Wednesday, 11 November 2026

(9.45 am)

SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: Please remain standing for a moment.

MR ALISTAIR LAW (affirmed)

SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: Thank you very much. Please have a seat. Yes, Mr Moss.

Questions by MR MOSS

MR MOSS: Thank you, sir. Please start just by giving us your full name, if you would.

A. Alistair Law.

Q. Thank you. Mr Law, if we could have on screen, please, TIK000003. We can see this is your first statement to the Inquiry and if we go to page 39 TIK000003_0039, we see, although we have redacted your signature for privacy reasons, that the statement is dated 7 August. Can you just confirm that the contents of that statement are true to the best of your knowledge and belief?

A. Yes, they are.

Q. Thank you very much. And if we could then have on screen please TIK000001. Can you confirm that this is a second statement you provided to the Inquiry, after the Inquiry had drawn to TikTok's attention some deeply distressing material that was hosted on TikTok. And if we look at page 9 TIK000001_0009 of this second statement, again, we see that signed and I think you

provided that statement on 28 August, is that correct?

A. Correct.

Q. Again, just in terms of identifying information that we may rely on, if we can go to TIK000002, please. I think you can confirm that these are the answers that were provided by TikTok UK to a Section 21 notice under the Inquiries Act, that the Inquiry served on TikTok to ascertain information about the posts and the people who were doing the posting of the distressing material, yes?

A. Yes.

Q. Can I make clear, in fairness to you and to TikTok, that this statutory disclosure requirement was provided not because TikTok had refused to provide the information voluntarily but that the Inquiry anticipated that it would be easier to get the information if we provided you with a statutory notice. So there was not a lack of co-operation that led to this notice but it was thought to be helpful. Can you just confirm that that's your understanding too?

A. It is.

Q. Thank you. And then if we have ILT000223. This is the first witness statement of Mr Howarth, the solicitor to the Inquiry, which details -- not just in relation to TikTok, it deals with other matters too, but details the chronology in relation to that material. Can I just

confirm that you have had an opportunity to digest the contents of Mr Howarth's statement?

A. I have.

Q. Thank you very much indeed. If we go back to your statement then, please, and if we look at page 2 TIK000003_0002, paragraph 4. You set out that your own position, Mr Law, is as the Director of Public Policy and Government Affairs, Northern Europe for TikTok. Is that correct?

A. That is.

Q. Like a number of other witnesses -- and the Inquiry is very familiar with this -- you have been asked a good deal of information over a number of policy areas and I think you have had to rely on the expertise of colleagues and draw information in. Not everything within this statement, certainly the detail of it, would be within your own personal knowledge?

A. Correct.

Q. Nevertheless, you were authorised on behalf of TikTok, having pulled that information together, to sign this statement?

A. Correct.

Q. Thank you. I think TikTok UK, we can see from paragraph 4, is the legal entity, is this right, that provides the TikTok services for users in the UK?

A. Yes.

Q. Thank you. By way of your background, I think you joined in February 2024, is that correct?

A. Correct.

Q. What was your background before that?

A. Prior to joining TikTok, I had done ten and a half years in public policy at Sky, the last four of them as Director of Public Policy there. My background, prior to that, was in regulation. I was at Ofcom, the UK's communications regulator, for four and a half years.

Q. Thank you. If we look, still on this page, I think, paragraph 7, please Amanda. I think initially, is this right, your role was UK and Ireland but got it expanded, was it in August of last year, to include the whole of northern Europe?

A. Correct.

Q. Thank you. And I think it -- again, for the technicalities, I think you are a registered director of TikTok UK?

A. Yes.

Q. Can you tell us in outline terms what that role actually involves, please?

A. So, as a registered director, I sit on the UK board, although we are a wholly owned subsidiary and as such, will attend to statutory fiduciary duties in relation to

TikTok UK.
Q. Thank you, and your own particular area of responsibility, if your colleagues were to say: Mr Law, he is ultimately responsible to this, he leads on that, what would be those key areas?
A. It would be broad definitions of Government relations and public policy. So engagements with political stakeholders, some regulatory stakeholders working with legal colleagues and where appropriate, trade associations, NGOs and third parties.
Q. Thank you, and does that include safety moderation?
A. No, it does not.
Q. So when your statement deals with those aspects, is that one area you may be familiar with much of it -- you tell us -- but some of the detail on that is one of those areas where you may have had to draw on information from colleagues?
A. Yes, that is correct.
Q. I follow, thank you. If we look at -- looking now at how TikTok operates in the UK in just a little bit more detail is our next topic. If we can look at page 3 TIK000003_0003, paragraph 9 please.
Obviously, TikTok is available worldwide, at the risk of stating the obvious. TikTok UK is the operator of the platform in the UK and it contracts, I think,

with your customers via the terms of service?
A. Yes.
Q. So we should not think of the terms of service as just being a statement of policy, your users have to sign up to it as a contract?
A. Correct.
Q. Thank you. You tell us, in paragraph 10, that TikTok UK is regulated, unsurprisingly, under the OSA, is that right?
A. (Nods).
Q. I think that the ultimate parent company, is this right, of TikTok UK, you have got it there on the penultimate line of paragraph 10, is ByteDance Ltd, yes?
A. That is correct.
Q. Where is ByteDance Ltd incorporated?
A. In the Cayman Islands.
Q. Why is it incorporated there, do you know?
A. I don't.
Q. Where is it physically based?
A. We don't have a global headquarters, we have colleagues who are based all around the world. TikTok UK goes into TikTok Limited. TikTok Limited has headquarters in Singapore and in LA.
Q. Thank you. What's the position in the US? You will realise that there is a reason, when we come to it later

on, that some of the people involved in posting the deeply offensive material using TikTok were based in the US and there have been, I think, some constraints, which we will come to, about how much information TikTok UK could supply to this Inquiry because they were in the US.
A. Correct.
Q. So what's the corporate structure in the US? I think because of the Chinese affiliations, that had to be different in the States?
A. So a legal process was undertaken in the US following the passage of a Bill in 2024. The result of that legal process was divestment of the TikTok service over there into a joint venture, we refer to it as TikTok USDS, which stands for US Data Security JV, joint venture. ByteDance Ltd is a shareholder in that entity, but at slightly less than 20 per cent and there is no majority shareholder.
Q. Thank you. When did TikTok start services in the UK?
A. In August 8, 2018.
Q. And your current reach -- I think we have got the figures in paragraph 9 -- 30 million people across the UK use TikTok. That, even for such a popular platform as TikTok, seems a very high figure. Is that reliably actually 30 million people or may there be multiple

accounts within that?
A. So, we are confident, in the line there, which is more than 30 million people who access it each month. There are some updated figures that we provided to Ofcom which we could provide to the Inquiry in confidence, but our broad public line is more than 30 million people who we believe --
Q. But you are confident that is people not accounts?
A. Correct.
Q. Thank you. I think you would agree that TikTok has a reputation at least for being particularly popular with teens and the young? I am sure you are keen to have the older market too and I'm not suggesting that it is only teens and the young but that, by reputation, is a significant part of TikTok's demographic?
A. So I would agree that the reputation is of that and that there is a high level of popularity. I think with more than 30 million people accessing it on every month basis, that naturally implies that there is a broader set than just younger people and that that's been reflected in our growth since 2020 onwards.
Q. Do you know the percentage -- if you can get the figures for 30 million, what's the percentage of teen users, those under 18?
A. Again, I think we would be able to write to the Inquiry

in confidence on this about some specific --
Q. Why is that confidential?
A. Because it indicates the breakdown of our user base.
Q. Why is that a difficult matter to just give us a straight answer to?
A. Well, we have given it to Ofcom in RFIs and we would be able to do the same to the Inquiry. I think in terms of a specific percentage, it is around or under 5 per cent that are teen users. We define "teen users" as under the age of 18.
Q. And are you confident that the figure is as low as that?
A. Yes.
Q. Thank you. In terms of the internal structure, I think in broad terms, we have it in paragraph 11, you explain:
"There are multiple internal teams responsible for preventing the misuse of TikTok, including the sharing of harmful content and ensuring that children have safe experiences ..."
That includes a trust and safety team, is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. How big are they in the UK?
A. I don't know the specific figure within the UK of our trust and safety team. It is a global function and I can talk more about how we organise it, but we have

colleagues that are based all over the world, in part to ensure a 24/7 level of coverage. Sandeep Grover is the head of trust and safety, he is based in San Jose.
Q. Thank you. Can you give us an indication of, in broad terms, what the other teams are who are essentially involved in that aspect? So trust and safety team is one.
A. So trust and safety team for -- if the question is in response to the paragraph 11 sharing of -- preventing the misuse of TikTok, including the sharing of harmful content and ensuring that children have safe experiences on TikTok, trust and safety would be the lead team. They would work with our product team, that includes sub-teams such as platform responsibility, who would design the measures and mechanisms that we have that operate to be able to, for example, test the age assurance of individuals.
Q. I understand. So it is obvious that the trust and safety team will have sub-teams, but the statement says:
"There are multiple internal teams responsible for preventing the misuse ... This includes TikTok's Trust and Safety Team ..."
So I'm simply asking what other teams?
A. Yes, apologies if I wasn't clear. I was talking about the product team that work with the trust and safety

team.
Q. I follow. So part of their responsibility, when you say "product team", would be product safety and its design?
A. Correct.
Q. Would that be fair?
A. Yes, developing products that will help put in place the measures and mechanisms that we use to keep people safe.
Q. Thank you. Now, I appreciate that it is intimately familiar to you but it will not be necessarily to everybody, so I do just want to go through briefly how TikTok works. We have a section which we can just follow on screen. So most users access the platform via their TikTok app, is that right?
A. That is correct.
Q. Users can upload content and it is then displayed to other users?
A. Correct.
Q. You have set out, over the page TIK000003_0004, paragraph 15, that members of the public who don't have an account can access a limited amount of content on TikTok as unregistered users?
A. Correct.
Q. But as I have understood your statement, they still have to provide a date of birth in order to do that and the terms of service and privacy policy have to be

acknowledged. Is that right?
A. On the mobile app, that is correct, yes.
Q. Is it different elsewhere?
A. On the web browser that we have, you are available to use that in an unregistered, unrestricted version, without putting that information in.
Q. On the app and on the -- I'm afraid what I think of as the desktop web browser version, is material that should only be viewed by adults and should be restricted for children, is that available to unregistered users?
A. It is not.
Q. So, all of that material is blocked unless you are a registered user?
A. Yes. So when we say "limited amount of content" -- we may get onto what the "For You feed" for registered users looks like, but limited amount of content is a subset of that that comprises our most popular videos, videos that have been through the content moderation process a number of times.
Q. Thank you. If we just go to the previous page TIK000003_0003, just in terms of the feed. It is paragraph 13, I think you explain the basics of that. So "split into variation sections", they can switch between them and I think then you have got a "friends" tab, is that right? What does that do?

A. So if you follow people and if people follow you, then the content that they post will appear in the friends tab.
Q. Thank you. There's also a variety of other functionalities. So I think relatively recently, you introduced a live stream function, is that right?
A. No, the live streaming function has been there for a number of years.
Q. And then there is a shop, I think?
A. Yes, TikTok shop has been available in the UK since 2021.
Q. And an AI assistant?
A. We have, yes, an AI assistant called Tako is available in TikTok.
Q. And TikTok STEM, a feed dedicated to educational and inspiring content covering the STEM subjects, so science, technology, engineering and mathematics?
A. Correct.
Q. So when I ask you later on about some of the difficult content, we should note that TikTok has set up a specific channel or feed on material that, no doubt, would be particularly useful for school-age children?
A. Correct, we see around about a third of children accessing that on a weekly --
Q. I was going to say I think that's proved popular?

A. Yes.
Q. Then the "For You feed", the "For You" page, tell us what that is, in essence?
A. Sure, so if I may, the difference between TikTok and perhaps some of our competitors that came before us, is that our competitors were primarily organised in what we call a social graph. The things that you saw were on the basis of who you followed, what they were posting and it would often appear potentially chronologically. The For You feed is what we call a content graph. The idea being that it will be serving you content from people who you will not necessarily follow, and in fact, the vast majority of the time you won't follow, and we make use of our recommender system, to understand what preferences you have in relation to content and then to serve you content that we think will be of interest to you.

So it is a content graph and you can scroll through videos that are being presented to you on the basis of our understanding of your preferences and interests.
Q. What are the dangers inherent in that?
A. Well, when we look at the risk assessment associated with the service as a whole, we take into account the potential dangers of content that is being serviced through that. We address that then through a range of

systems and processes.
Q. Before we get to how it is addressed, what are the dangers inherent in recommending and providing posts to users which is not based upon what their friends follow?
A. So I think that there is a broad user experience point here of, if we get it wrong and it is not on the basis of things that they are interested in. I think that then there is also a quality element as well, as to whether or not the quantity that is being surfaced is of sufficient quality to make for a good user experience. But these are some of the reasons why we then provide tools for individuals to be able to tailor their own --
Q. I'm going to come onto those. Presumably, if the material on the For You page is "liked", whatever terminology on your platform applies to that, the algorithms will take note of that and take it into account in what is then recommended and pushed onto that feed?
A. Yes, I wonder if I might, when you explain what happens when you start a TikTok journey, which is when you register as a user for the first time, you will be presented with a series of videos, about eight videos and again, these will be drawn from the pool of our most popular videos, ones that have been viewed hundreds of thousands, millions of times. You may like videos 2, 5,

6 and 8 and all algorithm will look at what are the cluster of other users that like 2, 5, 6 and 8 -- and to be clear, when I say "liked", that may not be clicking the "like" button, it may be just watching it, commenting on it, sharing it, versus others that you scrolled past.

It will then look at the cluster of users who have liked those videos, it will identify some other videos that that cluster of users also enjoyed and it will serve those up as the next set of videos that you then look at and use that to refine. It is based on both likes but also other kinds of engagement: watch time, comments --
Q. And so for children, the dwell time, how long they spend looking at a post, is sufficient to -- that information is picked up by the algorithm?
A. It is one of the signals that is taken into account, yes.
Q. So it is picked up by the algorithm, I think the answer is "yes"?
A. Yes.
Q. And that, even without liking, is part of the calculations done by the algorithm?
A. Yes.
Q. In terms of choosing what else is fed, is that right?

A. Yes.
Q. Thank you. If we look at page 4 TIK000003_0004, paragraph 17. You maintain eligibility standards and in paragraph 17 you talk about the algorithm systems using "machine learning to understand a user's preferences based on how they engage with content on the platform".
As you have explained, that includes what they have viewed and engaged with, the time spent -- so the dwell time that I have talked about -- the accounts that the user follows and any active feedback the user has provided. There, you start talking about controls. You give further detail about it in the statement, but you can say "not interested" or you can block a particular topic, yes?
A. Correct.
Q. Then over the page TIK000003_0005 at paragraph 18, there is a diagram of that and then eligibility standards, at paragraph 18, which you say "prioritise safety and are informed by the diversity of our community and cultural practices".
What does "informed by the diversity of our community and cultural practices" mean?
A. So, it means that when we set our community guidelines -- which I think we will come on and talk about -- we will approach the eligibility and where

things fall within the community guidelines, informed on a local context. For example, things that may be offensive in one particular region, because of cultural context, but actually form part of religious services or other kinds of processes in others, may be allowed in one but not in another.
Q. So when you say -- leaving the guidelines and the interpretation of the guidelines to one side, when you say here:
"... For You feed that prioritise safety and ... informed by the diversity of ... community and cultur[es] ..."
You are using location technology, are you, to inform what appears on the feed?
A. Yes, and so another thing that we do is we actively try and serve localised content on the feed, to ensure relevance.
Q. Thank you. And all of that must mean, presumably, that you do have the technical capability to modify what appears on the For You feed, by excluding certain content, including excluding content that hasn't actually been banned?
A. Yes.
Q. Thank you. Can you give some examples where you, in fact, do that?

A. Yes. So we set out some specific examples in the community guidelines, areas that may not be appropriate for the For You feed. So a good example of this might be documentary footage that is in the public interest but that nevertheless may contain some graphic images, and so we will allow that on the platform from a public interest perspective but won't put it into the For You feed for people to stumble across.
Q. Thank you. So we see the essence of that, I think, in paragraph 18, where you say in effect that content which is not suitable for a broad audience is made ineligible for that feed, is that correct?
A. Correct.
Q. Thank you. But that material can still be seen. If the user views it, searches for it or if they are a friend of somebody who has posted it, you could still find that material?
A. That is correct. I think it is worth saying -- and I know we will come to this -- but we have an ability to restrict from the For You feed and we also have our under-18 restrictions as well. Sometimes the two are one and the same, sometimes it is one or the other.
Q. I follow, thank you. Let's turn next as our topic please, Mr Law, to TikTok policy, some of which you have already started to explain.

So if we could have page 7 TIK000003_0007, paragraphs 23 to 24. A phrase that we may need to come back to:
"The safety of TikTok's users is central to how TikTok operates."
Is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. "TikTok UK and its group of companies are committed to creating a safe and welcoming environment for all users, with safety, diversity, inclusion, and authenticity at the heart of its platform. This is reflected in initiatives that TikTok UK and its group companies have developed, independent of any regulatory requirement, and also through our commitment to regulatory obligations, such as those under the OSA."
Just pausing there. When you refer to this being reflected in initiatives, there is a lot of detail in your statement -- and I won't have time today to go to all of it -- but I think you have youth counsel type groups, parent groups that you listen to, you have an engagement with safety-related charities and you have meetings with them and take their views into account, in the broadest of terms, is that fair?
A. Yes.
Q. Thank you:

"TikTok's policies are generally set at a global level, with additional specific policies created at a local level where required, including to complement the local context and culture."

So that's the intent and what you say about the approach to safety. How well is that, do you think, backed up, in practice?

A. So, I think that there are a combination of things here. The first is that we publish, on a transparent basis, how we are enforcing against our community guidelines. That details both the absolute number of videos that we are taking action against. It also shows the percentage of those videos that are violative as it pertains to the wider set of TikTok videos as a whole. These are published on a quarterly basis and we have actually, Chair, updated the latest version of this and we are again, very happy to send that to the Inquiry. But it shows improving and relatively high levels of action against violative content on a proactive basis. So that's using our own models, systems, moderators, either on upload or subsequently because of our actions.

It also demonstrates typically that the total violative content on TikTok is between 0.5 and 0.7 per cent of total content published on TikTok.

Q. But given how much content is published, small

percentages are still very troubling?

A. So that's absolutely one of the reasons why we don't view our approach to trust and safety as something that has been completed. We also have other mechanisms in place to try and ensure that even if videos are missed by content moderation, the reach and impact of them is further mitigated. So I mentioned earlier, for example, that content moderation is something that we will repeat as videos increase in views and reach.

Q. So you have spoken about the relative success in how much is taken down and the steps that are taken and we will come to the detail of some of that. My original question was about how well you think, objectively speaking in practice, that is being achieved. So:

"The safety of TikTok's users is central to how TikTok operates."

I mean, put this way, in contrast to your major competitors.

How do you think TikTok is doing in keeping violent material off its platform altogether?

A. I'm not familiar with the associated stats for competitors. I think what I would say is that the percentage of videos we remove proactively that are violative, is at its highest ever level at 99.5 per cent. Now, I am not saying that we are

complacent or that is, in and of itself, a sufficient number and we want to continue to drive that up and that is the sole focus of the trust and safety teams. But I think if somebody was sat here four/five years ago, those numbers would be lower and the investment that we have made, the iterations in our content moderation processes, have continued to work to try and provide the safest possible environment for people.

Q. We will come to some of the detail but are you not aware of some of the research that points to the fact that in the UK, TikTok is reported to be the worst of the platforms for the percentage of children who come across violent material?

A. I'm aware of certain -- violent material specifically, I'm not necessarily sure I'm aware of that. I'm aware of broader studies from Ofcom, for example, that have indicated that. We have spoken to Ofcom directly about those studies as part of our supervisory relationship and they are important inputs into us understanding, refining and improving our trust and safety processes.

Q. Does that worry you, when you see rankings of that kind?

A. Yes, and I think that it is something that, again, when we receive reports of those natures -- and I can talk again to the Ofcom report, specifically -- it is something that is passed to and escalated to the very

top of our trust and safety team and the trust and safety colleagues that I have, who have a variety of backgrounds in charities, like the NSPCC, WeProtect, working for the UN on human rights, they are dedicated professionals whose primary aim is to create a safe environment on TikTok. They take reports such as those very seriously and make meaningful changes to our approaches off the back of them.

Q. Thank you. So if we look next at paragraph 25, at the high level -- you have referred to them already, Mr Law -- you have:

"TikTok's primary global policy, known as the 'Community Guidelines' ..."

Is that right, apply to your global consumers?

A. Correct.

Q. How do you actually bring those to your users' attention? Can you help us on that?

A. So with a range of different mechanisms. When people sign up, they are obviously presented with the terms of service that reference the community guidelines. I appreciate that we have all been through terms of service processes and may not read them very directly. For our younger teen users when they first sign up and register, we provide a series of videos directly to them that direct them to places such as our safety centre.

Our safety centre has a range of different resources but it includes direct reference to the community guidelines. We will also cover things like the privacy policy as well and how they can set their own settings to what they want, in terms of being publicly available or not.

Q. Thank you. At a high level of generality, as you have set out in paragraph 25, the community guidelines obviously prohibit your users from sharing videos or other content that violate those guidelines?

A. Correct.

Q. And through the terms of service, no doubt, that is part of the contractual arrangement?

A. Correct.

Q. Which means that you can ban --

A. Correct.

Q. -- for breach?

A. Correct.

Q. Thank you. You also set out, just so we have it, in paragraph 26, that those are reviewed and updated on an ongoing basis to address new risks and new issues as they emerge, so they are not static?

A. Correct.

Q. Thank you. So, if we can go to paragraph 27, over the page TIK000003_0008. Key aspects of those community

principles, I'm going to ask that you particularly note (a) (c) (d) and (f) but:

"Prevent Harm;

"Support Free Expression;

"Encourage Kindness and Respect;

"Respect Local Cultures;

"Champion Inclusion;

"Protect Privacy.

"Be transparent and consistent ..."

Forgive me, it was (g), rather than (f) that I wanted you just to note because we may come back to it. Also "Act Fairly". So quite high level but important principles?

A. Correct.

Q. You say, if we just have paragraph 28, that:

"When TikTok has to make trade-offs between competing principles, [you] approach it thoughtfully and rely on internationally recognised [HR] standards ..."

And take account of some of those bodies that I mentioned briefly earlier, so your global youth council, safety advisory council's input from experts.

The trade-off between the competing principles, presumably that's a reference, amongst others, to the trade off between -- if we can just scroll back up, please -- the "supporting free expression" and some of

those other principles?

A. Yes and I think I would probably add "protecting privacy" within there too.

Q. Thank you. Again, just draw out some of the aspects in terms of positive steps that TikTok does take. If we look at page 9 TIK000003_0009, paragraph 30, a little bit further down. You also deal with TikTok shop having specific policies and I think in relation to the shop, a key aspect is the prohibition on some items being sold which includes, relevant for us, particularly bladed products, so knives, I don't think are allowed to be sold. Firearms, ammunition and weapons, I think you don't allow to be sold?

A. Correct.

Q. What's the system of enforcement against that for violations?

A. So, we have product listing rules that are overseen by a team we call "G&E" which is governance and experience, I think is the name. And they will use methodology that is similar to our trust and safety team that use it in relation to user-generated content. So identifying potential sales of prohibited products via use of automated models, their own reviews on listings that are placed up, with then sanctions as well in respect of people who breach it.

Q. When TikTok UK is aware of a UK registered user selling knives unlawfully, in other words, without any controls in relation to children, so advertising knives with no powers. Now, obviously, you will take that down and you will take action. Do you report them to the police?

A. We don't, and just to be clear as well, I think there are three different things that we are talking about here. There's user-generated content that may be advertising knives but not making a payment directly to TikTok. We prohibit the depiction or the promotion of the sale of regulated goods and commercial services. That's in our community guidelines and that includes cold weapons, which would include knives that have a combat or a tactical purpose to them. But we do permit people to include content for, for example, culinary knives. From an advertising specific perspective, similarly, we will allow content involving culinary knives for specific adverts, not sold through TikTok shop, but we won't allow those others and that is age-gated.

Q. Forgive me, I'm interested in -- I appreciate that you have those protections and I haven't challenged that TikTok takes measures to ensure that advertising is appropriate and is not for weapons and that you prohibit the sale of weapons. But people try to get round

protections, yes?
A. Yes, correct.
Q. So can I go back to the question. If somebody, contrary to your terms of service in your community guidelines, either advertises for sale, knives that could be used as weapons -- so you know the sort of thing we are talking about, the type of weapon -- that may be either unlawful of its own, so a zombie knife or something like that, or certainly a knife that can only be sold to those who are over 18; so if it is either advertised or an advert for it, or an actual attempt to sell them through the shop, no doubt, you take it down, no doubt, you take steps to ban them from the shop, or to warn them or ban them. Do you report them to the police?
A. We do not.
Q. Why not?
A. So, our approach to law enforcement proactive disclosure is guided by a couple of things. We have one specific requirement under the OSA in relation to CSAM, where we have to proactively disclose if we identify users who are posting that. Beyond that, we don't have any statutory requirements and our judgement -- we still make proactive disclosures to police, we do that where we identify a credible and imminent threat to life. We made a little over 500 of those proactive disclosures in

the UK in year-to-date and so our judgement is such that, where it has been provided for in law, that implies, I think, that Parliament has chosen to make an active requirement on platforms to report. There have obviously been recent passages in Parliament of relevant pieces of legislation, the Crime and Policing Bill introduced a requirement for take-down of any notified knife sales. Parliament chose not to, at the time, similarly require notification to law enforcement.
Q. If I was suggesting that there was a statutory duty, I would have put it to you, but why don't you do so? If people are using your platform to do something which is unlawful and you become aware of it and you take action to take that down and you know that a criminal offence has been committed by that or it is inciting a criminal offence, even if there is not an immediate risk to life, why not report your users to the police?
A. We are trying to take a proportionate approach overall and balance privacy concerns too and my reason for referencing the statutory requirement is not to say that there isn't one and therefore we don't do it, but I think we are informed by the existence of one for certain types of harms. So our approach is to say: we are statutorily required, we will, where there is a credible and imminent threat to life, we will do that

too. Part of this as well is informed by conversations with law enforcement and, as I have said, we have made 500 plus proactive disclosures under our own assessment of imminent and credible threat to life in the UK in this year-to-date. I think increasing the scale of that is something that, when we have discussed with law enforcement, they are not necessarily asking for because their own enquires are and directions --
Q. Mr Law, I follow that. You will forgive me, you will know, through the work of this Inquiry, that there is a real problem in this country with illegitimate retailers of knives trying to get round the appropriate safeguards. There is a National Knife Crime Centre that is working very hard to try to identify where that occurs. And one of the issues that I'm raising with you as a concern is that, of course it is appropriate to take the material down, to take sanctions, but surely, if we can go back to page 7 TIK000003_0007, paragraph 23, if TikTok and its group of companies "are committed to creating a safe and welcoming environment for all users, with safety, diversity, inclusion" at the heart of its platform, surely even if on a voluntary basis, you would want to be providing the police with that information, where you know the identity or information about somebody who's committed a criminal

offence or is trying to commit a criminal offence through your platform, in relation to something that relates to community safety. So why not go further than the statutory minimum and report them to the police?
A. So, at the moment, our policies don't go that far. I think, as we spoke about earlier, there's always the potential for our community guidelines to be updated and when we update them, we take into account a range of different factors, including recommendations from Inquiries such as these and others. But I think our starting point at the moment is that the balance between creating a safe environment on the platform, protecting the privacy of users, and then the statutory requirements and requests that we are under is such that we will do it where there is a statutory requirement --
Q. Mr Law, there is no privacy issue -- if somebody is committing a criminal offence of advertising unlawful knives, there is no privacy difficulty at all with informing the UK police. I would suggest that you know that very well.
A. I think that the point that I'm trying to make is that our community guidelines are trust and safety judgements that are not judgements of illegality in and of themselves.
Q. Thank you. If we look at page 8 TIK000003_0008,

paragraph 29, the privacy policy:

"... provides transparency to our users regarding the personal information [but] ... TikTok may access, preserve and share information with law enforcement agencies, public authorities or other third parties if TikTok believes in good faith that this is necessary to detect, investigate or prevent any illegal activity, among[st] other things."

So, the very terms of your own privacy policy would permit you to refer unlawful knife sellers or unlawful knife adverts, wouldn't they?

A. Yes.

Q. So there is no balance of privacy concern?

A. Well, I think that the terms providing for it doesn't then necessarily mean that you automatically approach any potential illegal activity with that process.

Q. No, but we are not talking about the lowest end of the scale when we are talking about unlawful knife dealers, are we?

A. I would agree.

Q. If TikTok, following this exchange, has any inclination to change its approach in relation to knife sellers illegitimately -- and I have recognised, I hope, fairly, that you ban them and take action and you don't tolerate that sort of activity on the platform -- but if TikTok

is minded to change its approach in informing the police about unlawful knife activity on its platform, would you update the Inquiry by 17 December, please?

A. I'm happy to give an update by that time. I think I would note as well, as I mentioned earlier, that weighing such decisions is not merely a review of what our privacy policy says and what we are able to do, it is something that we have to think about on a broad basis in relation to a wide variety of other harms and as noted, in relation to law enforcement and their own capacity. And I think I would return -- and I know we have exchanged already, but I think I would return to the fact that this was something that Parliament directly considered, when it put in place powers under the Crime and Policing --

Q. Mr Law, I'm going to stop you. You will forgive me. You have given that evidence and the Chair has your answer. We have not been made aware from the inspector who leads the National Knife Crime Centre that there is a concern about the capacity to deal with platforms in the UK informing that centre about the unlawful use of knives.

A. Understood.

Q. If that position changes, we will let you know. Thank you.

Could we turn to teen users, please. Could we look at page 10 TIK000003_0010, paragraph 38 of your statement. So, users must be 13 years of age or older to use TikTok in the UK. Is that correct?

A. Correct.

Q. And how do you draw the distinctions between the 13-16 group and the 16-18? I think there is some difference.

A. Yes. So users that are ages 13, 14, or 15, operate with a series of restrictions, in terms of both the content that they are able to access and the features and functionalities available to them. Some examples of this, the most prominent one would be direct messages. Direct messages are not available to people under the age of 16 on TikTok. Their accounts are set as private by default and the content that they post is not available for other users to download or to make use of features that we have on the platform, such as stitching and duetting, that's where you use somebody else's content and react to it. That's turned off as well.

When somebody becomes 16, some of those features unlock. For example, direct messaging is now available. But we still have further restrictions in place. So, for example, nobody under the age of 18 is allowed to go live on TikTok live. Nobody can become a TikTok shop seller under the age of 18 as well. From 18 onwards,

the full adult experience, both in terms of functionality and content is available to individuals.

Q. Thank you. So in part, Mr Law, because I won't have time, if you will forgive me, to go through every single aspect but can I put it up on screen so that it forms part of our record because, again, while I will challenge you on some of these aspects, I don't want to overlook the detailed and extensive measures you have set out in your statement. So if we could have on screen page 29 TIK000003_0029, paragraph 118.

What I'm going to ask Amanda to do is just to put that on full screen, just so that the learned Chair can take a moment to refresh his memory of these.

SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: Yes.

MR MOSS: Then over the page TIK000003_0030. You have referred to a number of these already. So, we see (g) for example, the "duet" functionality, which I think is where you can go side-to-side with another user, if I have understood it correctly?

A. Correct.

Q. Is turned off. So those two pages are all child functionality controls and restrictions.

Without overlooking the utility and the benefit of those, I think quite a few of them are things that are set by default to be protective but can be turned off?

A. Correct.
Q. Has any thought been given to making those so that they can't be turned off for your teen users?
A. Yes, I think these are areas that we keep under a constant level of review and is reflected by the fact that some of them, we have opted to disable in full, the direct messaging for example and others start on a default off basis as a suggested guardrail but I think we recognise that -- again, this is informed by conversations, particularly with our global youth council -- that individual users want agency, want to be able to set their own appropriate experience on the platform, even with guardrails that are then in place that we fundamentally stick to.
Q. Thank you, and just on the previous page TIK000003_0029, if we can look down at (e), please. I'm afraid this is my fault for not fully understanding it, but it says:
"... daily screentime limits for Teen Users ... Have their screen time set to 60 minutes by default."
But I don't think it stops them using it after 60 minutes, first of all?
A. On the basis of this evidence, that is correct, yes.
Q. So:
"When teens reach the limit, they are given a 'pause and reset' experience ..."

What's a "pause and reset experience" exactly?
A. I'm afraid, I don't have full knowledge of this myself. I believe that it is a full screen takeover that is similar to our "sleep hours" app that we cover over the page but with apologies, this is one of the areas where I relied on colleagues' input.
Q. But it says they are given a pause and reset experience and are unable to watch videos until a five-second countdown is completed and that's available to adult users as well. So, what I wasn't clear about was whether there was a pause and reset experience -- whatever that means, in practice -- first and then you get a five-second countdown, or whether the pause and reset experience is the five-second countdown?
A. With apologies, I don't know the answer to that either and I would have to consult with colleagues.
Q. The whole issue of screen time and its effect on children is important, but not -- largely speaking, outside the terms of reference of this Inquiry but in terms of potential harm to children, is a five-second countdown really enough to stop doom-scrolling, do you think?
A. So what I do know is that this 60-minute default was something that we specifically consulted the Digital Wellbeing Clinic at Boston Children's Hospital on.

I don't think that any of our competitors have introduced something similar and we worked with them to try and work out what would a sort of centralised approach look like, that then people could vary from, one way or another.
Q. Thank you. Then just page 31 TIK000003_0031, paragraph 120. You also set out the role of parents, carers, teachers, schools and other professionals working with children and their important role in supporting young people's online safety and digital literacy. You set out there -- I'm not going to go through them all, but again, your written statement will stand as your evidence in relation to this -- quite a range of tools, guidance and educational materials designed to assist those responsible for supporting young people online, is that right?
A. Correct.
Q. So the sort of thing is, you have got a "Guardian's Guide", that's (a). There is a range of resources in TikTok's safety centre, which you can put -- direct parents and educators to, and involving -- as we have touched upon already -- at (c), involving parents in feedback.
A. Correct.
Q. Thank you. Can we go, next please, to age assurance.

If we look at page 10 TIK000003_0010, paragraph 39, we see that it says:
"TikTok uses a neutral, industry-standard age-gate that requires people to provide their date of birth when signing up."
Now, just starting with the obvious point, a date of birth is literally child's play to mislead and fake?
A. Yes.
Q. What is the industry standard to which you are referring?
A. It is the fact that the date of birth, when you are presented with it, defaults to today's date, as opposed to defaulting to a date that may be the first date above the minimum age, in terms of service, which some platforms have, in the past, adopted.
Q. Right.
A. Sorry, and to add, and also not to say underneath: you need to be X number of years to be able to access the app. So it is a straightforward: please enter your date of birth, defaulted to today's date, with no additional information.
Q. Do you agree that outside readers of this statement, when they see a phrase "a neutral, industry-standard age-gate" might think that that was something much more sophisticated?

A. I could not speculate, I don't know.
Q. But what it is, is it doesn't promote the age. You have to physically change the date?
A. Correct.
Q. And there's no indication given, immediately below it, of what to put in to circumvent the controls. That's the industry standard?
A. Yes.
Q. Thank you. And you indicate that if someone tries to create an account but doesn't meet the minimum age requirement, they are suspended from attempting to create another account, as well as that account not going forward. Is that right?
A. Correct.
Q. How do you identify if it is the same person trying to create an account again?
A. A combination of different signals. So email address being used is one, device ID being used is another. So if the same device is then trying to do the same thing again, we will block it.
Q. Thank you. And paragraph 41, we have it on the page already, we see that people can report underage users, or suspected underage users and no doubt, your safety team would then look into that --
A. Correct.

Q. -- and do an assessment and get involved and if needs to be, take action?
A. That is correct.
Q. So others can flag it. Importantly there, at paragraph 40, you say:
"TikTok uses automated measures and technologies to look at profile images, content and comments and detect signal, such as keywords, that could indicate potential underage accounts."
Is that right?
A. Correct.
Q. And in a nutshell, is that the essence of how you check, in the first instance, that somebody is over the age of 13?
A. I wouldn't say in the first instance because --
Q. Other than the date of birth that's stated?
A. So we have date of birth and actually the availability in the app store is dependent on the app store being set to the age upon which you would be able to download it. So if your app store age is set at 12, actually the app won't even be available. But then beyond that, once they have signed up, then yes, the automated measures and technologies that we use which run on an ongoing basis are ways in which we provide further assurance beyond the age gate.

Q. Thank you. And you give a bit more detail about that at paragraph 44. Just over the page, please TIK000003_0011:
"... machine learning technology to identify users whose age doesn't match the age provided at sign up. The technology uses information provided by the user ... their profile, device information, the videos they [have] published, their interactions with other users ... and other on-platform behaviour to predict whether a person falls within a certain age range."
Is that right?
A. Correct.
Q. So this is being used, not just to check as to whether they have reached the age of 13, but would also be assessing whether or not they might be an adult -- a child who is posing as an adult?
A. Yes, so a teen user under the age of 18 is the specific thing that we are looking at there.
Q. You don't require any form of identification?
A. No, not at that stage.
Q. Why not?
A. We seek to balance, on a proportionate basis, something that gives a level of assurance as well, as something that is privacy preserving as well.
Q. There are, are there not, lots of ways in which

identification of age can be done in a way that protects privacy?
A. I mean, there are lots of additional age assurance processes, some of which we use in other parts of our --
Q. No, Mr Law, forgive me, that's not an answer to my question. There are lots of ways in which identification of age can be done in a way that protects privacy?
A. I would broadly agree, but I think "protects privacy" is not a binary judgement. Some things are more privacy preserving than others.
Q. When you use those sort of techniques for identification at the appeal stage, surely TikTok takes lots of steps to protect the privacy of that information?
A. Correct.
Q. And you could take similar steps to protect the privacy of the information at the stage of first sign-up, if you required proof of age identification?
A. So I'm confident in the processes that we adopt to protect data that we hold on individuals. I think -- and apologies, because I'm not a privacy lawyer, but there are obvious requirements to minimise the amount of information that you are collecting about individuals, even if the protection of that data is assured through data security approaches that you have. I think that

that's one of the guiding principles in the approach that we adopt.

Q. Mr Law, I'm going to try the question once again. You could take similar steps to protect the privacy of information at the stage of first sign-up, if you required proof of age identification at that stage?

A. Yes, that is correct.

Q. Thank you. I think, in terms of if a suspicion is picked up by the automation, it will then get passed, is this right -- it is paragraph 42 I think, on page 10 -- it will then go to moderators in the first instance?

A. Yes, human moderators in relation to if we believe someone is under the minimum age, ie under 13.

Q. Thank you. And in essence, looking at paragraph 42, do they then look at the type of information that's been picked up in an automated way and assess it and make a human judgement then, at that stage, or what?

A. They look at both the information that has been picked up, if it has been automated, they will also look at any user reports and they have the ability to view the accounts more holistically. So it may have been flagged because of the automated technology or it may have been flagged because of a user report but our human moderation team has the ability to look holistically at every aspect of the account to make a determination.

Q. All right, and then if looks as though -- but you will tell me if this is wrong -- but it looks, from the final statement, as though the user's not, at that stage, asked to engage in confirmation. If the moderator concludes the user is 13, they are immediately banned?

A. Correct.

Q. But there's then an appeal process --

A. Yes.

Q. -- that they can go into, is that right?

A. Correct.

Q. And so if we go back over the page, page 11 TIK000003_0011, paragraph 44, we see that, in terms of the technology that is being used, they can object to the use of that technology to predict their age but they will, I think, at the appeal stage, be asked to provide a number of forms of identification or a number of different methods, by which they can prove that they are the age that they say they are. Is that right?

A. Yes, there are a number of options available to them.

Q. Thank you. And that might be a selfie with ID, a parent or guardian confirming their age, alongside the parent confirming with a credit card?

A. Correct.

Q. A photograph with a parent or a guardian over 25 years of age?

A. Correct.

Q. Thank you. So if we just look at TIK000025. "Minimum age appeals on TikTok". So I think this is the guidance on this. If we just look at page 2 TIK000025_0002. We get to see how you go through it and for the Chair's note, we see all the things that can be done at an appeal's stage: selfie with ID; ask your parent or guardian; photo with parent/guardian; credit card authorisation and so on.

I think, in broad terms -- we don't need to turn it up, but, sir, for your note it is TIK000026 -- that the same types of identification can be used if the user objects to the automated technology being used?

A. Correct.

Q. So just to be clear about this, if somebody seeks to sign up but is given the privacy notice and says: actually, I don't want you to suck out all of this data that is trying to assess how old I am. You then go into a situation whereby they can provide something like a driver's licence or a passport?

A. Correct.

Q. Or another form of identification or credit card et cetera, at first sign-up?

A. Yes.

Q. So it is perfectly possible to do that because TikTok

does do it?

A. Yes, and I would agree that, you know, to refer to your earlier conversation, we can absolutely keep that data safe. Again, I think the point is on proportionality and the use of automated technology as a first instance as the best way of preserving privacy and making that trade-off.

Q. Is that right? Because that technology is soaking up lots of information about the user automatically. Information about where they are, what they have been looking up, soaking up a lot of personal information to make the automatic assessment. Why is that more proportionate than getting a form of identification?

A. Well, again, I'm not a privacy lawyer so I don't --

Q. Forgive me, you don't need to be a privacy lawyer to comment on that.

A. Well, so, I suppose that things like selfies with IDs, things like facial age estimation -- facial age estimation, I think is termed as biometric information as well -- tends to be treated as more sensitive beyond activity on the platform itself.

MR MOSS: Thank you. I note the time, sir. Would that be a convenient moment to break until 11.15 am for Remembrance Day commemoration?

SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: Certainly. We are going to take

a break now and I will rise until 11.15 am.
(10.49 am)
(A short break)
(11.15 am)
SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: Please have a seat. Yes, Mr Moss.
MR MOSS: Thank you, sir. Mr Law, I had to break off mid-topic, for obvious reasons, but we are still dealing with age assurance, so if we could have page 11 TIK000003_0011 paragraph 43, please, you are keen to observe, I think, in your statement that TikTok actively monitors the number of suspected underage accounts it removes and remains the only platform to transparently publish those numbers in a quarterly report.
So there's your point about TikTok's efforts in relation to transparency.
A. Yes.
Q. And in terms of suspected underage accounts, between January and March of 2026, TikTok removed 25,700,000-odd suspected underage accounts. I assume that's the global figure?
A. Correct.
Q. Do you see that as a good thing?
A. I see the activity that we take to prevent underage accounts staying on the platform as a good thing. I recognise that a large many of that implies the scale

of attempts that are being made. I think, when taken with the other elements, which I know we will probably come onto to discuss, in terms of how we treat people upon sign-up, I think that it represents an approach that still keeps people safe and shows the level of activity that we have and investment we have in enforcing our minimum age terms of service.
Q. The reality is this, isn't it, that that figure is very double-edged. So on the plus side, it does show how active TikTok is and the sheer number of accounts that it is banning for being underage. But it also shows how many people are trying to get onto TikTok and at least initially succeeding, when they are underage, or assessed to be underage, yes?
A. Correct.
Q. And presumably you would agree that if TikTok had the appeal-level measures of forms of identification, those figures would be much lower?
A. I think they would be lower, yes.
Q. Because they would be more reliable, not foolproof, but more reliable in identifying whether or not a new sign-up user was actually a child or not?
A. Yes, my understanding is that the efficacy of those other approaches is likely higher than age estimation technology. I think when we think about our approach,

we also try and ensure that it is working in construct with the community guidelines and our enforcement of those, such that when people are placed into the platform experience, they are placed into an under-18 content experience, regardless of what age they have said in the UK. And so the combination of those things and our high level of activity in terms of identifying suspected underage accounts, to us, creates a proportionate system.
Q. You say it is proportionate but it would be more reliable if you used standardised forms of checking age identification?
A. I think that the likelihood is that it would be a higher level of earlier enforcement, yes.
Q. Is the answer to my question "yes"?
A. Yes.
Q. Thank you. You understand that in the context of this Inquiry, the reason why I wish to explore -- perhaps in a way challenging, but I hope fairly challenging, your evidence in this relation to this -- is because AR used a false date of birth with both X and Instagram -- other platforms, of course -- and he lied about being an adult and as a result of that, he was able to view a graphic video of the stabbing of a priest just minutes before he went out to murder those three young girls and stab all

the others.
A. Yes.
Q. When one takes into account the seriousness of potential harms from children being on any social media platform, I don't just mean TikTok here, shouldn't you be seeking to use the most reliable forms from the outset?
A. So, we are obviously guided by Ofcom's guidance and our own judgements about what we consider to be robust and appropriate. I think there are always trade-offs to be made. The version of a -- an extreme version of this could be providing every single piece of information in relation to somebody's age and as I say, this works in construct with our community guidelines and our approach to content --
Q. One understands that, but my question was, shouldn't you be seeking to use the most reliable forms from the outset?
A. Again, I think there are trade-offs that is one needs to consider, including the importance of minimising the amount of data that is being captured in the first --
Q. Mr Law, forgive me, we have been through this. You capture that data when there is an appeal.
A. Correct.
Q. And you hold it securely and many other platforms use age identification across the country in all sorts of

ways, whether for purchasing alcohol, or all sorts of different places, there is age identification. And so I suggest that privacy is not the real issue here.

A. Well, I think that this is obviously something that the UK Government is looking at, in terms of its proposals --

Q. Mr Law, I'm not asking about the UK Government, forgive me. And I'm not asking about what the minimum standards are, although we will come onto those. I'm asking why TikTok has chosen to use an age verification system which it knows is not the most reliable one. What's the answer to that question?

A. We believe that our age assurance process is robust, proportionate and effective.

Q. So although it is not the most reliable, it is sufficient, is that what you are saying?

A. Yes.

Q. Is it more expensive to run the system that you run on appeals than the automated system?

A. I don't know the answer to that, I'm afraid.

Q. Do you think it is likely to be more expensive? We don't need to go back to it, but when you have to have a system of verification involving parents producing a form of identification that's provided and checked, it stands to reason that that's more resource and labour

intensive, yes?

A. I think my only uncertainty is around developments of the automated technology that we use. Some of which will take really significant levels of investment and R&D, so I don't think I'm in a position to suggest one is greater than the other.

Q. When TikTok decided and continues to opt to use what is less than the most reliable system, did it take into account the costs, and what I'm going to suggest are the obvious greater costs of using the more reliable system; is cost a factor?

A. I don't know specifically. I would infer that obviously the practicality of us being able to deliver it on an operational basis is taken into account.

Q. Mr Law, not the practicality. The cost. Was it taken into account by TikTok or not?

A. I don't know.

Q. Why don't you know?

A. I wasn't present when the first approach was determined in terms of age assurance and I have not been privy to those discussions.

Q. And when you were put on notification, as you were two days before giving evidence, specifically that we were going to ask you about age assurance issues, and their reliability and the choices that TikTok had made,

did you not think it was important to understand if cost was part of the justification and the internal thinking, and inform yourself as to that?

A. I think we are outcome-focused and again, I would restate we believe that our age assurance process is robust, proportionate and effective for its requirements.

Q. Can we look at the position in relation to Ofcom in relation to this. So, I don't think I need to go particularly, unless you want me to take you to the documents, but while I understand of course that TikTok would say that it would -- its own community guidance would avoid the most damaging type of material in statute, primary priority content, being available online, I think you would agree that TikTok has to have in place, because of the risks, what the statutory language refers to as "highly effective age assurance processes", yes?

A. I don't know that we have made that specific determination. Our community guidelines prohibit what we would call primary priority content under the OSA. We also believe that our multi-layered approach to age assurance fulfils Ofcom's underlying criteria in its age verification guidance.

Q. Thank you. The guidance on highly effective age

assurance, could we just have a look at that, OFC000029. Just while that's being brought up, sir, can I just correct, I think earlier in the transcript I may have referred to somebody who was 13 and I should have said "under 13" and TikTok's legal representatives have asked me to correct the record, which I'm happy to do.

So this is the "Guidance on highly effective age assurance" from Ofcom. If we just look at page 4 OFC000029_0004. If we just have the top of the screen:

"... our guidance to assist providers of regulated user-to-user and search services ... in implementing highly effective age assurance for the purpose of fulfilling their regulatory obligations ...."

It is applicable for:

"Stage 1 of the children's access assessment, as explained in the Children's Access Assessment Guidance; and ...

"Understanding how highly effective age assurance should be implemented where applicable to recommended measures set out in Ofcom's Protection of Children Code of Practice for user-to-user services."

All right? If we could just go to page 7 OFC000029_0007, please, and paragraph 3.1:

"In this section we set out ..."

And it is important that I should stress the words:

"... a non-exhaustive list of the kinds of age assurance that we consider are capable of being highly effective at correctly determining whether or not a user is a child, and those that are not capable of doing so."

Yes?

A. Yes.

Q. We are going to come back to a different type of non-exhaustive list later on in your evidence, as you know. But in relation to this, we take that as an important context. This is not a definitive list but if we then look at 3.3 to 3.4, we see that is stressed again by Ofcom:

"... a non-exhaustive list of the kinds of age assurance that we consider are being capable of being highly effective at correctly determining whether or not a user is a child ... age assurance methods are developing at pace and this list may expand in time."

Again, it is important that I should go through, I'm afraid, these preliminary paragraphs, in fairness to you and not take the list in isolation.

So they do say:

"It is for the service provider to determine which age assurance [method] to use in order to implement an age assurance process that is appropriate to meet its duties under the Act. Implementing one of the example

methods is not a guarantee that the service is acting in accordance with the requirements of the Act -- service providers need to be able to demonstrate that the method has (or methods have) been implemented in such a way that ensures the overall process as a whole is highly effective."

So that as is the intro. Again, at 3.4:

"We ... provide examples of methods that we do not consider are capable of being highly effective ..."

Then if we just go, please, to page 8 OFC000029_0008. If we could just scroll down a little bit so that we can see 3.7 through 3.13. I'm not going to go through all of these, or the detail of them at least, but you have: open banking; photo-identification; facial age estimation; mobile-network operator age check; credit card check. And I think it goes over the page: email-based age estimation; and digital identity services.

I think you would agree that the methods that TikTok use are not there listed?

A. For the general purpose, registration of users, yes.

Q. Thank you. If we then go, please, to DSIT000101. This is Ofcom's "Update: tech firms' responses to our call for action to protect children". It is dated 21 May 2026.

If we could go to page 3 DSIT000101_0003, please. If we could have the top half of the page:

"Our challenge[s] to the sites and apps most used by children."

So it introduces the duties that came into effect in July 2025. And they say that:

"... our latest research into children's online experiences ..."

Which was in November and December 2025, so after the coming into force:

"... shows that much more needs to be done by tech firms to protect children. Seven in ten children aged 11-17 recall experiencing harmful content online -- the same level reported in the research carried out in March and April 2025. The services that are repeatedly mentioned by children as the sites where they are seeing this harmful content are the largest and most popular sites with children -- not niche or specialist services. These findings mirror our and other organisations' research over many years."

Then on 12 March, next paragraph, we see that:

"... we wrote to the tech firms most popular with children -- Facebook, Instagram, Roblox, Snapchat, TikTok and YouTube."

So TikTok received that letter?

A. Correct.

Q. And I stress that you are not the only one there listed, and:

" ... set out four areas where not enough is being done -- our demands -- and identified specific changes that each service could make to keep children in the UK safer online."

So they said:

"Not all ... applied to all ... services."

If we just look at what the areas were: failsafe grooming protections; safer feeds for children; an end to product testing on children, which I'm not going to ask you about and, the last of them:

"Effective minimum age policies. Use highly effective age assurance to ensure children under the service's minimum age policy ... are not able to access the app or site."

Then just over the page, please DSIT000101_0004:

"This keeps younger children out of online spaces designed for older users, reducing their exposure to inappropriate content."

So you received Ofcom's indication of concern that their work, based on studies done at the end of last year, had indicated that TikTok, amongst others, was not sufficiently effective in age assurance?

A. Yes.
Q. Thank you. And if we just look at page 4 of this document please. At the bottom of the page:
"TikTok and YouTube ..."
In contrast to others, which I won't go through:
"... have not committed to any significant changes in response to our specific demands. They maintain that their feeds are already safe for children. Of the three only Meta committed to new improvements to children's feeds on Facebook, which will match existing levels of protection currently ... on Instagram.
"Although they all acknowledge the importance of minimum age policies, we are not currently convinced that the commitments made by any of the four services that set a strict minimum age of 13 in their terms of use -- Snapchat, Facebook, Instagram and TikTok -- ensure they will effectively prevent children under 13 from accessing their sites and apps."
So, it is a matter of public record that, as recently as May of this year, you had effectively said to Ofcom that you were not going to be taking further measures because you considered that your existing protections were the same, notwithstanding the UK regulator drawing particular concerns to your attention, is that right?

A. Correct.
Q. Does that remain the case?
A. Yes, as I am sure you are aware, we are under an active Ofcom investigation, and co-operating with that, but our approach remains the same as it was in May.
Q. So you are refusing to enhance the effectiveness of your age assurance, you are not taking any further measures?
A. So, at the moment, our approach remains the same as in May and we continue to believe it's robust and proportionate and effective.
Q. And so you are refusing to take any further measures?
A. We didn't take any further measures after this, that is correct, yes.
Q. And you are continuing to refuse to do so as of today?
A. As of today, we are adopting the same approach, yes.
Q. That includes refusing to introduce more reliable methods?
A. We have not introduced more reliable measures, that is correct.
Q. Thank you. Page 5 DSIT000101_0005. I think we have got into page 5 already. So if we could just look at the way that Ofcom have expressed it:
"We are deeply concerned by the responses to the safer feeds demand."
So this is on safer feed information now:

"Our evidence published today shows that personalised feeds are the primary route through which children encounter harmful content."
Do you agree with that?
A. I'm not sure. I agree that it has been Ofcom's conclusion. I don't think that it necessarily matches our own experience and views.
Q. And here again, TikTok -- not the only one -- but are singularly identified, along with one other:
"It is particularly concerning that TikTok and YouTube have made no new commitments to make children's feeds safer and appear to believe that their current approach is good enough.
"We have used our information gathering powers to request detail from Meta, TikTok and YouTube, given the particularly high levels of usage of these services, on how they detect and prevent children being exposed to harmful content. We have received responses from all three services, which we are now scrutinising.
"If our assessment concludes that services are not complying with their duties to use appropriate systems to prevent children's exposure to harmful content, we will proceed to enforcement action. We will also consider scope to use new regulatory powers that require firms to undergo skilled persons' reports, and/or make

their systems accessible for remote viewing. We will share our conclusions with government as it considers responses to its consultation 'Growing up in the online world', including potential new rules restricting children's access to services that are built around the personalised feeds."
So in response to that indication, a deep concern from Ofcom about the safety of TikTok's feed, and YouTube's as well. Since this was published, have you taken any new and innovative further steps to improve child safety in this area?
A. So -- and we will, I am sure, touch upon this further -- but our content moderation processes are being continuously iterated, so the effectiveness of our moderation is something that we spend a lot of time on, we ingest new signals, we improve our methods and improve our detection over a period of time. And the points that were made about kind of children's feeds, we have described how teen users of TikTok will have a different experience, both on a function and a content level, from adult users.
Some of the measures that were welcomed by Ofcom from other competitors reflected them adopting the approach that we already take, ie having teen user accounts that have a different content experience and

a different function experience to adult users as well. So that's why we were confident in our approach to teen users' feeds.

We have constantly iterated, from a content moderation perspective, which I hope has improved the level of safety. There is no one specific element that is diametrically different today from others, but we continue to improve our family pairing app, which is -- our family pairing control, sorry, which is our parental controls approach. And introduce further elements of content moderation on an ongoing basis.

Q. So, in other words, the response has been business as usual, iterative, gradual changes of process. You haven't said: the UK regulator has raised deep concerns, we need to re-think the way that we are doing this and have a step-change in our safety? That's not been the response. You have continued to bring gradual further improvements through the process of keeping an eye and gradual changes to how you do your moderation?

A. So I definitely say it constitutes more than just keeping an eye. Our trust and safety team have indeed continued their work. Some of the initiatives that they are undertaking are substantial and, you know, would lead to material improvements in certain areas. But I suppose the answer is that there hasn't been a single

standalone initiative that has been brought forward on a public basis in response to this.

Q. Does that amount to an assessment that you think Ofcom have got it wrong?

A. I think we were clear, when this letter came into Ofcom in the first instance, that we believe in the robustness of both our age assurance approaches and our approach to content moderation and the safety of teen users' feeds.

Q. Is the answer to my question, yes, you think Ofcom have got it wrong that there aren't grounds for deep concern about the safety of TikTok?

A. I think in relation to the letter that was sent, our response to that is public. We outlined the set of reasons why we believe that, yes, our teen users' feeds are safe and that the age assurance approach that we take is proportionate.

Q. Page 7 DSIT000101_0007 of this document please. So we have "Safer content feeds", and we see in relation to that, priority services who are affected, TikTok, YouTube, Facebook, Instagram. TikTok and YouTube have not committed to further changes, yes?

A. Correct.

Q. And "Minimum age enforcement":

"Children are reliably prevented from accessing services below minimum age through highly effective age

assurance.

"Snapchat, TikTok, Facebook Instagram.

"Snap[chat], TikTok and Meta have set out how they enforce their minimum age policies. We are not currently convinced these commitments ensure they'll effectively prevent children under 13 from assessing their sites and apps.

"The evidence shows many under 13s are continuing to access all these sites."

Is that true? Are many under-13s in the UK currently accessing TikTok?

A. So I would say yes, on the basis of, again, our transparently published numbers of reported underage users that we enforce against. Clearly, when we identify and detect these we ban them immediately.

Q. Once detected?

A. Yes.

Q. If detected?

A. Yes.

Q. If we go back to your statement, page 35 TIK000003_0035, paragraph 137:

"We are committed to continued collaboration with Ofcom under the OSA to ensure young people can safely enjoy the full benefits of being online."

Of course, responding to Ofcom, in terms that you

don't consider that their deep concerns are merited, is a form of collaboration, but are you really fully collaborating and responding proactively to the concerns that Ofcom are raising?

A. So, in general, we have a supervisory relationship with Ofcom under the OSA, we meet with them frequently. There are a series of concerns, as part of those supervisory relationship, that we will talk to them individually about. We may resolve issues, give them further information around it. The examples that have been pulled up today I think are the areas where there is a direct disagreement obviously, in the assessment, but I don't want that to be indicative of the overall relationship that we have with Ofcom, which I think remains collaborative on a supervisory level across a number of different areas.

Q. If we look at OFC000056, please, next, Mr Law, if you would. You will be familiar with this, I know. It is the 15 July report under section 157 of the OSA.

And if we could look at page 3 OFC000056_0003. Just take the overview first:

"A generational shift towards a more age-aware internet is beginning to take place in the UK, with the rapid adoption of age assurance across a range of services. Ofcom has carried out an assessment of the

use and effectiveness of age assurance, based primarily on evidence from the first six months of the protection of children duties being in force. This report lays out early findings across the pornography, social media, and online dating sectors, rather than final conclusions about the effectiveness of age assurance. In line with the duties under the [OSA], Ofcom is sending a copy of this report to the Secretary of State ..."

Then it refers to age checks in various ways and if we just look, please, at the penultimate paragraph on this page:

"Some of the social media services that children use the most continue to rely on propriety age inference systems, which we did not include in our HEAA guidance ..."

That is the guidance we looked at a few moments ago, the non-exhaustive list:

"... as a method capable of being highly effective."

I am sure you would agree that TikTok are one of those?

A. In terms of our general users, yes.

Q. Yes, so when it says "some of the social media services that children use the most continue to rely on" that, that includes TikTok --

A. Yes.

Q. -- as a prime platform provider:

"Our analysis indicates variability in performance and reinforces our longstanding, serious doubts about the efficacy of some age inference models, which analyse a user's activity and behaviour on a platform to estimate whether they are a child or an adult. In some cases, these systems may have failed to correctly identify large numbers of children on their platform, putting them at risk of exposure to harmful content."

Does TikTok come within that as well?

A. I don't know.

Q. Sorry?

A. I don't know.

Q. Well, given your seniority, and place on the directorship, what Ofcom were flagging here is a concern that in some cases, these proprietary systems may have failed to correctly identify large numbers of children on their platform, putting them at risk of exposure to harmful content. I don't want you to second guess who Ofcom was talking about. I'm asking you: does that description apply to the shortcomings in TikTok's system?

A. Sorry, apologies. I thought you were asking me to comment on Ofcom's --

Q. Not at all.

A. So, again, I think that we identify and transparently report on the children that we identify that are underage, that are making use of our platform --

Q. But what about those that you don't identify?

A. Well, that represents our approach and the set of published numbers that we give and it is on the basis of additional underlying tests of efficacy as well and, again, I think we feel confident in the robustness and effectiveness of the approach that we take.

Q. Being candid about matters, are you worried that might not be the case, that large numbers of children are able to get round your automated system? Is that a worry for you, as a director?

A. So, look, I would -- I think, of course, any potential failings in any our systems causes concern for me and others, that are in the positions that we are, including our trust and safety team. I think that we pour a lot of resource and development into our age assurance work. We are clear about the number of accounts that we take action against and we are trying to iterate and improve that always.

I think that the endpoint of this comes to risk as well and that's where I do think that the content community guidelines approach that we take, which again differs to some of our competitors and differences to

other services, whether that be pornographic services, or other social media sites that nevertheless have a, I suppose, greater tolerance for potential harmful content relative to us.

You combine that with the fact that people are placed into an under-18 experience from a content perspective upon sign-up as well, and while -- and I think that the overall conclusion of that means that we think that we are adopting an approach that is robust and effective and proportionate and meets the obligations that we have under regulation.

Q. You have explained those matters to Ofcom and if we bring it up to date, if we can have on screen OFC000068, so just looking at page 1 we see this is the 16 July. And the summary:

"Ofcom has today opened an investigation to understand whether TikTok Information Technologies UK Limited has failed, or is failing, to comply with certain duties under the section 12 of the [OSA] ..."

Yes?

A. Yes.

Q. And page 2 OFC000068_0002 under "Investigation", if we can have "Investigation" and then the rest of the page available. What we see there:

"Ofcom has today opened an investigation into

TikTok ... to examine its compliance with its duties under the Act. [It] follows Ofcom's review of the steps taken by major platforms to protect children online and the publication of our Children's online experiences report, which [highlight] concerns about children being exposed to harmful content on TikTok. In addition, the Age Assurance report, published today, suggests that in some cases age inference models, such as those used by TikTok, may have failed to correctly identify a significant proportion of children, putting at risk of exposure to harmful content."

And it is in that context that you can publish as much as you like, transparently, those that you have identified, but the issue is those that you are missing:

"In light of these concerns, this investigation will seek to establish whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that TikTok has failed, or is failing, to comply with its legal obligations as set out above, including by using age assurance that is highly effective at correctly determining whether or not a particular user is a child."

It is right that I should cover this:

"They also say the opening of an investigation does not mean that Ofcom has reached any conclusion about whether the provider has breached its [duty]. However,

where we identify compliance failures, we can impose fines ..."

And they go on to explain the powers in that regard.

Did the formal opening of an investigation cause TikTok to take stock and wonder whether the time had come to introduce the obviously more reliable systems that you already use at the appeal stage?

A. I think we were cognisant of the potential for enforcement. Ofcom's own statement, as you put it up, from May, suggested that enforcement action would be a potential endpoint for those services that it was concerned about.

I think we continue to look at the data and look at the effectiveness of our existing systems and I think, as pertains to Ofcom's guidance on highly effective age assurance, there is an aspect of that document which sets out the underlying criteria for what can be considered HEAA.

So they have translated that into the series of specific approaches that they believe may be capable. But the underlying criteria is whether or not an approach can be technically accurate, robust, reliable and fair and we believe that our multi-layered approach is capable of doing that.

Q. All right. Can I go back -- just give me one moment.

Can I go back and I'm going to re-state my question, I would ask you please to listen to it and answer the question that I asked: did the formal opening of an investigation cause TikTok to take stock and wonder whether the time had come to introduce the obviously more reliable systems that you already use at the appeal stage? Was that given consideration?

A. We are constantly examining what the best approach is from an age assurance perspective and wider safety on our platform.

SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: It doesn't really answer the question. I mean, it is up to you how you answer it, but I think it is very, very clear in terms: did it cause you to take stock and did you consider implementing the appeal facilities which are available? I mean --

A. Apologies, Chair. So the reason for my earlier answer was to try and imply that that was a consideration when Ofcom sent the initial letter and their statement in May, as opposed to it being a consideration -- I think, as you put it, Mr Moss -- that was just brought as a result of the opening and the investigation.

So what I'm trying to convey is I think that Ofcom has been clear in its view that services, including TikTok, it would prefer it to move towards a differing version of age assurance and we have obviously given it

consideration within that. Part of our consideration though is what is the Ofcom criteria under which highly effective age assurance is defined? And also, you know, what do our community guidelines allow in terms of primary priority content? And so our assessment continues to be that our current approach is appropriate.

SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: So shortening that, the answer is you did take stock?

A. At a slightly earlier point, yes.

SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: And have made a decision that the current arrangements are fit for purpose?

A. Yes.

SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: Thank you. Yes, Mr Moss.

MR MOSS: Thank you, sir. Page 37 TIK000003_0037, paragraph 146:

"TikTok believes strongly in the importance of providing age-appropriate experiences for its community, and the safeguards we have in place aim to help to create a safe environment for young people to use TikTok."

You understand the importance of giving candid evidence to this Inquiry?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you think that this area, TikTok's age assurance, is

the first area where TikTok is at serious risk of not living up to the ambitions that you espoused in your witness statement?

A. No, I don't think I would agree with that characterisation.

Q. And if an outside observer were to think that: the reliance upon our system works, notwithstanding what others say, and we are happy that it is sufficient, regardless of what the UK regulator is saying. If the outside observer were to suggest that the there was an element of sophistry in that, you have more reliable systems, you are not employing them and cost is likely to be a significant reason; what would you say?

A. I think there is a combination of reasons that drive the lack of deployment of those other things at scale. You have asked earlier about cost and I'm not certain as to the specific weighing up of that in a -- what I do know is that on practicality aspects, there are a series of potential drawbacks. Say, for example, ID being one of them. Plenty of people under the age of 18, under the age of 16 don't have ID. The holding, as I have said previously, of extensive amounts of facial age estimation I think comes with privacy concerns.

Likewise, as we have seen when Ofcom has considered what facial age estimation may be appropriate for the

under-16 ban, there is a lack of efficacy and accuracy, the younger that somebody goes. So I think there are a range of different reasons why we haven't deployed alternatives at scale and remain of the view that our approach is both proportionate but also robust and effective.

Q. Mr Law, I'm not going to go through it again, but I will just raise one more time for your comment. The practicalities can't be all that great, because you use exactly those techniques, when dealing both with appeals and with users who refuse to give permission for the automation. So they work and they are practicable, in the sense that you are already doing it, no doubt, in thousands of cases.

A. But not at scale, in the same level of scale as millions --

Q. And is the problem of scaling it up (1) that it will cost more money and slow down the process of people signing up and your revenue streams from advertising? Is that what lies at the heart of it?

A. No, I think what lies at the heart of it, again, is being proportionate in our approach, making sure that we are minimising the amount of data that we are requiring from people. There are some practicalities that do become difficult at scale, such as the provision of ID,

which is available for some but definitely not available for all. And, again, that's been one of the considerations that Ofcom has undertaken as it has produced updated guidance on the potential under-16 ban.

Q. Thank you. I'm going to step away from age assurance now and let's turn to measures to keep users safe from content, when that content doesn't actually violate policies.

So, if we look at page 20 TIK000003_0020, paragraph 81. You say that:

"TikTok recognises that seeing too much content about a single topic, including content that doesn't violate our policies, may not be in the best interest of our community's wellbeing."

Yes?

A. Yes.

Q. Can you just illustrate why that is the case, what you accept would be one case where that would be damaging, say, to the mental health of a teenager?

A. So specifically on that, I would determine it as negatively affecting content, so content with strong themes of sadness or depression, not violative in itself but not necessarily something that, on an accumulative basis, may be positive.

Q. Thank you. So you say:

"While this type of content may be eligible for the For You feed for Adult Users, [you] interrupt repetitive content patterns ... to keep the viewing experience varied and reduce the risk of users being exposed to excessive amounts of a single content category."

Is that right?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you do that for adults as well as children?

A. That is specific to adults. Depending on the type of content that we may be talking about, it may not be eligible --

Q. Some of it may not be eligible for the under-18s. Thank you.

If we go over the page, please, to page 21 TIK000003_0021. You explain how that's done. So:

"Interspersing different types of content ...

"Not recommending two videos in a row [from] the same creator ...

"Providing prompts which encourage content diversification ..."

And:

"Limiting executive recommendations ..."

I don't want to overlook that, but you give the detail.

Then, in paragraph 82, you say:

"... content which contains depictions of violence may be permitted on TikTok because it is in the public interest."

A. Yes.

Q. You touched on this earlier but it is fair that I should go to the detail, so:

"To minimise the impact of this ... we consider the following ... actions ..."

So the content, if deemed to be potentially in the public interest, it is available, it may nevertheless be ineligible for the For You feed, is that right?

A. Correct.

Q. A warning may be added to the content, yes?

A. Yes.

Q. There is adding an "opt-in" screen in relation to that type of content and adding a label or informational banner to provide context to the content. Just give us a real-world example of what that might look like, the banner?

A. Sorry, you are specifically asking about (d) there, are you?

Q. Yes:

"Adding a label or informational banner to provide context to the content."

A. So this might be a banner which says: this contains

distressing footage, and we might apply it, for example, over news footage. I had one example where I discussed directly with the UK broadcaster, news footage of distressing scenes in the Israel-Gaza conflict that contained footage that was graphic in some ways but nevertheless, had a public interest --

Q. So there is your public interest and you deal with that.

A. Correct.

Q. So not eligible for the For You feed in that case, would that be right?

A. Correct, the subject of my discussion with the broadcaster was their frustration at that fact.

Q. That it --

A. That it wasn't available for the For You feed.

Q. I follow, thank you. Then paragraph 83, you say that you recognise that:

"... some content, while not in violation of ... Community Guidelines, may still be unsuitable for Teen Users ..."

And you have "implemented measures to restrict its visibility or make it unavailable" for them. Then paragraph 84, you organise content based on thematic maturity, similar to systems used in films, television or gaming industries. So you take a view a bit like film classification --

A. Yes.

Q. -- taking it simplistically --

A. Correct.

Q. -- as to whether it should be available for teens, and presumably, some would be available for the 16-18 year group, but not those --

A. No, it is just an under-18 content experience. So that's consistent across 13-15 and 16 and 17s.

Q. I'm trying to take this as shortly as I may, while drawing out these positive points that you assert. But we see in paragraph 85 TIK000003_0022, that you also have design controls. So that includes, at (a), blocking searches based on particular keywords?

A. Yes.

Q. And "partners with organisations to redirect risky searches related to some" form of content. So you get the sort of off-ramp offer?

A. Yes.

Q. I think it is sometimes referred to. You say, at (c):

"Users can post hyperlinks to TikTok by adding a URL to their profile bio ..."

And by other means. So adding hyperlinks to stories and direct messages. But those that are in hyperlinks via direct messages are plain text and are not clickable.

A. Yes.

Q. So does that mean you would have to physically copy it and paste it across?

A. Yes.

Q. And:

"... controls to reduce the extent to which harmful hyperlinks can be shared on the platform and [you also] provide in-app guidance to Teen Users and parents on the dangers of clicking ..."

On links, effectively?

A. Yes.

Q. Thank you. And then page 21 TIK000003_0021, please, paragraph 86. You say you have noted the findings of the Youth Endowment Fund and you are "continuously working to reduce the likelihood of young people encountering violent content".

We will come back to that:

"TikTok has recently expanded its efforts through search interventions and creator-led campaigns."

What is that about, just briefly in essence?

A. So working with creators to produce content that we'll then help amplify on our platform itself, dealing with the dangers of being exposed to violence.

Q. Thank you. 87:

"... urges [to] the community to take a stand

against violence and [warn] users about the dangers of being exposed to violence."

So proactive efforts there. Then over the page TIK000003_0023, I think, at 88:

"Alongside the search intervention [this year] partnered with a range of NGOs, such as The Mix, [other] content creators, [in] a public facing violence prevention campaign. [With] NGOs [being] provided with advertising credits ..."

In the real world, what does that mean?

A. Advertising credits is a way of being able to make use of in-kind payments from us, to be able to then spend and achieve high levels of promotion on the platform itself.

Q. Thank you. So you give them a freebie, essentially, to be able to advertise?

A. Yes.

Q. Thank you, and:

"... content creators were directly commissioned to help increase the quantity and reach of existing content ..."

I think this is really beneficial content, isn't it, and helpful content?

A. Correct.

Q. So again, I do not want to overlook those measures.

Thank you.

One of the questions from the victims and survivors teams in relation to this is where violent content is permitted for the For You feed, does TikTok limit how much of it is served to one user in succession?

A. So, I think I don't necessarily agree with the characterisation of the question. Violent content is not allowed on the platform under our community guidelines. While there are some elements that are then allowed, from a perspective of things that we have discussed already, like documentary footage or public interest, that is taken out of the For You feed and therefore not recommended as well.

Q. What about content that -- there must be a threshold applied in relation to violence material. What about material that has an element of violence but sits below the threshold; are any controls put on that?

A. So, again, I'm not sure that I'm -- sorry, apologies, I'm just trying to find the relevant part of the community guidelines. But I think that we are comparatively strict when it comes to our application of the community guidelines in respect of these areas. And, therefore, you know, the expectation is -- as you say, there may always be a threshold but I think if the threshold isn't reached, then it is a view that the

content is primarily benign and if it is in the For You feed, it will of course be subject to the diversification that I think we highlighted within the statement itself. That was -- apologies, I can't remember --

Q. Don't worry, you have explained that.

A. So we try and diversify against all types of content and when we stepped through earlier, the examples of breaking a filter bubble, there are some pieces of contents that we are very specific on preventing those from being recommended one after another and then more generally, content as a whole, we still seek to introduce levels of diversity, including things that you may not have encountered previously or previously been interested to. So that would fall into the latter of those two things.

Q. I want to ask a specific question about how the algorithms work now.

For the moment, assume that it is an adult user.

A. Yes.

Q. You will understand that this Inquiry has a particular concern about those aged 18-25. If an adult user shows interest in material that is violent, but is deemed below the threshold, so it is appropriately on TikTok because it's got some aspects of violence but not enough

to be banned; does the algorithm amplify that interest and show the adult more of it?

A. Again, with apologies, I don't think I agree with the characterisation in as much as our community guidelines are robust in relation to violent content and, therefore, the idea that there could be content that is sufficiently violent but not violative is not necessarily one that I agree with.

In general, if the question is: for individual pieces of content that people are interested in, will the algorithm show them more covering those things? Then yes, the answer is yes.

Q. So if, for example, there was material -- so you have said in relation to it, it won't go through to the For You feed -- but let's say somebody shows an interest in news footage of football violence, brawls, which were allowed up because it is news footage and there is a public interest. If an adult goes to that material, will the algorithm provide more of that type of content or not?

A. Not in the For You feed because if that type of content is documentary, public interest footage of violence, that will be ineligible for the For You feed.

Q. Can I ask about this, you come onto moderation steps that are taken, but obviously there is a time lag -- and

I know that you will say much of this detail is taken down quite quickly -- but for violent material there is a time lag before it is taken down. If a user sees that sort of material, that's outside the guidelines, and might, two days later, be banned, would the algorithm work to try to show more of that type of content?

A. In general, the algorithm works to try and show you content that you have expressed an interest in. I think to your point on moderation, we, as you say, do remove --

Q. Forget about moderation for the moment, we are going to come to it. But illicit material that shouldn't be up, there's going to be other illicit material that shouldn't be up and your moderation would hope to catch up with it. But does the algorithm say: this person is interested in that, we will show more like that because this footage is similar and people who are clicking on that are doing it. So does it amplify material that is illicit that you might go, later on, to take down?

A. So I think that we recognise that as a risk: it is one of the reasons why we continue to diversify, as I have said all types of content --

Q. Forgive me, does the algorithm do that or not?

A. My understanding is that the algorithm will try and emphasise things that you have shown an interest in,

yes.

Q. And if the age protection aspects have not yet caught up, so it is a new post that's gone up, if a child is able to access it, because it's not yet been age-gated and it's not yet been taken down, does the algorithm still kick in for a child? Does it say: this user is interested in this material, we will show the child more, even though it is material that should be moderated down and taken down altogether?

A. Sorry, can you repeat the first part of your question?

Q. Forgive me. It is a long question but it is a technical area.

I'm dealing with illicit material and we understand that your community guidelines will say it will come down. Let's assume that this is material that, once assessed, whether by automation or report, TikTok would take down. What I'm asking about, if that material is up for a period of time, okay? Assume that because it is up and it hasn't yet been moderated out, it's also not age-gated and a child comes across that material. Does the algorithm still kick in and try to show the child more of that type of material?

A. So, I suppose the answer to the hypothetical is, yes. But that is one of the reasons why we both continue to invest very highly in content moderation. And also the

reason why I asked for the repetition of the question is to assess whether or not, in the hypothetical, it is not only not being picked up by the moderation but also not been captured under any of our other elements, ie making it ineligible for the For You feed or indeed, rating it as something that wouldn't be applicable for people who are under the age of 18.

Q. Yes.

A. But yes, if you want to kind of narrow it to, it has been missed by a first-round moderation, it hasn't been indicated that it is inapplicable for the For You feed or under 18, and it appears in somebody's feed overall and they express interest in it, then it is possible for similar types of those posts to also be served to them. Notwithstanding, the diversification and disruption elements that I mentioned earlier.

Q. Have you done any analysis of how much violent content gets onto children's feeds before it is moderated out?

A. So I'm not aware specifically in relation to children. What we do do, for all content moderation that takes place is we assess, not only the length of time that it has been up on the platform but also the number of views that it has received.

Q. We are going to come to those figures. Have you done any analysis of how much violent content gets onto

children's feeds before it is moderated out?

A. Not to my knowledge.

Q. Do you not think that is something extremely important to do?

A. I think that it's tied up in our approach to content moderation as a whole, which is always to seek to understand why there have been misses in the first place, what the impact of those could be. And that's why I do mention the differing views, ie the number of views and the reach and impact that may have been generated by that content as well. Those are very important directions for our trust and safety team. They help us understand where gaps are and what we should do to remedy those. My answer is that I don't have a specific understanding of violent content in relation to children though.

Q. Because it is not analysed by TikTok, you have not gone after that information, even though you could?

A. Because we are doing it on a broad basis. Any miss of community guidelines --

Q. One understands that you are doing it on a broad basis, and I promise I will take you to the document that shows that you are, but that's exactly the point. You have the data about the users and whether they are over 18 or under 18 and you are deliberately choosing, I suggest,

not to analyse how much of that material is viewed by children because you won't give an age breakdown.
A. I don't have that myself. It may be that there is some area within TikTok that is looked at it, but it is not something that I have had made available to me.
MR MOSS: Sir, because this is going to be a long session, I did promise our stenographer that we might just have a five minute break and I'm about to move on to a different topic if that is a convenient moment?
SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: We shall, we will sit again at 12.20 pm.
(12.15 pm)
(A short break)
(12.20 pm)
SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: Do have a seat. Yes, Mr Moss.
MR MOSS: Thank you, sir. Mr Law, I want to turn next to TikTok's policies on violent content and behaviour and if we go to page 12 TIK000003_0012, paragraph 47 of your statement, we will see that:
"TikTok's Community Guidelines specifically prohibit the publication of content that threatens, glorifies, promotes or encourages violent behaviour."
Yes?
A. Yes.
Q. So that's the headline. And again, in fairness to the

careful detail set out in your statement, I just want to draw out, principally from the exhibits, how that is put in place.
So, if we look further in your statement, first of all, at paragraph 48, you explain that the community guidelines are subdivided into separate categories and for the moment, can we just note the "safety and civility" and the acronym for that, S&C, because we are going to see that in documents, which relates, amongst other things, to violent and criminal behaviour, hate speech and hateful behaviour, and violent and hateful organisations and individuals and:
"Sensitive and Mature Themes ('S&MT'), which relates (among[st] other things) to shocking and graphic content and animal abuse."
Then, you say in 49:
"As explained in our Community Guidelines ... the S&C and S&MT policies do not allow ..."
And then could we have the totality of that on the screen:
"Violent and criminal behaviour ..."
Further detail is given:
"Hate speech and hateful behaviour ...
"Violent and hateful organisations or individuals on its platform ...

"Content that is extremely graphic ..."
I'm not going to read out every part of it, but I'm just giving the feel. If we just go over the page TIK000003_0013:
"Content that shows or promotes animal abuse, cruelty [or] neglect or exploitation.
"The trade, marketing, or promotion of regulated, prohibited, or high-risk goods and services including firearms, ammunition, explosive weapons, or instructions on how to make them."
Yes?
A. Yes.
Q. So taking it directly from your statement, that is a fair summary of the headlines?
A. Correct.
Q. Then, if we go to the community guidelines themselves, I will do this as quickly as I may. It is TIK000015. And if we could go to -- these are the community guidelines themselves. We see headings. If we go to page 2 TIK000015_0002, could we just have the lower third, under the heading "Safety and Civility".
So here we see the details. So the first three I think are the most important:
"Violent and Criminal Behaviour: We don't allow threats, encouragement or glorification of violence,

promotion of crime, or instructions on how to commit harmful acts.
"Hate Speech and Hateful Behaviour: We don't allow content that promotes hate or attacks people based on protected attributes like race, religion, gender or sexual orientation."
I'm just going to ask you to remember that one because I am going to come back to it in a specific context:
"Violent and Hateful Organisations and Individuals: We don't allow people or groups that promote violence or hate, including violent extremists, criminal organisations, [and] those responsible for mass violence. Supporting, recruiting for, or promoting these entities is also prohibited."
So set out in what might be thought to be a good, clear terms; a bold key point, followed by explanatory text, would you agree?
A. Yes.
Q. Thank you. Then on page 3 TIK000015_0003, we have the equivalent for "Sensitive and Mature Themes". And we just see, in relation to that, the second bullet point is probably the most relevant for us:
"We don't allow extremely graphic, violent, or disturbing content -- especially when it could cause

viewers emotional distress."
Yes?
A. Yes.
Q. Thank you. Page 4 TIK000015_0004, very briefly. We have "Regulated Goods", for our purposes including knives, yes?
A. Yes.
Q. Thank you. Then page 10 and 11, start on page 10 TIK000015_0010:
"Violent and Criminal Behaviour.
"TikTok is about bringing people together, not promoting conflict. We don't allow threats, glorifying violence, or promoting crimes that could harm people, animals, or property.
"If there is a specific, credible, and imminent threat to human life or serious physical injury, we report it to relevant law enforcement authorities."
And we may come back to that:
"For details on how we approach content that shows violence without encouraging it, see our Shocking and Graphic Content section."
Now, we may come to that, but that's the bit where there may be public interest justification, so your football hooliganism shown in the context of news reporting, that's not in any way encouraging it, would

you agree?
A. Yes.
Q. So over the page, page 11 TIK000015_0011, we see the way that it is dealt with, with some, again, good format no doubt, "Not Allowed" and "Allowed" and we see more detail given in relation to hate speech and hateful behaviour.
The preamble for that, is:
"TikTok is a place for diverse communities to connect -- not for spreading hate. We don't allow hate speech, hateful behaviour, or promotion of hateful ideologies."
Yes?
A. Yes.
Q. Is that taken seriously when it comes to users who don't follow that and engage in deeply offensive speech that is intolerant of one racial, or other group?
A. Yes, violations under that will have videos removed, multiple violations will lead to further sanctions, including account banning.
Q. Thank you. There's also reference there to praising acts of violence. We will come onto the post about AR in that context.
If we look at page 14 TIK000015_0014, you then get more detail on the violent and hateful organisations and

individuals, yes?
A. Yes.
Q. And again, I don't think I need to go through all of that but I'm merely bringing this up to show the level of detail that it goes into.
I think you say in your statement -- we don't need to turn it up, that you don't use the phrase "violence-fixated individual" in terms of your policy, but you do have this reliance on the category of "violent and hateful organisations and individuals".
A. Yes.
Q. I think that is your policy approach, rather than VFIs --
A. Yes.
Q. -- by way of definition? Thank you. But presumably "violent and hateful organisations and individuals," is meant to capture things like Com networks?
A. Yes, so we believe it is broad and flexible enough to be able to capture even those organisations that may not be as organised in the offline world and specific in their objectives.
Q. Yes, so they are less clearly connected but nevertheless still networks engaged in nihilistic violence?
A. Yes.
Q. TCC?

A. Yes.
Q. Captured by this?
A. Well, it has the potential to be captured by it.
I think that obviously the moderation works together and, you know, the actual content is assessed, as are then accounts and the way that accounts organise themselves. But some of the other elements of the community guidelines that you have referenced earlier would be ways in which to capture content that may have been tagged with TCC but seek to glorify or promote individuals who have carried out attacks.
Q. Thank you, and we may look at an example of that a little bit later. Then page 15 TIK000015_0015, please. We see more detail provided, in particular, of what is not allowed, including providing -- at the second bullet point:
"Providing material support to Violent Political Organisations, or promoting or praising violence caused by them."
Is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. And then:
"Promoting, praising, or providing material support to ..."
"Hateful Organisations.

"Individuals who cause mass or [serious] violence, or promote hateful ideologies."

To some extent, it may be obvious, but all of those points should be -- first of all, they are prohibited?

A. Correct.

Q. They are also the things that the moderation should be looking carefully to pick up and to take down?

A. Yes.

Q. Thank you. We see, on page 16 TIK000015_0016, what is allowed. So:

"Discussing a Violent Political Organisation ...

"Documentary or educational ..."

Purposes:

"Fiction [and] art ..."

Again, one understands why there needs to be that nuance, would that be fair?

A. Yes.

Q. Thank you. Then pages 32 TIK000015_0032 to 33 is where I think you deal with the shocking and graphic content. So:

"TikTok is a place to discover content that sparks joy, not shock or disgust. That's why we don't allow anything extremely gory, disturbing, or violent, especially when it could cause psychological harm."

Then some details are given to what would count for

that. If we go over the page TIK000015_0033, so "Not Allowed":

"Depictions of real-world:

"Graphic incidents and violence, such as torture, the moment of someone's death, or the shooting of an individual."

So we will come to some other platforms -- Mr Law, you are not the only platform giving evidence, as you will understand -- who may have different guidance than this, but TikTok's approach is that the moment of someone's death, or the shooting of an individual, dead bodies, shouldn't be shown?

A. Correct.

Q. Thank you. I think that's probably sufficient. Is there anything else in those guidelines, or do you think that is a sufficiently fair summary?

A. I suppose, sorry, just to highlight your last point, the dead bodies bit is under "Not Allowed" there, but obviously we do, in that same exhibit, have what we put as ineligible for the For You feed and age-restricted, that can include graphic incidents in a public interest context, as we have discussed before, and then ineligible includes some elements of dead bodies that might in traditional memorial contexts, so I just thought I'd draw that out.

Q. Thank you. So turning next to our next topic, to moderation of this type of content and behaviour.

If we go back to your statement, page 12, paragraph 47, we have seen it before. But let's just pick up the threads.

So:

"TikTok use a combination of advanced moderation technology and safety teams to enforce its rules proactively and consistently."

Yes?

A. Correct.

Q. So, the first steps that are taken on this are automated, is that right?

A. Yes.

Q. And if the automation picks up something of concern, it will then go -- is this right -- it may be taken down immediately? Could it be picked up and taken down immediately from the automation?

A. Yes, indeed, the vast majority is taken down immediately on automated --

Q. And I think there are some cases where it may go for a check by a human analyst in the safety team?

A. Correct.

Q. Thank you. So, if we look at paragraph 54 on page 15 TIK000003_0015, we should remind ourselves of the

emphasis that you give in your statement, that this is not on a UK basis, so we are not looking at UK-related laws and specific UK approaches. This is community guidelines and if it is taken down, it is taken down globally?

A. Correct.

Q. And at paragraph 55, you say:

"In addition to removing content, TikTok will terminate accounts and report cases to law enforcement as appropriate."

A. Correct.

Q. What you mean by "as appropriate" is if there is an identification of either child sexual abuse material?

A. Yes.

Q. Or a credible threat to the life of an individual, or serious injury?

A. Yes, credible, imminent threat.

Q. But not otherwise?

A. Correct.

Q. Purportedly on privacy grounds?

A. I don't think it is solely privacy. I think, again, proportionality as well and our reading of underlying regulatory frameworks.

Q. Thank you. If we look then, please, to some of the figures, because I promised that I would come to those

because you wanted to rely on them. So if we look at page 20 TIK000003_0020, paragraph 80, I think that's where we can pick that up more usefully as a launching point, at least.

So, we see there, in terms of the number of accounts that were banned in the UK, 3.2 million accounts were banned, yes?

A. Yes.

Q. And would you accept that, as previously, that figure has an element of being double-edged? On the plus side, it shows that action is being taken by TikTok and it is identifying a large amount of material for removal that is inappropriate and either on the basis of serious single infringements or multiple infringements, accounts are being banned as a result?

A. Sorry, so your question is?

Q. That is a plus side?

A. That is a plus side. Agreed, yes.

Q. The downside is how much material is being posted that is leading to people being banned?

A. So I would slightly caveat that. That's material that is attempted to be posted. So, it is a violation of our community guidelines if you attempt to upload something that is violative, even if it then never gets on the platform and again, within our transparency report we

report the percentage of content that was never viewed by anyone. That will most commonly, in almost all instances, mean that it was blocked upon upload. That still counts --

Q. So you are quite right to go to that detail. But I think a large amount of this material does get uploaded but is removed within the first 24 hours. I think we will see some graphs that that's a large proportion of the figures?

A. I don't think it is a large proportion. I think it is -- removed within 24 hours, also includes things that were removed upon upload as well. So I think the most useful elements of our transparency reports here are the ones that show number of views and again, apologies I don't have the exact figure but it is in the mid-80s that it is 0 views, ie blocked upon upload.

Q. Thank you. If we look at page 26 TIK000003_0026, paragraph 105. I think it is not limited to -- banning is not limited to the online activity. I think if you become aware that an account relates to somebody who is a violent extremist, then that off-platform activity can lead to a ban as well?

A. Correct.

Q. Thank you. In 107, you say:

"TikTok's Community Guidelines prohibit organised

harmful communities ... [and that you have] processes to identify networks of accounts dedicated to spreading hate including looking for signals such as accounts using coded language, emojis or symbols to evade detection systems ..."

Yes?

A. Correct.

Q. So looking for the hash "TCC", it may not be absolutely everything that is posted with that hash, you have to assess it, but that would be an obvious red flag?

A. I'm not sure I would agree with the characterisation of an obvious red flag. The TCC community in legitimate interest in true crime has been a very large community. I think that is an example of attempts that are made to co-opt particularly popular and occasionally benign terms by groups that are seeking notoriety. So, in and of itself, it may be something that is to be taken into account, but actually, the vast majority of content under "TCC" will be non-violative and likely about true crime itself.

Q. But put together with the Sandy Hook shooter's name, for example?

A. So, yes. An example of where you are able to then bring several signals together, to give an indication, yes.

Q. And you know why I ask that?

A. I do.

Q. Thank you. To what extent are you able to track those sort of communities and their activities on TikTok?

A. So, I think it is worth saying, we will start with the content and our primary idea here is to be able to take down content that is violative. We will learn, from that, signals, including how these communities are evolving, specifically to try to evade detection, variations on the terms of their using, examples of hashtags they may be trying to co-opt to try and bring people in. So it begins from a content basis.

We also look directly at accounts themselves and whether or not the set of videos that they are posting have similarities in that respect, attempting to achieve the same thing. And as described in this paragraph here, we also look at networks of accounts, how accounts are interacting with each other, whether that is via comments, whether that's via postings and re-postings as well.

I think it is fair to say that, taken together, the specific types of communities that we are talking about here are inherently (a) trying to evade detection, (b) nebulous in their kind of growth in an online area, and (c) have as their objectives directly trying to achieve notoriety, cause outrage and cause division as well.

That does make it challenging.
Q. Is (a) true?
A. Sorry, (a) being that they are trying --
Q. Trying to evade detection?
A. To evade detection of our moderation processes, yes.
Q. But part of the reason they want to post, but perhaps in a surreptitious way and not draw immediate attention, so they get immediately banned, is to use your platform to get notoriety. So they want to evade detection of your systems but they want to proliferate their hate through your platform?
A. Yes, agreed.
Q. What resource, in real terms, in terms of money or personnel, is actually invested by TikTok in teams who are not involved in the general moderation but are proactively probing for abusive networks who are seeking to use your network?
A. So, we have a number of teams that are dedicated to different elements of this. I don't have specific headcount in relation to them, but we have -- the same team that is used to identify covert influence operation, also acts to identify and disrupt violent extremist networks that we detect.
Q. But you can't say, in monetary terms, or a headcount --
A. I don't have figures on that, no.

Q. Thank you. We should just come back to TIK000015, the community guidelines, in terms of the banning. We have touched on this so we can deal with it relatively shortly. But page 54 TIK000015_0054.
In terms of what leads to banning. We see, if we can have the bottom half of the page, please. So, "we may ban an account" for:
"Repeated rule violations.
"A single, severe violation.
"Trying to avoid enforcement.
"Running accounts that are dedicated to breaking the rules, like spreading hate, the unauthorised trading of regulated, prohibited ... or high-risk goods ..."
And so on.
Severe violations -- and here is the non-exhaustive list that I said I would come back to -- so severe violations include:
"Inciting or threatening serious violence when there is a credible risk of harm or danger to public safety.
"Engaging in child sexual abuse, including sharing, helping others access, or downloading [child sexual abuse material], soliciting youth, or grooming.
"Sharing graphic imagery of adult sexual abuse, including non-consensual acts or image-based abuse.
"Coordinating or facilitating human trafficking or

smuggling."
Yes?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, in relation to the non-exhaustive list of Ofcom highly effective age assurance methods, you were keen to point to the underlying outcome of what was meant to be achieved.
A. Yes.
Q. What is your underlying outcome of what you mean to achieve by giving a non-exhaustive indication of what counts as a severe violation?
A. So I think this is speculative by myself, rather than being directly informed by making a decision, but to enable us the flexibility to cover issues that are not directly listed there but nevertheless we may think, on the face of evaluating it, it constitutes a severe violation.
Q. Presumably in relation to that, one would apply a bit of common sense, in asking: is this a single but severe violation of the type that warrants the user being banned?
A. Correct.
Q. Even if not listed?
A. Yes.
Q. For example, if they have posted something which is

sickening, unjustifiable and praising a mass casualty attack?
A. So I know that we are obviously going to come onto some specifics. I think we are talking about decisions that are not taken directly by me but by my trust and safety team who are experts in this area and view it across a number of different measures and, therefore, I think it's for them to undertake that judgement. We are clear on some areas that would count here. As you say, that's non-exhaustive. But it doesn't put me in a position to be able to give an informed view myself, as I'm not a trust and safety operator.
Q. We will come back that. Thank you. If we could just go to page 61 TIK000015_0061 of this document, please. In terms of "Enforcement", this sets out the public interest exceptions, yes?
A. Yes.
Q. So the type of things where graphic material might be shown for the public interest exception. I'm not going to go through them all but it is fair that we should indicate that you have this to help with the nuanced judgements, I think, that may need to be made?
A. Yes.
Q. So satirical material, for example. Over the page, at 62 TIK000015_0062, principally for the Chair's note.

Then:

"We aim to remove content or accounts that violate our rules before they are viewed or shared. Content first goes through [the] automated review process ..."

And so on. We also have "Notice and Appeals":

"We believe in fairness and consistency. If your content breaks a rule, we seek to explain why it was removed. If your account is banned, you will see a message in the app. If your content is made ineligible for the [For You feed] or otherwise restricted, this information will appear in the TikTok analytics tool.

"If your ... banned, or your content was removed, made ineligible for the [For You feed], or otherwise restricted, and you believe this was an error, you may appeal the decision. Once your appeal is filed, you can view its status ..."

And so on. So there is a right of appeal?

A. Correct.

Q. Thank you. So if we go back to your statement, at page 16 TIK000003_0016, paragraph 61:

"Upon upload ... video content goes through a technology-based automated review process designed to flag certain types of content that may violate S&C [and] S&MT policies."

Which happens in real time. So I think that's your point. You say that when it is revealed that there were no views, an inference can be drawn that it never got up in the first place?

A. Yes. That might not be the entirety of those that have zero views and it may be that some were present on the platform first, but I think, particularly given the route to further reporting, being something like a user report, obviously as soon as it gets a user report, it has a view. So the vast majority.

Q. So that remains relevant for an argument that it caused no harm because no one, in fact, saw it, but we should understand that those no views can include material that wasn't popular, no one came across it, but it was up for a period of time, however short, but also covers those that were -- never actually appeared on the system?

A. Yes, and I think in terms of the former there, the likelihood and the potential for that is pretty narrow, in as much as if it is not being reported to us by a user or by one of our trusted flaggers, it is not reaching a threshold of views that puts it through our content moderation system again. So I think the only route to identifying something that would have zero views that was on the platform would be if, as part of our ongoing sweeps and long-term containment, we might

have found that. But because of that, my view is, while I can't say with absolutely certainty that zero views means never on the platform for every piece of content, I think we are talking about the vast, vast majority of that --

Q. So can I understand this, if the automation system is going to -- effectively to ban it, it is not an ongoing automation, it bans it is straightaway, it never gets up, but thereafter, you could get user reports --

A. Correct -- it happens in real time, as the video is uploaded, the automatic process --

Q. And that always applies? It is not that sometimes the automation may take a period of hours to complete, it is before it goes out?

A. Correct.

Q. I follow, thank you. You mention the automated view. So paragraph 62 you deal with that, that if the content reaches a certain threshold of popularity, then it is flagged for further review?

A. Yes, and that can happen multiple times as well. So it is not a single one-off, it can happen repeatedly.

Q. And is the further review automated or is that by humans looking at it in the safety team?

A. I think in the first instance it is automated. My understanding, although I would have to fully check

this, is that when it reaches very high levels, then there might be additional levels of review as well.

Q. Thank you. Does the -- what is perhaps difficult to understand about that is, if the check of reaching a certain level of popularity is automated, is that somehow a more extensive, automated check because it is if it was going to fail that, it would have failed it at the first instance --

A. Well, not -- well, I was going to say "not more extensive". So there are two things that I think are relevant. The first thing is that ways that the post has been engaged with can be relevant. So comments that are on it, for example, can be additional levels of signals that can then potentially spark something else.

Secondly, as I mentioned earlier, these automated models that we make use of are being constantly iterated. So if there was a piece of content that lay very unviewed for a period of time, it may be that one or several of the models that it has passed through have been updated over a period of time and therefore, when it goes through automated review again, it is being reviewed by models that have received updates subsequently.

Q. I follow, thank you. So you indicate, in paragraph 63, that if potential violation is found -- I think we

touched on this -- either it will be banned by the automated system or it may go to a human trust and safety team for further review?
A. Correct.
Q. You stress, paragraph 63, see the end of the paragraph, that automated removals are the more common, making up 96 per cent of the total removals?
A. Correct.
Q. Going over the page TIK000003_0017, we see the methods that are used for that and I only need to go to the headlines:
"Community vision models ...
"Review of audio clips ...
"Text based detection models ...
"Similarity detection systems ...
"Account activity monitoring, which enables TikTok to understand how accounts are being operated ..."
Then AI:
"Large language learning models ... which help TikTok scale and improve content moderation."
And:
"... TikTok uses [multiple] LLMs which can perform tasks related to other types of content, including visual content."
So those are the type of tools you use?

A. Correct.
Q. Then in paragraph 65, taking it as shortly as I may, I think you're keen to emphasise that that applies not just to the videos or the images, but also to the comments that are made on a post; is that right?
A. Correct.
Q. Thank you. In paragraph 68, over the page TIK000003_0018, you say that there are typically thousands of moderation staff active at any given time, 24 hours a day, seven days a week, is that right?
A. Correct.
Q. And then, paragraph 70, I think you deal with the point you touched on just a moment ago, again, over the page TIK000003_0019, that you can have, I think, sweeps -- targeted sweeps for content where they have identified specific risks of potential violations. And even if you are able to address it -- I don't think we need to get into the fine detail of the technology for that -- but will that involve an element of teaching the system what to look out for, in a new type of language that may be a problem, that sort of thing?
A. Yes, I think there are elements of that. Those are incorporated into our automated models. The point around paragraph 70 is that the targeted sweeps is where a new bit of information has come to light and we may

want to try and identify across the platform whether or not any of that material exists.
Q. Thank you. Then in 71 and 72, is where, in your statement, you deal with something which, again, you have dealt with before, that users are themselves able to flag content. What happens when users do make a report about content?
A. So it will --
Q. Saying that: it violates the guidelines and I'm concerned?
A. They will have the opportunity, when they do so, to identify the particular parts of the community guidelines that they believe it violates and to add any additional levels of information that relates to their user report. It will then go through review. The type of review that it is undertaking depends on a number of different factors, including the number of user reports that may have been received about that video and how that video may have been classified in the first place as well.
Q. But, I think from that answer, you are seeking to justify a question I have not yet asked. But it is not always a human. So sometimes, as we will see, even though someone has complained about it, the automated systems will look again?

A. Yes, with the additional signals that have been granted by the user report itself.
Q. Thank you. Paragraph 74, there is an opportunity for community partner channels, so organisations involved in safety, to flag matters and you say that that's part of the overall safety design, I think, effectively?
A. Correct, yes.
Q. Thank you, and then also in 74, various UK NGOs can report suspected harmful materials as well?
A. Yes.
Q. And you also work with Tech Against Terrorism, from whom we heard from Mr Hadley yesterday, to help identify and remove terrorist and violent extremist content. It is paragraph 75. Is that right?
A. Correct.
Q. I will come back to that. On page 16 TIK000003_0016, paragraphs 59 to 60, with apologies for jumping around, you say that the:
"... approach to content moderation has evolved considerably over time, and continues ..."
To do so, and you say it is "leveraging technology to achieve our overarching safety goals", to remove egregious content quickly:
"We have upgraded the systems that route content for review ...(reading to the words)... of harm."

You say:

"Our proactive technology is also driving down the amount of content that needs human review, as it grows more sophisticated at catching things like spam accounts at sign-up or duplicative content. Between 2024 and 2025, there was a 76% decrease in shocking and graphic content seen by human moderators due to intervention by our automated systems."

So I think the positives that you want to assert is that you would assess that the automated systems are removing, at source, more material because actually there has been a decrease in those going through the human analysis?

A. Yes, that is correct, as well as being able to do so without some of the trade-offs that are maybe needing to be made by human operators, ie accuracy and speed, which is something that human moderators will have to trade off, on occasion.

Q. Thank you, then in the transparency report that you have referred to a number of times. Let's look at it together. TIK000023. So this is your enforcement report. I believe you indicated there is a more recent one than this, that perhaps you will let us have?

A. Yes.

Q. But unless the overall pattern is vastly different, I am

sure this will suffice. So if we look at page 2 TIK000023_0002. Can we have the top diagram highlighted. So this is "Content removals relative to" what is published. And if I have understood it, what one takes from that is the cyan colour shows the proportion of video material that's removed as being in breach of guidance has been bouncing around between 0.5 per cent and 1 per cent, but in 2026, has reached its lowest point since these figures have been taken, of 0.5 per cent?

A. Correct.

Q. There has been a reduction in the removal rate for the purple, which is the comments that are removed, is that right?

A. Correct.

Q. But what has gone up is the suspension rate of what is published as live streaming?

A. Correct.

Q. Why do you analyse that the live streaming rate is going up?

A. I don't have a significant insight into that, I'm afraid. I'm happy to write to the Inquiry subsequently but I don't know what's driving that.

Q. One possible explanation for that is that those who are aware that the automisation of video material has

greater effectiveness and so are moving to live stream content?

A. We also run automated review across live stream content as well, so for example, models that detect human nudity.

Q. Yes, I don't doubt that for a moment but looking at the figures, it may be that TikTok would take some comfort for the fact that the trend is down for the cyan but it would be wrong to take that without noting the strong upward trend for live streaming?

A. I think I would say with all of this, our goal is obviously to remove violative content and we want to put in place measures to prevent people from wanting to upload it in the first place. So I think that we perhaps care less about the percentage that people are attempting to upload and more about our success in being able to prevent that.

Q. Thank you. It does depend how many users see it before it is removed?

A. Yes, and I would say that that's definitely a metric that we also care about quite considerably.

Q. The bottom, I think, shows the total removals and restoration by content type. So the purple, I think, is video removed. The yellow shows how much by automation and the green shows how much was restored. What one

sees is that in the early days, the number of videos -- no doubt, it's becoming more popular so the ongoing trend is upwards because of numbers. But it starts with only a very small proportion in 2020 are removed by automation?

A. Yes.

Q. Bringing it right up to date, where the overwhelming majority is now being removed by automation, that the yellow nudging close to the top of the purple, in my simplistic layperson's way of looking at it?

A. Correct.

Q. And you would see that as good?

A. Again, our focus is primarily on efficacy. So to the extent that automated review and automated removal is a proxy of preventing an upload and limiting its reach, then yes, I would see it as a good thing. I don't have the figures for 2020 or 2021, but I would probably imagine that our proactive removal rates at the time and the rate of removal of videos with zero views was substantially lower than it is today.

Q. Thank you. On page 4 TIK000023_0004, we see the video removal rates. Could we just have the whole page. Thank you. Let's look at the top one, first of all. So "Total removals and restorations, by content type".

So if we could zoom back in on the top one, please.

So, "Videos actioned", "Accounts removed", "Live sessions suspended", "Comments removed", shown there in totality. What do you draw from that?

A. So we have obviously seen a reduction in the amounts of comments that are removed directly. Again, I don't have a particular view on what's driving that. I do know that we have implemented particular measures to try and warn people ahead of time if they are trying to post comments that may be violative, that may use violative terms as well. And so it could be that that's having an effect.

Q. Thank you. At the bottom of the page, "Removal rates, viewed distribution, and report response times". "Proactive removal rate" and "Removal rate within 24 hours" are shown there. Again, I'm focusing on the videos because some of the material that we need to come onto. In general terms, those are both high figures, yes?

A. Yes.

Q. They are both -- "proactive removal rate", is that to show what is caught by either automated systems or the safety team as opposed to user reports or -- what is the definition of "proactive removal rates"?

A. No, I don't think that is correct. I think "within 24 hours" could be a combination of those and so the

"proactive removal rate" is where we have done it, not via a user report. Removal "within 24 hours" could include both user reports, but also our own systems.

Q. Thank you. And page 5 TIK000023_0005, I think, the graphic that you were alluding to earlier on with a large proportion having zero views, which you would infer is removed at automation first stage. So it never gets up?

A. Yes.

Q. Then you have "1-10 views" and then "11-100 views", which has a bit of a surge but not anywhere as near as the zero views?

A. Yes.

Q. Thank you. Then I think if we look at the second half of this page. I think we have response times. So, "Removal rates, view distribution, and report response times". "Less than 2 hours", "Between 2 and 8 hours", "Between 8 and 24 hours" and then "More than 24 hours". And the tab on the top shows "Response time to user-reported content".

So I think this is intended to show how quickly, where material is then removed, that that process takes place?

A. Yes.

Q. So, on the plus side, a lot of that is done quickly.

But does that also reflect how reliant TikTok is on automated review, because so much of it is done within less than 2 hours; that is likely to be automated review?

A. Yes, I mean, I wouldn't characterise that as not being on the plus side, I think it's a statement of, yes, how our systems work.

Q. Yes, thank you. Then page 6 TIK000023_0006, just briefly, an important exhibit that you have emphasised in your statement, so I want to ensure that we have understood it. We have got "Videos removed, by policy". And we see that, for videos, actually, there's quite a chunk there, in relation to -- not a very technical term -- but regulated goods and services?

A. Yes.

Q. But if you take together "Safety and Civility" which is the light purple, and "Sensitive and Mature Themes", you can see that they make up -- I don't know what that may be -- just less than a third or something like that?

A. Yes.

Q. Thank you. If we just go to the bottom of the page. For "Comments removed, by policy", now, the "Regulated Goods, Services and Commercial Activity" shrinks here because this is looking at comments that are made on things that are posted. So it may be understandable

that regulated goods drops down the pecking order and the overwhelming majority of these come under "Safety and Civility", with a sizeable minority being under "Sensitive and Mature Teams". So that's -- once you get into what people are commenting on posts, that's -- the majority come under those bits of your community guidance?

A. Correct.

Q. Thank you. Then page 7 TIK000023_0007, under "Market data", "Total videos removed", "Proactive removal rate", "Removal rate within 24 hours", "Videos restored", and the percentage removal rate of published. I know, from your statement and from your evidence, that those are high-level figures that I think you wanted to be part of your evidence?

A. Yes.

Q. Thank you. What we don't see any breakdown for, in relation to this, is anything more specific in terms of the take-down rate and speed, in relation to terrorist material?

A. Not in this report, no.

Q. Could we look in your statement at page 32 TIK000003_0032, paragraph 123, please. You said specifically in relation to extreme violence, your words:

"... TikTok is proud to be a member of Tech Against Terrorism ..."

Is that true?

A. Yes.

Q. You would agree that Tech Against Terrorism is an important organisation, not just in the UK but also with global reach because, amongst other activities, it is using open-source intelligence to identify material posted on platforms, including, but by no means limited to TikTok, that may be terrorist material, terrorist supporting material or also extreme violent type material which they classify as a type of extremism?

A. Yes.

Q. Yes, and no doubt, that's why you say that you are part of what they do and are proud to be so?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you subscribe to their TCAP alerts, so the alerts that they give out?

A. I don't have full knowledge of it, but I strongly suspect that we do.

Q. Thank you. So, we put you on notice of this, when Mr Hadley gave evidence yesterday, he raised two problems in relation to the interface between Tech Against Terrorism and TikTok. The first one was one of practicalities. So he said that TikTok have said, when

they are giving their alerts -- which we must remind ourselves are alerts about terrorism material, terrorism supporting material and extreme violence -- that TikTok have said that they would prefer for us to use your own platform for content removal requests. So, in effect, fill out the form for each individual post that you consider to be a problem.

And, in essence -- I have shown you the draft transcript for yesterday before you gave your evidence -- but what he was indicating there was how problematic that is for them, as a relatively small organisation, that instead of, as a trusted flagger, emailing you a list: here are all of the URNs that we found on your platform that are of terrorism-type concerns, you are saying: fill out the form on each and every occasion.

A. If I can just clarify --

Q. Just wait until we get to the question, if you do not mind. I asked him:

"Question: When TikTok have said that they would rather you use their system because handling the emails is manual for them, is that a request ... again, similar to the form filling you explained, that they want you to fill out that form for each piece of content that you are seeking to alert?"

He said:

"Answer: That's my understanding, which obviously stretches credulity, given these companies are large and profitable precisely because they use technology, AI and automation. So for content policy teams to tell me that processing emails is cumbersome, seems to be quite a peculiar thing for them to say."

Forgive me for interrupting you, but that was the concern that he raised. First of all, is what he says there accurate, to your understanding?

A. So I think it is, broadly. But I would just like to make two clarificatory points. The first, is when we refer to a form, we are not referring to user-reporting forms that are available to every user. We are referring to a dedicated what we call our TSET programme, part of our community partnerships programme which again, is referred to in my statement. So this is a dedicated tool that provides information directly to our trust and safety teams, who are then able to act upon it directly, in real time. It is used by some of the other organisations that I mention in my witness statement, such as --

Q. So it is not the public form of concern, it is a trusted flagger. All right, so that, I am sure, is beneficial but doesn't deal with the concern, which is that you are

not receiving -- prepared to receive these by email and what you are requesting requires laborious, manual --

A. So my second point of clarification would be that we are still receiving them by email and escalating them on that basis. Our suggestion to Tech Against Terrorism has been that an adoption of this process doesn't then create the potential redundancies or resilience issues that may come via the email approach.

Q. Right. But presumably, if you just invested in that a little bit, you could just use all of your AI knowledge to suck up the list of URNs that's listed in the emails and put them into the system and you have much greater resource to do that than a not-for-profit limited liability company like Tech Against Terrorism; why not just do that?

A. So I have no doubt that we will continue to iterate the way in which we can ingest these things from our trusted flaggers. I think the point is that that is how we have approached it with others, including others that have sort of similar scale, and it has the added benefit of being able to reach our trust and safety teams directly, no matter the time, where they are in the world, and so on. But, of course, we are always looking to try and make these things as easy as possible because this is important information from our perspective, when it

comes to trust and safety content moderation.
Q. Now, by definition, because Tech Against Terrorism are finding this material, it's material that's got onto the system?
A. Yes.
Q. And has evaded moderation?
A. Correct.
Q. It is in the public interest, is it not, for TikTok, as with other platforms, to be open and transparent about how effectively and how seriously you deal with that material?
A. Yes.
Q. The second aspect of Mr Hadley's concerns which he raised yesterday is that it is difficult for them to determine whether TikTok has removed material because of the anti-bot detection measures which you have in place. So they are not able to automate an assessment. They have a list of URNs, that they have reported to you; they can't run programming to check whether it has been taken down and how quickly it has been taken down because that is trying to suck data -- my understanding of his evidence -- in a way that will get picked up by TikTok as bots try to draw information. And the way around that is for them to be granted researcher API status and his evidence is that they have asked for it;

do you agree that that has happened?
A. It is my understanding it has, yes.
Q. And that it has been refused?
A. Yes.
Q. And that it has been refused on a number of grounds: that Tech Against Terrorism are not affiliated with a university; and they are not a charity, in the sense that they are a company limited by guarantee, which is a form of non-profit, and apparently that doesn't match your criteria?
A. So I believe that to be the case, for the researcher API that we make available. I wonder if I might just go back to your point around what this is trying to solve, as it were, because I think you said that Tech Against Terrorism say they can't automate checking the URLs that they have provided to us. My understanding -- which again I'm happy to go away and check -- is that we will report back to them on anything that has been flagged back to us directly. So I don't think this is in relation to issues and individual instances that they have flagged, that they then can't check. I think that the point they are making is that this is about their understanding of wider trends, where they seek to make use of wider sets of approaches.
Q. Yes.

A. That indeed might be permissible by a researcher API.
Q. But it is about hurdles being put in place of a not-for-profit, trusted flagger, that you say you are proud to deal with, that you are not giving them access to the tech to see how much of the material you take down and how quickly you take it down.
A. So, again, I don't know whether that is a completely correct characterisation because the researcher API is able to be used on a kind of aggregated, anonymised basis, so that people can investigate trends without breaching privacy. So what I don't know is whether or not the characterisation that you have just used is an accurate one, in terms of what the researcher API allows you to do.
Q. And given TikTok's resources, do you analyse how many of these alerts lead to take-downs and how quickly they lead to take-downs?
A. So yes, again, my understanding is that with the alerts themselves, we will be responsive to Tech Against Terrorism and -- in relation to the things that they have flagged to us and the action that we take.
Q. That's not an answer to my question. Given TikTok's resources, do you analyse how many of those alerts lead to take-downs and how quickly they take them down? It is not an answer to that question to say: our policy is

to be responsive.
A. So, with apologies, I was trying to say that, my understanding is that on each of those alerts, we will respond to Tech Against Terrorism saying what we have taken down. I think what Tech Against Terrorism is arguing is that they want to do wider trend analysis which is indeed, what our researcher API will allow academics and charities to undertake.
Q. So why not treat them as a charity?
A. I don't know the underlying rationale behind how we have drawn up our research for API eligibility and I know that it is in use at the moment by more than a thousand people making use of it, across the EU, UK, US --
Q. So why not extend it to Tech Against Terrorism if they are such a trusted partner? Let's go back to your statement, at 123 and put that on screen:
"... proud to be a member of Tech Against Terrorism ..."
A. With apologies, I don't manage that relationship directly and therefore, I'm not familiar with the specifics.
Q. All right. If, as a result of this exchange, there is a change in how TikTok is dealing with Tech Against Terrorism, in terms of its preparedness to give it researcher API status, before the 17 December, could you

please let the Inquiry know? Don't trouble to make a note, because others will. Equally, if you have decided -- forgive me for putting it this way -- to dig your heels in and not do it, likewise, could you tell the Inquiry that that is the case and explain why?

A. Yes, of course.

Q. The suggestion I have for you is this is another area where, when you say, in your statement, "TikTok is proud to be a member of Tech Against Terrorism", there is a serious risk that TikTok is not living up to the values you seek to espouse in your witness statement. Do you wish to comment on that?

A. I don't think I agree with that characterisation but equally, I accept that I don't have the full view of our relationship with Tech Against Terrorism, so I think the commitment that you have from me is to go away and work with colleagues to explore these issues further.

Q. Thank you. Could we, just to finish off on this subject, please, just go back to page 15 TIK000003_0015 and paragraph 58 of your statement. Sorry, we haven't got to this previously. I'm not going to read it out but you do give, there, the specific UK figures?

A. Yes.

Q. So the learned Chair can just make a note of that, in terms of the number of videos globally but then you go

on to give the UK figures.

What percentage of TikTok's revenue is spent on content moderation and safety?

A. I don't have a specific answer to that. We have been public previously that our spend on trust and safety is in the billions, but I don't have it as a percentage and I think, in part, it reflects the part that trust and safety on approach involves lots of business areas. There is the trust and safety team itself and then the significant R&D that we do into the automated reviews and the models and so forth.

Q. You were put on notice by our evidence proposal that we were going to raise that issue with you. Have you not raised queries to inform yourself of the answer to that question?

A. I think that we don't necessarily think it is a question that is answerable without really specific definitions because of the holistic elements of how we approach content moderation.

Q. You have given figures on what you say -- you gave your answer, that you have given figures in relation to the billions, in terms of the spend.

A. Yes.

Q. So you have that figure and you have your revenue. It is not the proverbial rocket science to give it as

a proportion.

A. I'm afraid, that I don't have a specific number that would constitute --

Q. Could you update the Inquiry on that and give a specific figure --

A. I could look into whether a figure could be given, yes.

Q. Thank you, by the same date, please. And then paragraph 117 on page 28 TIK000003_0028. This was the point that I sought to pick up with you before because I have gone, I hope fairly, to all of those figures showing take-down materials. But you say that the data that we have been talking about relates to violative content across all users, and that you don't hold data or analysis regarding the prevalence of young people uploading or viewing violent content.

I'm going to suggest the first part of that is not accurate. You do hold the data because you would know, if you chose to programme it, of what the age is of people who are uploading material that is taken down?

A. I suppose, the point would be on whether or not it is held, or otherwise subject to data --

Q. You could extract it from your current data?

A. Possibly, I don't know.

Q. It is not a possible -- if you ran the programme to do the link, saying: what material is taken down from

registered users, and what date of birth they gave, you would have your answer?

A. Well, I think that the point there being violent content which, I think as we have outlined in content moderation, you know, will fall into a variety of different categories, be it safety and civility, sensitive and mature themes as well. And so while, at an aggregate level, you may have broad policy, narrowing it down to specific violent content may not be something we hold.

Q. You say that:

"TikTok cannot provide content level data broken down by user age ... for several reasons, including [its] practices of maintaining pseudo anonymised data. In addition ...(reading to the words)... users ..."

Mr Law, it may be my fault, but I simply don't understand this. How could it possibly be a privacy breach for TikTok to say: of this material that we take down, this percentage was actually uploaded by children?

A. Because I think that the underlying -- as we said there, we maintain pseudo anonymised data. We make sure that we aggregate data so that individuals cannot be directly identified.

Q. Forgive me, Mr Law. I'm sorry. That is a nonsense. If what you are publishing is a percentage figure of how

many -- whatever the figure is, 25 million -- and you are going to say 18 million of that content was uploaded by children, that's not -- it is a million miles away --

A. I think --

Q. Mr Law, forgive me. I will seek not to interrupt you, please extend the same courtesy to me.

A. Of course, my apologies.

Q. That is a million miles away from identifying anything about the privacy of an identifiable child. So why does TikTok not give that data?

A. I'm afraid, I have given the answer, which is that those are our data preserving practices at the moment. We take great care to aggregate data up to a level where there's an inability to be able to identify individuals. I think that the specific statement here talks about content-level data, broken down by youth/age, so again, referring specifically to the idea of violent content as a narrow element of the sets of community guidelines against which we enforce.

Q. Or is it because you are disinclined to run the analytics on that because it would tend to produce embarrassing answers that would support the concerns that have been raised by Ofcom? Is that the real reason?

A. I don't believe so.

Q. Sir, would be that a convenient moment?

SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: It would.

MR MOSS: 2.05 pm?

SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: Yes. We will take a break now.

(1.25 pm)

(The short adjournment)

(2.05 pm)

SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: Please have a seat. Yes, Mr Moss.

MR MOSS: Thank you, sir. Mr Law, I need to turn now to the offensive posts relating to AR.

You know the gist that we are using and you have a hard copy. Please feel free to take a moment at any time that you need to, to refer to that wording, if at any time it assists you. We will all understand why you may want to pause and that's absolutely fine.

A. Thank you.

Q. Can we start by picking up the context, in page 23 TIK000003_0023 of your first witness statement. I think this would have been before you were aware of the offending material. So you pointed out there, that:

"... despite the extensive systems and processes outlined above, violent content can be challenging to identify, assess and moderate. [And] understanding the degree to which ...(reading to the words)... or identities."

Is that right?

A. Correct.

Q. So we have the context of -- the broad headings, I think, in which TikTok, as I have understood it from your evidence and statements, wish this to be viewed in part. Could we also have a look, please, at page 38 TIK000003_0038 paragraph 151.

Again, in fairness to you and TikTok, this was before you were aware, I think, of this offending posting. So even before then, you were explaining to the Inquiry, that:

"... the scale and speed of user-generated content presents a challenge to real-time monitoring, including difficulties in identifying authoritative information including ...(reading to the words)... by changing keywords, misspelling ... terms ..."

And so on. But:

"... TikTok continues to focus on and improve its content moderation systems with continued investment in AI moderation and safety tools and continues to develop relationships across industry, government and law enforcement."

So, as we look at this offending material which was sadly hosted on TikTok, I take it that you would ask for that context to be part of the way in which this is

explored?

A. Yes.

Q. Thank you. And it is also right, if we can turn to your second statement, please, at paragraph 8 TIK000001_0002. You will tell me otherwise, but I am sure you will want me to read into the record the expression of deep sorrow that you have been authorised to give. So, you say:

"I recognise the distress that will have been caused by the Offending Content and in particular the profound pain that will have been felt by the families of the victims, and to all those affected by their deaths. I'm deeply sorry for that additional suffering. TikTok takes incidents of this nature extremely seriously and has prioritised its response accordingly to ensure that appropriate action is taken. The Offending Content and content of this nature violates our Community Guidelines ..."

You give specifics of that:

"... and where it is identified, it is removed. In general, this kind of violation accounts for a very small proportion of the content we remove from the platform for violating our Community Guidelines, as outlined in ..."

Your first statement. We have looked at that.

So I think that was the expression, in those terms,

that you wanted to have earlier on in your statement when you were made aware and TikTok was made aware of this material, is that fair?
A. Yes.
Q. Thank you. I need, however, to look with you at, first of all, this expression and the way that it has been addressed in the way that it has. Because you recognise, very appropriately, if I may say so, the distress caused by the offending content and you express that you are deeply sorry for that additional suffering. But I want it look at TikTok's responsibility in relation -- we'll come on to the posters and what has been done about them, but in relation to TikTok, is TikTok sorry that it hosted this material at all --
A. Yes.
Q. -- on its platform? And are you and is TikTok sorry that its systems were not good enough to detect and remove this material?
A. Yes.
Q. And are you sorry that it was not removed sufficiently quickly by TikTok?
A. Yes, absolutely.
Q. Is there any reason why those matters were not set out, candidly and straightforwardly in your statement, to recognise, as I may say so, you have immediately done in

my question, why TikTok's acceptance of its shortcomings were not set out here. Rather, it was phrased in terms of being deeply sorry for the offending content and the harm of that offending content?
A. Yes, so look, I fully recognise that the paragraph here doesn't convey the depth of our apology because the apology is for it being on the platform in the first place, as you say, and the inability for our systems to have identified it in the first place, as well as the distress and the significant additional suffering. That was clumsiness on my part, in terms of the witness statement, rather than a particular approach that was deliberately taken.
Q. The sensitivity and the distress with which these posts are concerned, could not have been more obvious; would you agree?
A. I would.
Q. And whether it is you or others who were involved in the formulation of this statement, that acceptance of where TikTok failed should have been front and centre in this witness statement?
A. I agree.
Q. Thank you. How would you rate TikTok's handling of the UK user who posted, or re-posted, the worst of this material?

A. Sorry, can you repeat the question, please? How would I rate?
Q. How would you rate TikTok's handling of the UK user who posted or re-posted the worst of this material?
A. So, my understanding is that the material itself was taken down. The user was not banned, as it was the first and only violation on their account, and the other elements of their account did not contain violative content or content related to this nature, is my understanding.
Q. All right. So are you saying that the response was adequate; is that your evidence?
A. I'm saying that it is in keeping with the approach that we take, from a trust and safety perspective.
Q. No, please answer my question. Don't change the wording. I think you can give a yes or no answer. Is it your evidence that TikTok's handling of the user in the UK who posted this material has been adequate?
A. I think it has been in line with our community guidelines, our approaches.
Q. I will try once more. Has it been adequate? If you don't answer that question, the learned Chair will draw such inference as he feels appropriate. Has it been adequate; "yes" or "no"?
A. I'm afraid, I would repeat the answer, simply because

I think views on what is adequate or not are individual. I think this is in line with the approaches that we say that we take, from the community guidelines. That may differ from person to person. We set out the approach that we take in areas where we ban on the basis of a single violation. I appreciate your point, Mr Moss, that that's non-exhaustive. But my trust and safety colleagues who, as I have said earlier, I consider to be highly professional experts in their field, took this decision and therefore on that basis and my trust if them, I suppose -- and with apologies, I would say that it is adequate, in relation to their judgement.
Q. All right. We may come back to it, albeit briefly. So can I deal with the first batch of material and I will just read the gist of this, with the reminder to the media about the guidance that has been given. So this was an AI video depicting AR hugging Elsie, Bebe and Alice, with the use of highly offensive language.
A. Correct.
Q. Mr Law, you were kind enough this morning to indicate to me -- would you forgive me just putting it into the record in open court -- that you have seen the actual video of the post yourself?
A. I have.
Q. Thank you very much. The use of AI imagery of these

three innocent, young, murdered girls is sickening.
A. I agree.
Q. To use AI imagery of AR, who murdered them, is yet more sickening.
A. I agree.
Q. And to accompany that with offensive language, more sickening still.
A. I agree.
Q. It is fair to describe the post as grossly offensive?
A. I would do, yes.
Q. And you could describe it as indecent or obscene, as well?
A. Yes.
Q. If we could have, please, on screen ILT000385, 1, what I want to do is look at the chronology. And we can see at the bottom of the page, so the first batch we are dealing with, video (a). Could we have that enlarged, please.
So, this is one way of getting this into evidence. That the date of posting of that was 5 July, do you agree?
A. Yes.
Q. Thank you. And if we then go to ILT000402, we know that this material was reported by Mr Walker, or by his firm who are the solicitors for the bereaved families for the

parents of the three girls, do you follow?
A. Yes.
Q. And we see here the outcome of that, which was what?
A. That no violation was found by the review.
Q. Of this sickening material?
A. Yes.
Q. 403, please. ILT000403. It is the next document, I do apologise. We see the chronology here that it was reported -- or the receipt of report, 9.04 am on 12 August -- I think it is the reverse-date system. And the indication comes back, no doubt automated, "We'll review and take action" and the sum total of it was that in 30 minutes, there was a response:
"No violations found."
Is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. And presumably, that would have been an automated assessment?
A. Yes, that's my understanding.
Q. Thank you. It was then further reported by the Inquiry on 12 August -- sorry, it was reported to the Inquiry, I should say, on 12 August. So if we could have ILT000233, so reported to the Inquiry, ILT000233.
Thank you. So this is Mr Howarth's statement. If we look at page 2 ILT000233_0002, paragraph 4. He

explains that the "Recognised Legal Representative ... for the bereaved parents", that is Mr Walker:
"... wrote to the Chair to draw his attention to what he described as an 'utterly sickening' post on TikTok that related to the Southport attacks and comprised ... (AI) generated material. The Chair was informed by this letter that the matter had already been referred to the police. The Inquiry was informed that the post had inevitably caused considerable distress to the bereaved families."
It was then, I think, reported by the Inquiry. So if we can just have a look, please, at -- perhaps I can just give the time. I think you will agree that it was reported by the Inquiry via a Rule 9 request on 13 August at 9.54 in the morning, yes?
A. Yes.
Q. Could we have paragraph 12 on page 3 ILT000233_0003 of this statement. Sorry, paragraph 11 was where we get that timing. Then we can see, in paragraph 12, that after an initial acknowledgement at 5.23 in the afternoon, your legal representatives confirmed that the offending content was no longer publicly available. Had that then involved a human assessment of the material?
A. Yes, my understanding is that is right.
Q. Thank you. And then, a Section 21 notice was served by

the Inquiry -- so that was the exchange on 13 August. The Section 21 notice was then served. So that is TIK000002. And page 1. I'm going to say immediately what we are looking at is not the right page for this first batch, okay? But the reason why I'm going to that is if you read down the left-hand side, you get the questions that were asked. So: the username is (a); the personal details which were provided when they signed up to TikTok, which is (b); the records of any age or identification processes that were used; the originating IP address; the location, where it was made; the time when the post was made; and whether the post was reported to TikTok and if so, when the report was made; any steps that were taken in response.
So those were the standard questions. I go through that because when we go to TikTok's response in relation to this video, that's at page 5 TIK000002_0005 of the same document, please, and it is video reference (a) that we are looking at, we see from the top of the page, "US user videos":
"Note -- the information below has been collated from publicly available sources."
A. Yes.
Q. And the only information that was provided was the "user" and the "username" and "Steps taken by TikTok":

"The account has been permanently banned for violating TikTok's Community Guidelines. The video was removed from the platform on 13 August ..."

Is that right?

A. Correct.

Q. Thank you. I won't bring it up on screen but at the time, your legal representatives were writing to the Inquiry -- had written to the Inquiry, to say: TikTok wishes to draw the Inquiry's attention to the fact that the Rule 9 request relates to a US-registered user of TikTok and as set out in an earlier letter, TikTok UK is the service provider of the platform for UK users and it is unable to provide the detailed information requested in relation to this TikTok user.

Is that right?

A. Correct.

Q. Why were you unable to provide further information about the sickening posts posted by the US-based user of TikTok?

A. Because US user data and moderation is undertaken by the US entity. TikTok UK and TikTok Ireland are joint data controllers for users in Europe and the UK and therefore we, as a legal entity, have access to greater data for them but there are privacy restrictions on obtaining more granular user details for US --

Q. Did TikTok UK seek to get that information and it was refused by the US entity, or did you not seek it because you knew it wouldn't be provided by the US entity?

A. The latter.

Q. So you didn't even ask?

A. If we were referring to specifics around the examples that you gave, so IP addresses, for example --

Q. Yes.

A. Then yes, that is correct.

Q. Thank you. So, what we can take from this, in relation to this video, is it remained online for, I think, five and a half weeks?

A. Yes.

Q. The auto moderation failed?

A. Yes.

Q. And the moderation failed when first uploaded and failed when flagged by the solicitors for the families?

A. Yes.

Q. And it was only removed upon a legal letter from the Inquiry, drawing TikTok's lawyer's attention to it?

A. Yes.

Q. We see, from what's on screen at the moment, that this account has been permanently banned for violating TikTok's community guidance. Was the US user's posting of this material part of the decision to permanently ban

him or her or was that coincidental? Was he or her banned for other breaches?

A. I don't know the full details of that because, again, it falls under US user moderation. So I can't give an indication with certainty as to why the ban took place, but it could have been multiple violations or indeed, an account dedicated to activities that are contrary to our community guidelines.

Q. In terms of quite how appalling this post is -- and I'm bound by the gist, but you have seen it -- it would have breached, in the clearest possible terms, a whole range of those community guidelines that we looked at earlier?

A. Yes.

Q. So, it breached it because it promoted or glorified violence, such as calling for violent attacks, or praising acts of violence?

A. Yes.

Q. TIK000015, page 11, sir.

It was not allowed under the violence and hateful organisations and individuals section either, because it included an individual who had caused a mass or a serial violence attack?

A. So, I'm going to say "yes" to that. I should clarify, of course, that I'm not that person who makes those judgements, but this would be my reading of it.

Q. It doesn't matter. You can answer the questions. Forgive me. It was not allowed because it included an individual who was responsible for a mass casualty attack?

A. Yes.

Q. That's just a plain and straightforward fact. It was not allowed under community guidelines because it promoted, praised, or provided material support to an individual who was responsible for a mass casualty attack?

A. Yes.

Q. It was contrary to the guidance because it showed people who were linked to individuals who caused mass or serial violence as well?

A. Again, that would be my assessment, yes.

Q. Please don't give any detail in relation to this at all, and I have put you on notice of this question and how I'm going to phrase it so that you can deal with it.

A. Yes.

Q. But it would also have breached guidelines because the highly offensive language referred to in the gist included highly discriminatory and derogatory language?

A. Yes.

Q. Has TikTok taken any other action in relation to this user in the US, given the gravity of the breach and the

seriously offensive and obscene nature of the post?
A. I don't have that information.
Q. Has TikTok referred the user to the police in The States?
A. I don't know.
Q. The victims and survivors team -- and I'm going to, on this occasion, put the question entirely as it has been given to us. It is as follows:
"So no one in the UK can prosecute whoever made a video of three murdered children with the man who killed them and the families still don't know who it was, is that right? Is TikTok content with that position?"
A. I think that that is right. I think the position reflects privacy requirements as well as then presumably, extra jurisdictional elements that I'm not familiar with. But I would say that, yes, we are unable to provide the data and that information and that is a limitation to UK authorities.
Q. As we will come onto, TikTok UK have access to, and supervision over, at least the re-posing of this material, the same video, in relation to batch 2.
A. Yes.
Q. Does TikTok know what AI was used to create the content?
A. No.

Q. Have you tried to find that out?
A. I have not seen specific analysis around that. I can say with confidence that it wasn't TikTok-related AI, because we don't offer the --
Q. Just be very careful --
A. -- to manipulate things in that way.
Q. All right. So you would be confident that it wasn't TikTok AI because the nature of what is shown in the AI depicted on this video -- the detail of which we won't go into, other than the fact that it shows hugging, which is in the gist -- you don't think could have been created on TikTok's AI?
A. Yes, at a high level, business users have access to TikTok Symphony, which is an AI tool that can be used to create video. Beyond that, the AI that we have is very limited in terms of image generation and moving image generation, in particular.
Q. Thank you. I'm going to move to batch 2 now. So, batch 2, as per our gist, is a further posting of the video in batch 1, as well as four other video posts by different users, which glorify AR and the events of 29 July 2024, including AI videos of AR; yes?
A. Yes.
Q. I want to concentrate mostly about the first video in this series, which is that UK user posting the same

video. Now, all of the questions that I asked about that material being sickening and so on, which you readily agreed to, I won't repeat. But it is the same video, so we will take that as our starting position. But are you aware of when that video was posted by the UK user?
A. I think that that's contained in the --
Q. Don't worry, it is not a test. It was 26 July.
A. Yes.
Q. And you will appreciate the resonance of that, in the context of these events. Because the UK user posted that just three days before the second anniversary of the attack; do you follow?
A. Yes.
Q. Making it more sickening still?
A. Yes.
Q. Was the Inquiry the first body to report that post to TikTok?
A. No.
Q. How many times had it been reported to TikTok before the Inquiry reported it?
A. It was subject to four user reports, prior to the Inquiry reporting to us.
Q. So if we look at TIK000002_0001, it is the same document as we have got on screen but page 1 and we just look,

please, at the bottom two boxes. The time when the post was made, 26 July. I don't overlook the fact that three minutes after its posting, it was restricted and not recommended on the platform's For You feed.
So whatever it was in the automated moderation, something picked up that there was something about that video that meant that it wasn't appropriate to push to the For You feed, yes?
A. Yes, I can clarify what that is as well. It was that it was a duplicate posting. So it was a posting of a video that had already been posted before --
Q. All right, so that's nothing to do --
A. So that was on quality grounds, as opposed to community guidelines.
Q. Then the video was reported four times: 26 July at 3.55; the second on 2 August; the third on 7 August; and the fourth on 7 August, later in the day. Were all of those -- well, let's go through what's said in relation to it. In response to the first report, the content was automatically reviewed and labelled as "AI generated" and remained on the platform, yes?
A. Yes.
Q. Then over the page. After the fourth report, the content was automatically reviewed a second time and remained on the platform. And the content was finally

deleted from the platform on 14 August, in relation to the Inquiry's intervention?
A. Yes.
Q. So if we go to the previous page. When the video was reported for that first time, that's presumably what, by another user?
A. Yes, is my understanding. Yes.
Q. And within five minutes of it going up, someone is complaining that this material is inappropriate?
A. Yes.
Q. And we see those further complaints being made, totalling three more in total. And you have to realise that the totality of those systems didn't lead to this material being detected as sickening and in breach of multiple guidance?
A. Correct.
Q. Thank you. Can we turn next, please, to ILT000223. It is page 4 ILT000223_0004, paragraph 14 of Mr Howarth's statement. So, these are the circumstances. You will remember that the first batch has been reported by the Inquiry. The Inquiry has been told on the 12th and reported to you on the 14th:

"On Friday 14 ... the Inquiry Secretariat carried out a search of TikTok using key terms that were referred to in relation to the First Post. The Inquiry

Secretariat identified a batch of five posts. One of these posts contained the same material as the ...(reading to the words)... user."

And then it goes on to deal with the other four. It was captured digitally and you have seen our evidential capture of that material?
A. Yes.
Q. So:

"Accordingly at 1602 ... that same day ... the Secretary to the Inquiry [Mr] Knight wrote to ...(reading to the words)... abhorrent ..."

I don't suppose you disagree with that?
A. I agree wholeheartedly.
Q. And that many of the associated comments were "equally disturbing". And you were told that the Chair had been made aware of those links and he remained deeply concerned and there was a request that they be removed the same day.

If we just scroll down together a little bit:

"... together with any other content that similarly glorified AR. It also requested that TikTok provide an assurance regarding the steps it is taking to identify and remove such content ..."

Then we see, that on 14 August, at 21.12, your legal representatives responded to say that it had been taken

down.

TikTok UK had received, on 13th, the earlier letter from the learned Chair of this Inquiry, expressing personal deep concern at the first batch.
A. Yes.
Q. Why was the Inquiry, rather than TikTok, finding a duplicate the following day that hadn't been taken down?
A. I don't have a full answer to that. When we received the first of the Inquiry's notifications on 13 August, members of the trust and safety team were stood up to investigate and respond. That also included, as we have covered already, engagement with US colleagues because of it being a US user too. But I completely agree with you that we should have been able to identify, within that time period, duplicates and take action against them.
Q. Yes, because it is not as though this was posted on the morning of the 14th. It had been up since three days before the anniversary of the deaths.
A. Yes.
Q. I mean, that is a striking failure to take action, isn't it?
A. So, look, I would recognise definitely the failure in the lack of action. I think the steps that are taken

specifically, some of which can be quite technical, which involve things like adding the specific elements of content to a high-risk library so that it is seeded. That can be a period that takes some time before then sweeps are run again and it may have been within that period of time that this further content was identified by the secretariat to the Inquiry. I'm in no way suggesting that that is something that diminishes the level of responsibility that we have on that front.
Q. But it smacks of a lack of urgent attention being given to it. I mean, you are a company of huge resource and this was a direct duplicate that had been sitting on your platform for quite some period of time and you will forgive me putting it this way, but the Inquiry Secretariat, still less, the counsel team, are not IT experts and they were able to find it with not very much work.
A. No, I accept that. I would say that the urgency that was around it was something that I observed directly, in terms of the trust and safety teams that were brought together to look into this, but I completely --
Q. Why have you not just put analysts on it -- all that was being done was the hashtags and so on that were associated with the first posts were put into a search on TikTok and there was further material. Why was that

not done? It might be thought to be inexplicable.
A. No, look. My understanding is that the process involved in removing that first piece of content, which was US users as well, was something that the trust and safety team were working on and ingesting the relevant signals on it. But I completely accept that it was a shortcoming of ours that we didn't immediately pick up those additional pieces of content or indeed, the third batch.
Q. And the fact that the Inquiry's was the fifth report in relation to such serious material, and that there had only been two reviews previously of the material in relation to four complaints about it and that none of them had had a safety analyst actually look at the material, speaks to serious flaws in your system, doesn't it?
A. Well, I think at this point, it is worth -- with care, obviously -- highlighting the challenges that are involved in content moderation. So the contextual elements, the use of occasionally surrealist, ironic elements too, that some of these communities that we are talking about deliberately try and use to, as we were discussing earlier, to evade detection.
Q. There was no irony involved in this case.
A. No, I was not being specific to that, I was talking

about in generalities. Therefore, the challenges that we face from a moderation perspective are such that every single piece of violative content helps us build up signals, but we have to work very hard to be able to cast the net as wide as possible, to be able to identify signals in the first place. And we have outlined ways in which we do that.

You talked about the kind of process and the automated reviews. Again, the scale that we are dealing with, both posts of videos and user reports, is such that the balance we strike is one of automated reviews as standard which, as I have described, have been increasing in sophistication and accuracy over a period of time and then, yes, human reviews when it reaches a certain level, or with additional levels of information as well.
Q. Could we go back, please, to TIK000002. And page 2 TIK000002_0002:

"As this user committed a single violation ... and this content was removed, TikTok has not taken steps to ban the account. The circumstances in which TikTok will ban user accounts are outlined ..."

In the relevant paragraphs of your first statement.

How can it credibly be said that this post, which you have agreed is sickening and abhorrent, has not been

treated as a single severe violation of the community guidelines?
A. So, as we discussed earlier, we list a series of areas where we identify them, that's non-exhaustive, but the judgement of my trust and safety colleagues is that it hasn't constitute -- I would like to emphasise that I personally completely agree your characterisation; I find it abhorrent, offensive, disgusting. The trust and safety judgement overall is that it is a violation --
Q. You, Mr Law, are a registered director of the company.
A. Yes.
Q. Why haven't you, and other directors, stepped in and said: that may be the judgement at first instance of the safety team, but this material is sickening and abhorrent and we are going to ban that user?
A. That is a matter for our trust and safety teams. They are the ones with the relevant expertise. Particularly with my day job engaging in government relations as well, it is quite right that I shouldn't have the ability to make determinations on content moderation.
Q. Is it actually a stated policy that the directors of the company are not able to take a decision where they consider that a moderation decision as to whether to ban a user has fallen far short and is likely to bring the

company, for example, into disrepute?
A. So, I don't know that it would be a stated policy in that respect.
Q. So why -- if it is not a policy, why has action not been taken? Because you are purporting to say that: it is right that it should be with my colleagues. But you are not able to point to any policy that says that that's the case?
A. Sorry, I was going to continue and say that --
Q. Forgive me.
A. -- it's a stated policy that the trust and safety teams are the ones responsible for content moderation. And one of the clear divisions that we have is for me, in an externally facing role, to be able to engage with stakeholders, to hear a series of their views on different issues. But trust and safety, the people who are taking the decisions over it, there are naturally reasons why we reserve the moderation decision to them, as the experts in their field.
Q. How senior within the organisation -- given that this material had been flagged by a Public Inquiry and by the Chair of it -- how senior was the person who took that decision?
A. I don't know the answer to that, I'm afraid.
Q. Why do you not know the answer to that?

A. Because I haven't reviewed the specifics of which member of the trust and safety team actioned that particular --
Q. Why not?
A. My apologies, Mr Moss. It wasn't something that I prepared for this.
Q. Again, forgive me, but we put in our evidence proposal that we were going to ask you questions about that and it would have been clear that you were going to face probing questions in relation to this. The simple reality is that your safety team got this catastrophically wrong in the decision they made, yes?
A. Sorry, the decision to not ban?
Q. Yes.
A. I trust their judgement on these things. You know --
Q. But your own view is that it is abhorrent and sickening?
A. I agree, yes.
Q. And that he or she should have been banned?
A. I agree that it is abhorrent and sickening. I think that the actions that we take under our community guidelines is an area that I very deliberately leave to our trust and safety team.
Q. It promoted or glorified violence?
A. Yes.
Q. It promoted a hateful organisation or individual?
A. Yes.

Q. It praised what he had done?
A. In my view, yes.
Q. Not in your view; it is obvious, isn't it?
A. Yes.
Q. And it was grossly offensive and discriminatory as well?
A. Yes.
Q. If we look at your second witness statement. Paragraph 8 TIK000001_0002. *(Pause)*.

When it is said that "TikTok takes incidents of this nature extremely seriously", if you are candid with this Inquiry, Mr Law, can you understand why many people may find it difficult to accept that statement?
A. Yes. I can see that, on the basis of what we have just discussed, that that would cast doubt on that. I think the only thing I can reiterate is that trust and safety colleagues that I have, who are professionals in their field, are making these determinations on the basis of community guidelines at scale. I trust in their judgement on this and the response that we pull together on this is one that reflects their judgement and the exercise of that.
Q. The failure to ban this user who is based in the UK was an abrogation of TikTok UK's responsibility, do you agree?
A. I don't.

Q. Was this user even given warning as to their future conduct? The post was removed. Were they warned: what you posted was sickening, it is a single violation, you haven't had any previous warnings, but if you do this again, you will be banned?
A. They would have received the automated report in relation to action on an offending video, on a violative video, which would have explained the reasons under which this was being removed, the specific elements of the community guidelines, and --
Q. Just hold. It has been removed because it breaches these guidelines. Nothing more than that? Nothing adjectival?
A. That is correct.
Q. To say: we, TikTok, find it absolutely appalling that you have posted a video depicting a multiple murderer hugging his victims; you must never do this again. There was nothing; it was just a standard, automated email and nothing more?
A. It is my understanding that it was the standard response when content is removed.
Q. And still today, that's the only action? An automated email that has been sent to this user by TikTok UK, is that the truth?
A. That is my understanding, yes.

Q. Is that adequate?
A. Again, I think it is a reflection of the way that our community guidelines operate.
Q. Is it adequate?
A. Relative to the responsibilities we set out in our community guidelines, yes. I equally understand that the huge level of distress that both the offending content caused and the presence is clearly profoundly distressing.
Q. I put those words of grossly offensive, indecent or obscene to you earlier on and you agreed with them?
A. Yes.
Q. Is TikTok UK aware that it is a criminal offence in the UK, under section 127 of the Communications Act, 2003, for a person to send, by means of a public electronic communication network, a message or other matter that is grossly offensive of an indecent, obscene or menacing character?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you report this user to the police?
A. No.
Q. Why not?
A. So, to return to the conversation that we had earlier, we set out the engagement that we have with law enforcement and it is restricted to proactive

notification in relation to child sexual abuse material and then notification to law enforcement where there is a credible and imminent threat to life.

Q. Sir, as you know, the Inquiry has reported this user to the police and we have been promised updates in relation to any action that is taken.

A. I think, if I may, Mr Moss, there is obviously then the ability for the police to use their statutory powers with our law enforcement team, to be able to uncover this information. Clearly, we have provided it for the Inquiry but when we have had similar incidents --

Q. But you didn't apply it to police. The Inquiry obtained it from you under Section 21 and the Inquiry provided it to the police.

A. Correct.

Q. It may not be thought to be a very good answer to that, that if the police come knocking at your door, you will then provide it, because you haven't volunteered the information, have you?

A. That's true, with apologies, my point was to highlight the statutory ability that they have to work with us, to preserve data and obtain information in relation to users when making statutory requests to us.

Q. Thank you. We will deal more briefly with other material in this batch, not because it is not serious

but because it covers similar ground. Could we just look, please, back in TIK000002, page 3 TIK000002_0003. So this is video (f), sir.

We can see that this was posted on 7 August and we can see that that was reported once, at 12.30 am on 9 August. So that's going to be another user, I think, reporting it?

A. Yes.

Q. The content was automatically reviewed on 9 August and remained on the platform. So, again -- I'm not going to go through the detail -- but the gist shows that this was a post glorifying AR, yes?

A. Yes.

Q. And the moderation failed; the automatic moderation failed there, again?

A. Yes.

Q. Thank you. It was then reported -- just to get the chronology right -- by the Inquiry on 14 August, at 4 o'clock in the afternoon, 4:02, and removed by TikTok. If we just go over the page TIK000002_0004. No, I don't think we get that detail. But sir, the timing of that was at 23:00 on the 14th. The content of that was different to the previous videos but would have breached largely the same community guidelines?

A. That would be my expectation, yes.

Q. Thank you. And the user here was permanently banned. Do you know why this user was permanently banned, when the arguably worse UK user wasn't?

A. This user was banned because the account was dedicated to breaching our community guidelines, so had other material and actions that indicated intent to break our community guidelines repeatedly.

Q. Thank you. If we just go over the page TIK000002_0005. It does relate to this user. We can see that that included, I think, another post in relation to AR, who -- which had the caption "failed by society", yes?

A. Yes.

Q. So this user had also posted, in the context of a site dedicated to this, another post about AR which it looks like had also not been picked up?

A. Correct.

Q. Thank you. Then, in relation to the rest of this material, videos (b), (c) and (d), could we just have a look at the letter that outlines the posting dates. That's ILT000385 please. Could we have the bottom of page 2 ILT000385_0002 and top of page 3 ILT000385_0003.

So that we can see, just to get the dates of this, that one of them had been posted on 1 July, reported by the Inquiry on the 14th, and then removed, at that stage, the same day. Video (c) had been posted on

24 July, again, reported by the Inquiry and removed. And the third additional video here, another video glorifying AR, had only been posted on the 13th, and again, reported by the Inquiry.

A. Yes.

Q. But in relation to these three, again, some of them had been up for a while. I think as long as one and a half months in one case, three weeks in the other, only a day for the other one. Again, moderation had failed to pick it up?

A. Correct.

Q. And despite the Inquiry having reported, on the 13th, the sickening first batch, TikTok had not, itself, done work to identify this material. The relatively small team at the Inquiry had to notify you that its simple searches had found these videos and then, and only then, did TikTok remove them?

A. That's my understanding, yes.

Q. Then, in relation to the third batch, these are six posts which glorify AR and the events of 29 July, including AI videos of AR. And those were identified by the Inquiry, I think you are aware, on 18 August 2026. So if we just have a look at what's on screen here, we can see that. It was reported to TikTok on the 19th and you confirmed removal. I'm not going to take issue with

exactly when it was, but no doubt, acted promptly once the Inquiry had drawn it to attention.

But there again, the same point arises, doesn't it? Because when I was asking you questions previously about the events of the 13th and the 14th, one is talking about a period -- I'm not going to quibble over exactly how many hours, but 24 hours, give or take.

But four days after that, when the Inquiry is running further checks, when we want to check on TikTok again and other platforms, again, using completely unsophisticated -- and I don't raise that critically of the secretariat who did the work, but completely unsophisticated techniques, the Inquiry was finding abhorrent material. So what possible explanation is there for why TikTok hadn't removed that material between the 14th and 18th of its own volition?

A. I think it is probably a combination of the steps that are being taken, which is to ingest the additional signals that we have in relation to the violative content, update the way in which therefore our models work, the sweeps that we do, feed them with further information so that, on a broad basis, it is able to take action across the whole range of content across the platform.

What I accept is that there's definitely

shortcomings in the fact that relatively benign terms that were used by the secretariat were then bringing up this abhorrent content because I think that that is amiss, relative to what we would usually undertake, from a trust and safety perspective.

Q. But it is more than that, isn't it? You are saying: well, rest assured we would have been doing all the work on hashing, or whatever it is. We would have been programming our systems. What you didn't do was get a human being to sit down and plug in simple search terms and say: my goodness, this is reputationally disastrous for us; it is sickening and it's abhorrent. Let's just get one of our techies to do basic work and see what we can find. Forgive me, but the Inquiry were able to do it with very limited resource and no IT specialism. So why didn't TikTok even just put one person onto this? Again, you understand why I'm asking it because you say, in your witness statement, that it was treated very seriously.

A. Yes, and there were people who were undertaking those kind of sweeps. Clearly, they weren't able to pick up the sets that you identify, particularly in batch 3 which occurred a few days subsequent, which we deeply regret --

Q. Mr Law, I'm sorry. It may be me, but that lacks any

sense of credibility. How can it be that non-IT trained staff of an Inquiry can quickly find this material when -- forgive me using the phrase -- TikTok techies can't? Are you seriously saying that a sweep was done, by informed people actively looking for this material, and that those technicians and analysts in TikTok, with all your resources, were unable to find something which unqualified, effectively civil servants of the Inquiry were able to find very quickly? Is that really your evidence?

A. Well, I am saying that sweeps were done and that checks were undertaken. Clearly, they were not comprehensive on the basis of, as you say, the findings of the secretariat to the Inquiry, for which I think we remain very deeply regrettable and sorry.

Q. Thank you. Your second witness statement -- I'm not going to go to the detail, but it will be published, so it is there, please don't think I'm overlooking it -- deals with steps that you have taken subsequently to try to ensure that similar material is not available on TikTok.

A. Correct.

Q. Is that a fair summary?

A. Yes.

Q. Thank you. I want to turn, finally in terms of my

questions, to look at some other evidence, moving away from those materials, of concern raised by others in evidence and in reports about TikTok.

Your statement mentions the Youth Endowment Fund report, second report. Could we have a look at that, it is ILT000302. So, page 1, just for context:

"What role does social media play in violence affecting young people?"

If we go to page 12 ILT000302_0012, and just remain ourselves of the methodology. Top of the page. I think you will be familiar with this, but:

"... third annual survey into young people's experience of violence."

So do you remember when I asked you, at the start of your evidence, about whether you were aware of how TikTok ranked for violence? This is why I was asking about this and why I was asking directly in relation to violence:

"This year, we surveyed over 10,000 children aged 13-17 in England and Wales about their experiences over the past 12 months -- compared to 7,500 last year."

If we go to page 6 ILT000302_0006, please, having seen the methodology. Bottom of page 6, please. You see:

"Violence is widespread on social media.

"Exposure to real-life violence on social media has become the norm rather than the exception for teenage children."

Do you agree with that?

A. I agree that the study concluded that, yes.

Q. Do you agree with it? Not -- it is obvious that that's what the study concluded. Do you agree that exposure to real-life violence on social media has become the norm rather than the exception for teenage children in the UK?

A. I'm not sure that I would agree with that, off the basis of our own understanding, no.

Q. "... 70% of respondents have encountered some form of real-world violence online in the past 12 months. The most frequently observed content is footage of fights involving young people, with 56% of respondents reporting that they have seen such videos."

Other types, "threats of physical harm", content relating to gang activity, weapons, and so on.

So that's what they are drawing as a concern. Go to page 7 ILT000302_0007, you get the assessment of the proportion of children using social media platforms who have seen violent content. And where does TikTok rank?

A. At the top.

Q. Which means the worst?

A. Yes.

Q. 44 per cent as a proportion of children TikTok users who have seen violent content on TikTok.

A. Yes.

Q. When you see that graph, and realise that TikTok is ranked the worst, it is not a result of how popular TikTok is because this is looking at the proportion on TikTok. So it already allows for that. What is your reaction to the fact that you are ranked worse than X, Facebook, Snapchat, Instagram, YouTube, Reddit, Telegram, WhatsApp, Discord, Facebook, Android Message, Twitch and iMessage?

A. Regret at that fact. It does not represent the way that we want to operate as a platform and it does not represent the environment that we are trying to create for our users, at all.

Q. And how can one tally your earlier answers to the effect that TikTok takes violent material very seriously, but also your response to Ofcom, in terms of Ofcom's concern about the nature of the material that is being fed to children, when, compared to your major competitors, you seem to be the worst performing?

A. So, I think that this is an area where, you know, we continue to invest very significantly, to try and improve our overall metrics. Obviously we report our

own metrics as well, which we have covered. But some of the areas --

Q. Forgive me. I will let you finish, it is my fault.

A. I was just going to say I think some of the things that were mentioned earlier on in this report do pose challenges. We have, in the past, for example, seen quite a lot of challenges around school fights. Something that was, for a period of time, being -- trying to be driven as activity on the platform. That is an example of an area where we took dedicated steps to understand terminology that was being used in relation to that, to roll out proactive measures to be able to guard against it, as well as to work to raise awareness. And that's a process that we adopt across a range of harms and which are continuing to adopt in relation to violent content.

Q. I'm not seeking to challenge that there are not gradations of improvement being taken by TikTok, but it sits unhappily with your response to Ofcom that there isn't a systemic problem with the nature of TikTok's feeds. Because I put that to you earlier on in relation to violence and you said: well, I'm not aware of that specifically in relation to violence. But here it is in a high-profile report. So how can you be saying, against evidence like this, to Ofcom: we don't have

a particular problem, we think our systems are doing an adequate job?

A. Well, we obviously provide information to Ofcom and through our risk assessments as well, that's based on underlying data that we collect and the data pipelines that we build. And we provide that information to Ofcom, both through risk assessments and responses to RFI. And the combination of measures that we use, content moderation, and under-18 content experience backed by age assurance, as well as the user controls that we spoke about previously as well, we think gives an appropriate environment.

Of course, we are always working to try and improve levels of safety and to drive down any levels of violative content. I'm not familiar with the exact methodology that is associated with this and I know it was self-reported, as I understand, as well. So there may be disconnects --

Q. Mr Law, you will have to forgive me. I have taken you to the methodology and if one thinks about it in terms of medical literature, it is hardly a small-scale sample. 10,000 children have been asked for their experience and asked questions along the lines of: have you been exposed to violent content? And in which case, on which platform? And as a result of that very

large-scale study, TikTok rank worst. I mean, that's deeply concerning, is it not?
A. Look, I mean, of course, we are concerned by these sort of reports --
Q. Not concerned, deeply concerning?
A. -- we make use of them, in terms of trying to understand where gaps may be and to integrate additional signals and pieces of information to be able to close those gaps.
Q. Deeply concerning, yes?
A. Yes.
Q. And that's the terminology that Ofcom have used. You recognise it?
A. Of course, I'm concerned, as I look at this, and I know that our trust and safety team are as well. But I think it also a snapshot on a basis of a self-reported survey, which doesn't necessarily match across to definitions that are used, either by Ofcom or within community guidelines. And it is an area that we continue to drive improvements, drive investment in and improve our outcomes.
Q. So we should not take, at face value, the results of 10,000 children being asked to give their experience of seeing violence and where they see it --
A. I'm not suggesting that we should not take it as face

value. I think what I'm saying is, particularly as it maps across to obligations that we face under the OSA, the way we approach our community guidelines as well, it may not be completely one-to-one equivalent, but obviously -- look, what I share is the concern at seeing any report such as this that has us at or near the top.

What I do know is that our trust and safety team, their aim would be to have us not just near the bottom but also to have that percentage be at zero and that is the work that they undertake and that they strive towards.

Q. At the top for risk, at the bottom for safety, I think is the way to put it. You said you want to see any report -- I mean, where it is at the top of the diagram, it is the bottom performing --
A. On this report, yes.
Q. Thank you. Secondly, the "Safer scrolling; How algorithms popularise and gamify online hate and misogynistic for young people" report, January 2024. I say immediately, that is some time ago now. It is ASCL000007.

So you see this report, UCL and University of Kent. If we look at the methodology, page 14 ASCL000007_0014.

Can I say in fairness to you and TikTok straightaway, Mr Law, this is not a comparison piece.

This is reporting on TikTok because TikTok seems to have been selected as an example to take, so it was looking at it in that way.

But effectively, the methodology -- I'm not going to read it all out -- but was four archetypes of young people. So children's accounts were created and then given archetypes. We see first loneliness, second neurodiversity. If we go over the page ASCL000007_0015, the third concern about male appearance and self-improvement and the fourth was in terms of content that emphasises looks-based attraction, related to appearance and so on.

If we go over the page to 16 ASCL000007_0016, we see diagrams showing how this worked.

So if we just follow the text, first of all:

"Following the identification of the four archetype's interests and the procedure flow for watching videos ... each archetype was run consecutively, each for seven days ... On four separate factory-reset iPads. No identification information was given to TikTok through account creation. Given the ethical limitations of interacting directly with users, particularly those under the age of 18, the only activity that was conducted on the archetype accounts was watching videos. No proactive activity, such as

liking, commenting or searching was conducted."

And then:

"For each archetype, a researcher watched videos on TikTok for one hour per day for seven continuous days. [And] based on the archetypes in the 'interest' list, if the videos presented through the algorithm were ...(reading to the words)... they proceeded to watch the video to the end ..."

So they are not liking, they are not doing anything proactive, they go to the initial glance. And what you see is, if they are not sure whether it fits their archetype of areas of concern, vulnerability, they watch for ten seconds more and then they decide, or cannot decide. If they cannot decide, they skip. But if, for either of those routes, they decide: yes, this is speaking to my vulnerability or my area, they watch it through to the end. Do you follow? So that is the basic methodology.
A. Yes.
Q. If we see in terms of where that then takes -- the executive summary, page 4 ASCL000007_0004. Paragraph 2:

" ... we highlight how the affordances of social media platforms, exemplified in this research by the recommender systems of TikTok, actively amplify and direct harmful content to young people. Through

intensive online fieldwork, we employed an algorithm study which used an archetype modelling methodology (based on long-form interviews with young people) to analyse over 1,000 videos on the social media platform TikTok. After only 5 days of TikTok usage, our research shows a fourfold increase in the level of misogynistic content being presented on the 'For You' page of an individual's TikTok account. We found that the algorithm privileges more extreme material, and through increased usage, users are gradually exposed to more misogynistic ideologies which are presented and gamified through soft or humorous cultural forms."

How does that tally with your level of assurance you stated in your evidence about the safety of your feed systems and algorithms?

A. So if I may, Mr Moss, I would like to make three observations in relation to this. The first is that this was a study conducted a little over three years ago now. Again, that is not to absolve us of responsibility in the first instance, but almost certainly doesn't represent the set and approach that we take to both content moderation and recommender systems.

Secondly, the methodology that you worked through, I don't think -- or in fact, colleagues of mine who have greater levels of expertise within this do not

believe -- that this represents anything like the typical use of the platform as a whole. You describe -- and the report covers, how, if it is not specific to the particular interests that they are looking at, they will scroll. If they are unsure, they will watch an additional 10 minutes, but if not, they'll watch till the very end, on videos that could be 1, 3, 10 minutes long as well. So that is not typically how we will observe people engaging with the algorithm as a whole and with the For You page as a whole. So I don't think our position would be that it represents anywhere like the average use or indeed, within a really wide range of the average use.

The final point that I would make is that that doesn't necessarily mean that we don't recognise this as a risk that we will then seek to mitigate. Indeed, I have had other reports that I have been involved in that have adopted similar methodologies and even though we don't think the methodology represents the approach that a normal TikTok user will take, we are alive to the concern that the kind of long tail of individuals, who may actually be really particularly fixated on certain types of issues, may exhibit behaviours that it is a bit more like. In those instances, we continue to work on the disruption elements within our recommender

algorithm, both from a diversity of content perspective, in the first instance, and then also specific puncturing of filter bubbles, as described in my first witness statement.

Q. Thank you. "Three Minutes to Harm: The Algorithmic Escalation of Misogyny and Online Abuse" by Big Tech's Little Victims, please, NEU000023. This is research, I think, sponsored by the National Education Union and it is much more recent, February 2026. If we could go to page 3 NEU000023_0003, please.

We see, middle left:

"... misogyny does not exist in isolation. When we examined what children are actually shown online, a broader pattern emerged. Sexist content sits within a wider ecosystem of algorithm-driven harm that also includes violence, sexualisation, self-harm material and extremist narratives. These harms are interconnected, driven by systems designed to maximise engagement rather than protect young users."

And the findings were immediate and consistent:

"Concerning content appeared within an average of three minutes of logging on.

"For every minute spent scrolling, profiles were shown one piece of harmful or inappropriate content.

"In several sessions, harmful material was the very

first item served.

"Over one week, profiles were exposed to ...(reading to the words)... harder to escape."

Now, this is not, at this stage, focused on TikTok but it does include TikTok. Do you recognise those findings?

A. I'm aware of the report, yes.

Q. Do you recognise that it is correctly identifying matters of real public concern about, but not limited to, the way that TikTok operates?

A. I agree that it is identifying matters of public concern. I think that, again, from a methodological perspective, including the definition of "concerning content", we would again have a different view as to the report's approach.

Q. Page 4:

"The content followed clear gendered pathways."

I'm going to, for the moment, restrict myself to boys, if I may:

"Profiles presented as boys ...(reading to the words)... figures.

Then, page 14 NEU000023_0014:

"It is clear that urgent action is needed to protect young people from being fed a diet of addictive, harmful, extremist content on social media. Our first

report, Robbed, set out the ways in which Big Tech companies are profiting from drawing young people into addictive algorithms."

Do you think that that is an accurate description of a problem for TikTok, as well as for other platforms?

A. I do not.

Q. Could we have on screen, please, DSIT000099. We see -- actually, I think I have probably dealt with the Ofcom material sufficiently.

You are familiar with this particular report. Is there anything particular you want to draw to the Inquiry's attention in relation to TikTok?

A. No, I feel that we discussed this report and our response to the Ofcom letter earlier.

Q. Thank you. Can we go, then, to the EU commission finding, ILT000384. I stress, this is preliminary. So:

"Commission preliminary finds TikTok's 'For You' feed in breach of Digital Services Act for harmful 'rabbit holes' effect."

Issued in Brussels, 6 November:

"... The [EU] commission has preliminary found TikTok in breach ...(reading to the words)... personalised videos, even when those are related to mental health struggles and body image.

"The more a user interacts with a certain type of

content, the more TikTok's 'For You' feed algorithm recommends similar content. This design can be harmful when such endless and repeated exposure involves, for example, content about sadness, isolation or body image. These 'rabbit holes' can have a detrimental impact on users' mental health, especially that of vulnerable adults and minors.

"Today's preliminary findings focus on both risk assessment and mitigation measures."

One just emphasises, in the lower half of the page, not least under "Next steps", that:

"TikTok now has the possibility to exercise its right to defence."

Can examine the documents and respond. This isn't a final conclusion, as I hope I have made clear, sufficiently and fairly. But again, it starts to look like a pattern, does it not, of senior regulatory bodies and researchers drawing particular concern about low standards by TikTok?

A. I think, as you highlighted, they are preliminary findings. We are on record, through the statement, as believing that there are significant inaccuracies in the Commission's assessment and indeed, I think on what's on the page at the moment, you know, we recognise some of the risks they identify, such as significant expose to

content about sadness. We have specific measures and mitigations in place because of those; those were some elements I referenced earlier in evidence. So I think we are alive to the risks that potentially exist here. We assess risks both, under a DSA perspective and an OSA perspective here in the UK and it is our responsibility to put in place mitigations against any of those risks that include several processes I have outlined.

Q. Just a couple more, please, if I may. The Institute for Strategic Dialogue report, "Beyond Extremism: Platform Responses to Online Subcultures of Nihilistic Violence", February 2026. So again, you will note how recent it is. ILT000226.

Just while that's being brought up, are you familiar with the ISD?

A. I am.

Q. Do you rate them as an organisation?

A. Yes, we have a good and constructive dialogue with them.

Q. Page 1 we see just for context. Then page 9, can we just turn to page 9 ILT000226_0009.

The bottom half, maybe, of the page, the last two paragraphs of text:

"This policy paper provides on overview of the specific online threat landscape of nihilistic violence subcultures. The first section sets out the networks

that comprise the ecosystem ...(reading to the words)... different harms. The third section offers an overview of intervention opportunities ..."

So that's what it is seeking to do. If we look at page 15 ILT000226_0015, please. Just above "Ban Evasion Methodologies", TCC, which we touched on earlier on. I know you say that True Crime Communities have a different connotation --

A. Yes.

Q. -- but in terms of the nihilist extreme network, they can:

"... be found on nearly every mainstream social media platform; however, they are most prominent on ...(reading to the words)... narratives and the short-form writing features of the platform lend themselves well to the research and engagement users desire."

Then they say:

"Similarly, the features of TikTok and Pinterest are leveraged to share and discuss TCC media."

So that's about how that affiliation of extreme violent supporters are finding the features of TikTok useful. Are you aware of that risk?

A. Yes.

Q. And do you -- don't go into any operational detail --

have a team who are specifically looking at ways of preventing TCC and those like them from exploiting that? Not on a general AI or automated method, but about dealing with them as an organisation?

A. So yes, and I think it is probably worth highlighting this report was in partnership with GIFCT, of which we are a member. The really important element of GIFCT is the ability to share signals and information within industry. Similarly, we work with law enforcement and other public bodies, National Crime Agency. I myself, met with the Home Office a little over a week and a half ago on these specific issues. Because the community that we are referring to, as we discussed, are both aiming, number one, for notoriety and number two, are evolving and moving at speed and so we need not just a TikTok response to that, but a response that involves both industry and other partners in equipping ourselves as best we can on that.

Q. So against that background, could we have on screen TAT000015. This is Tech Against Terrorism's "Violence-Centric Ecosystems in Southeast Asia" report.

It is very recent. It is May of this year and they were commissioned -- the Southeast Asia aspect, Mr Hadley told us, because they were commissioned to do this report.

If we can look within that please at the bottom of page 7 TAT000015_0007. It goes further than the previous report, in saying:

"During this investigation, TikTok was identified as a primary entry point for violence-centric content in the region. Its recommendation systems can surface progressively more explicit or related material following initial ...(reading to the words)... prior intent."

That is deeply concerning?

A. I would agree, that is concerning.

Q. "Movement almost certainly occurs toward more private or controlled environments, including invite-only ..."

Platforms, and we will be asking questions obviously of those platforms. But the reality of this is that TikTok is being used as a gateway for these extremists?

A. So I would say that -- we talked earlier about the number of people on the platform. That's most of society and therefore, we know that there will be bad actors that try and use our platform features to advance their own objectives. I do recognise the characterisation that we, when used by those bad actors, are primarily targeted for what you might term their broadcastability, for the ability try and achieve a high level of reach. And I think this report correctly

identifies what we then see, which is attempts to off-platform people into more closed spaces -- our platform is not closed -- but more closed spaces for coordination and further organisation and planning.

Our responsibility and focus therefore is on the content moderation element of it, first and foremost, supplemented by those recommender elements we spoke earlier. But first and foremost, identifying using the right signals and information to be able to enforce or community guidelines at scale and prevent that content being on the platform in the first place.

Q. All right, but in terms of the reality of this, if we turn to page 5 TAT000015_0005, Mr Hadley, in his evidence yesterday, emphasised this aspect.

This figure, do you see, is a screenshot taken from TikTok --

A. Yes.

Q. -- in April of this year. So not three years ago, but this year, yes? And the text is very small but we have checked it and it is set out in figure 1. So the hashtags included "tcc", yes?

A. Yes.

Q. And "adamlanza"?

A. Yes.

Q. Who was ..?

A. The Sandy Hook Elementary School shooter.

Q. So a post on TikTok, which is a screenshot of gameplay, which has the acronym for an extreme violent organisation and the hashtag for the Sandy Hook shooter and what do you think the picture on the left is showing?

A. I imagine it is designed to be in a school.

Q. And what do you think the holes in the wall are, at the back?

A. I imagine they are meant to be bullet holes.

Q. And yet, that has evaded the resources of TikTok's moderation efforts?

A. Yes, clearly.

Q. Mr Hadley said in his seminar evidence, that tactics techniques and procedures with regards to VFI activity, he said that if we are fixated on a particular idea, the algorithms will reinforce this. Then he said:

"It is actually quite an effective way to map out large terrorist networks."

And the effective way is actually:

"... to let the TikTok algorithm find terrorists for you. It is surprisingly easy to do so."

They are a trusted partner. You are proud to work with them.

A. Yes.

Q. And when the Executive Director says of TikTok that an effective way to map out a large terrorist network is to let TikTok's algorithm find terrorists for you and it is surprisingly easy to do, what's your reaction?
A. Of course, hearing that, causes concern and one of the reasons why we do have them as a trusted partner is because we do know that they have the expertise and the ability to help us to maximise the efficacy of our approach to content moderation and that's critical to us.
Q. Thank you. Mr Law, there is much more helpful detail in your statement that I could have gone to, but I'm conscious of the time. Are there any matters that I haven't covered which you particularly wanted to emphasise?
A. If you just give me a moment, if that's okay?
Q. Of course.
A. So I suppose, the only thing that I think it would be worth -- and in some senses, this is re-emphasising, but we are deeply aware of the challenge posed by content moderation associated with some of the communities that we are talking about today. And in particular, how they will seek to -- we have just spoken about an example -- co-opt hashtags that may be benign in and of themselves, to try and spread their own propaganda and their own

content around that. We are constantly looking at the ability to gather more signals, both on an industry basis and with partners as well, but we do know that bad actors are, in turn, constantly trying to be ahead of us in terms of the way that they alternate their approaches and they vary.

So it is a constant arms race, one that we want to equip ourselves as strongly as possible, both through the resources we drive towards it and also the partnerships that we strike. But it is one that we are firmly, firmly committed to delivering on. And recognising the bad actors that will try and use our platform to their end. We, you know, are doubling down on the extent to which we are -- particularly, in relation to this community -- sharing those informations, updating our systems and our approaches, to try and stay ahead of their evolution.

Q. Thank you. Mr Law, at this time, I would normally look to my left to see if the Core Participants have any questions. When I was asking you about age assurance, I know that they would have wished me to ask this simple question: has TikTok given thought to a system whereby you assume that all new registered users are a child until they use adult identification to prove otherwise?
A. I believe we gave thought to that when the OSA was being

brought into force. We have adopted an approach that is not dissimilar, in as much as we assume everybody is a child until our automated technologies give us the confidence that they are above the age of 18.
Q. But rather than getting proof of actual ID?
A. They do have the ability to do that and then they will be defaulted into the over-18 experience, similar to the conversation we had earlier about people who choose to opt out of the automated technology estimates.
MR MOSS: All right. Having covered that ground, I'm just going to look to my left. I think Mr Bowen KC may have just some brief questions he wishes to raise.
SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: Thank you, Mr Moss.
Yes, Mr Bowen.
Questions by MR BOWEN
MR BOWEN: Thank you, sir. I ask questions on behalf of the bereaved families, the surviving children and the adult victims. Just on that very last point, so that default position is technically possible?
A. Yes.
Q. It would involve, presumably, a bank card, a passport a driving licence?
A. Yes, so a series of things that we offer for our appeal process, yes.
Q. Okay, and the reason you haven't done it, I assume, is

because it would drive down traffic on the site?
A. I think the reason that we haven't done it is because we judge the approach that we take to be the appropriate trade-off between accommodations of privacy preservation, practicalities and assuring ourselves of people's age.
Q. Would it have a commercial effect, if you took that course?
A. I don't know for sure. I imagine there may be one, yes.
Q. So you make less money?
A. I think that --
Q. All right, okay. You have been asked detailed questions about the videos. If I can just cover this quickly, sir, I will try not to duplicate. As I understand it, you repose a lot of trust and confidence in the trust and safety team?
A. Yes.
Q. You say they are adequate and you support and stick with the approach they took, as you have explained to counsel for the Inquiry?
A. Yes.
Q. We know that no human review?
A. Until notified by the Inquiry.
Q. Correct, so therefore, you must blame the system. You blame the automative processes that must have failed?

A. I think this is a good example of where automated processes are as strong as the signals that you can feed to them in the first place and didn't have the relevant signals to be able to take action --

Q. Right. So it must therefore follow that you cannot possibly say that the system was sound, and there must have been a systemic defect?

A. I'm not sure that I would go as far as that. I think the evasion of a piece of content doesn't mean that there is a systemic defect overall and, again, I think the overarching numbers that we are able to provide on violative content that is taken down on an automated basis, suggests a system that is working and operating at scale in an effective manner, albeit not a foolproof one.

Q. But as I understand it, you said the community guidelines were followed and you can't really second guess or criticise the individuals, the professionals who are invested in safety?

A. I think they have more judgement than I would on this area, yes.

Q. Well, at the risk possibly of duplication, how, in any common sense world, can that fit with your own personal acceptance that they were grossly offensive, that they were deepfakes, presumably, and you have a murderer

dancing with his victims?

A. As I say, I find it abhorrent. The content itself was removed. Most accounts were banned because of other content. One account was not, because of the sole --

SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: That was very duplicative, Mr Bowen.

MR BOWEN: Well, I hope this one isn't. That's your personal acceptance. Are you also accepting that on behalf of the company?

A. I'm afraid, could you clarify the question, please?

Q. Well, you are the main board director?

A. I'm a director of TikTok UK, yes.

Q. So, is that therefore, the formal company line? Because the two positions, they clash, plainly.

A. Well, no. I think everybody at TikTok believes the content of the videos to be abhorrent, offensive and distressing. I think the area where there is -- that we are particularly discussing is whether or not the single user that wasn't banned, that the posting of one of those videos constituted a single severe violation, which we list in your community guidelines as an example of one of the bits of activity that could lead to an account ban. In that area, while I am in complete agreement that the content itself is abhorrent, offensive and distressing --

Q. As is the company?

A. So yes. We would agree with that, yes, and it is one of the reasons it was removed on our community guidelines. But what I'm saying is that my trust and safety colleagues is the ones that determine what is the threshold for an account ban and what constitutes a severe violation, versus what might be just contributory to a violation.

Q. On these facts, would you -- ie, with your company hat on -- agree that the system should be able to facilitate sort of one strike and you are out?

A. It does facilitate one strike and you are out. I think what I'm saying is that it is the trust and safety team that make that determination and they are well placed to do so.

Q. You have, very sensibly, inevitably accepted the trauma and psychological harm caused by these videos?

A. Yes.

Q. As I understand it, all that has happened in terms of action taken by the company prior to your witness statements is one simple letter dated 13 August from your solicitors?

A. Action taken in respect of? Sorry, apologies.

Q. What I'm driving at here is did any -- was there any senior management consideration of whether or not there should be some form of personal apology offered to the

families?

A. So I included an apology within my witness statement. I'm very happy and grateful to Mr Moss for highlighting that it may not have come across as a fulsome apology and I'm both deeply sorry -- myself and TikTok is deeply sorry -- for the presence of that content on that platform.

Q. But there has never been -- nobody has ever reached out to the families?

A. No.

Q. And if they found that helpful, would that be possible?

A. Absolutely.

Q. So, you would convene -- I don't have instructions on this, but if they found it helpful because of viewing this on the live stream or reading your material, that they wanted a face-to-face with the Chief Executive, let's say. Would that be possible?

A. Certainly, I would be able to take that away and work with colleagues who I think would be in a good position to be able to discuss the issues and answer any questions, but yes.

Q. Has this whole question and the engagement with the Inquiry led to a full and proper discussion at main board level? Or has it been dealt with at a more junior stage?

A. So I would distinguish between two separate things. So the trust and safety response in relation to this Inquiry and the offensive content that we are talking about was one that had a level of attention right the way up to leaders in our trust and safety team, at the very top of that. The wider issue of -- call it TCC, or I think the Home Office uses non-ideological extremist violence groups -- is also something that is being directly addressed and with both direct attention with senior management and resources dedicated towards it as well.

Board is a slightly different thing. We are a private company and therefore, we delegate some elements particularly around online safety to subcommittees as well, they will receive regular reports too. But what I can assure you of is that senior leaders in trust and safety and at the top of the organisation have been aware of, both this Inquiry and the offensive content that was highlighted, and the wider TCC community or NIEV community.

Q. Would it be fair to characterise this whole issue as a PR disaster for TikTok?

A. Look, as I say, we find it deeply regrettable and are very sorry that this content was on the platform at any given time. I think that is does represent -- as some

of the reports that Mr Moss was showing, it does represent a strong challenge to content moderation across lots of online platforms in a dedicated but nebulous community that are seeking to evade moderation and specifically cause outrage. So it is something, I think, that the whole of industry is grappling with and we'll continue to work with them and others, to try and address it.

Q. Okay. Moving to a slightly different topic. You've been very frank about the position about getting information or not even asking for information from America and you have given those -- you've given reasons. As I understand it, first of all, it happened in America not here; that is the first reason. And the second was sort of a rather amorphous reference to privacy. Just whose privacy are you protecting -- or is the system protecting?

A. I think in that instance, it is the specifics and with apologies, I'm not a privacy expert, but the specifics of where the legal ability to request and gather data from sits. TikTok UK and TikTok Ireland are joint data controllers for UK and European users, but US users contract with the TikTok USDS JV --

SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: This is very duplicative.

Q. Just one more question and then I will shift. There is

no suggestion that you are trying to protect -- or the system isn't trying to protect the poster, the sick individual who put this up in the first place?

A. No, it is the same for any US user. And again, we have a range of data security and restricted data practices within TikTok, that also apply to UK and European users, I should add, in --

Q. Given all the questions that have been asked, which I will not repeat, would you be prepared to go back to your colleagues on the main board, or the board, and reconsider whether or not there should be further attempts to assist the Inquiry, by providing the information that has so far been -- that so far, you haven't been able to provide?

A. Look, I'm happy to explore that, but I think that this is a set of company wide restrictions that we place. As I say, they are also placed on European and UK users' data, in respect of data transfers operating outside of our jurisdictions and rest of world situations. So I think the implications of it are company and worldwide and therefore, it is an area that understandably, has standard company practice associated with it.

Q. All the more reason, therefore, to look again.

Multiple accounts. You banned the user in America?

A. Yes.

Q. Stop me, sir, if this has been covered. What is to stop that user having multiple accounts, using a different ID, different IP address?

A. So we have some series of steps in place, in order to prevent what we call recidivism, so using similar signals, be it the same email address and the device ID, which I mentioned earlier --

SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: Again, this has all been covered already, Mr Bowen.

MR BOWEN: In that case, fine. Then finally, sir, subject to you not finding it helpful, Mr Hadley yesterday gave evidence that the platforms exist really solely to make money from advertising. You are not a social enterprise, not a charitable enterprise, correct?

A. Yes, we have wider revenue streams than simply advertising.

Q. Yes, and accompanying unacceptable content, will often come advertising, will it?

A. Well, I think that that's one of the areas -- and in fact we didn't cover this during Mr Moss' questions, but it is actually one of the areas where there is a moral imperative to ensure that the safety and security of our users are -- is guaranteed. But there is also a very strong commercial imperative, both because we want users to have a safe experience themselves, but also because

advertisers don't want content that appears against violative, abhorrent or distressing --

Q. Well, it depends what you are advertising.

A. Again, on the basis of the advertising policies that we put out. And you know, TikTok seeks to attract huge brand names and well known companies to advertise. And a big part of that is assuring them of a number of different things that we spoke about today; be that the safety of the content, be that age assurance, when it comes to advertising regulated goods and services. So we have strong commercial imperatives as well as the moral ones, to try and drive a safe environment.

Q. Okay, another point -- second point --

SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: Mr Bowen, are you winding up?

MR BOWEN: I am absolutely, absolutely, just bear with me another minute or two, if that. The second point you made was that there was often tension behind what the trust and safety teams might say or recommend and what the commercial, decision-makers might decide, so --

A. I don't recall --

Q. Well, so if there is a recommendation to take something down or a recommendation in relation to safety generally, but it might have some commercial impact, the dollar quite often trumps questions of safety? Is there anything you'd like to say about that?

A. No, I don't believe I said that --

SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: That hasn't been said in evidence, Mr Bowen, and that's emerged for the first time in your question. Now, how would you deal with that proposition, Mr Law?

A. So, I think that this, in part, goes back to both what I have just said, about actually the commercial imperative is to create a safe environment. I think then the other thing is it relates slightly to the exchange that myself and Mr Moss had in relation to the sanctity, as it were, of trust and safety teams taking decisions on content moderation.

SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: Mr Bowen, I would urge you to wind up, please.

MR BOWEN: I have no further questions.

SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: Thank you very much indeed.

Mr Law, it has been a very long day for you. You are very, very nearly finished. There are just a few matters of detail that I want to make sure that I have got correct.

Questions by SIR ADRIAN FULFORD

SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: Mr Moss asked you some questions about -- when there were advertisements for knives and the like --

A. Yes.

SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: -- he asked you whether or not, in particular circumstances, various people were reported to the police or not. And you, very clearly, stated that the position of the company is there needs to be a credible and imminent threat to life before that happens.

Now, as part of your answer, you said this, that an element of the decision-making in relation to that was informed by discussions with law enforcement?

A. Yes.

SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: Now, that can cover a multitude of possibilities, Mr Law, and I would ask you to answer this question carefully.

A. Yes.

SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: Are you suggesting, in making that observation, that anyone in law enforcement discouraged TikTok from reporting the kind of criminal activities that Mr Moss was outlining?

A. I do not think I'm suggesting that directly. If I may, Chair, this reflects conversations that I have had with the TikTok law enforcement outreach team and law enforcement response team, because they are teams that are designed to operate within the SPOC system, receive information from law enforcement and provide it, as well. The indication that those colleagues have given

me is that when they have discussed, I suppose illegality in its broadest form, that lots of proactive recommendations and information from online platforms would not necessarily be useful to them, given the potential scale that would be driven there.

SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: Yes, but Mr Moss was not dealing with trivial, potential criminal offences. These were ones with real substance to them but which fell short of credible and imminent threats to life. What I'm seeking from you is whether you are saying that law enforcement has indicated to you that for an offences that are serious but fall below an imminent threat to life, that they have been saying to you: we discourage you from reporting that to us.

A. No.

SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: Thank you. You gave us the figures for accounts being banned for 2024, three and a half million, or a bit less. Have you got the figures for 2025?

A. Not on me, but I will be able to --

SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: Can you supply them, please?

A. Yes.

SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: Thank you. You -- in dealing with avoidance of detection, you indicated that that there are a number of teams which are dedicated to combating

things like the evasion of detection by Com groups. You didn't know how many were involved in that process and precisely how they were broken down. Could you similarly, please, provide us with a description of the sections within TikTok who deal with that and the numbers and a very short description of what they do?

A. Yes, certainly.

SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: Thank you very much.

Finally, in relation to the videos, the batches that we dealt with at the end of Mr Moss' questions. And you were absolutely clear that although you personally disagree, you gave your judgement on the content, you put your trust in the trust and safety teams.

Are there ongoing discussions at TikTok in relation to whether or not, whatever the guidelines are being applied by the trust and safety teams, whether in light of the experience in relation to the videos that took a while to come down, that those guidelines need changing? So, if this were to be repeated, would there be the same result?

A. So I can't speculate on the latter bit. I think, in terms of are there ongoing conversations? As I mentioned earlier, both in relation to this Inquiry and the wider TCC/NIEV community we have observed, there is a lot of work that is ongoing. Part of that work

includes consideration of our existing community guidelines, whether or not there are any either gaps, or indeed, different approaches that need to be taken in relation to that. So I think -- you'll forgive -- my answer to your question is probably yes, albeit not necessarily absolutely specific to the specific example that we have been discussing today.

SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: If there is any, either direction of travel or conclusion, that is reached in relation to that work before Christmas, could we be notified of it, please?

A. Yes.

SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: Mr Law, thank you very much indeed. You are free now to go.

A. Thank you, Chair.

MR MOSS: Sir, we must give our stenographer a break. The responsibility is mine, but I apologise to her. Could we seek to resume at 4.05 pm, which I hope will be enough time for the tech -- 4.10 pm. Yes, I think we must have a longer break. Sir, we may need to sit late, if it is not inconvenient to you.

SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: No, it's not.

MR MOSS: Ms Wakeman will seek to deal with her questioning in an hour, if that's acceptable. The responsibility is mine and I apologise.

SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: That's fine.

MR MOSS: Thank you, sir.

(3.55 pm)

(A short break)

(4.08 pm)

SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: Yes, Ms Wakeman.

MS WAKEMAN: If I can call Mr Burrows of the Molly Rose Foundation. Mr Burrows, do you have the oath or affirmation with you?

A. I do, yes.

Q. Are you able to take that now? Thank you.

A. I will.

MR ANDY BURROWS (affirmed)

(Evidence by videolink)

Questions by MS WAKEMAN

MS WAKEMAN: Thank you. Could you start by stating your full name, please.

A. I'm Andy Burrows, and I am the chief executive of the Molly Rose Foundation.

Q. Thank you. If we could bring up on screen your statement, which is MRF000008. Thank you. And going to page 20 MRF000008_0020. Can you confirm that you have signed the statement and it is true to the best of your knowledge and belief?

A. I can.

Q. Thank you. That can be taken down, thank you. So I understand from your statement, you have been the Chief Executive of the Molly Rose Foundation since August 2024?

A. That is correct.

Q. And prior to that, I understand that you worked at the NSPCC. Do you want to just give a very brief background of the work you did in that role?

A. Yes. So I have worked on online safety policy for a decade. So I was previously leading NSPCC's online safety programme, where I campaigned for and influenced the original commitment to introduce the Online Safety Act and the passage of the bill.

Q. Thank you. As you explain in your statement, the Molly Rose Foundation, I understand, was founded following the death of 14-year-old Molly Russell in November 2017 and at Molly's inquest, the senior coroner determined that exposure to harmful online content contributed to her death in more than a minimal way, is that right?

A. That is correct, yes.

Q. Could you start by giving us a brief overview of the focus of the foundation's work?

A. Absolutely. So, the foundation was founded/established by Molly's family and friends after her death. We exist with the belief that suicide is preventable and we work

at the intersect of online safety, mental health and suicide prevention. Our belief is that we need to see an approach which builds stronger legislative and regulatory frameworks, to address the product safety issues which were highlighted by Molly's death and that we know are still very much in existence today.

Along with a focus on education and critical literacy so that we can empower young people to better respond to the threats and challenges of the online world.

Q. Thank you. So it is looking at online safety but through the lens of a mental health and suicide prevention perspective?

A. That is correct.

Q. You explain in your statement that, as part of the foundation's work, you engage with Government. So DSIT, Home Office, DfE, is that right?

A. That is correct, yes.

Q. And Ofcom as well?

A. And Ofcom.

Q. Thank you. I want to move to my first topic which is the current understanding of the threat posed by violence-fixated individuals and the online environment. And you explain, in your statement, this is page 3 MRF000008_0003, paragraphs 14-15, you say that:

"... (VFIs) have become an increasing focus [of your] work and are as such a recognised term ..."

That the foundation uses; is that right?

A. That is correct and it's very much become a focus in the last two or three years. At the point when the foundation was established, our focus would primarily have been on the systems and processes through which content was recommended, but the threat posed by behavioural harms is now very much front of mind for us.

Q. Thank you. You go on to explain that you have focused on a particular threat vector, the Com, that attracts violence-fixated individuals into a global and rapidly growing online, group-based ecosystem. Later in your statement, you go on to say that the threat posed by the Com represents, in your view, the most disturbing threat to children's safety of our times.

What is it about the Com groups that you find so concerning?

A. The threats posed by Com is ostensibly a new archetype of online grooming. We are obviously all too familiar with grooming that has been perpetrated for primarily sexual motivations or for (unclear) motivations. The formation of these groups represents a new form of grooming that is driven by primarily an interest in extreme violence and in the sadistic exploitation of

victims. So we see typically, but not exclusively, young girls being groomed as victims, both young boys and young girls being groomed as perpetrators and a range of high-harm threats, including live streamed and coerced acts of self-harm, suicide. We would see peer-on-peer sexual abuse, animal abuse, a whole range of [audio distorts] but the underpinning for all of those is the interest and the motivations around extreme violence and around the degradation of victims.

Q. So extreme violence is the thread running through all of that. Are there any particular or new challenges that arise from the threat posed by the Com?

A. The Com is I think a significant challenge because of the nature of the threats that it represents. Whether we are talking about social media companies, whether we are talking about the law enforcement, or the legislative regulator response, we have had the relatively luxury, if I can put it that way, of being able to view threat types in quite a siloed way. We have seen relatively distinct threats.

But what we see, through the emergence of Com and the fluid nature of these groups and of the harms that they perpetrate, is now that we see a cross-cutting harm that, as I say, will manifest itself in a range of threat types.

Now, that has quite substantial implications for how we respond to those threats. Given that we have, to date, tended to structure the response in a different way, it has implications for how effectively -- it means that these threats are currently being proactively detected and disrupted by platforms. And it has substantial implications I think for the Online Safety Act which has not afforded, by its design, for these threats that spread across a range of threat types and very much across a range of platforms as well.

Q. Thank you. We will come onto the Online Safety Act in due course. Could we scroll down to paragraph 19 MRF000008_0004 in the statement. You are talking here about Government understanding of the threat posed by violence-fixated individuals. You say there, that:

"... there is an uneven understanding of the risks posed by [VFIs] among[st] governmental and regulatory agencies ..."

You say:

"There is a clear and well-developed understanding of the threat posed by [VFIs] within the Home Office, [NCA] and other law enforcement agencies ..."

But in both DSIT and Ofcom, awareness of the threat has been much weaker. What is it that's led you to form that view about that inconsistency of understanding?

A. So I think the understanding and the recognition of the threat posed by Com groups, in both the Home Office and the National Crime Agency, has been strong and it was quick to form. We have, though obviously, split responsibilities across Government, where the Home Office is the lead department for public safety, but then DSIT -- or now DCMS -- is the primary department responsible for online safety and the work of Ofcom. I think that has been a complication throughout the passage of the Online Safety Act and it taking effect. It means that the departments and law enforcement agencies working on the frontline of new and emerging threats, such as the Com, are not the primary decision-makers when it then comes to the online safety legislative framework or how that is then implemented by the regulator.

And so I would say that, in our experience, particularly with the former DSIT ministers, and with Ofcom as the regulator, that the awareness of the threat posed by Com was very low and I think there was a lack of understanding of the urgency posed by this as a new threat. At the point where we were seeing multiple law enforcement agencies starting with the FBI, starting to issue warnings here, but really quite a period of catch-up before DSIT -- and I would say, most

particularly, Ofcom -- recognised the threats posed by the Com. There was an extended period where Ofcom, frankly, seemed to be asleep at the wheel in terms of this as a new and emerging threat.

Q. Thank you. If we could go over the page in the statement to page 5 MRF000008_0005, paragraph 25. Here, it is a point you have already touched on in your evidence, you say that:

"The risks posed by [VFIs] will typically extend across multiple types of online user-to-user services. However, in the absence of well-established cross-platform collaboration mechanisms, any activity ... on a single platform may appear discrete or disparate in nature, when if viewed with full context may point [to] a more substantive and interconnected set of high-risk threats."

When you are talking about cross-platform collaboration mechanisms, what sort of collaboration do you think would be most helpful in tackling that risk?

A. So if we looked at other threat types where there is a more established response and where there is a legal underpinning that necessitates that -- so I'm thinking most particularly here about child sexual abuse -- then there are cross-industry arrangements to identify illegal content, so hash matching of those so that they

can be proactively detected and removed, if there is an attempt to post them. Arrangements to then identify and catalogue newly produced harmful and extreme content. And also signal sharing. So the identification of signs, of signals of threat actor behaviour. That may be, for example, encouraging users to move to other platforms, identification of group behaviours.

What we have at present is no formal mechanism or requirement for that signal sharing to take place. So, to the best of my understanding, there are some voluntary efforts, they are largely built upon the existing CSA framework, but there is no requirement for standardised signal-sharing or hash-matching arrangements. Effectively, what that means is we are looking here at grooming pathways that take place across a number of platforms, starting, most typically, with gaming platforms, before moving to chat platforms; so the likes of Roblox, of Discord, of Telegram. The issue being that if no one platform has every piece of the jigsaw, that it is not possible, even for the most determined of platforms, to then be able to identify and correctly identify the threat.

It means that, at best, in cases we might see a threat being identified if it has characteristics, for

example, of child sexual abuse. But that may not go on to then understand the full complexity of the threat and it means that we will see the threat type be under-reported and potentially going undetected.

Q. Why is it, do you think, that those mechanisms are not already in place?

A. I think this reflects and stems from -- well, I would say two reasons. Firstly, it is very clear that tech platforms do not have a good track record of doing this on their own terms. Where we have seen those well-established arrangements relating to child sexual abuse, that is because of the legal status and the widely accepted severity of the threat.

So I think the platforms, essentially, will not do this by themselves. There needs to be the legal underpinnings. But what we then have, in the Online Safety Act, is a framework that views threats through those -- that siloed approach and that does not place any duties on platforms to reasonably co-operate with each other on new and emerging threats. It is a point that I and a number of civil society organisations have impressed on the, then Government, at the time that the bill was being passed, but it is something that the Government, at the time, deemed disproportionate.

Q. Are you able to assist with what the main objections to

taking that forward were, or are you not able to say?
A. I mean, I think my understanding was that that was seen as being disproportionate, to place burdens on platforms to co-operate with each other and the focus was to place duties on platforms in terms of their own discrete efforts. I think it is very clear that it was not enough at the time and it certainly does not adequately respond to the way in which this threat has since changed.
Q. Thank you. That's helpful. I now want to move to my second topic which is how the online environment can contribute to fixation and violence, and looking specifically at high-risk design features. And within your statement you set out a number of what you term high-risk design features on online platforms that you say pose particular concern.
If we could look, first, at recommendation systems and algorithms. If we may be able to turn up page 6 MRF000008_0006, paragraph 29 please. You say there, that:
"There is extensive research that demonstrates the role played by personalised recommendation systems in recommending large volumes of problematic content to young users."
You say that your research has shown that:

"... personalised algorithms can result in a young person's feed quickly becoming overwhelmed with high-risk content, with over 95% of posts recommended to a 15-year-old's account on TikTok's For You Page and Instagram Reels containing high-risk forms of harmful content."
Just to be clear in terms of what types of content we are talking about there, you have cited your research at MRF000002, which we don't need to bring up on screen, but that research appears to relate to -- the focus of that report is on suicide, self-harm and depression content. When you talk about harmful content here, is it just that type of content, or would it also encompass violent content?
A. That research did not focus on violent content. We focused on those categories of suicide, self-harm, eating disorder and depression content, which very often tend to be recommended interchangeably on the profile.
So it related to those content types. But I would say that there is a broader range of research that demonstrates, similarly, the role that algorithmic recommendation plays in terms of shaping the content that young people see. So I would feel very confident that this is not a quirk -- if I can put it that way -- relating to these types of subject matters, but that

this is reflective of the way in which recommender systems work on these platforms.
Q. All right. But just to clarify. So research done by the foundation isn't able to assist us, necessarily, with whether violent content is being pushed through the recommendation and algorithm systems?
A. That's not something that we have tested directly, no.
Q. If we move on, then, and if we could go to look at paragraph 31, which is just down the page, scrolling down so we can see 31-33, if possible. You are talking here about the effect of recommender systems. You say there that it is not only the fact that it is exposing young people to excessive amounts of harmful content, but it may:
"... trigger secondary emotional, cognitive and psychological impacts. For example, repeat exposure may produce de-sensitising effects, which may result in young users seeking more extreme, violent or age-inappropriate types of material."
You then say that the algorithms may also result in "assortative relating", so young people consuming that content are "more likely to identify and build relationships with other users being exposed to this material".
And then, that that may:

"... increase the risk that the behaviours displayed in harmful content become normalised ..."
And it might incentivise "communities of practice", built around "shared interests of violent and graphic forms of content".
So I think what you are setting out there is a harmful pathway. Someone is seeing the violent content, being desensitised to it, seeking it out more and more. Then they are relating to other young people who may be being exposed to the same material, and then that's being normalised, such that they may then form communities built around those same shared interests.
I appreciate what you said earlier in terms of the focus of the foundation's work being more towards the suicide and self-harm type content, but are you able to assist us with whether that same harmful pathway may also result from violent content, due to algorithms?
A. Certainly, what those dynamics will then allow for is where we are seeing Com groups looking to identify and target young boys with the intention that they can be encouraged to join these groups, and then to go on a pathway where they become perpetrators, that these sets of mechanisms then afford them the opportunity to understand where they should be targeting.
So if you are seeing algorithmic recommendation of

content, if you are seeing these communities in practice form, then that is enabling Com groups looking to grow and extend their networks to, for example, post on the comments, be it posts with links to Com group forums, to make contact with users who are showing, perhaps, an interest in extreme violence.

So those mechanisms are not just promoting and showing a large volume of content, but they are creating those "community" dynamics around it, allowing for that desensitisation, allowing for the deepening of the threat and allow, therefore, for the identification of those who may well go on a pathway to become perpetrators.

Q. Thank you. If we may go up to paragraph 30 on page 6. We have covered algorithms and recommender systems already. You talk there about other design features that can "expose young people to high-risk content".

Some of the things mentioned there are "recommended search terms". Then you talk about:

"... other high-risk design features that are designed to maximise ... engagement and dramatically increase the risk to exposure to cumulative harm ..."

Aside from algorithms, what do you say are the main features of concern on platforms, in relation to VFIs?

A. So I think to highlight two. One is the role of

auto-complete entries and AI-generated search box. I am thinking there particularly of TikTok, which has enabled the hyper-personalisation of content.

And the second major feature that I would identify is end-to-end encryption and we know that then Com groups will typically exchange and share material that degrades victims, that shows the results of the grooming that they have perpetrated on end-to-end encrypted sites. That they will migrate to those platforms because clearly, it is technically much more challenging to detect and to disrupt abuse that is taking place on those platforms.

I think there is a live question about whether the benefits of end-to-end encryption versus the risk for under-18s means that we should be looking again at the availability of those services.

Q. Yes, and when you talk about "end-to-end encryption" is your understanding that the platforms won't be able to moderate those communications because they are encrypted?

A. That is correct. So the most that they would be able to do would be to identify the metadata, so that would be, for example, group names or an avatar photo, but the actual contents of the messages themselves cannot be detected.

Q. Thank you. Could we have a look, please, at page 7 MRF000008_0007, paragraph 35 of your statement. Here, you talk about some of the particular types of platforms that pose risks in relation to VFIs and the way that they are set up. You say that:

"The risks posed by Com groups are particularly severe on gaming, messaging and livestreaming platforms, with the highest risk of groups making initial contact with new members and victims on user-to-user gaming services like Roblox and Discord."

Those two platforms, in particular, is it right that -- well, Roblox is a gaming site. Discord, as I understand it, has a connection to gaming and that many gamers use it to communicate whilst gaming. Is it fair to say that those platforms are both attracting young people and teenage users, potentially also children?

A. [Audio distorts], yes.

Q. What is it about the design of Roblox and Discord that you think makes them particularly risky for Com groups, and for VFIs, if you are able to comment as well?

A. So, I mean, to take each of those in turn. We know that Roblox is a site that is very popular, particularly with younger children and teens.

It has a very high take-up and we know that then

that is used by Com groups, particularly to identify and target potential victims. The platform has a range of functionalities, including live chat, including voice chat, and a range of games which act as, essentially, individual rooms. So it may well be that a young person, if they are -- for example, they have a particular interest or they are drawn to a space where there is a discussion of particular themes, so that, for example, could be poor mental health, it would be, on the perpetrator's side, an interest in extreme violence. It encourages a young person to find those spaces and then to explore those spaces and to play game-based simulations in them. So again, this is about essentially young people being drawn to spaces where they can be readily targeted and potentially coerced.

On Discord, then, we know that those -- that that site has channels, including private channels, where those networks are able to form and thrive and where content can be exchanged and shared between members.

And I think one of the important things to really kind of highlight about Com Groups as, in essence, a -- growing groups of violence-fixated individuals, is that then these networks grow and self-sustain, based on sense of status and clout and in these groups that is afforded by being able to perpetrate and then share ever

more egregious acts. So they become self-sustaining and then we see a pathway that starts on Roblox, that migrates onto Discord and to Telegram and then potentially onto a range of other sites as well.

But it is a clear pathway between those platforms. Those platforms are fully cited and fully aware of the particular risks that are playing out on those platforms. So it is not something that they could credibly claim was a surprise or in any way unknown to them.

Q. Why do you say that they are fully cited? What leads you to believe that?

A. I mean, I certainly have publicly and privately discussed the threats posed by this threat type with the platforms. It is widely understood by law enforcement that these are the most problematic platforms for the starting points of these grooming pathways. So it just would not be credible for them to claim that this is something that they were unaware of. If the moderation and proactive detention of this threat is insufficient, which I believe that it is, then that is a decision on their terms. It is not something that they can hide behind a lack of knowledge.

Q. Thank you. And on Discord, in particular, you say later on, in your statement -- we don't need to bring it up --

it features advanced settings for creating multi-layered chat rooms, with varying levels of access permissions. And you also say that video calling and live streaming features are actively embedded into some services. What's the particular concern with first, the multi-layered chat rooms and secondly, the video calling and live streaming?

A. So, essentially, kind of these chat rooms will operate as communities, where the moderators of those communities -- so individual users rather than a platform themselves -- can afford permissions into what parts of that space users will be able to enter. That can be used to fuel these competitive dynamics. So if you are seen as gaining clout because of the actions that you are perpetrating, then you can move your way into the higher echelons of the group, as it were.

In respect of video and live chat features, this is where we know that then abuse can be either perpetrated or can be played or shared back. When we talk about the risks posed by live streaming, kind of -- we should recognise that that also very much includes the prospect of group and video chat calls, where you could potentially have a large number of users on there and then they provide a space for real-time abuse to take place.

Q. Thank you. It may be that you can't assist with this, but if you can, when material is live-streamed on platform, for example Discord has live streaming, do you know whether that is typically moderated in the same way as more static, non-live content?

A. I can't speak specifically about Discord but what I can say is that broadly, live streaming is a more challenging functionality to be able to moderate, given that this is inherently live and may or may not have restrictions on which types of users could talk to each other.

And so that means that live streaming moderation is really only as good as the ability to immediately and quickly identify a harmful live stream. So time is of the essence and that is the particular challenge. It is also obviously what's technically complex to be assessing the threats of live video and I think this speaks to the fact that platforms have -- questions about whether platforms have adequately risk assessed their decisions to include high-risk functionalities here. And the approach that has been taken by the regulator is very often along the lines of whether it is proportionate to introduce product mitigations, based on the products, the design that is already there, rather than starting from the point where I think it should be,

which is that a platform should only be able to offer functionality if it can be demonstrably shown that it can be made safe.

Q. Thank you. I think that leads onto some proposals in Canada that we will come onto later, that you talk about in your statement.

I want to move now to ask some questions about duties on the platforms, at present, to report. Could we, please, look at page 9 MRF000008_0009, paragraph 45 of your statement. You say there that:

"The limited response from tech companies to date is likely in part informed by the lack of legal requirements to detect and report violence fixation threats."

You say that there are reporting requirements in the UK for other more established threat types, like child sexual abuse material, and you believe there would be merit in similar reporting requirements for VFIs who are deemed to pose a potential threat to the wider public or vulnerable individuals.

It is right, isn't it, that at present, if a platform is aware of a young person who is fixated on extreme violence but there is no element of child sexual abuse material as part of their activity, there is no mandatory requirement on that platform to bring them to

anyone's attention, is that right?
A. That's entirely correct. It may well be that where there are ad hoc relationships between more engaged platforms and law enforcement, that we do see those type of referrals happen, but that would be the exception rather than the norm. And it does come back to the lack of a legal underpinning for these threats. And I think what we have seen is that the starting point that I think many of us would hope that the platforms would take, which would be to taking an approach that is mindful and more conscious of public safety, is not what we have seen played out. And I think we have seen that most vividly with the Tumbler Ridge shooting in Canada, where we know that OpenAI's moderation team had detected that the perpetrator of that shooting had used OpenAI to understand and model how to undertake that shooting and seemingly also had been radicalisation by the chatbot, but then, when that activity had been flagged, a decision was made not to then go on and refer to law enforcement.

So I think what this tells us is that we do not see an approach which veers on the side of tackling potential public safety threats. And you know, neither does it appear that there is a driver, however cynical it might be, of reputational risk of them being on the

wrong side of an atrocity, which was something they were aware of but which they did not report.

So I think it is very clear that we would need to have a legal underpinning with the associated power of transparency, and (unclear) understanding, not simply that those arrangements do exist, but also that they are being used. Without that, I think we would continue to have, at best, ad hoc arrangements.

Q. Thank you. You talk -- the duty you are envisaging in your statement is around VFIs deemed to pose a potential threat to the wider public. That obviously raises some questions about where the appropriate point to set the threshold would be, of a duty. A question from the victims groups, is: should the threshold be set by conduct, so that would be looking for a stated intention, for example, to commit serious violence or an act of significant violence; or should it be set by content, for example, somebody viewing reams of gore material online? Or both?
A. I would propose that it is constructed slightly differently, so where there are reasonable grounds to identify a threat. I would say that threat detection here is admittedly challenging. We know, for example, that there is this phenomenon of live action players, who will essentially mimic the motifs and the behaviours

of Com networks, but they are doing that for aesthetic value, rather than the intention of going out and committing these -- but essentially, whilst it is more challenging than some threat types where there is a simple "yes" or "no" about whether the threshold of illegality or concern has been reached, it is not something that with appropriate investment in teams who have a specialism in these issues. With that resourcing, it is eminently possible to be able to make those judgements.
Q. Thank you. I now want to turn to think about the Online Safety Act. We touched on it a little bit already. You set out in your statement, in some helpful detail, some of the work that the foundation has done to engage with the Government, to raise concerns about the growing risks posed by VFIs from February 2024 onwards. That's all very helpfully set out. I'm not going to go through that material now but we have it before the Inquiry.

So I want to go straight to the issue of the outstanding issues, as you see them, with the Online Safety Act as it stands.

Please could we look at page 11 MRF000008_0011, paragraph 58 of the statement. If we could scroll down to the second half, thank you. You say that:

"... the Online Safety Act, as it currently drafted,

has proven wholly inadequate to shift the underlying incentives, business models and poor product design choices that contribute to the risks associated with [VFIs] and groups."

Do you want to just explain, in brief terms, what you mean by that?
A. Yes. Many of us had envisaged and called for online safety legislation that was outcomes-focused. In essence, broadly analogous to, for example, health and safety legislation, where there are clear outcomes and then it is for regulated services to demonstrate that they have taken reasonable steps to identify and then to act on reasonably foreseeable harms.

Instead, we have ended up with a design where Ofcom sets codes of practice containing measures that platforms are expected to take, or they must take measures in kind. And if those measures are adopted, then the platforms are seen as being compliant and they gain a safe harbour, as it is known. What we have seen then is that the way in which Ofcom has enforced and implemented the Act, it has been characterised by very high levels of risk aversion. It has set very high evidentiary thresholds before it will satisfy itself that measures are economically proportionate and technically feasible to be implemented and we have

arrived at a situation where legislation effectively barely captures the status quo of what platforms already do and is certainly not challenging and incentivising platforms to go further or faster in investing in threat detection and disruption.

Q. Yes, and you say in your statement that the safe harbour provisions are having a chilling effect on safety by design. And safety by design is something the Inquiry has heard a lot about. In some ways, it is quite a hard to pin down concept. I think the platforms may well say that they feel they already have implemented safety mechanisms which are safe by design. Are you able to assist us in pinning that concept down a little bit, in terms of what safety by design would look like to you?

A. I mean, look, we currently have a situation where platforms are required to identify risks in their threat assessments, in their risk assessments, but then not necessarily to take action to address those, unless there are specific measures in the codes of practice. So a safety by design approach is essentially an exercise which identifies the reasonably foreseeable threats and then places the onus on platforms to consider whether the design and the operation of their platform is taking reasonable steps to mitigate those risks.

So it is an emphasis on proactive design, with the intention of being able to design out harms after they have taken place, rather than what we very often relied on, which is this game of whack-a-mole of trying to identify and take down harmful content or identify harmful behaviours after they have already taken place.

Q. Thank you. That's very useful. You go on to say, at paragraph 66 on page 13 MRF000008_0013, that you would, in particular:

"... like to see the adoption of an overarching Duty of Care, with regulated services facing an overarching requirement to identify and act on reasonably foreseeable harms."

I think that leads on from the point you were just making, but it is a suggestion that I don't think many, or any, others have made to the Inquiry. And I wonder if you might be able to explain what you would be envisaging in practice with that duty of care and how it would work?

A. Yes. So I made the analogy, a moment ago, to health and safety legislation, which places those broad outcome-based measures on those entities covered by the legislation. So, in this context, there would be a broad-based duty of care to identify and act on reasonably foreseeable risks. A platform would be

compliant if they could demonstrate that they had identified that -- identified risks that it would be reasonable for them to have foreseen and then that they have taken reasonable and appropriate steps to be able to mitigate those threats playing out on their platforms.

That would essentially mean that a platform's defence is being able to demonstrate that it has taken good, strong steps to identify and act on harms. I believe this would be -- this would make the regime much more future proof because part of the challenge that we are seeing in relation to Com and VFIs is threat types that are different to what was conceived when the Act was passed. I mentioned earlier about the luxury that we had of seeing threats as very siloed, whereas now they are being interconnected and fused and much more complex in their nature.

This would also mean that we move away from the chilling effect that we are seeing on safety by design and safety by design innovation. It would mean that codes of practice could serve as useful indicators of the measures that platforms should be taking, but they would be acting as a floor not a ceiling to what platforms are expected to do.

Q. So if a particular platform identified a particularly

foreseeable risk as being a high risk, for example, they would be required, under your duty of care concept, to potentially take more significant steps than the code might, because of the particular nature of their platform; do I understand you correctly?

A. Absolutely. So in essence, this is an exercise in identifying the range of threats that may play out on the platform and obviously, certain platforms may be more predisposed to particular threat types because of their design and usage and the audience that they attract. And once those threats have been identified, then there is a requirement to reasonably act on those.

It also has the benefit of being platform-specific. The challenge with codes right now is that Ofcom has boxed itself in, in terms of trying to suggest measures that can apply to a whole range of platforms which may be very different in nature. This is starting from the outcome, that you have to take reasonable measures to make sure that your platform is safe and that you are cognisant of the risks that are -- that should be front of mind for your particular service.

Q. Thank you. I want to move on now to think about other reforms and specifically, pick up on a point that you raise at page 19 MRF000008_0019, paragraph 102 of your statement.

You say there that the:

"Foundation would also recommend the potential extension of duty of candour arrangements to apply to tech firms in these settings. In our experience, tech firms may typically adopt a risk averse and highly limited response to legal, public and law enforcement proceedings, with clear disincentives to co-operate where safety, operational or regulatory failings on their part may ultimately be surfaced as a result of their voluntary co-operation."

It is right to say that we are seeing some litigation by tech companies in the Administrative Court, for example, in judicial review proceedings, but those of course would already be subject to the duty of candour. I wonder if you might be able to assist with what proceedings you had in mind in particular at this part of your statement?

A. If I can go back to Molly's inquest. It took almost five years for Molly's inquest to take place after her death and a very significant reason for such a delayed set of timescales were the delays in information and data being provided by platforms that had been issued with the relevant notices; most notably Meta in respect of Instagram.

There are clear commercial incentives on platforms

to be able to drag their feet; to go as slowly as they feel that they reasonably can; to comply with legal requirements that may be in place to provide data. That may very often certainly have the effect and may well have the intention of trying to frustrate and delay public and legal proceedings.

So, we would very much like to see the duty of candour that has been passed and now applies to public bodies being applied to services that are regulated under the Online Safety Act, so there is the duty not just to comply with legal requests but to operate speedily, act with candour and to cooperate fully with the work that is being undertaken, rather than, as we have seen all too often trying to frustrate that work.

Q. Yes, so are you alluding there to the Hillsborough Law currently going through the House of Lords?

A. Exactly, yes.

Q. Thank you. I now want to look at the forthcoming social media ban for under 16s. Could we please have a look at page 14, paragraph 76. Thank you.

You explain there that you have raised significant concerns about the "potential impacts and unintended consequence" of the forthcoming social media ban. I hope you will forgive me for summarising but the main concerns in your statement are about enforceability of

the ban which is focused on a set number of platforms, rather than applying restrictions to high risk design features and functionalities.

So you say we should be looking at the features not just creating a list of platforms as has been done in Australia, is that right?

A. That is correct. And I think the lesson that we can take from Australia, where compliance has been very low; the data suggests that up to 85 per cent of Australian under 16s are still viewing content on prohibited sites; or from the Online Safety Act where similarly compliance has been very low. Our data has, for example, shown no meaningful change in the exposure of young people to harmful suicide and self-harm content.

The key underpinning there is that legislation and regulation is only as good as the powers that are in place to see that it is enforced.

What we, kind of, could be looking at with an Australia style ban, if that is the approach that the Government were to go down, was a ban that will likely be enforced by Ofcom, the (unclear) regulator, with the same powers, which clearly have not been enough to make the companies take meaningful steps to actively comply with the ban to date.

So it would be reasonable to assume that we would be

looking at a similar set of effects, where the disincentives for platforms to comply are so great that they will not.

The issue that is particularly concerning then is around the safeguarding implications of a ban that essentially exists in name only. We are aware in Australia, for example, that there is now a clear disconnect between parents who think that their children are not using these platforms and the experience of children themselves, which is that they very much still are. That presents barriers to disclosure. It will make it harder for young people to disclose if they are experiencing troubling or problematic online experiences or content.

And so our fear would be that unless we have a ban that is more smartly designed, we are turning away from the safety by design agenda, that is so important to address the problem of safety failings we are talking about, and introducing a set of potential unintended consequences.

Q. Let's now have a look at some of the research that the Molly Rose Foundation has done in relation to the Australia ban. If we could please look at MRF000007.

If we could zoom in on that summary box. We can see there a number of key findings. So you say there are

significant questions about the effectiveness of the ban:

"Three fifths (61 per cent) of 12-5 year olds who previously held accounts on restricted platforms continue to have access to one or more active accounts;

"More than half of 12-15-year-olds who previously used TikTok, YouTube and Instagram remain able to use accounts on these platforms.

"70 per cent of children still using restricted sites say that it was 'easy to circumvent the ban'. In most cases social media platforms have failed to detect or seek to remove under 16s accounts."

Then, if we could please look at page 3. If we could zoom in on the table at the bottom of the page. This is a table of how children aged 12-15 had retained access to accounts on social media sites, covered by the restrictions, and the main reason across the board, the top line of the table, is that no action was taken to remove or deactivate a pre-existing account.

Are you able to assist the Inquiry with whether platforms were required as part of the Australia ban to remove existing accounts or was there an assumption that existing accounts would stay and any new account to be created would fall within the ban?

A. So one of the key lessons of the Australian ban was

about the threshold that platforms were expected to meet when undertaking the age assurance to identify accounts.

So, this was about taking reasonable steps, which the platforms have then interpreted as enabling them to get away, effectively, with the performance that you see there on table 2.

One of the things that I think is encouraging is that the UK government has learned the lesson there in Signal, but it will require a higher threshold of highly effective age assurance, which is a valuable lesson that needs to be learned. But, again, I would come back to: we can require highly effective age assurance; we can add as many provisions there as possible, but it is clear that with the powers currently available under the Act, they are not ones that the companies are sitting up and taking notice of.

Q. Just to be clear, when you talk about the highly effective age assurance, is that for the creation of new accounts or was there an expectation that companies were meant to go through existing accounts to try and weed out accounts held by under 16s?

A. Yes. So the requirement is that under 16s should not have access to these services, so that is both new and existing.

Q. Your evidence shows that in over 60 per cent of cases

across those four platforms children are saying that no action has been taken?

A. Exactly. Some of the data, some of the behavioural science work that has been undertaken here suggests that the threshold that would need to be reached for a ban to succeed would be something in the order of 60-70 per cent of young people having their accounts removed and that being the threshold that would be necessary to start to overcome the network effect that applies with these products where, regardless of whether children and young people, and indeed all of us necessarily want to be on these platforms and enjoy being on these platforms, everyone else is.

Q. If we could go back to your statement and page 16, paragraph 83, please. You say there that you would:

"... strongly favour an application of the ban that draws on the approach being introduced in Canada, in which platforms will be banned unless they earn an exemption afforded by meeting a set of specified safety by design criteria."

Are you able to tell us a little bit more about the proposed approach in Canada and also where that has got to in terms of implementation?

A. Yes. So in Canada legislation was published earlier this year. So it is currently going through

Parliamentary passage. But, essentially, it views a ban as a means to an end and the end being that safety by design is the objective and that harm should be removed from these platforms and has the right of continuing to be able to access young people.

That is the model that we would favour here and I think there have been suggestions from the Secretary of State, Lisa Nandy in recent weeks that she is keen to consider this.

So how I would envisage this working is that, if a platform wishes to earn an exemption, then there should be a set of stretching requirements around safety by design. We would envisage this as being a rolling process, so that additional measures could be added by the Secretary of State; being subject to a regular review, that would mean that this is not a one and done exercise but as new threats or new functionalities appear, then they could be added to the list as appropriate.

We would like to see, for example, in respect of algorithms, that if there is an ability to continue to offer algorithms, then that should be, firstly, with a very clear objective that harmful content is not being spread, but also with the possibility of being able to offer high quality content as a quota within that feed.

I would say, ultimately, this is about whether the risks of having a ban that is not enforced means that we are, effectively, continuing with the status quo, where children will be able to use high risk platforms and where the harm is not being designed. This approach would incentivise platforms to be taking those necessary safety by design changes.

When we look at the approach that is being taken by other countries and other jurisdictions, clearly Canada is taking through this legislation. The European Union has published the EU KIDS Act -- the European Commission I should say -- which similarly incentivises a safety by design approach.

So, to be blunt, there is a strength in safety in numbers, if we are clustering with other middle powers to proceed with a safety by design approach. Australia is much more looking like an outlier, perhaps it did earlier on in the year, by insisting on a blunt platform base rather than a features and functionality based approach.

Q. Thank you very much. I don't have any further questions. I'm just going to look to my left to see if there's anything. No. Thank you. Sir, do you have any questions?

SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: Mr Burrows, that has been extremely

useful. Thank you very much indeed for your contribution, both in the statement that you have provided, which was very detailed and your very helpful evidence this afternoon. I'm very grateful to you.

A. Thank you so much.

SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: We can terminate the link and the arrangements for tomorrow.

MS WAKEMAN: 9.45 am tomorrow.

SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: I think it is quite a crowded day tomorrow as well, isn't it?

MS WAKEMAN: Yes, we may be needing to sit late tomorrow as I understand it.

SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: Yes. So the reward that is waiting is that I think that next week is two days rather than four days.

MS WAKEMAN: It is.

SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: So this week's labours will be rewarded. Thank you all very much. 9.45 am tomorrow.

(5.15 pm)

(The Inquiry adjourned until 9.45 am the following day)

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