13/2 15/19 23/23 25/11 27/22 28/3 35/4 38/24 44/1 55/12 61/6 62/6 65/16 66/25 67/4 78/17 86/18 87/15 91/25 93/20 101/7 104/2 105/22 108/2 109/12 112/4 127/7 127/10 127/13 133/8 134/4 142/23 143/1 143/1 144/16 148/2 149/23 150/5 152/20 153/21 153/25 155/3 156/2 156/4 159/3 159/23 162/1 162/6 162/7 162/16 165/24 166/18 166/21 166/23 166/25 167/4 168/11 172/3 172/7 175/7 177/1 180/25 181/18 186/1 187/3 187/7 189/22 190/11 191/9 194/17 208/7 209/5 222/6 233/4 242/7 242/12 243/7 243/23

said [38] 5/8 6/16 28/13 28/14 28/14 28/22 29/1 50/9 55/23 56/14 62/10 62/21 67/12 69/4 82/5 90/16 94/23 99/21 101/15 110/23 119/20 136/9 149/7 154/3 158/13 163/12 176/5 177/5 177/5 179/4 188/2 198/21 199/10 245/4 245/5 248/18 250/4 250/6

sake [1] 229/1

sale [2] 13/14 115/1

Sam [1] 177/5

same [26] 3/2 17/15 17/17 29/17 34/7 89/3 89/4 89/9 89/20 89/24 96/16 103/22 111/3 117/10 117/11 121/18 131/9 131/10 148/12 168/11 169/9 194/11 204/24 209/16 218/12 223/20

sample [2] 35/22 117/24

samples [2] 20/4 144/25

Samurai [1] 38/3

sanctions [1] 157/18

sandbagging [2] 150/21 151/10

satisfied [2] 54/21 165/15

satisfy [1] 81/11

Saturday [1] 101/10

saw [10] 19/24 45/2 158/13 174/14 174/25 179/18 190/19 205/15 232/17 243/3

say [110] 3/13 4/4 9/8 9/17 14/13 17/23 18/14 18/20 19/4 21/5 22/1 23/3 23/6 23/19 27/13 29/10 32/3 33/7 38/25 40/10 42/19 47/3 47/11 48/11 49/3 49/25 51/18 57/7 59/10 60/3 61/9 64/24 65/21 66/12 69/15 70/1 72/8 72/23 73/4 74/12 74/25 75/17 78/23 79/3 79/13 80/15 86/24 87/7 87/14 88/9 89/18 90/22 94/4 95/5 95/20 96/4 97/13 98/9 98/19 102/21 104/18 105/4 111/1 111/12 120/24 121/9 122/21 125/25 130/15 131/4 139/8 153/25 155/12 159/11 166/22 173/15 183/22 188/23 190/6 192/25 197/22 200/14 202/25 208/16 209/1 209/15 211/2 214/1 214/15 214/17 215/17 217/13 220/7 226/15 229/15 233/6 233/19 235/24 236/18 237/1 237/6 237/18 238/20 239/11 240/16 242/20 243/5 245/25 246/17 247/16

saying [13] 48/19 61/19 62/14 65/20 68/12 80/7 169/23 189/25 226/3 230/18 231/4 240/19 243/21

says [30] 11/1 26/2 42/13 42/21 43/19 89/14 97/15 135/6 135/17 137/8 142/11 150/7 151/14 161/2 162/8 168/19 171/11 171/22 173/12 182/6 184/2 184/8 188/10 189/1 200/8 201/3 201/21 204/10 215/3 250/15

scale [13] 24/11 35/9 95/8 95/22 103/24 109/6 109/8 112/5 113/19 126/15 137/5 157/14 194/6

scaled [1] 195/15

scam [1] 93/21

scams [2] 126/24 128/7

scan [1] 213/4

scans [1] 166/12

scant [1] 161/16

scenario [11] 14/9 14/17 32/18 138/16 179/12 197/22 239/2 239/18 239/18 240/7 249/16

scenarios [13] 11/19 14/16 52/21 54/4 68/1 79/19 106/17 135/12 144/16 151/15 188/4 198/24 239/15

school [8] 16/25 17/5 94/25 141/24 187/19 188/6 188/17 188/18

scientific [5] 10/2 11/6 21/2 138/5 139/1

scope [2] 186/4 240/10

score [5] 153/1 153/3 153/5 165/16 191/4

scores [11] 152/21 154/5 155/9 155/10 155/12 165/14 165/18 173/6 175/23 184/24 190/19

scoring [3] 152/16 185/7 194/9

screen [22] 1/12 10/9 10/14 22/10 36/4 39/7 53/25 54/16 71/3 82/19 82/22 82/24 91/2 125/15 174/7 180/17 207/7 217/3 224/13 227/1 241/7 241/13

screened [1] 206/21

screens [1] 69/5

screenshots [1] 176/17

S

scrolling [2] 84/11 85/20
scrutiny [4] 227/11 227/21 227/23 228/2
se [1] 239/25
search [25] 4/1 5/1 41/4 84/18 84/21 92/1 92/8 92/22 92/23 93/2 93/7 93/11 162/2 182/1 218/5 218/7 218/12 218/13 218/13 218/18 221/24 222/2 246/15 246/20 247/1
searches [7] 81/16 91/5 92/13 92/15 97/18 246/16 246/23
searching [3] 84/25 91/21 219/21
SearchReport [1] 247/7
seat [3] 1/7 125/8 206/10
second [20] 1/14 3/6 28/23 29/25 32/23 69/10 69/10 85/2 105/1 142/10 146/24 171/19 173/23 196/6 196/10 200/20 203/6 204/13 204/14 224/21
second-level [1] 196/10
secondly [3] 20/1 25/6 245/14
secrecy [1] 230/25
secret [8] 210/21 211/19 211/25 212/2 212/19 212/20 219/17 231/1
section [8] 1/19 26/1 41/19 135/10 142/9 142/23 145/10 186/25
section 58 [1] 145/10
section K [1] 1/19
sections [2] 140/19 174/14
sectors [1] 42/7
secure [1] 209/4
security [6] 4/11 93/20 156/7 170/20 191/20 209/11
see [107] 1/17 2/4 2/6 3/7 4/17 11/1 22/11 24/25 25/18 27/5 31/13 32/22 33/10 33/24 34/19 34/24 35/20 35/23 36/22 37/1 39/12 40/2 42/10 45/11 49/4 49/12 59/2 60/18 72/5 72/6 73/8 75/1 79/20 80/2 82/1 82/6 83/9 83/16 83/20 86/23 90/16 90/17 96/13 106/23 106/25 107/2 108/2 117/17 117/18 118/23 123/3 123/21 124/4 135/15 136/12 136/16 142/16 147/8 147/12 151/19 152/14 152/18 152/21 154/9 155/9 163/15 163/19 163/21 164/17 165/13 166/25 170/19 172/21 172/25 173/5 175/20 179/12 180/18 180/19 183/5 184/6 185/6 187/13 187/15 187/18 189/10 189/13 190/15 190/22 195/7 200/21 200/21 201/1 202/8 204/10 204/20 207/10 214/7 222/17 224/17 226/20 229/19 238/6 238/13 241/8 243/2 249/2
seeing [12] 26/4 26/19 29/16 32/20 33/3 36/22 45/12 45/14 67/7 69/19 72/18 77/15
seek [5] 63/18 204/18 221/9 221/20 233/14
seeking [1] 237/7
seem [6] 75/14 184/21 223/16 228/7 234/5 241/20
seemed [2] 205/21 225/25
seems [7] 33/21 80/5 174/12 217/11 227/15 230/19 250/9
seen [26] 14/2 20/25 30/24 31/21 32/4 33/7 34/2 36/12 42/19 43/23 50/7 70/2 93/23 100/12 106/4 121/25 140/18 156/14 158/20 178/16 184/21 189/20 198/9 225/11 227/19 243/20
sees [2] 107/8 144/14
selected [2] 79/5 83/25
selecting [1] 117/24
selection [1] 208/3
self [25] 26/6 30/6 39/14 46/12 71/19 83/13 85/8 102/18 158/11 159/16 160/7 160/9 167/4 167/8 167/13 168/25 169/10 217/5 232/14 232/16 237/24 239/6 240/6 240/13 240/21
self-affirmation [2] 160/7 160/9
self-declaration [1] 39/14
self-declared [5] 232/14 232/16 239/6 240/6 240/21
self-declares [1] 217/5
self-declaring [1] 240/13
self-harm [10] 26/6 85/8 102/18 158/11 167/4 167/8 167/13 168/25 169/10 237/24
self-report [1] 159/16
self-reporting [1] 30/6
selfie [3] 50/11 51/15 52/12
selling [1] 225/2
send [3] 89/15 213/24 223/19
sending [1] 214/9
senior [3] 26/14 228/10 241/18
sense [5] 14/15 42/10 177/17 202/22 234/25
senses [1] 163/18
sensitive [24] 9/24 46/2 46/8 46/23 49/7 54/8 54/10 130/12 136/15 136/15 137/22 138/6 154/17 155/4 159/24 232/5 236/20 237/18 237/19 238/7 239/1 239/11 240/24 241/3
sensitivities [1] 246/24
sensitivity [3] 19/23 132/24 236/22
sent [11] 61/14 61/15 62/8 62/22 75/19 122/1 168/1 202/2 211/11 223/23 232/1
sentence [4] 48/18 69/1 142/10 230/7
separate [7] 29/5 47/23 73/25 155/8 168/12 168/21 194/8
September [1] 74/18
September 2024 [1] 74/18
series [3] 64/19 155/21 170/16
serious [12] 26/5 26/23 110/5 111/16 112/22 112/23 112/24 164/22 167/4 174/10 196/25 235/19
seriously [7] 35/5 69/14 86/16 87/15 114/9 177/1 228/13
serve [2] 37/23 153/13
served [6] 77/5 77/19 85/23 146/11 220/19 220/22
service [79] 9/10 9/10 10/4 10/7 10/12 29/15 30/9 31/1 34/5 34/6 34/8 35/7 40/19 42/23 43/3 44/16 46/4 46/4 47/15 50/21 52/16 52/19 53/22 54/6 54/6 56/19 56/20 59/8 68/4 68/17 70/19 71/22 119/13 122/1 127/14 128/3 156/24 157/21 161/12 162/2 162/14 193/15 208/23 209/2 209/23 219/14 221/3 222/21 222/22 223/6 223/6 223/12 223/13 223/20 223/22 224/11 224/15 225/9 225/22 226/6 226/10 226/13 227/7 227/16 228/14 229/4 229/8 229/18 229/23 231/4 232/24 233/7 235/24 239/21 240/9 240/15 241/6 248/9 250/8
serviced [1] 224/1
services [63] 4/23 24/21 24/24 26/20 29/13 34/4 34/12 34/18 35/2 35/7 39/21 40/15 40/24 41/24 42/14 43/20 43/25 44/5 44/8 44/9 44/11 44/15 44/17 48/17 54/3 59/12 59/12 63/12 66/19 67/8 67/13 67/19 67/19 68/11 69/20 70/9 70/10 70/11 71/8 73/8 73/20 74/11 94/21 128/5 133/20 133/22 157/6 162/7 165/10 183/20 184/16 193/12 210/18 219/9 222/13 222/18 222/18 223/9 223/10 225/3 249/11 249/22 249/23
sessions [1] 85/22
set [43] 19/7 39/22 47/22 48/6 51/7 59/6 63/22 67/22 67/25 73/14 74/3 74/6 74/8 83/16 85/12 92/13 104/23 110/16 110/17 112/17 114/21 114/25 115/3 126/20 132/5 134/20 136/1 155/8 157/2 161/21 180/22 187/22 208/13 210/18 218/22 218/25 221/3 226/10 234/11 237/12 240/8 242/10 244/25
sets [4] 43/3 55/18 83/10 226/23
setting [8] 36/13 94/14 94/25 98/4 110/2 110/2 201/18 236/23
settings [1] 29/9
seven [4] 59/15 70/1 84/11 183/6
several [3] 85/22 202/14 220/5
severe [4] 11/24 105/20 106/14 106/15
severed [1] 11/25
severity [4] 134/10 154/13 154/20 157/15
Sexist [1] 85/5
sexual [12] 26/6 108/25 134/15 136/13 138/4 144/8 148/10 158/10 176/10 179/19 199/5 216/6
sexualisation [1] 85/8
sexualised [1] 158/19
sexuality [1] 76/10
sexually [1] 37/6
SHA [1] 250/25
shall [2] 207/1 248/14
shape [4] 128/3 146/9 172/16 208/22
shaped [1] 168/3
shapes [1] 155/3
share [11] 22/5 25/8 76/13 87/16 92/5 112/19 122/10 167/11 213/14 215/7 223/5
shared [15] 20/11 20/16 24/6 29/14 34/5 56/16 63/11 65/12 71/16 106/6 201/22 204/14 214/5 214/12 215/6
sharing [5] 52/12 65/10 76/11 93/19 229/16
she [2] 242/20 243/17
shift [1] 41/21
shock [5] 11/2 11/20 11/22 12/4 16/16
shooter [1] 141/24
shooters [1] 16/25
shooting [1] 17/5
shootings [1] 188/6
short [10] 58/13 122/12 125/4 130/11 175/15 180/11 194/14 206/6 228/23 231/12
shot [1] 181/2
should [51] 8/15 8/18 15/25 16/10 16/24 17/6 20/23 30/2 33/4 48/22 68/2 73/3 73/10 80/1 95/19 103/24 131/4 132/14 133/10 133/11 134/9 135/13 135/19 137/2 137/10

S

should... [26] 138/3 140/13 142/3 142/7 151/14 166/2 166/22 168/1 172/3 176/21 177/3 181/1 184/7 190/3 192/6 206/19 206/21 207/3 228/12 231/12 231/17 232/11 233/10 235/24 237/11 251/6
shouldn't [13] 17/2 56/19 70/19 73/8 77/4 100/7 116/20 132/14 141/18 147/9 165/25 186/13 190/2
show [11] 13/18 13/19 13/20 43/11 53/25 103/4 107/12 108/5 117/2 117/8 180/25
show's [1] 123/10
showed [2] 44/23 178/9
showing [17] 11/21 14/25 15/9 79/10 80/12 81/1 81/4 115/18 116/13 117/15 152/16 159/6 197/17 205/13 205/15 238/17 238/21
shown [9] 15/23 22/23 27/5 27/8 85/4 85/21 115/17 116/16 116/22
shows [11] 30/13 35/13 68/5 70/1 107/6 108/5 108/7 140/12 154/10 167/15 187/2
shut [1] 201/24
sibling [1] 68/17
siblings [1] 30/8
sickeningly [1] 229/2
side [19] 3/1 85/12 105/11 105/11 107/11 107/16 108/16 112/10 127/21 154/14 169/3 172/10 173/24 183/9 207/23 207/24 210/6 228/2 237/7
sight [1] 21/24
sign [4] 41/6 52/6 52/8 240/16
signal [1] 163/22
signals [7] 40/14 41/10 100/23 122/11 141/5 163/8 193/3
signature [1] 125/20
signed [14] 18/16 36/16 36/20 39/2 45/21 45/23 46/3 46/4 47/1 47/4 47/5 47/8 125/21 207/11
signed-in [1] 39/2
signed-out [4] 46/3 46/4 47/1 47/4
significance [1] 245/4
significant [13] 27/12 35/14 51/20 60/23 61/8 62/4 65/3 65/6 67/17 108/15 174/18 235/14 244/16
significantly [8] 32/6 53/3 149/22 149/24 151/15 189/20 204/25 225/13
signing [1] 224/18
signs [5] 140/12 167/8 192/16 194/15 202/13
similar [10] 97/5 100/9 141/6 141/16 147/11 147/23 163/7 173/11 196/20 197/21
simple [5] 71/4 71/24 72/11 150/2 185/9
simplest [1] 128/20
simplistic [1] 143/11
simply [4] 65/23 70/9 128/4 241/24
since [12] 9/19 44/1 44/25 63/10 65/2 75/18 77/20 101/10 207/19 245/18 247/17 250/16
single [15] 49/13 49/14 49/17 49/23 99/23 104/7 104/19 106/14 114/16 127/7 163/4 181/2 203/8 212/22 212/22
single-shot [1] 181/2
singled [1] 60/13
singularly [1] 24/20
sir [12] 1/9 58/16 118/19 124/24 162/11 177/11 180/6 201/6 206/14 206/25 251/5 251/12
sit [9] 8/25 58/11 90/13 92/1 120/8 126/25 127/2 206/3 221/19
site [2] 44/23 60/5
sites [2] 70/15 239/20
sits [19] 7/4 12/2 12/7 31/1 52/13 68/14 77/19 85/6 113/10 120/3 127/3 153/11 161/25 184/18 188/19 221/5 222/4 229/5 237/1
sitting [1] 251/5
situation [2] 52/3 110/13
situations [3] 65/12 109/10 211/8
six [3] 20/15 42/3 174/4
six months [2] 20/15 42/3
size [1] 35/8
skipping [1] 84/14
slicing [1] 37/12
slight [2] 2/10 8/10
slightly [14] 4/15 69/22 78/22 83/8 89/7 129/18 151/19 154/15 159/10 160/12 165/20 172/8 181/11 189/13
slip [2] 72/9 98/1
slipped [1] 30/20
slipping [1] 139/9
slips [1] 20/2
Slow [1] 213/23
slower [1] 89/10
slowly [1] 177/15
small [3] 84/4 167/10 209/19
SMS [2] 93/21 232/1
Snapchat [6] 32/24 59/5 67/14 83/21 188/13 189/14
snapshot [3] 28/3 28/8 135/12
so [541]
social [32] 12/16 31/6 31/14 31/15 32/9 32/20 42/7 42/14 42/23 43/20 44/22 60/5 79/7 79/10 79/22 80/13 80/25 81/1 81/4 81/6 81/25 83/18 88/19 127/12 163/17 163/17 163/21 165/6 165/8 171/9 179/10 219/25
societal [1] 19/20
society [5] 53/21 81/24 82/7 82/14 102/24
software [6] 48/13 51/11 51/23 54/1 244/21 244/22
Sol [1] 129/14
soliciting [1] 10/3
solution [1] 50/19
some [131] 3/25 8/22 11/4 12/11 13/17 13/18 16/22 19/19 21/10 22/9 26/10 27/12 31/18 32/16 39/22 42/14 43/23 43/25 44/14 44/15 44/16 45/4 51/6 51/6 51/14 51/17 53/12 54/17 54/19 63/22 64/4 64/17 66/10 67/25 68/16 70/2 70/11 72/6 75/24 79/9 79/22 81/23 82/13 82/13 84/14 84/18 87/1 88/14 93/8 93/22 94/9 95/18 103/13 104/6 104/17 105/10 106/7 114/22 114/23 115/6 116/3 116/18 118/14 120/19 124/7 124/12 129/19 131/21 131/25 132/22 133/25 140/3 140/6 141/9 144/10 147/12 148/10 149/6 151/13 151/24 152/21 154/2 155/10 155/10 158/13 163/18 164/15 174/22 174/23 175/7 175/8 175/9 175/20 175/23 176/4 176/9 176/18 178/18 180/24 182/16 185/1 185/15 185/19 185/20 185/20 186/13 186/19 189/4 191/5 192/17 192/17 193/3 194/1 195/10 195/22 195/24 196/10 196/12 204/4 210/14 210/15 216/14 217/15 222/3 229/13 237/14 239/15 242/9 242/14 248/7 248/11
somebody [11] 6/18 7/6 13/9 38/11 49/15 106/12 110/19 194/20 215/2 215/14 221/7
somebody's [1] 237/7
somehow [1] 70/5
someone [19] 15/9 30/23 47/2 52/13 92/15 93/21 106/6 111/3 122/17 131/2 131/15 139/11 152/9 153/14 173/3 176/3 197/21 214/24 240/23
something [43] 3/12 13/3 14/18 16/2 30/20 47/3 54/10 57/15 65/6 72/25 79/20 80/12 91/23 98/10 103/9 117/15 119/19 122/18 136/19 136/20 146/15 153/24 158/15 160/11 170/9 170/12 174/20 175/16 177/4 178/2 178/3 179/15 218/1 218/18 225/5 225/23 228/14 230/1 233/14 234/14 239/16 244/1 247/5
sometimes [15] 17/24 23/13 28/14 28/17 30/13 93/6 104/3 138/17 147/19 150/21 163/21 165/8 200/23 204/20 204/21
soon [1] 209/25
sophisticated [1] 23/12
sorrow [1] 3/14
sorry [17] 14/13 28/15 65/18 77/16 82/11 94/18 98/13 99/5 115/5 156/24 157/21 165/2 177/22 195/8 234/2 244/12 251/8
sort [34] 13/24 29/23 37/3 38/10 40/12 41/1 41/3 45/4 54/1 77/8 81/13 93/14 97/19 109/12 139/9 146/3 146/22 154/4 157/14 163/24 166/8 175/22 176/9 186/13 189/22 191/5 191/15 192/5 193/3 193/19 195/15 195/21 197/20 219/17
sorts [16] 128/7 133/10 138/11 138/13 139/4 140/2 149/2 149/8 156/8 159/3 175/10 176/20 193/12 198/6 205/3 205/15
sought [2] 80/12 84/17
sound [1] 3/14
sounded [1] 94/19
sounds [1] 211/8
source [1] 246/6
sources [2] 117/14 250/12
Southport [1] 3/15
space [5] 71/15 211/12 213/4 214/11 215/25
spaces [6] 209/18 212/3 214/10 230/8 230/13 231/8
spam [5] 9/24 93/24 106/1 213/25 213/25
speak [25] 3/23 14/1 23/7 37/17 38/7 73/11 92/2 146/5 148/15 156/5 175/12 177/15 193/18 199/18 200/25 209/6 216/12 224/7 227/23 230/21 233/1 233/3 233/22 234/21 245/23
speaking [6] 3/24 94/10 114/7 200/17 209/12 230/14
speaks [2] 203/2 203/10
spec [15] 133/23 135/1 135/4 141/18 141/20 141/21 142/3 146/10 146/23 148/19 153/7 153/20 158/13 178/15 179/18
specialised [3] 39/21 167/25 196/11
specialising [1] 102/17
specialist [5] 102/10 102/19 103/7 103/19 103/21

S

specialists [3] 191/8 195/9 195/12
speciality [1] 2/21
specific [40] 2/24 3/22 8/22 14/1 15/10 20/15 23/8 23/9 56/23 56/25 59/8 60/3 60/23 62/5 68/4 86/4 87/4 87/4 87/8 87/20 88/18 96/13 103/6 104/4 104/18 104/19 129/22 132/12 132/22 137/23 138/15 146/5 146/18 156/18 168/6 170/11 194/13 198/24 208/19 239/17
specifically [16] 7/1 7/15 17/7 35/11 57/13 64/7 68/6 73/25 82/23 87/14 153/11 191/2 191/21 212/3 214/22 229/22
specification [4] 133/2 134/18 134/22 137/20
specificity [1] 198/1
specifics [5] 35/12 37/18 38/7 86/9 175/12
specified [1] 51/22
specifying [1] 131/17
speculating [2] 33/22 114/2
speculation [1] 29/20
speculative [3] 9/3 15/20 69/22
speech [15] 23/7 23/11 23/13 23/17 23/18 23/20 27/22 102/17 111/5 112/23 114/7 114/13 144/13 208/20 210/5
speech-related [1] 23/13
spend [4] 94/11 101/2 101/7 101/17
spending [1] 77/6
spent [3] 85/20 101/1 101/6
spills [1] 13/22
split [1] 212/8
spoken [1] 203/16
spoofed [1] 164/6
sport [1] 84/2
spurting [1] 15/1
st [3] 9/11 69/2 213/10
stabbing [5] 115/10 115/19 116/10 116/21 197/18
stabbings [1] 116/13
stable [1] 122/23
stack [3] 153/21 153/25 186/1
stage [13] 50/8 132/9 144/16 146/20 149/11 169/23 197/16 197/23 232/9 234/15 235/1 235/11 236/18
stages [4] 94/11 146/22 148/18 240/3
stand [1] 162/13
standalone [1] 29/5
standard [7] 40/8 153/8 178/21 197/11 199/8 219/25 243/23
standards [4] 22/25 203/3 205/16 242/7
standing [1] 1/3
staring [2] 200/23 200/24
start [13] 1/9 10/19 97/13 118/5 124/25 125/1 177/22 186/17 210/16 234/3 243/21 246/11 251/7
start-ups [1] 186/17
started [2] 250/16 250/22
starting [2] 61/4 247/24
state [6] 34/19 34/23 51/4 126/23 165/2 209/23
statement [74] 1/14 1/24 2/2 2/3 2/5 2/11 2/14 2/17 2/23 3/6 3/6 3/22 4/4 5/8 9/6 9/17 12/14 16/11 17/13 17/19 20/25 22/11 36/5 38/19 39/21 47/10 48/19 54/19 54/23 55/8 55/17 68/3 73/18 74/25 79/9 80/4 82/17 88/4 89/2 91/3 95/4 104/22 117/22 118/5 118/19 119/19 121/24 123/4 125/16 125/17 125/21 128/17 130/15 133/3 138/23 158/1 162/8 197/6 199/24 203/25 205/21 207/8 207/13 208/6 208/13 211/8 219/11 220/6 220/16 231/20 233/6 243/24 246/12 247/11
statements [1] 3/5
states [3] 140/23 164/17 208/21
statistical [1] 128/20
statistically [2] 240/5 240/20
statistics [1] 95/18
statutory [1] 199/1
Stay [1] 135/5
Steel [1] 15/17
stenographer [1] 177/9
stenographer's [2] 177/14 244/8
step [9] 18/25 62/15 62/17 62/19 100/24 137/12 137/12 163/6 180/21
step-change [1] 62/19
steps [10] 43/20 62/9 104/2 137/3 137/5 142/13 175/6 201/18 202/14 231/17
Sticking [2] 159/9 219/8
still [28] 8/16 36/25 43/10 52/24 67/7 67/18 69/25 81/14 89/10 89/12 89/14 89/14 90/2 90/12 90/18 104/21 108/15 122/5 133/7 155/14 173/6 187/1 187/2 189/15 211/11 212/7 212/8 212/13
stones [1] 141/14
stop [5] 80/19 179/5 221/7 233/11 251/6
stopped [2] 92/3 119/18
stopping [1] 82/11
storage [1] 212/11
Store [3] 232/23 233/22 236/3
stored [2] 112/6 212/10
stores [1] 234/8
storing [1] 145/19
straight [1] 238/6
strategic [4] 125/12 126/18 137/12 170/19
strategically [1] 150/20
strategies [1] 204/6
strategy [4] 127/3 127/4 184/13 184/15
straw [2] 200/23 200/24
stream [4] 101/24 102/2 102/4 115/18
streamed [2] 54/7 249/21
streaming [2] 242/4 249/20
streams [2] 75/7 101/21
street [4] 11/17 238/17 238/22 239/19
strengthen [2] 202/15 202/20
strengths [1] 164/10
stress [1] 246/14
strict [2] 23/6 184/9
strictly [1] 83/25
strike [13] 104/25 105/1 105/3 105/5 105/17 105/19 105/22 106/8 106/18 110/6 110/7 110/10 111/13
strikes [4] 104/24 105/11 105/16 106/4
strive [1] 62/18
strokes [1] 162/24
strong [7] 23/3 93/2 166/23 233/23 234/18 234/20 235/15
stronger [1] 93/25
strongly [2] 176/19 177/2
structural [1] 191/5
structure [3] 5/5 7/3 53/7
structured [1] 4/18
structures [1] 21/23
students [1] 92/17
studies [1] 22/23
study [3] 172/4 172/20 189/19
stuff [3] 30/14 62/18 149/10
sub [1] 194/12
sub-teams [1] 194/12
subcategories [1] 141/8
subject [13] 162/9 166/5 185/25 201/4 207/5 212/25 214/1 214/15 214/17 215/18 218/15 241/8 246/8
submit [1] 123/9
submitted [1] 62/4
subscribe [1] 218/10
subscribed [2] 75/11 218/19
subscribers [4] 96/17 212/25 218/5 219/21
subscription [1] 218/15
subsequently [5] 64/8 107/20 121/13 126/11 202/2
subsidiary [1] 4/22
success [1] 97/7
such [52] 10/3 11/19 11/21 11/24 13/18 18/7 27/5 27/11 31/22 32/7 75/1 79/7 91/8 114/3 114/11 128/24 134/10 137/22 139/22 140/15 141/23 142/14 144/8 144/17 146/7 146/8 146/14 158/10 159/1 163/1 165/8 166/5 166/11 166/16 168/1 168/24 176/11 177/25 181/3 190/1 190/6 191/13 207/4 209/10 214/20 217/15 221/17 226/1 227/5 229/5 246/20 250/12
suffering [2] 27/4 27/8
sufficient [6] 49/13 49/23 86/24 95/24 195/17 199/14
suggest [11] 39/9 52/5 58/4 90/7 113/5 125/1 137/15 145/11 166/7 239/6 245/20
suggested [5] 42/21 82/10 131/20 156/14 169/25
suggesting [8] 83/12 85/16 87/21 92/20 114/9 116/15 226/6 230/19
suggestion [4] 32/8 70/5 112/11 191/6
suggests [9] 13/10 44/13 49/16 67/16 79/14 121/15 168/18 190/13 194/20
suicidal [1] 168/19
suicide [5] 26/7 168/25 169/9 238/10 239/24
suitability [1] 148/8
suitable [1] 13/11
summarise [1] 129/7
summarises [1] 194/15
summarising [1] 243/19
summary [3] 21/18 55/12 64/5
summer [1] 25/17
supervised [20] 8/22 29/6 29/7 33/14 39/19 64/14 67/22 68/11 68/13 70/21 74/6 74/9 74/13 74/14 74/18 75/18 77/15 77/18 78/10 90/15
supervision [4] 68/2 74/16 79/1 79/3
supervisory [2] 61/12 227/24
support [3] 25/16 78/24 143/2
supports [1] 122/5
suppose [1] 197/17
sure [39] 6/25 33/9 44/3 45/9 57/13 58/1 59/23 61/10 68/21 71/12 71/14 77/18 97/10 107/4 108/19 108/19 117/17 122/15 128/11 144/17 149/1 179/8 179/15 191/23 200/18 211/24 215/21 216/3 217/20 224/21 225/8 227/22 231/14 232/8 235/17 236/11 240/22 248/2 249/22
surely [7] 29/23 48/22 73/10 103/24 116/13 229/24 235/20
surprise [1] 183/19

S

surprised [1] 228/8
surprising [1] 170/5
surprisingly [1] 144/10
surrounding [1] 65/15
surveillance [4] 110/18 110/19 110/21 134/16
survey [14] 28/3 28/8 28/24 29/23 32/12 34/3 34/3 34/3 35/22 35/23 36/2 44/20 44/23 45/15
surveys [1] 235/21
survivors [1] 105/15
suspect [3] 57/20 159/18 175/19
suspend [1] 157/13
suspending [2] 168/8 192/19
sustain [1] 171/5
sustained [1] 197/18
sword [1] 15/12
swords [9] 13/18 13/19 13/21 14/25 37/10 37/25 38/3 78/6 78/8
symbols [2] 103/17 149/7
sympathies [1] 3/16
synagogues [1] 188/9
synthetic [2] 143/23 143/24
system [67] 20/3 20/8 21/20 22/7 27/20 30/21 41/10 48/20 51/14 53/1 61/16 61/21 62/2 62/5 63/12 76/13 81/14 82/3 90/21 92/8 96/3 96/9 96/10 96/22 97/3 97/20 98/3 98/8 98/20 99/10 99/13 99/17 100/18 103/5 104/24 113/11 113/12 121/18 121/21 122/1 122/5 122/13 122/25 123/12 123/20 146/8 149/15 149/18 159/17 160/4 160/7 162/25 163/2 163/3 163/7 168/21 168/24 169/9 178/23 193/19 202/1 204/8 204/11 219/19 222/25 223/4 244/18
systematic [1] 109/6
systems [91] 6/9 19/17 20/7 20/18 20/20 20/22 22/1 22/2 22/6 24/9 40/5 41/2 42/16 42/25 43/13 46/1 46/8 46/14 62/23 63/4 63/5 64/2 64/24 65/9 65/11 65/16 66/5 66/11 68/24 71/14 73/5 82/24 85/10 86/11 86/18 91/11 92/6 92/7 92/13 95/7 95/12 95/14 95/21 95/23 96/14 97/14 107/15 107/20 107/22 110/16 111/1 112/17 119/15 120/14 140/6 143/25 144/1 144/7 145/1 157/11 157/16 164/8 164/21 166/3 166/7 167/3 167/22 167/22 169/16 171/3 171/23 172/5 178/25 179/3 179/5 179/7 179/16 182/10 194/3 194/4 194/9 202/6 209/22 219/13 222/9 226/24 234/22 243/25 246/3 246/4 246/10

T

table [4] 151/20 152/14 154/9 154/12
table 1 [1] 152/14
tables [1] 189/4
tail [1] 67/3
tail-end [1] 67/3
take [46] 10/15 10/21 16/3 20/4 20/9 25/2 35/4 41/22 69/14 71/2 73/21 86/16 87/14 99/23 103/15 108/24 109/8 109/15 113/14 118/13 121/22 122/24 124/16 124/19 125/7 128/17 136/2 141/19 142/2 146/3 146/13 170/14 170/15 175/17 175/18 177/1 186/6 198/15 210/1 210/11 228/4 230/1 230/14 231/17 232/19 233/17
take-downs [1] 113/14
taken [20] 17/16 24/7 24/17 25/8 35/10 35/19 38/16 43/20 83/11 196/22 202/14 208/8 221/16 223/23 227/18 228/8 228/13 238/18 244/2 248/22
takes [5] 107/8 108/16 139/5 175/18 175/19
taking [10] 24/14 62/14 99/6 100/24 103/10 113/20 118/8 158/14 201/19 250/16
talk [2] 75/20 153/10
talked [16] 17/9 72/19 78/18 86/14 112/5 131/25 148/19 168/7 169/21 175/10 177/18 177/21 181/23 192/18 199/15 202/6
talking [22] 24/21 24/23 44/5 45/8 45/20 68/3 71/19 77/23 80/11 81/16 91/19 104/3 112/10 114/4 114/6 123/15 131/4 165/11 172/19 196/9 199/13 238/16
talks [3] 172/13 173/10 182/5
tanks [1] 126/11
target [2] 197/19 245/15
targeting [4] 18/6 188/7 188/8 245/9
task [2] 197/6 199/7
tasks [1] 150/22
TAT000012 [6] 180/16 180/19 181/9 182/3 182/15 184/1
taxonomies [3] 132/13 132/23 133/5
taxonomy [1] 132/17
teaching [1] 83/3
team [34] 5/16 5/18 6/7 6/11 6/12 6/16 8/14 8/16 9/19 14/20 37/18 38/8 86/6 93/18 93/20 94/22 115/23 124/16 124/19 127/2 127/8 147/15 147/23 148/24 156/1 165/24 167/25 194/11 196/18 197/14 214/13 215/6 221/12 230/2
teaming [4] 147/3 147/7 147/19 148/14
teams [23] 5/8 5/9 5/10 5/11 6/7 6/9 7/2 12/9 15/19 24/24 71/12 86/18 87/16 99/11 105/15 118/17 127/24 127/24 147/4 151/25 153/10 194/8 194/12
teams' [1] 203/10
tech [18] 58/20 59/3 175/1 180/15 182/5 182/8 184/22 191/6 192/4 242/25 243/6 248/17 248/19 248/21 250/13 250/15 250/17 250/18
Tech's [1] 83/1
technical [15] 97/17 98/14 121/17 122/13 127/21 127/24 146/21 151/3 153/10 156/6 162/9 162/18 163/1 235/14 250/24
technically [4] 120/10 120/18 121/15 135/15
technique [2] 161/7 192/23
techniques [1] 149/24
technology [13] 40/3 40/12 56/2 95/15 120/5 120/15 122/7 127/14 190/11 190/13 199/2 237/11 241/11
teen [29] 29/6 40/8 62/6 74/19 75/2 75/3 75/6 75/7 75/9 75/11 75/18 77/15 78/10 86/13 89/5 90/15 143/1 157/19 157/25 158/5 158/7 160/9 160/21 167/7 167/7 167/9 167/15 189/7 198/9
teen's [2] 74/23 167/11
teenage [1] 31/16
teenagers [4] 74/20 88/11 88/15 88/24
teens [17] 64/7 64/14 68/11 74/10 78/25 90/12 142/23 142/25 143/1 158/8 160/16 161/2 166/18 166/24 167/6 169/8 169/22
TEL000005 [3] 224/13 228/16 228/16
TEL000018 [11] 207/8 207/9 207/16 208/16 210/17 211/14 219/10 231/21 236/17 246/13 247/15
Telegram [72] 33/1 206/16 207/18 208/5 208/8 209/11 209/16 210/15 210/18 211/3 211/5 211/19 211/22 212/8 212/15 213/20 214/5 219/5 219/13 221/10 221/16 221/20 222/5 224/18 224/22 226/5 226/8 227/5 228/21 230/4 230/18 230/24 231/6 231/9 231/13 231/23 231/25 232/21 232/21 233/5 233/10 233/19 234/10 234/24 235/19 236/1 236/11 237/3 237/10 240/14 241/9 242/6 242/15 242/20 243/19 243/23 244/9 245/10 245/11 245/13 245/15 245/20 245/21 245/24 246/16 248/18 249/3 249/7 249/12 249/15 250/5 250/6
Telegram's [10] 207/25 208/15 208/17 209/21 210/16 217/11 234/17 239/5 247/22 248/14
telephone [1] 166/11
television [4] 30/25 68/18 69/5 69/15
televisions [2] 29/14 34/9
tell [18] 4/3 4/5 36/5 36/7 59/13 78/11 78/12 98/6 127/5 130/23 133/5 147/14 148/1 158/3 196/23 197/5 198/16 200/1
telling [2] 49/17 106/13
tells [3] 39/17 39/23 66/20
ten [5] 70/1 80/21 80/25 187/12 187/25
tend [6] 14/11 34/22 129/25 152/19 164/19 179/13
tends [1] 245/20
terminate [5] 55/15 91/18 105/20 106/17 111/13
termination [2] 105/3 105/24
terminology [3] 103/18 149/7 181/16
terms [107] 7/22 8/5 8/11 9/6 9/10 9/10 10/3 10/7 10/11 13/15 15/22 16/15 17/22 19/10 19/24 26/25 30/1 30/6 35/8 37/2 47/15 54/2 57/19 62/14 77/3 84/19 84/20 92/8 92/22 92/23 93/2 93/7 93/11 94/17 94/22 97/17 108/20 108/23 110/6 117/22 130/15 130/23 136/7 143/11 143/15 146/1 150/2 152/16 154/9 156/3 156/23 156/24 157/20 160/9 160/11 160/16 161/25 164/23 165/4 167/19 172/18 175/6 183/2 185/9 186/20 196/21 197/2 197/8 198/12 198/16 199/12 201/9 206/18 208/8 209/23 217/15 217/23 218/6 220/4 221/3 221/25 224/11 224/14 225/9 225/22 226/4 226/6 226/10 226/13 227/6 227/16 228/14 229/4 229/8 229/18 229/23 231/4 235/23 236/4 239/21 240/8 241/5 243/5 243/9 246/20 248/1 248/9
Terror [1] 250/13
TerrorGram [3]

T

TerrorGram... [3] 244/2 244/11 244/12
terrorism [32] 25/15 26/3 26/11 27/2 27/6 102/18 102/25 103/11 126/8 126/10 126/15 131/6 134/14 145/10 157/6 175/1 177/16 180/16 182/5 182/11 184/22 191/7 192/4 216/9 248/17 248/19 248/21 250/14 250/16 250/17 250/19 250/21
Terrorism's [1] 182/9
terrorist [11] 11/17 26/8 180/23 181/3 181/14 181/20 182/7 216/4 227/9 249/9 250/7
terrorist-related [1] 216/4
test [7] 95/23 155/13 177/14 178/19 178/24 192/13 196/23
tested [6] 149/12 181/19 185/19 187/12 187/23 187/25
testing [19] 59/19 122/15 148/3 148/17 151/1 151/11 156/21 169/25 185/4 187/10 189/21 190/20 191/7 191/13 191/20 192/10 193/17 204/6 244/17
tests [2] 188/3 191/15
text [4] 131/1 145/8 161/17 228/19
than [51] 14/11 14/16 31/16 32/6 32/10 32/24 42/8 42/25 51/6 51/15 52/16 68/4 69/20 71/7 84/24 85/10 94/13 96/20 108/14 116/9 117/5 118/8 127/11 130/16 139/1 141/12 149/22 150/16 152/8 152/17 153/15 156/8 163/21 171/23 171/24 172/2 172/12 172/17 172/20 174/1 181/21 182/9 182/13 185/1 189/18 198/21 210/7 213/12 230/6 231/16 243/14
than I [1] 141/12
thank [162] 1/4 1/6 1/9 1/12 2/2 2/16 2/23 3/19 3/20 4/17 5/15 6/11 7/13 8/11 9/5 10/9 10/14 10/20 11/10 12/14 16/10 17/4 17/10 17/19 19/22 20/23 21/22 25/11 27/24 36/4 36/11 38/19 39/16 41/18 44/12 50/7 58/11 58/16 58/25 60/17 66/17 69/23 73/18 82/16 88/3 89/20 91/2 94/6 101/13 101/19 104/21 106/19 108/1 108/23 109/10 117/20 118/18 119/3 124/20 124/22 124/24 125/7 125/12 125/15 125/19 126/1 126/5 126/17 126/25 127/5 127/20 128/16 129/11 130/2 130/8 130/20 132/22 133/5 133/23 135/5 136/12 137/1 137/19 140/7 142/2 142/7 143/5 146/16 149/18 150/6 152/6 153/25 155/7 159/11 162/12 162/18 163/23 165/17 166/17 166/19 168/17 169/18 173/9 173/22 177/11 177/13 178/6 179/18 180/6 180/14 181/9 181/11 187/8 194/14 194/23 196/21 198/16 198/25 199/12 199/24 201/2 201/14 203/4 203/13 205/18 205/22 206/3 206/9 206/11 206/14 207/16 208/5 208/13 211/14 212/21 216/16 216/22 217/9 217/23 218/8 218/15 218/22 219/4 219/8 219/24 220/4 222/4 224/11 225/11 227/4 228/18 231/18 233/17 236/17 237/10 237/18 241/7 241/13 244/15 246/10 248/5 248/13
thanks [1] 251/5
that [1724]
that's [176] 2/2 3/11 6/7 7/12 10/17 10/24 17/11 17/13 20/8 23/15 26/20 31/1 32/14 32/17 35/5 36/14 43/8 45/8 46/20 49/18 50/22 53/20 54/2 56/11 57/19 59/18 66/9 70/4 74/11 74/14 76/18 77/8 77/19 79/16 83/6 86/11 86/18 89/9 91/7 97/6 98/10 99/16 104/11 106/1 108/12 110/20 110/20 111/6 114/22 117/16 118/9 120/16 122/7 123/21 127/14 127/22 128/22 129/5 129/10 129/13 132/5 132/16 132/19 132/21 133/9 133/24 134/24 135/3 136/3 136/9 136/22 137/18 139/9 142/4 142/21 143/4 143/10 143/14 143/15 143/16 143/18 143/22 144/5 144/22 145/6 145/22 146/20 147/7 147/19 149/14 151/22 152/10 152/18 154/5 154/23 155/16 156/13 157/1 157/4 157/10 157/16 157/22 157/24 158/21 160/3 160/11 160/22 160/23 161/7 161/7 161/18 161/23 162/3 162/17 167/18 168/6 168/10 170/12 172/19 173/4 174/16 174/25 179/1 180/1 180/3 180/6 181/8 184/13 185/12 187/10 189/17 190/15 191/23 193/25 194/7 194/17 195/1 197/1 198/5 198/20 202/24 202/25 203/7 203/10 207/21 209/8 212/18 213/20 214/3 216/8 218/21 219/16 219/23 219/24 220/24 222/11 222/16 230/20 235/12 235/13 236/25 237/15 237/24 238/9 238/10 238/24 239/2 240/2 240/24 242/8 242/13 243/4 244/5 247/23 247/25 249/25
their [84] 6/20 18/17 18/22 22/22 22/24 25/16 26/20 27/18 29/19 30/18 30/24 30/24 30/25 30/25 33/18 33/23 34/22 36/1 39/3 40/9 44/17 44/21 44/24 45/5 47/22 49/20 55/25 58/20 59/7 60/24 67/14 70/10 70/13 71/10 74/23 75/2 75/3 75/6 75/7 75/9 75/10 76/17 76/20 103/19 113/17 119/13 129/25 145/21 148/8 149/16 158/25 159/16 160/18 160/20 163/9 167/9 167/12 167/16 179/21 198/1 204/1 206/23 209/5 209/5 210/23 212/24 212/25 213/19 214/1 215/18 217/2 217/2 217/3 217/5 217/18 227/13 234/22 236/4 237/8 240/10 240/15 242/4 242/14 250/22
them [93] 8/17 9/2 16/2 19/15 20/4 20/7 20/8 23/2 24/14 26/25 27/3 28/12 29/1 30/1 30/12 30/19 39/5 39/6 39/11 39/18 39/22 41/12 49/18 49/19 49/21 51/2 51/4 53/11 54/3 55/3 56/8 57/22 60/16 65/24 69/7 69/11 70/20 70/21 71/12 80/16 80/17 82/1 82/18 82/19 88/25 89/19 92/19 102/12 102/18 106/8 117/11 120/8 122/11 122/15 129/19 130/7 133/21 135/2 141/6 150/1 152/11 157/13 157/13 157/14 159/19 161/14 163/19 164/8 168/9 170/14 170/15 176/14 176/17 178/18 183/16 185/20 189/8 189/9 192/22 193/2 193/16 194/24 198/15 202/18 205/10 210/4 212/11 212/15 212/16 224/8 224/9 229/10 240/16
themes [3] 18/5 18/7 171/4
themselves [9] 51/11 52/1 53/25 94/15 127/15 127/19 133/21 139/4 245/9
then [154] 5/1 6/12 6/16 6/23 7/1 10/14 11/10 12/10 14/8 14/19 14/21 18/9 18/14 19/3 19/7 20/7 21/14 23/20 24/6 30/19 31/23 33/15 34/22 34/24 37/21 40/18 40/20 40/23 42/11 43/6 44/8 48/7 48/10 48/25 49/3 50/7 51/3 52/13 52/20 56/14 56/18 57/6 57/16 60/17 63/25 64/8 67/9 76/10 76/13 77/7 82/12 84/10 85/1 85/12 85/13 88/4 90/4 90/18 91/22 95/19 96/4 97/18 98/9 98/12 98/22 102/7 104/25 106/15 107/22 112/7 112/15 113/4 113/15 113/17 117/10 118/4 118/4 120/15 120/16 122/1 122/8 122/9 122/18 126/22 127/8 127/17 128/25 133/23 135/17 135/23 136/4 137/19 139/15 140/9 142/16 143/5 146/14 148/9 149/15 150/6 150/19 156/16 156/23 157/17 160/7 161/9 165/11 166/13 167/5 167/23 168/20 172/8 172/13 173/22 175/17 175/17 181/13 181/22 182/2 182/23 183/9 183/23 188/14 189/10 191/25 193/10 194/3 194/21 194/23 195/21 196/6 196/21 201/21 202/12 202/13 204/7 204/18 211/22 212/21 213/9 218/15 224/20 224/24 227/1 231/18 232/2 239/10 239/21 240/10 244/15 244/25 246/7 250/3 250/16
theoretical [1] 131/18
theory [1] 172/13
there [331]
there's [18] 3/12 8/10 17/6 53/5 57/16 76/5 90/12 111/5 136/4 138/22 147/3 148/12 151/11 154/4 160/19 174/9 192/20 218/1
thereafter [1] 107/7
therefore [7] 45/3 84/23 88/14 120/9 152/23 201/14 211/25
these [66] 6/5 10/15 12/9 16/10 17/13 24/17 33/20 40/9 45/4 52/5 54/16 56/21 59/14 60/15 64/2 64/21 70/15 73/5 79/4 84/19 85/9 87/10 87/14 88/1 91/16 92/18 104/17 105/11 108/5 121/1 138/13 140/1 140/18 141/1 144/6 149/2 152/24 153/18 154/5 158/14 159/12 162/18 164/8 164/21 171/13 173/13 175/14 179/12 184/15 186/11 187/3 187/5 187/20 190/24 191/2 205/2 211/3 216/17 221/25 224/14 225/19 226/6 227/11 227/22 230/22 234/8
they [289]
they'd [1] 59/14
they're [3] 145/18 212/10 212/13
thin [1] 180/25
thing [3] 89/3 109/12 122/21
things [44] 4/18 9/11 37/6 37/8 37/12 38/3 40/12 53/20 57/14

T

things... [35] 72/9 76/14 76/21 81/25 98/5 104/17 106/1 111/4 117/18 118/12 122/3 122/19 126/24 127/21 128/6 135/2 138/14 144/8 146/2 146/25 147/1 147/8 149/2 149/8 161/11 162/13 166/11 171/16 175/7 176/20 179/13 185/23 191/16 193/12 221/25

think [242] 1/13 2/7 3/9 3/12 3/25 4/19 7/16 7/19 7/24 8/1 8/5 8/14 8/22 10/6 10/11 10/17 10/21 12/16 13/14 15/16 15/25 17/6 17/10 17/15 18/12 19/13 21/22 22/1 22/2 23/6 26/18 29/19 30/4 30/5 31/8 33/25 34/1 34/4 34/17 38/4 38/15 43/2 45/11 46/3 48/9 50/24 52/7 53/5 53/16 54/4 54/11 56/9 57/8 61/13 61/21 64/17 68/20 69/15 71/9 71/18 72/2 72/19 73/13 74/15 76/5 77/1 78/1 78/15 78/19 80/8 80/18 80/18 80/21 81/21 81/22 81/25 82/8 82/12 83/2 86/3 86/4 86/8 87/17 90/17 92/4 93/5 94/3 94/7 94/16 94/22 98/14 99/5 99/20 104/3 105/18 106/23 108/2 111/19 113/15 114/13 115/11 115/12 117/21 118/21 119/20 120/18 121/20 122/21 124/10 126/11 127/5 128/2 128/9 129/11 129/24 130/8 130/10 130/13 130/15 133/1 134/19 135/23 140/18 140/21 141/3 141/19 142/7 142/8 142/16 143/19 146/16 147/12 147/14 149/11 150/23 151/22 152/14 153/2 154/8 154/9 155/9 155/16 155/24 159/1 160/15 162/1 162/25 163/2 163/16 164/5 165/8 165/11 166/2 168/17 170/19 172/19 173/6 174/24 175/3 175/12 175/19 175/24 176/4 176/4 176/6 176/8 176/14 176/25 177/5 178/21 179/2 179/4 179/7 179/25 184/7 185/20 187/10 187/12 189/18 190/22 190/23 190/24 191/19 192/2 192/11 192/19 196/13 197/5 198/8 199/4 199/6 199/10 200/17 202/12 202/24 203/16 203/21 204/4 205/24 206/2 207/19 209/23 210/8 210/9 210/9 212/2 215/22 216/4 216/25 217/7 218/24 219/11 219/25 221/1 221/4 221/6 221/22 225/6 225/17 225/21 226/7 226/9 226/12 226/16 228/12 229/20 230/1 230/6 232/6 234/7 235/6 236/7 237/6 240/4 241/8 242/15 243/24 244/5 245/14 246/13 250/23 251/6

thinking [7] 92/8 109/13 111/23 151/6 158/22 164/20 176/16

third [24] 11/10 12/5 69/23 72/10 77/12 105/2 119/13 119/17 123/13 123/19 143/19 147/12 147/20 149/3 175/13 175/15 190/22 190/23 192/3 192/13 198/12 198/22 200/25 204/2

third-party [6] 119/17 123/13 123/19 143/19 147/20 149/3

thirdly [1] 25/7

this [290]

those [183] 3/5 3/16 5/11 8/16 9/2 10/11 12/5 20/22 21/6 21/22 21/24 23/11 23/13 23/24 29/9 35/4 39/10 39/13 42/25 45/18 51/1 51/9 52/1 52/3 52/4 52/8 53/24 54/14 54/25 54/25 56/22 57/14 57/24 60/2 64/23 65/24 66/4 66/7 68/21 74/15 76/14 77/19 78/2 78/3 82/1 82/5 82/11 84/5 86/2 86/3 91/8 92/3 92/6 92/15 93/14 93/22 96/8 98/5 103/3 103/21 103/25 105/8 106/7 106/11 107/3 107/11 107/18 108/16 108/21 108/25 112/10 112/12 114/16 115/6 119/8 120/14 122/3 122/10 126/3 127/18 127/23 127/23 129/14 129/16 129/24 130/2 130/4 130/10 131/25 132/8 135/4 136/21 138/19 139/7 139/12 141/1 141/11 141/14 143/11 144/14 145/11 146/3 147/2 147/9 147/19 148/6 148/13 148/15 148/22 149/8 149/8 149/17 151/6 157/2 159/6 159/9 160/17 162/24 165/21 166/13 167/19 167/22 168/11 169/16 169/18 169/19 171/5 171/16 176/1 176/5 176/8 176/13 176/21 176/23 179/2 179/9 185/12 185/19 186/9 187/5 190/7 191/15 191/16 191/19 192/3 192/19 192/21 193/9 193/12 195/2 195/13 196/7 196/14 197/3 197/13 197/24 198/5 198/10 198/24 199/2 199/4 200/25 204/5 205/7 205/18 209/12 210/3 210/20 211/8 211/20 212/5 212/9 218/5 218/18 219/2 224/5 234/18 234/19 235/15 245/8 245/9 246/3 247/3

though [21] 24/18 41/1 90/22 141/7 141/8 142/7 142/7 148/5 152/22 153/17 161/18 165/21 169/13 190/16 190/24 200/22 205/8 211/9 223/8 237/19 241/9

thought [16] 23/22 38/1 77/10 105/10 120/1 123/3 150/12 150/13 150/16 150/18 151/4 151/7 220/25 224/4 235/11 244/13

thousands [3] 57/17 107/17 216/20

threat [12] 26/17 50/16 109/3 113/1 113/1 113/3 159/7 196/6 198/24 199/3 200/3 200/6

threats [6] 22/19 31/25 104/16 128/7 172/6 198/17

three [9] 56/24 60/4 60/25 73/14 83/4 85/19 104/24 135/25 183/16

threshold [10] 76/20 77/7 89/22 202/10 221/5 221/11 221/12 222/20 223/11 240/8

thresholds [2] 37/2 169/18

through [71] 4/13 4/19 6/8 6/9 8/3 20/2 28/9 29/14 29/19 30/20 33/18 33/19 36/25 47/21 47/22 52/1 52/24 56/14 72/10 74/3 81/17 82/18 84/12 89/12 89/14 89/24 91/10 93/24 96/3 96/14 96/20 97/3 97/9 97/14 97/20 98/1 98/3 98/8 98/20 99/3 99/12 99/17 99/25 100/7 100/17 103/4 106/21 114/23 117/12 120/17 122/1 122/6 123/14 130/13 134/18 145/4 159/14 170/13 175/8 182/1 187/15 187/17 200/5 200/23 200/24 202/18 202/23 218/13 240/3 240/24 246/19

throughout [1] 181/16

thumbnail [1] 10/6

thumbnails [1] 9/23

tie [1] 155/7

TikTok [14] 22/24 32/23 50/7 59/5 60/21 60/22 67/13 69/6 83/20 163/10 163/12 164/25 178/8 220/1

TikTok's [1] 163/6

time [40] 4/10 10/15 16/2 25/2 48/23 49/24 51/8 51/16 57/15 63/14 63/15 65/14 72/10 77/6 78/13 86/1 94/11 103/22 126/14 129/24 135/1 152/18 155/10 156/16 163/4 175/18 179/9 179/13 187/5 191/22 193/4 195/5 198/3 199/19 202/8 209/16 220/12 235/25 245/23 249/14

timeframe [3] 20/15 59/15 63/7

times [3] 100/6 107/17 161/12

timing [3] 25/24 62/25 197/19

title [1] 41/20

today [10] 3/10 66/23 124/24 126/4 148/11 156/9 177/25 205/22 208/3 233/16

together [8] 5/10 31/12 56/25 58/18 126/2 127/25 128/1 231/20

told [5] 12/16 127/6 225/24 226/15 231/2

tomorrow [2] 28/23 251/13

tone [1] 136/20

too [6] 41/7 54/25 110/24 116/15 145/23 191/14

took [1] 244/17

tool [1] 183/4

tools [6] 50/10 102/19 123/6 128/13 182/12 212/22

top [20] 6/23 13/1 18/23 19/24 25/20 28/12 41/19 67/12 85/12 103/25 107/6 134/1 154/8 170/20 172/25 173/9 187/16 189/5 224/17 246/8

topic [6] 132/12 132/22 201/2 224/12 231/19 246/11

topic-specific [2] 132/12 132/22

topics [7] 64/21 84/6 84/8 92/18 139/22 158/10 158/14

torture [2] 11/18 134/12

tortured [1] 229/3

total [1] 187/12

totality [4] 34/14 63/1 68/3 71/21

touch [1] 141/14

touch-stones [1] 141/14

touched [3] 36/11 217/9 217/23

towards [8] 41/21 70/20 81/17 94/1 107/15 166/13 180/21 197/4

track [2] 92/13 104/16

tracker [2] 66/25 182/9

tracking [1] 71/13

trade [3] 52/14 76/12 107/24

trade-off [1] 107/24

trade-offs [2] 52/14 76/12

traditional [1] 177/17

trafficking [1] 134/12

tragedy [1] 201/25

tragic [2] 3/17 126/2

train [5] 95/21 129/17 143/15 144/1 144/25

trained [8] 134/21 135/4 144/3 145/20 145/24 167/3 167/10 195/2

trainers [1] 143/21

training [30] 106/6 127/15 128/23 130/21 132/4 132/9 138/13

T

training... [23] 143/6 143/7 144/7 144/21 145/8 145/25 146/7 146/16 146/17 146/18 146/20 147/6 147/11 148/23 149/9 149/24 150/5 156/1 175/10 185/13 186/3 195/6 195/14
trajectories [1] 171/6
transcribed [1] 244/9
transcript [1] 241/14
transcripts [1] 207/2
transformations [3] 136/17 136/18 137/25
transit [2] 210/24 211/17
translations [1] 129/8
transparent [1] 59/12
treat [3] 141/6 141/15 241/2
treated [1] 106/14
trend [5] 44/3 45/10 45/13 118/7 141/4
trends [4] 103/25 148/22 149/6 205/9
trialled [1] 93/22
tried [1] 49/25
tries [1] 246/23
trigger [3] 159/3 196/6 198/5
triggered [1] 57/7
triggering [1] 91/17
triggers [1] 102/3
true [7] 1/24 2/14 125/22 159/6 207/13 212/19 212/20
trust [12] 5/8 5/16 5/18 6/8 6/12 9/19 12/8 15/19 86/17 87/15 242/7 243/22
trusted [2] 167/2 250/12
try [17] 53/23 71/24 72/24 81/11 87/12 115/11 128/17 141/15 149/5 190/7 191/3 193/2 226/11 236/8 240/16 246/1 248/14
trying [16] 48/16 48/25 49/18 49/24 57/9 57/20 72/4 94/1 97/8 151/5 151/18 153/22 154/18 173/2 209/21 244/10
Tumbler [7] 187/17 201/2 201/8 201/15 201/25 204/12 205/16
turn [11] 1/17 25/11 118/22 187/21 203/4 209/9 216/17 224/12 231/18 246/10 247/10
turning [2] 7/15 94/6
tweak [1] 20/7
tweaked [1] 135/1
Twitch [1] 33/1
Twitter [1] 22/24
two [24] 2/25 4/11 4/15 18/12 57/3 62/4 92/3 98/2 98/19 104/8 105/2 111/4 114/7 119/18 120/7 121/12 141/1 146/22 198/10 200/18 207/22 212/4 212/7 227/16
two years [5] 4/11 4/15 92/3 119/18 121/12
type [21] 36/16 36/20 62/18 80/10 81/19 93/9 100/9 132/23 143/15 147/23 153/14 168/11 173/3 177/20 179/23 181/6 207/6 219/25 237/13 241/8 250/24
type 2 [1] 207/6
types [12] 9/22 31/24 38/6 79/6 82/9 89/16 108/21 115/7 130/2 158/14 192/19 237/15
typically [2] 188/11 188/14

U

U18s [1] 158/18
ubiquitous [1] 30/7
UK [74] 3/9 4/23 6/14 7/25 8/3 8/12 13/3 13/6 13/7 13/9 14/16 14/19 14/20 14/21 14/23 22/4 26/15 31/10 35/10 41/22 47/13 50/24 59/9 83/3 102/23 104/20 109/2 109/15 109/19 109/21 110/2 110/14 111/19 112/5 112/9 112/10 113/24 114/1 114/9 114/12 114/12 119/13 119/22 120/9 120/19 121/18 130/9 148/2 162/19 164/17 166/5 191/14 197/17 200/3 200/7 200/10 201/11 202/22 203/16 203/20 203/23 205/11 205/14 217/15 219/5 219/14 222/23 223/2 223/14 228/7 228/9 228/12 230/15 232/23
UK-based [1] 114/1
UK-registered [1] 114/12
ultimately [3] 6/21 122/17 197/13
unaware [2] 227/19 233/16
unchanged [1] 43/23
unclear [2] 114/24 244/3
uncover [1] 191/3
uncovers [1] 191/4
uncritical [2] 173/16 173/18
under [88] 7/16 7/19 7/23 8/6 8/13 8/21 9/7 12/13 13/2 14/7 14/19 14/20 14/23 18/1 21/8 21/24 22/4 29/6 39/17 39/25 40/8 41/20 48/14 48/21 49/2 49/17 50/9 54/25 55/16 56/3 56/18 56/21 57/16 67/17 67/21 67/23 68/1 70/18 76/17 77/2 90/25 90/25 108/24 109/5 109/24 111/7 111/19 112/5 112/6 116/14 123/24 133/13 137/23 138/21 145/9 150/20 150/25 155/9 157/20 157/20 157/21 157/22 157/23 159/9 159/18 159/18 159/19 160/2 161/25 162/16 163/6 163/10 163/24 164/19 168/15 168/15 169/8 179/22 201/6 206/18 222/6 222/13 222/15 242/17 243/18 245/9 245/10 245/16
under 13 [2] 157/21 157/22
under 13s [2] 56/18 56/21
under 16 [1] 76/17
under 18 [18] 8/6 8/13 18/1 21/8 21/24 39/25 40/8 48/14 48/21 49/17 50/9 54/25 56/3 159/18 159/18 163/24 245/9 245/10
under 18 years [1] 245/16
under 18s [9] 8/21 14/7 55/16 138/21 155/9 157/20 157/23 159/9 160/2
under-18 [3] 159/19 168/15 169/8
under-performing [2] 150/20 150/25
under-resourced [1] 164/19
underage [2] 55/15 236/22
underlying [4] 24/6 35/5 120/3 201/8
undermining [1] 103/20
understand [46] 41/8 75/23 75/24 87/18 101/16 104/10 113/25 115/3 122/9 139/3 144/5 144/12 146/14 146/20 149/5 151/7 153/17 154/25 156/6 161/18 178/2 183/21 185/24 189/23 189/25 190/7 192/11 195/18 213/13 216/16 218/1 220/17 222/5 224/3 224/6 225/9 228/6 229/10 229/20 231/9 232/16 234/2 240/14 242/24 249/16 249/19
understanding [41] 33/6 71/16 94/20 112/4 112/14 116/17 117/7 120/13 130/18 136/22 146/22 148/5 151/3 154/23 158/17 162/3 162/17 166/4 168/13 168/24 180/1 180/3 191/19 203/7 203/11 208/7 216/13 218/11 219/6 222/16 226/2 229/6 230/12 230/22 234/11 234/17 234/20 235/15 235/25 239/3 250/18
understands [1] 115/19
understood [6] 2/21 4/24 56/23 146/6 219/20 232/10
undertaken [2] 86/8 244/16
unfair [1] 106/19
unfortunate [1] 114/18
unfortunately [3] 33/20 72/3 114/13
unfounded [2] 243/24 244/6
unhappy [5] 28/20 29/2 29/4 30/2 30/12
unhealthy [1] 221/8
uninitiated [1] 129/6
unintended [1] 93/17
unions [1] 83/3
unique [2] 171/8 232/1
uniquely [1] 246/17
unit [2] 103/11 196/19
universally [1] 192/25
unlawful [2] 109/19 110/20
unless [9] 30/20 50/1 75/14 166/14 214/24 215/13 223/22 225/5 240/1
unlike [4] 164/25 165/5 233/5 237/14
unlikely [3] 14/9 48/9 220/18
unlisted [1] 75/5
unpack [1] 56/9
unrealistic [1] 88/21
unreasonable [1] 63/6
unsafe [6] 28/19 29/2 29/3 30/2 30/12 155/2
unsure [1] 161/19
until [5] 40/21 55/13 78/1 161/23 251/15
unverified [1] 123/23
unwitting [1] 221/1
unwittingly [1] 220/19
up [81] 3/4 5/7 7/11 7/13 25/10 26/20 30/9 35/6 36/13 37/12 37/21 39/22 41/6 46/12 47/22 48/6 52/6 52/8 57/23 57/24 58/25 66/1 66/3 66/7 67/22 67/25 73/19 74/8 74/10 80/21 82/19 82/22 88/6 91/6 91/20 92/13 93/15 96/4 101/12 108/8 109/18 110/16 110/17 112/17 114/21 114/25 115/3 116/7 116/18 118/5 118/7 118/15 147/5 153/13 153/23 158/1 159/10 161/21 169/18 172/8 175/15 175/23 176/17 180/17 199/24 201/14 205/1 209/9 215/13 216/20 218/25 219/21 220/22 224/8 224/18 234/11 240/17 241/19 242/10 247/10 248/16
update [1] 58/20
updated [2] 135/1 141/20
upholding [1] 134/5
uplift [6] 152/4 181/3 181/22 184/10 184/24 185/5
upload [2] 123/24 247/7
uploaded [8] 15/4 24/10 75/6 76/21 76/21 76/22 106/5 106/12
uploaders [1] 106/2
uploading [1] 78/9
uploads [2] 75/4 95/16
upon [7] 36/11 67/24 204/15 217/5 221/14 232/14 238/15
ups [1] 186/17
upsetting [1] 45/2
upstream [1] 193/8
urgent [1] 16/3
us [71] 1/9 4/3 4/5 7/21 12/16 15/17

U

us... [65] 18/10 18/13 18/24 24/9 36/5 36/7 37/2 38/16 39/17 39/23 40/11 41/1 49/17 56/14 59/13 61/16 66/21 68/24 87/16 96/2 98/6 100/20 103/15 106/13 110/25 112/6 112/9 112/19 113/8 113/10 113/10 113/16 114/16 114/19 115/5 119/12 121/4 124/1 126/2 126/11 127/5 127/6 133/5 136/17 147/14 148/1 158/3 180/4 183/11 187/5 188/4 191/2 191/13 192/3 196/23 197/5 198/16 200/1 200/24 201/6 204/2 225/6 231/2 233/18 243/12

usable [1] 152/6

usage [6] 69/20 156/25 159/5 178/4 202/1 202/3

use [79] 7/24 8/1 8/4 12/9 13/17 15/12 26/16 28/12 39/1 41/14 42/1 42/14 42/23 43/13 44/15 47/17 50/18 52/5 52/8 52/16 52/19 55/4 56/2 78/25 87/9 92/23 93/20 95/7 102/1 106/18 109/18 119/24 121/5 121/7 123/6 128/13 129/3 131/12 133/20 133/21 142/4 143/8 143/19 145/17 147/4 151/6 156/24 157/2 157/8 159/17 160/8 160/11 160/16 161/12 164/25 165/6 166/2 178/10 179/23 181/3 183/2 186/10 186/22 189/22 193/14 194/14 197/9 197/11 203/3 214/20 221/18 226/5 226/8 226/23 228/20 232/12 233/10 244/21 250/18

used [60] 13/19 13/20 15/1 30/7 30/22 37/11 38/2 40/19 41/6 43/6 50/22 67/12 69/17 80/6 81/1 84/10 84/19 89/7 93/6 93/7 94/24 97/3 98/9 100/8 100/17 104/7 108/9 119/10 121/7 122/9 129/6 130/25 131/5 131/10 131/21 132/3 133/7 134/9 134/20 143/15 144/15 144/25 151/7 161/7 178/7 178/25 182/10 182/20 183/3 183/18 196/15 204/1 204/13 209/2 220/1 220/8 226/5 235/12 242/3 245/21

useful [8] 47/7 57/21 77/3 126/4 128/5 152/12 163/2 244/13

usefully [1] 181/15

usefulness [1] 147/17

user [98] 22/18 39/17 39/23 40/7 40/14 40/15 40/22 45/21 45/23 48/14 48/16 48/20 55/14 56/3 57/10 92/10 92/13 92/25 96/6 97/4 97/17 97/21 102/2 109/21 110/14 111/14 131/20 132/7 132/18 133/13 133/13 135/14 136/18 139/3 140/12 142/13 146/11 146/13 146/15 152/5 153/22 153/23 154/2 155/2 155/5 156/23 157/13 159/2 159/18 159/18 161/11 161/14 161/15 161/19 162/14 162/14 167/15 172/3 178/24 179/4 185/5 186/8 187/13 188/17 193/11 193/14 194/21 195/9 198/10 198/15 198/15 199/15 204/24 214/11 214/18 215/5 215/23 217/5 220/18 222/12 222/12 222/21 222/21 222/22 222/22 223/5 223/12 223/12 223/13 223/13 223/23 223/23 232/5 234/13 235/3 236/21 240/22 246/22

user's [12] 40/6 55/20 111/21 112/7 119/13 120/10 121/18 123/10 159/22 181/17 195/18 196/2

user-generated [1] 223/5

user-provided [1] 142/13

username [1] 217/7

users [107] 7/21 7/23 8/5 12/19 18/15 19/21 20/19 33/15 34/6 39/2 39/3 39/24 40/4 40/8 41/11 47/12 51/2 52/23 52/25 54/12 55/13 55/16 55/25 56/12 81/8 83/17 84/7 84/17 85/11 93/23 95/17 96/4 99/10 101/22 112/10 112/12 113/16 114/12 117/17 119/22 123/1 123/9 124/6 124/7 127/18 127/19 128/3 128/12 130/7 130/9 130/16 130/19 133/20 135/9 138/11 139/7 142/4 157/5 157/19 158/20 159/6 159/16 163/13 163/19 163/23 164/14 169/9 171/4 183/20 187/23 188/11 189/7 192/16 197/2 200/7 204/16 204/20 209/18 211/16 212/7 213/11 215/24 216/22 217/2 218/25 219/5 219/7 220/9 220/11 222/23 223/2 223/4 223/6 223/14 223/19 223/20 223/22 225/8 231/12 233/9 235/5 240/5 240/21 246/2 246/19 247/7 247/11

users' [1] 159/15

uses [15] 19/5 40/3 40/13 86/13 95/15 128/25 129/3 137/10 139/6 143/11 163/7 163/7 222/24 223/3 237/3

using [36] 23/20 30/18 34/6 43/5 43/10 45/18 45/19 52/22 54/6 66/11 71/11 76/18 83/15 86/21 92/22 93/11 93/17 94/13 103/17 105/7 119/16 143/22 143/25 145/20 157/5 157/23 167/22 183/7 196/21 204/17 221/9 233/24 236/14 237/15 245/20 250/22

Usually [1] 155/21

utilise [1] 250/11

V

valid [1] 123/10

validate [1] 9/2

validating [1] 8/16

validation [3] 121/21 172/13 173/16

valuable [7] 152/12 163/18 164/3 164/4 179/3 192/2 199/4

valuation [1] 173/18

value [5] 165/20 175/14 190/25 240/17 240/19

variability [1] 44/13

variance [1] 164/18

variations [1] 173/13

variety [2] 86/14 157/18

various [4] 16/13 130/2 157/25 204/22

vast [7] 19/13 100/11 105/25 124/6 143/18 193/21 194/1

Vegas [1] 183/10

vehicle [2] 110/17 182/17

veneer [1] 180/25

verifiable [1] 164/12

verification [33] 25/12 48/15 48/21 48/24 49/12 49/22 50/11 50/12 50/12 50/13 51/15 52/12 52/24 53/12 119/17 119/22 119/24 120/4 120/17 121/11 121/21 121/23 121/24 123/7 123/13 123/14 123/16 123/18 123/19 163/3 164/1 164/8 236/4

verified [3] 123/23 124/6 124/7

verify [8] 44/21 119/16 122/2 123/20 159/20 160/14 161/2 161/4

verifying [1] 123/17

versions [1] 129/18

versus [3] 184/15 185/25 197/3

very [83] 1/6 2/2 2/16 3/19 8/22 10/9 14/9 26/14 26/18 27/4 27/7 29/21 30/10 32/15 33/5 35/5 39/14 61/9 62/4 62/22 69/14 69/14 77/14 79/9 80/5 81/22 85/22 86/5 87/15 87/15 88/3 104/17 104/17 105/18 106/9 107/11 108/12 122/24 122/25 124/3 124/3 124/8 124/20 124/22 124/23 124/24 125/7 128/1 141/3 143/11 145/22 164/15 167/25 170/10 179/16 183/13 184/24 186/22 190/18 192/11 193/13 197/23 200/22 205/19 205/22 206/9 209/23 212/2 215/23 216/18 218/24 221/24 227/25 228/13 228/18 228/23 233/24 235/21 238/10 238/10 245/7 247/2 248/2

vetting [1] 147/7

VFI [2] 201/10 205/12

via [6] 68/17 71/20 100/12 108/20 130/25 247/12

victim [1] 119/4

victims [5] 83/2

105/14 179/21 245/14 245/20

video [21] 18/17 37/6 37/19 37/21 37/22 47/2 49/3 49/5 50/21 53/18 54/13 79/20 79/22 80/18 80/21 81/4 91/15 92/11 97/13 116/17 239/19

videos [21] 9/22 24/10 31/22 34/21 75/4 75/6 75/10 79/7 79/10 79/24 80/15 80/20 80/22 81/1 84/14 98/17 106/6 107/1 114/15 117/25 250/7

view [24] 18/17 36/21 49/18 73/12 73/13 76/18 80/11 80/16 92/18 98/13 99/6 99/9 99/15 99/19 100/4 100/11 100/15 121/17 139/22 141/24 152/25 217/14 230/19 242/18

viewable [5] 224/22 228/21 230/4 230/18 231/5

viewed [11] 34/8 62/11 79/6 79/11 88/13 88/14 95/17 96/21 98/12 99/16 107/16

viewer [1] 97/13

viewers [9] 8/9 11/3 11/20 11/23 16/17 17/25 21/8 29/17 88/14

viewing [18] 29/13 29/19 30/9 30/24 36/17 47/4 47/7 68/15 68/19 69/16 71/25 72/22 78/7 79/21 84/13 96/23 97/4 99/8

views [14] 96/20 97/8 97/9 98/1 98/23 107/5 107/6 107/7 107/9 107/10 107/18 108/13 108/14 108/20

vile [1] 111/5

violate [6] 17/24 90/1 114/5 118/1 147/1 147/1

violated [2] 112/19 202/3

violates [3] 5/20 12/18 102/13

violating [3] 127/19 239/21 248/9

violation [7] 108/10 110/5 178/4 178/18 194/19 196/1 201/25

violations [7] 10/3 105/19 106/5 112/21 113/14 113/17 159/5

violative [28] 32/15

V

violative... [27] 37/16 46/11 50/24 95/16 95/22 96/19 96/19 97/7 98/1 98/12 98/12 98/13 98/23 99/6 99/8 99/12 99/15 99/18 99/19 100/4 100/11 100/15 102/20 103/9 110/16 116/2 117/22
Violators [1] 204/9
violence [82] 16/15 17/7 18/8 22/20 26/6 31/4 31/6 31/14 31/15 31/18 31/24 80/13 85/7 90/23 93/12 99/24 105/21 111/11 112/23 114/8 126/21 131/2 131/6 131/22 132/20 132/20 133/16 133/19 134/11 136/7 136/10 139/2 139/17 139/20 140/22 140/24 146/19 148/13 148/20 153/15 157/6 157/7 158/11 158/23 158/24 167/9 167/14 167/19 168/16 169/6 169/10 172/12 172/17 176/20 182/12 188/18 191/25 192/20 192/24 193/6 196/14 197/3 197/5 201/11 203/22 204/5 205/13 221/8 224/22 227/10 228/20 228/25 229/2 229/15 229/18 229/21 229/23 230/3 230/10 230/17 231/5 238/2
violence-related [4] 131/22 167/9 167/14 167/19
violent [88] 6/1 9/25 10/21 11/2 11/4 11/12 11/13 16/16 16/18 16/19 17/13 18/11 19/24 21/11 22/19 27/2 27/6 32/20 33/3 35/15 37/4 37/5 37/23 55/16 73/9 76/18 76/19 76/19 77/4 77/5 89/21 89/23 90/1 90/22 91/16 92/12 98/7 100/6 105/21 123/24 123/25 130/25 133/22 141/4 141/5 141/9 147/17 151/20 154/14 158/10 158/14 158/17 158/20 164/24 165/5 167/16 177/22 182/7 182/11 187/24 188/3 188/12 188/16 189/7 191/16 193/1 194/10 208/9 210/7 210/11 210/12 216/8 217/17 220/11 220/19 221/4 225/14 226/19 226/21 227/7 227/8 228/23 238/11 238/17 239/12 241/4 249/9 250/7
violent-related [1] 167/16
visibility [1] 234/22
visible [2] 206/22 240/2
vital [1] 53/19
volume [3] 72/14 108/12 114/13
volumes [2] 24/10 27/21
voluntary [1] 64/14
vomit [1] 11/22
VPNs [1] 209/10
vulnerability [3] 31/4 140/12 239/4
vulnerable [1] 209/3
VVR [2] 117/24 118/15

W

wait [3] 116/9 176/14 192/25
wake [1] 201/19
Wales [3] 28/1 28/4 29/25
wallet [10] 119/5 119/8 119/12 119/23 120/1 120/4 120/5 121/4 121/8 123/15
want [62] 1/19 2/8 9/3 22/8 23/18 29/3 41/6 45/11 50/18 54/9 57/7 57/11 65/7 65/17 68/21 71/14 73/18 75/20 76/17 86/11 86/18 90/16 96/12 106/1 107/5 111/22 112/11 114/2 130/20 130/21 132/2 133/19 133/21 143/5 144/7 144/9 144/12 157/19 170/16 179/8 179/14 180/2 180/14 189/18 192/11 192/25 193/2 196/1 197/24 197/24 201/14 202/18 205/10 221/1 221/4 221/5 229/10 232/6 233/20 240/22 241/18 246/10
wanted [10] 3/13 3/14 3/18 46/25 49/9 54/20 125/25 126/2 144/2 228/4
wanting [2] 76/7 229/8
wants [1] 47/2
war [1] 134/11
warning [10] 13/16 16/7 26/14 91/20 93/8 93/21 104/24 105/1 192/16 202/13
warnings [8] 93/14 93/17 93/19 93/22 93/23 94/2 105/17 194/15
warranted [1] 202/4
wary [1] 164/7
was [198] 3/17 7/20 8/14 14/6 14/8 14/9 14/12 14/17 14/18 15/4 20/13 20/14 24/1 24/12 24/25 25/6 25/7 25/8 26/14 27/19 28/15 28/15 28/23 29/1 30/11 30/12 30/15 35/8 35/9 35/10 35/19 36/8 36/24 37/15 37/20 37/21 37/21 37/22 37/23 37/25 40/21 41/6 44/21 53/25 54/19 55/6 57/1 58/4 59/23 61/14 61/17 62/8 62/8 63/8 63/20 64/25 67/1 67/3 69/6 71/7 72/11 74/13 78/7 82/3 83/2 83/10 83/13 83/14 83/22 83/23 83/24 84/23 85/22 86/8 87/1 87/2 87/19 87/21 87/23 90/1 90/4 94/9 94/12 94/15 94/18 94/19 94/20 94/20 94/23 94/24 95/1 106/15 107/3 107/22 109/7 109/18 109/19 109/21 110/1 111/16 112/22 113/8 114/4 114/19 115/13 115/17 115/17 115/20 115/20 115/21 115/24 115/25 116/1 116/5 116/5 116/6 116/7 116/17 116/21 117/5 117/6 117/15 119/19 120/1 121/12 123/8 125/25 126/9 131/2 136/3 144/2 145/7 145/9 146/11 146/15 146/15 152/16 153/14 155/19 155/23 155/24 155/24 156/12 156/16 160/15 169/2 169/22 171/22 172/19 173/1 178/7 178/8 182/19 184/6 184/9 184/11 185/4 185/11 187/10 189/21 190/1 190/5 191/3 191/6 195/23 201/15 201/16 202/2 202/9 204/12 205/12 208/11 208/19 211/11 219/6 226/16 226/19 228/3 228/14 228/15 235/19 241/19 241/22 242/23 243/11 243/17 244/3 244/9 244/10 244/13 244/23 249/10 249/14 249/17 249/17 249/21 250/4 250/5
was 13 [1] 83/14
Washington [1] 126/12
wasn't [12] 24/20 56/8 57/2 65/22 101/11 107/19 117/12 190/4 190/17 208/10 230/21 233/1
watch [5] 47/2 49/9 57/7 79/22 79/23
watched [1] 97/13
watching [14] 29/4 29/18 33/18 34/21 75/16 76/2 80/19 80/22 84/14 94/11 94/15 94/19 94/20 94/24
Wave [5] 66/25 67/2 67/10 69/25 70/3
Wave 1 [2] 66/25 70/3
Wave 2 [3] 67/2 67/10 69/25
way [40] 12/21 13/10 13/13 19/1 22/9 25/12 27/16 36/21 92/14 92/19 94/18 97/22 112/16 113/12 114/21 115/4 141/16 145/4 146/14 155/4 158/24 160/23 166/9 177/21 177/25 178/18 179/25 185/4 215/7 218/12 218/25 221/8 225/19 226/14 231/11 235/19 243/6 243/19 244/8 249/23
ways [8] 29/11 99/14 101/23 129/19 131/11 136/11 203/1 208/23
we [821]
we would [1] 112/7
we'll [3] 138/21 175/3 234/24
we're [1] 98/6
we've [1] 227/25
weaker [1] 239/7
weakness [3] 105/16 191/5 239/4
weaknesses [1] 35/14
weapon [2] 32/4 110/20
weapon-related [1] 32/4
weapons [20] 32/1 32/7 37/11 77/7 78/6 109/13 109/14 112/24 114/8 131/13 134/13 134/14 137/7 148/9 157/7 157/8 178/3 183/4 191/21 198/4
web [1] 166/22
website [1] 36/25
websites [1] 28/19
week [5] 59/15 70/3 85/24 104/25 105/2
weekend [1] 8/15
weekly [2] 130/16 130/19
weight [11] 175/5 185/7 185/15 185/18 185/24 185/25 186/7 186/16 186/18 186/22 186/23
weights [2] 143/8 143/12
welcome [7] 24/8 24/11 24/12 124/14 176/4 177/4 177/6
well [51] 23/23 24/12 32/18 38/6 47/16 55/22 57/22 68/12 70/14 94/21 95/1 96/10 102/13 116/11 122/20 124/1 139/5 142/5 143/20 143/23 145/14 147/24 148/3 148/14 149/5 155/13 159/1 164/5 168/12 176/21 177/15 183/22 184/23 184/25 187/19 190/17 191/11 194/1 216/11 227/12 228/2 228/22 229/15 230/5 235/3 240/3 244/3 244/10 245/15 249/14 250/15
wellbeing [2] 78/25 80/24
went [2] 109/18 118/15
were [95] 5/10 9/1 13/5 14/8 23/25 24/14 24/17 24/18 25/14 25/22 27/16 28/11 28/18 35/23 49/24 54/1 54/22 56/25 58/16 59/16 60/1 60/1 60/3 60/4 60/10 60/13 60/15 60/15 61/4 61/5 64/18 64/22 68/10 71/8 76/7 76/8 76/10 83/20 83/25 84/4 84/6 84/7 84/13 84/19 84/20 85/14 85/17 85/20 85/24 86/21 94/25 101/4 106/24 107/1 114/1 114/11 114/12 115/23 117/14 117/15 121/6 123/3 145/12 145/24 146/13 156/1 159/4 159/6 165/14 171/23 171/25 172/5 172/11 173/13 174/13 174/17 178/25 182/10 183/23 185/10 188/3 196/9 198/22

W

were... [12] 198/24 202/3 202/6 205/6 205/15 229/24 230/14 230/22 232/19 232/20 236/6 248/20
weren't [3] 28/24 54/20 78/9
West [1] 126/10
West Point [1] 126/10
what [186] 2/25 5/16 5/25 7/22 8/12 9/20 13/23 14/14 16/8 19/24 20/1 20/16 23/3 31/6 33/4 34/15 34/17 35/21 37/10 37/20 38/1 39/12 40/11 41/1 41/2 46/3 47/1 48/19 56/13 59/13 61/5 62/10 64/25 65/15 65/17 65/22 66/4 66/8 66/20 67/9 68/5 68/10 68/14 69/4 69/9 71/16 72/8 73/3 74/3 75/14 75/15 75/16 75/24 76/1 76/1 76/12 76/20 76/22 79/13 80/2 81/16 83/6 84/19 84/20 85/4 86/2 86/21 89/22 92/24 93/2 94/23 94/24 95/1 96/2 97/4 97/9 98/8 100/1 100/5 100/5 100/7 100/21 100/25 101/5 104/3 106/1 108/21 109/1 109/10 111/5 111/15 111/24 112/15 116/5 119/5 120/14 120/19 122/9 123/15 126/22 127/2 128/2 128/10 132/6 132/7 140/23 141/7 141/16 144/12 147/9 148/10 149/5 151/5 151/24 152/3 152/18 153/21 157/2 158/13 158/21 162/21 163/7 163/8 172/19 173/4 174/25 175/24 176/7 177/23 178/15 181/10 182/1 185/7 187/13 189/23 190/5 190/6 190/15 191/3 192/12 192/21 192/22 193/9 195/9 197/8 197/16 197/20 199/8 200/21 201/1 202/8 202/22 205/11 205/21 209/21 211/11 213/6 214/4 214/7 214/8 214/9 215/1 218/8 219/1 219/24 225/9 225/19 227/10 228/22 228/23 231/12 232/21 233/24 234/12 234/17 235/17 236/18 237/1 237/6 237/19 239/6 245/5 245/25 249/16 250/4 250/20
what's [14] 15/17 52/18 61/24 86/25 92/22 128/4 136/7 146/24 162/13 162/15 191/18 201/19 243/16 245/4
whatever [2] 89/23 238/22
WhatsApp [2] 32/25 249/3
when [94] 1/19 7/14 13/4 13/21 13/23 14/13 18/15 20/13 23/15 24/3 27/17 27/20 27/21 28/11 30/7 34/20 38/9 49/5 49/10 54/18 61/14 62/21 73/8 85/4 87/7 88/13 93/21 93/23 94/12 94/22 96/13 96/21 96/21 98/6 98/7 99/25 100/6 108/17 114/12 116/21 121/12 127/14 127/15 127/17 129/1 129/17 132/6 135/14 136/6 136/18 139/8 144/14 146/7 148/17 150/22 150/25 152/14 153/25 154/24 155/4 158/22 161/21 164/20 167/2 169/6 169/8 171/3 175/14 176/10 179/15 181/13 185/10 185/23 186/11 190/6 190/20 194/18 200/14 200/19 200/23 202/25 209/9 214/15 214/17 215/5 215/17 228/13 230/22 237/18 240/16 242/3 244/21 246/22 249/19
whenever [1] 190/22
where [85] 1/20 2/25 4/10 12/3 18/22 21/7 26/2 30/23 34/6 45/12 47/17 48/16 50/8 54/8 54/19 56/20 57/16 57/20 59/7 63/10 65/10 68/1 68/16 72/2 72/6 72/9 77/14 79/19 93/9 96/12 99/23 103/8 103/10 103/19 104/4 104/7 104/9 104/11 104/15 104/23 106/6 106/17 107/16 109/10 109/20 110/13 112/22 115/16 123/13 123/17 131/20 137/13 138/6 138/16 146/17 149/4 153/8 155/5 156/10 161/25 179/10 179/12 193/1 193/2 193/16 193/22 193/25 196/7 209/24 212/3 212/10 221/2 222/21 223/12 227/7 227/16 227/25 235/12 239/8 240/7 241/5 241/24 242/13 247/7 248/11
whereas [1] 123/15
whereby [3] 14/17 19/19 54/4
whether [60] 14/6 21/15 22/2 23/17 24/6 24/25 25/5 29/15 37/15 37/16 40/15 56/3 57/9 58/1 60/13 71/10 71/22 72/11 72/18 72/24 73/11 76/18 77/3 90/14 95/24 96/14 99/9 99/22 112/18 113/16 113/25 116/1 117/25 121/2 127/18 130/24 130/25 131/5 139/25 142/2 146/10 159/17 163/11 168/1 168/4 169/9 171/5 175/24 177/3 178/24 196/22 201/10 202/3 202/4 217/14 218/10 239/7 239/9 248/10 249/22
which [169] 3/23 4/6 4/12 4/17 4/23 6/11 6/24 12/4 13/9 13/10 13/13 13/18 15/3 18/7 18/12 28/5 28/19 29/5 29/7 29/12 32/11 34/13 35/1 38/2 38/23 41/5 42/16 42/24 44/14 51/12 52/9 52/13 52/15 55/11 57/10 60/1 61/1 61/14 62/6 62/23 63/7 63/20 64/6 67/25 68/18 74/9 75/3 75/10 78/6 78/16 80/7 81/10 82/25 83/13 94/8 94/18 96/3 98/17 105/16 107/6 109/11 109/11 109/13 109/18 111/11 112/17 112/17 113/8 113/12 113/12 113/14 113/15 113/21 115/14 115/24 117/14 117/15 117/15 121/5 121/22 123/16 126/14 126/22 126/25 127/2 127/3 129/18 130/7 130/22 131/7 132/12 132/13 132/17 132/19 133/2 134/6 135/4 135/12 138/1 140/8 141/9 142/8 143/1 146/24 147/3 149/19 149/21 151/8 151/14 152/2 152/4 152/8 153/5 154/9 155/11 155/11 159/23 160/19 164/20 165/19 166/22 168/18 171/22 172/1 173/5 174/8 174/13 175/3 175/4 176/2 176/19 176/22 178/8 178/11 179/19 181/22 181/24 182/10 183/1 184/5 185/15 189/7 189/16 193/11 201/3 201/16 207/5 210/18 210/21 211/4 211/15 212/7 213/12 213/23 215/3 221/25 223/20 224/25 225/6 226/3 230/8 230/14 230/15 234/10 235/4 237/4 246/6 246/7 246/19
while [16] 27/10 43/23 44/24 45/3 51/3 52/10 52/24 53/23 103/1 116/11 140/16 176/13 210/9 221/16 239/11 250/6
who [75] 6/9 6/13 6/16 6/18 6/19 6/20 7/2 7/6 7/9 7/23 7/24 22/5 22/12 25/22 26/10 27/10 28/24 29/18 30/23 32/3 33/15 33/16 33/17 36/15 38/11 44/22 45/18 47/23 48/7 49/15 51/9 51/24 51/25 53/21 53/24 57/6 57/10 69/2 70/19 76/17 78/25 92/18 93/11 112/10 119/8 119/16 131/2 141/11 145/11 153/14 158/23 169/20 186/10 195/13 197/2 197/3 197/14 197/17 204/16 204/20 209/12 210/2 210/12 218/9 218/19 218/23 221/7 221/19 223/23 223/23 226/10 233/9 240/3 240/15 240/21
who've [1] 32/7
whole [6] 8/7 45/9 108/17 120/22 145/13 175/25
wholly [1] 96/5
whom [1] 209/3
whose [2] 102/12 182/19
why [60] 8/19 14/23 14/24 16/6 16/6 23/24 25/7 30/11 36/8 48/22 50/15 50/19 52/5 52/7 56/8 61/7 62/15 62/19 66/18 73/15 73/15 79/17 80/9 80/13 80/15 81/2 81/18 92/15 97/6 111/14 116/7 117/6 117/11 117/12 117/16 118/9 118/9 118/15 133/16 138/8 138/9 146/12 148/12 153/11 155/24 175/16 182/4 186/17 224/3 227/17 228/19 230/3 230/4 232/25 233/13 240/22 241/20 242/6 242/18 245/14
why 13 [1] 36/8
wide [1] 109/6
wide-scale [1] 109/6
widely [5] 95/17 140/15 178/22 183/18 194/4
wider [3] 85/6 196/7 204/3
widespread [2] 31/14 32/10
will [154] 1/23 2/6 2/24 3/24 7/1 7/15 16/12 17/21 25/3 26/1 27/7 27/11 28/8 28/22 30/21 33/15 34/6 34/21 34/22 37/14 38/14 38/18 39/12 39/22 41/8 45/9 46/14 46/20 53/23 58/11 61/1 61/9 63/12 63/18 66/2 66/10 68/16 69/4 71/24 72/2 72/6 72/9 72/15 74/2 80/4 81/18 81/24 82/5 82/17 87/18 89/15 89/18 93/1 93/3 94/9 94/16 99/15 99/19 100/11 100/16 100/23 101/13 103/6 104/25 105/2 105/3 109/15 115/6 118/17 118/21 124/16 124/19 127/22 129/17 129/19 129/20 130/14 131/25 132/6 133/2 136/9 136/10 138/19 138/21 138/24 139/8 140/7 140/20 142/2 142/6 142/23 143/7 145/23 151/19 151/23 151/24 154/2 157/11 158/3 159/9 160/19 165/15 165/17 166/6 166/9 167/11 167/16 168/4 168/13 168/13 168/19 169/2 169/18 170/14 170/15 170/19 172/21 173/8 175/3 177/15 186/4 187/18 188/19 192/7 193/5 193/9 193/9 193/21 193/22 193/25 194/2 198/14 199/6 205/10 206/3 206/21 207/2 207/4 210/6 210/14 215/7 216/4 220/5 221/2 222/3 222/17 224/8 225/19 226/11

W

will... [5] 230/1 242/21 243/1 245/3 246/22
willingness [1] 243/9
wind [1] 175/22
within [55] 5/1 5/2 6/11 6/14 6/19 8/25 10/22 20/6 27/20 30/8 66/7 68/17 77/19 85/6 85/18 90/11 102/4 104/19 104/19 116/19 126/25 127/2 128/24 135/19 138/15 138/19 140/3 155/5 155/12 155/22 156/1 160/11 162/21 163/25 179/21 194/11 196/17 210/10 220/4 220/14 221/10 222/13 223/7 223/25 224/5 225/19 226/13 226/21 229/22 229/23 233/19 234/8 235/5 241/5 245/24
without [34] 16/7 33/5 36/6 36/13 37/14 39/5 47/13 50/23 52/20 53/12 59/16 73/2 79/1 103/20 106/10 106/20 108/13 115/12 117/9 131/3 131/17 133/8 137/11 140/22 174/14 174/24 175/22 212/16 215/11 221/21 225/11 229/1 236/14 248/16
witness [18] 1/14 3/6 124/25 125/15 125/17 133/2 162/8 205/21 206/8 206/14 206/20 207/8 208/3 220/6 224/13 231/19 241/18 252/13
WITNESS A [8] 206/8 206/14 206/20 207/8 220/6 224/13 231/19 252/13
witnessed [1] 31/24
witnesses [1] 101/13
wits [1] 240/15
woefully [1] 231/11
won't [5] 3/2 25/2 45/19 106/21 232/20
word [2] 128/25 151/6
worded [1] 80/6
wording [4] 17/15 60/14 140/8 227/8
words [13] 22/25 128/24 145/19 152/6 159/13 166/10 178/12 184/11 185/16 191/16 228/24 247/3 247/7
work [32] 5/16 21/20 27/13 45/17 90/6 92/6 93/19 94/5 97/4 97/22 100/1 114/19 122/15 127/8 127/24 128/1 128/10 129/4 130/13 145/4 147/20 161/9 170/2 175/9 187/5 194/12 203/19 204/4 219/19 227/14 240/10 243/12
worked [7] 4/7 4/8 120/23 121/1 121/11 122/6 126/7
working [16] 5/10 7/2 21/25 92/3 92/17 118/17 119/18 121/13 122/6 122/8 122/9 134/18 142/5 192/13 203/22 246/1
works [6] 6/4 91/20 105/19 128/3 215/23 220/25
world [14] 22/5 31/18 91/10 131/19 141/5 143/2 144/14 151/9 159/8 186/17 196/5 197/5 201/11 205/13
world's [2] 53/18 54/13
worried [1] 77/22
worrying [1] 44/4
Worryingly [1] 26/10
worse [4] 32/23 32/24 165/19 185/6
worst [4] 28/23 29/25 32/23 69/10
worth [5] 39/14 189/19 199/10 221/23 240/4
would [320]
would-be [1] 188/25
wouldn't [26] 45/23 45/24 47/3 57/12 60/3 65/7 76/4 81/15 92/19 93/14 103/18 104/9 104/13 105/23 109/23 109/25 110/4 110/6 114/2 124/3 124/8 139/12 145/4 183/24 239/1 239/13
wrapping [1] 205/1
write [3] 7/10 75/20 128/14
writing [4] 101/9 124/17 130/11 136/20
written [3] 66/3 230/22 249/24
wrong [2] 128/19 145/14
wrongly [1] 161/1
wrote [3] 59/3 66/18 185/22

X

x axis [1] 154/10

Y

Yeah [1] 154/18
year [32] 8/19 12/13 25/14 30/15 30/16 32/6 36/15 37/7 41/15 44/22 51/24 51/24 57/16 67/23 68/1 70/1 70/19 79/11 80/1 83/16 84/7 84/21 90/25 90/25 162/10 197/17 206/18 207/10 221/6 235/7 236/2 244/2
years [11] 4/11 4/15 48/2 49/2 49/16 62/3 92/3 95/13 119/18 121/12 245/16
yes [255]
yet [7] 70/10 121/3 121/10 155/17 224/2 228/10 243/19
you [795]
you'll [1] 183/22
you're [1] 114/6
you've [1] 250/15
young [26] 26/18 28/4 28/10 29/15 30/6 31/7 31/20 38/12 45/12 52/11 54/25 71/20 72/23 79/20 80/19 81/22 82/6 82/12 83/17 85/11 117/17 221/18 235/5 241/24 242/1 242/13
younger [8] 20/18 47/17 52/25 73/21 77/21 81/8 88/14 90/14
your [164] 1/9 1/14 1/25 2/3 2/5 2/14 2/18 2/20 3/6 3/6 3/21 4/4 4/5 4/6 5/7 8/14 9/6 9/17 10/6 10/15 12/14 12/16 14/24 16/1 16/11 17/13 17/19 19/22 20/24 29/20 33/3 33/21 36/5 37/1 38/10 38/19 39/21 43/13 47/10 48/19 54/9 54/19 58/19 61/7 66/5 73/4 73/18 74/25 76/9 78/3 78/21 79/9 80/2 80/4 80/9 80/14 82/17 82/22 87/10 87/18 88/4 89/2 89/19 90/15 91/2 91/19 94/7 95/4 96/16 98/18 99/21 100/25 101/4 101/15 104/22 105/17 106/10 106/12 108/10 109/16 111/7 116/14 117/12 117/21 118/5 119/19 120/18 121/17 123/4 123/21 124/4 124/22 125/10 125/15 125/16 125/19 125/22 125/24 126/6 126/17 126/17 126/25 127/5 127/20 128/17 130/15 133/2 138/23 140/21 141/24 147/14 152/14 155/13 156/25 158/1 159/10 162/11 165/3 170/13 175/8 190/19 197/5 199/24 201/6 202/1 202/18 202/23 205/20 205/20 205/22 207/1 207/3 207/3 207/4 207/8 207/13 207/17 207/22 208/2 208/13 211/8 217/10 219/11 219/21 220/6 220/16 221/3 221/5 224/4 226/17 227/16 228/10 229/8 231/4 231/20 232/12 233/6 243/16 246/4 246/12 247/11 247/25 250/10 250/21
yourself [1] 54/17
YOUT000001 [2] 2/4 2/6
youth [3] 31/4 31/9 94/22
YouTube [173] 3/2 3/9 3/18 3/23 4/12 4/14 5/1 5/2 6/4 7/14 7/22 7/25 8/1 8/4 8/21 9/9 9/10 9/11 9/20 9/21 9/22 11/4 12/19 13/16 13/25 14/21 16/13 16/18 17/6 18/2 18/16 18/21 19/5 22/24 23/9 23/10 23/24 23/25 24/17 24/20 25/6 25/8 26/15 27/13 27/16 28/23 29/1 29/4 29/5 29/12 29/13 29/16 29/22 30/7 30/13 30/16 30/19 30/22 30/24 32/13 32/22 33/3 33/14 34/2 34/20 34/21 35/1 35/10 36/6 36/12 36/16 36/17 36/21 38/16 39/1 42/22 45/15 50/21 50/21 59/5 59/23 60/2 60/11 60/21 60/22 61/6 61/11 62/16 63/22 64/1 64/11 64/14 67/13 67/19 67/22 67/24 68/2 68/6 68/11 69/8 69/9 69/17 70/5 70/12 70/16 70/20 71/5 71/7 72/1 72/7 72/12 72/16 73/7 73/12 73/14 73/20 73/25 74/9 76/18 78/24 78/25 81/17 83/11 83/13 83/21 83/22 85/16 86/4 86/10 86/11 86/13 86/22 86/24 87/2 87/11 87/14 88/10 91/23 92/2 92/7 92/8 92/9 93/10 94/11 94/13 94/16 94/19 94/20 94/24 95/1 95/15 95/22 100/12 100/25 103/2 103/24 109/1 113/23 114/1 114/11 114/25 115/14 115/20 115/21 116/6 117/4 117/5 117/10 123/16 123/17 123/19 123/23 182/20
YouTube Kids [4] 30/19 64/14 70/20 73/25
YouTube's [8] 8/5 9/18 16/24 35/14 62/19 86/2 87/25 118/1
YouTube-related [1] 4/14
YouTube-specific [1] 86/4

Z

zombie [2] 32/5 109/18