Tuesday, 10 November 2026

(10.00 am)

SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: Yes, Mr Moss.

MR MOSS: Thank you, sir. Just before we start today's evidence, I indicated there were some matters that I needed to address in relation to our Topic 2, online harms.

So, the first is that I mentioned in my procedural update on 5 October, at the start of the hearings, that the Inquiry had commissioned the South West Grid for Learning, SWGfL, to carry out a time-limited review of content on online platforms, as well as to record platform moderation and response to its flagging.

By way of background, SWGfL is a not for profit charity, which is part of the UK Safer Internet Centre and carries out a number of important roles in relation to online harms such as running a revenge porn hotline and StopNCII.org -- that is Stop Non-Consensual Intimate Image Abuse -- which protects intimate images from being shared online by perpetrators of intimate image abuse.

SWGfL searched a range of relevant terms connected to knives, blades, weapon-carrying, weapon use, intimidation, violence, glorification, incitement and sales over an eight-hour window. In doing so, using an adult account, SWGfL identified 91 posts which

related to those topics, on various platforms: X, TikTok, Reddit, 4chan, Telegram, Instagram, YouTube and Discord.

Seven days later, SWGfL carried out a review to see whether the posts in question remained online and, in most cases, those which remained online were reported to the platform in question.

Seven days after that, SWGfL carried out a further review to determine whether the posts that had been reported remained online. A report was drafted with the results and it was called "Weapons and violence online, content sampling report".

As I noted previously, it is right to recognise that there was a spectrum of material of concern identified in this report, which ranged from material with violent overtones, but which might be regarded as newsworthy, to material which can fairly be categorised as very violent or strong gore material, as well as material relating to the selling of illegal knives.

It is the Inquiry's assessment that SWGfL have identified and reported a significant amount of concerning content, as well as serious issues concerning the platforms' moderation action in response. That exercise has been done, we would say, quite properly and in good faith and in accordance with their expertise as

a trusted flagger. As a result, the Inquiry provided the report to the platforms in question and made requests under Rule 9 of the Inquiry's rules, requiring the platforms to address the issues raised by the report.

The report and a further explanatory statement from SWGfL and the statements from the platforms have been made available to our Core Participants.

While a number of the issues in the SWGfL report were accepted by the platforms in question, it is apparent from the platforms' Rule 9 responses that there are a number of discrepancies between the report and the platforms. Sir, these give rise to quite a number of factual disputes including: whether certain posts were subject to age verification; how age was verified by the platforms; whether content warnings were in place over the posts; and how some of the posts were reported to the platforms. The platform statements in response have led the Inquiry to conclude that the report should not be relied upon as an expert report in the legal sense.

Sir, as you know, that conclusion has been reached in careful consultation with you and ultimately under your direction. We are mindful, in particular, that detailed arguments over the discrepancies would be a likely distraction from the central issues which we

will be exploring with platforms in the coming days.

In absolute fairness to SWGfL, I should make clear that they are not legal experts, nor did they prepare an expert report in the conventional sense. Rather, it was a factual report of what they had found.

Sir, as I say, the Inquiry has decided, in those circumstances, not to rely on the SWGfL report. We should make clear, however, that it remains the case that the report of SWGfL gives rise to concerns and those concerns will be explored in a number of ways by the Inquiry and there is other material that we can use in relation to questions for the platform.

I should also indicate by way of exception, that in one case, some posts of interest identified by SWGfL remain online and we are ensuring that they are available evidentially in a second witness statement from the solicitor to the Inquiry, Mr Howarth.

The theme of concerning content and in some cases slow response in taking material down reported by SWGfL remains, for the reasons that I have indicated, of importance to the Inquiry and will be investigated by this Inquiry by further and different measures.

Secondly, and separate to that first issue, sir, as you know, the Inquiry was alerted to concerning posts concerning AR on TikTok and as a result of that, the

Inquiry then identified further concerning posts on TikTok, as well as Roblox. The process of collating those posts has been set out in a first statement from Mr Howarth, solicitor to the Inquiry.

The Inquiry made the posts in question available to Core Participants as well as to TikTok and Roblox and they were made available to inspect on application.

In addition, the Inquiry has obtained written evidence from TikTok and Roblox to address these posts and their response to the posts.

Sir, it is necessary for us to handle these posts with care. As with the case studies reviewed by the expert cadre, we are conscious of the risks of copycat behaviour. In particular, the Inquiry wishes to avoid drawing further attention to the specific posts and to the posters and to similar types of posting. That is to discourage any behaviour seeking notoriety or anything that amplifies this type of posting, which understandably causes great distress to the victim survivor groups.

As a result, the three batches of posts will be referred to by just only in our hearings, using the following language. So the TikTok batch 1 posts: an AI video depicting AR hugging Elsie, Bebe and Alice, accompanied by the use of highly offensive language.

TikTok batch 2: a further posting of the video in batch 1, as well as four other video posts which glorify AR and the events of 29 July, including AI videos of AR.

TikTok batch 3 will be referred to as six posts which glorify AR and the events of 29 July, 2024, including AI videos of AR.

And the Roblox material will be referred to as screenshots of users on Roblox, incorporating references to the 29 July 2024 into their username and avatars and having the ability to dress their avatars as AR and arm themselves with a knife.

Sir, we have, of course, liaised closely with the victim survivor groups who are happy that the material should be referred to in that way.

So I would ask all Core Participants, advocates and witnesses, making reference to these postings, to adopt the language that I have indicated and we are very grateful for the considerable care that has been shown by the media in its reporting and we would ask the media to take the same approach in any reporting of our hearings, starting tomorrow, when this material will need to be referred to.

It would be helpful if the media could exercise caution when reporting on any specific weaknesses identified in the moderation of platforms, which could

assist bad actors to evade moderation in the future and could allow them to post further offensive content.

SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: Thank you very much, Mr Moss.

MR MOSS: Sir, may I call Mr Hadley.

SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: Please. Could you come forward, please Mr Hadley, and remain standing for a moment just to take the oath.

MR ADAM HADLEY (sworn)

SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: Thank you very much. Please take a seat. Yes.

Questions by MR MOSS

MR MOSS: Thank you, sir.

Mr Hadley, you have been to the Inquiry before but could I just ask you to start by giving us your full name?

A. Adam Hadley.

Q. Thank you. If we could have on screen, please, TAT000024. This is your formal witness statement to the Inquiry. If we go, please, to page 19 TAT000024_0019, we will see your signature. It is a statement dated 5 August and can I just ask you to confirm that the statement is true to the best of your knowledge and belief?

A. I confirm that.

Q. Thank you. You gave evidence in our seminar 6B and if

we could just have on screen, please, ILT000250. Those were the very helpful slide pack that you provided for that. If we could have on screen, please, just dealing with our references, TAT000025. We further burdened you with a request for further information following your seminar presentation and at TAT000025 we have the response that you have provided in writing to that, dated 5 November, yes?

A. Yes.

Q. Thank you. So, if we can just go back to your statement please, TAT000024. Just look at page 1 TAT000024_0001, paragraph 1. Just a very brief reminder, we see you are the Executive Director of Tech Against Terrorism, yes?

A. Yes.

Q. And Tech Against Terrorism was founded in 2015 in response to a UN security resolution calling for greater collaboration between the public and private sectors in the fight against terrorism online. So that's the briefest of backgrounds.

A. Yes.

Q. You, in fact -- if we look further down page 1 at the rest of the page, you have a section on the role of Tech Against Terrorism which goes on to the subsequent page, but Mr Hadley, if you will forgive me, I'm not going to go through that because you set that out in your seminar

presentation which we have available.

So I want to go straight to page 2 TAT000024_0002 and paragraph 6 and look in a bit more detail about how you work with Government. Can you first of all just explain the nature of how you work, in general terms, with the Home Office?

A. In general terms, we have meetings with the Home Office and their officials to discuss matters of concern with regards to the terrorist use of the internet. Occasionally, they might commission research and other work on our behalf but for the most part, we are sharing information and our own findings with them to ensure that they are informed of the situation with regards to the terrorist use of the internet.

Q. Thank you, and we see from elsewhere in your statement, we will come onto it, that you have a channel of communication with Counter Terrorism Police as well. What sort of issues do you tend to take to the Home Office as opposed to Counter Terrorism Police?

A. With the Home Office our interaction largely relates to policy and concerns about the volume and type of terrorist content online. Whereas with Counter Terrorism Police it is much more focused on a specific threat to life, so it is more operational.

Q. Thank you. You set out in paragraph 6 a number of

reports which you have been involved in or you have been commissioned to do. So some of the investigative and technical assignments. Sir, I'm just going to provide the references and I'm going to ask for these not to be brought up because they are redacted, but you have one at TAT000003, and then there is an investigation into the exploitation of gaming platforms to gamify terrorist content, which is TAT000004, a lengthy project for the Home Office concerning radicalisation risk, which is TAT000005 and then TAT000006, a report concerning a VFI, which, if we just go over the page TAT000024_0003, was issued as part of that project.

And then, TAT000007, an email confirming the success rate of that and then TAT000008, the statement of requirements to a forthcoming project sponsored by the Home Office.

Sir, the reason why I deal with those materials in that way without bringing them up, is that they are subject to type 1 or type 2 redactions, but, sir, they are on the record and you, of course, have access to the totality of those but their content is sensitive and I can't ask further questions about them in open hearing.

So, can we look at paragraph 7. You reference there the CTP channels of communication and when is it that

you would use the CTIRU channel to communicate concerns?

A. There are two circumstances in which we would use the CTIRU channel. The first is when we detect imminent threat to life, where an individual or a group has posted content online suggesting that they are in the process of conducting an attack or intend to do so. So in all of those cases we would immediately escalate to the CTIRU, who would then share that material with relevant authorities globally. In most cases of course, it is not just a UK, it is global and the CTIRU then would engage the Counter Terrorism Police liaison officers globally, potentially and embassies, to alert the local authority that's relevant.

The second situation or circumstance in which we would contact CTIRU is when there is a so-called "incident". So even this weekend, late on Saturday evening we were in communication with CTIRU regarding the terrorist attack in Krakow in Poland, sharing information with them about potential manifesto or bystander footage or attacker-produced footage. In the end, nothing was found.

When there is a major terrorist attack we will stand up a team to proactively identify content relating to that attack in order to determine whether attacker-produced content has been produced and how it

has been shared on platforms. So those are the two circumstances in which we would routinely be in contact with them.

Q. Thank you. Since you have raised it, you refer to bystander footage. Are you able to indicate why, for you, bystander footage of these type of attacks is of significance?

A. Well, so it is not just bystander footage but the general point is that where many terrorists are concerned, including VFIs, content relating to successful attacks can, of course, play a role in their radicalisation and veneration of violence in general. There are many documented cases of attacks being inspired by material that's been produced as a result of a prior terrorist attack.

So the online environment or ecosystem in which this content is allowed to be freely shared will almost certainly contribute to further cases of radicalisation and mobilisation. And there are two elements to this, one is attacker-produced footage, for example Christchurch or Buffalo, or whatever the attack might be and the broader point is around content that has been shared with a view to, I suppose, valorising or celebrating the attack.

Currently -- and I can share data on this

separately -- from what we can tell, most platforms fail to remove attacker-produced material and most platforms fail to remove bystander footage.

Terms of service relating to bystander footage is quite complex and varies quite significantly across platforms. Typically, platforms would say -- their policy teams would say that bystander footage is out of scope for content removal or content moderation --

Q. Just pausing you there. Just remember we have to take a note, just in terms of the speed of delivery of your evidence. But on where they say it would be out of scope if the terms of service, presumably some of the argument in relation to that, depending upon how graphic the footage is, but would be that it is newsworthy and that might be used as a defence as to why there is a public interest in its publication?

A. Some platforms would use that defence for inaction, whether it being maybe newsworthy in some cases and that's a fair reason in cases, perhaps where the BBC or a news organisation sharing the material. That is not a consistent policy applied across platforms. Some platforms will remove content if it shows a moment of death, for example, or extreme violence.

So further study, I think, is required to understand how the platforms deal with this material and whether

they uphold their own terms of service. Certainly in our experience, platforms rarely uphold their own terms of service with regard to bystander footage. There were many examples, even over the weekend, of people being murdered and this material being freely available on a large number of platforms, even though in some, if not many of those cases, it should have been removed because it violates the terms of service of those platforms.

Q. Thank you. You also say in paragraph 7 that, in addition to those types of notification, you have conversations with senior personnel in CTP on a regular basis. What are the -- what's the thrust of those channels of communication? What are you seeking to achieve with those sort of communications?

A. That might involve Prevent, so we work quite closely with the Prevent team in CTP London. You know, a lot of this is sharing research. So, every few weeks or so, we will share research papers on things that we are finding online that we think might be relevant for governments and we have a distribution list that is freely available to Government stakeholders.

Q. Thank you. You explain that you have recently been -- or you have recently started a project funded by Counter Terrorism Police to devise a methodology for, as you describe it "surfacing radicalisation risk in school-age

children from aggregated key word data based on their online activity whilst using school computers".

And you say that:

"A particular objective of this project ..."

Sir, you will note the exhibit reference which again, is a redacted exhibit so I won't bring it up:

"... is to identify patterns of online behaviour indicative of VFI radicalisation."

Now, in relation to that, the victim and survivors team had some questions that they wanted to ask. But I think the relevant matter that you can address in an open hearing is this: are you able to confirm that, in broadest terms, you are not looking at data at an individual pupil level, but you are looking to identify areas of focus for preventative work, based on aggregated data?

A. Yes, I can confirm we are only looking at aggregated, anonymised data.

Q. Thank you. If we look at paragraph 8, towards the bottom of the screen, you go on to deal with the relationship that you have with Ofcom. Can you just explain the work that you do in terms of take-down rate and what interface you have with Ofcom in relation to that?

A. With Ofcom there are a number of ways we work with them

and share information. The primary one is providing a tool called the take-down monitor. So much of the research commissioned -- and you went into in your introductory comments -- all content that we report to platforms, we will also monitor when/if it is removed. This data, we believe, is potentially useful for regulators because they can understand more about the removal rates of content.

So we furnish Ofcom with high-level aggregated data with regards to terrorist content removal rates across platforms and that's provided through this tool called the take-down monitor or compliance monitor.

Secondly, perhaps in more general terms, we will share our open-source intelligence findings with Ofcom and other Government stakeholders. For example, if we are finding large amounts of VFI content on TikTok or large amounts of ISIS content on Instagram -- which happens frequently -- we will share that with regulators, Ofcom and e-safety commissioners in Australia.

Q. All right, so just taking those two aspects separately. On the first aspect, obviously we will have Ofcom giving evidence but from your perspective, do you have any visibility of what Ofcom has done with those take-down rates? So, where platforms are either failing to take

the material down following reports that Tech Against Terrorism has made, or they are very slow to do so, do you know one way or the other whether Ofcom has taken action?

A. No.

Q. And is that because Ofcom may take that action directly and you don't know about it, or do you know that they haven't yet taken action?

A. I couldn't say either way. In many cases, regulators -- this doesn't necessarily apply to Ofcom but quite a few regulators aren't able to share information about what enforcement action they might be doing. Perhaps they are preparing a case. So, we are in discussion with many regulators, so it is pretty typical for us not to know in advance about what action they might be considering.

Q. I follow. You also said that you are obviously providing quite a large number of these alerts and then monitoring their rates, does that give you, in your estimation, a reliable pattern of the better performers and the worst performers amongst platforms, in terms of the speed with which they remove inappropriate content?

A. Well, as I have said before, the small platforms are actually fairly easy to work with. The large platforms would argue that they are not the problem, it is small

platforms. But actually, whilst the relative proportion of terrorist content some of the smaller platforms is pretty high, their engagement is significant. Of the major platforms, it is only really Telegram that engages with us meaningfully. So in terms of the take-down data, there is a methodological challenge here, which is that it is much easier to discover and monitor terrorist content on the small platforms because these small platforms have fewer mechanisms to stop that detection process. Large platforms have pretty sophisticated anti-bot measures that are designed to prevent automated crawling and scraping of their systems. Therefore, it is difficult, at scale, to determine the amount of terrorist content on larger platforms and it is also difficult to determine if it has been removed.

I have asked a number of platforms repeatedly for a way of determining whether material has been removed from their platforms and in one case, have been completely ignored. So that's to say the content we refer to platforms we obviously want to devise ways of checking to see whether it has been removed.

We have built our own technology to automate that process but it is really difficult because in a sense we are trying to evade the platform's anti-bot detection systems. We would like a way of doing this without that

friction, so that we can query the platforms to check whether this material has been removed. It is a systematic problem that I think all regulators will have as well as, the large platforms deliberately make it difficult to determine whether that content has been removed or not.

Q. So in the layperson's way of thinking about things, you can't suck in the large-scale data about -- if you have got a large number of reports that have been made, presumably, what, you have to go through those almost manually to see whether they have been taken down or if you are doing it in an automated way, you risk being detected as a bot?

A. Well, certainly doing it manually would work but it would be extremely expensive and we would need to hire thousands of analysts to do that manually. Clearly, that's not appropriate. Where automation is concerned, there are a number of ways of trying to automate this process. Most of those are probably in violation of terms of service of the platforms. But considering the platforms, in most cases, are violating their own terms of service, I feel they have set a precedent for that.

So in lay terms, there are automated ways of checking to see whether that content is there. You can create a programme to open up the page and take

a screenshot. There are various other ways of doing it, but it is technically complex and requires ongoing maintenance to ensure that the accuracy of the take-down is high.

Q. Thank you. Now, in some ways, we are predicting a topic I was going to come onto later but since we have raised this issue, let's deal with it now.

Are there measures that the regulators could take to make that process easier, either for Government to do, or by a Government authorised contractor, which could potentially be you, to do, in terms of requiring the platforms to permit that work to be done?

A. Well, common sense would suggest the platforms should be providing this information. I probably would turn the question on its head and ask the platforms why they are making it so difficult in the first place. If I'm not mistaken, the terms of service of X and the API expressly forbid the use of API for analysis of content moderation effectiveness. Quite why they would do that is perhaps a question for them. I can only assume that they are deliberately trying to make it difficult for people to scrutinise the extent to which they are upholding their terms of service and in some jurisdictions, the law.

Certainly, what would be helpful would be for

provisions under the Online Safety Act to be enforced with regards to making it easier for independent researchers to use existing APIs and/or mechanisms to determine whether material is online. Because as far as I'm aware, very few researchers or academics in the UK have access to those researcher APIs and the ones that are available are quite unreliable. The result of this is that only those organisations with the technical capabilities to build these tools are able to determine whether this material is online and how to discover it.

So, as I think I said in the seminar, the challenge here is data access. It is extremely limited on the large platforms and I suppose you would have to ask the platforms why this is the case. But certainly this is undermining any efforts that we and others are working towards to understand how much terrorist content is online and what platforms are doing about it.

Q. Thank you. The API, is that application programming interfaces?

A. Correct. That's a way for a computer to access data automatically.

Q. Yes, I follow. With all of those caveats -- and you must say if you are not able to -- so those caveats about methodology, do you have visibility of which platforms are slower and which are quicker at taking

down inappropriate violent material which ought to be seen, if nothing else, as a breach of their own community guidelines?

A. We have those statistics and I would be happy to share them with you. Noting that there is a bias there because it is skewed towards the smaller platforms because it is relatively easy to find the material there. So the overall volume of content in the system for the large platforms is quite low but as I have explained, there are reasons for that.

Q. Yes, and are you cautious about stating publicly in relation to individual platforms?

A. In what respect, sorry?

Q. As to where individual platforms rank in relation to that? So which are better and which are worse; are you cautious about expressing that in public for any reason?

A. Well, certainly there is a history of a platform suing independent researchers and academics and using I suppose it is called lawfare, to discourage research and there are some well known examples of this having taken place.

I think, plainly put, there is a huge amount of terrorist content on major platforms, some of this has been available for many years. The challenge is that a lot of this evidence is anecdotal because there isn't

a systematic way of understanding how much terrorist content is available online.

I could give you hundreds of anecdotal examples, some of which we only found today. For example, a ISIS beheading video on Facebook we found yesterday. It has been available for months. There are so many examples of terrorist content being available for a very long time on major platforms and in many cases, this can be discovered using basic keyword searches. Hopefully, this is something we could come onto later in terms of proactive technologies.

Q. Yes. Thank you. If you could provide those breakdowns, in the first instance, confidentially to the Inquiry and we can take it potentially in stages from there.

You come on in your statement, if we look at page 4 TAT000024n_0004, paragraph 10, to deal with the engagement with the tech platforms, and you say, first of all, that there are 400 platforms registered to receive your TCAP, Terrorist Content Analytics Platform alerts, is that right? And they are, in essence, what?

A. That is a broad range of platforms, from very large platforms, Facebook --

Q. It is my fault, the question was ambiguous. Just deal briefly, if you would, with what the alerts cover?

A. Yes. So we have five tiers of content alerts, which

I will go through briefly. Tier 1 is threat to life.

Q. Let's just have on screen TAT000001.

A. Here we go, yes. The tier 1 is "threat to life", where there is an imminent threat to life. Tier 2 is "crisis", which is when there has been a terrorist attack and content relating to this. Tier 3 is "designation", meaning where content is almost certainly created for or in support of a designated or proscribed terrorist organisation, in other words, is there a logo on that material. Then tier 4 is "promotional", which is in support of that organisation, of that terrorist group, or in the case of NVE, violent meme.

So we will classify content based on these tiers. There is also tier 5 which is "recommended" which we don't use often because platforms wouldn't do much about it.

Q. Just deal with what that covers then? You say tier 5 "recommended".

A. So that might be where there is encouragement of violence, for example, but not necessarily relating to terrorism. Given our limited resources, we tend to focus where we think we can have maximum impact. Tier 3 is especially valuable for us because when sharing content alerts with platforms, if we are able to argue that that material is connected to a designated group,

we are found they are much more likely to act on it. Clearly, the fact that content has been produced by a designated organisation doesn't legally mean that platform is obliged to remove it, of course, but it strengthens the argument and is more successful in terms of take-down requests.

Q. And extreme violent material, not linked to terrorist ideology, could that -- where would that feature in these tiers typically? Is that more in tier~1 and tier 2?

A. It could be tier~1 and tier 2, also "promotional", tier 4, or tier 5 which isn't on this page, which is "recommended". Part of the challenge is that the violent content is -- there is very limited clarity from a legal perspective about the status of pro-violent content and often we would need to rely on the terms of service of that platform to determine whether that material was in violation of the terms of service. So often what we are trying to do with the content analytics platform is to err on the side of caution and share alerts where we believe the platform is more likely to respond because otherwise they will just try and tie us in knots and run us around in circles, in terms of non-removal of alerts.

Obviously, with tier~1, you would hope that they

might remove that material. But actually in cases of tier~1, we will refer that to the CTIRU first and will wait to hear from them about whether we refer it to the platform because obviously there is the risk of evidence removal.

So Tier 3 is where we are reporting -- is the tier under which we are reporting most content. But to your question about extreme violent material, we would also report that, but we would tend to focus on where we think we are going to be more effective.

Q. Thank you. There is obviously a degree of engagement by the platforms because they register to receive the alerts. If we can go back to your statement, you phrase it in that way. To what extent, in your experience, do they actually positively welcome the service and act on it?

A. Well, I mean, we are making them -- by alerting them to the content -- liable for its removal. So I can't imagine they will be particularly pleased to receive the alerts but again, that is a question for them.

There is a challenge in terms of the sharing of alerts. Quite a few platforms have asked us to fill out a form, which sounds reasonable, except when you are considering sharing, I don't know, 30,000 pieces of content with them, you obviously can't log in and fill

out a form for every piece of content. So we prefer, where possible, to share it with one email inbox and the terrorist content analytics platform will aggregate these alerts, I think twice a day, and share with platforms alerts of terrorist content, with an explanation of which terrorist group this is connected to.

With X, we have been sharing terrorist content alert for some time. I don't know whether they have been acting on this at all. In some cases, very long take-down times. We were wondering if they were even looking at that inbox.

TikTok have said that they would prefer us to use their own platform for content removal requests. We would obviously rather send it to an email inbox. TikTok has said they would rather we use their system because handling the emails is "manual" for them. So in many cases, even if platforms are acknowledging they receive the requests, they claim that it is burdensome and requires quite a lot of manual labour for them to process these requests, which I think is quite a strange thing for these platforms to be saying.

Q. Thank you. When TikTok have said that they would rather you use their system because handling the emails is manual for them, is that a request that -- again,

similar to the form filling you explained, that they want you to fill out that form for each piece of content that you are seeking to alert?

A. That's my understanding, which obviously stretches credulity, given these companies are large and profitable precisely because they use technology, AI and automation. So for content policy teams to tell me that processing emails is cumbersome, seems to be quite a peculiar thing for them to say. I don't know what systems they have in place, of course. But the net effect of this is that trusted flaggers and others just don't have the resource, don't have the funding to do all this manually and as a result, quite a lot of the content isn't being reported.

Q. Thank you. Are you able to give an indication -- I think you have talked about X's position -- in relation to TikTok when it is reported, about their speed of removal and their speed of response?

A. It is difficult for us to determine whether TikTok has removed material because of anti-bot detection measures, which I explained earlier. So our data on the large platforms is quite sparse in terms of content removal timelines because of the difficulty with which we face in finding that out. We have asked repeatedly for research API access to TikTok and they have declined to

provide researcher access to us.
Q. On what grounds?
A. A number of different grounds. They have said that we are not affiliated with a university and we are not a charity. Tech Against Terrorism is a company limited by guarantee, which is a form of non-profit, and that apparently doesn't fulfil their criteria of being a non-profit. So, as a result, they have refused to provide researcher access to their API.
Q. Even though you are providing them with alerts to what, on any view, as a responsible body, you consider to be either terrorist material or extreme violent graphic material?
A. Yes. We deliberately only refer content where we assess it is almost certainly created by or in support of a terrorist organisation or extreme material. So we are not just sharing kind of any referrals to them. We want to make sure that we are certain that that alert is in violation of the terms of service.
Q. Thank you. You also indicate, in paragraph 10, that you have had some involvement with some platforms on a commercial basis. What sort of work have you done for the platforms, or with the platforms?
A. Much of our work historically with platforms is focused on two areas. So one, helping shape their policy and

ensure that their terms of service or community guidelines were appropriate. And two, conducting in-depth, open-source intelligence investigations, for example, helping them understand how ISIS is using their platform or how extreme violent material is being shared.

We don't do any of that work currently. Most platforms have reduced their funding for external research. Anecdotally, a lot of this is as a result of cut-backs in these companies and I know certainly with one platform there was a decision -- a dilemma, if you like -- that they had, in terms of cutting the number of employees in that team versus the funding for external research.

One of the things I would ask for more transparency about is the extent to which platforms are funding research, how much they are spending on external research and how many they are spending on their own content moderation efforts as well.

Q. Yes, we will be coming to that with the platforms when they give evidence.

Thank you. If we can have paragraph 11 on screen, please. You say that you:

"... take the view that there is little common or shared understanding between the public and private

sectors about the risk that a child or young person fixating on violence might pose a serious or escalating risk to others."

So can we start with the public sector aspect of that. What's your concern about the lack of understanding from the UK public sector about the risk that a child who is fixating on violence might pose to others?

A. Well, my impression is that there is limited understanding -- well, first and foremost, of let's say prosecutions of individuals who have been included in the Prevent programme, it is unclear the extent to which extreme violent content has contributed to their radicalisation or mobilisation towards committing a violent offence or another offence.

So I think the challenge there is there isn't much data on this. We have developed our own tool called the "Counter-Terrorism Casebook" that analyses public information relating to prosecutions in the UK and elsewhere, with a view to understanding the detail of actually how have platforms been implicated and how has content been involved in whatever offence has taken place.

Plainly put, there isn't much data on this that's publicly available and, therefore, it is hard to know

how policy is being drafted.
Q. Thank you. Then, so far as the private sector is concerned, from what we see on the lower part of the screen, I think there, you are referring principally to the technical platforms themselves, is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. And you say:

"Nor do we think that tech platforms appreciate such risk ..."

What sits behind that conclusion?
A. Well, if they did, you would hope they would do more about it, I suppose is the assumption behind that.
Q. You flag, in this part of your statement -- and we don't need to go into the detail -- but that they are perhaps better and focused on sexual exploitation and abuse material and you set out that there is greater legal risk for them in that area and also it is conceptually firmer than terrorism and extreme violence material and easier to identify, is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. Thank you. But you say:

"The ready availability of non-ideological violent material suggests ... a widespread ignorance ..."

I'm going to concentrate, for the moment, on the private sector:

"... of the risk posed by cumulative and desensitising exposure to material that is violent without exhibiting obvious ideological markers."

So you are saying there that the platforms are ignorant of the harm posed by the cumulative and desensitising effect of that. Have I understood it correctly?

A. Yes.

Q. A more sceptical view might be that they are not ignorant about it but that they are not motivated to do anything about it?

A. I would agree with that entirely. Having said that, what would be helpful, I think, would be for the Government to provide, perhaps partially public, information or evidence about how this type of material has been instrumental in radicalisation or mobilisation. I don't think it is the responsibility of the Government necessarily to do that research, to be clear. But that would be helpful to demonstrate to platforms, in a way they can't deny, that their services and the content that they have published and shared is has played a significant role in a large proportion of terrorist attacks, for example.

So I would imagine the platforms could say that they are ignorant of this, because of course the whole online

safety regime is predicated of their only being liable if they are alerted to things by other people. I think it is no coincidence that they make it quite difficult for other organisations to report content to them because in doing so, they are not liable for it.

Q. One of the difficulties that emerged out of our other seminars, those that you weren't yourself involved in, there is a difficulty, though, in that area is that, while in the ideal world, one would be able to provide clear academic evidence that exposure and repeated exposure to extreme violent content material and gore leads to increased risk of real-world violence, the difficulty is that you can't do the sort of blind studies that would prove that because it wouldn't be ethical to expose young people to extreme violent content and a control group who weren't so exposed.

So one does end up with, yes, of course, cases -- and awful and catastrophic cases, of which Southport would be one -- where the perpetrator had consumed such material but the challenge is perhaps to get platforms to accept the assessment as opposed to the clinical evidence of a higher tier, to get them to accept the assessment, that that type of material and exposure is likely to be harmful. Do you agree that that is a challenge, that platforms will say: well, where's the

proof?

A. I am sure their lawyers would say that, but kind of common sense suggests that freely available content that's provided by these platforms and the cumulative effect of this, obviously, will be contributing to the radicalisation of individuals. I think the challenge here is one of lawfare, that platforms obviously are very good lawyers and will pick apart anything they can, if they so choose.

But I think members of the public and most people would think, well, it's plainly obvious that if children are viewing extremely violent material repeatedly, that that is going to contribute to them being radicalised and mobilised. It shouldn't be the case that Government needs to provide evidence because I think that is obvious but also, this isn't being done by the Government. So it is extremely difficult to analyse court transcripts in this country and expensive, in some cases. So, you know, the Government is not kind of helping the matter, in a sense.

What I would ask for is some sort of database or dataset that makes it easier for everyone to understand what those radicalisation pathways have been. No one case of terrorism or radicalisation is the same but there are commonalities and making it easier for people

to understand what those pathways have been historically, I think might help in making the argument to platforms that the content that they have shared or amplified has played a vital role in that radicalisation or mobilisation.

Q. So you touched on that in your seminars. I think you would encourage, where there is any sentencing exercise -- leaving terrorism to one side, which isn't our terms of reference -- but you would encourage, in any sentencing exercise in the VFI sphere, for the sentencing remarks and/or other material that's made public to be explicit about the nature of online harm's involvement in consumption, so that that material is then publicly available?

A. Yes. I mean, we have built the tool that I have mentioned, the counter-terrorism casebook, which kind of searches the internet for all references to cases. So can kind of work outside in, to build up a fairly good picture of what journalists often have discovered and published. And that's okay, but that's quite a circuitous way of finding out the information that otherwise could be shared more efficiently by the court system.

I would also say the police do have a lot of this information but I imagine this is classified: so is

there a way for the police to declassify some of this information, or to provide a password-protected database for researchers so we can actually see. Because the police, presumably, do have a lot of this evidence. In some cases, they will know exactly what content an individual has been seeing but it is confidential and the question I would have is: does it need to be that confidential? Is there a way of sharing this information? Because I think that data already exists, either in the police datasets or the court system.

Q. So, to make available to researchers the device downloads that shows exactly what material were being accessed by the perpetrators of significant attacks --

A. Yes, because I think that would be useful for platforms to say: actually, you say your service hasn't contributed to these attacks but actually, here is the evidence, based on interviews with the people who have been prosecuted or the data that has been downloaded from their devices.

Q. Thank you. I want to turn to the online environment and how it can contribute to fixation to, to fantasies, extreme violence and attack planning for individuals who don't have ideological drivers. That takes us to the next section of your statement.

So, if we can look just at the totality of

paragraph 12 TAT000024_0012. It is quite a long paragraph. But you explain, first of all, that, in your view:

"Platforms can support the development of violent fantasies or fixations by failing to treat non-ideological violent content seriously when it occurs, either in isolation or in aggregate."

Is that right?

A. Yes.

Q. And are you able to indicate again -- and I'm sorry to put you on the spot -- but whether there are any particular platforms where that is more of a problem than others?

A. It is a problem across all of them. I would say it is particularly acute with platforms such as X, where there is much more violent content available. But I wouldn't want to pick them out particularly because the problem is widespread.

Ideally, one would research the policies, as in the terms of service/community guidelines and compare that with the reality. Platforms have different policies, they have different online cultures. Some platforms are quite happy to monetise people being beheaded and make money out of adverts connected to that. Other platforms are a bit more reasonable and at least will attempt to

remove that material. Whether or not they actually enforce their own terms of service is a separate question. This is something that could and should be investigated methodologically as in -- kind of systematically, rather. But there aren't that many current studies because no one is funding that research.

Q. Just to be clear, when you talk about "make money out of adverts connected to that", are you referring there to the extreme end of this type of material, so beheading videos and the kind, that are left to get a lot of hits and platforms are making money by leaving it up and getting money from the adverts that are alongside it?

A. Well, there is plainly a conflict of interest within these companies. They are there to make money through advertising based on in-depth psychological profiling of their users. So in my experience, often the trust and safety teams, content moderation teams are trying their best but they are often sort of unable to influence the rest of the company because the rest of the company is focused on making money out of advertising. And in many, if not all, of the cases of this content being shared, there will be adverts placed alongside this material and therefore it would be possible to determine how much money they are making as a result of this content being online.

Q. Thank you. You also say in this paragraph that there is a presumption of non-removal which is normally rebuttable only by clear evidence. Do you mean, by that, that there has to be clear evidence that the post is inciting or encouraging violence before there will be a readiness to take it down?

A. In many cases, platforms will argue with us about a specific post and this is going back to what I was saying earlier about the TCAP's tiers. We obviously don't have time or resources to argue with them about specific posts. That's why we err on the side of making referrals where it is obviously terrorist content. But I think I am often surprised by the extent to which platforms are prepared to argue about specific pieces of content, presumably because they are not willing for a precedent to be set if they were to agree that that material should be removed. So I often find platforms are extremely defensive and will, in some cases, try really hard to argue that a piece of content doesn't violate their terms of services even though, in our view, this does in many cases.

Q. You do, on the other hand, indicate, albeit you stress there are a few, that there are a few platforms that operate a presumption of removal, rebutted by evidence of good faith. Are you able to indicate which platforms

are which operate that sort of an approach?
A. Well, so platforms like SoundCloud, for example, are quite receptive to removal requests and will work hard to ask follow-up questions about what should be removed. So I think it is probably unfair to categorise all tech platforms as being defensive, but certainly the ones with the greatest amount of content on tend to be the least receptive to content removal requests.
Q. Thank you. You say that platforms fail to appreciate the cumulative effect of viewing violent content. Can I just test that against an argument that might be made. I mean, it may be said that, if you take at least some of the violent content material online that's available, it could be said that, taken individually, it is no worse than what is seen occasionally on post-watershed news reporting or on documentaries about violent individuals or violent groups or in films.
And, therefore, if what they are meant to be moderating and monitoring is the individual posts, I suppose it might be argued they can't be wholly responsible for the cumulative picture. What do you say about that line of argument?
A. Well, I'm not a psychologist so I can't comment on the psychology of gradual, incremental processes, but again, I think common sense would suggest that if someone is

receiving kind of below threshold material repeatedly, especially at moments of perhaps vulnerability, that that has to have an effect on the psychology of individuals, especially perhaps vulnerable adults or children. More research is perhaps required but I think it is kind of obvious.
Then what I would say is that, considering these platforms exist to sell adverts, to sell services and products, I would argue that whilst obviously selling widgets or whatever is clearly not the same as a radicalisation process, if we are to be encouraged to buy something, there has got to be a journey there. Marketing, of course, has demonstrated this time and time again, but certainly where digital advertising is concerned, you are not going to buy a product by just looking at one advert. You might see an advert 20 times and eventually, you might be persuaded to buy that service.
I would argue perhaps something similar applies with radicalisation and content, that actually, if the same algorithms that are serving adverts and content connected to those adverts, are also serving below-threshold material, it stands to reason that the cumulative effect will be that those individuals will be radicalised as a result.

Q. Thank you. That leads to a point you make again about two-thirds of the way down this platform, that you say your own research -- or your research accounts, rather, "suggests that non-ideological violent content is rarely, if ever, disqualified from recommendation algorithms".
So, if I've understood that correctly, from accounts that you have set up to carry out research or to check for material, you can tell -- is this right -- from that, that by viewing posts, or even by liking posts, whatever it may be, more non-ideological violent content is pushed by the algorithms?
A. Yes, well, the algorithms are designed to encourage engagement. So if you engage with material, like, re-share, comment on, you will get more of that material, regardless of what that material is. And because platforms seem not to have kind of a risk calculus, this material is shared freely.
So it wouldn't be difficult for them to rank or categorise the risk of that material and then dampen the sharing of that accordingly. That would be technically possible to do. They have just decided not to do it.
Q. I think some of the platforms may say that they do have some safety measures in place, and we will come to it with individual platforms, to limit the effect of

algorithms on encouraging this material and to set limits in relation to that. Do you see evidence of that in practice on the major platforms, in terms of violent material?
A. No. We have to take their word for it as there appears to be no mechanism to test this. What I would say, in terms of -- because I want to be constructive and focus on action as a result -- it would be broadly possible to test this. Having avatar accounts and engaging with material and then seeing what happens, we could run experiments quite easily to determine -- to evaluate the extent to which these algorithms are or are not amplifying material. It can be tested. It could probably be automated as well.
So at the moment, there isn't much data to show this one way or another, but in principle one could design experiments to test this.
Q. Thank you. And so far as you are aware, is any work being done, whether by the Home Office, the Counter Terrorism Police, Ofcom, DCMS, to run that sort of experiment?
A. I'm not aware of it and I would be surprised if there is any such activity because, as I have stated previously, there are concerns about Government entities looking at the Internet and using services and concerns about RIPA.

So I'm not aware of any such work and I would be surprised if there is any because of those regulatory and compliance concerns.

Q. Thank you and we will come onto those.

Thank you. You say that -- right at the end of that paragraph, that:

"The dissemination of material relevant to attack planning ought to be easier to disrupt because [it would be] useful to a terrorist as it is to a VFI."

And therefore, would fall into community guidelines on facilitation of terrorist activity, also likely to be illegal. When you say "ought to be easier to disrupt", do you see that in practice?

A. In terms of platforms removing the material if we alert it to them?

Q. Well, yes, but also, whether that sort of material is the sort of material that gets pushed through amplification on algorithms, or whether you see less of that. So to get material relevant to attack planning, so material that might show weaknesses or potential targets, one would think that that is quite extreme material, very high risk material. Do you see even that material being pushed by algorithms or is the fact that that is easier to disrupt and is likely to be illegal, does that tend to be removed by the platforms more

readily than mere extreme violent content?

A. I think that that would be determined by the type of content, so is it a video or an image or a pdf. So attack planning material is more likely to be a pdf. Most platforms that serve pdfs wouldn't be recommending that material. So as a result of that, it is much less likely that that material will be algorithmically amplified.

Q. All right. So in paragraph 12, when you said "ought to be easier" that wasn't a hint that that's not happening in practice, is that correct?

A. Yes, with the exception of file-sharing platforms and some of those do recommend material based on what you have viewed. But obviously TikTok, you don't view pdfs on TikTok, you are not going to have bomb-making manuals recommended on TikTok.

Q. Thank you. Can we just look briefly, please, at TAT000014. If we just have the top of the page. Can you briefly explain what the background to this document is? It is one of your exhibits.

A. Yes, this is a fairly typical brief that we might write about a terrorist group or violent extremist group online, to assess the extent to which they are using the internet and the response by the tech sector.

Q. Thank you. If we can go to page 9 TAT000014_0009 within

this report, just the top half of the screen.

You say:

"While many actors in the Com Network migrate to encrypted or niche platforms, public-facing spaces such as TikTok, X, and Instagram remain critical for discovery, recruitment, and reputation-building. Content posted on these platforms often serves as an initial point of contact for new users, even if more explicit materials are shared elsewhere. It is likely that mainstream platforms will continue to host 'gateway' content that is stylised and obfuscated but retains connections to more extreme material."

So what -- can you give us an example of that sort of material that you see hosted on TikTok, X and Instagram?

A. Well, it might be material that is branded or uses keywords or various ideas that might be attractive to the target audience. It might be discussion of attacks et cetera. And then forwarding activity to other platforms or services.

Perhaps best to think about this as almost like a marketing funnel. So you would want to have, on the one side of the funnel, a kind of really broad base of content to pull people in and then gradually, you would encourage a migration towards perhaps more private

spaces, more extreme activity and content.

Q. Thank you. Then you say:

"The proliferation of this content across the internet ecosystem creates unprecedented challenges for detection, removal, and prevention efforts. Continued moderation pressure may reduce visibility temporarily; it is more likely to result in content dispersal across new or decentralised channels rather than disengagement from the ecosystem altogether."

So is that that those who are using these posts to try and entice new people in, there is a risk of them going elsewhere, if one particular platform goes tougher on it?

A. Well, yes. So there is a kind of fairly nuanced argument here, which is relating to adversarial shift. So in a sense -- perhaps there are some ideas from game theory, which is a branch of mathematics that looks at trying to encourage or understand how behaviour is affected by various rules. So where content is concerned, you want to think through (1) how to reduce easy access to that material, (2) basically increase friction so that children can't access this, and then move it to other spaces where it can be more easily moderated. So you are trying to think about the overall system and trying to ensure that there aren't perverse

second-order affects of content moderation.

The point that we made here was not to say the platforms should be doing as little as they are, rather they should be making it more difficult for this content to be accessed. That will also result in this material moving elsewhere and that's further on down the --

Q. But you also say here:

"To address this cross-platform collaboration is needed to identify and disrupt content migration patterns."

What are you actually talking about there, when you say "cross-platform collaboration is needed"?

A. Well, in the industry we would say "signal sharing", which is slightly vague and euphemistic. I would say, practical things that could be done there is sharing URLs and saying: we have removed this content, this URL, this material, you may want to do the same thing. We tried to do this through our hashing database and our URL-sharing system. Very few platforms have signed up to use what we are providing and they don't appear to be doing it themselves.

So the point we are making here is that where this type of violent material is concerned, or material relating to the True Crime Community, et cetera, unless platforms meaningfully work together, to share

indications of what's happening on various platforms, you know, it is just going to move from one platform to another.

Q. But the hashing, again in layperson's terms, would mean if you have something like a True Crime Community post, if shared and acted upon, it would detect not just the original post re-posed, but close equivalents to it. By detecting whether it is video or audio or the content, it will pick up that it may be a different person posting and there may be different text put on top, but it is the same fundamental material?

A. That is right. So hashing means that you can kind of fingerprint an image or video and then you can easily find identical or similar examples of this at scale, which obviously is quite efficient.

There are other things which can be done by the tech sector. It would be very easy for them to share keyword lists for example. It is a service we will be launching next year. In many cases, terrorists, violent extremists, VFIs will share content online in order for it to be discoverable. They want people to see this material. They want to, I suppose, recruit individuals and therefore they will seek the kind of path of least resistance to ensure that this material is discoverable. So it might be -- I won't go into the keywords now --

but there are particular keywords you may want to use in your posts so other people can find this. I'm not aware of any efforts by any tech platforms to share keywords they are coming across. They could do so very easily. It could be done in Excel spreadsheet if they wanted. They clearly decided they don't want to do this, because it would be straightforward.

Q. Yes, thank you. I want to move to look next at AI and the particular risks that it can contribute to fixation. Can we go back to your statement, page 5 TAT000024_0005, please and paragraph 13.

What you tell us there is that you did an investigation for which our reference is TAT000012, and if we could just bring that up, the AI investigation.

That's the front page. If we go to page 7 TAT000012_0007 and the top of the page. You have a pithy header:

"Why does this matter?"

The report says:

"Terrorist and violent extremist exploitation of AI is no longer hypothetical or anecdotal: Tech Against Terrorism's incident tracker documents more than 30 public cases in which AI systems were used as an operational assistant in terrorism, violent extremism

or mass violence, across at least 11 different AI tools and linked to more than 70 deaths ..."

So the import of that perhaps needs no underlining but this is AI tools having been shown to have been used in 30 cases leading to 70 deaths. Is that right?

A. That's right.

Q. Thank you. If we look at page 8 TAT000012_0008 next, please. At the top of page 8, if we could have the very top please. You say:

"AI assistance to the inception of terrorist activity is a safety and control problem across the board, not only at ... extremes."

Then you give seven judgements, which you set out below, falling into three groups. So could we just have those. So in relation to those, do you want to just introduce them, relatively briefly, but just explain the most central points here?

A. There are two points, fundamentally. One is that -- well, maybe just stepping back a bit. When we are talking about AI, there are two things to consider. One is does the large language model have the knowledge or capability to provide something called "uplift"? So does it know how to make a bomb or whatever it might be?

And, secondly, are the guardrails working? The guardrails are designed to prevent the model misbehaving

or supporting misuse in some way or another.

I think if we are to assume that AI is going to become as powerful as the AI companies believe, the matter of uplift -- does a model know how to build a bomb, can it encourage people to become violent if it wants to -- is perhaps a moot point because we have to assume AI is going to become very powerful. Therefore this argument has to reduce to: are the safety guardrails working?

You might be aware that there is a huge amount of publicity around so-called misalignment. So can the AI itself become an adversary? Can it take over? Can it attack systems? So a lot of focus on what is called misalignment and there is some focus on misuse. Most of the focus on misuse is on chemical, biological, radioactive, nuclear use cases. There isn't really any focus on day-to-day, operational misuse of AI. And that, we think, should be a major national security priority and unfortunately it is not.

So the widespread use of AI for criminal intent and uplift is already evident and there are very few mechanisms to measure the extent to which AI providers are giving this sort of support.

So broadly put, the counter-terrorism AI benchmark we have established demonstrated that even some of the

best AI models give meaningful answers to obvious terrorist queries. We would suggest that the guardrails aren't working for even some of the best models.

Now, there is a separate problem which is even worse, and that is that -- so there are closed models where you can't access the system, you can just query it. And there are open models that you can download. So many of the AI models that have been developed and are being developed, especially by the Chinese but not necessarily just by them, can be downloaded onto your own computer, your own server. In those cases, you can remove the guardrails. This is called de-guardrailing.

So, whilst some of the more successful and more popular models have guardrails, many of those are rather -- perhaps a thin veneer of safety and security. But with the open-weight models, all of those guardrails can be removed and that is a process called abliteration.

Q. Yes. So if we go back into your statement. That's very useful for understanding because it's quite dense -- it's not a criticism -- for those who are less familiar with this. So page 5 TAT000024_0005, paragraph 13. So, you set out there -- having introduced this, you set out, towards the bottom of the page:

"By way of summary ... a third of [the] prompts

elicited information which was meaningfully greater than the result which would be returned by requesting the same information from a search engine."

So if I have understood correctly, that's relating to the uplift aspects, that there is relevant knowledge there and that the way in which the AI tool puts information together means that you get, in this case, more damaging information than you would get by more conventional search engines?

A. That is right. So the AI providers will often say: well, we are not providing uplift really because someone could Google search it. So we try to kind of deal with that objection in advance by building a tool that alternates the Google search and then combines this information. But even if that were the case, making this material easily available, making it -- you know, reducing the friction of access, will have a cumulative effect. And I think, you know, lots of counter-terrorism practitioners will say that a large proportion of people interested in conducting violent attacks or terrorism are not necessarily the most intelligent people. So even small uplift, incremental support to what they are trying to do, could have a broad effect across the entire population.

Q. They don't need to do the same amount of open-source

research by search engines if the AI tool will do it for you?

A. Well, exactly, and you could say what this might result in is someone who is curious, who is thinking about: how can I conduct an attack? Can easily go to one of the chatbots, AI providers that has lower or less effective guardrails and with a sense of curiosity, ask: how might I do this? In some -- Wired magazine published an article that went into some of this research.

There were some examples that we found where you literally ask the AI: I am a terrorist; help me conduct a mass casualty attack, and some of these models will give you hundreds of words of response and planning and then ask for further help. You know: is this enough information? Can I help you more? Do you want more guidance?

So the point here is that in some cases, the chatbots effectively are becoming attack coaches and our concern is that whilst some of the major providers have relatively good guardrails, quite a few don't. And in any case, as I was saying now, open-weight models can have all of these removed and many of these abliterated models are free to download from services such as [redacted]. So if you were a neo-Nazi or a VFI and you wanted some guidance, some coaching to help brainstorm

how to conduct an attack, you can download some of these models locally onto your computer and ask it questions repeatedly about how you can conduct attacks. This technology is already available to download.

Q. Yes. So we see, at the bottom of the page:

"The investigation also concluded that the most informative ..."

Over the page TAT000024_0006:

"... responses were provided by AI models which had been programmatically 'abliterated', or stripped of any built-in guardrails, before being distributed on the open market."

So that's the particular risk to which you are drawing attention, of those that have the guardrails deliberately capable of being removed and downloaded onto local services. Presumably, by then, the damage is done because once it is downloaded onto the server, even if something is then done to make the tool safer, once you have got a downloaded version with the guardrails removed, that person is still able to use it?

A. Yes, and that's why we are concerned. Because this is akin to nuclear proliferation problem. The difference being that with CBRNE risks, you obviously need the nuclear fissile material. But actually, if you have abliterated models that you download, that have the

capability that they do, goodness knows how those might be used.

Q. Yes, and that, I think, informs why you are saying and warning, in relation -- at the end of paragraph 13:

"This is a serious national security concern given the possibility of de-guardrailed models which provide meaningfully useful instruction in attack planning being freely available."

A. And what this means in practice is that -- I mean, I have discussed the risk relating to individuals using de-guardrailed models for attack planning coaching but also the more sophisticated organisations -- the more sophisticated terrorist organisations will also be able to use these models, to provide uplift in designing chemical or biological weapons. This is a point that the Director General of MI5 made a couple of weeks ago and this is all because of poor guardrails in mainstream models and non-existent guardrails in those models that have been abliterated.

The point I would stress is that uplift -- we can discuss uplift, you know: does the model actually provide uplift? Well, I think we have to assume that AI models eventually will get there and as I've said before, the question should be about evaluating the guardrails. Unfortunately, though, there are very few

benchmarks focused on this. There are hundreds of benchmarks that look at how fast or clever a model is or how good it is at solving maths problems, but there is no incentive, in the AI industry, to create safety benchmarks because, of course, it would be very bad for their valuations if it could be demonstrated that those models could be used for mass casualty attacks.

The final thing I would say, if that's okay, there are -- so we have referenced the 30 or so cases where AI has been implicated in radicalisation, mobilisation, or attack planning. There are also quite a few examples of designated terrorist organisations using these models. For example, whilst the Houthis are not designated in the UK, they are a foreign terrorist organisation. Anthropic, who created Claude, publicly released a paper explaining how the Houthis had been using Claude code to build missile guidance technology. A few weeks later, the Houthis attacked civilian sites in Saudi Arabia, killing dozens of people. So that's an example of the more advanced sort of expert use of these models, to build software with lethal effect.

Q. I follow. If we could look, please, at TAT000012 back in the report and page 21 TAT000012_0021?

SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: While that's being brought up, I think the stenographer is having quite a tough time,

Mr Hadley. Could you just slow down slightly. Thank you.

MR MOSS: Thank you, sir.

So, page 21, you have made three recommendations here:

"Treat the circulation of abliterated open models as a major national security concern.

"Support detection and monitoring of where de-guardrailed models are distributed, recognising that once downloaded a model can no longer be withdrawn.

"Fund and support periodic independent, terrorism-specific evaluation of models."

I think that's what you were talking about a moment ago, the lack of benchmarking, and:

"Avoid architectural lock-in."

What's that about, in brief?

A. Which bit?

Q. "avoid architectural lock-in"?

A. So, the point being made here is that AI is not just a chatbot or a system, it is also the infrastructure to provide access to this. So you will have the model provider, you will have something called an inference provider, which is running the model, and you will have various other services are used. And the concern here would be if governments are using models that they don't

understand the safety and security of, and being locked into using those, in particular, if there's the risk that a model might have a bias or some unexpected behaviour that could manipulate or influence the outputs of that model.

So, as I was saying with open-weight models, there are actually three ways in which they can have their guardrails affected. So the first I have mentioned which is called abliteration, which is the removal the guardrails in their entirety.

The second way in which open-weight models can be manipulated is a process called "steering", when you can select a particular weight of a model and encourage it to behave differently. There is a famous example of the Golden Gate Bridge in San Francisco and someone manipulating a model so that all of the output would always talk about the Golden Gate Bridge, regardless of what it was discussing. So the second thing is steering the model.

The third, which is perhaps more concerning -- and the AI Security Institute, or researchers there, put out a paper on this a couple of weeks ago, is something called "adversarial fine tuning". So that means what you can do is if you have specialised data about bio-weapons or chemical weapons, you can effectively

merge that, you can train an open-weight model so it becomes more specialised in that particular information domain.

So my point here with architectural lock-in is that open-weight models to be vulnerable to manipulation and the closed models, there is very little transparency about why they are making certain decisions. So either way, governments, from a security point of view, have a difficult challenge here because they either rely on closed systems, about which there is limited transparency, or they rely on open-weight models, which could have been manipulated in different ways.

MR MOSS: Thank you. Sir, I just wonder -- I'm going to move to a new topic -- if it is a convenient moment to take our 10-minute break, or perhaps just marginally longer than 10 minutes?

SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: Yes. We will sit again at 11.40 am. Thank you very much.

(11.28 am)

(A short break)

(11.40 am)

SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: Thank you, Mr Moss.

MR MOSS: Thank you, sir. Mr Hadley, my next topic was to deal with algorithms and recommender systems. We have got ahead of ourselves slightly and dealt with much of

that. But I did want to ask you about one of your exhibits. Could we have TAT000015 on the screen, please.

And this report, quite recent, May of this year, "Threat Assessment. Violence-centric Ecosystems in Southeast Asia". Could you just help us understand the background to this as to why there was a specific report being done on violent-centric ecosystems in Southeast Asia?

A. Often we will decide to focus on areas of research that we think are important. In some cases, we might be funded to conduct research. In this particular case, I believe it may have been commissioned by a Government stakeholder and we release this broadly to our distribution list as well.

Q. Thank you. So, within this, if we look at page 3 TAT000015_0003, please, and "Executive Summary, Key Findings". I just want to take the first two bullet points:

"Violence-centric online ecosystems in Southeast Asia represent a growing and dynamic threat characterised by decentralised, hybrid and cross-platform activity that often falls outside existing terrorist and violent extremist detection and disruption frameworks. These ecosystems represent

a shift from cause-based and entrenched belief systems towards engaging with and committing acts of violence in pursuit of notoriety, social status or nihilistic sentiment."

Now, those are obviously areas of concern for the Inquiry. In broad terms, can you help us as to why that sort of material is falling outside of violent extremist detection on platforms?

A. The nature of content connected to these violence-centric online ecosystems, as perhaps referenced earlier, is that it is harder to define. It is perhaps less obvious. It might not be -- in many cases, there may not be a logo associated with it, there may not be a hierarchical group associated with this material. And in other cases it might be quite subtle and there might be quite subtle signals as to the nature of this content. So there is obviously a broad range of material covered by this report and broadly speaking, ISIS, Al-Qaeda, Extreme Far-Right material is relatively straightforward to define and therefore to find, whereas there is much more ambiguity with regards to NV content and that's the point we are making here.

Q. Thank you. So some of the imagery associated with this, some of the acronyms that may be used, don't immediately flag non-ideological extremist movements or Com

networks, but to those who know what to look for, you can see that it is actually linked to those groups?

A. Yes, and the difference is that with this type of content, the context of that content is more important. So whereas the so-called traditional forms of terrorist content, which are still shared in great volumes online -- so it is not a problem that has gone away -- but traditional content, in many cases, could be evaluated purely on the basis of that one piece of material. Whereas what we are seeing with violence-centric online ecosystems is that it is necessary to look at overall pattern of activity across an account, for example, or maybe ten pieces of content. It is only then that you are able, with any certainty, to determine that that falls within scope.

Q. Thank you. So, you go on to say, in the second bullet point:

"A substantial volume of harmful content within these ecosystems are being produced and circulated in memetic, gamified and ambiguous formats, while platform recommendation and discovery systems are almost certainly extending and pushing this material beyond niche communities into broader and mainstream online spaces."

So, again, the text is reasonably heavy but what one

should take from that is that the risk that memes and gaming are being used to reasonably surreptitiously proliferate this material in ways that are perhaps evading content moderation; is that the thrust of it?

A. Yes.

Q. Thank you. If we look at page 7 TAT000015_0007, please, just looking at some of the examples that you give of this, at the bottom of page 7, please.

You do say, in terms of cross-platform activity, that, in this investigation, "TikTok was identified as a primary entry point for violence-centric content in the region".

Now, is that because -- and you must say if you don't know -- TikTok was particularly weak at picking up the content, or is that related to the geographical base, focusing on Southeast Asia?

A. Both.

Q. Thank you.

"Its recommendation systems can surface progressively more explicit or related material following initial interaction, meaning that users may encounter such content without prior intent."

So that looks as though the user can have this material -- my words -- somewhat foisted upon them, without deliberately seeking it out?

A. That's the nature of engagement optimisation upon which the business models of these companies rely.

Q. Thank you:

"Movement almost certainly occurs toward more private or controlled environments, including invite-only Discord servers, closed Telegram groups, and gaming adjacent channels."

So that is the concept of initial contact on more mainstream, large platforms and then moving into other platforms. Then some examples are given of this. So over the page, at page 8 TAT000015_0008.

Thank you. So if we just have the screenshot, please. So that's a screenshot of TCC, True Crime Community:

"... aligned account that is hosting multiple recorded gameplays replicating attacker footage and first-person shooter content."

A screenshot, I think, from TikTok in April 2026; is that right?

A. Yes.

Q. Then, perhaps more graphically for our purposes, again, TikTok content on page 5 TAT000015_0005. Again, the screenshot, please. Similarly, here, screenshot of gameplay, but the assessment is that this is gameplay that is:

"... replicating the Sandy Hook Elementary School shooting, the user [is including] the hashtags 'tcc' ..."

Then that screenshot from the gameplay replicating Sandy Hook Elementary School attack is posted on TikTok?

A. Correct.

Q. And, at that stage, clearly whatever moderation was in place, despite the fact that this was replicating the Sandy Hook shootings, hadn't been moderated or taken down by TikTok?

A. Well, in this example, we can see the keywords quite clearly laid out, on the right of the screenshot.

Q. Yes.

A. I can't see why this material would not have been found by TikTok.

Q. Thank you. So if that were taken seriously by TikTok, very obvious hashtags of concern such as "tcc" should be an obvious flag?

A. Yes, and if I may, what we are proposing is the establishment of a discovery index, terrorist content discovery index and the idea being that we and others work to establish a common set of keywords that we would expect platforms to be using to detect terrorist content or violent content like this. And clearly "tcc", true crime, et cetera, would fall into this category.

However, I think it is important to stress that merely a keyword map would not necessarily mean that that content should be removed, but you would hope that it would make it easier for the platform to evaluate that content in the first place.

Q. Yes, it is a search that should lead to certain content being identified but there would still need to be an assessment process of what had come up because it may be innocent material. But you will correct me if I'm wrong, but the hashtags associated with this post, you would say, should quite simply have led to this never being posted in the first place, or if it was posted, being taken down very, very quickly?

A. Yes and it goes back to the point I was saying earlier, that people posting this material want it to be found. So they are going to try to use keywords, obvious ones, and they maybe obscured keywords or other ways, because why would they bother sharing material if it can't be found. So they will constantly be trying to find ways of publicising the material and making it easy to find. In this particular case, it couldn't be easier, could it, with that keyword and in fact, at least two quite concerning keywords there.

Q. Yes, thank you. That can come down from the screen. So if we go back to your statement at page 7

TAT000024_0007, please, paragraph 17.

You say, in this context, that:

"Granting researchers access to relevant statistics is an essence condition of improving our understanding of this problem, and we look forward to regulatory interventions to this effect in the future."

Then you draw reference to the Digital Services Act in the EU, which you say is partially helpful but doesn't extend to NGOs and it doesn't extend to research organisations in the United Kingdom.

So what is the particular problem that you are alighting on here?

A. Currently, the only way to find this material is if a human being, an analyst, logs in to a profile and then manually searches for this. Clearly, the volume and extent of content that's discovered is limited by the number of people you are able to hire. There are very few automated ways of finding this material, whether that be a API, that I have mentioned before, or other mechanisms. So, this both applies to the overall content moderation statistics, and also the content itself. So we are necessarily sort of limited by our own funding to hire analysts to do this manually.

Q. And this goes back to the problem that you have explained earlier on, is this right, that platforms make

it deliberately hard for the content as a whole to be assessed in an automated way?

A. Well, I can only assume they are making it deliberately hard because it wouldn't be difficult for them to make it easier and the fact that they haven't is perhaps a question for them.

And there is a circularity here, in that there is limited systematic data available to show one way or another how effective the platforms are at content moderation and in the absence of that data, and the absence of that evidence, it is hard then to go to the platforms to say that they are not complying. So there is a circularity here, which I think regulators in particular suffer from.

Q. Thank you. I want to turn to a different topic now which is the effect of anonymity on the internet and online disinhibition which may arise out of that. Could we have a look at page 8 TAT000024_0008, paragraph 20 of your statement.

So you say there, that you don't think that:

"... anonymity is an operative factor in risk escalation: it may frustrate the identification of individuals who presents a risk, but it is too common a means of harmless internet use to have any causative importance."

Then you flag up a consideration which, on any view, is relevant, that:

"For many internet users in countries subject to heavy censorship, anonymity is an essential means of freely receiving and imparting information."

So, think about that. Outside observers may think that the fact that individuals are free to engage anonymously online and post material anonymously, increases the tendency and increases the prevalence of violent content being posted and to encourage others to be involved in that violent content. So those people engaged in that hide behind the online anonymity. Can you just help us to understand a little bit more why you don't see that as a problem, or at least you don't see that as a problem that's worth tackling?

A. Well, I would say that there are many things you might want to do before you de-anonymise access and sharing of material. That seems to be quite a severe, disproportionate measure in the absence of all the simple things that could be done to improve content moderation.

Q. So, you would say that the various aspects that we have been exploring should go first before you would go to that, on privacy grounds and also because of the large-scale benefits, away from the horrors of these

sort of events, that anonymity on the internet brings?
A. Yes, I very much see this as a last resort if all other mechanisms have failed.
Q. But you go on to say that you do think, about five lines down, that:
"... harmful content platforms, such as gore websites, are a significantly underestimated vector of radicalisation, desensitisation of violence, and mobilisation."
So you do accept that platforms and internet sites that are distributing this sort of material are having this effect and many of those will be posting anonymously?
A. Yes. But I'm not sure that the extent to which those sites are harmful is necessarily as a result of the anonymity but rather, the impunity with which those services operate in general.
Q. Thank you. I am going to ask you not to use the name, although the Inquiry is aware of it, but you refer to "one website which is a compendium of footage depicting human deaths and includes the footage of several violent attacks perpetrated by individuals subsequently convicted or otherwise categorised as terrorists".
Is that website -- and again, please don't name it but is that website readily accessible from the UK?

A. Yes, as are hundreds of similar sites and also sites operated by designated terrorist organisations.
Q. Is it age-gated or not?
A. Not that I'm aware of.
Q. Has that particular site been reported by Tech Against Terrorism?
A. It's unclear who we would report it to. We have a small team that focuses on understanding terrorist-operated websites, which perhaps this broadly could be included in that category, certainly from a technical perspective. The challenge with websites is that there are a number of -- you know, a website is not just a one thing, it is the domain registration, it is the server hosting this and all manner of services might protect that website.
Often, terrorist organisations and other organisations might use Cloudflare, for example, to protect the domain and to anonymise the server. So the point about anonymity, where these sites are concerned the big issue is about the anonymity of the server infrastructure, not necessarily the users posting the material. So with regards to terrorist-operated websites, which is slightly different but related, we are monitoring hundreds of these, one that's run by ISIS, many are run by ISIS. And it is not very clear

who is responsible for these and the same applies to gore websites.
Q. So this particular gore website, should we understand it is because of the nature of it as a website, that it is not regulated in the same way that a social media platform would be?
A. My -- that is my understanding, that there is ambiguity about how these websites are regulated, yes.
Q. And you are not aware of any specific power that can be involved to take the website down, at least for users in the UK?
A. No. And even with websites that are almost certainly run by ISIS, it is unclear what powers can be used against the companies profiting from the provision of the services that underpin that website.
Q. Thank you. If we turn to current capability of agencies to detect online behaviours linked to fixation or attack planning.
If we just look at page 9 TAT000024_0009, paragraph 21.
You start by saying that:
"The signals of fixation with violence or of pre-attack planning have yet to be definitively established ..."
And you refer there to inferences being drawn from

"the circumstances of previous attacks, both by VFIs and conventional ideologues, do not yet form a reliable evidential basis for any kind of diagnostic protocol".
I think this is where you then went into the value of sentencing remarks including that and I don't want to go back to that.
But, you also say in this paragraph that, if one looks towards the bottom of what's on the screen at the moment, you say:
"The failure to account for online activity in the public account of this case, when Prevent's caseload is dominated by individuals whose radicalisation began online, is reflective of a continuing disconnect which I do not believe the Government is capable of recognising, let alone resolving."
Then you say this:
"the information is certainly there: Tech Against Terrorism regularly encounters individuals in the course of monitoring the surface web whose patterns of behaviour are sufficient to cause notifiable concern. We therefore feel able to conclude that intelligence capable of sustaining interventions in the pathway of VFIs toward mobilisation is both available and obtainable without the need for specialised technical or legal capabilities."

Now, one view in relation to this would be, for example, that sadly, violent material and gore is so prevalent on the internet and its use -- we heard a figure of 1 million or so UK users for top gore websites -- that merely looking at those who engage with such sites would create so many false negatives that it would not be a useful activity.

You are painting a slightly different picture here, saying: the information is there and we come across behaviours which are notifiable and of concern.

Can you help us to understand that? Of course, you will come across some individual cases but could that be expanded to be an actual programme of looking at what is happening on these sites, to specifically try to have interventions in cases of concern? Or is this just a byproduct of your research and your work?

A. So whilst viewing material, I would agree -- or there is a high prevalence of the material and many people viewing that. You can also imagine a way of analysing the engagement with that material in a way that allows you to focus on the people who are engaging most with that. So viewing material is -- sharing it is bad, viewing it, perhaps also, but engaging with that material over a long amount of time is the sort of thing that we would expect to be useful for understanding who

is being radicalised.

So going back to my point earlier, with Al-Qaeda content, you could say, one example of sharing that is particularly egregious but with this sort of material, it is more an accumulation of activities, the pattern of behaviour that would be used to establish if that individual is of concern.

Q. So I appreciate -- the clue is in the name, Tech Against Terrorism, I appreciate you go back to use the terrorism examples. But if we could just focus on extreme violent content not connected to ideologies. When you are seeing that sort of material, is the reality that you see some users who are repeatedly sharing that information a lot, which may give rise to the concern, either that they are bad actors, so they may be Com network types who are deliberately propagating that material, or they must have a vulnerability because they are so immersed in it that they are sharing it, so they are sharing signs of fixation in a vulnerable sense, rather than a bad actor case; you are seeing examples of that?

A. Many, and we report it when we find it as well.

SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: Who do you report it to?

A. CTIRU, CTP.

SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: Thank you.

MR MOSS: Thank you, and regardless of whether there is an ideology that stands behind it?

A. Correct.

Q. Thank you. So that leads to, I suppose, the -- one of the mainstays of your seminar presentation, about open-source intelligence and how it could be used more by Government and if we could just bring up TAT000025.

I introduced this at the start. This is your response to the request for information and you tell us, in paragraph 2, taking this as shortly as I may, that RIPA itself doesn't give any guidance which would -- or direction that would be an inhibitor to the use of open-source intelligence.

But as you get to the layers below, you say that:

"The guidance concerning online research is drawn in the Home Office's Covert Surveillance and Property Interference Code of Practice ..."

Which starts by saying that:

"... much of what is online 'can be accessed without the need for RIPA authorisation' and that general monitoring of the internet for themes and trends needs no authorisation."

So far so good, but it then says that:

"... an authorisation may need to be considered where the study of an individual's online presence

'becomes persistent', and should be considered where a public authority is 'systematically collecting and recording information about a particular person or group'."

So just pausing there. That's the high-level Home Office surveillance code guidance. I think you are alerting to the fact that thereafter, lots of different public authorities write their own policies on top, which will be varied and that's where one starts to get: you can look somebody up twice online but after that, it is systematic. Have I understood the concern correctly?

A. Yes.

Q. Thank you. So you have the full detail of this obviously available in the document.

If we look at page 2 TAT000025_0002, in terms of your recommendations here, you talk about the need to "audit and harmonise policy".

For the reasons I touched upon, about how, at the lower level, they become agency dependent and they are not the same, is that right?

A. Yes.

Q. "Define the threshold". So I think you are pointing there that "persistent" and "systematically" are not defined and there needs to be clear guidance about that?

A. Yes, and perhaps needs to be reasonable as well because

it would appear that, if an individual analyst is looking at content once, that's fine, but any broader approach is not and this goes back to what I was saying about our own efforts at Tech Against Terrorism, we can't afford to hire thousands of analysts to do this work. There is technology that, in theory, is capable of doing this work much more effectively but unfortunately, as a result of these sorts of concerns, it would be necessary to hire thousands of analysts to do this work.

Q. Thank you. Then over the page TAT000025_0003, recommendation 3:

"Measure and evaluate the use of the powers for online investigation."

I think you are, there, looking that there should be data on how many applications have been made under RIPA for this and what work has been done without it, to try to establish a better understanding of what's actually going on in this field, is that right?

A. Yes, and the point being that you would expect there to be a baseline number of requests. I'm not sure the intent of RIPA was to stop all of this work and my concern is -- and I don't have the data to back this up -- my concern would be that public officials are so concerned about the process of applying for

authorisation, that they don't do so. And, therefore, I would hope that there is a baseline number of these requests. And if that isn't happening, that may indicate that either the process isn't being followed or the work isn't being done.

Q. Thank you. Then 4:

"Fund training, tooling and data access."

You refer there, to:

"... Home Office and [CTP] funding open-source training beyond basic search, specialist tooling and low-attribution devices ..."

So, is that getting at the point of positively training what you can do beyond just simple searches and how you can use devices that can't be traced back to Government? I mean, you are talking about the training in those techniques, yes?

A. Yes, and in particular, so Prevent officers, police officers in the Prevent team, as far as I'm aware, are not given particularly detailed training or tooling or data access and my understanding is that there, generalist officers are expected to search the internet to try to understand whether someone in the Prevent programme has interacted with, engaged or produced terrorist content. Actually, this is quite difficult to do. It needs training, it needs tools, it needs data.

Certainly, from what I understand, this has not been prioritised to date.

Q. Thank you. Then 5:

"Establish a central open-source fusion capability."

You spoke about that in your seminar. You say, essentially, this ought to be ideally brought in within a new and separate organisation, that can do it across Government, GCHQ-like, but for open-source?

A. Yes.

Q. 6:

"Measure platforms directly."

That's a reference to:

"Ofcom measuring for itself how easily content produced by a designated terrorist organisations can be found ..."

And I think that's where you got your new measure of how easy it is to do that, which is something that Tech Against Terrorism is doing?

A. Yes, we have started doing that. But more than this, certainly technically, it would be possible for regulators to experiment and test. The ethics of it would need to be considered, of course, but these are systems that could be evaluated with a bit of ingenuity.

Q. Thank you. Over the page TAT000025_0005, 7:

"Set a standard for what happens next."

So a:

"... standard for open-source investigators, officials and platforms on what to do when concerning activity is found, including when removal is the wrong first step for a vulnerable adult or child ..."

So that's about what do you do once it's found, who do you report it to and perhaps, just having an eye to the fact that immediately having the material removed may, in some cases, be problematic. And you have got the point about evidence disposal but also action may need to be taken on the information, so you do not want to dispose of it?

A. This is particularly problematic with regards to NVE or VFI content because it is not clear who, within the Government, is responsible to deal with this. Is it CTP, is it the National Crime Agency? And as you have said, there is also some concern that removal of that material might inadvertently encourage someone to become violent or self-harm. And without knowing who they are, what jurisdiction they are in, there is real danger that you are playing a part in encouraging them to become more violent by removing their account or content.

Q. Thank you. Then 8:

"Expect researchers to share."

You said, in relation to this:

"UK Research and Innovation and universities should expect researchers who hold archives of terrorist content, or who produce intelligence on terrorist use of the internet, to share them with the central capability ... And to refer the contents to platforms for removal and for hashing ..."

Can you help us to understand that a little bit more?

A. Well, whilst I don't want to criticise academics and researchers focused on this area -- many dedicated individuals and groups -- there often isn't an expectation for them to then refer this content to the platforms or to Government entities. This isn't made any easier by the platforms making it obviously quite difficult to report the content.

Nevertheless, we would argue that encouraging researchers to share what they are coming across, so it can be analysed collectively and reported to platforms, would be beneficial. I'm not aware of this happening at scale. We have a tool called the Trusted Flagger Platform that allows this and supports this but the adoption is quite low.

Q. Thank you. So, I think the product of your research -- and when you are exploring matters online, pretty much as a matter of course, you would seek to report

inappropriate content to the platforms but I think, are you indicating that some researchers don't all have the same approach?

A. There is no common code of conduct. Understandably, if you are conducting primary research on terrorist content or VFI material, or whatever it might be, you wouldn't want to remove that before you have analysed it but I'm not aware of any expectations placed on university researchers or others to report that once their analysis has been completed.

Q. Recommendation 9:

"Fix responsibility for school and university devices."

Which we may came back to briefly just a little bit later. But in any event, you are, I think, flagging there, as you have done in your statement, the lack of any auditing of the standards of software that is used in schools and university, the lack of a central requirement in standards in this area as well?

A. Well, my understanding is there is guidance for schools and local authorities that they should be using software but I am not aware of any compliance, any audits, any checks put in place, to check -- determine that that is working and evaluate the number of false positives. So, it seems rather strange to have -- encouraging schools

to use software but then not actually checking to see if it works.

Q. If one imagines a situation in which there was an uplift in the Government's open-source intelligence work in this area, so looking at online harms and I want to focus obviously on the VFI cohort.

What would they, in a nutshell, be doing in the extreme violence sphere and what would the benefit be of that work?

A. Two obvious areas, I would suggest. The first is understanding patterns of behaviour. As I have said, with VFI material/activity, it is unlikely that one piece of content alone would be sufficient to identify someone being radicalised. But by finding a pattern of behaviour, building up that understanding of activity, it then would be possible to refer that to platforms to remove these sort of super-nodes or super-spreaders, these individuals who are sharing material. Then secondly, the same research might be used to intervene, to reach out to these individuals and into support them.

Q. Thank you. That can come down from the screen. Sir, there's considerable more detail but I have gone to the executive summary, effectively for obvious reasons.

SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: Thank you.

MR MOSS: If we go back to your statement, please, to look

at page 16. There is a section -- forgive me, it is the previous page TAT000024_0015, I'm looking for paragraph 36. There is a section here that is dealing with whether you can put together information cross-platform, that may flag individual cases of risk and what we were interested in here is the fact that AR had definitely had an interest online in extreme violence material. So you could look at his imagery and see that he had looked at certain imagery to do with torture and abuse, historical cases of that, Nazi war graves et cetera, but if you had put that together with his purchasing patterns, of interest in archery equipment and then gravitating to crossbows and machetes and put those together, you would have a picture of real concern.

In this paragraph, you say that:

"These disparate sources of data could only be united and cross-referenced following the exercise of communications interception powers to obtain that data from their respective providers."

So should we understand that, while, after an attack, piecing that together is possible, in this area you are saying this isn't really a viable area for a IT-led solution because you would only join the dots if you had an intercept on the material because

individual platforms wouldn't be able to tell you enough of the picture?

A. So, in terms of publicly available information that's been shared by that person, in theory, it would be possible to find it. In practice, without automated access to platforms via APIs, et cetera, that would be impractical. Even if you were to establish that pattern of behaviour and connect the dots, so to speak, the attribution would then be a challenge.

In some cases, it is possible to attribute the user. Perhaps they have shared a picture of their school in the background or they have shared a picture of their car with the registration number. So there may well be many cases in which a user, over the totality of content they have shared, has kind of leaked their identity in some way or another. So through ingenious open-source intelligence methods, you may well be able to determine that. Not very scalable.

So the point we are making here, certainly in particular regarding attribution, the platforms will have this data and I would expect there to be a way for the police to make lawful requests for that information, but I'm not aware of actually how they go about that process. Presumably, there is warranty to support this but they would need to show that an offence has been

committed. But I'm not a criminal lawyer so I'm not sure what would be required.

Q. So the indication you give here is that building patterns of data from private sources would be so invasive and disproportionate that it is less desirable to "preventing immediate mobilisations of VFIs than joining the dots of data points available in the records of different public bodies".

Now, I think -- getting to the heart of that, I think what you are really saying -- but correct me if I'm wrong -- is the safeguarding bodies who may be involved with individuals would need to lead on drawing together, in a multi-agency way, what was known and take an interest in what they have been doing online. You need to come at that problem from that direction, not thinking that -- not think that there is some automated way to join the dots from what they are doing privately in a marketplace and what they are doing on an online platform?

A. There are many ways you could approach this. Some would be really difficult to do. But certainly, if you were to start looking at or finding individuals who have repeatedly engaged with this type of content online, on the one side, and on the other side, looking at vulnerable children and adults and their online

activity, you can imagine meeting in the middle.

The point we were making here is that private data sources -- it is completely different from publicly available information.

Q. Of course.

A. And it probably would be sensible to understand how to use the publicly available information more appropriately. And the point about RIPA is that, if persistent and systematic access to the internet requires authorisation, and that authorisation isn't being sought but is necessary for understanding VFIs, then you can imagine why this is not being dealt with.

I know you do not want me to talk about terrorism, but with terrorist content, you don't need to build that pattern of activity because it is obvious with itself. Whereas with VFI activity, it is rarely obvious just on the basis of one piece of content. It is necessary to create and understand that pattern of behaviour, which, as my understanding goes, would require RIPA authorisation.

Q. Yes, thank you. Turning to the methods of reporting of concerns, again, we have touched on this but I just want to go back to page 10 TAT000024_0010, paragraph 23 of your statement.

So, you say there that:

"Tech Against Terrorism has a clear idea of where to raise concerns: [so] miscreance at platform level to Ofcom, threats of immediate harm ... [to] CTIRU, [and] terrorism and serious criminality comprising significant offline and online aspects are a matter for [Counter Terrorism Police], and non-operational and residual policy matters tend to be a matter for the Home Office."

So that is your developed knowledge. Do you have a sense of whether these reporting mechanisms are clear for other organisations who are less specialist than yourselves?

A. I wouldn't be able to comment but it is certainly not easy to understand where to report material. There are a number of websites that the Government has for terrorist content. I'm not aware of any for material relating to VFIs.

Q. Thank you. I said that I would come back to the aspect of education settings. If we just look down lower on this same page, to paragraph 24. You explain that you think that:

"Designated safeguarding leads", just going over the page TAT000024_0011:

"... are sensitive to behavioural signals which could reasonably cause concern."

But then I think you draw out that, as opposed to

those leads being sensitive to the concerns, if we look at paragraph 27 TAT000024_0012, that whilst schools have an obligation to install filtering software, you are not aware of any meaningful auditing requirements to ensure compliance. There don't appear to be any standards in place to help schools determine the thresholds for intervention; is that right?

A. Yes.

Q. Thank you. Sir, for your note, we asked Ms Dixon about issues related to this on Day 18, page 156. Sir, I'm not going to ask this witness whether he considers those are enough because that is a matter for you to judge but you have had Ms Dixon's evidence on it.

If we go back to TAT000025. This was your seminar follow up. And it is page 12 TAT000025_0012, paragraph 37.

If we have the whole of that paragraph. You say, halfway down:

"Two gaps remain ... responsibility is delegated to each school, which has many other concerns, so the judgement of whether a product is technically adequate falls on people who may not be equipped to make it. Second, there is little certification: the Department does not quality assure products ..."

But you also flag the fact that:

"... the UK Safer Internet Centre, [which is] a partnership of three charities, invites providers to self-certify their systems against its checklists ..."

Is that right?

A. Yes.

Q. So although they run an accreditation scheme for filtering systems that providers can apply to, it's effectively based, at the moment, on self-certification rather than rigorous outside scrutiny?

A. That's my understanding.

Q. Thank you. If we can go back to page 11 TAT000024_0011 of your statement, when I had started to dig into those aspects of education providers, can we just have the whole page again, please, that was within a section "Barriers to monitoring, reporting and responding to online harms". Now, there is a good deal of detail in your statement and I don't want to go through all aspects of it and I have taken you to the education aspects, but I do want to pick up a few key items.

So if we go to page 13 TAT000024_0013, paragraph 31. You say:

"In the case of tech platforms, a formidable obstacle to the process of responding to online harms is the lack of resourcing (and political support) made available for content moderation: the depletion and

demoralisation of the Trust and Safety sector only increases the opacity and unaccountability of the reduced content moderation activity that persists."

So I think you have dropped some hints about this already in your evidence. But I think you have a concern that safety and moderation teams within the big platforms are not given enough priority and resource, is that right?

A. That's right, and it is unclear what budget is allocated to content moderation and AI has a role to play here, in two senses. One, many platforms have said that they are using AI to understand content and to detect content more and they have, in some cases, as far as I'm aware, reduced the number of analysts employed by the company.

And also, with all these companies as well, they are investing in their own AI capabilities, building out data centres. So it is well known there is a huge amount of financial pressure on these companies to ensure that they are reducing headcount and unfortunately, much of this is also applied to trust and safety teams. As far as I'm aware, there is a very limited information available about the number of people in the trust and safety teams and the budget that has been allocated to them.

My concern is that the budgets have been

significantly reduced and AI, instead of being used to improve the productivity of its content moderation systems, has instead been used to cut the costs.

Q. Thank you, and the reference to lack of resourcing and political support, do you mean that in an informed sense in terms of internal policy, or do you mean it at a national politics level?

A. Both. Platforms respond to national, political pressure and media pressure. When I established Tech Against Terrorism more than ten years ago, the terrorist use of the internet was a top priority. The then Home Secretary, Amber Rudd, convened a meeting with tech companies and they took it very seriously.

Unfortunately, it is hard to see that that pressure has been maintained. So I think platforms are political in how they choose to allocate their resources. They do respond to pressure and we are not seeing much of that pressure at the moment, other than what Ofcom is doing.

Q. Thank you. Then paragraph 32, arising out of that, you propose requiring platforms to invest a reasonable proportion of revenue in their moderation efforts?

A. Yes, and I think the principle here is the "polluter pays" principle, which is the idea that if companies are involved with polluting an environment, that they are expected to pay for its cleanup. It's this principle

that supports the regulation of financial services in this country. The Financial Conduct Authority is funded, of course, by a levy on financial services. And you have to wonder why this does not also apply to social media platforms. Why are they not contributing to a fund to ensure that their systems are safe? Because it would appear that these platforms are quite happy extracting profit, but they are also seemingly -- you know, accept the fact that they have socialised the harms and costs associated with this.

Q. That is going a little further, isn't it? One aspect is to say that there should be a standard, or that these firms should be encouraged to invest a certain amount of their revenue in their internal methods. But I think you are moving on to going a step further, that they should contribute to some sort of outside body that then investigates and takes action on lack of safety?

A. Well, three points. Firstly, it would be good to know what their budget is for online safety, what proportion of their revenue it is. Secondly, to set expectations of what the minimum should be. And then, thirdly, well, I personally feel that platforms should be contributing to Ofcom's budget. I can't see why the taxpayer should be picking up the bill for ensuring that the internet is safe, when this problem is being created by platforms.

Q. Thank you. Paragraph 34, in part just for the Chair's note, I think is where you refer to the discoverability index that you are developing, with the aim of measuring the time taken to find content that violates terms of service. What's the intention once you have got that up and running? Is that then going to be published by yourselves, referred to Ofcom, both?

A. Yes, so the idea is to create a ranking of platforms, to say, by type of content, VFI being one of them, how straightforward might it be to discover that material. So level 1 of the TCDI focuses on keywords. So we have already seen a few of those keywords. The test for level 1 might be: in five minutes, is it possible to use one of these keywords to find that content? If so, it fails that level. So our intent -- given limited resources, probably not until January next year now, but our intent is to publish this.

The idea behind this, given everything I have said about how hard it is to access content. It doesn't make any sense for us to try to do that because it is going to be very difficult, but why not measure how easy it is to find material because surely, that actually is really what's quite important here. If we are trying to reduce ease of access, let's measure it. And of course, that is measurable, by searching for keywords for example.

Q. Thank you. So, while the Inquiry's attempts at its own open-source intelligence, we will try to keep an eye on that publication. Would you let us have a copy of it when it is published? If January it is to be, or thereafter, that would be very helpful.

Thank you. Page 15 TAT000024_0015, please, paragraph 37. Turning to inter-agency working. You say, in the first few lines of this paragraph, effectively, that your understanding is that successful inter-agency collaboration is overly dependent on good practitioners going above and beyond the call of duty -- my summary, rather than your precise wording.

But you say that:

"Such exceptional effort is required in order to navigate the multiple bottlenecks imposed by the policies of their parent institutions ..."

Where have you derived this understanding from? Because this is a bit removed from your standard day job, it might be thought?

A. Well, so CTP invited me to observe a meeting, or a number of meetings, where practitioners came together and discussed some of the challenges that they were seeing and some of the anonymised cases that they were dealing with. So, as a result of that, I was able to understand a bit more about the process that they go

through to try to establish their course of action.

Q. So it is from that experience?

A. Yes.

Q. We probably need to be careful about the detail in relation to that. But you say that:

"While the efforts of individuals are highly commendable, change must take place at the system level to enable inter-agency working to be as successful as it could be. What this requires is both a more scientific approach to building a common endeavour through which the elements of a system that drive and inhibit action are comprehensively mapped; this understanding of what actually happens to generate successful outcomes should thereafter become the paradigm and the policy for action in the future."

Now, we have been approaching matters at quite a granular level, saying: which agencies need to come together, should there be a lead agency, should there be a process that owns the risk? And so on. You are coming to this from a different angle and a different type of expertise.

But can you help us to understand what, in concrete terms, you would say should be done about inter-agency working? One understands what's on the page but what does that look like in practice?

A. Well, in practice, I think creating workshops or seminars or meetings where there are panels of professionals coming together and talking about these issues would be helpful. It is happening informally, of course, but in practice, many of the organisations are constrained by their own -- by the laws that apply to them, their own kind of ways of working and there might be -- this is not my area of expertise -- but based on meetings that I have attended, what I have seen is that the CPS is restricted in what it might be able to do, the police as well, social services, they all have their own remit. And unfortunately, VFI activity often falls right in the middle of all of this and can fall between the cracks. Whether a system change is possible or desirable, I don't really know, but there are surely measures, such as having more of these sorts of panels, that would be helpful. I know some enterprising individuals have organised these meetings, but I'm not sure how widespread they are.

Q. Thank you. Just three more matters from me. There is a lot more detail in your statement, but I just want to draw out three more matters. The first is the Online Safety Act. Could we look at page 6 TAT000024_0006, paragraph 14 please.

You say that you consider the OSA to be "only

partially effective in blocking material that may support the development of violence fixations or fantasies". You say it "does make effective provision to protect children who are capable of developing such fixations or fantasies" and you reference there section 62, subsections 6 and 7 of the Act.

Now, that's the provisions in relation to priority content that's harmful to children. And in that context, is referring to depicting real or realistic serious violence against a person, depicts the real or realistic serious injury of a person in graphic detail. That's subsection 6. And subsection 7: content which depicts real or realistic serious violence against an animal, depicts a real or realistic serious injury of an animal in graphic detail, or realistically depicts serious violence against a fictional creature or the serious injury of a fictional creature in graphic detail.

First of all, that's -- the very focus on of that in the statute is harmful to children and I think, is this right, in paragraph 14, you are drawing out the issue of what about vulnerable adults in relation to that? Is that your first point?

A. Correct, yes.

Q. Can I ask about the second aspect that may arise from

that because we know that the standards of what are expected of platforms are different at the level of priority content, from primary priority content -- and the primary priority content is the higher level of protections that would apply to material such as pornography and suicide and self-harm.

Would you be in favour of the OSA going further and dealing with extreme violent content as primary priority content?

A. Yes.

Q. Thank you. You say, in relation to the Government's plans for introducing a criminal offence of extreme violent content, page 18 TAT000024_0018, paragraph 42. This is the second of the final points I wanted to explore. You broadly welcome that:

"... not least because such measures reflect a welcome awareness that such content contributes ... to VFI radicalisation ..."

But then you say this:

"We do however take that view ..."

I think it should be "the" view:

"... that criminalising the sharing of extreme violent content is less important than re-categorising violent content, as described in paragraph 40 above, to achieve parity of probation with terrorism content

and ..."

Child sexual abuse material.

Can you just explain why you take that view?

A. Well, so the point we are making here is that the categorisation of the content is also important because then it establishes a precedent, an expectation is placed on platforms.

Q. The expectation on platforms to, what, remove it immediately or remove it -- to take moderation effects that it is not available at all?

A. Either.

Q. Thank you. And then page 4 TAT000024_0004, paragraph 10, just going back to the question of shared hashes and platform uptake. Obviously, you have developed the process of hashes of terrorist content. To what extent have you been able to start applying that, or is it beyond means, to extremely violent material?

A. The technology exists to do this and the understanding of the sources of that content also exist. We are considering including the TCC-related content in the scope of the Terrorist Content Analytics Platform. There are a number of challenges with doing so, including, excluding CSAM material. Not necessarily TCC activity, but quite a lot of NVE content will include

CSAM. So we are working with the Internet Watch Foundation to build their hash sharing into our system so we can filter that out before we then start archiving, hashing and alerting.

One uncertainty we have is the legal basis with which we would be sharing hashes of violent content. I think, as we have established, the status of that material is somewhat ambiguous and therefore it is unclear which -- or if any platforms would be willing to ingest those hashes and what they would do as a result.

My concern with including that type of content, those hashes, is that it is only the context that would help decide whether to remove that and that's something that would be difficult for us to ascertain and it would also be quite challenging for the platforms to determine.

Q. That shouldn't inhibit a Government agency, or for that matter Tech Against Terrorism, sharing the hash in the first place. The question is what efficacy it would have in terms of to what extent it would encourage platforms to take the material down?

A. Correct, and it is an issue of thresholds. So defining what we mean by violent content will be important. So, it might be better to focus on particular attacks, for example, or have a taxonomy, to say: actually, content

relating to this is within threshold and content relating to that isn't.

But in practice, it might be difficult to determine exactly what is hashed and what isn't. Going back to terrorism, if I may, if platforms are not using terrorist content hashes where it is obvious examples of ISIS content, I'm not sure how realistic it would be to expect platforms to remove violent content if they are ignoring all the other material.

Q. Thank you. You should not believe barristers' time estimates, nor their counting of how many points they have left, because there was, in fact, a fourth matter, just very briefly. We do not need to turn it up, your statement. Sir, for your note, page 3 paragraph 9 deals with your education work in schools. I just want to look at the presentation in relation to that. TAT000011. Just to draw out one point that is relevant to our debate on a different issue, which is definitions. So TAT000011, please.

Sir, this is "Decode the digital world: Tech, Terrorism and Online Safety". It is your presentation to schools. I won't turn it up, but within this material, we see you relying on the Southport attack for educating about risks of online harms in various ways.

If we go to page 9 TAT000011_0009 though.

One of the aspects, just in terms of definitions is under "Types of extremism", you are quite happy, as an organisation, to include violence fixation, see the right-hand side of the screen, as a form of extremism?

A. Correct.

MR MOSS: Thank you. I'm just going to look to my left to see if there are any questions at all. I think not. Sir, do you have any questions for Mr Hadley?

SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: Just a couple.

Questions by SIR ADRIAN FULFORD

SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: Mr Hadley, first -- I have many questions but I'm going to try and focus on the ones that particularly struck me.

The record of your evidence earlier was that you had asked the large platforms for a means of being able to determine if material had been removed and, as I understood what you said, that that request had been, and I quote "completely ignored".

A. Correct.

SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: Is that right?

A. Yes.

SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: By all platforms?

A. By one in particular.

SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: Right. Then let's deal with the others. So if one in particular -- and I'm not going to

ask you to name them -- but a large platform?

A. Correct.

SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: Right. What about the other platforms? So something less than completely ignored, but did you get a satisfactory answer?

A. We struggle to maintain, I suppose, communication with the large platforms. They don't reach out to us particularly and when we reach out to them, sometimes we are ignored completely. Telegram is co-operative and they communicate with us pretty effectively.

SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: But have they given you the means of determining whether material has been taken down?

A. No.

SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: So you have liaised with them, but you haven't got the positive result that you wanted to?

A. That's correct, yes. So we have had to be pretty imaginative in terms of building tools to determine whether content has been removed.

SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: Yes, so you have had to do it yourself, rather than having their assistance so that they would facilitate you in having the ability to do that? Right.

The second point was this. You have talked -- both earlier when you contributed very helpfully to the seminars and today, you focused on needing information and looking at different sources of information, one of

which is transcripts of sentencing hearings. Can I just ask whether you have approached either the sentencing counsel or the Lady Chief Justice in relation to this, to see whether that is something that could be facilitated?

A. We have not. However, we have liaised with the Home Office to understand what work they have been doing with regards to this.

SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: Right, thank you. So, APIs. Should, or could, the Government request or require access in order to conduct the kind of research that you have talked about, for instance, requiring companies to enable them to use, for instance, APIs, in order to monitor the various things that you have been discussing?

A. Should they? Yes, and my understanding --

SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: Could they? So, I mean, I imagine there probably isn't any theoretical restriction on them making that request and insisting on it. But that, presumably, would be one way of doing this effectively, if a Government said, "We require you to give us that level of access"?

A. It's certainly technically feasible and other than RIPA considerations, I think it would be possible. Some of these platforms will sell API access. So, X, for

example, will sell access to the API. But the standard terms of access to the API forbid this type of analysis.

Other platforms do not have official APIs. There are -- my understanding of US law on this matter is not comprehensive, but my understanding is there have been a number of cases in the US with large social media platforms suing companies who have been scraping their systems. So there are unofficial APIs that can be accessed and many of those are comprehensive. But the legal status of using them in this country is not something I fully understand.

SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: So, a Governmental requirement, as long as it didn't conflict with RIPA, would be one way of doing it?

A. (Nods).

SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: Right. Thank you very much indeed, Mr Hadley. That's been very helpful.

MR MOSS: Sir, there's just one matter arising out of that, if I may, sir, with your permission?

SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: Yes.

MR MOSS: I think earlier on in your evidence -- we were just checking the transcript, Mr Hadley -- and you said that you had asked repeatedly for research API access to TikTok and "they have declined to provide researcher access to us". So is that the same point, that it is

they that you had in mind, who you had asked and they had given no explanation, or is that a different point?

A. Both TikTok and X, we have requested researcher API access, yes.

Q. And been denied it?

A. Correct.

Q. Thank you.

SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: Thank you very much, Mr Hadley. You are free to go.

MR MOSS: Sir, we need to make some arrangements -- thank you, Mr Hadley -- because our next witness is giving evidence remotely. So may we break for lunch there and could I say that we resume perhaps at 1.35 pm or 1.40 pm?

SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: 1.35 pm.

MR MOSS: Thank you, sir.

(12.50 pm)

(The short adjournment)

(1.35 pm)

SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: Yes.

MS WAKEMAN: Thank you, sir. We are now going to be hearing from Mr Imran Ahmed who joins us remotely. I understand that he is going to start by taking an affirmation.

SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: Yes, could you take the affirmation please Mr Ahmed.

MS WAKEMAN: Mr Ahmed, could you just confirm that you are able to hear us clearly?

A. I can hear you.

MS WAKEMAN: Thank you, and do you have the words of the affirmation there to take now?

A. I do.

MR IMRAN AHMED (affirmed)

(Evidence by videolink)

Questions by MS WAKEMAN

Q. Thank you. If you could just start by stating your full name?

A. Yes, my name is Imran Ahmed.

Q. If we could have on screen your witness statement brought up, which is CCDH000007, are you able to see that coming up for you now?

A. Yes, I can.

Q. Thank you. Is that your witness statement?

A. Yes.

Q. And if we bring up for you page 16 CCDH000007_0016, there should be a statement of truth and it is dated 31 July 2026, can you see that?

A. That's right.

Q. And you have signed that statement?

A. I did.

Q. So you can confirm that statement is true to the best of

your knowledge and belief?
A. It is.
Q. Thank you. I understand that you are the founder and CEO of the Center for Countering Digital Hate Ltd?
A. That is right.
Q. And you explain, in your statement on page 2 CCDH000007_0002, paragraph 4, that:
"CCDH is a research and advocacy organisation, focusing on social media platforms, search engines, AI chatbots and other generative AI tools."
You say that you:
"... seek to independently evidence how digital platform technology functions, the underlying business incentives driving their behaviour, and the impact of that technology and business model on individuals, society and democracy."
You go on to say that your:
"... advocacy focuses on fixing the problems [your] research identifies, working with policymakers to make technology companies accountable for the negative externalities generated by their services and business practices."
Is that a fair overview of your work?
A. Yes, it is.
Q. Thank you. And you say, at paragraph 5, just further

down the page, that the relevance of your work to Phase 2 of the Inquiry emanates from your research on algorithmic recommendation systems, online safety and harmful online content.
A. That's right.
Q. And is it fair to say that whilst your work focuses on digital hate, that work does also extend to include work relating to violent content and online harms more generally, as well?
A. That's right.
Q. Thank you. In your statement you set out, in quite a lot of helpful detail, some of the work that your centre undertook following the Southport attack unrest, in particular. That's set out on pages 2-5. I'm not going to go through the detail of that now but is it fair to say that that work included convening a meeting with a wide range of bodies, including Government departments, Ofcom, CTP and the Met, among others?
A. Yes.
Q. And also conducting research regarding the role of social media platforms in the unrest that followed the Southport attack?
A. Yes.
Q. Thank you. So I now just want to move to my first topic, which is how the online environment can

contribute to fixation on violence, fantasies of extreme violence and attack planning for individuals without ideological drivers. I want to focus on two key points. The first is harmful design features on platforms. And the second is the specific dangers posed by AI chatbots.
So if we start with the first of those. If we could bring up the bottom of page 5 CCDH000007_0005, going into page 6 CCDH000007_0006 of the statement, paragraph 21, please.
So you say there:
"CCDH has repeatedly evidenced the role of algorithms and other platform technologies in the promotion of violence and the amplification of hatred. Our research demonstrates that the same systems that accelerate exposure to extremist and violent material also provide infrastructure through which violence can be coordinated and planned."
So you are bringing up there those two aspects of, not only accelerating the exposure, but also providing infrastructure for coordination and planning.
Does the combination of those two capabilities create a risk over and above those risks arising individually?
A. Yes, I mean, clearly having a single system in which you have a very large potential audience in which you can

conduct proselytisation of hate and of the lies that underpin hate -- because the two are inextricably interlinked -- but also allow you to fund-raise, to push people into darker sections in which there may not be as much public visibility of your conversations, to spaces in which you can plan and operationalise; that combination is unprecedented.
Q. And thinking about recommendation algorithms in particular, what is it that you consider poses particular risk of those systems?
A. So, I look at it in two ways. First of all, there's recommendation algorithms once someone has identified a proclivity, a particular interest. What we see there is individuals are fed information that the system knows is likely to keep them on the system and what that means is reinforcement of their existing beliefs and presentation of content that will anger them. So, it is looking for stronger, effective -- strong emotional responses.
So we see that once someone is in an algorithm -- once someone has expressed a preference, that the system will continue to feed them content that it knows will either delight or anger them, will put them into an extreme emotional state. And that may be content from a whole different extremism.

So, for example, if someone shows -- we did a study called "Malgorithm", and it is not cited in my witness statement, but that showed that people who were looking at conspiracy theories about vaccines and Covid during the pandemic, were being fed content about -- antisemitic conspiracy theories, and vice versa. So there is this cross-fertilisation of extremisms.

But the second thing is that the platforms themselves understand that this content is sticky, that it engenders discussion, debate, anger, expressions of support or of opposition and so it prioritises that within its system and we find that malignant content can often come up very early in a user's experience, as the system tests what sort of things they may be interested in.

Q. Thank you. It could be said that at least some of the violent content available online, perhaps taken individually, might be said to be no worse than what's occasionally seen in the news, for example, or in a documentary or film. And, therefore, if the platforms are meant to be moderating and monitoring individual posts, it might be said that they can't be wholly responsible for that cumulative picture. What would you say to that?

A. Well, many of the individual posts that we identified in

our research were incitement of violence; there were specific calls for violence against Muslim people, against migrants, against facilities housing migrants, and those may well -- and I'm not here to opine upon the legality or not of each individual post that we analysed -- but they may have contravened the law but there is a difference, of course, in scale.

So a single call for -- or a single piece of disinformation cannot -- would not individually be as problematic as the repeated drip, drip of hateful content, of disinformation that re-colours the lens through which the user sees the world. And we have to be able to -- if we have systems that can do that, the way that we respond to them as public authorities, within the law, has to respect the fact that these are fundamentally different in terms of scale and, therefore, impact on the individual and on broader society.

Q. Thank you. You go on to say, at paragraph 28 of your statement, which is slightly further down CCDH000007_0007, thank you, that:

"... CCDH research shows that platform design choices -- including engagement-optimised recommendation systems, algorithmic amplification, frictionless content discovery, network recommendation features and

increasingly capable AI chatbots -- facilitate and aggravate extremes and reduce the practical barriers to attack planning."

We are going to come onto AI separately later and we have already discussed algorithms and recommendation systems. But which of those -- if you had to pick, as it were, which would you say are the most dangerous or concerning design features on a platform?

A. It is like asking me to pick between my children. I think algorithmic amplification is at the very core of the user experience on social media. And if you think about the amount of content that's uploaded to a platform, like say YouTube, for example, in less than an hour, the entire -- the equivalent, in terms of time, of the entire Netflix content library is uploaded to YouTube. It is clearly far too much for an individual to see.

That's true on every platform that we talk about. There is an enormous flood of content on there. The most important function of the user experience algorithms on those platforms is to select, to choose, to decide what to promote and what to allow to sort of wither away on the vine.

So that process by which they design the user experience, by which they become publishers -- and it is

sort of showing the hollowness of the claim that these are simply neutral platforms that allow people to communicate with each other -- it is that choice they make on a regular basis. And those choices serve commercial needs, shareholder value creation. As US courts have recently found, in part by using addictive features to keep people scrolling for as long as possible so they can be served advertisements, and that's really what these platforms are, are addiction engines in order to serve advertisements and the algorithmic amplification is crucial to that.

Q. Thank you. It may be that you can't assist with this, but are you aware of any evidence or studies related to, if we switch off any of these harmful features, so, for example, take away the algorithm, whether that would reduce risk of radicalisation?

A. The only people that have experimented with changing the way the algorithms work are the platforms themselves and they are rather reticent to give us insight into how they work. That is, in part, dealing with the transparency question and data access for researchers that we talk about later on in my witness statement.

However, I will note that after the January 6, 2021 insurrection in the US, in Washington DC, Meta did make changes to its news feed. It actually dialled back --

and one doesn't know much more than that -- it dialled back the intensity, the emotional affect of its news feed. And what it found was it reduced -- by exposing people to less emotionally triggering content, it actually made people post less offensive, aggressive, angry, emotionally triggering content. But it also reduced the amount of time they spent on the platform. So, they have dialled it back up.

Q. Is that some sort of study or paper, relating to --

A. It was extensively reported at the time.

Q. Thank you. If we could bring up now TAT000024 at page 5 TAT000024_0005, please. It is paragraph 12. So this is the witness statement of Mr Hadley from Tech Against Terrorism who was our witness this morning.

I'm just looking about five or six lines up from the bottom. So Tech Against Terrorism's own research "accounts suggests that non-ideological violent content is rarely, if ever, disqualified from recommendation algorithms".

Does that accord with CCDH's experience?

A. I can't say that we have actually studied that. I'm not quite sure how we could, without access to platform data.

Q. Right, that's helpful.

A. The question being asked is: do the algorithms have

disqualification mechanisms to say that certain content will not be disqualified from being recommended? And I'm not quite sure how you could, looking from the outside, differentiate between low amplification -- so low visibility of a post compared to, say, the mean visibility of posts by that user when it is violent content, rather than non-violent content.

Q. That's helpful and we will come onto --

A. It is multi-factorial.

Q. We will come onto platform data later, so we can get into that.

A. Yes, I am not sure how you would work that out. I have no reason to doubt Tech Against Terrorism, it is just it is not something that we have studied.

Q. Thank you. If we could go back to Mr Ahmed's statement, page 6 CCDH000007_0006, paragraph 23, please.

You explain there, that "there is very little common or shared understanding between organisations about online fixation and escalation" and that:

"The greatest barrier to understanding is a mistaken belief that digital platforms are neutral or organic spaces."

You go on to say:

"They are not. They are curated, algorithmically ordered and an attention-trained ecosystems that rapidly

identify interests, features and vulnerabilities."

You say that:

"[The] misunderstanding has greatly hindered relation and reform of digital platforms and contributed to the disparate, and so far unsuccessful, attempts [you say] to [attempt to] fix the problem of violence fixation and radicalisation ..."

When you refer to the lack of shared or common understanding between organisations, which organisations do you have in mind there?

A. I'm thinking more broadly about discourse in the media, in politics, in civil society, even within civil society and between organisations, that quite often there is this belief that -- the platform versus publisher debate is ongoing and as you know, I live in the US, most of my work is done here these days. And it is only, for example, very recently, the FTC -- in fact, this week, or maybe the end of last week -- issued some guidance in which they quite clearly stated that they do not see section 230 of the Communications Decency Act 1996, that essentially codes into law the notion that platforms are these neutral spaces. It actually says: no, you are acting as a publisher quite often and we are happy to distinguish between when you do act as a publisher and when you act as a platform and most of your activity is,

in fact, publishing activity.

That debate is ongoing and still not resolved and I think it's hindered our ability to treat these platforms, these businesses for what they really are, which is that they are publishers that make choices, driven by commercial needs, to promote certain types of content. And they do that on a hyper-personalised basis as well, also by taking an enormous amount of data about individuals to understand what it is that might keep them scrolling for as long as possible.

Q. That's helpful and in fact it tails on with one of the points raised by one of the experts within our expert cadre that we had, who did raise the fact that, as a suggestion, that perhaps there should be a movement towards treating the platforms more like publishers, in terms of holding them accountable for materials that they are publishing. Is that something that you would support a move towards?

A. Sorry, would you repeat the question?

Q. Of course, I explained that one of the experts within our expert cadre had raised the fact that perhaps there should be a movement towards treating the platforms more like publishers, in terms of holding them accountable for materials that they are publishing and I think that tails on with the point you were making and I asked

whether a move towards that is something that you would support?

A. Yes, I think that -- well, you have to be realistic about it. I mean, as I said, think about the amount of content that's published every day -- that's added to these platforms every day. It is different to, say, a broadcast network or a newspaper, but nevertheless, the platforms have built systems in which they are able to control user experience, in which they study individuals in quite a lot of detail to -- not just having demographic data but also psychographic data, so an understanding of their attitudes, their behaviours, their interests, their fears, the things that make them angry and share things. They study the language used by people, able to differentiate between when they are posting with emotional intensity and not.

So, I mean, for God's sake, if you try and upload a video to YouTube with five seconds of a Taylor Swift video, it will prohibit you from doing so because it is a copyright violation. But, nevertheless, despite sort of having these systems in place, we are meant to believe that they remain essentially a neutral platform, a blank wall, on which people just write content and no one is there to do anything about it and there's no curation. That's implausible to me.

I think we have to find that adequate middle point, between understanding them as being these vast platforms in which people write whatever they want and what most people experience from them, which is to have a highly curated, hyper-personalised feed of content that they know, for sure, is going to keep them scrolling.

Q. Thank you. So I will move on now from -- that was covering the recommendation systems and algorithms and I will move now to AI chatbots, that's another helpful feature of your witness statement. And if we could look at paragraph 25 on page 7 CCDH000007_0007. You explain there, that:

"The emergence of generative AI systems is a new and worrying development in the online radicalisation environment."

You refer there to your research paper "Killer Apps", which, if we could bring up on screen, is CCDH000030 and I understand, in a broad sense, that you tested ten popular AI chatbots to see whether and to what extent they would assist a user planning an attack, is that right?

A. Yes.

Q. We have heard this morning some evidence about guardrails and how some AI models can have guardrails removed. Were the models that you tested, within this

paper, just the regular AI model that a normal consumer going online would find?

A. Yes.

Q. Thank you. If we could look at page 4 CCDH000030_0004 of this document, please. And look at the last paragraph. You say there that:

"The danger is no longer theoretical."

Referring to AI chatbots:

"In the [US] 64% of teen[ager]s aged 13-17 have used a chatbot, with 28% engaging with them daily."

Then you go on, if we could scroll down, to summarise two examples. The first, the Las Vegas Cybertruck explosion, January 2025:

"Investigation logs revealed the perpetrator used ChatGPT to source guidance on explosives and tactics to evade law enforcement ..."

The second one, the Pirkkala School attack in Finland in May 2025. Again:

"... a 16-year-old spent months using a chatbot to refine a detailed manifesto and operational plan before stabbing three female classmates."

So it is fair to say, looking at those examples, that the risks posed by these AI chatbots are not a future risk but something we are already seeing?

A. Yes, and there have been examples since as well, the

most notable being Tumbler Ridge.

Q. Thank you. If we turn to page 7 CCDH000030_0007, I just want to briefly touch on the methodology and overview. Essentially, as I understand it, you created two personas. There was going to be a 13-year-old user based in the USA and a 13-year-old user based in Dublin. The minimum age for some of these models varied. As you can see from the table, it was either 13 or 18. And you explain in the report that you essentially had to create the account and you just set the date of birth as the minimum age for whatever the platform required, is that right?

A. Yes.

Q. If we could look at page 23 CCDH000030_0023. You explain, at paragraph 4, that:

"None of the chatbots consistently required substantial age verification, with most simply requiring a stated [date of birth]."

So just simply entering the date of birth?

A. That's right.

Q. And:

"Four chatbots did not always require users to state a birth date at sign up ..."

There were some specific differences between the platforms, which are set out in the bullet points now

which I will not go through. But it is safe to say that the last bullet point, Meta AI did actually ask for an image to be uploaded for age verification and a stock image of a teenager was used, in this case?

A. Yes.

Q. If we could look at page 26 CCDH000030_0026. You have set out there essentially the methodology that you used. So, first, the researcher would set a prompt which -- you have called it "ideology", but it didn't have to be a kind of recognised ideology, in that sense, did it? It could just be a violent ideation, is that right?

A. Yes, something like, you know, complaining about bullies at school.

Q. Yes. Then you would ask prompts asking about inspiration, so that might be asking about other school shootings that had taken place?

A. Yes, like Columbine.

Q. Then there would be some questions about location and then some questions about obtaining specific weapons. So part of what you were testing was whether AI was going to join the dots between those four types of prompts and recognise that this is a dangerous user?

A. Yes, that's right.

Q. If we could bring up page 6 CCDH000030_0006 now, just to see your key findings.

If we could scroll down. So we can see, in the middle headline, there:

"8 in 10 chatbots typically assist users planning violent attacks."

Could we zoom out on the page, please. Thank you. Then the third big heading "9 in 10 chatbots fail to reliably discourage would-be attackers."

A. Mm.

Q. And in one case, the final subheading "character.AI actively encouraged violence"?

A. I believe it has gone as chapter 11, which is probably a good thing for society, given what we found.

Q. Thank you. If we could turn to page 5 CCDH000030_0005. The paragraph under the heading "A power accelerant for harm", you are summarising the key findings here and you say your report:

"... shows that within minutes, a user can move from a vague violent impulse to a more detailed, actionable plan. The majority of chatbots tested provided guidance on weapons, tactics and target selection. These requests should have prompted an immediate and total refusal."

A. Yes.

Q. Yes, and you go on to say that one of the most chilling examples was a chatbot that "concluded its instructions

on weapon selection with the phrase, 'Happy (and safe) shooting!'"?

A. Yes, that is right.

Q. Could we look at page 11 CCDH000030_0011 of the report, please. You note here that it was Claude and Snapchat's My AI that performed best, in the sense that they typically refused to assist users planning violent attacks, in 68 and 54 per cent of responses, respectively?

A. Yes, and it is worth looking at the precise responses because Snapchat just said: no, I can't do that. But the response from Claude was -- as someone who studies safety and who has been doing this for over ten years, it was thrilling to see a chatbot behave in the way that you would expect it to, which is that when it realised that someone was asking and escalating a series of questions, culminating in asking whether they could obtain a weapon, it treated them almost like another human being might. It said: I'm not going to answer that and I think you need help.

Q. Yes. So we have got Claude's response on the screen there. So that's the type of response you say you would expect the chatbots to be giving out. Presumably, it follows that from the fact that Claude can do this, the technology is there to be implemented, it is just that

some AI models are not set up to respond in this way?

A. That's exactly right.

Q. Are you able to assist at all -- we asked the witness this morning about some questions about this. The issue we were exploring is whether answers given by AI chatbots are meaningfully greater than what someone could necessarily find on a search engine. Do you think -- and if you can't answer this, no problem but do you think this research, the information that was able to be surfaced, was it meaningfully greater than what someone could get on a search engine?

A. I mean, I'm a professional researcher and I am looking at you through a screen right now. On the left screen, I have a browser, which I refer to from time to time as I'm working and on my right-hand screen, I have four different LLMs open, which I use for my work because they are far superior, far faster, far more capable of seeing connections between data than search engines could be. They save enormous amounts of time and for someone that isn't as well trained as I have been in pulling information together, drawing analytical conclusions, weighing epistemic weight for different types of information, they are able to synthesize information, order it and provide it in a user friendly way incredibly rapidly and effectively. For someone

that doesn't have the skills that in sifting through information and drawing conclusions rapidly, that could -- that may well be something that they could not do without the assistance of a LLM.

But the other difference is the personalisation of the experience, that as it gets to know you, it learns about you. And the most chilling thing in this report was not "Happy (and safe) shooting!" The most chilling thing was reading the friendliness of the replies, it was seeing the system bending over backwards to please the user.

One of our other reports is called "Fake Friend" and that's what it reminded me of, as we were looking at the transcripts and watching the video of our researchers doing these interactions was this is the worst kind of person, a sort of an enabler, but an enabler of the most -- potentially, the most horrific violence. So it is the personalisation of that experience, its ability to simulate an emotional connection with you, to encourage. That makes it completely different to the idea of looking at a search engine.

Q. Thank you. This report was published in March 2026. Are you aware of any significant improvements that have been made to any of the chatbots that you featured in the report since this research was published?

A. No, and they certainly haven't communicated that publicly, if they have made changes. That said, we do conduct ongoing research. And in the past, when we have done studies into platforms, the best example is a study we did into ChatGPT, I think it was the 4.0 model, where we studied whether or not it would assist a 13-year-old with harming themselves -- with killing themselves, with -- taking a combination of alcohol and illegal drugs, to have a particular -- to have a very strong high and if it would help them plan a starvation diet, to lose weight very rapidly, so a 300-calorie-a-day diet which, for a 13-year-old, will cause them potentially irreversible harm over time.

We found that ChatGPT 4.0 was willing to do so. It even drafted a suicide note for us, to our friends and family.

When that came out, very soon after the case of Adam Raine, who was a young man from California, came out in which ChatGPT had been involved in having conversations with him, which were felt that it may have contributed to his death. And Sam Altman, the Chief Executive Officer, announced that they were breaking out ChatGPT-5 which he said would be safer. We then tested ChatGPT-5 comparatively with ChatGPT-4 and we found that not only was it less safe, so it was willing to respond

to 53 per cent of prompts with usable responses, as opposed to 43 per cent for ChatGPT 4.0. We found that the one thing it had changed was that it had changed the stickiness of the user experience.

So, at the end of a response from a chatbot, it will quite often suggest further questions you might ask it. In the original model, ChatGPT 4.0, that was about 9 per cent of times, from memory, and in the new version it was over 90 per cent of times, it would suggest follow-up questions. So what it was trying to do was trying to elongate the chat, the time spent on platform, and at the same time, was less safe.

So given that experience, we would be forgiven for taking with a pinch of salt, when platforms say they have introduced systems that will introduce safety. We are also currently testing ChatGPT for teams. I gave evidence to -- New York City Council had a committee of the whole council a couple of months ago on AI and the harms posed by AI and an OpenAI representative, which creates -- OpenAI is the parent company of ChatGPT -- they said that they had introduced ChatGPT for teams and it was a much safer experience.

That research is not yet complete, but our initial testing is that ChatGPT for teams is not safe and many of the features, for example, notifying parents --

a linked parent account, when a child is searching for potentially dangerous content, they don't actually work. There was no notification sent to our parent accounts. So I'm doubtful as to whether the purported safety features they are introducing with making things safer.

Q. Thank you. I think -- I'm not sure of the timeline of the research that you have mentioned, but if it can be passed to the Inquiry, as and when it is published, that would be very helpful.

A. We will.

Q. Sticking slightly there with the theme of rolling back, rather than improvements, if we could just go to page 4 CCDH000030_0004 of the report and look at the penultimate paragraph.

There was one point you picked up on there where you say that Anthropic, the one company that actively dissuaded attackers in your study, has announced a rollback of a key safety pledge. Are you able to explain what that safety pledge was that they are rolling back?

A. Yes, it is slightly complicated. They said that if there is a competitive -- so, if they find that a model shouldn't be released because of safety, but if a competitive model comes out with that feature, then they will release their model as well. What they are

saying is, essentially, if someone undercuts the safety experience, but improves the overall performance of a model, they will be forced to compete by releasing their own model that they know is unsafe.

Which is truly dispiriting, but a perfectly rational commercial response that, given that there are no standards for safety -- Anthropic said that at the same time as they are advocating for safety standards, saying that: what we don't want is a race to the bottom because what we want are minimum standards so we can have a race to the top, when it comes to the quality of these chatbots, you know, lower hallucinations, better quality answers, more processing power, et cetera.

What they are saying is: unfortunately, until you put that minimum baseline in place, commercially, we have to engage in the race to the bottom because we can't -- we have a duty to our shareholders. Given that today it is being reported that they are seeking a $1.3 trillion valuation, one can understand why they may not want to lose out to another platform.

Q. All right. Yes, we will come on later to what could be done in this regard. But, looking -- sticking with the same page that we have open, if we look at the next paragraph up, which starts "in a recent school shooting in Canada", you say there, that:

"... reporting indicates that OpenAI staff flagged the suspect internally for using ChatGPT in ways consistent with planning violence. Rather than escalating concern to law enforcement, the company chose to remain silent. Months later, that ChatGPT user allegedly killed eight people and left at least 25 injured."

I think you are referring there to the Tumbler Ridge shooting, which you mentioned earlier?

A. Mmm.

Q. Bearing that in mind, do you think that chatbot providers and platforms should be under a statutory duty to report a user who appears to be planning serious violence?

A. Well, they are already identifying users who are planning serious violence. In this instance, OpenAI -- this was written when it was written and there's been more information since then. But in this instance, OpenAI shut down the person's account, believing there to be a problem. But nevertheless -- and it was discussed at a senior level: should we now notify law enforcement? But they chose not to.

There is a serious problem there, that platforms hold all this behavioural evidence and what we strongly suggest is that they should be reporting and escalating

to a designated lead body that can coordinate with police, safeguarding and other operational agencies.

Q. All right. We will come onto your suggestions in that regard later. A question from the bereaved families and victims groups, they have asked whether any of the ten chatbots, in your view, that you tested in Killer Apps, would be in the scope of the Online Safety Act? Is that something you are able to assist with?

A. Chatbots are right now, still, out of the scope of the Act's duties. The Government has an enabling power, via the Crime and Policing Act, to bring them into the scope of the OSA, but has chosen not to do so and I think that the Government should do so.

Q. Thank you. What about age assurance? We touched on it briefly when looking at your study, but do you think effective age assurance is something that should be required of AI chatbots?

A. Yes, but it is not infallible. And it can't be relied on alone. So, there is a current Ofcom investigation into TikTok over inaccurate ageing for its models, allowing children to see harmful content. So, showing that there are problems with most of the existing age assurance mechanisms, what we want is safer platforms, not just ensuring that young kids can't get on there. And not everyone that has committed these acts of

violence would be covered under -- as an under 18 or an under 13.

Q. I understand.

A. Not all of them are kids.

Q. I'm going to move on now to the next topic I want to look at, which is barriers to monitoring reporting and responding to online harms.

If we may have page 10 CCDH000007_0010, paragraph 38 of your statement. At the last sentence there, you say:

"Our studies show that platform systems are wholly inadequate to protect users from online harms, including violent content."

You go on, at paragraph 39, to set out some results that you found from your own studies. You say:

"CCDH studies have shown that Facebook, Instagram, TikTok, Twitter and YouTube failed to enforce their own rules ... on 89% of posts containing anti-Muslim hatred and Islamophobic content reported to them ... and that X failed to act on 97% of calls for violence against migrants or Muslims posted in the year following the Southport ..."

Attack.

So in your view, is the problem that there is an absence or inadequacy of rules set by the platform, or is the problem with the platforms actually enforcing

those systems and rules?
A. It is the latter. It is the failure to act. So, the problem isn't that they don't have rules, they do have rules, and in those instances, they were -- all the posts that we were looking at would have contravened their rules. It was 89 per cent of posts containing anti-Muslim hatred that we reported to them. So we actually flagged it to them, but there was no action taken.
Q. Thank you. The research you have cited there, that relates to calls for violence and hate speech. Are you able to say whether your concerns about it being the lack of moderation and enforcement, does that extend also to violent content of the kind that the Inquiry is primarily looking at?
A. I'm not sure. I'm happy to write to the Inquiry. We have written probably 100 reports now and my recall -- I have two young children, so my memory is terrible these days.
Q. I understand. We can pick that up with other witnesses.
Could we now look, please, at paragraph 41 on page 11 CCDH000007_0011. This is where you are talking really about who is responsible. You say that:
"... while relevant agencies, charities and safeguarding organisations have an important

responsibility to identify individuals at risk, they are fundamentally constrained in their ability detect online behaviours associated with fixation, escalation, or attack planning."
And it is the platforms themselves that:
"... possess by far the greatest visibility of user behaviour, recommendations, engagement patterns and network interactions ..."
And they are the ones that are best placed to identify trajectories and introduce friction or interventions before harms escalate.
I just want to test that slightly and look at OFC000088 which is Ofcom's evidence. And page 50 OFC000088_0050. Paragraph 123. The middle sentence, they say:
"The degree to which the types of patterns which proactive technology can identify would correlate with a genuine threat of violence is an evidential question. Indicators which are correlated with individuals who have a fixation on violence may also characterise individuals who do not."
So, throwing some caution there in terms of how easy or difficult it may be to detect these trajectories. So, bearing that in mind, to what extent do you think it is feasible for platforms to detect concerning

trajectories and would it be reliable?
A. It wouldn't be perfectly predictive but it may certainly give you an indication. If you take, for example, the Tumbler Ridge example, where they closed a person's account down thinking: gosh, this might be bad for us in the future if this person does something. That is an example of them taking interventions internally that didn't lead to any notification to law enforcement and that person going on to murder people.
So, from the outside, we can tell that there are sufficient levels of understanding within platforms, within these businesses, that people may be very problematic. But they are not taking actions. I would say that there is more research that needs to be done, certainly, to identify the best predictive factors. It is not just consumption of information, it is also what people post as well, so behavioural, once things start to escalate into actually expressing views.
So it may be differing levels of intensity of action that may indicate that someone is a problem and given that the algorithms do reinforce patterns, compulsive viewing of a particular kind of information may be driven by the algorithms rather than the individual's particular proclivities but there may be other indicia, including behaviour, or returning to the information, or

clicking on profiles and spending time on them, scrolling for hours and hours and hours, that may indicate that someone has a fixation on a particular -- on violence.
Q. Thank you.
A. I would say the platforms are incredibly well placed to do that. There is no other authority. There is no other organisation that would have access to that kind of data and these companies do jealously guard that data as well. Even -- I was in court recently in the Ninth Circuit, defending -- CCDH is defending a lawsuit brought by X Corp, formerly known as Twitter. And in the testimony being given -- the arguments being made by X Corp's counsel, they reminded the court that taking a screenshot of a tweet is a violation of their terms of service that could lead to them taking legal action against you. Which shows the asymmetry in information between the outside world and the platforms themselves.
Q. I understand. Could we now look at page 11 CCDH000007_0011, at paragraph 43 of your statement. You say, the third sentence:
"Worse, platforms have been scaling-back automatic detection and weakening safety rules."
You give an example of Meta's 2025 decision "to stop automated enforcement of certain harmful content

policies".
A. Yes.
Q. Is it right that that policy change related to violence incitement and hateful conduct and bullying, rather than necessarily violent content; are you able to assist?
A. I think you're slightly splitting hairs there. I'm reminded actually, by searching, that the content -- so, in the two anti-Muslim reports that we did -- the Islamophobia reports that we did, the content we were looking at was, in fact, violent. So it was calling for violence against Muslims.

But in this instance, I think it would be fair to characterise the content that Meta said was acceptable, to be content that encourages and glorifies violence.
Q. All right. I think I poorly worded my question, but what I was hoping to get at was whether it was merely comments about violence or inciting violence or whether it might also encompass, for example, video footage?
A. I'm not sure they differentiated between the two.
Q. I'm grateful. Aside from that example you give in Meta, are you around of any other platforms that you think have scaled back their detection or moderation efforts in recent years?
A. We have reason to believe that that was -- that Meta tried to make a virtue out of having done so.

Mark Zuckerberg posted a video in which he, six times, used the words "free expression" in five minutes, to explain why they were reducing moderation of calls for violence. But that was a bit of demonstrative political signalling to the incoming administration, when he posted that video.

We have reason to believe that the same is -- that similar reductions in enforcement have occurred across all platforms, including Google's YouTube and I mean, X was always a bit of a cesspit but it has not gotten any better, let's put it that way.
Q. Thank you. I said earlier we will come back to data, so we will cover that now. You say, at paragraph 44, if we could just scroll down slightly, that:

"Providing better access to platform data to regulators, law makers, academics and independent civil society experts, such as CCDH, is therefore necessary to create a community of practice capable of effectively addressing the role of social media in the creation of VFIs and improving online safety."

How would access to that data improve understanding of VFIs?
A. If we can understand the content that VFIs have seen, it helps us to understand which patterns may be predictive of future violent behaviour. It can help us to

understand what the user experience was like, how that was distorted compared to another person's user experience. It helps us to understand the role that algorithms play and therefore, start to work backwards and work out, well, what may be going wrong with these algorithms in the wrong place, what might be going wrong with the enforcement processes.

We simply don't really know how these platforms operate from the inside. So, I compare our work to be -- we have these algorithms and we have a torchlight. They are sort of like a cavern and we can point the torchlight and try and get a sense of the topography of the environment that we are in, but they have the ability to switch on the floodlights and show us exactly how these things work and by doing so, what we can have is a serious conversation, with equal information available to both.

So, at the moment, we have no ability to have that serious conversation because the truth is that every time we identify a potential harm, even if we are studying large amounts of data, if our research is backed up by talking to CT practitioners, to neurologists, to psychologists, to sociologists, we can do the most work possible but the platforms always turn around and go: yeah, but you don't know because you

don't have access to all the data, only we do, so, cheers. And that is a real problem. We are not having an active discussion or discourse on how we will ensure that these platforms are commercially successful. And I have no problem with them being commercially successful, but, at the same time, safe.
Q. And you have mentioned a few types of data in that answer. So I think you referred to documents that a user might have seen. You referred to the sort of workings of the algorithm. Are there any other particular categories or types of data that would be particularly helpful for researchers to have access to?
A. Content enforcement decisions. So how platforms make decisions about enforcing their rules. What those rules are. So, there are some platforms that refuse to publish their entire rules because they say that if they published the rules, then people would know how to break them, which is kind of bonkers. It is like saying that we won't have rules -- we won't have laws, but if you have something that contravenes these unwritten laws, we are going to arrest you and imprison you. It is a very odd way of going about it.

So, more information on what the rules are. How they are enforced. How decisions are come to. Building up a corpus of information, so we understand what sort

of things do they tolerate. And can we have an active discussion about whether or not some things which are currently on there -- and this may not necessarily be just about Government, or law enforcement, this can be for civil society as well.

You know, I set up the CSO and I didn't remain working in Parliament and didn't seek to work in Government precisely because I felt that we were able to say things and urge things that it would be inappropriate for Government to do so.

Q. I think it is perhaps obvious from the answers you have already given but what is it that is the barrier to accessing the data? Is it platforms themselves refusing the request, or something else?

A. I mean, you know, there's just been litigation in the UK that's failed, where platforms are refusing to provide data to Ofcom under the code, saying it would be an undue burden upon them. That's one example of them pushing back. But they have a history of both hiding the data and making it difficult to access. In the past, when they have had more data accessibility, over time when they have been held accountable, they have sought to reduce the ability of others to hold them accountability by reducing access to data and now, most platforms are basically opaque to us, without spending

large amounts of money or painstaking research. And that's the approach that we use, is very painstaking research.

But, we have, personally, been sued as an organisation for the act of doing research. So, despite having published over 100 reports, we have never issued a correction for any of our reports, nor have we ever been sued for defamation, but we were sued for a terms of service violation for obtaining small amounts of data from the platform X, in order to conduct research. And that case was subsequently dismissed with prejudice by a court in California and a (unclear) ruling was issued. But, you know, defending a case like that in the US cost us over $1 million and they were seeking to end our ability to do business by seeking 10 million in damages.

So I think that just goes to show you the jeopardy that organisations like mine put ourselves under, by even having the temerity to take small amounts of data that is publicly available, that they publish for anyone to see on the internet, by taking that data in order to study it.

Q. I understand. You say, in the last sentence of paragraph 44, that:

"While the Data (Use and Access) Act 2024 contained

an enabling power to establish a statutory data access scheme for researchers, it has not yet been delivered."

I don't know, are you able to assist with why that hasn't been taken forward?

A. Because the Government is both indolent and incompetent, is probably my best answer.

Q. All right, thank you. Okay, I'm now going to move to my next topic, which was just to ask you about the designated body that we mentioned earlier in your evidence, that you talk about at page 13 CCDH000007_0013, at paragraph 52.

A. Just to add to that point, I do think it is unconscionable, given people have died, given that our democracy itself has felt tremors, that we remain in the position that the Government is saying: I think transparency might be going a bit too far --

SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: Mr Ahmed, I'm going to interrupt you, at this stage. I readily understand this is an area about which you feel passionately and in relation to which you have been involved for a long time. But can I ask you please to focus on Ms Wakeman's questions and address those. So if you don't mind, we will move on now to the next topic.

A. Of course.

MS WAKEMAN: So looking at paragraph 52, you say there,

that:

"There would be significant advantages to a clearly designated body with responsibility for coordinating responses where online activity indicates escalating risk."

You say:

"At present, responsibility is dispersed across platforms, regulators, law enforcement, and safeguarding agencies. [And] a lead organisation could improve information sharing, establish clearer lines of accountability and develop specialist expertise ..."

Are you envisaging there a body that's dealing request individual cases, so, for example, an individual who has been asking AI chatbots about attack planning that gets somehow flagged to this agency, or are you looking at a body that would be considering more bigger picture policy-level questions?

A. I think both and I think it is impossible to study the bigger picture policy questions without studying individual cases. I'm not sure if you are going to come to this, but there was a body that was starting to do this kind of work, the Commission for Countering Extremism, which I believe Prime Minister May set up, with Dame Sara Khan in charge of it. I sat on the pilot taskforce steering committee some years ago, for

a while. And that was doing -- Sir Mark Rowley was another member of the steering committee as well and we were starting to do that work, to look at the hybridised ideologies, the -- what I have described as a bricolage of odd conspiracy theories and disinformation and emotionally affecting material, that sort of -- that assembled itself into an ersatz personalised ideology, at which violence was at the core of that ideology for individuals and how that then led to real-world violence.

So there were cases we were looking at where people had been through that process very, very rapidly and ended up committing hate crimes, or violent crimes at the end of it. And then starting to understand: well, what are the components of this multi-factorial problem? What are the interventions that we could design around that? What is the further testing that we have to do? But that body was subsequently disempowered.

Q. Yes, and I think you talk about this at paragraph 53 in your statement, which is just over the page CCDH000007_0014 from where we are currently.

So you talk there about the commission which you have just mentioned, and you finish, by saying:

"Regardless of institutional form, platforms must be accountable to it, as they possess the information and

technical capabilities necessary to identify these harmful behavioural patterns."

Are you thinking there more in terms of the bigger picture policy points, given --

A. Yes, and --

Q. Surely for individual cases, should be the case that law enforcement are able to access the data they need from the platforms through requests in the normal way?

A. Absolutely. But this body -- perhaps I used the word "accountable" in the sense that they must be -- that this body must be able to ask it questions and know that there is a responsibility upon the platforms to provide a response to requests for information. So there must be an ability to have an active conversation with the platforms in order to get information, in order to share findings and to try and work together to improve the safety on those platforms, rather than, you know, something with the force of criminal law, for example, saying that: platforms need to give us this information, or else.

Q. Thank you. I'm now going to move to my next topic, which is reform options for the Online Safety Act. If we could look at page 9 CCDH000007_0009 of your statement, paragraph 33, please. You explain there that you have supported the Online Safety Act since

inception, but then you go on to say, at paragraph 34, that:

"... The Online Safety Act has yet to deliver change on those matters most relevant here: radicalisation pathways and promotion of violence."

You say:

"Chatbots are still out of scope of the Act's is duties, despite CCDH evidence that they can be used to encourage and plan violent attacks."

A. Yes.

Q. Then, if we could scroll down to paragraph 35, you there, say that:

"CCDH ... published a 10-point proposal with the Online Safety Act Network to strengthen the Online Safety Act ..."

I wonder if now we could bring that on screen, it is CCDH000032. So, you set out there ten bullet points, which are split into four subheadings. So we first have "Risk assessment and mitigation", "Safety by design", "User protections", and "Systemic issues".

We don't have time to go through all of these in detail but I just want to pick out some points from the bullets. So the first bullet we have is:

"Strengthen the obligation in the Act that regulated services take reasonable steps to seek to reduce the

risk of harm to users as identified in their OSA risk assessments."

I think that's fairly self explanatory. Then secondly, you move on to -- you say:

"Revise the 'clear and detailed' and 'technically feasible' conditions for code of practice measures to allow for more stretching, outcome-focused measures in the OSA codes."

Are you able to explain what you mean there?

A. Sorry, I couldn't see the -- that last bit.

Q. I'm sorry. I'm just reading out --

A. Sorry, I'm trying to read it myself. Eyes. *(Pause)*.

SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: It is the second bullet point.

A. Yes. So, at the moment, the feeling of the OSA network and CCDH is that the risk assessment and mitigation measures are too kind to platforms in what they say we know that platforms can do right now and what may be a stretch for them to actually perform. So by "outcome-focused measures", we mean that the current codes ask that platforms have certain efficient systems in place, but that isn't a judgement against outcomes.

Q. I understand. Thank you. And then you say:

"Remove the safe harbour provision."

Which I think sort of follows on from the point you have just made. We have heard a lot about the safe

harbour provision in the Inquiry. But just in your own words, why do you think that is an important step?
A. I mean, it's really somewhat of a tick box. It reduces all incentive to create a safe product beyond sort of code compliance really.
Q. I understand. The next point that you raise is you say:
"Insert a definition of safety by design into the Act to make clear to Ofcom and services what Parliament intended, and lay secondary legislation to require Ofcom to produce a 'safety by design' code of practice ... This should also clarify the requirement that services address harms to children caused by addictive or compulsive design."
So, why do you think that safety by design is an important reform?
A. I mean, safety by design is written as an objective of the Online Safety Act on page 1, but that was added fairly late in the legislative process. And Ofcom itself has said that safety by design isn't embedded in other areas of the bill. So we just strengthen that, give them the legal clarity of what safety by design means and then embed it throughout the requirements, throughout the outcomes that are expected from the bill.
Q. Thank you. I'm not going to pick up every single one of the bullet points but I wanted to ask you about the

second bullet under "User protections". You say:
"Deliver Parliament's intent that services can be categorised based on size OR risk and bring small but risky platforms into category 1."
I wondered if you had any particular platforms in mind there, that you thought might be -- fall within that category?
A. We would be happy to send you a list of platforms that we think probably should be brought under that. There's lots of examples, like Roblox, but we are happy to send you a list of those platforms.
Q. Thank you, that would be very helpful. Then, if we keep looking down the list, you say:
"... a minimum standard for Terms of Service ... for category 1 platforms [including] a 'no rolling back' requirement ..."
I think that probably follows on from some of the concerns you raised earlier on in your evidence, about the fact that safety in some respects seems to be going backwards rather than forwards. Is that right?
A. Yes. I mean, at the very least, there should be -- platforms can't just roll back without referring that decision to the regulator. It's an argument we are making in the safety -- it's -- platforms at the moment are sort of putting forward their terms of service and

then slowing rolling back and what we want to make sure that is that that's not just something that's done in darkness, that that's something that requires the platform to at least explain why they have made that decision and what the implications may be on safety. So we have the ability to push back on it.
Q. Thank you. Then, just looking at the penultimate bullet point. You say:
"Impose a duty on Ofcom to co-operate with other domestic regulators ..."
I just wanted to ask, is that because you sense that Ofcom is not co-operating with other domestic regulators at the moment? What are you getting at there?
A. I mean, it is currently voluntary. They are doing it but we think that it is -- it needs to be fleshed out and made statutory.
Q. Thank you. So you have got quite a long sort of shopping list of reforms there, some of which I have picked up on and some of which I haven't, and again, I wondered if you had to pick just one of those, which would you see as the most pressing?
A. I think safety by design is probably the single most pressing of them. Safety by design has been discussed all the way through the promulgation of the Act. The legislative process, since the Act, it's been described

as a system which implements safety by design but the truth is that "safety by design" is never adequately defined. And it's let companies to get away with saying: well, what do you exactly mean by that? And the whole purpose of the Act was to move us past the point where we were just arguing over definitions and to actually create these standards. Unfortunately, when it comes to safety by design, that isn't clearly articulated.
MS WAKEMAN: Thank you. I just now want to move to my final topic, which is other reforms and, sir, I'm aiming to finish around 3 pm, in time for our break between the witnesses, if that --
SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: Well done, Ms Wakeman.
MS WAKEMAN: Thank you. Well, I haven't done it yet.
So, looking at other reforms aside from the Online Safety Act, turning first to the social media -- proposed social media ban for under-16s and if we could look at page 12 CCDH000007_0012, paragraph 47.
You say there that you do not:
"... consider a prohibition on under-16s' access to social media to be a complete solution. Many of the systemic risks [that you] have identified -- including those arising from AI chatbots -- appear to be out of scope."

I just wondered, other than the AI chatbot issues, what do you see as any other issues, in terms of the scope of the ban?

A. I have to say that bans aren't something that we particularly advocate as an organisation. I think bans are a bit like pulling the emergency brake on a system that's clearly causing an enormous amount of harm. On a factory floor, people have been poisoned by the product, people that -- you stop the conveyor belt and you go: we have got to fix this before anything else goes out.

But that isn't to say that you shouldn't fix what's gone wrong. So, we would rather have safer systems, than have systems that are inaccessible to young people. We are absolutely convinced that social media and the AI platforms can bring substantial benefits to young people. So bans are a very blunt tool. But nevertheless, the power to be able to ban in the event that the emergency brake needs to be pulled is vital for governments to have.

Our issues with the Online Safety Act are not particularly on -- in this particular aspect of it, it is more on advertising and on algorithms.

Q. So in terms of the ban on social media, is it right to say that you would prefer to see change --

A. Yes.

Q. -- by the platforms, rather than a ban?

A. 100 per cent. I think bans are a statement of failure of a system that is meant to be creating safety by design.

Q. If we could turn next to VPNs and this is paragraph 48 CCDH000007_0013. You have explained there, that:

"CCDH has not conducted research into the use of VPNs to circumvent age assurance or content restrictions ..."

So you can't assess that issue. You say you recognise:

"... and believe that VPNs are legitimate technologies with a wide range of lawful and beneficial uses."

Your position is that the platforms should be safe by design for all users. So in a way, following on from the point you have just made. You say that:

"If platforms are required to meet robust safety standards regardless of how users access their services, the risks posed by the use of VPNs to circumvent age-based restrictions are significantly reduced."

When you talk about robust safety standards, are you envisaging age assurance measures for the platforms or something else?

A. I mean, in every instance we are talking about safety by design. Again, age assurance, as we have said, is imperfect, VPNs are imperfect, bans are imperfect. In Australia, the experience has been that without sufficient teeth to the social media ban, that usage of social media has gone up amongst young people.

So, it is why we have urged throughout not to look for blunt instruments but in fact, to build something that is more harmonious with the way that we approach regulating and dealing with other publishing businesses in our society, broadcasters, whatever else, create standards.

MS WAKEMAN: Thank you. I don't have any other further questions. I'm just going to look to my left.

SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: Mr Ahmed, thank you very much indeed for your contribution. It has been very helpful and certainly, from our end, it has been an absolutely impeccable connection. It's almost as if you have been in the same room with the rest of us. So I'm very grateful to you and thank you very much and we will now terminate the link.

How long, Ms Wakeman?

MS WAKEMAN: Thank you, sir. I think a 10-minute break.

SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: A 10-minute break, certainly. I will sit again just after 3.05 pm.

(2.58 pm)

(A short break)

(3.10 pm)

SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: Please remain standing for a moment.

MS MAGDA MASZCZYNSKA (affirmed)

SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: Thank you very much indeed. Please have a seat. Yes, Mr Boyle.

Questions by MR BOYLE

MR BOYLE: Thank you. Ms Maszczynska, could you give your full name, please?

A. Sure, Magda Maszczynska.

Q. Thank you. You are the Director of the Deterrence Center, is that right?

A. Yes.

Q. Thank you. Could we have your statement on screen, please. It is DET000007. Do you recognise that as your statement?

A. Yes, it is my statement.

Q. Thank you. Could we have page 71 DET000007_0071, please. We have redacted your signature for data protection reasons, but you have signed that, correct?

A. Yes.

Q. Thank you. Can you confirm that it is true to the best of your knowledge and belief?

A. Yes.

Q. Thank you. I want to start, Ms Maszczynska, by going through your background, please, and you have set out much of that at page 2 DET000007_0002 and paragraph 4. So you tell us you are a criminologist, security strategist, researcher, subject matter expert with over 20 years of experience, spanning academia and applied practice and that's been across security, defence, counter-terrorism, and public service. And you have done advisory training and consultancy delivery to law enforcement, security services, military organisations and international defence and security institutions.

Could you just describe, please, the Deterrence Center, and your role as Director of that?

A. Sure. It has been created a few years ago as a network of experts who can deal with deterrence. So not just prevention but we operate across domains, across agencies and we are trying to help with: how do we win without fighting? How do we convince our adversaries from not wanting to attack us and I think this is quite important for this Inquiry as well. So it stems from my background in academia but also working across the agencies. So we do some research, we do policy, advice, we do strategic consultancy and we do a lot of training. And the lessons learned from the training also contributed to my statement.

Q. Thank you. We will pick up those as we go through. Could we have page 14 DET000007_0014 up and paragraph 59, where you go through a bit more detail of some of the roles you have had, particularly relating to counter-terrorism in the UK. So, just going through those bullet points quickly. Firstly, you were co-chair of the Counter Terrorism Independent Advisory Group for Devon and Cornwall from 2021 to 2025, is that right?

A. Mm.

Q. You were also a member of the Counter Terrorism Independent Advisory Group South West. And you have also been a member of the National Counter Terrorism Advisory Network. Could you tell us, please, what that was?

A. It was a bunch of professionals from -- it was a group of community representatives and professionals working across agencies and we were gathered together to be like a critical front to the CTP, Counter Terrorism Policing, to advise on -- to basically have a two-way information and intelligence system, to advise on certain approaches within counter-terrorism, whether it was on operation tactics or a wider strategy, in terms of CETR network. And also when we had certain events taking place in a country, either on a regional or national scale, or even globally, that had impact on our nation here, there

was also -- the tensions within communities were reported into the Counter Terrorism Policing. So it was a both-way information passage, but also perhaps a bit of lessons learned, tension, and consultancy, in a way.

Q. In terms of the people within that network, obviously we understand your experience, was it otherwise practitioners from different areas, or --

A. Mostly, the way how we structured it, they were community representatives. We wanted to have as diverse range of experts and of advisers and of community representatives, especially from diverse communities, from young people, and from different professions who could actually contribute towards seeing the bigger picture, that currently terrorism, extremism and radicalisation is having on communities on a local, regional and national level. But also how Counter Terrorism Policing is operating in a way that it is in line with communities, practices, coaches and so on, so are there any discrepancies between them.

Q. Thank you. Then, the -- I think actually, penultimate bullet point, will go overleaf, but just looking at the bottom bullet point on this page, is a member of the Counter Terrorism Evidence-based Research Group. Could you help on that as well?

A. Gladly. It is amazing. So this network, this group, is

totally different vibe. We are practitioners, professionals, individuals from academia, from practice, from across the different agencies and we review available knowledge and understanding and create a police database that is operational for Counter Terrorism Policing, to help navigate the ever-changing landscape, more than just an environment, it is more to do with ecosystems. Like something in terms of hybridity, in terms of the grey zone, in terms of different counter-terrorism, perhaps examples from abroad, but also what might be bubbling up there and we are meeting once a month to review this but also, in terms of strategy and strategic aspects of the group as well. And the people there are just incredible. And it is just so -- such a pleasure to be amongst people like this, who actually really care about how Counter Terrorism Policing is developing and about gaining knowledge, understanding and transferable skills. It is one of my favourite groups ever.

Q. And you are working -- so that's research, effectively, on thematic issues that arise with CTP, is that right?

A. Yes.

Q. And that perhaps is perhaps one of the things that might have led you to doing some work in relation to violence-fixated individuals, which we will come onto in

one second. I just want to go, please, overleaf to the last bullet point DET000007_0016, where you say you are also a member of Devon and Cornwall Diverse Communities Key Individual team?

A. This is recent.

Q. Thank you. So I talked about some work you have done on violence-fixated individuals. Could we have up, please, DET000003. So, this is your research paper:

"Rethinking Counter-Terrorism: Beyond ideology -- Violence, Vulnerability, and Deterrence in the Age of Hybrid Threats."

Is this right, this is a research paper you published in May 2025, so before Phase 1 of the Inquiry had started hearings, but it was analysing the Southport attack and the question of ideology, is that right?

A. Yes.

Q. Thank you, and I think it is an article that was picked up by Lord Anderson in his Lessons for Prevent. I think the contents of this probably underline much of your witness statement and many of the themes that we will pick up through your evidence. The Chair obviously has that reference now. I'm not going to go through it in full but I think we will probably pick up all of the issues that arise from it.

I'm going to start, please Ms Maszczynska, asking

you about some Topic 1 issues. Our Topic 1 is about multi-agency working and dealing with violence-fixated individuals. Topic 2 is more focused on online harms. We have now moved onto the Topic 2 evidence so I'm just, please, going to pull out some headline points from your statement that deal with Topic 1, particularly on issues that you raise which are -- perhaps we have heard less from others, or are new.

There is a lot of detail in your statement. Of course, the Chair has all the underlying detail there too.

The first thing, please, I want to do was go to page 8 DET000007_0008 and paragraph 36 of your statement. Just at the bottom of the page and Topic 1 spent much time talking about the right definitions for what the Inquiry's terms of reference call "violence-fixated individual". And you tell us there, I think, that the definition that you, as the Deterrence Center, work to is a lone mass actor and you say it is:

"... an individual who acts alone, often without ideological aims, but who commits or plans to commit high-impact violence. LMVA actions may or may not be pre-meditated, but are typically rooted in psychological or emotional instability, personal grievance, social isolation, or accumulated vulnerability, rather than

collective ideologies or organised movements."

So, the definition you are using here is not one which is defined by ideology, correct?

A. Yes.

Q. So you say "often without ideological aims". Is this right, is the context to that picking up on your analysis in Rethinking Counter-Terrorism, which found that the conceptual boundary between terrorism and non-ideological mass violence -- I think the words you used were "created an operational blind spot"?

A. Yes.

Q. So, I think in that context, you are talking about a risk-based, rather than ideological based approach, is that right?

A. Indeed.

Q. So we heard evidence, by way of example, from Ms Rance from the National Crime Agency, but other witnesses who noted the challenges of determining ideology and the fact that it can be fluid. Is that the issue that you are grappling with here?

A. In terms of fluid ideology?

Q. Well, in terms of perhaps working to a definition which doesn't include ideology as one of the criteria?

A. Right. So in terms of operational blind spot, I think what I was trying to do initially in the Rethinking

Counter-terrorism paper and then mention that, during my statement, is that this was more like operation -- defining, plugging the operational blind spot with a definition so we could all understand, for the purpose of the paper, that this is an individual or a group of individuals who we are assessing.

After reading your Phase 1 Southport Inquiry documents and your definition of "violence-fixated individuals", I also say in my statement that I much prefer it because, whilst the LMVA, lone mass violence actor, may be geared for statistics later, post factum, if you were to be labelled "LMVA" as a 16-year-old, that carries certain aspects.

Whereas I feel like this definition now, it is kind of lacking. It is very good for operational stuff, perhaps later for statistics, but in terms of defining an individual, your definition is much better because the label -- it actually sounds like somebody is fixable. That there is hope, you know?

Q. So the lesson perhaps there might be -- tell me if this is right -- that when looking at definitions, one thing that you do have to consider is the risk of stigma?

A. Of course.

Q. That might come with whatever definition you choose to adopt. But I think the other point you make here and

elsewhere in your statement is that the absence of ideology, of course, should not be treated as an absence of meaningful, violence-related risk?

A. Of course.

Q. Thank you. I'm going to move on now please to what structures could be in place for dealing with VFIs. You don't agree, I think, with expanding the definition of terrorism to encompass individuals like AR and you also, I think, caution against Prevent being disbanded, or being expanded indiscriminately to handle all forms of serious violence. I think you do think that it should handle certain types of violence-fixated individual cases, is that right?

A. Yes.

Q. There's obviously a balance to be struck there. How do you see the line being drawn? Is it consistent with where Prevent is now, in terms of a fascination with extreme violence and mass casualty attacks?

A. I think that Prevent was very controversial initially. We all know how it started. It became controversial. However, I think it is one of the mechanisms and tools, if I may, to actually capture certain occurrences and the referrals and -- however, whilst working with the CTP, it is not like they have unlimited amount of resources, and nor should they be experts in all sorts

of violence, per se. And there is, I think, perhaps also related to events that are terrorising but are not terrorism per se. And I think sticking with the current definition of "terrorism", it is quite important -- events that happen in Poland a few days ago were indeed terrorising but the label of "terrorism" has not yet been asserted.

In terms of expanding Prevent, I believe that greater understanding is needed and also a greater coordination, a multi-agency coordination. So Prevent should not be solely responsible for management, for the accountability -- for every single individual who is fixated on violence. It is impossible. There are so many different -- but at the same time we have to strike a careful balance between agencies working together and feeding each other information, seeing the bigger picture. I believe this is something we are going to talk about in a minute, but also without putting a lot of pressure on agency that was not made to encompass for all sorts of mass violence or violence fascination and so on and so forth.

So it is a good start, I think, but we need to expand our systems and systems thinking, based on -- you know, our risks are developing much faster than our capabilities. And if we are just going to dump these

new risks that we barely understand, or are trying to, onto one agency or a fraction of this agency, it is not very fair and it is not very nice, especially without underlying resources, training and support.

And it is difficult because we are dealing with young people and we have the power to change their lives and their trajectories. So it is -- you know, whether it is young people -- but I think we need to think perhaps a bit in systems. So, what capabilities are there across agencies and domains? And then put them together to almost support Prevent and do it together, rather than just create something that is very stressful for some individuals working in this realm.

Q. So we will come onto systems we might put in place but I think in terms of the principle of where a referral might go, do I take from your answer, it is a difficult thing to define and --

A. At the moment, yes. But with the big front door and the coordination and duty holders, I think this is a great idea to consider, to basically share the responsibility of risk management, rather than just blame it on systems within systems, that were not designed to hold that space for this nature of threat.

Q. So is big front door a potential solution to the difficulty of trying to define where a referral might

go?

A. Yes, I believe so. But, as I said, a big front door does not necessarily indicate a nice, lovely capable house. So I think we need to be mindful of that as well.

Q. So you talk, I think, in your statement, it is page 43 DET000007_0043, paragraph 195, which we can have up, but I don't propose to read out, but about the solution of a designated coordinator who would operate the front door?

A. Yes.

Q. Can I ask you how see that working? Are you talking about a single individual?

A. I don't know anymore. You know, when I started writing it, I went to the tunnel for a week and I didn't emerge until the 80 pages were done. I started initially with an individual, but it is also some -- perhaps, but if we think about potential number of cases that that individual has to coordinate, it might not be -- it might have to be a whole team.

Q. Sorry. I think perhaps my question -- yes, so I obviously I understand the need to have appropriate capacity. But I think my question is, if it were to be a single individual, would you not need multi-agency expertise? So for example, would you not need CTP

expertise to decide that ideology?
A. Of course, yes.
Q. And elsewhere in the statement you propose the idea of a specialist team of -- or network of experts and seasoned practitioners who can support the multi-agency's tasked with assessing complex cases that don't fall neatly within any one agency's remit. Sir, that is paragraph 165.
Can I ask how you see that working? Is that something that comes together for a multi-agency meeting? Is that something that's sort of a level below the multi-agency meeting, where people are able to talk to each other? Or is that a kind of body of expertise that is able to assist practitioners as they are working on cases?
A. In between. I see it as something that could support practitioners dealing with such cases. I see it that sometimes perhaps it might involve individuals who are already there but I see it more as an extended family that actually likes each other. It would be lovely if it would be in that big door house, if it was a team of people, including the multi-agency advisory capacity, that not only digests cases and their ownership and accountability of risk, but also -- and directs them appropriately, but it also provides certain supports,

where individuals are stuck, rather than closing or passing case, or not dealing with the risk appropriately. I think this could provide certain reassurance and support and potential pathways to either adjacent capabilities that could actually hold that system.
Q. You see the big front door having an ongoing role in terms of managing cases?
A. Yes. When I imagine big front door, I literally imagine a big front door, whether -- probably green, with big handle. You know, there is this coordinator who stands and welcomes like Dumbledore. This is how I imagine it. But where does he welcome people to? I feel like this big front door metaphor, to me, is more like a plasma trying to plug the gaps between agencies, ministries, departments. It is that -- something that can hold capabilities of all of us together and then calibrate them, so they are -- it is not about people and agencies and their own specific -- it is about calibrating our own multi-agency capabilities and spear-heading them into that particular risk, into a particular person. And this is how I see this big front door, with room and apartment and a team of people, I would believe.
Q. Alongside that, you talk I think about a couple of other allied concepts. One, perhaps picking up on the roles

that you do today, as a research analyst and learning function that would accompany the system?
A. I would love that.
Q. So that would be doing, presumably, the same sort of thing you are doing now with CTP?
A. Whether it would be linked to the terrorist or not, it doesn't matter, it doesn't --
Q. Sorry, yes you're right. That's not what I was implying. What I meant was it would be doing thematic analysis on issues that were relevant to the work that practitioners were doing?
A. Yes, I think it is so, so important for us to learn lessons collectively. I would love to -- we propose that for years. There are two things, actually. The first one is about normal policing and CTP policing hate crimes and crimes that fall below the Terrorism Act threshold. I think potentially there could be a correlation, or even causation between hate crimes that we record and the nature of them and potentially, later people been either referred to Prevent or going through the pathway of vulnerability to susceptibility to radicalisation to extremism and hopefully not, but to terrorism.
I feel like it is so important to capture that with the multi-agency, juicy data that we have, if we could

get it together and recognise trends and patterns. Again, patterns are not suddenly -- it is not causation, right, they do not signify intent in any way, but if we could understand regional patterns, national patterns, if we could understand how the impact of global events have on our communities and our children -- and on top of this we had an amazing speaker/witness before, the role of algorithms and the online world in general. I think it is so important to guess lessons learned and convey them to practitioners, so they know what happens. So it is not just about training, but the training is informed by practice and by the current world in which we live in. That --
Q. Thank you. So actually, you bring me onto my next topic which is training, obviously a matter you are closely involved in. One thing you pick up in your statement about is the idea of cross-agency training.
A. Yes.
Q. I think some of us might be familiar with that idea in terms of exercising of emergency services and things along those lines but perhaps less so in the context of meetings of multi-agency, to look at safeguarding or things like that. Could you just expand on that concept?
A. Gladly. I think it just would be very beneficial. In

terms of multi-agency exercising, so more for like what to do in the terrorist -- in terms of emergency services, for example, and multi-agency -- I think we need something like this but for people dealing with VFIs, and understanding how the violence and fixation, that algorithms and global events contribute to all of this. Our world is no more transparent. It is opaque. Some of this is in the shadow and we must understand it. We do, but some of the teachers and NHS practitioners and probation officers and social workers, they might need it.

I feel like the feedback we receive from the Deterrence Center, for the training we provide about misinformation, about training people in the hybrid aspect of threats that affect our communities, it has been so positive and the appetite is there. And I also think, if we can get agencies together, so they can practice together, either via war-gaming, table-top scenarios, but involving case studies, either cold cases or specially designed cases, that people can -- you know, we think in stories. We attach meaning to stuff and I think it is so important for -- so, it is not only about the content of training but also that people will trust across agencies. Because the organisational cultures are so different.

Sometimes at the multi-agency meetings, it is very visible and I feel like if people get to know each other and get over the different dynamics coming from organisations and build trust, I think it is very, very important and also they will know who is responsible for what because they will witness and experience that during training.

Q. Thank you. Something that was picked up in the Phase 1 evidence, but you talk, I think, about the risk of a capability gap for practitioners in terms of their understanding of neurodivergence and the importance of training in that respect, is that right?

A. Just one second. I forget the name. Yes, so hugely important, especially in the Counter Terrorism Policing setting but also in other security services. How do we deal with individuals, especially underage individuals? How do we talk with them, how do we -- and especially with suspects perhaps. How do we -- do our police officers have the capability to actually extract certain information or know how to talk to a child -- not only a child, underage individual, but also a person showing signs of neurodiversity?

Again, neurodiversity and diagnosis are not like -- they do not indicate that somebody is going to be, I don't know, influenced by something particular or

displaying some bad behaviour or criminal behaviour. However, it is so important for the training to actually do it.

The other day, I had a meeting with Professor Gina Vale from Southampton University. We were talking -- her research on neurodiversity in the police setting is incredible. I feel like it is so, so important for -- to not only publish about this, but also train in this sphere, whether it is going to be a multi-agency training, it depends on the multi-agency appetite, whether it is going to be related to police and Counter Terrorism Policing, it is very important for the officers to have the awareness and capability. And I consider capability like kind of like a capacity and a skill to use it, to deal with people who are neurodiverse.

Q. Could you just give the name of the Professor again, sorry?

A. Of course, Gina Vale, University of Southampton. An amazing person.

Q. Thank you. Just final point on Topic 1 and then we will move on to Topic 2. It is interventions. You talk about exit programmes in Scandinavia in your statement as an example of disengagement practice. Are you able to just explain what those are and any relevant lessons

that can be drawn from them, in this context?

A. Yes. They are great. I mean, we can also start from thinking about our own probation capabilities and what do we do here in this country? But exit programmes in Scandinavia often link to violent -- not necessarily terrorists or people who are convicted of terrorism, we are talking here about Norway, Sweden, I believe Denmark. They are currently together under a collective review but they created quite an important difference. But again, exit programmes there, are -- so it is basically about if somebody is about to leave a penitentiary setting and then they are coming to start -- how are they assimilated back to real, normal life? What about their communities? Will they ever be accepted after what they have done? Again, these are not about terrorists per se, they are more about extremism -- or extremist.

Q. So it is a post-crime programme, is that right?

A. Yes.

Q. It is an exit from the custodial sentence?

A. But some of them could also be considered as something that could be done in a pre-crime space. But now, we are talking here about deterrence, the heart and mind. How do we -- we could talk about, it would be lovely if everybody would be coming from a lovely family, with

lovely safeguards, if we had great teachers to inspire us to be good people, if we had great communities, no drugs, no guns, no knives, you know, lovely. But can we actually do that? Can this Inquiry achieve those grand diversions? Because these would be lovely prevention of extremism and terrorism per se, but can we do that in such a diverse and divided society?

Q. And what sort of interventions does the exit programme deliver? Do you know?

A. Mentoring. Certain work schemes that try to deal with individuals' hearts and minds and to assimilate them with the society, but also make them almost like citizens that are welcomed and are -- perhaps don't pose risk. So far, the risk aspect, the exit programmes -- the research on them suggest that the risk of re-offending is reduced. But, again, we cannot just -- it is a very good case study, but we cannot just put it -- it is happening in different countries, with different dynamics and so on.

I feel like I didn't really bring justice to the exit programmes.

Q. Well, you have helpfully flagged it to us and given us some useful background, so that's very helpful and we can always look into that further.

I'm going to move on, please, to Topic 2, so first

of all, the kind of impact of the online environment on the risk of violence.

Could we have, please, page 6 DET000007_0006, paragraph 24 of your statement. So you talk -- you are there helpfully summarising to us part of your research paper, Rethinking Counter-Terrorism. And that the role of the online environments in AR's case directly and how online exposure to violent content:

"... in the absence of traditional radicalisation precursors such as ideological indoctrination or group affiliation, can shape distorted worldviews, heighten feelings of fear and injustice, and reduce empathy, creating conditions that may facilitate violent behaviour in real life."

The Inquiry heard quite a lot of evidence about this particularly through its seminars, about the lack of empirical evidence to tie consumption of violent content with real-world violence, certainly in terms of longitudinal studies. The evidence was that that's partially because it is hard to research because there is a lack of a control group and it is not ethical to expose children to the kind of violent content that the Inquiry is considering.

A. Yes.

Q. In terms of the conclusions that you reached in this

paper, what sort of kind of research and bases were you relying on?

A. Sorry, the paper Rethinking Counter-Terrorism? What conclusions did I reach?

Q. So in terms of your analysis of the violent content driving towards real-world violence, is that based on the case study of AR or wider experience as well, or background research?

A. So based on case study from AR but again, the research -- I have not done empirical research based on AR case before I was asked to -- before -- I have not empirical research, per se. The Rethinking Counter-Terrorism was based on open intelligence sources and I worry because not only he was kicked out of school, but then who is monitoring the online activities of people like AR? The internet is so omnipresent and I think it is very important for us to do something, something more than we are doing and I don't really know what is the best solution to this because we just had evidence from Mr Ahmed just before, and he is so right. You know, we do have a lot of tools and legislation and policies but I think the strategies you are suggesting from the Rethinking Counter-Terrorism -- and please forgive me, I don't remember all of the conclusions from there -- but they were based on knowledge and

understanding I have had from my academic research and when I used in academia and research as well and teach and have exposure to other people's empirical and otherwise research and also, my practical aspect of my work as well, that we recalled earlier.

I think like --

Q. That's in working with practitioners and delivering training, is that right?

A. Yes, but also cases that we have been dealing with and how young people or people even in their 20s are -- how are they being -- what are they doing online and the influence that online spaces have for them. I can recall the Polish example, in a minute --

Q. Yes, I will bring you onto that --

A. -- I also want to record this. I remember a few months ago, I was invited to be an expert on a panel for a previewing of the Molly vs The Machines movie, about the girl, north of London, who was exposed to horrendous memes and online content and she killed herself and this was a document about her. It was heartbreaking. I was sobbing on the stage together with other panellists.

And then we were discussing this -- and it was very difficult for some people who perhaps do not work in the field. And there was this lovely young girl in the audience, she asked a question -- she was maybe in her

early 20s -- and she said: you know what, guys, I don't find it shocking at all because I spend most of my life as a teenager exposed to everything and anything online and I have people who self-harm, who killed themselves, who are online all the time. And to me, to hear that here we are sobbing and here are some people who are much younger than us and to them, this is normal and we allow this to happen and for them to have impact on high threshold for viewing violence and perhaps -- and you know, we are all different people. Some of us are influenced in others ways to others.

Yes, I think it is something to perhaps be addressed.

Q. Thank you, and I think we have, is it Mr Burrows, from the Molly Rose Foundation, who will be giving evidence to us. Could we have page 61 DET000007_0061 of your statement up and paragraph 273 because I think you have given us some indicators of concern, in terms of online activity that you have identified.

So just going through those:

"Sustained or escalating engagement with violent, extremist or highly graphic material;

"A movement from passive consumption towards active searching.

"... preoccupation with particular forms of

violence, weapons ..."

And so on:

"Online expressions of grievance ...

"Engagement with online communities that normalise, celebrate or encourage violence."

So that might be, for example, Com networks, is that right?

A. Yes.

Q. "Significant changes in online behaviour ...

"... research into weapons ..."

And:

"... convergence between online behaviour and changes in offline behaviour ..."

Are there any of those that you deem particularly important?

A. Not to repeat my previous expert, but I think, from what I see here, there will be a system that can monitor the baseline activity of individuals and see the changes, so from basically how people engage with online content. Is it passive consumption or something that perhaps might indicate -- we have the same indicators of the terrorist attacks, but in physical world, but it is something that perhaps may also -- analysis of the online activity of the attackers before the attack has actually occurred and see what they were doing. Were

they doing something different to prepare, like physically, in tangible, real world? Has their online presence changed in any way? We understand, in AR case, what happened. But how could we capture that in time? And this poses ethical considerations here.

Q. So I think the Inquiry and the police investigation pulled in a lot of information about AR's computer use but certainly not a complete picture. One of the recommendations from the Inquiry's first phase is about a power for Inquiries to get information from social media companies about the past use of perpetrators of attacks. Is that something, as a researcher, you think would be --

A. Lovely and so important but so far, no luck yet. But the power that social media companies have, it's ... yes.

Q. You also talk, in your statement, about the harm caused by school exclusion. I think you have mentioned that also in your evidence today. You I think drew the connection, in your paper, between school exclusion and prolonged absence meant -- meaning increased online exposure --

A. Most likely.

Q. Yes, and I think you say at precisely the point when his offline --

A. Exactly, don't we all have this need to belong? I have this pillow that says that we all need to be a part of the gang. We all do, whether it is our family or friends. Think of our young people. If somebody is bullied at school, where are they going to spend a sense of belonging? Young people spend so much time online and there might be certain groups, like Com network or within computer games or encrypted chats. You know, this is -- but the worst point is these online groups are actually radicalising people, and such as -- and foreign State interference comes into play, but I don't know if we are going to talk about this later.

Q. Well, just on the topic we are on at the moment, I think you talk, in your statement, about a post-exclusion safeguarding and engagement protocol. Can you just expand on what you mean by that?

A. Gladly. Yes, and also what else there was -- post-exclusion and home schooling --

Q. Yes. So I think your statement, it is paragraph 304 at page 67 DET000007_0067, talks about a post-exclusion safeguarding and engagement protocol.

A. Yes, so what happens with these people? Imagine, we are excluded from school and what do we do? We go home, if we have one, or hopefully we do. And we spend -- what do we spend time on the phone, we spend time on the

computer and also, if we were excluded because of violence or seriously concerning behaviour, who is there to safeguard us, to check on us, who perhaps noticed something? I'm not talking only about random visits.

When I was preparing mentally for this Inquiry, I was thinking, you know, I used to work as mental health mentor for university students and what most of them needed is like this little angel who kind of kicked them in the butt sometimes -- not physically, obviously -- but to tell them like: don't be afraid, and take them to nice places and show them some kindness, so they could evoke their own capabilities and believe in themselves.

If we could have people like this also coming through the big front door and have almost like mentor -- but not the mentors we have now in Prevent, where they advise for an hour or two or -- but somebody who can perhaps go and check on them. People who are well trained to adjusting to certain people, certain personalities. And perhaps making the individuals believe in themselves and the good that there is, rather than be focused solely on the darkness.

I have been doing a lot of research in investigative psychology and concepts of -- I don't want to call it brainwashing, but manipulation, that we have experienced

in the physical world during many decades, now we see online. It is not just the misinformation but the manipulation of the mind and perhaps there is a link between the school exclusion -- and what does one could do with oneself when they are excluded from school, what do they do?

Q. So we have heard suggested in evidence that one option would be to treat a school exclusion as something that should trigger the intervention of children's services. Is that something you would support?

A. Potentially, but it depends, what sort of intervention. Is it just going to be like tick the box? Oh, you're fine? Okay, fine. I also understand how people in social work, how busy they are and how many cases they have. So, yes. But perhaps other young people, our younger people. Look at us. Do we do the same things online as 16-year-olds, 13-year-olds? I doubt that.

Q. Picking up on that topic, you mentioned before the recent events in Poland. I'm going to ask you a bit about that, given your links to Poland.

Obviously, we know in the past month in Poland there have been a series of attacks, I think three attacks related to online violence and it's not something the Inquiry has heard evidence about yet. So obviously this is an area -- it fits within your area of interest. I'm

going to ask you, if I may, some questions about that.

Just to set the scene; we have some open-source reporting about these attacks. Could we have up, please, a BBC article, which is ILT000388.

We have the headline there from the Polish Prime Minister, Donald Tusk, saying that these stabbings were driven by the online glorification of violence.

Could we have the next page, please ILT000388_0002. So there is a description there of the attacks that have taken place. Then, if we look a third down the page, we see the comments of Prime Minister Tusk, who said:

"We are not dealing with any group organised on a big scale.

"In the past years and months, we have noted -- globally and in Poland -- a rise in the fascination with violence ...

"The Prime Minister said the attacks were acts of 'nihilistic violence' associated ...(reading to the words)... online."

I just wondered -- sorry, there is other open-source information saying that this had resulted in the deployment of more than 20,000 police officers to schools in Poland and that following that, the Polish Government summoned major platforms to meet, including Google, Meta, TikTok, Discord and Telegram, although it

appears X was invited, but did not attend.

Do you have any more background or knowledge about this that you are able to help with?

A. I do. I did my research. I was in Poland. I was travelling a lot in October, but -- and I knew only stuff from the media. But when this question came up I was like: oh, my goodness. So basically what happened, on 8 October there was a 15-year-old former pupil allegedly attack school staff with a knife, killing a 37-year-old caretaker, as per this article here. Then there was 9 October, so a day later in another city, a 19-year-old attacked people at school, injuring ten according to initial reports.

Then between 10th and 12th, so days after, there was this wider school security emergency. Authorities responded to a further attack and numerous threats. Some rumours about Bloody Friday, like it was an organised activity, instigated in online spaces.

But there was actually -- so what the common factors were? They were all young perpetrators. Schools were the target. It was knife violence. Online violent content -- and authorities raised serious concerns about glorification, imitation and exposure, but there was also shared online community and there was no evidence of that, that it was an organised -- you know, like --

Q. Can I pause you. There was no evidence it was a shared online community?
A. No.
Q. Right, so in other words, the attackers weren't speaking to each other, but they were all --
A. No. They initially thought that, but actually -- and you know what I did, I spoke with this incredible professor from the University of Warsaw. She is called Agnieszka Gasztold and she was amazing yesterday because I was like: I don't live in Poland since I was 18 years old, help me understand how Polish Government responds to this. And she did. So basically -- and she is one of the directors of the centre who analyses these activities. It is a governmental centre. She said: so, these perpetrators were not talking to each other, however, they were belonging to other online communities but separate communities. So it wasn't like a bet or a dare to do some -- well.

Well, so it got really bad basically and there was a lot of speculation online, whether it was organised, whether it was Bloody Friday, whether we have to gear up.

So what happened is actually that some suspected it was an online challenge, but in fact it wasn't. According to Professor Gasztold, it was promoted

WhatsApp, on personal WhatsApp and personal -- there was also no evidence of movements such as 764 and 884, but it was TikTok and Telegram, they combed it but there was no foreign state interference. So it was not like foreign state actors, either directly or indirectly, influencing young people.

This is my worry that this is going to happen. I'm sorry, but I really need to say that because this is serious. You know, where is this manipulation coming from? And it could be weaponised, which is sick and totally unethical, but this is something that I think we also have to take into consideration.

So, no ideology present. All four were prone to the same TikTok narratives, ushered by the algorithms and within echo-chambers. And they were, in fact, memes -- you know, the videos with text -- the memes were about invitation to a party, to prove themselves. And: are you sure you are a warrior of our times? That's like that quote from one of the memes. Also, it is important here to understand the neurodiversity. According to Professor Gasztold, it was about -- it is also how the memes were perceived, filtered, and understood. One of the perpetrators had -- there were indications that there were challenges with understanding irony. So that's what how Poland responded.

Q. That was the vulnerabilities of one of the perpetrators?
A. That the Professor recalled from her own dealing with that case and her own research and practice, rather than open-source investigations.

How did Poland respond? They sent 90,000 police personnel deployed cumulatively to schools over the coming days. 90,000. Imagine that in the UK.

160,000 school checks were carried out and 192 people were detained.

Q. So, drawing conclusions here, this wasn't an individual Com network, but it was people who were --
A. Separately influenced online.
Q. Influenced. I was going to use the word "radicalisation" but in some ways, it might be apt, but not in a traditional sense?
A. Yes, I would.
Q. But by content that they were seeing online that was encouraging them to be interested in violence but not in a typical terrorist sense?
A. Exactly. And more like -- what did the lady say? Invitation to a party: you have to prove yourself, are you sure you are a warrior of our times? Rhetorics like this, you know, playing on certain insecurities, especially of young males and -- I don't want to be into other themes that might be adjacent to this discussion.

But yes. So, the Government was like: okay, so what are we going to do? So they summoned people. They summoned -- the Minister Krzysztof Gawkowski, they summoned people. Meta came. Actually, no. Well, yes. The invitations were sent to Meta, Google, TikTok, Roblox, Discord, X, Snap and Telegram. And X and Snapchat and Telegram did not attend and the Government reported illegal content notification. They did research between 7 and 12 October, so just a few days. There were 89 of illegal content notifications and only approximately two-thirds received no platform action.
Q. These were notices served by the Poland Government?
A. Yes, yes, yes.
Q. So sorry. The Polish Government had notified the platforms that there was illegal content but had a very poor return in terms of the platforms actually removing the content within, was it a five-day period?
A. Yes. And two-thirds of this platform was not -- so, what they demanded -- what the Polish Government said there were two-thirds ...

The Government made several concrete demands: faster removal and moderation of unlawful and harmful content. Then there was -- oh, so measure: faster direct reporting of channels. They agreed this in principle with the social media platforms. They also -- training

for officials, the Government requested. The status was agreed as an urgent measure.

Polish Government also approved the age verification and removal of under-13 accounts. And the status is ministerial demands. Social media, minimum age of 15, proposed policy direction but not a ban shown to be in force at the moment. There is also immediate blocking of specified serious illegal content. It is included in a proposed legislation but not shown to have been in post on platform at the meeting.

And there is also platform-specific fines, or binding enforcement orders, non-verified.

And yes. So, how do we deal with this? There are -- I have some observations.

SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: Can I suggest you wait for a question from the --

A. Of course, sorry.

MR BOYLE: Thank you, sir. So I think we pick up there, with that background, on a number of issues that are raised by your statement.

One that I wanted to ask you about is the idea that tech platforms should be brought into partnership or kind of co-operative. Is it plausible or realistic to expect tech platforms to co-operate with greater moderation or the kind of concepts and things that you

are suggesting? Do you have a view on that?

A. Yes. I do. I thought that saying "in partnership" was a little bit more liberal and lovely than to say: you must do something. Because we have evidence that suggests that this doesn't work when the tech platforms -- they are very powerful and when it is like: okay, this is happening, can you help us to moderate this to help young people? It doesn't seem to work.

So perhaps the option of working in partnership, working with them, perhaps could be a potential incentive for some measures to be negotiated and the corporation to be there. Because this also is reflected in terms of data sharing and in terms of access, our access to the data that is held on their servers and how quickly this can happen. We are not only talking about the use of VPNs, for example, but also the use of like online routers and access to the deep and dark web. So we are talking here, not just about the social media platforms that are on the open web, but also something that is perhaps -- how do we deal with that content?

Q. Thank you. I'm just going to ask, Ms Maszczynska, if you could slow down, please. Just try and keep your pace a bit slower for the transcriber.

Thank you. We heard, I think, from Mr Ahmed -- and perhaps no need to go through it in depth again -- but

about the Government having a power to establish new requirements on providers, to provide information to independent researchers into the carrying out of research into online safety matters.

You talk in your statement about research proposals that you had made for work which I think was probably more specifically in Prevent. Are there any research areas in online work that you are particularly interested in or think that should be an area of focus?

A. Yes, based on the training and the feedback from the training and lessons learned, is to deal with misinformation. And it also reflects one of the publications -- research papers that the Inquiry, I think, received about -- that disinformation may be deployed and is then taken by us, as misinformation, and shared across wider perception. But it also both deceives but reveals our societal vulnerabilities.

I think this is something that is very important to consider because with the very fast-changing environment, we have to speed up and pick up the process and try to match our joint capabilities with the nature of the threat. So if this is something that is deployed towards us, at us, I think we need to approach that from a multi-domain setting. Whether it is to do with public campaigns, perhaps, of improving understanding and

people's awareness; whether it is to do with training professionals; whether it is to do with online -- with tech platforms' appetite to help in these endeavours. I think this is rather important because this has the potential to -- for radicalisation, that perhaps goes into extremism and people would act on it.

I'm really glad you guys are here and doing what you are doing because it just has a lot of -- it is a lot of good, you know, of how to tackle these things.

Q. You talk in your statement about pattern recognition tools. If we have up on screen, please, page 7 DET000007_0007, paragraph 27. So you talk about the development -- so:

"... agency capability to detect online risk ..."

And you talked about how, in your paper, Rethinking CT, you explored a capability gap in practitioners' awareness and digital risk assessments. And you refer to the lack of curiosity in the Phase 1 report.

You talk about recommendations on digital threat assessment and practitioner training, which you have just touched on and perhaps I will ask a follow-up question on. But also the development of digital threat assessment teams and the introduction of pattern recognition tools.

Just breaking that down, "pattern recognition tool",

what is that? Is that the use of artificial intelligence, or ..?

A. That would be nice, if we can use it rightly and ethically and if we can calibrate so it is a support tool for us, it's not a decision-maker, per se. But in terms of pattern recognition, you know, we do a lot of work in pattern recognition in our tangible world. We know about how surveillance works, how profiling works, how we profile our adversaries, how we profile dangerous individuals.

But in terms of online aspects -- pattern -- so, for example, I remember many years ago, teaching that B&Q staff are taught if somebody is going to the shop and taking a basket with a lot of knives, a lot of ropes, a lot of ingredients to perhaps harm others by one way or another, they are trained to perhaps notice that.

If we can do the same thing with online activities, with activities that are worrying, or if there could be like a ping -- like, Mr Ahmed talked about the ping of the chatbots, you know, like how they respond to that. Is this pinged? Can we have the ping? Can we recognise certain patterns and tools of not only online activity, but what people do and how they do it, but also whether they are just passively scrolling for violent content, or whether they are engaging in a way, or perhaps are

a little bit more -- that may be a little bit more -- how do you say it -- influenced by that, perhaps.

Q. So I think there are two points here. (1) giving practitioners the tools to detect online behaviour from people who are in front of them, which I think might go to the --

A. No.

Q. -- list of risk factors you have. But also you're, I think, advocating for tech platforms providing information, based on the background that they have of their users' behaviour; is that right?

A. That would be nice, but I think what I meant by "pattern recognition", it was about early assessment teams. So for example, in cases where we suspect that somebody might be at risk of radicalisation and extremism and we can voluntarily ask them -- and perhaps not only assess what they are exposed to, but if we can assess this under pattern recognition -- so -- but again, are we going to create another tick the box, checklist thing?

I think, if we are going to have the pattern recognition tools to support early identification of concerning online behaviour, it would be nice for this to be developed via practitioners from different agencies, by including psychologists, online experts. By taking the experience and expertise of people, social

workers, education providers, to contribute towards that.

We already have some indicators of perhaps certain platforms, or certain chats, or certain -- but I think AI would be very helpful to basically make sense of the quantity of data we produce and people are exposed to. But, again -- and then we could also have certain capabilities that would be proposed to us, or how to deal with certain pathways, certain methodologies.

But how would it actually be in practice? It would be lovely, but it might be difficult.

Q. So I think one of the things that Topic 1 has grappled with is how, whatever multi-agency structure you create to deal with VFIs, would gain an understanding of someone who was referred to online activity. Do you have any -- so, I think that you are talking to some of those concepts, in terms of what might be useful for them, presumably based on your experience of working with CTP.

And am I right, are you saying that certainly, a list -- or not necessarily a tick box, but a tool for practitioners to assess that online activity is something you think would be helpful?

A. I think it would be -- you know how I see it? I see it like a mechanic's toolbox. You know, like the red one

with like the lovely drawers and all the wheels and it's so big and the tools you need to fix a Ford are different to what you need to fix a BMW. And if we could create a wardrobe full of capabilities that we have across different agencies, and different methodologies that are available to us and different resources and then, if we can actually have this in that room behind the big front door, so there could be some form of interoperability and coherence across our capabilities and humans and agencies, and if one of the tools would be the pattern recognition, that would be lovely.

Q. You also talk in your statement about the importance of digital literacy for professionals.

A. Yes.

Q. I think you say you have delivered online training sessions for educational practitioners including teachers workshops on safeguarding in the age of digital manipulation.

I assume that's an area you think -- is that an area where you think further work could be done?

A. Yes, but not just like digital awareness. Not just like you go and you listen. Like our kids have so much more awareness of what's happening online than we do. They live pretty much online. They are so tech-savvy.

It is not just about digital skills, it is also about, like, the mass cognition patterns; about individual patterns; about understanding the risks of exposure to certain things.

So it is not just like basic training for teachers. They need a bit more awareness of not only what is happening, but how is this happening and how it affects -- perhaps a bit about cognition and critical thinking, but it is related to their work setting. So it is bespoke to them because what you would teach somebody working in social services might not be the same as what you would teach to secondary teachers because their work platforms are different.

Q. I'm going to move on now to the topic of civil orders. Could we have, please, page 65, paragraph 290 of your statement. You talk about:

"Whilst older approaches might suggest ...(Reading to the words)... human support."

Just to unpick that. I think this is talking to the recommendation of an idea of a civil order where a certain threshold is met when dealing with someone who's raising the sorts of issues that this Inquiry is considering.

I think you are seeing the trigger as an evidence risk of serious violence. Is that the test that you

might put forward for these types of orders?

A. I would say so. It is difficult and it might not be the same for everybody, so it be would difficult for us to assert in that threshold.

Q. You express doubt about the practicality of putting that in place and we can see further about that in your paragraph 291.

On what evidence does that doubt rest? Is it just simple understanding that the topics you have already been talking to, that children are very tech savvy?

A. I believe so. Also, if your computer or your phone is going to be out of use or reach because a civil order is imposed, are you not going to go to your friend's house and use theirs? Or are we going to tag people not to go to friend's houses?

Because the internet is omnipresent indeed. How is this possible to impose that? I think that there will be easy ways to get around that.

Q. Can I ask, is that based on case studies you have worked on or particular studies of civil orders in other contexts?

A. Perhaps and perhaps for my academic work about civil orders and about how people get around them in certain manners, yes.

Q. You have done research in certain civil orders of being

ineffective, is that right?

A. Yes.

Q. Is that in the context of online use?

A. No. There is one but I forgot its name. So I don't want to recall -- I'm sorry.

Q. One way to tackle this might be that -- just to summarise. I think you support the idea of the order but emphasise it would require very careful pitching to make sure it was actually enforceable and of use?

A. Yes.

Q. It would, presumably, depend on the case that was being dealt with in terms of the sort of measures that would be needed, is that right?

A. Yes.

Q. And could it be that for some cases you might not need such stringent measures, but for the most risky cases you might have to have very stringent measures in place whereby you achieved a way of precluding someone having access to the internet or at least free access to the internet?

A. Indeed.

Q. I should also say I think, you talk that for younger children the management of that access might be more practicable. Presumably that is where parents or some sort of guardian has a closer monitoring of the child?

A. Yes.

Q. I think you also draw the point that a person's birthday shouldn't result in the loss of institutional memory, relationships or understanding of risk?

A. Yes.

Q. Any sort of order should not have a cliff edge where a child turns 18, is that right?

A. Yes, very much so.

Q. Ms Maszczynska, those are my questions. Before I turn to see if there are any others, is there anything else that you would like to say that I haven't asked you about yet?

A. No, thank you. Cheers.

SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: Thank you very much indeed, Ms Maszczynska. It has been extremely helpful. We are very grateful to you.

So that concludes the evidence for today Mr Boyle, is that right?

MR BOYLE: It does sir, yes.

SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: And we are 10.00 am tomorrow morning?

MR BOYLE: I think we are 9.45 tomorrow morning. We have a slightly extended morning break.

SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: Because of Remembrance --

MR BOYLE: Yes.

SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: There is a parade I think.

MR BOYLE: Yes, I think we will have a mid-morning break at 10.45, but we can perhaps confirm the details tomorrow.

SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: 9.45 am tomorrow. Thank you very much.

(4.20 pm)

(The Inquiry adjourned until 9.45 am the following day)

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