

Wednesday, 14 October 2026

(10.00 am)

SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: You will need to take the oath.

DAC VICTORIA EVANS (sworn)

Questions by MR MOSS

SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: Thank you very much indeed, please have a seat. Yes, Mr Moss.

MR MOSS: Thank you, sir.

Deputy Assistant Commissioner, just start by giving us your full name if you would, please?

A. DAC Victoria Evans.

Q. Thank you very much. If we could have on screen, please, CTPHQ000409. We can see that you have provided a third witness statement to this Inquiry and this is your statement for this Phase 2 of the Inquiry. If we could go to page 44 CTPHQ000409_0044, please.

We see that this is a statement that you signed on 7 August 2026, obviously we have redacted your signature. Can you just confirm that that the contents of this statement, please, are true to the best of your knowledge and belief?

A. They are.

Q. Thank you. You have provided two previous statements obviously to the Inquiry. Can I just draw those up on screen for reference purposes. So the first of those is

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A. That is correct, yes.

Q. Thank you, and I think you took over from DAC Tim Jacques who was your predecessor I think, is that right?

A. That's correct.

Q. Whom we will be hearing from in his new role next week. In terms of your professional background please, if we may, page 2, CTPHQ000006_0002 paragraph 5, you have explained that you were an Assistant Chief Constable for Cambridgeshire Constabulary for four years and before that, an ACC within Dyfed-Powys police and you have 20 years of policing experience in a wide range of roles, is that right?

A. That's correct.

Q. Thank you. If we look at paragraph 5, lower down, we can see that you also had a role in the National Police Chiefs' Council, which obviously DCC Court explained to us yesterday, where you were the lead for implementing volume two of the Manchester Arena Inquiry?

A. That is correct. That was a finite role, so it has concluded, but I did take that role whilst I was in Cambridgeshire.

Q. Thank you, and then, if we could go to paragraph 14 on page 4 CTPHQ000006_0004, please. You explain there, that:

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CTPHQ000006.

And that was your first statement to Phase 1. It was dated 30 June and then CTPHQ000153, which was a second statement that you provided on 24 November 2025. Obviously, if at any time you want to refer back to those statements they are on the system but overwhelmingly, I'm going to be asking you about your third statement for Phase 2 and of course, Deputy Assistant Commissioner, it was precisely a year ago today that you gave oral evidence. Sir, for your note, on 14 October of last year and obviously there's a transcript of your previous evidence.

Would you forgive me, Deputy Assistant Commissioner, if I do go through your role and experience again because there is a different set of Core Participants for Phase 2 and a different audience. So although this is familiar territory, could we just look at it briefly together, please.

So back to your first statement CTPHQ000006_0001 and if we can maximise paragraph 4, first of all, bottom of the page. So we have got your dates in post. 5 May of 2024. Since then, you have been the Senior National Coordinator for Prevent and Pursue, is that right?

A. That's correct.

Q. Shortened, I think, in many documents to "SNC"?

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"CTPHQ supports regional CTUs and CTIUs in the implementation and assurance of common systems, policies and procedures through effective communication and collaboration. In addition to its policy responsibilities, CTPHQ may facilitate the sharing of CTP resources across the network to provide additional capacity or specialist capability ..."

I think, within your role, is this right, you have a strategic leadership aspect and overseeing that but I think some of the operational detail that we see in your statement, is this right, are matters on which you had the assistance of colleagues?

A. That's correct. So the network is set up. We are not an organisation, we are a collaboration. You have CTUs and CTIUs who deliver the operational daily business and my role is one of strategic coordination and sits over the network and I do that on behalf of the Chief Constables. I have been supported by operational colleagues to provide the detail of my statement, but I am familiar with most of it.

Q. Thank you very much. So if we can go to look at that then, the CTP network and the role of CTPHQ. Again, we covered this in Phase 1 so I will deal with this as briefly as I may. If we go to page 2, please, of your third statement CTPHQ000409_0002.

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1 I think we are on the wrong statement. Could we go
2 to the third statement, please. Thank you. Whenever
3 I say "the statement", unless I say otherwise, I mean
4 that third statement. I think the previous paragraph
5 may have been a false reference. Can we go to page 2
6 and paragraph 6, please.

7 So you touched on this a moment ago, but the Counter
8 Terrorism Policing network is a collaboration of
9 specialist teams working within police forces across the
10 country, in partnership with the UK Intelligence
11 Community, the Government and local communities, the
12 prison and probation service and other partners to
13 deliver the UK Counter-Terrorism Strategy, CONTEST:

14 "Simply stated, this strategy aims to reduce the
15 threat of terrorism to the UK, its citizens, and its
16 interests."

17 So, it is a collaboration, we should understand,
18 that the CTP network is not a single entity as such, is
19 that right?

20 A. That is right.

21 Q. If we can look over the page, please, CTPHQ000409_0003
22 at paragraph 8. You explain the make up and again,
23 familiar territory, but:

24 "To deliver the CONTEST strategy [there are]
25 officers and staff within the CTP network work

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1 different, in that I have the ability, in my role, to
2 take national strategic and tactical command of threat
3 and operations where it is necessary, and that is to
4 bring those to their conclusion and then we revert back
5 to business as usual processes.

6 Q. Thank you. So if we just scroll down and look at
7 paragraph 9, I think this is something you explain
8 there, the role of CTPHQ within this. That CTPHQ
9 shouldn't be seen, my words not your statement, as
10 a directing headquarters that is in charge and gives
11 orders. It is more of a coordinating feature, with that
12 exception I think you have just mentioned, that in
13 certain circumstances you can take grip of a particular
14 situation, is that right?

15 A. Yes, it is. I mean, clearly we set the strategy and the
16 policy, the network then, broadly, will adhere to that
17 but there can be slight local variation depending on the
18 set-ups that exist within those regions.

19 Q. So for individual cases, and other than going back to
20 some aspects of AR, I won't be dealing with actual
21 individual cases, but in relation to individual cases
22 and the work of the regional units, if we look at
23 page 4, CTPHQ000409_0004 paragraph 12, you explain there
24 that the operational accountability would lie with the
25 chief constables of the relevant regions, is that right?

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1 collaboratively across ..."

2 A system which I think has nine regional
3 counter-terrorism units and counter-terrorism
4 intelligence units in England and Wales. Then there is
5 the headquarters function, which is hosted by the Met,
6 is that right?

7 A. That is correct.

8 Q. Thank you. How does it work in terms of, at the local
9 level, at the regional level, because there will,
10 I think for most cases, be several forces within the
11 region. Can you just explain how that works in terms of
12 lead force?

13 A. So each region is responsible operationally to the chief
14 constables within their region. Broadly speaking, there
15 is usually a lead force within the region. It varies
16 slightly in each region but effectively, those regions
17 work together under their own slightly smaller
18 section 22A but there is an overarching one that myself,
19 my colleague DACSO and ACSO, the Assistant Commissioner,
20 Lawrence Taylor are responsible for. Apologies, lots of
21 acronyms. So effectively, we provide the national
22 strategic coordination and those regional units are
23 responsible for the operational delivery and day-to-day
24 responsibility.

25 There is only a certain circumstance where that is

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1 A. That is correct.

2 Q. Thank you. Then, can you explain, if we could have
3 paragraph 13 on screen, not that you will need the
4 reminder, but can you just explain the role that CTPHQ
5 does have in relation to policy and building policy for
6 the unit?

7 A. So, CTPHQ is made up of a number of different
8 capabilities and capability leads or heads of
9 profession, they are usually chief superintendents,
10 superintendents or police staff equivalents and they
11 look after thematic areas. So prevent, for instance,
12 sits under the interventions portfolio. We also have
13 intelligence and investigations and other thematic
14 leads. They are responsible, under mine and my deputy's
15 direction, for creating and implementing common systems
16 of working, policies, procedures and ensuring that they
17 are then shared throughout the network. So we create
18 the common frameworks for people to work within and then
19 they are delivered operationally and with local
20 accountability through the regions.

21 Q. Thank you. Could we just look, please, together at
22 page 5, CTPHQ000409_0005 paragraph 15. You say that:
23 "In respect of all areas of the CONTEST strategy,
24 CTPHQ continually seeks to enhance the network's
25 [capability] to reduce the risk posed by terrorism."

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1 I want to just explore with you, with our Phase 2
 2 experts in mind, you say:
 3 "Learning is drawn from a variety of sources,
 4 including, but not limited to, academic research,
 5 internal and external reviews of major incidents, and
 6 relevant recommendations from assurance bodies, inquests
 7 and public inquiries."

8 When we are dealing with aspects such as is the
 9 complex and sensitive aspect of neurodivergence, for
 10 example, is CTPHQ itself dealing with the academic
 11 research and looking what can be learnt from those
 12 matters? In other words, is CTPHQ big enough and has
 13 the resources that it engages with that directly rather
 14 than relying on the Home Office?

15 A. We do engage with that directly and as you are aware,
 16 you have spoken to Dr Richard Taylor, we have things
 17 like the Clinical Consultancy Service where we have
 18 expertise. We also engage with academics. But we link
 19 and work with the Home Office as well. So we have some
 20 work that we lead ourselves, some work that we deliver
 21 across the system and we also engage with wider law
 22 enforcement partners, international partners, to
 23 understand learning and best practice from them.

24 What I would say is clearly, policing, we are not
 25 clinical experts and therefore we go out to the people

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1 divide. You must correct me if I get this wrong but is
 2 it right to say that for those professionals in the
 3 community who are subject to the Prevent duty, training
 4 in when they should make a referral and what the nature
 5 of the Prevent duty is, that sits more with the Home
 6 Office, whereas CTPHQ's training obligations and duties
 7 lies with the CTCO's training, supervisor's training and
 8 matters of that kind?

9 A. That is correct.

10 Q. Thank you. We have referred to CONTEST and just to look
 11 at it, at page 3, CTPHQ000409_0003 paragraph 7, just to
 12 go back in your statement. Again, very familiar ground
 13 but you set out there the four strands of the CONTEST
 14 strategy. I'm going to ask you some questions about
 15 Pursue because in part of the issue about definitions in
 16 Pursue and when counter-terrorism can act. So if we
 17 leave "protect" and "prepare" to one side, we see:

18 "Prevent -- preventing individuals from becoming
 19 terrorists or supporting terrorism.

20 "Pursue -- disrupting active terrorist plots,
 21 threats and activities."

22 I think those are the two areas in which you are
 23 particularly involved?

24 A. That's correct.

25 Q. Thank you. Can we turn then, please, to the tests for

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1 who have the expertise and are best placed to support us
 2 with learning in that particular sphere.

3 Q. Thank you. Without turning if up, if I may just offer
 4 the reference, in part for the learned Chair's note, to
 5 paragraph 40(3) at page 6 of your first witness
 6 statement. I don't think you will need it turned up.

7 Could you just give us a synopsis of CTPHQ's role
 8 and responsibility so far as training is concerned,
 9 particularly for Prevent officers?

10 A. So Prevent officers, their training is designed by
 11 CTPHQ. So there are national standard training
 12 products. If we take, for instance, the PAF, which you
 13 will be familiar with and I referenced in Phase 1. That
 14 is a nationally trained product. You have to be
 15 accredited in it to use it and that's training we
 16 deliver jointly with the Home Office. There are
 17 a number of mandated courses that have been designed in
 18 the centre with support from our organisational
 19 development unit. That doesn't preclude regions from
 20 rolling out their own local training if there's
 21 a particular theme or issue that they want to explore
 22 but they would usually do that within the frameworks and
 23 with support from the headquarters departments.

24 Q. Thank you.

25 It may be useful just to remind ourselves of the

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1 Prevent referrals and changes to Prevent since Phase 1.

2 Again, I'm afraid Deputy Assistant Commissioner,
 3 some of this is familiar ground that we went through
 4 again but it is important if we can take a little time
 5 just to set the scene for it. But I do want to focus on
 6 some updates. So if we can look please at page 6,
 7 CTPHQ000409_0006 paragraph 20 of your statement.

8 You say that, in essence:

9 "CTP's role within Prevent has not changed since the
 10 date of [your] previous statement. The role of CTP
 11 within Prevent is set out within statute under
 12 section 26 of the ... 2015 Act ... namely to give due
 13 regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn
 14 into terrorism."

15 So that phrase "prevent people being drawn into
 16 terrorism" is one that you and I, I think, will come
 17 back to time and again. So we note its statutory basis
 18 now, and then:

19 "This is further expanded ... within the statutory
 20 Prevent Duty Guidance 2023 ..."

21 Version, and the reference CTPHQ000012, but we don't
 22 need to turn it up:

23 "... which reiterates the role of Prevent as 'to
 24 stop people from becoming terrorists or supporting
 25 terrorism [and] supporting the rehabilitation and

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1 disengagement of those already involved in
 2 terrorism' ..."

3 Then you refer to the "newly published Home Office
 4 Key Principles of Prevent" which we looked at with
 5 Mr Emmett:

6 "... which says 'Specialist police officers such as
 7 Counter Terrorism Case Officers (CTCOs), are responsible
 8 for determining whether someone is at risk of
 9 radicalisation and should be considered for support
 10 through Prevent. Their decisions should be underpinned
 11 by the Prevent Assessment Framework ..."

12 Which you mentioned a moment ago:

13 "... and their professional judgment should be
 14 informed by regular, relevant training."

15 So that's the headline key essentials, yes?

16 A. That's correct.

17 Q. Thank you. Then if we go to page 17 CTPHQ000409_0017,
 18 please, and paragraph 50. Again, it is something by way
 19 of revision really but important to have these points in
 20 mind. So:

21 "Following de-confliction of an of a referral ..."

22 The process of checking whether they are already
 23 known or maybe subject to an investigation of
 24 a different kind:

25 "... CTP will complete the Prevent Gateway

13

1 are reasonable grounds to believe ..."

2 So we shift from "reasonable grounds to suspect" to
 3 the test of whether there are "reasonable grounds to
 4 believe" that the individual is vulnerable to being
 5 drawn into terrorism; is that right?

6 A. That's correct and that is the statutory test, that is
 7 consistent and has not changed.

8 Q. Thank you. Again, that's the revision of some core
 9 principles which, as you say, have not changed.

10 If we look, please, at some areas where there have
 11 been change. If we could turn please to page 7,
 12 CTPHQ000409_0007 paragraph 23. You give an overview of
 13 those and we will come to some of these separately in
 14 due course. But you explain there that -- we see (i) in
 15 the list:

16 "Placing the National Decision Model ... at the
 17 heart of Prevent Case Management."

18 Can you explain what that means in more concrete
 19 terms?

20 A. Of course. So the new SOP brings together -- it is
 21 a revised operating procedure for our teams and it
 22 brings together multiple interim policies. Chair, you
 23 will recall we had the discussion in Phase 1 about
 24 multiple additions to policies and whether that could be
 25 confusing for staff and I outlined that we periodically

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1 Assessment (PGA) ... to assess ..."

2 Then the test at that stage:

3 "... whether there are reasonable grounds to suspect
 4 that the individual referred is vulnerable to being
 5 drawn into terrorism."

6 Is that right?

7 A. That's correct, so they will do -- the PAF is a process
 8 that has multiple stages in it. They will initially do
 9 a Prevent referral screening. Then they will look at
 10 the Prevent Gateway Assessment. If they believe there's
 11 reasonable grounds to suspect, at that point, they will
 12 move into what we call the information gathering stage,
 13 which is the next, more detailed phase.

14 Q. Again, there is some complication to this. But
 15 referral, de-confliction and then asking the question
 16 whether there are reasonable grounds to suspect that the
 17 individual referred is vulnerable to being drawn into
 18 terrorism. If, "yes", more information is gathered.
 19 Then, I think paragraph 51:

20 "Following multi-agency information gathering ..."

21 That we have just mentioned:

22 "... a further assessment is undertaken ..."

23 And this is now the Section 36 test, yes?

24 A. That's correct.

25 Q. "... under the ... 2015 Act to determine whether there

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1 review it and consolidate and this is the product of
 2 that consolidation.

3 The national decision-making model is a tool that is
 4 well known and well trained to all police officers. It
 5 is our core decision-making tool and underpins how we
 6 make decisions and we have made sure that that is
 7 evident and runs through the whole of the SOP, to
 8 support our teams to make good decisions. They use that
 9 in conjunction then with the structured decision-making
 10 tools, the PAF and others, to support their
 11 decision-making throughout the process.

12 Q. Thank you. I wanted just to pick up on point (vi) in
 13 this sub-list, where you say:

14 "Clarification of the expectations concerning
 15 'disguised compliance', 'false compliance', and
 16 'insincerity of change'."

17 Now, I don't want to go over old ground, but the --
 18 part of that, I think, derives from findings in the
 19 Phase 1 Inquiry, about the way that AR's apparent
 20 disguised compliance was addressed. So can you help us,
 21 in outline, with what that clarification now seeks to
 22 achieve?

23 A. It is absolutely learning from Phase 1. It has always
 24 been within our policies but we have strengthened that
 25 within our training products, using the best evidence

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base we can, from not just within CT but beyond, and the SOP makes it very clear to officers and staff that they have to test and challenge what information is presented to them by a particular individual who has been referred. And that they are, in simple terms, not to take information at face value and are to test and check it, where they can, with external sources.

I would say in lots of different fields, not just in Prevent, insincerity of change, false compliance, we can test it but it is incredibly hard to determine -- if someone is absolutely determined to deceive authorities, they are determined to do that but we have made it very explicit that officers need to consider that and not just take information on face value.

Q. Thank you. Then also looking at things other than the core tests, that have changed. If we could have paragraph 24. It is over the page, page 8 CTPHQ000409_0008, please. You reference there systems of controls which prevent a case being closed while actions remain outstanding.

So we will remember why that was an issue, which was about the task of the referral to the vulnerability hub as was CCS, as it now is I think, not having been completed, but AR's case being closed. So can you just explain what the system control is now and what the

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exited ..."

So just pausing there. That is a more senior officer, I think, having to agree to the closure of those sort of cases than would be the case for one of the more traditional, ideological-type categories?

A. That is correct. So it is a Prevent inspector, in the case of the fascination with committing mass casualty violence. There is also is higher level of closure oversight for what we call police-led partnership cases and similarly for repeat referrals.

Q. Thank you. I think one aspect -- we are going to come onto aspects of the SOP, standard operational procedure. I think one thing that has changed is a lot of this has now been brought together into a single procedure now, the SOP, but I think you can give the assurance to the Inquiry that these additional safeguards which were, to a large extent, Southport-related have been carried across to the SOP?

A. They have absolutely been carried across and we have also carried out business assurance that then has informed those. There have been minor tweaks to those sections of the policy, to make sure they are operationally workable, from the learning, but the essence and the increased supervision is absolutely still there.

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practical impact of that is?

A. So, on the Prevent case management system there is a process for recording individual actions and those individual actions have to be completed and concluded and a supervisor can't then close a case if there are actions that remain outstanding with activity that has not been done. The supervisor training has also been strengthened to reinforce that point and again, it is explicit within the standard operating procedure.

It is a much more robust system. Like any system, it requires the people inputting to use the system properly and use the processes. So, as always, you have to use the system correctly to ensure that those safeguards work. But that is explicit through our training and also our supervisor training, to prevent actions not being completed and the case being closed.

Q. Thank you. I think because some of these were being -- some of these aspects were being put in place in Phase 1 but as a reminder, if we look at the top of this paragraph, it is why you say:

"The Inquiry has previously heard ..."

But I think you wanted to issue the reminder in this statement:

"... the requirement for supervisory sign-off before cases involving an extreme fascination with violence are

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Q. Thank you. Then on page 14, CTPHQ000409_0014 at paragraphs 73 and 74, just rounding off, I hope, the sections on what's changed since your previous evidence, on page 24 CTPHQ000409_0024. Paragraph 73 is a reference there to specific training course relating to neurodiversity. Do you just want to tell us the headlines in relation to that?

A. Absolutely. So it is a mandatory part of our training for both our CTCOs and our supervisors in Prevent. It does cover autism specifically and a number of other conditions. It's been designed and supported by our Clinical Consultancy Service, again, so that we have the expertise from those who are better placed to talk on those subjects and it has been delivered as part of the National Foundation in Prevent course, in the fourth module.

It has also been reinforced through what we call Hydra training, so a bit more of an immersive, practical training session, to make sure that people understand how to apply this and how it can support their decision-making. Again, it is really comprehensive training but our police officers aren't mental health experts. So it is training that helps them make good decisions but also they have the Clinical Consultancy Service as experts that they can consult with where they

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1 need to at the appropriate point in the case.

2 **Q.** Thank you. Are there any other aspects of particular
3 changes since your previous evidence that you wish to
4 draw to the Chair's attention before moving to the next
5 topic?

6 **A.** Not in great detail but we have, in the SOP, ensured
7 that signposting to other agencies is explicit with
8 a clear protocol as to how it should be done. We have
9 reinforced the importance of information sharing, at the
10 appropriate stages. So we have zoomed out and
11 considered lots of the learning from this case and
12 others and the discussions in the Inquiry to ensure that
13 we have reinforced some of those areas that were in
14 previous policy.

15 **Q.** Thank you. Could we turn then now to a fourth area,
16 fourth topic, of VFI definitions. Could we look,
17 together please, Deputy Assistant Commissioner, at
18 page 5 CTPHQ000409_0005 of your statement, paragraph 16.

19 So on this section you start off by saying that the
20 CTPHQ recognises -- and you know what the Cabinet Office
21 body is and you know that we are not using the name for
22 that, and to a large extent it doesn't matter, so:

23 "CTPHQ recognises [that Cabinet Office body's]
24 working definition of Violence Fixated Individuals ...
25 which is 'fascination with extreme violence and intent

21

1 What you say -- might it be possible to have 16 and
2 17 at the same time just so we can see the top of 17.

3 That's perfect, thank you so much.

4 So you say:

5 "In terms of practical application, CTPHQ uses the
6 definition 'fascination with extreme violence or
7 mass-casualty attacks' (FEVMCA) to identify a subset of
8 VFIs who are potentially vulnerable to being drawn into
9 terrorism and hence relevant for consideration under the
10 statutory frameworks of the Prevent duty for inclusion
11 within the Prevent programme."

12 Is that right?

13 **A.** It's correct. So that term existed prior to --

14 **Q.** That's what I wanted to start with asking you about.
15 That's not a term that was developed as a result of the
16 Southport attack. That was a pre-existing category, one
17 of quite a number, so that CTCOs could designate as
18 being the most appropriate descriptor for a referral?

19 **A.** It is probably helpful if I go into some detail here.
20 So you will recall the 2019 letter that we talked about
21 in detail in Phase 1. The evidence of things like
22 school shooter fascination, mass casualty attacks, had
23 been visible and evident in casework since that time.
24 To a lesser degree, I would say, but it was something
25 that had been discussed. And when the new system, PCMT,

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1 to inflict extreme violence, where ideology is not the
2 primary driver' but does not use the definition
3 operationally."

4 Is that right?

5 **A.** That's correct. It may be helpful for me to sort of
6 describe how that came about. Following the awful
7 events in Southport, we were, as a system and with
8 Government, talking about the particular characteristics
9 of an individual, a phenomenon that we were seeing in
10 casework and the term "VFI" I guess, became working
11 language to describe something we were all talking about
12 and we then recognised the importance of -- to
13 understand it and explore it more, we at least needed to
14 start with a working definition that would allow us to
15 start gathering information and evidence. So it became
16 common parlance, for want of a better phrase, and then
17 a definition built around it, to help us all start to
18 understand and gather evidence to move forward.

19 So it was never intended as an operational
20 definition. It was really to help us with policy and to
21 ensure that we could start exploring the evidence base
22 within parameters.

23 **Q.** Thank you. If we can just scroll down a little bit so
24 we can see paragraph 17 because I want to explore that
25 just a little bit further.

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1 was brought in, the category "fascination with extreme
2 violence and mass casualty attacks" existed within our
3 general policy and was one of those categories.

4 I should say, those categories you have referred to,
5 it is one of a number and they are very broad categories
6 that are used to categorise referrals when they first
7 come into the Prevent system. So it gives a broad
8 indication of the type of examples that are evident in
9 that case. They are not restrictive or proscriptive and
10 we ask officers and staff to label cases based on what
11 the greatest proportion of evidence is. So you could
12 have multiple of those categories evident but they will
13 go with the one that is most evident in the initial
14 information.

15 So that existed; it was there. What we recognised,
16 both as a result of that case and some of our
17 discussions in the Phase 1 of this Inquiry, was the need
18 for greater clarity to support our officers as to what
19 that category could mean in the current climate and how
20 they could apply it operationally, which was why we then
21 implemented the policy, which became known as the FEVMCA
22 policy, that gave more prescriptive -- not so much
23 prescriptive, but more guidance for officers and staff
24 as to what that category could look like and why it
25 would be relevant to Prevent, but also included the

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1 enhanced supervision and the safeguards that we put in
 2 place because we recognised the complexity of
 3 considering those type of cases, which was perhaps not
 4 evident in some of the more ideologically-motivated
 5 categories.

6 **Q.** I follow, and you will understand that the spirit in
 7 which I ask these questions is one of exploring how
 8 things are currently organised and options for change.

9 **A.** Of course.

10 **Q.** But in that spirit, it is right that while the Cabinet
 11 Office body was looking at an early definition, and the
 12 work that Mr Emmett described in his evidence, the early
 13 work in response to Southport and Government looking at
 14 this area because of the horrors of the Southport attack
 15 was going on, the position in CTPHQ, I think, has been
 16 to mould the incoming cases, in terms of how it's going
 17 to be defined, around an existing category, albeit that
 18 work was done to expand or clarify what was meant by
 19 that category. So in other words, no new category was
 20 created?

21 **A.** No. But I am not sure I agree with how you
 22 characterised that. If you will forgive me, I will try
 23 and explain. The work we were doing cross-government on
 24 VFI was always broader than Prevent. It was about the
 25 phenomenon that we were seeing, bearing in mind the case

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1 and then will be balanced against the Section 36
 2 decision. So I just think we need to be careful. It
 3 isn't a: if the violence doesn't match that category
 4 they cannot be considered. Because in all cases, they
 5 are fact-specific and the officers and staff will
 6 balance everything they see that is evident in the case
 7 to decide whether it then meets the reasonable grounds
 8 to believe that someone is susceptible or vulnerable to
 9 being drawn into terrorism. That is the key point for
 10 our practitioners.

11 **Q.** There may not be much between us, if anything on this,
 12 but as a matter of historical fact, that the work
 13 looking at the wider cohort, if I can use that phrase,
 14 VFI, which I think is what you are emphasising -- and
 15 again, I don't raise this critically but as a matter of
 16 historical fact, did not lead CTPHQ to decide: we need
 17 a new category or a different category, to better
 18 capture those who are in the VFI cohort who are
 19 appropriate for Prevent. At some stage, the view must
 20 have been taken that, with FEVMCA and some other
 21 categories that could apply -- so: no ideology, unclear,
 22 uncertain, mixed unclear -- we have sufficient
 23 categories already to identify those from the wider VFI
 24 cohort who may be appropriate for support on Prevent?

25 **A.** That's correct. What underpins that is a lot of

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1 itself -- and I'm conscious of not going into sensitive
 2 details and not talking in detail about the awful
 3 incidents at Southport -- it wasn't prosecuted as
 4 a terrorism case. The motivations for that attack did
 5 not meet the definition of section 1 of TACT. So the
 6 work we were supporting and others were engaged in,
 7 cross-government, was always about a broader category.
 8 It was helping us to understand what are the
 9 characteristics of people who commit violence that is
 10 not ideologically motivated and then can include things
 11 like the Com and things I am sure we will come to.

12 Prevent, and what we were discharged with doing in
 13 CTP, is making sure that our officers had clarity as to
 14 how they assessed cases under the duty of Prevent, which
 15 is a specific process bound in statute. So it wasn't
 16 a case of us trying to mould cases into a category, it
 17 was making sure -- that category already existed because
 18 we recognised that there are occasions where mass
 19 casualty violence, school shooting, can be evident in
 20 Prevent cases --

21 **Q.** And can be relevant to Prevent?

22 **A.** And can be relevant to Prevent, and we needed to make
 23 sure that our officers and staff -- that is not the only
 24 category. If violence appears in the case summary it
 25 will be considered with all of the other vulnerabilities

26

1 feedback from our practitioners who are used to looking
 2 and seeing these cases and their feedback to us about
 3 how this type of behaviour presents in our casework. We
 4 have done testing where we have used example case
 5 studies and tested people's decision-making and their
 6 understanding of it. So there is a body of work that
 7 sits underneath it to support why we felt those
 8 categories remained appropriate within the bounds of the
 9 statutory duty which Prevent is designed to deliver.

10 **Q.** Thank you. So, being careful not to overlook the other
 11 categories that might be in play, would you agree that,
 12 for the most part, the "fascination with extreme
 13 violence or mass casualty attacks" category is at the
 14 forefront of the consideration that's being given if
 15 a VFI is referred into Prevent as to whether somebody
 16 meets the statutory test? It could be another category
 17 but there is a focus on FEVMCA?

18 **A.** I mean, there's definitely a focus on it because our
 19 officers and staff are -- you know, they are absolutely
 20 attuned to the awful events in Southport, the
 21 commentary, the narrative and ultimately they care and
 22 they come to work because they want to make sure that
 23 they protect the public. So it is most definitely at
 24 the forefront of their mind. But the challenge,
 25 I think, when talking about any of our cases through

28

1 a single category is when they are making a Section 36
2 decision, what the officers and staff are looking at is
3 everything that presents to them in that case and that
4 will be a multiple overlap of different vulnerabilities,
5 different behaviours presenting.

6 So it is never as simple as: they meet that
7 category, because even if it is somebody who is
8 ideologically motivated, they will quite often have
9 other vulnerabilities that we would argue make them even
10 more vulnerable or susceptible. So it is very difficult
11 to talk in kind of simple, binary terms about complex
12 cases --

13 Q. Forgive me for interrupting, but it goes back to the
14 point you made earlier on, that, as I understand it,
15 CTCOs do need to give a categorisation, but you may see
16 aspects of several categories. But ultimately, one is
17 chosen, but the narrative within the PAF may refer to
18 several others and aspects of several others. Is that
19 a fair summary?

20 A. And it can change throughout a case because they
21 allocate those categories at early stages of that case.
22 The category doesn't change as the case progresses
23 because we record what the case first presents as, to
24 help us understand the themes that come into our
25 referrals, but as they work through information

29

1 back to that under a different topic. But for now, we
2 note that that is the way that the definition has been
3 slightly advanced in the SOP, with the reference to
4 "fascination" and "committing". But that's now the
5 definition for FEVMCA, which is applied operationally,
6 with the caveat that it may not be, by any means, the
7 only one that is appropriate. Is that a fair summary?

8 A. That's correct.

9 Q. Thank you. So, if we draw back from that for a moment
10 and we keep in mind, because I want to explore,
11 throughout your evidence session, the interplay and the
12 options going forward between these two groups. So the
13 wider VFI cohort, if you like, and the narrower group of
14 individuals who may share some characteristics with the
15 wider VFI cohort, but who, in the current way of
16 organising things, are appropriate to be taken on by
17 Prevent.

18 Would you agree that under the terms of the statute
19 at the moment, ultimately, the only way of describing
20 that narrower group is that they are vulnerable to being
21 drawn into terrorism?

22 A. The statutory test is reasonable grounds to believe that
23 they are vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism.

24 Q. Thank you. So, if we can think of that wider VFI --
25 there is no trap in any of this, I just want to be clear

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1 gathering and understand more, they will constantly be
2 gathering more information that illuminates the entirety
3 of the case. So it is not a static process, it is
4 iterative as they work through the different
5 assessments.

6 Q. Thank you. Important to read on, if we may, in
7 paragraph 17 but it is fine as it is on the screen. So
8 in terms of FEVMCA, you say that the:

9 "... definition was first outlined in the
10 standalone interim FEVMCA policy ... which was
11 implemented after the Southport attack but [that] has
12 now been incorporated into the new Prevent ..."

13 SOP, so that is what we were talking about earlier
14 on, in terms of bringing policies together and:

15 "The SOP now defines these 'Fascination Cases' as
16 cases where an individual 'does not have an identifiable
17 terrorist/extremist ideology but evidence of
18 a fascination in committing an extreme violence or mass
19 casualty attack, the consequences of which may have no
20 specific racial, religious, or political motivation'."

21 Yes?

22 A. That is correct.

23 Q. Now, what won't come up on the transcript is the
24 emphasis I gave to the word "committing". Can we put
25 a pin in that because you will know that I want to come

30

1 about terminology. So if we think of that wider VFI
2 cohort and the narrower, vulnerable to being drawn into
3 terrorism cohort, we know about which we are speaking.
4 Whether there should be a difference between the two is
5 an option for the future and everyone has to recognise
6 that the way that it's currently dealt with is statute
7 bound, so not in any shape or form a criticism of CTPHQ.

8 But, would this be right, that the definitions on
9 any view are not just semantics for CTPHQ? Certainly,
10 so far as the narrower Prevent cohort, vulnerable to
11 being drawn into terrorism, as we have been talking
12 about, that's defined by statute. So that's important
13 because it is a statutory test which sets the limits of
14 what Prevent may do?

15 A. That's correct.

16 Q. To what extent is the definition of the wider cohort,
17 VFI, important to CTPHQ?

18 A. I think it's important across the board, not just to
19 CTPHQ, in two ways. It is important from a policy,
20 legislative point of view as to how the whole system
21 understands the cohort and then what we should do about
22 them. It is incredibly important to operational staff,
23 not just police officers within CTP but policing more
24 broadly and also, I would say, operational staff in
25 schools, in hospitals, in any part of the system who may

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1 interact with one of those individuals because to be
2 able to help people, refer people, consider
3 interventions, you need clarity as to what we are asking
4 people to look for when they are interacting with
5 children and young people. So frontline practitioners
6 need clarity because that enables them to do the right
7 thing and make the right judgments.

8 It also then becomes equally important, as you work
9 through any future process, assessment, referrals,
10 interventions and obviously from a policy point of view
11 it is important because you need to know what you are
12 dealing with and what you are trying to create systems
13 and interventions to prevent.

14 **Q.** Would this be fair, in general terms, that, as we will
15 perhaps go on to look at, one of the current challenges
16 is that there is a large number of referrals coming into
17 CTPHQ as -- sorry, coming into individual regions as
18 Prevent referrals, which ultimately, the assessment is
19 they are not in the narrower cohort, they are not
20 vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism, they may fit
21 the wider VFI cohort and at the moment, regional
22 counter-terrorism units need to do their best to
23 understand which outside agencies might be best to pass
24 those cases onto for further work on their
25 vulnerabilities or risks?

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1 to other agencies. Now, that is quite a lot and I would
2 say that probably suggests the gap that is evident
3 because they are not suitable for our systems and the
4 statutes that bound them but when -- we and our officers
5 and staff, when they look at them, do feel that they are
6 people who do need safeguarding support, more generic
7 support from a system and they require support that
8 Counter Terrorism Policing doesn't own or isn't
9 responsible for.

10 **Q.** Thank you. So I just want to try to bring things up to
11 date because, in paragraph 16 of your statement, which
12 we have still got on screen, Deputy Assistant
13 Commissioner, you made the point that CTPHQ recognises
14 the Cabinet Office body's working definition and, my
15 words, that definition now, so far as cross-government
16 is concerned, is the old definition. So keep
17 paragraph 16 in mind, if you would, but if we could have
18 on screen Mr Emmett's statement, HOM000964, this is
19 becoming a common reference, page 56 HOM000964_0056,
20 paragraph 159, please.

21 I know that you will be familiar with this but now
22 we have the Non-Ideological Extreme Violence, rather
23 than VFI, which Mr Emmett explained the Home Office,
24 paragraph 157 at the top of the screen, is "in the final
25 stages of agreeing" but which we know -- we don't need

35

1 **A.** That is correct. I think -- and completely
2 understandably, there isn't really an alternative well
3 known national obviously advertised pathway.

4 **Q.** There is not a pathway for that?

5 **A.** So people who are concerned, particularly in education,
6 Prevent is a system that is known to them. They
7 understand that there may be a risk or a vulnerability
8 there. Also it is very hard for a frontline
9 practitioner to understand what something is or isn't.
10 When I say "frontline", I'm talking about not police
11 officers, but people who are interacting in schools or
12 health. So definitely there has been a significant
13 increase of referrals into the Prevent system.

14 **Q.** We will look at both the increase in the referrals and
15 we will look at what might be thought to be a lack of
16 a clear standard pathway in subsequent topics, but
17 sticking with this issue of definitions, it is not as
18 though Counter Terrorism Police doesn't have
19 an operational involvement with the wider cohort,
20 because they are getting referred into Prevent at the
21 moment, in numbers?

22 **A.** They are and I think I would draw -- it is referenced,
23 I believe, in ACSO's letter in one of my exhibits,
24 particularly for children and young people, it is circa
25 about 60 per cent of referrals that we are signposting

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1 to pull it up, but see HOM001011 -- now features in the
2 interim guidance which has been published. So 159, the
3 three essential components: extreme violence; no clear
4 ideological purpose; and explicit or implicit intent to
5 shock, intimidate or outrage a wider audience.

6 So that's NIEV. Is that now in use and parlance in
7 CTP as the formal definition of the wider cohort?

8 **A.** It is not a definition that we are using operationally.
9 So, I think as outlined in Jonathan Emmett's statement,
10 I was aware that the Home Office were working on
11 a revised definition, that it was in the final stages
12 and as a result of the guidance that the Home Office
13 issued, I believe on 8 October, my teams are aware of
14 the language because it is language that is starting to
15 appear in policy papers and in discussions. So they
16 understand that the definition is being worked on but it
17 isn't a definition that we are using it operationally at
18 this stage.

19 **Q.** Operationally, you are focusing on vulnerable to being
20 driven into terrorism and the categories that we have
21 explored. Does CTPHQ have a view on this definition and
22 its appropriateness?

23 **A.** I think -- I have thought very carefully about this and
24 also some of the expert evidence that we heard during
25 this phase, of alternatives. My honest opinion at the

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1 moment is I'm not sure that any of the definitions are
2 the final version that describe what we need to and that
3 isn't a criticism of any of the work done by the Home
4 Office or any of the others who have offered evidence.
5 I think it goes to the complexity of this subject, and
6 the fact that we are all trying to get to the right
7 position and the right understanding of what describes
8 this cohort.

9 I think -- I can understand how the definition has
10 been devised. My concern is the potential that it may
11 not include those people who commit violence for
12 violence's sake.

13 Q. Thank you. If it was easy, it would have been sorted by
14 now?

15 A. Exactly. As I say, that is no criticism and we have
16 been engaged with tactical groups with the Home Office
17 on this definition. I wasn't aware -- as per Jonathan's
18 statement, I thought it was in the final stages.
19 I wasn't aware that it had been formally signed off as
20 the Government definition but that's, again, that is not
21 a criticism --

22 Q. I think to be fair, Mr Emmett, if he were listening,
23 would say immediately: it is interim guidance. It is
24 not final in the stage that this Inquiry's consideration
25 of that remains, but it has gone to publication in

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1 A. I think that could be difficult to identify in -- we are
2 talking in the pre-criminal space here, in the
3 prevention space. I think it could be difficult to
4 identify that and I come back to my earlier point around
5 there are -- and I believe some of the experts reference
6 this, there are some people who are intent on committing
7 violence for violence's sake. There isn't a shock or
8 intimidatory or a kind of communicative element to it.
9 This isn't my -- I'm not an academic, it is not my area
10 of expertise, but I can see how that may create
11 a challenge.

12 Q. Thank you. Professor Cassam, as I think you will be
13 aware, at least in general terms, has put forward what
14 he describes as a framework, an alternative, of
15 "Non-Ideological Violent Extremist". Now, as soon as
16 the word "extremist" or "extremism" is used, literally
17 if not metaphorically, your eyebrows might rise, for
18 reasons that I will come back to. But that would, on
19 the face of it, have the benefit of capturing that group
20 of, yes, communicative violence, to shock, intimidate or
21 outrage the public, but also someone who is extreme in
22 a sense that they just want to use violence for its own
23 sake. So it does potentially have the possibility to
24 capture that cohort better?

25 A. I think it does. But equally the "extremist" word then

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1 interim guidance. I think that's its status.

2 A. Absolutely, but it definitely goes to the challenge that
3 we are all grappling with of trying to get the right
4 definition.

5 Q. So the learned Chair, with Mr Emmett was exploring
6 whether indeed AR would have been captured by the
7 "intent to shock, intimidate or outrage wider audience".
8 At least when Mr Emmett would say: well, the test is not
9 have they committed or are they about to commit an act
10 intended to shock, intimidate or outrage, it would be
11 similar to the Prevent test, are they vulnerable to be
12 drawn into committing that sort of an act?

13 But even against that, the learned Chair was
14 exploring with Mr Emmett whether, in the picture that AR
15 presented to CTP before the attack and what was known in
16 the Prevent referrals and what should have been known in
17 the Prevent referrals, whether he would have been
18 captured by that or not. I'm not going to ask you
19 a specific question about that because I'm not sure that
20 it is entirely fair. But, should we take it from your
21 previous answer, that you have some concerns that the
22 third element, the intent to shock, intimidate or
23 outrage wider audience, might be one that sets the bar
24 too high or isn't quite capturing that sense of violence
25 for its own sake or nihilistic violence?

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1 creates different difficulties as to the interpretation
2 and I think this is where I come to with, I'm not sure
3 at the moment any of those three definitions quite get
4 us to the place we need to because they all have
5 elements of challenge or potential -- risk is the wrong
6 word, but potential difficulties with them.

7 Q. Can I just press you just a little bit on that?

8 A. Of course.

9 Q. The immediate and obvious aspect about Non-Ideological
10 Violent Extremist, describing the person rather than the
11 act, but getting away from fixed intent, is that the use
12 of the word "extremist", not as we understand it
13 statutory, but does have a cross-government important
14 policy, which is the definition of "extremism", which
15 was relatively recently updated, as you will be aware,
16 but which, in terms, links to ideology.

17 Now, that is something which could be changed and
18 would not be potentially so difficult to change as
19 Prevent tests because they're statutory. But, the
20 cross-government focus on extremism is important and can
21 you just help us to explain why, for you -- you
22 obviously have doubts about that and I'm not so much
23 interested because it is in guidance, I'm interested in
24 what sits behind that, as to why you think the concept
25 of extremism and including this group in it may be

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1 problematic?

2 A. So I think, it is not so much -- the reason I flag it as

3 a risk is because there are Government policy positions.

4 It isn't so much a position from an operational point of

5 view. I think what I'm flagging there is this can't be

6 dealt with in isolation, it has to be looked at -- if

7 you are using terminology that exists elsewhere in

8 Government policy that has a slightly different meaning,

9 we have to zoom out and take it in the context of the

10 whole system that this definition would sit within and

11 so that's why I flag it.

12 Obviously, you know, Government policy and

13 definitions are a matter for Government and whilst we

14 feed in as a consultant. So that's what I'm flagging

15 there, I can see how that can create potential

16 confusion. It can cause people to question it. Clarity

17 is the most important thing and people having a shared

18 and collective understanding of what a definition or who

19 terminology means.

20 If you have multiple different explanations for

21 a particular piece of terminology, in different parts of

22 policy or different parts of the system, what you

23 ultimately end up with is a lack of clarity. That is

24 not helpful, operationally. It is not helpful from

25 a policy point of view. So that's why I flag that and

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1 should or they shouldn't. I think the environment has

2 changed dramatically, the threat environment. Should

3 they be? Could they be? Potentially. We are clear

4 sometimes some of those behaviours can reach into

5 terrorism thresholds, which is what we, obviously in

6 CTP, are concerned with and apply our legislation and

7 our policies to. But not always. I think what you are

8 describing there starts to ask some fundamental

9 questions of how we describe some of these things,

10 across government, across communities. They are

11 considerations, I am sure, for Government and others.

12 I think in the prevention space, the bit we have to

13 perhaps zoom out and think about is definitions are

14 important but it is about how do we prevent. So some

15 things we can deal with generically because some of the

16 behaviours you talk about there don't just feature in

17 violence, they feature in things like criminal

18 exploitation and others. So how do we create a system

19 that is agile enough to deal with what are currently

20 presenting as threats but what might present as threats

21 in three, four, five years' time, because some of the

22 things that you have described there like common -- and

23 those type of things, they are of a moment now but we

24 need to be careful of not designing a system around

25 specifics, when we need a system that's going to be

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1 come to my conclusion that perhaps, at the moment, none

2 of them are quite at the point that has sufficient

3 clarity and removes as much confusion as possible.

4 Q. There might be a body of thought that would be along the

5 lines of, if you look at the way that societal threats

6 are changing and the role of the online environment in

7 them, in fact, including this type of behaviours, that

8 which Government is trying to grapple with, the

9 NIEV-type risk, but including groups like the Com

10 networks and those niche communities, should now be

11 recognised as part of an extremist threat, even though

12 they don't qualify for the different concept of

13 terrorism.

14 So leaving the consistency point aside, the

15 challenge would be, isn't it time to recognise that

16 an extreme fascination with violence in its own sake,

17 the cultivation of vulnerable people online, forcing

18 them to harm themselves in organised nihilistic groups

19 who are inflicting that sort of harm for its own sake,

20 or in some cases for extortion purposes, should be

21 recognised as extremism?

22 A. I'm pausing as I think -- I mean, I think the fact that

23 even in internationally, those types of crimes is dealt

24 with in different ways, again, goes to the challenge

25 here. I'm not sure I have got a fix on whether they

42

1 agile enough that the threat may continue to evolve in

2 what is a very fast-moving online environment. So those

3 would be my observations.

4 Q. Thank you. Can I turn next, please, to looking at size

5 and characteristics of these cohorts because that's

6 something in which Counter Terrorism Police have been

7 involved. So could we look please at page 9

8 CTPHQ000409_0009, paragraph 27 of your statement, to

9 start our consideration of this issue.

10 So page 9, paragraph 27, please. You helpfully

11 explain there, Deputy Assistant Commissioner, that.

12 "CTPHQ undertook a piece of analytical work in

13 August 2025 in which a quantitative assessment was

14 undertaken of 1551 possible individuals who matched the

15 [Cabinet Office body's] VFI definition."

16 And you explain that:

17 "From this pool, 21 individual cases were

18 dip-sampled and categorised into a qualitative dataset

19 and then scored against an in-depth literature review to

20 analyse whether violence fixation was the causal driver

21 of non-ideological extreme violence (NIEV) or one of

22 many factors to be considered."

23 So that's the piece of work that I want to look at

24 with you. So you say, as your headline, that that

25 report:

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1 "... made one key judgement with a high confidence
2 rating, namely [that] 'it is highly unlikely that
3 violence fixation, when flagged in isolation, will act
4 as a reliable predictor of an individual's risk of
5 mobilising to non-ideological extreme violence.'"

6 Yes?

7 A. That's correct.

8 Q. We may come back to that when we look at aspects in
9 relation to online harms and online risks. Just to
10 preface that just a little bit, that if violence
11 fixation, which may -- not always, but may often be
12 an online matter, I think one of the aspects that is
13 important in that is that, taken on its own, is not
14 going to be a sufficient indicator of somebody who is
15 going to go on to create real-world violence, and so any
16 attempt to be involved in mass analysis of that group
17 would be risking a very large number of false positives?

18 A. I believe that is correct.

19 Q. Thank you. If we go -- before we look at the research
20 paper or the summary that was derived from the research,
21 could we just look, still within your statement, at
22 page 10, CTPHQ000409_0010, paragraph 31, because you
23 gave some caveats, I think, to this work:

24 "Whilst these conclusions are useful for informing
25 future research and analysis it is important to note the

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1 trajectory of the cohort of individuals known to police
2 who are assessed to meet the definition of VFIs."

3 All right? Then, in the second paragraph:

4 "When looking for individuals meeting the current
5 definition of VFI ..."

6 And there is the reference to the Cabinet Office
7 body's definition:

8 "... within data from UK Police Forces as well as
9 Prevent Case Management, 1551 unique individuals were
10 identified as meeting the definition over a four-year
11 period ..."

12 So we see, in terms of the cohort overview, that
13 this wasn't limited to Counter Terrorism Police, it
14 seemed to be drawing information in from UK police
15 forces as well as from the Prevent case management.
16 Have we understood it correctly?

17 A. That is correct. I will dwell, if you will forgive me,
18 on the sort of data clarity point. This was -- we
19 almost set our teams an impossible task here because
20 I wanted them to help us try to understand what data was
21 available and draw some conclusions from it, firstly, to
22 help us understand more and then, to think about what
23 could the system -- and I don't just need CTP, I mean
24 the whole system -- to do differently to manage this
25 cohort.

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1 limitations of this exercise noting that there was no
2 clearly defined definition beyond the [Cabinet Office
3 body's] approach referenced above, and this was not
4 a category of data forces were specifically collecting
5 prior to the request. This meant that data returns were
6 dependent on individual force's ability to interrogate
7 these data aspects on their individual crime and
8 intelligence databases and retrospectively match them to
9 the definition provided."

10 All right? So, if you will forgive me, we have done
11 our statistical bit, that there are caveats to that and
12 it is on the record. Against that background, can we go
13 to the research itself, please, so it is CTPHQ000171
14 please.

15 So if we could have the top half of the screen
16 highlighted please. Just the background, so:

17 "CTPHQ Analysis & Research ..."

18 No doubt, does what it says on the tin:

19 "... has produced two papers on ... (NIEV) and
20 a subset of those engage in NIEV, Violence Fixated
21 Individuals ... These have been published
22 simultaneously and written to complement each other.
23 The papers focus on the characteristics associated with
24 NIEV that might help to aid identification prior to
25 their mobilisation to violence, and the size and

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1 It is only police data and police forces. There
2 isn't a VFI offence. So there isn't a dataset where
3 they can say how many people were arrested for X. There
4 isn't a flag on a system for VFI because it was new
5 language. So, it is most definitely imperfect data and
6 even within Prevent, we only have the data that comes in
7 because people have referred cases that potentially
8 aren't suitable for Prevent but they haven't had another
9 place.

10 It also doesn't include any data from the likes of
11 children's social care, education. So it is a really
12 informative product. I'm conscious we have used the
13 words, is it a good "proxy dataset"? It is to some
14 degree but only because it is the only data proxy
15 dataset we have, not because it's necessarily the best
16 or the most appropriate one. So I do think there are
17 a lot of unknowns in the data that we just don't have
18 access to at the moment.

19 Q. Thank you. If this is helpful to you, the spirit in
20 which we are seeking to explore this and other such
21 assessments is not to find the perfect one that says --
22 tells us the size of the cohort but to see what is out
23 there in terms of the size, because any assessment of
24 the best route in the future does need to take some
25 account of the size but I think, if I may put it in this

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1 way, you are preaching to the converted in the sense
2 that we all recognise that there is no perfect
3 assessment. I am not going to this to say that it was
4 a perfect assessment. If you look at paragraph 3, we
5 should also just note that another caveat in relation to
6 this research was that the return rate, I think, was
7 73 per cent from forces. So even before you get to what
8 other cases not visible to the police, may have been in
9 social care, this was, I think, 73 per cent of forces
10 who returned?

11 A. That's correct.

12 Q. Thank you. So, if we can go to the last paragraph on
13 this first page, please. Thank you. It is helpful in
14 looking at trends, I think. So because this was looking
15 at a multiyear analysis, it says:

16 "Based on the compiled data, the number of VFIs has
17 trebled in 2024/25, compared to the last three years and
18 it is likely this trend will persist into 2025/26. It
19 is assessed that this increase, which was seen most
20 prominently between January and March 2025, is likely
21 due to increased awareness (both from the public and
22 frontline workers) as well as heightened tensions as
23 a result of the Southport attack and subsequent trial."

24 So the reference in the tripling of the numbers,
25 which has cascaded out to a number of other documents

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1 but I think what the horrific events in Southport did
2 was bring those into the consciousness of a much wider
3 audience and then there are have been things that have
4 also happened within that time period, which is why
5 I feel this is a sustained increase now, not a spike.

6 Q. Thank you. So I was going to come back to the more
7 recent figures a little bit later, but just getting
8 ahead of that just a little bit, if this had been caused
9 by a temporary raising of awareness and only a sense of
10 perhaps appropriate caution, but professionals taking
11 a very precautionary approach and saying: I had better
12 refer everything, see the horrors of the Southport
13 attack, one might have expected a spike but with the
14 spike then subsiding.

15 I think the point you are making is it has
16 continued, and would this be right, that although there
17 would be -- it may be that you can only answer this
18 anecdotally -- although, as I have understood it, CTPHQ
19 may say there are some referrals that are poor
20 referrals, would this be right, that the large numbers
21 reflects genuine concerns about violence and very
22 violent individuals and those fascinated with violence,
23 rather than a huge number of wholly inappropriate
24 referrals?

25 A. Definitely. I mean, we do -- I'm always cautious of

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1 that the Inquiry is familiar with, going back to this
2 research that I think this came from, it did flag that
3 there is an aspect of increased awareness caused by the
4 very horrors of the Southport attack, yes?

5 A. Yes, I think there's probably a number of factors that
6 have contributed to that but that is certainly one of
7 them.

8 Q. And the other factors?

9 A. I mean, these are professional judgement, not from
10 an evidence base. Post horrific incidents, we often see
11 spikes in referrals. This wasn't a spike; it is
12 a marked shift and that's evident in the data, with the
13 persistent number of referrals, not just in VFI but more
14 broadly in Prevent. We obviously had the horrific
15 events in Southport and the raised awareness from that,
16 the tensions afterwards, the trial. Some television
17 programmes, the likes of Adolescence, you know, hugely
18 informative, raised awareness about something that
19 perhaps people weren't as familiar with. We, NCA and
20 others have done an awful lot of media around the risks
21 of online harms, violence fixation, the Com network. We
22 live in a different online environment. We have lived
23 through the pandemic, where children and young people
24 were more online than they were -- so I think there are
25 a whole number of things that could contribute to this

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1 saying "wholly inappropriate" referrals, because
2 people -- you know, we would always much rather know
3 than not know, because we most definitely want to
4 understand and manage risk. But there is definitely
5 a case that some, perhaps, could be dealt with at a more
6 sort of routine level or they are perhaps
7 misunderstanding of how risk can present. There is also
8 then a volume which are not -- bear in mind we are
9 a counter-terrorism system -- and I am always cautious
10 of saying that because it isn't that we don't want to
11 know, we have a public safety duty, we are just not
12 equipped to deal with some of the things that are being
13 referred to us -- there is definitely a bulk of
14 referrals where people are concerned about
15 vulnerabilities and violence and that's why they are
16 flagging them.

17 There is an anxiety, I would say, in frontline
18 practitioners as a result of the understanding and the
19 fear of knowing something about a child or a vulnerable
20 person and them not having acted on it or not
21 potentially feeling like they have the tools to deal
22 with it, so that is definitely a contributing factor.

23 I would also say an increase in referrals, there are
24 some that are absolutely for Prevent and the raised
25 awareness that is meant that people have become less

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1 reticent to refer things that most definitely sit in our
2 field. So it is a continuum of different factors.
3 **Q.** All right. I am going to come to several parts of the
4 rest of this paper but the next point to draw out is the
5 important conclusion at the bottom of this page. So it
6 says:
7 "Currently, it is assessed to be highly likely that
8 many categorised as VFIs are not being actively managed
9 by Police or Prevent due to the individuals not being of
10 CT concern, potentially leading to significant unmanaged
11 risk."

12 Yes?

13 **A.** That is correct.

14 **Q.** And would that still be your assessment now --
15 I appreciate this is a research paper, but is that still
16 a concern which, professionally, you hold?

17 **A.** Yes. I think in two different guises. Firstly, because
18 there isn't a mechanism or a route for those people --
19 I come back to my point, we don't know what we don't
20 know. So there could be cases that police aren't
21 managing or partners because we don't know they exist.
22 So there's that aspect.

23 Then from a CT perspective, yes, because we are
24 bound by our statutes, which is correct because we are
25 a CT and a national security system, but we then have to

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1 **A.** Yes. I mean, clearly if people are criminal convictions
2 there are processes to manage them if they present
3 a risk. If they are at the point where they are being
4 investigated because there is evidence that they are
5 committing offenses, they would potentially be managed by
6 police. But when you are in this prevention space,
7 criminal justice levers and tools, they are not the
8 tools that are available. So we have legal and criminal
9 justice levers in policing. So it is what system is
10 managing those when those powers aren't engaged.

11 **Q.** So in very simplified terms, it is not the answer to
12 this: well, they don't fall into Prevent territory, but
13 it is okay because they are clearly territorial policing
14 territory. That is not the case because they don't all
15 have convictions or serious enough convictions that they
16 are going to be, for example, managed under MAPPA?

17 **A.** Definitely or, as I say, just any other -- engage any
18 other criminal powers in legislation for investigation.
19 We obviously don't own prevention tools in policing or
20 the powers to deliver them.

21 **Q.** Thank you. Then you go on to say:

22 "... either due to lack of criminal conviction or
23 not being vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism ..."

24 And there's that critical phrase again. So, Prevent
25 can't act because they don't come within the statutory

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1 refer cases into other parts of the system and then
2 obviously, as we have discussed at various parts of the
3 Inquiry, how those -- there isn't a consistent system to
4 manage those cases. So it is twofold.

5 **Q.** So if we can draw back just from this paper for a moment
6 and just go back to your statement at page 10,
7 CTPHQ000409_0010, paragraph 30 please. You give some
8 explanation here as to what lies behind that quote that
9 we saw a moment ago about, "therefore unmanaged risk".
10 So the intro is:

11 "The assessment also concluded that it is currently
12 highly likely that many of those categorised as VFIs are
13 not being actively managed."

14 So that is the passage that I just took you to
15 a moment ago, but you explain that a little bit more
16 than is in the paper in this paragraph of your
17 statement. So it is:

18 "... either due to a lack of criminal
19 conviction ..."

20 So just pausing there. When the research paper
21 conclusions referred to "not being managed by police or
22 Prevent". The police bit, I think in your statement,
23 you are flagging there may be a lack of criminal
24 conviction. So they are in the, potentially,
25 pre-criminal space?

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1 test:

2 "... potentially leading to significant unmanaged
3 risk."

4 But then you say this:

5 "This reflects the central gap discussed throughout
6 [your] statement: there is at present no identifiable
7 national home for the assessment and management of the
8 risk posed by VFIs ..."

9 I pause there to say you are talking about VFIs in
10 that wider cohort sense:

11 "... who fall outside the statutory boundaries of
12 the Prevent programme. [They] will however be known to
13 local policing and likely other wider services and could
14 be subject to other non-VFI specific prevention and
15 safeguarding activity."

16 Of course, we will come back to that because that's
17 the other issue of what the other pathway might be. So
18 just to round this off, if we can go back to the paper
19 to draw out other significant aspects of it, please,
20 CTPHQ000171, page 2 CTPHQ000171_0002. We see in the
21 first paragraph, again, just to get some useful
22 information out of this, second line:

23 "It is highly likely that potential VFIs will be
24 flagged to policing between the age of 12 to 16 ... 86%
25 of all cases with an accurate date of birth relating to

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1 individuals aged 18 years or younger at the time of
 2 reporting."
 3 So a very large majority of those identified in this
 4 were under 18?
 5 **A.** That is correct.
 6 **Q.** Thank you. Then, we see in the second paragraph:
 7 "While education remains the biggest source of
 8 referrals into Prevent, and therefore a focus on minors
 9 should be expected within the data (it should be noted
 10 that being a minor in itself is not a social risk factor
 11 and those on the pathway to violence will present
 12 a unique interplay of factors that are highly
 13 individualistic and may co-exist) ..."
 14 Then this:
 15 "... there is nonetheless a concern that minors with
 16 developing faculties for critical thinking may be being
 17 routinely exposed to extreme violence online."
 18 Then a reference to the 2024 Ofcom report, which:
 19 "... identified that many children in their sample
 20 were encountering violent content online without seeking
 21 it out. In the dataset, one case outlined that
 22 an individual was targeting a fellow minor via Snapchat
 23 with threats and images of extreme violence, including
 24 dismembered bodies, a video of someone being shot in the
 25 head, execution [as well as] pornographic videos."

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1 caution in referring to neurodivergence in particular as
 2 a risk factor as opposed to a vulnerability, which this
 3 paper in fact comes back to, I think you would agree,
 4 I know you followed some of the evidence, that again,
 5 with the expert cadre and Mr Emmett's evidence, that
 6 there seems to be a consistent pattern of the broad
 7 areas of risk factors that are involved but very much
 8 turning on individual cases?
 9 **A.** I think that is the reality. They can present in
 10 different proportions in different ways, in every single
 11 case.
 12 **Q.** Thank you, and then the third paragraph says that:
 13 "It is likely that the risk factors and warning
 14 behaviours exhibited by perpetrators of NIEV are the
 15 same as Self-Initiated Terrorists ... While the
 16 characteristics of perpetrators of NIEV and
 17 [Self-Initiated Terrorists] will not always be
 18 identical, in CTP's judgement they will likely
 19 correlate."
 20 Then examples are given of that, of:
 21 "... propensity to violence, criminality and
 22 loneliness."
 23 With a recommendation for further work, and then the
 24 next paragraph:
 25 "It is highly unlikely that violence fixation, when

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1 What not, obviously, seeking to be based in academic
 2 research or the academic literature, the professional
 3 judgement was a strong expression of concern that, for
 4 minors who are still, in neurodevelopmental terms,
 5 immature, this may be being driven by extreme violence
 6 online?
 7 **A.** Yes, I mean, on a human level, it cannot be good for
 8 developing minds to be exposed to horrific and harmful
 9 material in the volumes and the frequency that is
 10 available online, would be my professional judgement.
 11 **Q.** Thank you. Then over to page 3 CTPHQ000171_0003,
 12 please. I will deal with this as briefly as I may,
 13 given the importance of this, but it may be thought
 14 consistent with other Phase 2 evidence that the Inquiry
 15 has heard. So:
 16 "A literature review undertaken by CTPHQ identified
 17 six principal strands of risk factors ...
 18 "Violence;
 19 "Personality traits;
 20 "Mental ill-health;
 21 "Neurodivergence;
 22 "Personal Grievance; and ...
 23 "Misanthropic ... Nihilistic beliefs ..."

24 Again, the Inquiry is now familiar with those
 25 through its Phase 2 work and with the caveat about

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1 flagged in isolation, will act as a reliable predictor
 2 of individual's risk of mobilising to non-ideological
 3 extreme violence ..."
 4 Just pausing there, that is the point that we
 5 touched on, I think, earlier on --
 6 **A.** Yes.
 7 **Q.** -- that the fascination itself is not a sufficiently
 8 reliable predictor so you need more, and it goes on to
 9 identify:
 10 "It is almost certain that perpetrators of NIEV will
 11 have experienced a unique combination of psychological
 12 and social risk factors that subsequently influence
 13 their pathway to violence."
 14 So there, writ large, is the individual assessment
 15 of each case?
 16 **A.** And it also won't only depend on what risk factors are
 17 present but also what protective factors are present
 18 that may change or alter the outcome. So it is
 19 incredibly individual and case specific decision-making.
 20 **Q.** Thank you. So the conclusion there is:
 21 "Consideration of a range of factors, in addition to
 22 violence fixation, will improve the ability to identify
 23 those at risk of committing ..."
 24 These acts. Then, if we can just skip the next
 25 paragraph and go to the one after that, please:

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1 "There is a realistic possibility that traits
2 associated with neurodivergence will increase exposure
3 to co-existing risk factors, such as social isolation,
4 or perceived injustices, which in turn influences their
5 pathway to violence. However, it is almost certain that
6 neurodivergence in isolation is not a causal driver of
7 NIEV. The literature review highlighted that
8 neurodivergence continues to present a greater
9 prevalence in offending populations compared to the
10 general population. However, it is almost certain that
11 neurodiversity individuals, without co-existing factors,
12 will not go on to conduct NIEV."
13 So the broad emphasis of that paragraph, I think --
14 and you will see why I said that it is important to come
15 back and read this page as a whole, because at the top
16 it says "risk factor: neurodivergence" but there is
17 complexity that sits behind that and, as with other
18 evidence we have heard, this research piece was pointing
19 towards neurodivergence importance because of how it
20 interrelates with other aspects of risk, so those who
21 are neurodiversity may be more vulnerable. Effects of
22 neurodivergence and social aspects may mean they have
23 difficulties in the area of social isolation and
24 perceived injustices, not direct cause: autism causes
25 violence?

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1 **Q.** So again, would it be fair to conclude that while one
2 must make allowance for the effects of Southport on
3 reporting rates, the international trends would also
4 point towards this being something significant and
5 sustained?
6 **A.** This is definitely something that is of concern to
7 international partners. It isn't something that's
8 unique to the UK. And I think, as you have pointed out
9 on a number of categories, there is no one single factor
10 that is a factor that will be a reliable indicator of
11 mobilisation to violence. It is an interplay between
12 multiple different things and different vulnerabilities.
13 **Q.** Thank you. I'm going to turn next to the equivalent
14 Prevent data. Would that be a convenient moment to take
15 our mid-morning break?

16 **SIR ADRIAN FULFORD:** 15 minutes. We will sit just after
17 11.45 am.

18 (11.31 am)

19 (A short break)

20 (11.47 am)

21 **SIR ADRIAN FULFORD:** Yes, Mr Moss.

22 **MR MOSS:** Thank you, sir. Deputy Assistant Commissioner,
23 before the break we were on the topic on the size of the
24 cohort and characteristics of the cohort. Can we just
25 have your third witness statement back on screen,

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1 **A.** As I say, that was the findings from the papers. We are
2 absolutely clear there are no causal link between
3 neurodivergence and NIEV or indeed terrorism and I think
4 Dr Taylor was -- put a very valid point there about the
5 risk of double-selected cohorts. We are looking at
6 referrals that may have clearer diagnosis than others.
7 So there is real care that needs to be taken around the
8 subject of neurodivergence and how it features in
9 casework.

10 **Q.** Thank you, and just finally over the page, please,
11 page 4 CTPHQ000171_0004. The top paragraph:

12 "It is highly likely that a perpetrator of NIEV will
13 adopt misanthropic and nihilistic ideas, however these
14 will play a lesser role in their pathway to violence.
15 In isolation, possession of these ideas is not
16 a reliable indicator for mobilisation to NIEV."

17 So just pausing there. A little bit like
18 fascination with violence, merely having misanthropic or
19 a nihilistic idea is a poor predictor. But then:

20 "In 2024, the Global Terrorism Index reported a 270%
21 increase in violent attacks where the ideological
22 motivation was unclear or undetermined, rising from
23 14 in 2023 to 52 in 2024."

24 Yes?

25 **A.** That's correct.

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1 please, and it is page 10, CTPHQ000409_0010
2 paragraph 32.

3 You, very helpfully, towards the bottom of the page
4 set out the statistics. So at the time of your
5 statement, you said:

6 "The Home Office published its official statistics,
7 'Individuals referred to and supported through the
8 Prevent programme, April 2024 to March 2025' ... on
9 6 November 2025."

10 You don't need to turn that up, sir, but you can see
11 on screen the reference is CTPHQ000412 for that, in due
12 course.

13 **SIR ADRIAN FULFORD:** Yes, thank you.

14 **MR MOSS:** That notes that in the period from July 2024, so
15 one notes that is the post-Southport attack phase:

16 "... to 31 March 2025, there were
17 6,350 referrals ..."

18 And over the page, please, CTPHQ000409_0011:

19 "... made to Prevent. This represents a large
20 increase of 34% (up from 4,722 referrals) compared to
21 the same period in year ending March 2024 and [a] 37%
22 increase ... compared [with] the same period in year
23 ending March 2023."

24 So I'm not particularly interested in the difference
25 between the 34 and the 37 per cent, but there is

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1 a significant increase in the referral rates immediately
2 after Southport.

3 There's then, in paragraph 33, more information
4 given in your colleague, Assistant Commissioner,
5 Lawrence Taylor's evidence, to the Chair of the Home
6 Affairs Committee. But for my purposes, it is
7 sufficient to look at the position as explained in
8 paragraph 34 of your statement. So just a little bit
9 further down, where you go to the latest version of the
10 Home Office statistics, published on 6 August of this
11 year and that shows that 10,293 referrals relating to
12 9,957 individuals were received in the 12-month period
13 from October 2024 to September 2025.

14 So, these are not always the same months within the
15 year, they are rolling. But the October 2024 to
16 September 2025 period shows an increase of 39 per cent
17 on the previous 12 months and the highest ever recorded
18 number of referrals in a 12-month period.

19 So, far from any Southport spike receding and going
20 down, there is not only your sustained level but
21 actually still going up?

22 A. Yes, absolutely. We are seeing a continual increase
23 year on year. Pre-the figures that you have talked
24 about there, we would broadly receive between 6 and
25 7,000 referrals a year and it fluctuated and as you can

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1 the multiple different stages and the relevant legal
2 tests and our conclusions are then -- that there is no
3 concern, or that they need to be referred elsewhere to
4 wider parts of the system.

5 Q. Thank you. So that is the overall figures. Mindful of
6 your Dyfed-Powys background and your current role, can
7 we just look specifically at the position in Wales, for
8 the moment. Can we have CTPHQ000433.

9 Just to get our bearings on this, this is
10 a 30 January 2026, see the date bottom left, report.
11 Counter Terrorism Police Wales analysis and research.
12 And the title of the report:

13 "What is the scale, trajectory and nature
14 (characteristics) of those who meet the current
15 definition of Violence Fixated Individuals (VFI) within
16 Wales' Prevent and Police Force data?"

17 All right? So if we can go to page 3, CTPHQ000433,
18 please and could we have the -- so the executive summary
19 says:

20 "This assessment sets out the Welsh policing picture
21 emerging from the National Counter Terrorism
22 Policing ... report on Violence Fixated Individuals ...
23 [And] provides a Wales-specific interpretation to
24 support proportionate, evidence-led decision-making."

25 So you can see why I'm going to this because it

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1 see, there has been a year-on-year increase. I fully
2 expect the figures this year to continue to increase
3 based on what we are seeing.

4 Q. I was going to ask you about that. Your expectation is
5 for that trajectory to continue:

6 "The 'no ideology' concern categories accounted for
7 the majority of referrals ... whilst fascination with
8 extreme violence or mass casualty ... (where no other
9 ideology is present) made up 8% ..."

10 We should not think that FEVMCA is making up a very
11 large percentage of these but what is clear is that if
12 you take no ideology together with FEVMCA -- and I know
13 there are other categories -- but that is now the
14 largest part, rather than extreme right-wing, Islamist
15 extremist concerns?

16 A. Definitely. I think what it demonstrates is the point
17 I raised earlier of Prevent is a system that was
18 designed ultimately as a system to prevent people who
19 are vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism. It is
20 a CT system. I would suggest those figures are
21 demonstrating that there is a potential unmet need in
22 that there are clearly vulnerabilities that frontline
23 practitioners are so concerned about they need to refer
24 somewhere, and in the absence of anywhere else, those
25 referrals are coming into Prevent. We look at them in

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1 looks specifically at the Welsh position. The minute
2 says -- and note, if you would, the multi-year analysis,
3 so:

4 "Between 1 April 2021 and 31 March 2025, Wales has
5 recorded a sustained rise in potential VFI-related
6 referrals. CTP Wales analysis shows this increase is
7 not driven by higher levels of violent offending, but by
8 a growing number of non-violent individuals presenting
9 vulnerability, safeguarding concerns, and early
10 [indications] of potential escalation. The current
11 demand profile reflects earlier identification and
12 improved awareness, rather than a step change in
13 realised violent threat."

14 Just pausing there. If we could go ahead to the top
15 of page 5 CTPHQ000433_0005. The reasons why I just want
16 to explore with you what may be different in Wales and
17 then go on to why that might be the case, if anybody can
18 say. The "Key Judgements" here, is:

19 "(1) We assess with high confidence that VFI
20 referral volumes in Wales are growing at a small but
21 meaningful pace, as shown by a positive trend line
22 slope ... This reflects sustained demand rather than
23 short-term spikes."

24 So if one were to pause there, one might think
25 similar pattern. But actually if one reads on, we can

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1 see that it is different:

2 "It is almost certain that the rise is driven by
3 improved identification of individuals exhibiting
4 violent fixation, rather than an increase in serious
5 real-world violent offending."

6 But then this:

7 "Notably, Wales has not experienced the national
8 three-fold increase in VFI referrals reported in
9 2024/25, and current data does not explain this
10 difference."

11 Now, other than what's written there, "it doesn't
12 explain the difference", can you shed any light on that
13 as to why Wales seems to have a different experience?

14 **A.** So I think the reality is every region, and even
15 sometimes every force area, will have a different
16 presentation of risk and demand and that will depend on
17 multiple things, social and economic factors, local
18 arrangements that exist in generic safeguarding
19 patterns. So there is a number of different things that
20 could impact on that. I agree with this, I do not think
21 we can explain that difference but equally, I haven't
22 commissioned specific work to say why is Wales
23 different.

24 The reason -- we don't discourage regions from
25 conducting their own analysis, it is helpful because

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1 such as Southport ... have almost certainly increased
2 vigilance, reporting, and referral activity. This
3 underscores the necessity for proportionate threat
4 assessment and structured analytical judgement, as
5 opposed to reactive escalation or misrepresenting risk.

6 "Within this dataset, CTP counterterrorism
7 thresholds are not met."

8 That is put in bold:

9 "Violent fixation and grievance are usually
10 non-ideological, meaning these cases fall outside
11 counterterrorism thresholds by design, not because of
12 a failure in identification or referral processes. Only
13 a small minority of individuals progress to real-world
14 violence and where violence has occurred, it is mainly
15 interpersonal or domestic, directed at known victims.

16 "Welsh data shows that most individuals in this
17 cohort exhibit violent fixation without ideological
18 drivers. While some present credible risks of serious
19 violence, they do not meet counterterrorism[s]
20 thresholds. Risk is therefore appropriately managed
21 outside CTP pathways, through safeguarding and public
22 protection arrangements. [And] risk is currently being
23 managed ..."

24 Then there is a list of them. So: MARAC, MAPPA,
25 public protection and violence units, mental health,

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1 they all work within their own local arrangements and
2 clearly some aspects within Wales are devolved, so this
3 piece of work, as I understand it, was to allow them
4 though about were there any -- it is kind of
5 problem-solving from the ground up, if you will, of how
6 can policing understand the data better to help manage
7 this demand in the absence of a national direction or
8 a national policy and we certainly wouldn't discourage
9 regions from exploring their own data and doing that.
10 But I can't specifically, with an evidence base, account
11 for why it is different in Wales. But I suspect if
12 I replicated this in every region, there would be
13 variances in every region and I would expect that.

14 **Q.** I follow. Could we just go back to the executive
15 summary on page 3 CTPHQ000433_0003, please. Deputy
16 Assistant Commissioner, to save going back to this
17 document I'm going to jump ahead a little bit and ask
18 about the consistency or otherwise with which FEVMCA,
19 and the "vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism" test
20 is being applied. So back on page -- it is 000433, the
21 executive summary, it is on page 3 CTPHQ000433_0003.
22 The same document, page 3 please. Thank you very much.
23 So I have read the start of this executive summary.

24 Reading on, it says:

25 "External events, including high-profile incidents

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1 social services:

2 "However, the sustained upward trend of VFI and
3 growing case complexity mean that continued pressure on
4 system capacity is likely."

5 Could we just check just below, please:

6 "The future core policing challenge is therefore
7 preventing escalation, rather than responding to
8 an increased risk of terrorism. Welsh policing is well
9 positioned to manage this risk through prevention-first,
10 partnership-led approaches, aligned with statutory
11 safeguarding duties and established public protection
12 frameworks."

13 Are you comfortable with the way this document
14 describes the position? In particular, when it says
15 "within this dataset, CTP counter-terrorism thresholds
16 are not met"?

17 **A.** So I would bear in mind they are talking about the wider
18 cohort VFI, not FEVMCA as the specific. So what they
19 are describing there I think is consistent with our
20 position, in that not all VFIs are going to meet
21 Section 36 decision and in fact, a large number of them
22 don't, which is exactly what the statistics call out
23 when we look at Prevent referrals.

24 So I can see your interpretation of -- they have
25 made a very specific statement there. It is not

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1 a document that is signed off by headquarters but
 2 I think what they are pointing out here is exactly the
 3 problem that we are exploring as part of this Inquiry,
 4 in that Prevent has a statutory threshold, it is the
 5 Section 36 decision and a large proportion of these
 6 cases that sit in VFI do not meet that statutory
 7 position. They are not necessarily saying that they
 8 wouldn't get looked at in the earlier stages of Prevent,
 9 the reasonable ground to suspect, but they are saying
 10 that a large proportion of them -- and they are
 11 obviously talking about a specific case set there that
 12 they have looked at in their data.

13 **Q.** I follow, but it is not just the passage in bold. If
 14 you look at the top of the screen and what follows
 15 thereafter:

16 "Violent fixation and grievance are usually
 17 non-ideological ..."

18 Pausing there. Fine:

19 "... meaning that these cases fall outside
 20 counterterrorism[s] thresholds by design, not because
 21 of a failure in identification or referral processes."

22 As a description of Prevent, that's not right
 23 because you can have -- the whole purpose is that you
 24 can have a violence fixation and a grievance, no
 25 ideology, but still be vulnerable to being drawn into

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1 done quite a lot with our practitioners who are actually
 2 making these decisions to go through specific,
 3 anonymised cases to talk about and make sure we have
 4 consistency in decision-making, we have gone round the
 5 regions. Every decision is case-by-case and there is no
 6 single and constant way of ensuring consistent
 7 decision-making because it's always going to be based on
 8 the officer or the member of staff who makes the
 9 decisions within the frameworks. They use the
 10 frameworks that they are given to make those decisions.

11 **Q.** I understand and it must be right and fair to point out
 12 that this is a research document, not a policy document.

13 **A.** Exactly.

14 **Q.** But in terms of testing that understanding of what might
 15 be thought to be quite a complex position, can I put it
 16 this way, had this -- there is no reason to presume why
 17 it should have done, it is a research document -- but
 18 had this crossed your desk, would you have got the
 19 Deputy Assistant Commissioner's red pen out on those
 20 first two lines and said "that's not quite right"?

21 **A.** As always, how something is phrased -- I say this --
 22 I can drive my team mad, saying: I would prefer you to
 23 phrase something like that than like that -- it is a
 24 research document -- all of these documents are designed
 25 to prompt discussion, inside our system and beyond, to

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1 terrorism. In which case, it would be a Prevent case?

2 **A.** It does say "usually". I mean I think here they have
 3 described, in a very narrow sense, a particular
 4 analytical case set. I do exactly accept your point of
 5 these aren't -- again, we are not in kind of "yes" and
 6 "no" positions. Each individual officer will look at
 7 all of the information that's presented to them and make
 8 a decision against the Section 36 test. It is why it is
 9 always difficult to say one category is specifically not
 10 or specifically is; it is about the totality of the risk
 11 and vulnerability that's presented.

12 **Q.** Some outside observers might say this is an example of
 13 the joint letter approach still not being clear?

14 **A.** The reason why I think -- this is an analytical
 15 document, it isn't a document written by practitioners
 16 or about practitioners' decision-making. I think we
 17 absolutely have to separate the two. It is
 18 an analytical product which has looked at specific
 19 question sets to inform responses. It isn't about how
 20 a CTCO applies decision-making.

21 I think we all recognise, even with all of the
 22 clarity that's been put in place, we are still in
 23 a position where VFI, as a broad cohort, do not have
 24 an exact home within any part of the system, far beyond
 25 CTP. What we have done, as I referenced earlier, is

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1 try and help us understand this problem. So I think it
 2 is unfortunate the way it has been worded and condensed
 3 down.

4 Does it cause me huge concern in that it will change
 5 application of how CTCOs will make decisions? No, it
 6 doesn't. It is also a document that's a moment in time
 7 and designed to help the wider system manage this risk
 8 better, which clearly I'm never going to discourage
 9 because we all want to make sure that this risk is
 10 managed in the best way it can be, until there is clear
 11 policy direction and decisions as to how the wider
 12 system can corral around this issue.

13 **Q.** But if you will forgive me just pressing you just this
 14 once, Deputy Assistant Commissioner, when you say, "so
 15 I think it is unfortunate the way it has been worded and
 16 condensed down", I think the answer to my question of
 17 whether you would have taken the red pen out is "yes"?

18 **A.** No, that isn't my answer to that question. I think my
 19 point is, for people who work within this system, they
 20 will read that and understand the nuance. We all
 21 understand -- I am not saying we understand the VFI
 22 problem but we all understand the difficulties with this
 23 challenge and have such an ingrained -- I think there is
 24 a risk that when you are inside something in an in-depth
 25 system, that wording will make sense to somebody who is

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1 a specialist in the system who is analysing this
 2 problem. It perhaps makes less sense when you're
 3 reading it cold as somebody externally and looking at
 4 this document in isolation.

5 **Q.** Thank you. Can we move, then, to what I said I would
 6 come onto -- just looking briefly at Pursue and the
 7 definition of "Pursue" please.

8 Could we have your statement back on screen please
 9 and it is page 5, CTPHQ000409_0005 paragraph 17. So,
 10 you say there that pursue has no formal definition.
 11 It's about two-thirds of the way down the paragraph:
 12 "Within Pursue work there is no formal
 13 definition ..."

14 Is that right?

15 **A.** Absolutely, yes.

16 **Q.** "... however [Counter Terrorism Police] assesses and on
 17 occasion adopting investigations in which the
 18 ideological nature is unclear or as yet unknown,
 19 referencing the uncertainty at a particular time as to
 20 whether an incident is terrorist in nature or not. This
 21 is not unusual in CT investigations which may start with
 22 unclear or unknown motivations at the beginning of
 23 a case and are often resolved to be traditional
 24 ideology-based investigations following further work."

25 Is that right?

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1 need to go into any detail, let alone sensitive
 2 detail -- but does it mean that because the boundaries
 3 of what CTP may get involved in, in the Pursue context,
 4 doesn't have the same statutory bounding, that there
 5 is -- and this isn't a criticism at all -- a perfectly
 6 appropriate degree of flexibility which can be used for
 7 Counter Terrorism Police to be involved in case --
 8 sometimes because it is operational and it is urgent and
 9 imminent and we don't know, sometimes because -- my
 10 paraphrase -- it is not really CTP core work, but we
 11 have specialisms that would be very useful to
 12 territorial policing, so we will maintain
 13 an involvement, even though it is not terrorism-related.
 14 Does that show that, in Pursue, there is a little bit
 15 more discretion operationally than there is in Prevent?

16 **A.** I'm not sure I would characterise it that way. I think
 17 they are completely different pillars of the CONTEST
 18 strategy, working in different spheres. We are firmly
 19 in the law enforcement space here, either in
 20 intelligence or investigation. And I will be cautious
 21 how I phrase this, for obvious reasons, not to go into
 22 the details of how we manage investigations in that
 23 space.

24 So I think it is important that they are not
 25 directly comparable in relation to more flex or not. As

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1 **A.** That's correct.

2 **Q.** Then over the page, please CTPHQ000409_0006. You make
 3 the obvious but important point, that:

4 "[Counter Terrorism Police] will always prioritise
 5 the safety of the public and the rights of individuals
 6 under Article 2 of the Human Rights Act ... This means
 7 that on occasion where it is necessary to protect life
 8 or respond to imminent threat, CTP may take on or retain
 9 responsibility for an investigation/activity outside of
 10 its core role where it is best placed to ensure
 11 individual or public safety is maintained. This may be
 12 because [Counter Terrorism Police] have the best
 13 understanding of the risk due to previous involvement,
 14 where the complexity or scale of the risk means CTP is
 15 best placed to address it, or where the concerns are so
 16 immediate it would be unsafe to hand responsibility to
 17 another agency. On other occasions CTP may provide
 18 support to frontline policing, meaning responsibility
 19 for managing the risk sits with that ... force but
 20 [Counter Terrorism Police] provides additional expertise
 21 or resource, for example, with forensics, interviewing,
 22 or large-scale witness enquiries."

23 So forgive me for getting the whole of that
 24 paragraph on, but that's the full context.

25 So, in relation to Pursue -- and we don't obviously

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1 police officers -- and CTP regularly use our primary
 2 legislative powers under PACE and primary offences and
 3 we also use our TACT powers, but our responsibilities in
 4 our investigations we deal with are those that relate to
 5 CT, national security or have some nexus that would
 6 engage us as a system. We also work with other parts of
 7 the system.

8 I think what I was trying to characterise there, in
 9 the -- not in the post-attack space, but in the
 10 pre-attack space is, we can have investigations that, as
 11 you say, happen very quickly. We are aware of how
 12 threat can materialise very quickly, particularly in the
 13 current threat landscape. There will be something about
 14 that case that suggests there could be information that
 15 means there is a CT nexus of it but in the early stages
 16 we are not evidential threshold tests, we are much
 17 before that. Therefore, if we think we are best placed
 18 to deal with it, either because of an Article 2 issue or
 19 because handing it to another part of policing would
 20 hinder our ability to manage that public safety risk or
 21 manage the investigation, then of course we will
 22 continue to do so that.

23 That happens in all spheres of policing because we
 24 have to not be so tightly bound by, you know, "I'm
 25 a robbery squad", "I'm a burglary squad". That prevents

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1 us from protecting the public --

2 Q. There is a sort of natural flexibility --

3 A. -- no element of policing is going to do that. There is

4 a natural flexibility to do the right thing and we are

5 firmly in the investigation and law enforcement space.

6 I think the Prevent element is -- we are within

7 a statutory duty for Prevent, but we are also in a space

8 where criminal justice powers are not necessarily the

9 strongest levers. Therefore, it is the partnership

10 powers or the partnership interventions and expertise

11 that are sometimes more useful in those spaces and they

12 aren't necessarily skills or things that sit with

13 Counter Terrorism Policing.

14 Q. So, take as read, if you would, the very strong caveat

15 and explanation that you are introducing there, that

16 Prevent and Pursue are very different arms of the

17 CONTEST strategy. I don't, in any sense, want to

18 minimise that or overlook it. I want to, as I say, take

19 it as read, but is there even against that background,

20 this difference, that in the Prevent context you have

21 a CTCO at the Prevent Gateway Assessment stage, saying,

22 effectively, "I have looked carefully at this case, I am

23 extremely worried by what is going on with this

24 individual, but I do not assess the threshold that

25 I have to apply is met, even though, in broad terms,

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1 to believe" decision and they will balance it and they

2 are accountable for that decision. Clearly, we try and

3 gain consistency in that. What I would say is isn't

4 a case of -- in the case you have described -- of CTP

5 keeping it because if something meets the Section 36

6 decision, it goes to Channel. It is about going to

7 a next stage, so it isn't CTP holding that risk. If it

8 met that statutory test and the officer or the staff

9 member --

10 Q. There would be information gathering and then

11 a further --

12 A. -- it would go on -- it would move on to the Channel so

13 it would actually hit the multi-agency space. If a CTCO

14 was really concerned about a particular case and it

15 didn't meet the Section 36 threshold, then, as per all

16 of the policy and just general policing, I would be

17 expecting them to speak to a supervisor. They would

18 say, "Where should this go then? Do we need to notify

19 the local policing? Do we need to speak to -- not just

20 refer it to another agency, but do we need to engage

21 with them personally, to say we are really concerned

22 about this risk?"

23 So there is lots of different ways of referring

24 something to another part of the system. I suppose what

25 I would say, and it is not evident in a great degree but

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1 without going into details, I think there are some

2 aspects of this case that are sufficiently worrying that

3 it would be good for this case to have counter-terrorism

4 capabilities."

5 The CTCO in that case and their supervisor on the

6 Prevent Gateway Assessment, has to say: this is not

7 a Prevent case. Now, of course, all sorts of things can

8 happen in terms of referring the case to territorial

9 policing, to others and all sorts of things. If it was

10 such a high risk, it could be referred for Pursue action

11 and one understands that.

12 But if there was a very big concern in the

13 pre-criminal space, that assessment would have to be

14 applied. There isn't, there, a discretion to say: well,

15 we will keep it in CTP for a bit because we can help.

16 Whereas, the contrast that I'm drawing out is in Pursue,

17 even with all of those differences, it is a little bit

18 more business as usual, in that there may be elements

19 of -- again, without going into detail, but there may be

20 elements of: we can use some Counter Terrorism Police

21 capabilities and specialisms, perhaps not for a long

22 time, just in the sensible business as usual because we

23 can help territorial policing, for example?

24 A. So I will try and break that down. I mean, ultimately

25 every CTCO is responsible for their "reasonable grounds

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1 we have found it in some of our reviews, is because

2 officers and staff are genuinely concerned about these

3 type of cases and they know their system, our system

4 doesn't allow us to deal with them and probably isn't

5 the right place for them, as evidenced in the Crest

6 report, but they know there isn't a proper structure

7 that sits beyond us, we have seen some evidence of kind

8 of risk averse decision-making from some of our CTCOs

9 where perhaps cases have then gone through for

10 consideration for Channel, whereas if we looked at them

11 across the benchmarking we clearly give feedback on

12 those cases, talk to them about why, give them

13 reassurance about the other mechanisms.

14 But there is a human element to this, for officers

15 and staff, because ultimately they want cases to be

16 managed well and they want to support people who are

17 vulnerable and make sure they get the right help.

18 I think that is the demonstration of the challenge we

19 have, in that there isn't a place and a clear ownership

20 for the cases that fall beyond CT mechanisms currently.

21 Q. Right, so this may be an unfair simplification but does

22 it follow, from your answer, that whereas I was

23 beginning to explore very gently, would you want to have

24 a bit more discretion in the Prevent space?

25 I understand your answer to be that, actually at the

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1 ground, for wholly benign reasons, what happen in some
2 cases, is the CTCO might put it through to the next
3 stage, so might go through to information gathering, out
4 of being risk averse, but rather than having that
5 element of discretion that I have explored with you in
6 the Pursue context, I think what you are saying is the
7 bigger picture here is to have the alternative pathway
8 available so that the CTCO has confidence that there is
9 another pathway to which to refer the case that will
10 deal adequately with what may be all those benign and
11 appropriate concerns about: this looks like a bad case,
12 where there's real grounds for worry, but it is not
13 vulnerability to be drawn into terrorism?

14 A. I think the reality is, if we allow the system to --
15 excuse the phrase -- put sticking plasters over
16 something to disguise a problem, we are not
17 systematically dealing with the issue and that, for me,
18 creates risk. It also -- I would come back to -- and
19 I am sure we will come to it later, Prevent is not
20 necessarily the right system for these cases. So,
21 that's why certainly for me, from a strategic level, it
22 is really important that we understand what the right
23 place is for these cases and that will be determined
24 undoubtedly by, you know, recommendations the Chair
25 makes and decisions for Government. But dealing with

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1 Prevent Coordinators, Higher and Further Education
2 Prevent Coordinators, Prevent Education Officers and
3 Health Prevent Coordinators ('the joint letter'). This
4 communication was intended to describe the authors'
5 joint position on managing individuals with 'unclear,
6 mixed or unstable ideologies'."

7 The Chair said:

8 "This is a significant letter, and I have set it out
9 in its entirety at the end of to this chapter to avoid
10 quoting lengthy passages.

11 "The letter provided Prevent case examples of
12 individuals with unclear, mixed or unstable ideologies,
13 which included those who: 'are obsessed with massacre,
14 or extreme or mass violence, without specifically
15 targeting a particular group ([ie] 'high school
16 shootings')'. Later, the joint letter asked recipients
17 to 'consider the possibility of an individual's
18 obsessive interest in public massacres of any kind as
19 a possible signal of vulnerability'.

20 "For individuals with an unclear ideological
21 motivation to be included in the Prevent programme, they
22 needed to be at risk of 'being drawn towards an
23 extremist ideology, group or cause', and in this context
24 the letter importantly differentiates terrorism from
25 other forms of violence. It was noted that the

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1 things on a case-by-case, ad hoc basis outside of policy
2 isn't a long-term, sustainable position.

3 Q. Thank you. That leads neatly into the next topic which
4 I want to explore with you, which is how the Prevent
5 definitions in practice are working, or the Prevent
6 thresholds in practice are working, and the area of
7 whether there's still confusion and difficulty over the
8 joint letter type issue and you know what I mean by
9 that.

10 Together with the alternative pathway, this is
11 really one of the two core areas that I want to explore
12 with you.

13 We should perhaps just start by brief reference, if
14 you and the Chair will forgive me, back to that joint
15 letter because we referred to it but let's just get it
16 on record. So could we do it via the Phase 1 report
17 please. So that's CHAIR000002. Page 56
18 CHAIR000002_0056, paragraph 26. In fact, if we could
19 have the bottom half of the page, that would be ideal.
20 So:

21 "On 25 June 2019, Ms Sara Skodbo, the Director of
22 Prevent, and Chief Superintendent Nik Adams, the
23 National Coordinator for Prevent Counter Terrorism
24 Policing, sent a letter to Regional Prevent
25 Coordinators, Channel Panel Chairs, Local Authority

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1 Terrorism Act 2000 does not define or limit what is
2 meant by 'political, religious or racial'. The authors
3 observed that the individual's belief does not have
4 to ..."

5 Then over the page CHAIR000002_0057:

6 "... be long-standing or deep-rooted. There was
7 a reference to those with an obsessive interest in
8 public massacres, but this is described as providing
9 a possible sign of 'vulnerability' (which, for these
10 purposes, is a 'vulnerability' of being drawn into
11 terrorism)."

12 So just pausing there, again, the familiar phrase.
13 Then 29:

14 "In a critical passage, it was explained that 'Some
15 individuals seek to support or enact TACT [Terrorism
16 Act] offences without a clear understanding of the
17 ideology or cause they are ostensibly supporting.
18 Therefore, individuals whose ideological motivations are
19 unclear, mixed or unstable, but who demonstrate
20 a connection to, or personal interest in, extremism,
21 terrorism or massacre should be given the same
22 consideration for support ..."

23 Those words are emboldened:

24 "... as those whose concerning ideological
25 motivations are more consistent and obvious' ..."

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1 The report notes that that emboldening emphasis was
2 in the original:

3 "Immediately following this observation, the authors
4 stated that the letter was not intended to expand the
5 remit of Prevent. Instead, the guidance provided by the
6 letter was intended to ensure that individuals receive
7 the support they need if they are were vulnerable to
8 being drawn into any form of terrorism, as described in
9 the Act. A further key observation was as follows ..."

10 If we just scroll down a little bit:

11 "'When it comes to preventing people being drawn
12 into terrorism, our responsibility is to offer
13 interventions and support to all individuals who are at
14 risk, irrespective of whether that risk is being driven
15 by a true belief in an ideological cause or group, or
16 whether an involvement to either of these is being
17 driven by other vulnerabilities and complex needs.'"

18 So again, with apologies for the long citation, but
19 we need to have that summary of the joint letter in mind
20 and for those who wish to see the whole letter, it is
21 obviously referenced and set out in full in the report.

22 You will be aware that, in broad terms, the Phase 1
23 report identified concerns at -- the difficult
24 compromise, taking it at a high level, that was being
25 run in that joint letter and whether it had really given

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1 letter to pick up a particular aspect of it, which is
2 not so much addressed in your statement. I don't say
3 that critically. So the letter itself is CTPHQ000220.

4 Sir, I know you will be familiar with this letter
5 but just get your bearings again. So 26 January, going
6 from ACSO, Head of CT Policing, to the Home Secretary.

7 Then page 5 please, CTPHQ000220_0005 and
8 paragraph 32. The Assistant Commissioner had been
9 dealing with other matters and the longer-term position,
10 but he then said this:

11 "We need to strategise for that time, but I am also
12 a pragmatist."

13 Then, underlined:

14 "We need to describe an interim. My position, and
15 our working strategy is that we can and should rapidly
16 explore how we ..."

17 Then there is three bullet points. The first one
18 is:

19 "Formalise what is already the case; that Prevent
20 provides a gateway/referral mechanism for concerns
21 around targeted public violence ('school massacres'), ie
22 explicitly build the de facto wider front door."

23 Then, the second bullet point:

24 "Behind that door, develop a Channel-type response
25 for defined 'school massacre' and similar mindsets,

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1 an effective settlement that was, firstly, appropriate
2 but, secondly, fully understood.

3 So that was the joint letter. Then, if we can move
4 to after Southport. Could we move, please, to the
5 26 January 2025 letter from Assistant Commissioner for
6 Specialist Operations, Matt Jukes to the Home Secretary.
7 So if we start, first of all, with your statement and
8 what you say about that. You just introduce it at
9 page 11, CTPHQ000409_0011 paragraph 35.

10 You say that that letter confirmed that:

11 "... police leaders and the National Crime Agency
12 would also write collectively ..."

13 And we have seen that letter, that's the one
14 two days later and we may look at that later on:

15 "... on the connections between the Southport
16 murders and the wider context of sexual, interpersonal,
17 and public violence increasingly legitimatised and
18 fuelled online setting out a further series of potential
19 measures."

20 You say that:

21 "The majority of the points raised in both letters
22 are considered as a matter of natural consequence of the
23 topics ..."

24 That you have set out in your witness statement.

25 Against that introduction, I just want to go to this

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1 having tasked an international evidence review by the
2 College of Policing;"

3 And thirdly:

4 "Seek [the Cabinet Office committee] support for
5 significant hardening of the system of referrals
6 (hand-offs) to ensure appropriate prioritisation of
7 those referred, and accountability for the action
8 taken."

9 All right? I'm just being careful about that
10 redaction in the third bullet point as to what body that
11 refers to. I just want to seek your assistance in
12 relation to this. First of all, can you just explain
13 what was meant by the first two bullet points?

14 So starting with the idea that Prevent provides
15 a gateway referral mechanism for concerns around
16 targeted public violence, school massacres and where he
17 was saying that already formalises what was already the
18 case, can you help with that?

19 A. So what AC Jukes was doing here, as he has outlined, is
20 he was catalysing discussions to explore options. So
21 the formalising what is currently the case is the FEVMCA
22 policy. That was us formalising our position of: we
23 have already reinforced and put greater descriptors
24 around what can fall within the Prevent categories and
25 I think Lord Anderson referred to it in his report as:

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the Prevent front door has widened just enough. I'm paraphrasing, I don't want to misquote him. Because we accepted, at this point -- this was January 2025 -- we were already seeing those referrals come in and we had defined our policy positions before it.

Regarding developing a Channel-type response that sits behind it, clearly that's not something only policing or CTP can influence. That was the discussions around: well, what are the right interventions for those people?

I don't want to speak for Home Office colleagues but obviously in evidence, they talked about where they have slightly expanded some of the inter-prevention providers that could deal with those specific people who make it through the Section 36 gateway decision.

I suppose, designing a wider system than that is the very challenge that we are talking about and Jonathan summarised in some of his evidence yesterday.

Q. Yes.

A. So that was my understanding. I think what AC Jukes was trying not to do was to constrain our thinking of what is possible. We have explored that at length, we have looked at the legal and statutory gateways and what we can and can't do within those, and we have adapted our system, I would say, to the absolute edges of what we

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concerns about demand. So this letter, and probably many other documents that exist within all of our collective disclosures, we have had so many different thoughts, dreams, to try and think what could work and test them and this is one example of those and certainly AC Jukes and current ACSO, me and others, taking our responsibility of, I suppose, systems leadership in this as a very important factor. This isn't CTP saying: we will only deal with what we can and we are closed to anything else. We were very open to exploring what is possible within the current bounds and that I think is what this describes.

There is a reality that, back to 2009, we were always -- already identifying some of these cases were coming to us. More have come since Southport. We haven't, neither have Government, gone out and explicitly said: those referrals should come into Prevent and I think that's what he is referring to as "it has become de facto". That's not necessarily the desired position, but clearly, we need to deal with what is in front of us and ensure that we are doing that responsibly.

Q. You will forgive me, there was no intention to overlook the 33 and it gives -- he referred to legitimate concerns about that and nor was this particularly

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can, to deal with those within the statutory boundaries that we have. Clearly, going beyond that is a matter then for sort of Government working with wider partnerships, if that was what they chose to do, as the option for those cases that don't fall within the policies as we have set them out.

Q. I'm just keen to understand, just in terms of what different options appear to have been at the table. It is not raised in any sense to say: well, this was being raised for thought, it is different from what the position is now. If that's the case, that's absolutely fine, but just in terms of understanding what at different stages was being contemplated. Because one thing that is interesting about this, on its face, depending upon what the thinking was, which is why I'm seeking your assistance, is that the first part, formalise what is already the case, that Prevent provides "a gateway/referral mechanism for concerns around targeted public violence (school massacres)" seems to say: we are already doing this, we are already receiving, now, referrals for a wider cohort and we should formalise that role that we do have, because on the ground it is already happening?

A. I think I would probably draw you to his paragraph number 33, where he then talks about the legitimate

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leading to a: therefore, what has CTPHQ done about it? It is nevertheless interesting to explore the thinking and also some of the language and I don't seek to interpret it as a statute or a formal policy document, when it was a letter to the Home Secretary. So, please, all of that context is understood.

But, if that's what the first bullet point was referring to, it is also interesting that the second bullet point is referring to:

"Behind that door, develop a Channel-type response, for defined 'school massacre' and similar mindsets, having tasked an international evidence review by the College of Policing."

So not looking over the last bit, that's: let's get an evidence base for it. But one aspect that's interesting about that is, was this thinking about a system whereby there would be a Channel-like process but not Prevent's Channel process but something that mirrored it, that Prevent could refer cases onto, in the -- for the moment, de facto reality that we are getting this broad set in? Is that what it's referring to? So it's not saying: take them on as Prevent cases and put them to Channel because, presumably, then it would have said: give them to Channel. It is developing a Channel-type response behind that door?

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1 A. As I say, this is kind of an everybody thinking: well,
2 what could we do --
3 Q. Yes, I'm exploring it in that spirit.
4 A. Exploring it in that spirit and then obviously, that's
5 moved on. We have had Lord Anderson's thoughts. We
6 have engaged more, we've tested the legal boundaries.
7 So I think what he is describing there is: well, is it
8 possible that there is another parallel -- I hate to use
9 the word "channel" -- another parallel pathway is
10 probably a better phrase, where those types of cases
11 could go, that isn't going beyond -- it isn't about
12 Prevent and that statutory duty, it is something else.

13 Clearly, because it is multi-agency, policing alone
14 most definitely couldn't design or implement that, nor
15 design it. But I think what AC Jukes was trying to do,
16 as everybody has on this really tricky topic, is put
17 ideas into the system for discussion, to try and problem
18 solve what is a very, very difficult issue and
19 ultimately one we all wanted to put our minds to.

20 Q. Thank you. Can you help with what might be thought to
21 be a curiosity -- and again, I'm raising this in the
22 spirit of trying to explore it and just understand
23 what's going on here, but a curiosity about this is
24 that, against the background of the FEVMCA category, so
25 "fascination with extreme violence and mass casualty

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1 it is doing is recognising that we know, regardless of
2 what the FEVMCA policy says, the test for CTCOs is, does
3 it meet the Section 36 decision of reasonable grounds to
4 believe that you are vulnerable to being drawn into
5 terrorism? That is the test.

6 And there are some cases that even in those
7 categories won't meet that test. But does that mean
8 that there are other interventions or that there's wider
9 vulnerabilities that should be dealt with in another
10 part of the system? That would be my interpretation.
11 But I'm conscious I'm interpreting somebody else's
12 thoughts here.

13 Q. Again, are you saying, therefore, that we shouldn't read
14 paragraph 32 as early thinking that Prevent might divest
15 itself of the FEVMCA category and push that to a new
16 pathway?

17 A. I don't believe that's what AC Jukes was saying because
18 I think we have always been clear that there is a small
19 subset of the wider group that should (a) be considered
20 by Prevent and some of whom will meet the 36 decision.
21 So I don't think he was in any way removing Prevent's
22 responsibility around that smaller group. But I think
23 he was highlighting, there is a wider group who don't
24 meet that Section 36 decision-making threshold, that
25 actually do need to be supported in another way by

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1 attacks", that the -- school massacres is identified
2 both in the first bullet point "we are acting as
3 a gateway referral mechanism for concerns around
4 targeted public violence ('school massacres') and in
5 the second point. So if he was thinking about another
6 pathway behind the initial, widened front door which
7 would have Channel-like responses, he seems to be
8 thinking about school massacre cases going there.

9 Now, that seems a little bit odd when there is
10 an existing Prevent category of FEVMCA.

11 A. There is. I suppose, we are getting into real nuance
12 here but the FEVMCA policy doesn't say every single
13 person or every single one of those cases automatically
14 goes through to Channel. I mean, firstly, that would be
15 beyond the statute. What it does is say: that is a case
16 that should be properly considered for Section 36 with
17 all of the other vulnerabilities.

18 I think -- using the school massacre, it is a type
19 or category that's referred to internationally as
20 a challenge that is non-ideological. So I think he was
21 using that -- and I don't want to speak for him because
22 clearly he was the author of the letter, not I -- in
23 a generic term to say: when I say "targeted public
24 violence", I'm talking about those types of things.
25 I don't think it contradicts the policy. I think what

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1 a different system.

2 Q. All right. So just to round this off, in the terms that
3 we have been trying to keep our terminology consistent,
4 we should read the "school massacres" phrase here as
5 meaning the wider VFI cohort, rather than a closer to
6 FEVMCA -- or, no? Maybe I have taken this as far as
7 I can.

8 A. I was going to say I would not want to categorically say
9 it is either of those categories. I think it goes back
10 to, we are -- this was in the early stages and it was
11 part of the reason why we were trying to get consistent
12 terminology because we were all using slightly different
13 terms to describe slightly different things and
14 I wouldn't want to say that is categorically the broad
15 VFI category. I think he is using general language to
16 describe some thinking to catalyse discussion.

17 Q. Thank you. So certainly, while obviously the debate
18 goes on, reform in those terms, I think, hasn't happened
19 in that way?

20 A. No.

21 Q. Thank you. Let's look then at what the policy currently
22 is. So for that, I think, we can take up the Prevent
23 SOP. Could we have that on screen, please. It is
24 CTPHQ000410 and could we go to page 27, CTPHQ000410_0027
25 please, and the top of the page. So under "Overview",

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1 we see the Section 36 test set out and we have covered
 2 that ground.
 3 Under "Key points", it says that:
 4 "The [Act] does not require officers to suspect
 5 terrorism offending of planning, nor does it use
 6 'susceptible to radicalisation' as the legal
 7 threshold -- this is the language used in the Prevent
 8 Duty Guidance and channel/PMAP Duty Guidance. CTCO
 9 decisions must be expressed in the language of
 10 Section 36(3): whether the subject is 'vulnerable to
 11 being drawn into terrorism' -- meaning any terrorism
 12 related offending described in UK legislation, including
 13 the non-violent terrorism offences."
 14 So that seems to be encouragement for CTCOs to keep
 15 very carefully to the statutory language.
 16 A. I think to ensure that -- yes, but to ensure that it is
 17 a statutory process. So we want to make sure that their
 18 decision-making is guided by the legislation, as you
 19 would expect.
 20 Q. Yes. Again, no trick in any of this.
 21 "Early intervention".
 22 If we just scroll down a bit:
 23 "The section 36 framework is designed ... to enable
 24 preventative support. Officers are not expected to
 25 find ... 'points to prove' for terrorism offences

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1 give guidance on the meaning of "reasonable belief", the
 2 belief being subjective, the "reasonable grounds --
 3 objective".
 4 If we scroll down a little bit, without wearying by
 5 reading out the totality, we can see that the terms of
 6 the guidance there and also emphasis on it having to be
 7 the CTCO's and the supervisor's own formed belief. They
 8 have to record and explain it in plain terms and be able
 9 to explain the source for the belief.
 10 So guidance in that respect. Then over the page to
 11 49, CTPHQ000410_0049, please:
 12 "Minimum decision standard ...
 13 "Vulnerability."
 14 If we go to the second half of the page. There is
 15 then:
 16 "Terrorism link.
 17 "The rationale must explain why the concern is
 18 terrorism-linked, rather than only a general
 19 safeguarding, welfare, criminality, public order, mental
 20 health or social-care concern.
 21 "The link may be direct or indirect, but it must be
 22 present and capable of explanation. It may include
 23 terrorist ideology, terrorist-supporting activity,
 24 terrorist material, extremist ideology, reasonably
 25 linked to terrorism, coercive influence by

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1 before ... deciding whether a referral meets the
 2 Section 36(3) threshold. The legal test is whether the
 3 referral subject is 'vulnerable [in bold] to being drawn
 4 into terrorism', not just referral subjects who are
 5 'already being drawn into terrorism'.
 6 "It is not a criminal threshold, a charging
 7 decision, a legal of fact, or a decision that the
 8 Subject has committed, planned or intended
 9 terrorism-related offending. It is simply a threshold
 10 for referral to a statutory Local Authority-led
 11 multi-agency panel so that the extent of the person's
 12 vulnerability to being drawn into terrorism can be
 13 assessed and, where appropriate, support can be
 14 considered.
 15 "This process is not without boundary: Channel/PMAP
 16 Duty Guidance is explicit that support may be provided
 17 early, but cases must not be adopted where absolutely no
 18 terrorism-connected concerns are believed to be
 19 present."
 20 So, in part, I'm going to these passages because
 21 otherwise it would be said I'm cherry-picking things
 22 later on. So on any view, that is set out. Then on
 23 page 48, CTPHQ000410_0048, there is guidance provided on
 24 the Section 36 test.
 25 So, again, I won't read all of this out but it does

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1 a terrorism-linked person or network, or a plausible
 2 pathway into violent or non-violent terrorism-related
 3 offending.
 4 "Prevent is grounded in early intervention and
 5 safeguarding, and includes stopping people becoming
 6 terrorists or supporting terrorism. The Channel Duty
 7 Guidance also recognises that Prevent may involve
 8 challenging extremist and non-violent ideas where they
 9 are part of a terrorist ideology."
 10 Then, just a little bit further down, please:
 11 "Credible pathway.
 12 "The rationale must explain how the available
 13 information indicates a credible pathway by which the
 14 Subject may be drawn into terrorism-related offending.
 15 "This does not require evidence that the Subject is
 16 already planning an offence. The pathway may relate to
 17 influence, grooming, exploitation, online
 18 radicalisation, contact with extremist or terrorist
 19 material, increasing ideological fixation, movement
 20 towards support for terrorism, exposure to terrorist
 21 narratives, capability, escalation, attack-planning
 22 indicators, or non-violent terrorism-related offending."
 23 Then CTPHQ000410_00050:
 24 "The Channel Duty Guidance is clear that there is no
 25 single pathway to terrorism and no simple profile of

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those who become involved. Assessment must therefore be based on the available of information in the individual case, not on assumptions or profile-based reasoning."

Again, I must not take any of this out of context which is why I read the whole. If we can go back to the previous page CTPHQ000410_0049, one of the questions that the victims' teams have raised, if we can just have, please, the section on terrorism link, is they point out that, although that language is careful and nuanced and it does contain the case where there may be a plausible pathway into violent or non-violent terrorism-related offending, as well as all of the more obvious terrorist links set out earlier in that paragraph, that they raise, as a question, whether you think this emphasis on terrorism link has the practical effect of moving the bar quite high for a vulnerability to be drawn into terrorism? The use of terrorism link and the totality of this, read together, is pointing in the direction of terrorist ideology, just by way of its emphasis?

A. I understand why they may think that. I'm not sure I agree and that isn't to take away from the families' concerns. I think we do need to go back to the starting point that this is a programme designed to prevent people being drawn into terrorism. It is a part of the

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ideologies, or confined to -- but there does need to be tangible information that they can make their decision-making on to justify the statutory test.

Q. So you would say that, insofar as -- a critique of this passage may be that there is a lot of emphasis on clearer links to terrorism, terrorist ideology, terrorist-supporting activity and not much said about the pathway into violent or non-terrorism-relating offending. You say that training gives that emphasis and all the ways in which unclear ideology, a fascination with violence could nevertheless, even though it is non-ideological at present, lead them to being vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism?

A. Could, but the presence of those things alone won't necessarily meet the Section 36 -- it is all of these factors and all of the wider vulnerabilities and I think this is where it comes back to, it is very hard to take any single part of the policy in isolation because the Section 36 decision is about all of these things and how they interplay together.

Q. I follow. So as well as the Terrorism Act -- and I said I would put a pin in it and we would come back to it, there is the committing bit. So let's look at that. If we go to page 66 CTPHQ000410_0066, this is the updated version of what I think was previously the FEVMCA

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counter-terrorism system and whilst it is preventative, it is about that vulnerability to terrorism, rather than a broader, generic safeguarding aspect.

We spent quite a lot of time in devising this and working with our teams and our practitioners to understand how to describe this and try to describe it so it wasn't drawing people down the route of: you must have an ideology, because all of our teams have absolutely clear on that.

But there does need to be something that suggests -- to meet the reasonable grounds to believe, there does need to be something that suggests that somebody is vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism, as opposed to any other form of criminality or other things. So there does need to be specifics around that, otherwise actually we are going beyond what is -- and that isn't -- because I completely understand certainly why the victims' families would ask that question, but I think it goes to the challenge that we have got; this is a counter-terrorism related programme and therefore, that is how we have to make our decision-making to meet the statutory tests.

There is, in the training and the various documents that sit underneath, we spend a lot of time with our teams talking about them not being confined to single

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interim policy, now in the SOP. So the headline, section 22:

"Fascination with committing an extreme violence or mass-casualty attack."

Then the overview section:

"Henceforth, 'Fascination Cases' are defined as cases where an individual does not have an identifiable terrorist/extremist ideology but evidence of a fascination in committing an extreme violence or mass casualty attack, the consequences of which may have no specific racial, religious or political motivation."

Then "Themes", I just wanted to pull out a little bit lower down:

"These cases involve individuals, often young people, who show a strong interest in conducting extreme violence or mass-casualty attacks, without a clear ideological motive."

So there, the wording is a strong interest in "conducting" extreme violence or mass casualty attacks without a clear ideological motive:

"The absence of ideology does not lower the risk. Behaviour may indicate planning, copycat intent, or violence driven by hate, online notoriety, nihilism or despair. Individuals showing this fascination, even without explicit extremist ideology, may still be

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1 suitable for [Prevent Case Management], including
 2 Channel, PMAP or PLP."
 3 So, first of all, Mr Emmett's evidence on this was
 4 that the Home Office, first of all, were not consulted
 5 on the addition on committing. Secondly, he said that
 6 the Home Office did have some concerns about that
 7 because there was a concern that it may risk increasing
 8 the Section 36 threshold.

9 First of all, were the Home Office consulted?
 10 A. So if I can describe the chronology -- and I'm very
 11 happy to write to the Inquiry and put this down because
 12 I'm doing this chronology from memory. It will be
 13 correct, but forgive me, I won't be able to remember the
 14 exact dates.

15 The FEVMCA category, as we spoke about earlier,
 16 existed pre the Southport attack. It was one of the
 17 PCMT categories that was agreed with the Home Office
 18 when that system was introduced in, I think,
 19 November 2024, but forgive me because I'm doing the date
 20 from memory.

21 The word "committing" was in that category at that
 22 point, so pre the Southport attack, and has always
 23 featured within the guidance.

24 When we then created the first edition of the FEVMCA
 25 policy, the word "committing" was left out of it, by

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1 and were being considered properly for Prevent.

2 The addition that the Home Office refer to -- so
 3 I suppose in answer to your simple question, were the
 4 Home Office included in that? In the PCMT, yes
 5 absolutely, because those were signed off categories
 6 together.

7 They refer to the final policy, which is this
 8 version which was updated after the interim policy.
 9 "Committed" still featured in that, in the body of the
 10 policy, the only thing that was different was it was
 11 then added into the title of the policy.

12 Q. I was going to say -- could we go this far --

13 A. -- in the title rather than in the body of the document.

14 So, the change -- there isn't really a change. It is
 15 not a case that "committing" was not in that policy and
 16 was suddenly included in November 2025. It has always
 17 been within that category, because it describes our
 18 understanding of what we think the risk factors are.

19 Q. Has it been made -- forgive me for interrupting you, but
 20 is the reality that it has been made more prominent?

21 A. I would have to defer to my team and I would happily do
 22 this outside. I'm not sure if it was deliberate in
 23 making it more prominent. It was merely that is the
 24 definition of the category and the heading represents
 25 that. As far as I understand, but I will check this and

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1 omission, I am told by my teams, rather than by
 2 deliberate design. Very quickly, when we issued that
 3 interim policy, we got strong feedback from our
 4 practitioners saying: why has this word been omitted?
 5 Our general, professional judgement, evidence-based and
 6 I was particularly struck by -- I think it was
 7 Professor Cassam who referenced "committing" quite
 8 a number of time in their presentation, because it goes
 9 back to this thing of, people can be unfortunately
 10 consuming a lot of violent material and fascinated with
 11 it, it doesn't mean it is necessarily a risk factor to
 12 go on to do others. So there is a lot of nuance here.

13 So, that feedback came from our workforce, the team
 14 recognised the omission and I think there was a period
 15 of about 11 days where the word "committing" was out of
 16 the first version of the policy and then it was updated
 17 because the error was recognised and it returned to the
 18 position it had been previously.

19 That policy was interim. We did quite a lot of work
 20 post that, a business assurance process, to see how it
 21 had landed. Were we seeing case that is previously
 22 hadn't passed through various stages in the system going
 23 further? We were. So we were seeing cases going to
 24 information gathering and beyond. So it was having the
 25 right effect, in that these cases were moving through

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1 come back to the Chair willingly, that wasn't

2 a deliberate -- to make it even more prominent than it
 3 had been in the policy before. But if that's incorrect,
 4 I will come back and correct that for you.

5 I would come back to my earlier point in evidence,
 6 which is this is a category that is ticked when somebody
 7 comes into the PCMT category as one that defines the
 8 strongest characteristic. This isn't a -- if this isn't
 9 present, it can't meet the 36 decision, because you are
 10 considering every aspect of the vulnerability, not this
 11 solely. So it is not a pass or fail, if I can call it
 12 that, around a word of "committing". But it is the
 13 professional judgement of the teams and always has been,
 14 pre-dating the policy and the attack, that that best
 15 describes the types of behaviour that could be
 16 concerning. Other violence can still be concerning and
 17 it will feature in the vulnerability factors throughout
 18 PAF.

19 Q. So a fascination with mass casualty attacks without
 20 obvious evidence with a fascination of carrying them
 21 out, do you say that would still weigh in the scales?

22 A. It would still be a consideration, absolutely, if it was
 23 documented as a vulnerability. It wouldn't be
 24 discounted. I think also I would just draw attention to
 25 the fact that this is a policy purely to help CTCOs,

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1 this is to help our staff balance their decisions and
 2 understand the concepts that are in casework. It isn't
 3 a category we push out to frontline practitioners and
 4 ask a teacher or somebody, nor is it a category --
 5 whilst Channel Chairs will see the category, it is not
 6 something -- it is very specifically to help policing
 7 colleagues understand --

8 **Q.** It is internal -- forgive me, I think that is
 9 understood. You have rightly predicted what my second
 10 question, after the consultation point was going to be,
 11 as to why it had been added. But your answer to that
 12 is, in summary: it has always been there, it was
 13 inadvertently left out, that led to concerns from
 14 practitioners who thought that it was helpful because it
 15 was an indicator of greater concern and it has been
 16 re-inserted, is that right?

17 **A.** That is correct and I think I would go back to the
 18 points we have just discussed at length, at various
 19 points. There is a need for clarity for staff and
 20 precision around -- we talked about the 2019 letter at
 21 points not giving clarity and we have tried really hard
 22 to give our operational staff clarity and language and
 23 you will notice in our definition, we use the phrase
 24 "fascination", deliberately. Whereas other definitions
 25 that we have talked about use "fixation". Now, we would

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1 take them on. Now, is that fair or unfair?

2 **A.** I don't think it is correct, would be my interpretation
 3 of that. The Section 36 decision is the anchor point
 4 for whether a case moves through to be considered by
 5 Channel, and that's the reasonable grounds to believe
 6 that someone is vulnerable to being drawn into
 7 terrorism.

8 That can be made up of any number of factors, as
 9 I have described. This can definitely be one of them,
 10 equally so could ideology, so could other vulnerability,
 11 so could other aspects of violence that don't meet that
 12 definition. It is all of those things considered.

13 So, that's the test and that's the only test the
 14 officers and staff in CTCOs can apply. So I think what
 15 you were asking me was: is this a way of shoe-horning
 16 cases in that don't meet that definition --

17 **Q.** To an extent --

18 **A.** -- no, because it is a statutory -- and the officers
 19 will justify it. But it is a recognition that, going
 20 back even to the 2019 letter, officers should consider
 21 these as factors that are risk factors or
 22 vulnerabilities, and that they may contribute towards
 23 their decision-making to reach the reasonable grounds to
 24 believe decision point.

25 I think you -- as we have all said throughout this

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1 say that is a clinical term, it has very specific --
 2 "fascination" is deliberate to be broader again --

3 **Q.** Right, I want --

4 **A.** -- to not confine the definition.

5 **Q.** I understand, but just before we break I want to just
 6 round off this important area, if I may and just stick
 7 with the FEVMCA definition and also what that may or may
 8 not point to in terms of thresholds.

9 So, one view of this, from an outside observer, just
 10 looking at the text and how it has been done, and
 11 I stress that, but an outside observer, one view of this
 12 could be that the emphasis -- and at least greater
 13 prominence being given to "commitment" of FEVMCA in this
 14 SOP, is a wholly benign, well-intended way of helping
 15 CTCOs identify the most significant type of concern, so
 16 the serious end of cases, but one that isn't really, in
 17 truth, related to vulnerability to being drawn into
 18 terrorism.

19 So what I mean by that is, it could look like, if
 20 somebody has got a fascination with conducting a mass
 21 casualty attack, that is a strong indicator that they
 22 should be taken on and, in truth, whether that means
 23 they are going to be drawn into terrorism with
 24 an ideology isn't really the concern. Because that is
 25 the sort of case that is so worrying, that we should

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1 process and in the wider discussions, the central
 2 challenge here is Prevent is a system for a specific
 3 thing. Some of the things that are now being referred
 4 into it don't align to the purpose of what Prevent was
 5 designed for.

6 **Q.** Yes. Partly what lies behind these questions is the
 7 important aspect of your statement, which we will come
 8 onto after the lunch adjournment, that Prevent, as
 9 I understand it, and CTPHQ, remain of the view that
 10 there very much is a narrower group within the VFI
 11 cohort that Prevent should be taking on --

12 **A.** Absolutely. We have always maintained --

13 **Q.** -- and put into Channel discussions. Can I, just before
 14 the lunch adjournment, raise with you the same sort of
 15 hypothetical case that I did with Mr Emmett and you will
 16 know what I'm coming to and you can get your revenge in
 17 first now and say: hypothetical cases are not terribly
 18 helpful.

19 But, imagine a 15-year-old boy who has taken a knife
 20 into school, he has carried out an assault, the school
 21 have concerns about the type of material that he has
 22 been viewing. They have done some sort of education,
 23 school-level intervention. They have had to try to have
 24 a supportive discussion, a concern discussion. What has
 25 arisen out of that is a concern about his interest and

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fascination with violence, but no indication, quite the contrary, about ideology. So the boy is not interested in politics. He is not interested in religion. He shows no sign of Far Right extremism at all or Islamist or any other religious-based extremism.

Arising from the assault, his devices have been seized by territorial policing, perhaps, and what that shows is a mass of gore and extreme violence material and an interest in mass casualty attacks and those who carried them out in the past and not just passive consumption of those, but some indication of wanting to emulate them.

Now, before one gets to any thresholds and tests, to anybody seeking to minimise a risk to the public, that is a very concerning case. And you will forgive me, Deputy Assistant Commissioner, for putting it in this way, but in some ways that feels like a case that Counter Terrorism Police ought to be involved in.

And I know it is a hypothetical case, but in that type of situation, that might be the sort of case where the fascination with committing a mass casualty attack, of which there is some evidence, would lead to that being taken on in Prevent. But in truth, there isn't really a vulnerability to being drawn into terrorism because it is a case of his interest is violence for its

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definitely wouldn't mean he was vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism because it would depend on all of the surrounding circumstances that would go into it. That is the danger of hypothetical cases because without knowing the detail, it is all those vulnerability factors, the push/pull factors that support that decision, but I would definitely expect it to be a case that would progress through at least the first gateway of Prevent and then the decision would be made, based on everything the officer or CTCO had, to say: yes, on those circumstances they do think there is a justifiable belief that they could be vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism, reasonable grounds to believe, move forward.

If not, then I would absolutely expect, as per policy, that those officers and supervisors would be saying: right, does this need to go to a mental health team, to a local MASH team, to a local policing team, and that's where they would then make the decision about onward referrals. That is the point. Because then -- because there isn't a natural system for those, that may mean they refer that case to multiple different parts of the other system because they were concerned there was a mental health issue, there might be a local policing -- safeguarding issue, there might be something for a MASH. So that would be the other alternative.

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own sake. He has no ideology and he is very firm about that.

A. I think there is a lot of assumptions when you get to -- so if you start with the basics of what you have described there. If that was referred into Prevent, would I expect it to meet the first test, reasonable grounds to suspect, and it to move to information gathering? Yes, I would suggest it would. And then there would be a wider information gathering process, understanding of what the schools have done, potentially, if the officers felt it was appropriate in those circumstances, a visit. That's not always the case but it is explicit, in policy they can.

So for me to then predict would that meet a Section 36 decision and would it go into Prevent? I'm not saying it to avoid the question, it is almost impossible to say because it depends on what you would have gathered. You just made a statement at the end there to say he has absolutely no interest in -- well, if we would have found that out during that process, that may or may not have tipped the officer's decision to say does it fall in or does it fall out? It is -- all of those things would be taken together. But it is definitely a case that would be concerning.

I would disagree with, potentially, the -- that

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Q. There are referral options open but just before we break, I suppose it comes to this, that, if in that case, it is at least something of a stretch -- recognising everything you say about the dangers of drawing conclusions from hypothetical cases -- but if in this case it is something of a stretch to say vulnerable to ending drawn into terrorism, but you would say: well, you can't say that he wouldn't be, doesn't all of that point to whether the test of vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism is quite right for that type of category of serious-end VFI?

A. I think I would flip that on its head and say it is not whether the test for being vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism is wrong or right. It is have we got the right mechanisms to support people who are demonstrating those type of vulnerabilities? I don't mean CTP, I mean do we, as a system, have the right mechanism? So I would flip it on its head and rather than using the lens of definition of terrorism, I would flip it the other way.

Q. Deputy Assistant Commissioner, I'm going to try once more and I know that your key point is: let's have another pathway that works and I promise that I will come back to that after lunch. But if the statutory bounding wasn't as it is, would you want the test to be

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1 set there, bearing in mind that type of serious-end VFI?
 2 Because again, it may not be very scientific, but to
 3 outside observers, it may be thought that that feels
 4 like a case that Counter Terrorism Police ought to be
 5 involved in.

6 **A.** I think the reason -- and it is not to avoid answering
 7 the question, I don't think it is as simplistic as that
 8 because it isn't about whether I would want Counter
 9 Terrorism Policing to be the people who looked at that
 10 case, it is more about who were the agencies who have
 11 the right support and levers to be able to support those
 12 types of cases. So it isn't a: CTP or not. It is about
 13 who have got the right things to support those types of
 14 case, CTP, or the counter-terrorism system full stop,
 15 has a specific role and responsibility. Those cases --
 16 of course, if statutory boundaries were changed could
 17 come into Counter Terrorism Policing but, as we will
 18 probably come onto later, there is a cause and effect as
 19 a result of that for what that means for the wider
 20 system, what it means for how we are able to manage
 21 cases and also whether we are the right people, because
 22 we have a specialism in terrorism and national security,
 23 that is the extra -- that's the specialism that CTP and
 24 the Prevent system bring.

25 If that specialism isn't necessarily engaged, then

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1 Channel ... In recent years, the majority of referrals
 2 into Prevent have been closed as 'Non-CT -- referred
 3 on', and that is still the case this [financial year] so
 4 far. These cases are typically signposted out of
 5 Prevent to education, health or local authority partners
 6 for appropriate support. This underscores an increasing
 7 trend where, while many referrals often reflect genuine
 8 concerns, they are not [Counter Terrorism] concerns and
 9 we are not the most suitable partner to address them."

10 It goes on to continue:

11 "So far this [financial year], child referrals
 12 closed as 'Non-CT -- referred on', have increased to
 13 [around] 60 per cent. [And] of that cohort, 70% were
 14 categorised as 'Fascination with Extreme Violence and
 15 Mass Casualty Attacks'."

16 So that gives some helpful information and some
 17 figures upon the numbers of those that are being closed
 18 and referred on.

19 When it said that "these cases are typically
 20 signposted out to Prevent to education, health, or local
 21 authority partners for appropriate support", I think in
 22 your witness statement -- we don't need to turn it up,
 23 but I think you make clear the obvious point that
 24 Counter Terrorism Police, having made the decision on
 25 the statutory test, doesn't have any further role in

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1 is it other specialisms that sit elsewhere that are best
 2 able to deal with those cases? So, it isn't about who
 3 wants the case or not, for me. I think it is about who
 4 has got the right tools and levers to support the risks
 5 and the vulnerabilities that are being presented in any
 6 case, not just our case.

7 **MR MOSS:** Thank you. Sir, would that be a convenient moment
 8 perhaps until 2 o'clock?

9 **SIR ADRIAN FULFORD:** Thank you very much. 2.00 pm.
 10 (1.10 pm)

(The short adjournment)

12 (2.00 pm)

13 **SIR ADRIAN FULFORD:** Yes, Mr Moss.

14 **MR MOSS:** Thank you, sir. Deputy Assistant Commissioner,
 15 still on the question of how the Prevent definitions are
 16 currently working, but turning to different aspects now.

17 I want to ask about those cases that are not taken
 18 up by Prevent and could we look, please, at CTPHQ000209.
 19 We can see that this is a letter from AC Taylor, to the
 20 Home Affairs Committee and the date of it is
 21 17 November, 2025.

22 Could we go, please, to page 3 CTPHQ000209_0003. We
 23 see, in the second paragraph, the figures referred to:

24 "So far this [financial year, around] 20% of all
 25 referrals [have been] put through for discussion at

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1 those cases under statute, or indeed under policy, once
 2 it's made the appropriate referral on?

3 **A.** That's correct.

4 **Q.** It would be different if the case had been adopted but
 5 later closed, because there would be a review process.
 6 But, if these cases, no role?

7 **A.** That's correct.

8 **Q.** And Mr Emmett, in his evidence on Monday stated -- my
 9 short-level summary -- that both the Home Office -- and
 10 I think he extended it to CTPHQ as well, then had no
 11 real visibility of these cases. You don't know what the
 12 outcomes are?

13 **A.** That's correct.

14 **Q.** There's no feedback loop at present for Counter
 15 Terrorism Police to know what the outcome has been or
 16 what actions have been taken?

17 **A.** That's correct.

18 **Q.** One has to be careful to note that it is perfectly
 19 possible that in some -- many of the cases there is
 20 adequate support being given by an individual agency
 21 according to its own policies. But the concerning
 22 aspect, would you agree, is twofold? First of all,
 23 there's no overall system for checking that and,
 24 therefore, doing analysis of how the bigger VFI cohort
 25 fair on being referred to different services?

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1 A. That's correct.

2 Q. And, also, that, taking AC Taylor's letter as a short

3 way to summarise this, also it is a disparate group of

4 individual agencies for the most part. There may be

5 some cases where MAPPA might be used, but for the most

6 part, it is a disparate group of agencies to whom they

7 are onward referred, rather than a single, clear,

8 multi-agency structure?

9 A. That's correct. There is no formal multi-agency

10 structure. On occasion we may refer them into the MASH

11 if it exists in the area. But, of course, MASHs look at

12 specific things under their policy and process, under

13 Working Together. So it is not only the absence of the

14 multi-agency structure, it is the fact that we are

15 putting those cases then into -- those people will be

16 putting them into their own policy considerations rather

17 than through a VFI policy lens, if I could use that

18 expression.

19 Q. Thank you. So one of the questions from the victims'

20 teams in this area, was: if these cases are referred on,

21 as per this letter, is there any adequate mechanism or

22 process into which they can be referred which has

23 an appropriate public protection approach as its focus?

24 A. Not one that is well suited. I have referenced MASH as

25 an option. But I think each of the single agency or

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1 top of 24. So the Inspector sign-off, in particular, of

2 FEVMCA cases, and also in relation to multiple referral

3 cases and fascination cases as well.

4 Those are on one side of the scales. I'm not going

5 to -- looking at the other side of the scales -- I'm not

6 going to go back and bring up the Phase 1 report. But,

7 could I just, sir, for your note, reference, using the

8 paragraph numbers, in CHAIR000002, paragraphs 92, 126 to

9 127, and 142. You will be familiar, in broad terms,

10 with those. They are the key Phase 1 findings in terms

11 of difficulty of understanding the settlement in the

12 joint understanding, but I'm not going to go through

13 that because that's old ground.

14 You also refer, in your own statement -- and we are

15 grateful for it -- it is paragraph 42 at page 14

16 CTPHQ000409_0014, to the review of closed cases and the

17 review of those 239 cases, we see, about four or five

18 lines down, showed that 83, which is 35 per cent:

19 "... were recommended for re-opening or further

20 review and returned to the originating region with the

21 reviewing case officer's rationale."

22 Now, if I have understood the nature of that process

23 correctly, it would be fair to observe that in some

24 cases that may have been actions that should have been

25 taken before a final decision was made. It doesn't

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1 multi-agency structures are for a different purpose. So

2 not designed to deal with this type of risk or -- so not

3 something that is a good fit, I would suggest.

4 Q. Thank you. You will recall, I hope, my reasonably

5 gentle challenge about the Welsh document on

6 understanding and how well the boundaries are currently

7 understood, and I want to just come back to that by

8 reference to some other examples.

9 In fairness to your headquarters and your statement,

10 if we could look at page 18, CTPHQ000409_0018

11 paragraph 54, please. Looking on the positive side.

12 You reference, I think it is in the middle of that

13 paragraph, that:

14 "CTPHQ has undertaken exercises using example

15 referrals to test consistency across regions on these

16 decision points showing strong consistency with only 2%

17 of example cases recorded as being closed prematurely."

18 So it looks like a level of internal work has given

19 a degree of reassurance in this broad area?

20 A. It has. That reassurance work continues; it is

21 an ongoing process.

22 Q. Thank you, and we have looked at it, I think, in

23 a different context but if we go back to page 8,

24 CTPHQ000409_0008 paragraph 24, we shouldn't forget these

25 aspects of additional checks that we looked at, at the

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1 necessarily imply that the overall decision-making was

2 wrong. So there would have been cases of that task

3 should have been done so it was closed prematurely. But

4 the overall percentage of 35 per cent might be thought

5 to be one of concern?

6 A. So those cases were cases that had been existent and

7 been dealt with prior to the formal FEVMCA policy and

8 some of the policy additions that we brought into place

9 and it was really us testing those cases against the new

10 policies to see whether things were outstanding, would

11 they have been dealt with differently. It was a useful

12 test, firstly because we wanted to ensure that if there

13 were any cases that had significant risk, they could

14 clearly be escalated.

15 But you are quite right, what a lot of the returns

16 related to, were not so much significant concerns of

17 unmanaged risk, but actions that we would say: that

18 action should have been conducted, that could have given

19 you more information to help, therefore, they went back

20 to regions. But it was helpful -- I would say it was

21 clearly done at a time of significant demand because we

22 were also dealing with what was coming through the front

23 door, but it was a deliberate decision to look at that.

24 And also, I suppose, reassure ourselves that the current

25 policies we had implemented were picking up the right

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1 things. Because if you applied it to cases previously,
2 it allowed us to make sure that the policy, if applied,
3 would pick up the right things and ensure that they were
4 corrected going forward.

5 **Q.** Just briefing, were there some cases, nevertheless in
6 that cohort of the 35 per cent, where at least applying
7 the revised policy and guidance that had been brought
8 in, where the concern was more substantive, that a case
9 that was non-ideological but should have been judged to
10 have been vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism,
11 hadn't been treated as such?

12 **A.** I don't want to mislead you. I'm not aware that there
13 were any cases where there was significant risk
14 identified that should have been managed differently.
15 But with the leave of the Chair, I will get that checked
16 and come back formally to double-check the detail with
17 my team. But I'm not aware that there were anything
18 that there were of significant risk where they felt they
19 should have been dealt with dramatically differently to
20 how they were, but I will clarify that for you.

21 **SIR ADRIAN FULFORD:** Thank you.

22 **MR MOSS:** Thank you. Then the next aspect in terms of
23 aspects on the scales that may point to difficulty is,
24 in fact, a helpful passage in CTPHQ's own opening
25 statement, so CTPHQ000490. Can we start please at
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1 writing large for us during your evidence today. It
2 goes on to say:

3 "Prevent should not be relied upon to triage a risk
4 which its legal framework neither requires nor permits
5 it to manage."

6 But the reference to CTPHQ entirely accepting the
7 finding that it remains ambiguous, unsatisfactory and
8 hard for ground level CTP officers to implement
9 consistently, without going back to our exchange before
10 lunch, it looks like you would accept or that CTPHQ
11 would accept that it is, at the very least,
12 a challenging area?

13 **A.** I think we absolutely accept this is a challenging area
14 and I think, as I have outlined in my evidence this
15 morning, we have done all we can to clarify the areas of
16 policy and decision-making that we are responsible for
17 within our statutory bounds to ensure that our officers
18 and staff have clarity. In any complex, safeguarding
19 decision-making, there is always going to be an element
20 of ambiguity because you have got to take in such a vast
21 amount of information on a case-by-case basis. There is
22 no easy logic tree or decision tree to follow these
23 cases through because you are balancing multiple
24 different things.

25 So, yes, it is a tricky area. I would definitely
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1 page 7, CTPHQ000490_0007 paragraph 18:

2 "While CTPHQ considers that FEVMCA remains
3 an operationally workable subcategory for CTP Prevent
4 purposes, CTPHQ agrees that system-wide clarity is
5 an important aim for the 'VFI' cohort more generally.
6 Not all individuals displaying signs of
7 violence-fixation will be best served by a referral to
8 a CTP-administered and voluntary scheme. As Dr Taylor
9 put it, '[t]hresholds and gateways are built around the
10 categories, so definitional inconsistency translates
11 directly into inconsistent access to intervention' ..."

12 So that's relevant context but if we then go to
13 page 9, CTPHQ000490_0009 paragraph 25, my learned
14 friend, Mr Butt KC and Ms Shrimpton say this:

15 "In Phase 1, the Chairman found that the relevant
16 criteria remain[s] 'ambiguous, unsatisfactory and hard
17 for ground level CTP officers to complement
18 consistently' ... CTPHQ entirely accepts that finding.
19 CTPHQ suggests, however, that the difficulty lies
20 primarily in the absence of anywhere else for the very
21 much larger group of 'VFI' cases, those which are not
22 suitable for a Prevent referral or those which are
23 referred and do not meet the statutory test, to be
24 referred and effectively managed."

25 Now, that last clause, of course, you have been
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1 say that the VFI area is very tricky and probably some
2 of our discussions have highlight that, with the
3 difference in views around definitions, how easy they
4 are to be operationally translatable, et cetera.

5 **Q.** Thank you. Then the third aspect, just to seek your
6 assistance on here, is the Inquiry's own questionnaire
7 report and can we have that on screen, please, it is
8 ILT000219. So this is the Crest authored analysis of
9 the questionnaires that were sent out on the Inquiry's
10 behalf. So it is dated 24 September 2026. Can we go to
11 page 10 ILT000219_0010, please, for methodology.

12 We see at the top:

13 "Each survey combined closed questions ... with
14 open-text questions exploring narrative responses. Five
15 questions were asked in identical form across all eight
16 surveys to allow group-wise comparisons. [Those were]
17 addressed organisational understanding of VFIs, staff
18 recognition of early indicators, confidence in
19 identification, clarity of organisational process, and
20 staff's ability to take appropriate action when a VFI
21 case is identified end. Each survey additionally
22 included closed and open-text questions, specific to
23 that service's statutory or organisational role,
24 reflecting the distinct functions performed by each
25 service within the wider system. The full text ..."

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1 Is available in the appendix.
 2 If we go to the bottom of the page, please, we will
 3 see in the figures. If we can have the table, if we
 4 may, as well as the bottom paragraph. So in the table
 5 of who responded.
 6 CTP, number of responses submitted: 10. Now, if one
 7 casts one's eyes down the list, that seems very low but
 8 we will see the reason for that in a moment. Slightly
 9 confusingly -- also we will see the reason for this in
 10 a moment -- the number of potential responses was 9. We
 11 have 9 potential responses but 10 responses submitted,
 12 which seems a bit odd. But we will come onto that.
 13 Final sample: 10, response rate "see note below".
 14 Now, this is all because, for very good reason, CTP
 15 was dealt with slightly separately -- or differently,
 16 I should say, to the others. So if we have the whole of
 17 the bottom paragraph:
 18 "Counter terrorism policing ... CTP operates through
 19 9 counter terrorism units ..."
 20 Don't need to tell you that:
 21 "... covering England and Wales (Northern Ireland
 22 and Scotland are outside [the] scope); therefore, 9 was
 23 the maximum number of regional responses achievable.
 24 Each response was completed apply a single nominated
 25 representative after collating the views of colleagues

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1 that we must take on board.
 2 Having dealt with those caveats, could we look at
 3 page 18 ILT000219_0018, please. The authors of this
 4 report, it might be said, were not blind to those
 5 issues. So:
 6 "CTP is treated differently from the other seven
 7 surveys throughout the statistical analysis ... Each of
 8 the other seven surveys captures the individual,
 9 independent views of many respondents; by contrast, each
 10 CTP response represents a single collated position
 11 submitted on behalf of an entire Counter Terrorism Unit,
 12 following consultation among[st] colleagues within that
 13 area ..."
 14 There is a reference to the bit I have just taken
 15 you to:
 16 "Because CTP's responses are not independent
 17 individual opinions but positions agreed on behalf of
 18 nine areas, formal tests of statistical significance
 19 comparing CTP to the other seven groups, or testing
 20 whether CTP's own responses collectively differ from
 21 a neutral position, would not be a meaningful exercise
 22 given what each response represents. For this reason,
 23 CTP's results are reported descriptively throughout this
 24 report, rather than tested for statistical significance
 25 alongside the other seven groups."

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1 within their CTU, that is, each entry reflect a regional
 2 team position rather than one individual's personal
 3 opinion."
 4 So just pausing there. This was an exercise of
 5 an appropriate person taking, collegially, the views of
 6 the teams in the region. Then it explains that:
 7 "All 9 regions responded (100% response rate)."
 8 Then we get the explanation for the odd 9 and 10:
 9 "One region, namely, East Midlands, were represented
 10 twice, by two individuals submitting independently
 11 rather than jointly, which is why the final sample
 12 was 10."
 13 They say:
 14 "We have retained both East Midlands responses in
 15 the analysis."
 16 Now, can I say, first of all, that because of that,
 17 it's a small sample in the sense that there are
 18 "only 10" but it is meant to be seeking the views by
 19 getting a representative spectrum of views. So a single
 20 response reflects the views of a lot of people.
 21 Of course, that methodology could be looked at in
 22 more detail. It is also right that I should acknowledge
 23 that if one is looking at a sample size of 10, but two
 24 of those are the same regional unit, you can get some
 25 statistical effects from that. So those are all caveats

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1 So that's why, when we go through this report in
 2 full and in detail, which I will not do, we don't get P
 3 numbers for statistical significance for CTP.
 4 Can we then go to page 23 ILT000219_0023 and again,
 5 it is important that I don't cherry-pick aspects out. So
 6 if we look under "Shared understanding ..." bottom
 7 third. One of the questions was looking at the extent
 8 to which organisations had a shared understanding of
 9 Violence Fixed Individuals, and what emerged from
 10 that, taking it in short order, and we can see it in the
 11 bullet point, is that:
 12 "Counter Terrorism Policing: Seven in ten CTP
 13 respondents ... agreed that CTUs have a clear and shared
 14 understanding of VFI, which is the highest figure of any
 15 of the eight groups, and reflects a good level of
 16 agreement across CTP as a whole regarding how they
 17 understand VFI risk."
 18 So the concept of VFIs, CTP scored very highly in
 19 that regard.
 20 If we then turn to page 31 ILT000219_0031, please.
 21 It will be the lower half of the page, I think. So on
 22 training, we see a headline:
 23 "Channel, CTP and MAPPA: where training falls short."
 24 "Training adequacy was rated lowest in this cluster
 25 of any surveyed. Over half of Channel Chairs ... rated

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the training and guidance currently available to them as 'fairly' or 'very' inadequate; only around one in four (24%) rated it adequate."

If we go over the page, ILT000219_0032, ignore the top diagram, if we could have the passage "half of all CTP" put to the top of the page:

"Half of all CTP responses indicated that the quality of the training CTUs received was 'poor' or 'very poor'. This sits alongside moderate-to-high self-reported confidence distinguishing VF from ideological risk in the CTP survey, suggesting officers may be drawing on general professional experience and judgement to compensate for gaps in formal training, rather than the training itself providing this confidence. One Respondent noted: 'We were not set up for this. We have been very well versed in the meaning of terrorism and what constitutes terrorist offending but we are not trained or experienced in dealing with individuals with such high levels of complex needs.'"

Would you agree that that is a concerning picture?

A. It is, but I would read that quite understandably, particularly with the comments -- and I'm conscious I haven't seen the detail that sits underneath this, so I'm interpreting this on the surface level rather than on what sits underneath -- that response, "we are not

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confidentiality attachments to the individuals, as you will understand, because there are obvious risks the other way.

Put to one side if you would, that -- the thrust of the second part of your answer and the second part of what one sees on screen. Because the authors of this report were contrasting the training adequacy with what those responding said about their confidence distinguishing "violence fixated" with ideological risk. So they were drawing a contrast. Particularly with the anecdotal comment, "we are not set up for this", et cetera, I think you're saying: well, that's not surprising because they are asked a question about the VFI risk.

But, in fact, the first part, just dealing with the quality of training. That is not: is the system well set up to deal with VFIs? It is asking about training in that area and you can see the figures for yourself in the diagram below. So, "How would you rate the quality of training?" 10 per cent said "very poor". 40 per cent said "poor". So you get to 50 per cent in the lower two sections.

So one can move all you look to the second part, that they have good understanding and it is a difficult area. But that is not a healthy response rate in terms

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set up for this", they have been asked a question in the frame of VFI, which, quite rightly, we have been clear, not all VFIs resist suitable for Counter Terrorism Policing and we -- whilst we do train and have developed lots of training around understanding what cases are suitable for Prevent and therefore should be considered in Section 36 decision, what we haven't done is train our officers to deal, in broad brush, with the large VFI cohort because that isn't something that either we do or we are equipped or trained to do. And I know from speaking anecdotally to our staff, they absolutely recognise when they are seeing VFI referrals with very complex needs that require support but don't meet our statutory decision-making points, what they then have to do is refer them to another agency.

So I read that -- perhaps I can't say whether that's right or wrong and I would be very interested to see the detail underneath because it will add to our evidence base as to how we develop our officer's training, but it isn't surprising because we are not set up, as they have said, nor equipped statutorily or with the skill-set to deal with the complex needs that are presenting in VFI cases that are not requiring CT support.

Q. You will understand, there were indications -- so that we got candid answers, there were promises of

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of the quality of CTPHQ designed training?

A. As I say, I would have to go through the detail. I would still say the question is asked through the lens of VFI, not the broad training. But we will absolutely take the observations from the Crest report away. We already quality assess and dip-sample with our teams the training we have rolled out and continue to iterate it. So I'm not suggesting -- I'm not in any way taking away from the findings of the survey. I think the task for us now is to delve into that detail with our teams to understand the context of that answer, to see are they referring specifically, as I think they may be, to the way the question was asked about VFI or their training more broadly in the sense of how they manage risk.

I'm not surprised their knowledge is greater in relation to counter-terrorism because they are counter-terrorism officers in a terrorism team and clearly, the definitions of "terrorism", "ideology" and the make-up of terrorist threat is something that our teams are very well versed in because of the nature of the work that we do and that being our specialism.

Q. Would you forgive the discourtesy as I struggle with the tech as I try to help you with the next bit. Could we just go, so that it is on record, to page 124

ILT000219_0124, just so that we can see the construct of

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the question, it's at the bottom of the page, very bottom of the page.

Question 9:

"Have you received training since July 2024 on any subjects relating to violence-fixated individuals ... or non-ideological risk in the context of your role as Prevent practitioner? Please include reference to wider training that addressed these issues."

All respondents answered that question.

Question 10 was:

"How well does the training equip you to deal with VFIs within the Counter Terrorism space?"

Over the page ILT000219_0125:

"10 out of 10 respondents answered this question.

"How would you rate the quality of [this] training?

"10 out of 10 ... answered that question."

There were those lead-up questions, but question 11 was simply:

"How would you rate the quality of the training?"

And the answers were the scores as they show on the board.

A. It is and my point, I think, is the question is: how do you rate the quality of the training? And the context of the question before was VFI training, rather than FEVMCA or CT. I think that would be how I would

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"[The] Counter terrorism units expressed the strongest concerns. Nine in ten CTP respondents (90%) indicated that the existing CTP structures and working practices are not well suited to identifying, assessing and managing non-ideological or violence-fixation risk. All CTUs, (100%) also reported that, within the current framework and level of resourcing, CTP was not effective in practice at managing this form of risk. One respondent described the perceived statutory limitation as ..."

Over the page, ILT000219_0047:

"Section 36 states that there must be reasonable grounds to believe that the individual is vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism, however this often does not align with VFI-type cases ... Similarly, the Prevent Assessment Framework is not designed with VFI in mind and so some aspects of it are not applicable to these cases'."

It moves on to Channel Chairs, but if we go down the page a little bit, to the middle of the page, and a bit more ILT000219_0048 (Pause):

"Some respondents also questioned whether extending existing statutory arrangements to encompass VFI-related risk would necessarily provide an appropriate solution. One CTP respondent expressed concern that doing so would

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interpret it if I was answering it, but I do absolutely take your point and we will take that away and explore, against our analysis of how they have fed back on our training, to understand what more we can do.

Q. The aspect that those questions were designed to get at was how good the training is at equipping CTCOs to deal with that area and the results are concerning.

A. They definitely need further exploration to understand the detail that's underneath.

Q. Thank you. Then could we go, please, to page 46 ILT000219_0046, and to the bottom of the page please:

"Concerns over suitability of existing statutory frameworks for VFI cases."

Unlike, in my previous questions, here, we are in the context not of training at all but in how well things fit. So this may reflect the gaps that you yourself are pointing to, but:

"Respondents from [Counter Terrorism Police], Channel and MAPPA were asked about the suitability of the statutory or operational frameworks within which they manage VFI ... risk[s]. Views varied between the three groups, although concerns about the extent to which existing arrangements are suited to this form of risk were evident across the responses."

Then the point of interest, perhaps, is this:

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extend Prevent beyond its existing purpose: 'General consensus that Prevent are not the right agency/department to be managing such risk ...

This is a quote:

"The addition of the VFI cohort has had a detrimental effect upon Prevent efficiency in managing ideological risk. It has watered down the roles and remit of Prevent'."

So, as I say, in fairness to CTPHQ and to you, this is getting at the difficulties of the structures overall in addressing it rather than a criticism of Prevent as set out. But what are your observations on those survey findings?

A. I mean, I would suggest broadly they mirror the discussions we have been having during my evidence this morning, which is the challenge of Prevent is a system that was designed to manage those who are vulnerable to being drawn to terrorism. It has a terrorism nexus to it and I think what my teams are describing in various different ways, either through their single sort of voting answers or their narrative, is they absolutely understand the challenge that only a small percentage of those cases will progress beyond the Section 36 decision, which leaves a whole number of VFI cases that our system is not best suited to assess or has the

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1 skills or the interventions to deal with them. So
 2 I would say that broadly mirrors the position that we
 3 discussed earlier this morning.
 4 Q. Thank you. That completes that topic. I want to move
 5 forward to the wholly forward-looking aspects, and we've
 6 got ahead of ourselves and dealt with some of these, so
 7 I will try to take some of it more shortly.

8 Could we look at my next topic about the potential
 9 change and the possibility to widen the whole definition
 10 of "terrorism". You are not allowed to say: that's
 11 above my pay grade, but I want to explore the CTPHQ
 12 views of that.

13 Now, one possible approach would be to widen the
 14 definition of "terrorism" because if one were to do so,
 15 the existing statutory test for Prevent of being
 16 vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism would also
 17 thereby be widened.

18 There are a number of places where we could start in
 19 relation to this, but of course, we know that
 20 Jonathan Hall's report -- sir, again, for your note, it
 21 is just ILT000100 -- but we don't need to look it up,
 22 you will be familiar with it -- recommended against that
 23 with detailed reasoning. We know that the Government,
 24 at this stage, has accepted that that recommendation
 25 from that report and I should note that Mr Basu, one of
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1 not clearly fit existing safeguarding, criminal justice
 2 or counter-terrorism pathways."

3 So far, pausing there, nothing, I suspect, with
 4 which you would disagree. She goes on to deal with --
 5 saying:

6 "One option, as set out in Lord Anderson's
 7 report ... is to expand the remit of the
 8 counter-terrorism ... Prevent programme to include
 9 non-ideological extreme violence. I understand that
 10 this model has also been adopted and implemented with
 11 success by Canadian counterparts via The Canada Centre
 12 for Community Engagement and Prevention of Violence
 13 programme.

14 59:

15 "A second option, which has been considered by the
 16 Home Office, is the establishment of a separate entity
 17 with overarching responsibility for the identification,
 18 assessment and management of VFIs."

19 Then this, in paragraph 60:

20 "However, the NCA's assessment is that this is not
 21 fundamentally a question of which single organisation
 22 should own a cohort known as 'Violence Fixated
 23 Individuals'. Rather, it is a question of whether the
 24 current system has adopted an overly narrow
 25 understanding of harm and risk, based upon 'ideological'
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1 our expert cadre whose former roles will be familiar to
 2 you, said that he agreed with that position as well.

3 A different nuance -- and I don't want to take her
 4 evidence too far -- would be to look at the evidence to
 5 come tomorrow from the NCA. So can we have
 6 Helen Rance's statement up on screen, please. It is
 7 NCA000032. And if we could go -- so Helen Rance, I'm
 8 sure that the role is familiar, but paragraph 2, just
 9 for context:

10 "... the Temporary Director of the Threat Leadership
 11 Command within the [National Crime Agency] ..."

12 Then if we go to page 12, NCA000032_0012 please, and
 13 paragraph 57, bottom of the page:

14 "At present, some individuals who pose a risk of
 15 serious violence are identified by organisations with
 16 a statutory obligation to refer those at risk of
 17 radicalisation into Prevent. Individuals with
 18 a non-ideological fascination with violence are not
 19 likely to meet [over the page, NCA000032_0013] the
 20 criteria for a Prevent response. Whilst the NCA does
 21 not sit on MASH panels, I understand that they focus
 22 on ... safeguarding of victims and do not routinely
 23 receive referrals for offenders.

24 "In my opinion, there therefore appears to be a gap
 25 in current arrangements concerning individuals who do
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1 and 'non-ideological' distinctions which are
 2 increasingly difficult to sustain in practice."

3 If we can move on, finally, to paragraph 63, please,
 4 which I think may be over the page NCA000032_0014:

5 "The NCA therefore believes that the future debate
 6 should also focus on identifying and managing
 7 individuals who pose a risk of serious violence,
 8 regardless of whether that risk is considered
 9 ideological, non-ideological, criminal, extremist or
 10 otherwise or arises because the individual is fixated on
 11 violence for its own sake."

12 Now, I don't want to misrepresent Ms Rance is, in
 13 terms, arguing for a re-definition of "terrorism", but
 14 she is, on the NCA's behalf, pointing to where a future
 15 debate may need to be. So against all of that
 16 background, can we come to what has been said on record
 17 by CTPHQ, by looking at CTPHQ000209. This is back at
 18 Assistant Commissioner Taylor's letter to the Home
 19 Affairs Committee.

20 If we can go CTPHQ000209, page 2, CTPHQ000209_0002,
 21 middle of the page. Do you see the paragraph beginning:

22 "As I noted ..."?

23 A. I do.

24 Q. "As I noted ..."

25 Forgive me, it is the passage above:
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"As noted in the session, this gap should not be addressed by expanding counter-terrorism legislation, a view supported by Jonathan Hall [the] Independent Review of Terrorism ... CTP's remit remains deliberately narrow, focused on terrorism and hostile state threats. It is vital that wider partners, beyond CTP and law enforcement, are equipped to manage the full spectrum of extremist behaviours and associated risks. We must ensure that policing is not seen as the first line of defence or the primary responder to wider extremist harms or vulnerabilities."

Now, that appears, on its face, not just to be aligning with Jonathan Hall but seeking to exercise how strongly CTPHQ agrees with that. Can you help us to understand why CTP takes that stance?

A. I mean, I think there is a number of reasons. Firstly, we do align with Jonathan Hall KC's review and his position, as you have said it, as do many others. There is a number of different important factors here. Firstly, CTP is one part of a large national security system that deals with the threats and the risks that come from counter-terrorism and national security risks. So we are not -- to change one part of the counter-terrorism system, changes the whole counter-terrorism system and the face of it and there

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right people with the right skills and I think that goes to Lawrence's final line there, about there is a risk here that policing, or the criminal justice aspect, becomes the primary response to what is a prevention matter with complex safeguarding needs and vulnerability needs that need to be addressed.

Policing -- and it is not for a lack of will -- we are not the people who are skilled and equipped to deal with very, very complex vulnerabilities and the types of interventions that are needed to manage some of the risks that present, not just in CT casework, but in wider threats and some of them that Helen has referred to in her statement.

So I think there are a number of different reasons. There is also the risk, I would suggest, of the chilling effect which, again, I think Jonathan Hall referenced in his seminar. We already know, and it is something we have to work very hard with Home Office to reassure people, that in communities, some people fear the Prevent system. They think that it is something it is not and I think one of your subject matter experts referred to that, a feeling that it is actually some sort of surveillance or investigative programme. We are clear it isn't but we know there can be that concern in communities.

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are cause and effect to that which would need to be very, very seriously considered, including legislation and how the system works. For the system to work well, the whole system needs to work and be aligned to each other, otherwise it doesn't achieve its aims and there is a significant risk of diluting our ability to manage those risks. That's not playing risks off against each other but it is a risk we are discharged with delivering against.

Again, I don't want to misquote Jonathan Hall KC, but I think he highlighted in his review, we already have quite wide-ranging terrorism legislation in the UK that goes beyond some of our other international partners. We have to use that legislation and the powers that we get with that with great care because they are -- for good reason, allow us further and wider ranging powers than the rest of policing other parts of law enforcement have. I think this isn't for me to arbitrate against but, you know, there would be public views and Government views as to whether it is appropriate that such far-reaching, wide-ranging powers were extended beyond where they currently are. So that is most definitely a consideration that would need to be considered.

I think also it comes back to whether we are the

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We also know, anecdotally, that some people worry about referring someone into a CT system when they are concerned about vulnerabilities and I think Dr Taylor referred to some academic evidence about the need for children and vulnerable young people to be able to access services in a prevention space without acquiring a label or something that is detrimental to them.

I think that is an important consideration as well, which, from our point of view, is why we favour options that aligned really with Lord Anderson's view, of a wider front door, something that is a more generic safeguarding gateway, that means if the specialisms of CT and Prevent are required, they can absolutely be supported and dealt with but actually, if they are not engaged, that those people can get the support that they need from other parts of a collective multi-agency system.

I genuinely think there is a risk that in widening counter-terrorism, whether that's legislation or Prevent, it may not achieve what we are all trying to achieve here because, ultimately, we want people to be referring people into a system where they can get that help and assessment in a non-specialist way for something -- so it does concern me, that aspect as well.

Q. Thank you. It may be that my learned friend,

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1 Mr Illingworth, who will be asking questions today on
2 behalf of the three victim teams, will want to take this
3 further.

4 But one of the questions that they have raised,
5 stitching this all together, is would public protection
6 be better served by a framework based on assessed risk
7 and indicators of serious violence, rather than by
8 categorisation, by ideology versus non-ideological?
9 I suppose the answer to that question is the same as the
10 answer to the question that I posed: it is putting all
11 of those factors together?

12 **A.** It is and I think, in some ways, we go to what a future
13 model could or may look like. There will always be
14 a need for, I suppose, a wide funnel at the outset
15 because we want people to refer. I say "we"
16 generically, not just CTP. You want people to refer
17 individuals of concern so they can access the right
18 support at an early intervention to prevent them (a)
19 going on to cause harm but ultimately, to ensure they
20 have better life choices and get onto a better path.
21 There will always be a need, then, for layers of
22 assessment, triage and understanding of what that means
23 and what that threat or risk or vulnerability is in more
24 detail.

25 There will be needs for specialisms in that.

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1 poor relation to Prevent, so that those who are the
2 victims, or the potential victims, of an atrocity like
3 Southport, are to feel that their loved ones are getting
4 the same levels of public protection, that alternative
5 pathway needs to have access to appropriately funded
6 Channel-like intervention, to ensure that it is not the
7 poor relation to Prevent, would you agree?

8 **A.** Absolutely. I'm not -- I'm more suggesting I would want
9 the right specialisms and the people who have got the
10 right tools to be able to support the risk. In no way
11 am I suggesting that there should be a hierarchy.
12 Absolutely in no way at all.

13 **Q.** Just as, as in a Prevent case, if consent to Channel
14 intervention is not forthcoming, that may often lead to
15 a police-led partnership?

16 **A.** If consent isn't given, yes.

17 **Q.** If consent is not given. Equally, if the alternative
18 pathway is not to be the poor relation of Prevent, one
19 would need to ensure that it has appropriate escalation
20 processes available, including, perhaps in the first
21 instance, to territorial policing taking more of a role,
22 if consent is not forthcoming?

23 **A.** Potentially in --

24 **Q.** Based on the individual case?

25 **A.** And to be clear, I'm not suggesting that policing or CTP

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1 Because if it is a generic offer, you won't necessarily
2 have a bespoke intervention for the right people.
3 Prevent and the CT system is one of those bespoke offers
4 and we bring specific things around that particular type
5 of threat, in the same way that some of the NCA's
6 Prevent programmes around cyber bring specialist
7 capabilities that my teams wouldn't have. Or if you are
8 looking at CCE or CSE. There will always be an element
9 of a need for specialist interventions or support from
10 officers or local authority staff who have the right
11 skills.

12 It is how you design a system that can allow broad
13 information to come in at the top but then have the
14 right layers and filters that can quickly assess and put
15 people into the right pathway, for want of a better
16 expression, that sits behind it. The key then is making
17 sure that that doesn't become siloed and people can
18 either move between pathways or, if you need more than
19 one specialism, that those people can be drawn together
20 in a multi-agency sense, to deliver the effect that best
21 serves the individual.

22 **Q.** But, if an alternative pathway -- would you forgive me
23 for putting it in this way --

24 **A.** Of course.

25 **Q.** -- if an alternative pathway is not to be seen as the

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1 don't have a role in this, quite the opposite. But
2 I think lots of agencies have a role in this, delivering
3 their specialism and the skills and the interventions
4 that they have through their responsibilities.

5 **Q.** And there is lots of other things that sits behind this.
6 I mean, refusal of consent, exploring why consent has
7 not been -- I'm not suggesting that a refusal of consent
8 to a single mental health intervention should leave to
9 territorial policing.

10 **A.** No.

11 **Q.** But one can see that in Prevent, there is a pathway
12 whereby, if consent is not forthcoming to Channel
13 intervention, there is a police-driven process --
14 without going into the fine details of what it may
15 involved -- on keeping, in layperson's terms, a good eye
16 on risk in that case where the interventions are not
17 being provided. And that may lead to other referrals,
18 it may lead to multi-agency dealing. But one needs to
19 have the same sort of consideration to next steps in the
20 alternative pathway if consent is not forthcoming?

21 **A.** I would agree, there would need to be considerations
22 about how that would work. I would -- I'm conscious of
23 not going into operational detail. I would stress that
24 in consent cases, police-led partnerships can often be
25 focusing on trying to support the individual or the

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1 family to understand why consent is an issue because
 2 what we would like to do is get them into the
 3 consent-based structures to allow them access to
 4 interventions --

5 **Q.** And also I think fostering the involvement of other
 6 agencies and encouraging why that may be important for
 7 support?

8 **A.** Yes, local authorities and others. So I would not want
 9 to sort of mischaracterise how PLP cases are dealt with.
 10 It is more around helping and supporting individuals to
 11 understand when they would feel ready to consent to
 12 engage with those supportive pathways. I have no
 13 evidence for this because we don't have an alternative
 14 system. I suppose we would need to see what consent
 15 levels look like in a system that was a much broader and
 16 wider safeguarding system. I am not familiar with the
 17 statistics on consent in other parts of the safeguarding
 18 system to any depth of knowledge, so I don't know if
 19 consent in the counter-terrorism system would be
 20 comparable to the types of consent you would or wouldn't
 21 get --

22 **Q.** I follow, there would be a lot of detail that would sit
 23 behind that. I follow. But as a general principle, the
 24 fact that -- at the risk of repeating myself, the fact
 25 that there is a clear option for a form of police

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1 So, sir, just for your note, the reference for this is
 2 paragraph 18 of the Deputy Assistant Commissioner's
 3 second statement. In that second statement, without
 4 drawing it up, you said that while many areas of
 5 policing are under strain, Prevent is under, your words
 6 "particular pressure", yes?

7 **A.** Absolutely, yes.

8 **Q.** We note that in Assistant Commissioner Lawrence's
 9 letter, he said -- this is to the Home Affairs Select
 10 Committee:

11 "As I note during the session, we are experiencing
 12 extraordinary demand on Prevent."

13 So put it even higher, and I went through, did
 14 I not, the Prevent statistics earlier on? So I take
 15 that relatively quickly because I anticipate that's one
 16 immediate problem, is that it would not currently be
 17 resourced to do it, by a long way?

18 **A.** Most definitely. The system isn't currently resourced
 19 to deal with the demand we are dealing with. We have
 20 made resource choices and decisions to enable officers
 21 to continue to safely manage those risks within our
 22 internal resourcing.

23 **Q.** Yes, and again, you anticipate an area that I wanted to
 24 come onto as to what impact that's having in terms of
 25 the triage function. But, can we -- noting the position

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1 involvement to continue if consent is not given in
 2 Prevent, that is something which needs to find
 3 a resonance -- it may not be a direct equivalent, but
 4 you need to have something -- again, I don't like the
 5 phrase, but in that space, you need something --

6 **A.** It would definitely need to be considered in a future
 7 model. Definitely.

8 **Q.** Thank you. Could we turn next then, please, to
 9 an alternative approach, short of the extremely
 10 fundamental change in the definition of "terrorism",
 11 would be the change in the definition of "Prevent", and
 12 we have touched on many aspects of that. But just to
 13 test that as a potential solution, one could say that
 14 the definition of terrorism is what the definition of
 15 terrorism is as currently. But Prevent should have
 16 a statutory basis of those who are vulnerable to being
 17 drawn into terrorism and those who are vulnerable to
 18 being drawn into NIEV, so Non-Ideological Extreme
 19 Violence, or vulnerable to becoming a Non-Ideological
 20 Violent Extremist, whichever definition you prefer.

21 Now, on that basis, that would give the route in for
 22 many more cases, potentially, to be within the statutory
 23 test taken on within Prevent and then knock-on, the
 24 impact of that may fall equally in Channel. Can we just
 25 explore the realities of that. Resources, first of all.

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1 on resources, that there's an initial 'just not
 2 possible', frankly; if further resources were to be
 3 provided to meet what that would mean, is there a more
 4 fundamental objection? I'm not diminishing the
 5 resources, but is there a more strategic objection to
 6 initially, Counter Terrorism Police in the assessment
 7 and then Channel in the interventions, as they are
 8 currently set up, playing that wider role?

9 **A.** I think there is a number of risks or factors --
 10 clearly, anything is possible and the widening of
 11 Prevent is absolutely a matter for the Government. It
 12 isn't just Counter Terrorism Policing resources that
 13 would need looking at. It is the wider system.
 14 I think, certainly anecdotally, I'm aware of Channel
 15 Chairs and Channel partners flagging the increasing
 16 demands that it has had on their system and the risk
 17 that they are having to manage cases more swiftly, are
 18 overwhelmed with the demands that are going through.
 19 They will talk to the detail of that but that is
 20 definitely a challenge.

21 There is also the risk that you are, again, changing
 22 one part of the counter-terrorism system. So you are
 23 widening and changing one part of what is the broader
 24 CONTEST strategy but also resourcing. So, it isn't just
 25 the Prevent system in counter-terrorism that would be

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drawn on and have resource considerations, if a case escalates within Prevent and needs to move into a Pursue space, well, we are -- Pursue, based on counter-terrorism, yesterday, the Director General MI5 gave his speech, outlining the threats and the challenges and the demands across the whole national security system.

There is cause and effect, not just at the front end of the system but for the whole counter-terrorism system, beyond Counter Terrorism Policing.

Again, that's not to say that shouldn't be done or shouldn't be a consideration, but there does need to be an understanding of what that may do to the wider system.

I think also it is important to say -- and it came through in the Crest report -- our current risk assessments aren't designed to deal with the broader VFI cohort. Our officers' training and knowledge is not designed to deal with that cohort beyond the bounds that we have set and the training that we have delivered.

The skills that -- so it isn't as simple as: some more resources and open the door, or broaden. There would be fundamental changes that would need to be made to our whole working practices and systems, to enable us to do that safely and well, and then interact.

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change, the aspect in which currently -- even if this is a simplistic view, would you accept it for the moment -- that the CTP aspects of Prevent are, to some extent, fulfilling a triaging role of receiving referrals from the wider VFI cohort and the number of referrals, you would say largely being rightly made, but having to be assessed by Prevent. I just want to touch upon the impact of that because you, I think -- I don't want to put words in your mouth, but I think you were about to say: we are struggling to deal with what we have to deal with already with the resources we have and you are having to make decisions.

Part of the aspects that this Inquiry needs to look at in Phase 2 is not just recommendations for change but in what sequence they might have to take place and what the priorities are for change.

So, could you give the learned Chair an indication of the actual impacts on Prevent of having to triage the large number of referrals and what the risks are on other parts of your work?

A. I will do my best in an open context. I mean clearly, part of my role in the national coordination is it is my job to balance that risk and move people and resources. We have done a huge amount on our policy and our efficiencies to try and make sure that we make our

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There is another consideration which is probably one that public or not would have a view on, but you are then putting more people into a counter-terrorism system. You are retaining their details on counter-terrorism systems and all of those things. There is an impact to that and that is different to perhaps how they would be dealt with in something that wasn't the national security system in the broader safeguarding system.

Q. And there may be also an allied point to that which you touched on in a different context earlier, whether it's right or wrong, but the stigmatising effect also, as being seen to be in a counter-terrorism position, even though Prevent would say it is an early intervention and so on?

A. But we are very alive to that risk. I think -- I keep coming back to it but that academic point of people being able to access help without labels. There is -- again, I have historic knowledge of this, not current, there is learning from gang's work on that, of people perceiving to acquire a label when actually what they need is vulnerability support in early -- in prevention and intervention. So there's lots of think about.

Q. Thank you. Now, you touched on something I did want to come back to which is, forget about the potential for

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systems as efficient as possible for our staff.

We have absolutely, during -- throughout this period, since the horrific events in Southport, had to move resources from other areas of business at different moments in time to surge resources in to manage the demand in Prevent.

We have also, through our general efficiencies programme, as you would expect, as an organisation we identify areas of efficiency and re-invest. We have had to use some of those reinvestment opportunities to bolster Prevent, over other areas of business, to ensure that we try and put resources into this.

So there is a number of different things -- ultimately it is my job to manage those risks and make sure that we are still tending to all of the parts of the system that we need to, but it has most definitely put a strain on the system and if you were to speak to the CTCOs and our frontline staff, I will tell you, a huge amount of their efforts have been them working extra hours, overtime and others because they care and they want to manage the risk well and have worked extra hours as well.

So it is a multiple-layered response. What it isn't is sustainable as a long-term response, to continue to manage the large volumes and potentially increases in

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1 that way going forward.

2 **Q.** Thank you. Two further sub-aspects of this. The first
3 directly flows on. If there were to be change, so, for
4 example, a new front door which is not Prevent, to
5 screen public protection type referrals into a Prevent,
6 vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism, wider VFI
7 cohort pathways, realistically that may take some time
8 to set up. It would need to be resourced, there may
9 need to be direct pilots and so on.

10 In the interim, the position is likely to be, it
11 might be thought, that the current system needs to
12 continue for a period of time. Are there any changes
13 that you would want to be made in the short-term to make
14 the system more effective or to help mitigate risk if
15 Prevent has to keep its current wide enough front door
16 role?

17 **A.** I'm pausing there to try and firstly, think of what are
18 useful, practical suggestions that I can make.

19 I suppose, from an efficiency point of view,
20 particularly when you look at the stats of how many
21 cases are being referred out of Prevent, we are
22 investing a lot of time and resource necessarily, to
23 triage and explore cases that don't have the
24 vulnerabilities to being drawn into terrorism. Whereas
25 actually, if they were moving into another part of

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1 aren't quick fixes, even within our system, which is why
2 we have had to take the approach we have taken around
3 how we manage that demand over this period of time.

4 **Q.** If -- and there's many things that lie behind the
5 "if" -- if it were to be practicable to establish
6 a multi-agency framework that would be the alternative
7 pathway, before it was practical to set up a different
8 triaging system, would the very existence of a wider VFI
9 cohort pathway make the triaging process at Prevent
10 referrals any easier? Instinctively, one feels you
11 would still need to do the same job to the same
12 standard?

13 **A.** I think we would still need to do the same job to the
14 same standard. But coming back to the point earlier
15 about our teams wanting to a good job and worrying about
16 letting people who need help not land in the right
17 place, I think it would give us confidence that -- at
18 an earlier stage, that if there was no evidence of
19 vulnerability being drawn into terrorism, we had a solid
20 mechanism that we were referring those cases to, that we
21 would be confident would be collectively assessing that
22 risk and would have the ability to flag back to us, if
23 they identified something that emerged at a later point
24 that may have a CT element. So I don't know if it would
25 make it more efficient but I can definitely see that

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1 a safeguarding system, you may find that they are able
2 to deal with what's presenting first and then if they
3 were to identify vulnerability risks, they could bring
4 us in. So I think there is a risk of -- we are
5 exploring cases to make sure we manage a vulnerability
6 to terrorism risk way, but there are still people who
7 still need vulnerability support that is not within our
8 gift to give them, and nor our expertise. So I think
9 that creates a risk with the status quo and probably
10 isn't an efficient way for those people to access that
11 help.

12 That isn't me trying to push responsibility to
13 another agency. But I'm not sure that filtering through
14 the process in our system to enable them to access wider
15 safeguarding help is an efficient way to do that.

16 Ultimately, if the current position continues and
17 the demand, we will continue to challenge ourselves in
18 our system to find different ways to manage the demand
19 and that will be potentially challenging, given the
20 demands in the other part of our system. There isn't
21 really -- I can't think of an obvious short-term measure
22 that would enable us to do that differently or better
23 because even bringing new resources in takes time. They
24 have to be recruited from forces, they have to be
25 appropriately vetted, they have to be trained. There

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1 there would be advantages in us knowing that we had
2 a constructed, multi-agency place, or a single agency
3 who was going to own the responsibility for bringing the
4 multi-agency together. I could see that has advantages.

5 **Q.** So it could have an advantage in easing risk averse
6 decision-making?

7 **A.** Potentially, yes. I mean, I think I would probably have
8 to explore that with my practitioners as to the
9 mechanisms of whether it would reduce demand
10 dramatically. But I think, ultimately, the thing we are
11 all worried about, would we feel better from a public
12 safety point of view because there was a system that
13 could provide the right support? Then yes, that would
14 be an advantage.

15 **Q.** Also, these are human beings making decisions who care
16 about the outcome, and that knowledge: it could always
17 be referred back to us if, on further examination by the
18 other pathway, might be of some reassurance in that
19 area, presumably?

20 **A.** Potentially, yes. You would need to make sure that
21 happened and to avoid some of the things that the Chair
22 highlighted in part 1, of siloed and things moving
23 between buckets. You would need safeguards but it could
24 certainly be a possibility.

25 **Q.** Yes. Then, finally -- I said there were two final

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aspects, the second one is this. There would be an alternative approach to changing the current definition of a Prevent, or at least the current guidance, which would be to go the other way and not widen the definition of Prevent or the cohort that's taken on, but to narrow it down to ideological cases. So that all of the non-ideological cases went to the new pathway. So, a sort of Shawcross-plus approach, if you know what I mean by that.

From your statement generally, it seems that CTPHQ is not keen on that and that you do feel -- have I understood it correctly -- that there is a narrower cohort of the VFI cohort that you feel, from your experience -- and it is the professional judgement of CTPHQ -- does appropriately sit in Prevent and it is the right place for them?

A. I think we have been clear and it is still my position.

There is a narrower subset of this cohort that we would absolutely want to be engaged with, because --

SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: As long as it meets Section 36?

A. Absolutely. Because there are some of those cases that meet the Section 36 decision and we are best placed to manage that risk and put the right support around those individuals. So, I wouldn't be supportive of narrowing. I think it is absolutely vital that we are in a position

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to be codified, taught and embedded."

Then one sees, in the next paragraph, that you explain views why you don't consider that CTPHQ or CTP officers would be the appropriate duty holders for the wider cohort of VFI cases.

So, you have introduced that idea then of work back from the necessary interventions to who the most appropriate agency would be. If we look at paragraph 91 on page 31 CTPHQ000409_0031, you say that:

"So summarise CTP is supportive of the idea of a duty holder approach for the clarity and consistency ..."

But you do say:

"... VFI-specific risks are wide-ranging and may not sit easily with a single agency across all casework, and that alignment between the owner of the risk and the owner of appropriate interventions to manage that risk may be challenging."

So, there may be a degree of consensus emerging over this. It wouldn't be possible to say: well, for the wider VFI cohort, not Prevent, not CTP, it should always be this agency who has the lead. There is too many variables within individual cases and cases that would have needs that would need to be met by a number of agencies at the same time?

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to assess those cases and make the decisions about the ones that should come into the CT system.

MR MOSS: Thank you. Can I move next then to, again, potential changes, the creation of a new VFI pathway which, again, we have touched on in many aspects.

Could we go back to your statement, please, at page 30, CTPHQ000409_0030 paragraph 88. Just for those who are not familiar, part of the context for this is that you will have been asked a question about your views on a duty holder scheme to make ownership clear and it was partly in this context that you were giving these answers. But I think it gives the clue to the view about the new VFI pathway.

So, you say, in paragraph 88, that:

"Regardless of whether the 'front door' model is implemented or not there is still the issue of ownership/duty holder for VFI cases. One possible route to identify the most appropriate duty holder might be to first identify the most effective interventions in the VFI space and then work backwards towards the agency that owns and deliveries those interventions to ensure that those charged with managing the risk can lever the tools to do so. Whilst no single agency at the current time has all the required expertise in the VFI space, CTPHQ believes [that] such expertise has the potential

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A. I think it would be very hard to identify one single agency to own any complex case with multiple vulnerabilities and risks. I think there are examples, Prevent is one of them, MAPPA another, where there could be several duty holders and within that duty, it can be explicit and clear, as to how duty holders need to interact, what their responsibilities are, what their responsibilities are for delivering their actions or their ownership of a particular plan in the context of a multi-agency setting.

So I think there are ways for multiple agencies to hold significant responsibility and accountability, provided the duty or a future duty is framed in such a way that that is what is expected of them and how they are expected to participate.

Q. Thank you. Taking it as shortly as I may. If we can just have the totality of paragraph 92 on the screen. In a helpfully pithy way, you take some of the named potential contenders and reference them, in a sense, only to -- if not to knock them down, then at least to point them to the practical difficulties. So MAPPA, which you raise, obviously statutory process which is well embedded. But you make the point that:

"[While] it may be possible to legislate to change MAPPA's remit ..."

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1 And we are familiar with that. Category 3 is all
2 that there is in this area and even that requires
3 a conviction or caution:

4 "... this would carry many of the same risks as
5 considered for CTP, ... pulling an existing process out
6 of shape, with risks to the core work that [it]
7 undertakes for convicted offenders."

8 Then on PDPs, again, another contender for being
9 potentially upscaled to do this:

10 "... that is referenced as being a place where
11 sub-MAPPA threshold cases can be managed ..."

12 But you point to the fact that it is non-statutory
13 in nature, with NPCC guidance which notes the:

14 "... lack of specific risk assessment for PDPs and
15 the fact [that] the relevant legislative framework for
16 MAPPA [and] management under the Criminal
17 Justice Act ... does not extend to [the] programme."

18 Where it does exist, it tries to mirror MAPPA
19 frameworks but without the statutory framework which
20 compels multi-agency working and information sharing,
21 and:

22 "As PDPs are not statutory there are potentially
23 areas where this function does not exist ..."

24 And you give the stark example of, for example,
25 London?

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1 professional in this area, have a view as to what shape
2 that should take? Or does CTPHQ have a corporate view?
3 Or do you go back to: that's the very difficulty and it
4 is cross-government?

5 **A.** I mean, it is the very difficulty. I think even my
6 observation there, and I do stand by it, of it is hard
7 not to come to the conclusion that there is a need for
8 a new structure, it could be possible though that that
9 new structure could sit in one of the -- it could go
10 into one of the existing structures. I know there is
11 lots of work ongoing in MASH around trying to formalise
12 national risk assessment. Each of these structures,
13 I think, are challenging themselves quite robustly to
14 think could they adapt, or is there a way?

15 So, clearly, to some degree, it is a matter for the
16 Government but I think operational partners, and we are
17 part of those discussions, are really actively trying to
18 understand. I mean, I think MASH -- out of all of those
19 structures, MASH is the one that I think has to some
20 degree the greatest possibilities if guidance or a duty
21 was applied over the top of it. Because there is
22 Working Together, the new version, 2026, you have
23 already got a statutory duty there that includes
24 predominantly your safeguarding partners, local
25 authorities, health, policing, you know, there are

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1 **A.** Absolutely. That's not to suggest there's not
2 mechanisms in London but London is a good example of
3 multiple different local authorities, multiple different
4 health -- so things that are non-statutory, are hard to
5 deliver in large force areas with multiple different
6 agencies to engage with. So that consistency piece,
7 I suppose part of the success of things like MAPPA or
8 Prevent, is there is national statutory guidance which
9 then means that people have to deliver, in their local
10 context, within clear guard rails and duties. That
11 makes it easier, in my view, to implement something.

12 **Q.** Thank you. In your own statement, if we may go over the
13 page CTPHQ000409_0032 to paragraph 93, you then deal
14 with MASH in a similar way, raising it as a possible
15 option, but noting the disadvantages. I won't go
16 through those, if you don't mind, because they are
17 matters that have been raised by others. But having
18 looked at MAPPA, PDPs and MASH and the large-scale
19 change for MASH towards the end of the paragraph, where
20 you come to a conclusion on this, is you say:

21 "It is hard not to draw the conclusion from the
22 consideration of the above that a new multi-agency
23 structure may be necessary for the management of VFIs
24 due to the challenges outlined."

25 Do you, as a very experienced and senior

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1 options there as to how education to come in. There is
2 something that at least has a lot of the tools perhaps
3 that you would need to support the vulnerable VFI cohort
4 because it would be things like support around the
5 family, early intervention opportunities, youth
6 diversion -- they, perhaps, as a collective own a lot of
7 the levers. So that is definitely a possibility.

8 But there would still be a need, I would suggest,
9 for anything to be effective, having that clear national
10 direction or duty is the thing that then ensures that
11 every part of the system plays their part in a way that
12 manages the risk appropriately and safeguards against
13 some of the things that the Chair pointed out from
14 Phase 1.

15 **Q.** Thank you. We want to pick up, with local Government
16 organisations, the national variability and the
17 challenge that Lord Anderson poses, that in some areas
18 MASH is very advanced and does more, in other areas much
19 less so.

20 Is that an area where your work means that you feel
21 you have a good view of that and understanding of how
22 much MASH varies because, on one view, what's said is,
23 in some areas, MASH is already doing quite a lot of this
24 and it would be an upscaling but it wouldn't be
25 a fundamental change. Then leaving aside, I think, some

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1 areas where there isn't a MASH at all, you get to areas
2 where they only deal with safeguarding and they only
3 deal with children and any sort of case management, for
4 both children and adults in a public protection sphere,
5 would be a fundamental root and branch change. Do you
6 have any idea of the scale of those and how many are in
7 the former and how many are in the latter?

8 **A.** Not currently. My knowledge on this is slightly
9 historic. I used to sit as a Chair on an executive
10 safeguarding board. In my previous role as a ACC, these
11 were responsibilities that sat directly under me. But
12 I have clearly been out of that direct contact with that
13 system since I have been in this role. So I'm not aware
14 of the current variation. There is definitely
15 variation; some MASHs don't deal with adults and
16 children.

17 But I think others will be able to talk to quite
18 a lot of work that has been done in the MASH space in
19 recent years and also there's clearly been some changes
20 to guidance that have been referenced to different parts
21 of the Inquiry, including on information sharing. So
22 there's clearly been advances. I wouldn't want to --
23 I wouldn't be certain that my historic knowledge is
24 current as to what the position is.

25 **Q.** Thank you. That's fine, we will pick it up with others.

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1 different potential positives. I think neither would be
2 perfect in the big picture. If I'm being honest,
3 I think we would have to work through those in detail
4 with operational teams to understand what those risks
5 and differences were. I think the preference, as I sit
6 here now -- and I'm doing this just hearing those
7 suggestions -- would be that you had referrals for VFIs
8 and if -- whatever the bounds of that system and
9 safeguarding referrals moving in there, and Prevent,
10 having the clear: these are Prevent referrals and coming
11 in.

12 There is a risk with that because you wouldn't want
13 cases bouncing between the two, saying: we don't own
14 them, I don't own them. So you would have to have some
15 safeguards put in to ensure that that didn't happen so
16 that cases couldn't just pass, ping-pong, for want of
17 a better expression, between two systems.

18 That could potentially work. The other risk with
19 either of those systems, I suppose, is we are asking
20 frontline practitioners to decide which route --

21 **Q.** To make a difficult distinction.

22 **A.** -- and that is the benefit of the Big Front Door, in
23 Lord Anderson's terms. You are not then asking
24 frontline people to decide what something is, you're
25 just asking them to identify risk and vulnerability and

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1 Before perhaps we come to our mid-afternoon break,
2 just lastly on this aspect. I want you to think about
3 that position where, if it were to be the case that
4 an alternative pathway, whether based on MASH taking on
5 case management, or social care, something like the
6 current MACE type of arrangement being expanded; if that
7 multi-agency pathway were capable of being set up before
8 a Big Front Door triage -- so you have got to imagine
9 a situation in which by Prevent, largely as it is, is
10 available but now there is an agreed pathway,
11 multi-agency, at a local level, to take the wider VFI
12 cohort. You could have a system whereby a frontline
13 professional, a teacher, could pass a referral to
14 Prevent, if they were worried about vulnerability being,
15 drawn into terrorism, and they could have the option of
16 sending a referral to that body if they thought: this is
17 more about a fascination with violence.

18 Or, the alternative would be both those referrals
19 all very much still go to Prevent, Prevent looks at
20 them, does an assessment, takes on its current
21 appropriate caseload but has, as its first stop, as the
22 referral onwards, the VFI agency. Do you see those two
23 models, how they could work?

24 What would be your view as to the better of the two?

25 **A.** Goodness. They would both have different risks and

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1 then it moves into a Big Front Door, who can decide
2 which is the best pot. But I appreciate you are asking
3 me for an interim and the Big Front Door is
4 a longer-term solution. So I would say two channels but
5 both have risks.

6 **MR MOSS:** Thank you. It was a difficult question to pose.

7 Sir, if it is convenient to take the mid-afternoon
8 break. If there is thought, over the break, on that
9 point and you want to come back, do so. Otherwise,
10 after the break I will come to the Big Front Door.

11 **A.** Chair, with your leave, can I have permission to consult
12 with my team?

13 **SIR ADRIAN FULFORD:** Oh, yes, you can.

14 **A.** Because they will have thought in detail about some of
15 these options and may have some other observations.

16 Thank you.

17 **SIR ADRIAN FULFORD:** We will sit again just after 3.35 pm.

18 (3.26 pm)

19 (A short break)

20 (3.36 pm)

21 **SIR ADRIAN FULFORD:** Yes, Mr Moss.

22 **MR MOSS:** Thank you, sir.

23 So turning to potential changes, the concept of
24 a Big Front Door. So, the concept -- a fundamental
25 concept within that would be that, however it was

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1 formulated, it would be the first receptacle for
2 referrals, both for the wider VFI cohort and for the
3 current Prevent, vulnerable to being drawn into
4 terrorism, cohort.

5 There are -- and one of the difficulties about the
6 Big Front Door is it can mean different things. So, one
7 way of organising the Big Front Door, the very Big Front
8 Door model, would be that it would take all referrals.
9 So it would take referrals that are the "traditional
10 safeguarding referrals", so risk of harm in the home for
11 children, being the obvious example. But it would also
12 take what might be thought of as the public protection
13 type referrals of those two cohorts, the VFI cohort and
14 the current Prevent cohort.

15 A slightly narrower front door, but still taking it
16 away from Prevent would have a system that just took
17 those public protection ones, so it took those too.

18 Now, whichever of those models is adopted, you would
19 be taking away from Prevent the de facto role of Prevent
20 at the moment of considering both those types of cases.
21 So the VFI type broader cohort comes in, if people have
22 concerns about them, as well as the Prevent cases taken
23 on.

24 I want you to focus on how you would mitigate the
25 downsides of another body looking at those cases first.

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1 I can call it that quickly, to provide advice. There
2 are multiple ways you could do that. It could be
3 an extension of our resources, in that you have a CT
4 officer or staff member, or numbers of them, in that hub
5 or you could have dedicated roles there where we gave
6 some upskilling to -- you know, there are lots of
7 different tactical applications to ensure that that
8 expertise was within there. But I would definitely --
9 it goes back to my point of CTP don't see themselves as
10 not part of the solution here, but in a directed way and
11 I think that would definitely be a way.

12 It would also guard against the risk, not just for
13 CT but in any system. If you have a very large front
14 door, or even one of the interim models you were talking
15 about before break, you need a way that referrals that
16 need urgent escalation, either because of risk or
17 because it needs to go to a particular pathway quickly,
18 you need a mechanism that allows that to happen,
19 swiftly. If there is something that is so obvious --
20 for argument's sake, that it has a CT nexus -- you
21 almost have an opt-out of lots of questions and
22 exploration in a multi-agency setting of triage and it
23 goes: right, there is something obvious that means it is
24 CT or it is cyber or it is CSC.

25 So there needs to be a way that if there is such

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1 If we could have on the screen, please, page 33,
2 CTPHQ000409_0033 paragraph 96 of your statement. You
3 say, towards the bottom half of that:

4 "[Counter Terrorism Police] can envisage a future
5 role where Prevent SMEs ..."

6 So subject matter experts:

7 "... may be based, physically or virtually, in
8 a multi-agency setting to support initial triage of
9 referrals. This would require careful exploration to
10 understand the impact and consequences of such
11 an approach. We would want to take care in establishing
12 these [new] ways of working to ensure there is no
13 detriment to Prevent's current integration within the
14 existing CT system."

15 Now, there may be some sensitivities that sit behind
16 that and you will be cautious, I know, about those. But
17 at a fundamental level, there seems to be no opposition
18 to the concept, as you say, whether physically or
19 virtually, those with CTP expertise being co-located
20 with those doing the triage function?

21 A. I think there definitely isn't an aversion to that.
22 I think you would need some extension of the CTP Prevent
23 expertise within that initial front door, to make sure
24 that they were able to advise, identify those cases that
25 clearly needed to move through to the Prevent funnel, if

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1 a presentation of information at the initial referral,
2 it can very quickly progress. Whereas those which are
3 perhaps more nuanced and it is not clear where it sits
4 and needs more exploration and partnership, then that
5 could happen. So that would be critical, probably not
6 just for CT but beyond.

7 I think also, if I may, just reverting back to the
8 question you asked me before break, if you were to have
9 those two parallel paths that I favoured, you would also
10 need to build into that system some sort of escalatory
11 process that could very quickly -- if there was
12 a dispute, where did it live, you would want a very
13 quick, multi-agency, with the right seniority,
14 escalation point that said: who owns this case? Right,
15 clear ownership, it stays with you or it moves to
16 a different funnel. So I think there are tactical
17 safeguards that help any potential interim solutions and
18 the long term.

19 Q. Again, we don't need to go into the detail that lies
20 behind it, but in open hearings in Phase 1, in looking
21 at the detail of what had happened with AR on his three
22 Prevent referrals, we looked at the process in the early
23 stages of a Prevent referral, of a system of
24 de-confliction, and of the way in which the Fixed
25 Intelligence Management Unit has an involvement at the

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1 early stage on doing certain checks on systems to gather
2 information.

3 Would you agree that, at a very high level, in
4 simplistic terms, there would be risks in losing that
5 work and one would have to find solutions to ensure not
6 just escalation routes but that equivalents were built
7 into the system? They may not be exactly the same but
8 one would have to ensure that cases were not missed,
9 that needed to have that sort of work done?
10 **A.** Definitely. Only the cases that needed that sort of
11 work because, if we are talking about very large funnel,
12 we would need to be careful and nuanced in that. Whilst
13 I won't try and design the solution now, there will be
14 a way that a solution could be designed to ensure that
15 that wasn't lost and we would want that to be maintained
16 for the cases it was relevant to.

17 **Q.** So, the critical thing at this stage -- because we are
18 not going to design it this afternoon -- is that
19 somebody with your expertise and seniority does not see,
20 in that, insuperable difficulties. There are lots of
21 things that would need to be worked through but it ought
22 not to be something that would completely --

23 **A.** Shouldn't be insurmountable.

24 **Q.** Thank you. Secondly, in this area, as to the two
25 models, the very wide front door, or the public

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1 a professional has a concern about a child,
2 an adolescent, or a young adult in any of those areas.
3 It all goes to the same body. That then looks at it and
4 may say: that is a child safeguarding concern, that's
5 children's social care, at whatever level. That looks
6 like a VFI cohort case, so that goes to the
7 multi-agency. That looks like vulnerability to being
8 drawn into terrorism. But it is triaging everything.

9 But you could have a model that says: leave the MASH
10 to deal with those, we want a triaging body that looks
11 just at the public protection cases?

12 **A.** Either could work. I mean, I think there is a very Big
13 Front Door that takes everything, from a kind of purely,
14 I suppose, utopia point of view -- we have talked about
15 the cross-cutting themes that sit across different
16 elements of casework. It would allow a proper holistic
17 zoom out to look at a referral of an individual that was
18 referred in and then consider the best agencies to
19 convene or the best pathways. I do, however, accept
20 that that is a huge, huge undertaking and involves
21 changing vast parts of systems in child safeguarding and
22 there would be risks with that.

23 So, I could see how keeping them separate and having
24 MASH and then your public protection type referrals
25 might be desirable. Anything that splits pots you have

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1 protection wide-enough door, going to a different body,
2 do you have a professional individual view as to which
3 would be better and which would be more practicable to
4 achieve, which may be two different questions, and does
5 CTPHQ have a view on that?

6 **A.** On the models you proposed to me before?

7 **Q.** Yes.

8 **A.** My personal view -- and I think I would, without having
9 consulted widely, say a CTP view would be the model
10 I outlined as my preference before break, which would be
11 the two. There would have to be safeguards built into
12 that. As I have described, the urgent escalation if
13 a referral went to the wrong place --

14 **Q.** To be clear, at the triage stage, the triage function
15 would be taking triages for those two pathways, not
16 taking also the wider safeguarding. So that's what I'm
17 concerned with.

18 **A.** Sorry --

19 **Q.** Forgive me, but there is a lot of complexity in this.

20 So do you remember I was saying that you could have
21 a front door system that took child concerns about abuse
22 in the home, so traditional safeguarding, and took both
23 VFI, bigger cohort, and the current Prevent type
24 referrals. So all of the safeguard and public
25 protection in one very wide front door. So

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1 to have the safeguards that make sure you don't end up
2 with silos. That would be my observation --

3 **SIR ADRIAN FULFORD:** The problem can be that you can have
4 a child who is at risk, but who is also a risk to
5 others?

6 **A.** Yes, absolutely.

7 **SIR ADRIAN FULFORD:** And if you don't have one front door,
8 you immediately split that problem in half?

9 **A.** Absolutely, and I think there is something about --
10 whilst you would always want the relevant parts of the
11 system to deal with what they needed to -- I was giving
12 this thought earlier, any duty or national guidance,
13 whatever may or may not be implemented, over and above
14 those who are the core duty holders, I think there has
15 to be something built in that requires other parts of
16 the system to join a multi-agency engagement or setting
17 if there is expertise.

18 So if I use CTP as an example. If there is a case
19 that is being dealt, in a wider multi-agency sense, the
20 majority of the risk sits there but there is something
21 that is identified, where the Chair or the lead agency
22 feels: actually, we need some CTP expertise here, it
23 would be absolutely right that we would be required to
24 attend a meeting or be called into an environment, to
25 give some expertise or help with a specific bespoke

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specialism and the same for others.

So I think there is -- because risk can be so wide-ranging and vulnerability, there is something about ensuring that specialisms can come in and give bespoke advice, even if the outcome of that isn't the whole case moving to that specialism, but they are able to support, which perhaps goes to reducing some of the risk that you highlighted, Chair.

MR MOSS: Thank you. Then, perhaps linked to that, if we could have back on screen, please, your statement, on page 29, CTPHQ000409_0029, paragraph 87. Having said, at the top of paragraph 87, that:

"CTPHQ is supportive of the concept of a big front door ..."

You do say, at the bottom:

"The success of a big front door would need it to be properly invested in and resourced ..."

But you also say this:

"... with a clear accountable owner and legislation to provide a duty for all relevant agencies to co-operate and support managing risk."

You say CTPHQ000409_0030:

"Whilst CTPHQ are supportive of this concept, it is not without risk, most notably that the strengthening of connections between Prevent and other safeguarding

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quickly become overwhelming cumbersome and difficult to complete and raises questions as to which agency would be best placed to complete it in the first place."

Just pausing there. We are obviously aware of the issues of interoperability of IT as well. But where the Inquiry's expert cadre concluded on this aspect was that a very important but more limited aim here should be to have a core, centrally available record of key events and key vulnerabilities. Not a 200-page complete history, but a much more condensed document but which is available to all, which is kept up to date and which all agencies have fed into.

On one view, the current multi-agency system lacks even that. Would you agree that there is strength in that sort of a more limited aim?

A. I think there's definitely strength in that approach. That would allow agencies to be able to see sort of critical risk factors or things that were significant without getting drawn into a lot of detail, which could risk not being able to see the wood for the trees.

Q. Thank you. Briefly, please, at page 33, CTPHQ000409_0033 paragraph 97, you say that in broad terms, CTPHQ:

"... considers that existing information sharing legislation and protocols are sufficient to allow for

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functions cannot be at the expense of well-established and effective connections between Prevent and the wider CT system."

You refer then to passages later in your statement. You seem, particularly, to be stressing there the desirability of having the system strengthened by what might be thought of as a MAPPA-like obligation of co-operation within the system?

A. Absolutely.

Q. Thank you. Can I turn next, please, to the necessary characteristics of multi-agency working in an alternative pathway. If we can go to page 27, CTPHQ000409_0027 paragraph 82. I will take this briefly because it echoes evidence from elsewhere.

You say that:

"CTPHQ would be supportive of a single shared multi-agency risk assessment tool."

It would be a benefit to the CT system and wider safeguarding, but you say:

"The challenge in such an assessment would be to keep it sufficiently flexible and agile given the wide variation in the types of threat, risk and vulnerabilities presented, and the responsibilities and needs between agencies. A single assessment which covered all the areas required by every agency ... could

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sharing of information regarding VFIs although some challenges remain in some individual cases."

You go on to say:

"... the framework is sufficient to allow for the sharing of information ..."

Then over the page, please CTPHQ000409_0034:

"Where issues arise locally it is often because different agencies, or parts of agencies, interpret legislation in different ways ... [And] CTPHQ considers that it is not the threshold for sharing information that is ... most problematic ... rather it is an agreed collective understanding of the thresholds, and the thresholds that are applied within agencies that generate an active response to a risk."

Now, that's coming from you, as a very senior professional working in Prevent, where there's the benefit of the Prevent duty.

Would you agree that there is a case for a statutory right to share information, if not duty to share information, in the VFI cohort solution? Because although it might be argued that, for example, child safeguarding routes to sharing information may be said to be sufficient, the different ways in which they can be interpreted, which is what you are referring to at 97, still leaves things open to seeing data protection

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1 as key and defensive decision-making about that.
 2 Would you agree?
 3 **A.** I think that is certainly a challenge and there are
 4 cultural barriers all agencies need to overcome and
 5 legislation, a duty could certainly help in that sphere.
 6 I would be keen that it dealt with the issue
 7 holistically, not for a single particular category, VFI
 8 or others, because I think removing people's tactical
 9 concern about breaching some Information Commissioner
 10 guidance, making sure everybody is clear on what should
 11 be shared and why, that would help all manner of
 12 different safeguarding and information sharing
 13 processes, not just specific to VFI. So I could
 14 definitely see there would be an advantage there.
 15 **Q.** Thank you. Then, more generally, in terms of good
 16 practice in multi-agency working, we are seeking to try
 17 to distil and condense down, from all of the experts and
 18 professionals who are giving evidence, a representative
 19 list of what it comes to, of what good multi-agency
 20 working in this area looks like. So we are currently
 21 looking at this in terms of ten principles derived from
 22 Southport.
 23 So the first is that multi-agency working
 24 arrangements require ownership. So whatever solution is
 25 reached on lead agency or multi-agency, there must be

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1 **Q.** Fourthly -- and I am sure there are better ways to
 2 express this -- but a culture of sufficiently good fit,
 3 that agencies should be focusing on ways that they can
 4 help the young person, even if it is not a perfect fit
 5 for the services that they usually offer. So they
 6 should look for what they can contribute, rather than
 7 reasons to turn down a referral? The statutory limits
 8 in the case of Prevent --
 9 **A.** An enabling environment rather than a constrictive one.
 10 **Q.** Fifthly, that lack of consent should not result in
 11 automatic closures, but there should be a culture of
 12 reviewing why consent is not forthcoming; reviewing
 13 other interventions that may be appropriate; and in
 14 appropriate cases, asking whether the refusal of consent
 15 means that actually the case requires escalation rather
 16 than closure?
 17 **A.** That should definitely be part of the considerations,
 18 yes.
 19 **Q.** Sixthly, the need for auditable decisions, recording
 20 thinking, including the rationale for case closures in
 21 particular and that a case should generally not be
 22 closed because it's somehow been timed out. If
 23 interventions have not succeeded, again, escalation
 24 should be considered rather than: we have tried for
 25 a certain length of time?

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1 a sense of ownership of the risk and ownership of the
 2 case. Within that, the child's voice, if it is a child,
 3 needs to be heard but there also needs to be the
 4 maintenance of a focus on risk to the public.
 5 Would you agree with that, in broad terms?
 6 **A.** Definitely. I think ownership, it is also worth
 7 considering accountability because whilst you may have
 8 an agency that owns the structure or the process or
 9 somebody who is responsible as Chair, it also needs to
 10 be clear that those around the table are accountable for
 11 the things that they have committed to doing, or for
 12 their part of the ownership of the totality of the plan.
 13 **Q.** Thank you. So both accountability and governance of
 14 that are important aspects that others have raised.
 15 Secondly, a culture of professional curiosity, the
 16 need to dig beneath the surface, to ask questions about
 17 the underlying causes for the vulnerabilities or the
 18 risk behaviour that presents?
 19 **A.** Yes, absolutely.
 20 **Q.** Thirdly -- touching on aspects that we have been dealing
 21 with recently -- the focus should be on data sharing
 22 abilities in order to achieve a core, accurate
 23 up-to-date overview of a young person's key events and
 24 vulnerabilities, shared across agencies?
 25 **A.** Agree.

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1 **A.** Yes. I do agree with that. I think there does also
 2 need to be routes to closure and the reason I flag that
 3 is otherwise you end up with a continually growing --
 4 **Q.** A caseload that just grows and grows?
 5 **A.** -- that cannot be managed. So there definitely has to
 6 be escalation but there have to be clear processes that
 7 allow practitioners to close cases and unfortunately,
 8 sometimes that means cases are closed with some risks
 9 still existing, that has to be managed in other
 10 structures or tolerated because the absence of risk is
 11 quite difficult to achieve and you have to balance not
 12 making practitioners risk averse and ultimately just
 13 constantly keeping cases open.
 14 **SIR ADRIAN FULFORD:** But it has to be explained, doesn't it?
 15 **A.** It does, absolutely, and rationalised.
 16 **SIR ADRIAN FULFORD:** So the auditable decision?
 17 **A.** Absolutely.
 18 **MR MOSS:** So the rationale in some cases, that may -- we
 19 have reduced the -- borrowing from different context,
 20 but an ALARP(?) approach, that we've reduced the risk as
 21 low as is reasonably practical. There remains a risk
 22 but it is one within our risk tolerances. In other
 23 cases, it may be: we, as an agency, have done what we
 24 can, the remaining risk may need to be looked at with
 25 others but that would still involve multi-agency

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1 working, to ensure that that is actually happening?
 2 A. Absolutely.
 3 Q. Seventhly, agreed escalation routes and processes.
 4 Eighthly, both individuals and units taking their own
 5 responsibility for high professional standards? And we
 6 include that because in some cases in Phase 1 it was
 7 that the standards of an individual professional or
 8 their unit was not good enough.

9 Ninthly, always consider the digital environment and
 10 the online environment as a key element in this risk
 11 area. So just as social relationships, risks and
 12 vulnerabilities need to be looked at. In the modern
 13 world the online relationships, risks and
 14 vulnerabilities need to be a key part of any assessment?

15 A. Agree.

16 Q. Tenthly, an expectation around adequate resourcing,
 17 which we include because it is no good expecting one to
 18 nine to be delivered if the resourcing is wholly
 19 inadequate?

20 A. Agreed.

21 Q. Now, to some extent, that list is easily stated. Is
 22 there anything, with all your experience, that you would
 23 add to that in your experience of what good multi-agency
 24 working should look like?

25 A. No, I think that covers the vast majority that you would
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1 traffic to their pages. Groups that have nothing to do
 2 with violence may use the material to entice viewers
 3 away from mainstream platforms to alternative online
 4 communities."

5 So you put up something that may be, in particular,
 6 attractive to an adolescent and they get something that
 7 had nothing to do with that clickbait:

8 "Anonymity [giving] users 'courage' to vocalise
 9 thoughts/fantasies and behave in a way that is [very]
 10 different to real world interactions.

11 "The drive by Internet Service Providers ... for
 12 privacy and anonymity can make it harder for law
 13 enforcement to assess risk posed. Whilst not a novel
 14 problem, this is likely to make identification and
 15 accurate assessment of terrorist threat more
 16 challenging ..."

17 Fourthly:

18 "As is well known ... the algorithm and
 19 recommendation systems used by online platforms leads to
 20 individuals being fed increasing amounts of the same or
 21 similar material. This applies in all areas including
 22 in relation to extreme content."

23 Now, those, as you will understand, are not new to
 24 the Inquiry but you pithily put them together and
 25 emphasise them and it is right that we should record the
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1 need for -- to give you good multi-agency working.
 2 I think the only things that I referenced a few minutes
 3 ago are, if there are -- I say different pathways, but
 4 if there are different segments to that system, how you
 5 ensure that there is cross-system working, if I can call
 6 it that. We could word it better, I am sure. But
 7 ensuring there is cross-system or cross-thematic working
 8 to prevent the ping-pong effect. That would be the
 9 obvious one that I think would -- I would add.

10 Q. Thank you. We will look to see how that can be factored
 11 in without making the list too long. But it is a useful
 12 feature to flag that must be contained within them,
 13 thank you.

14 Could I turn, briefly, to the online environment and
 15 online activity. For that purpose, could we have
 16 page 36 CTPHQ000409_0036 of your statement, please,
 17 paragraph 103. You say:

18 "Anecdotally [CTP] are seeing a large rise in online
 19 content that is indicative of individuals fixated on
 20 extreme violence with no clear ideological drivers.
 21 Without government level intervention, access to this
 22 type of material is unlikely to change."

23 Then you make some, if I may say so, very pertinent
 24 operational observations. So:

25 "Many pages use material as 'click bait' to bring
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1 concerns that you raise there.

2 Then, in paragraph 105, you refer to the recent
 3 release -- or relatively recent release that you made
 4 alongside the Director General of the Security Service
 5 and the NCA Threat Director. I wanted to give you the
 6 opportunity just to speak to what you said in that and
 7 why it was so important?

8 A. So this was a joint press release. We have done, at
 9 various points, others across our system and across the
 10 wider law enforcement partnership, to highlight the
 11 risks that are being seen in the terrorism space,
 12 extremism, violence. I am sure NCA colleagues will talk
 13 to it tomorrow in terms of Com and other harms.

14 We are seeing so much online content in our
 15 casework. It is very rare to have a case in the CT
 16 space where there isn't an online footprint of some
 17 description in the Pursue space, and -- I think
 18 I referenced it earlier today -- the volume of material
 19 that children, vulnerable people and even adults can
 20 access now in the online space is vastly different to
 21 how it was before online activity was so prevalent.

22 So there is very few ways to limit the volume, the
 23 exposure, the length of time young, impressionable
 24 people are exposed to huge amounts of content and
 25 because of the way different -- the things I have raised
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there work, there's very little moderating factors. So you can then get a stream of reinforcing content or something that's reinforcing views on a particular subject matter. The volume becomes higher. Sometimes algorithms, not all, but some will then give you content it thinks you will like more because you are interested in a category, which means you get more volume and that is a real concern.

I still think there is a perception in the wider public that this is information that is held on the dark web or in dark corners of the internet. It is literally, unfortunately, a few clicks away for children and young people and once those algorithms and the content, or people wanting to exploit the online platform, start to exploit it, it can happen very, very quickly.

Q. Thank you. I don't know if you were in the hearing venue for when Mr Emmett sought to demonstrate that, in one way, by talking about the number of UK users in one month visiting the main open web, not dark web, gore sites, and put it, I think, at the low million, but above one million, I think?

A. I think, at the risk of going back to some of our conversation this morning, that's what also make it very difficult to decide what is normal consumption in this

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statement as a whole, and paragraph 121 in particular, the warning that you are giving as to how important action in this area is?

A. Critical. Absolutely critical.

Q. You also, through the opening statement -- sir, for your note, it is page 18, paragraph 54 -- I think also support greater consideration to device-level controls as being another area that should be explored?

A. It definitely is an area that should be explored. How workable it is and how it works in practice -- and I am by no means an expert in this space, but I think all options that -- should be explored in this space, device, platform-level, to help manage the risk. But also still allow people to access safely, within the appropriate parameters, as you would want them to.

Q. Thank you. We have explored the concept that if you just based risk assessment work, even if you could access it, with what people are looking at online and passively consuming, you would have tens of thousands, hundreds of thousands, possibly millions of false positives and it is just not proportionate to do that.

If we look at page 38, CTPHQ000409_0038, paragraph 114, you deal with a different aspect of CTP's work. You say:

"CTPHQ would wish to make clear the separation

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day and age, in the current climate, compared to concerning consumption, because is an awful lot of -- there are people who consume this content lawfully, without risk, some with risk. It is very hard because that prevalence, as the stats that Jonathan referenced stated, is there.

Q. Thank you. Taking your headlines in relation to future action on this. Page 40, CTPHQ000409_0040 paragraph 121. So:

"The changes most likely to make a material difference are those identified above namely legislative change classifying the relevant material as illegal ..."

We know that the Home Office is taking steps in relation to extreme violent content, subject to the difficulties of definition being made illegal.

But secondly:

"... enabling law enforcement partners to make enforceable requests for its removal ..."

So that's the take-down powers, rather than just a duty to have a system in place. And thirdly:

"... greater moderation at source by service providers."

So that's obviously matters that we have already, to some extent, and will, during the course of Phase 2, pick up with others, but we should take from your

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between what is done to assess online activity within Prevent as a programme designed to support individuals to prevent them being drawn into terrorism, and that which is done under other parts of [Counter Terrorism] Policing such as our investigation and intelligence functions. Whilst these other parts of CTP do undertake some form of intelligence led detection of online harmful behaviour, we would not wish to share the specifics of our methodologies as that would assist those who would seek to avoid or subvert those [very] processes."

Should we understand that you are not able, in an open forum, to go into more detail as to -- not just the specific methodologies of that, but as soon as I start to ask you questions in that area, I think that quickly gets into areas you can't deal with in open session, would that be fair?

A. That is correct. I think in that paragraph I was drawing the distinction between Pursue is an intelligence and investigation function that has relevant powers and policies that can be applied in those spaces. But Prevent is a pre-criminal space and therefore different considerations are put in place. It goes back to the public, or some parts of the public having a fear that the two blur. They are separate

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1 pillars.

2 **Q.** Thank you. I just put on record that there are some

3 aspects of that of which we might ask for assistance and

4 I think, in one case, have already asked for assistance

5 in a closed state --

6 **A.** More than happy to provide detail.

7 **Q.** But for the reasons you have indicated, I'm not going to

8 ask you any further questions about that.

9 **A.** Thank you.

10 **Q.** Thank you. I think then, finally, from my questions,

11 just looking at interventions and effectiveness of

12 current laws and systems.

13 So if we could just have page 42, CTPHQ000409_0042,

14 paragraph 125 please. I'm taking it too quickly. Could

15 we have page 41, CTPHQ000409_0041, 124 first, please,

16 just to give the context. Bottom of the page:

17 "Another gap potentially exists in relation to

18 preventative civil orders. [While] there are

19 significant numbers of orders available for

20 post-conviction management ... Serious Crime Prevention

21 Orders ... and Criminal Behaviour Orders, these ..."

22 Then over the page CTPHQ000409_0042:

23 "... require a criminal conviction to have already

24 occurred. Youth Diversion Orders ... are similarly

25 limited for the VFI space as they require proof (to the

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1 some places where there are already effective orders, or

2 actually, you might be applying the wrong tool to that.

3 So I think to make it operationally usable and

4 something that can be effective, there has to be careful

5 thought and precision put into the design of it and also

6 the consideration of which part of the system would use

7 it, what would it be used for and what outcome and

8 effect? So I'm most definitely supportive of it but

9 I know, from the work on YDOs, a considerable amount of

10 thought went into designing that piece of legislation

11 and that order and I think you would have to have the

12 same level of careful thought to design something that

13 was workable and effective in this space.

14 **Q.** Thank you. So where that leads, it is actually on

15 screen in the same paragraph, is that you say:

16 "If a preventative civil order of the kind described

17 here were created, conditions restricting internet use,

18 or requiring it to be monitored, could form a valuable

19 part of it in the small number of highest risk cases,

20 subject to judicial oversight and to the tests of

21 necessity and proportionality."

22 So you seem to be valuing this as something that

23 does require thought, is likely to be helpful, but

24 giving a steer to the Inquiry that realistically, it

25 might be something that should be confined to the

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1 civil standard) that the individual has committed

2 a terrorist act, a relevant offence with a terrorist

3 connection or engaged in facilitative (to terrorism)

4 conduct. As such the preventative space for civil

5 orders for VFIs remains effectively empty at present."

6 So that's a clear, pithy analysis that we take as

7 your evidence. You then say, in paragraph 125:

8 "An equivalent mirrored civil order to the [Youth

9 Diversion Order] for the VFI space would be useful for

10 effective management ..."

11 But you then say:

12 "A simple mirror of existing legislation with the

13 removal of the requirement for the act for terrorist

14 would result in an order applicable to almost any

15 behaviour, VFI or otherwise."

16 Now, can you just expand briefly on the warning and

17 the reasons for it that you are giving there about the

18 potential for the order to be over broad and why it

19 needs careful thought?

20 **A.** Orders are hugely helpful and beneficial but they need

21 to be precise and designed to deal or tackle the

22 challenge that is being sought and the reason, if you

23 literally look the word "terrorism" out of the

24 requirements for the YDO, that could be anything. So

25 you would then be moving into gang, domestic violence,

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1 highest risk cases?

2 **A.** I think it needs to be because we are in that

3 preventative space and I know I'm speaking to people who

4 are very well versed in this, there is a risk you end up

5 with a slightly odd position where you have got very

6 high bars in, not just the Pursue space in CT, but in

7 criminal investigation more broadly, for what powers you

8 use and how you use them in that space, a gap in the

9 middle and then an order that has quite wide-ranging

10 powers in the pre-criminal preventative space.

11 It is not that it is not helpful but I think, again,

12 it needs to be zoomed out and looked at in the context

13 of all of the effective tools that sit within law

14 enforcement, to make sure that it is not well intended

15 for this issue but creates wider challenges across the

16 system.

17 **SIR ADRIAN FULFORD:** It could look disproportionate?

18 **A.** It would, most definitely, and then you come with

19 challenges around trust and confidence and all of the

20 things that I know you will be very well versed in.

21 **MR MOSS:** Thank you. Then just finally, on interventions.

22 If we could have on screen CTPHQ000009. Could we go

23 straight to page 17 CTPHQ000009_0017, please. This is

24 part of the PAF. If we can go to page 17, please. It

25 is dealing with support planning and the types of

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1 support. And we see the first one is
 2 "theological/ideological support". You will remember my
 3 questions about the alternative VFI pathway not being
 4 the poor relation. So if there is genuinely no issue
 5 about ideological risk, it may be that the
 6 theological/ideological support is less apposite. But
 7 all of the others: life and social skills; anger
 8 management; cognitive/behavioural contact; constructive
 9 leisure pursuits; education skills contact; careers
 10 focused activities; family support contact, and over the
 11 page CTPHQ000009_0018: physical and/or mental health
 12 support; housing support; drugs and alcohol support;
 13 mentoring; and then the category of "other"; those would
 14 all seem to be the headlines of interventions that you
 15 would want to have available, because of the
 16 similarities -- if we go back to some of the research
 17 documents, the similarities between the wider VFI cohort
 18 and what has been of help in Prevent cases, would you
 19 agree?

20 **A.** You would definitely want those. That list would look
 21 very similar for wider cohorts, Integrated Offender
 22 Management, MAPPA. They are the support structures that
 23 sit round individuals that can help reduce risk and
 24 vulnerability to a specific thing.

25 **Q.** But perhaps with added emphasis, if we can go back to
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1 be, sir, that you have some questions?

2 **SIR ADRIAN FULFORD:** I have one. Thank you very much.
 3 Questions by SIR ADRIAN FULFORD

4 **SIR ADRIAN FULFORD:** Could we, please, have up on screen
 5 Mr Court's statement at page 6, paragraph 27. While
 6 that's being found, obviously one of the things that the
 7 Inquiry is going to look at and I'm going to have to
 8 make some recommendations on is whether there is a new
 9 front door and how big or small it may be.

10 There is a question that is very much linked to
 11 that, but is separate, which is: who is going to be
 12 entitled to go through that front door? Because it is
 13 absolutely critical that those who are going to receive
 14 the kind of attention that would go with being accepted,
 15 having gone through the front door, are the right people
 16 and that you are not perpetuating a system in which
 17 people who should be looked at and should be helped and
 18 supported and monitored and not simply disappearing
 19 through the cracks.

20 So I think it will be fairly clear by now that this
 21 is a particular focus of anxiety on my part. Now, for
 22 VFIs, although this has, as it were, no statutory force,
 23 it has not, in any mechanistic way, been applied, it
 24 has -- that cohort has been given a definition by the
 25 Cabinet Office, with which you are very well familiar.
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1 page 17, CTPHQ000009_0017 please, you will tell me where
 2 it most usually falls under, but one sees "life and
 3 social skills". What's not individually identified on
 4 that list, perhaps slightly oddly, is online risks and
 5 particularly for the facet -- I am sure it could fall
 6 into many of the categories but one would want to see
 7 particular emphasis to effective online support and
 8 interventions, advice, mentoring?

9 **A.** Definitely. I mean, I think from our perspective,
 10 online would filter through. It is a cross-cutting
 11 theme across all of those. But I do think it is
 12 an important thing to consider, not just for VFI but for
 13 all interventions, as to what good digital risk
 14 management planning and safety planning actually looks
 15 like because a digital support plan will mean very many
 16 different things depending where the user goes, what
 17 type of activity they undertake, whether they are
 18 passive, proactive. So, there is some real nuance and
 19 it is probably an area, again, that there may be
 20 research and there may need to be more, as to how do you
 21 effectively help people manage their digital
 22 interactions in a way that reduces risk.

23 **MR MOSS:** Thank you very much. Sir, those are my questions.
 24 My learned friend, Mr Illingworth, has permission to ask
 25 questions on behalf of the three victim teams and it may
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1 Now, just reminding ourselves, yet again, of it:
 2 "Individuals presenting a fascination with extreme
 3 violence."
 4 So that captures their interest but it doesn't leave
 5 it there, it is combined with "the intent to inflict
 6 extreme violence, where ideology is not the primary
 7 driver."

8 Now, given your particular experience, which is
 9 extremely valuable in this field, if I may say so, is it
 10 your view that that cohort, which has now been a focus
 11 of attention for a couple of years with this particular
 12 title, is that a cohort that ought to be caught or
 13 allowed to go through, rather, whichever front door is
 14 eventually identified?

15 **A.** Yes. I think it is. But in the same way in Prevent,
 16 you need staged gateways in that process to consider how
 17 those behaviours are presenting and which are the cases
 18 that actually can be dealt with, in the more generic
 19 sense, just -- so ensuring school teachers are aware and
 20 safeguarding officers, versus those who reach
 21 a threshold -- and I hate the "threshold" word, but they
 22 have to exist in a system -- so that those who require
 23 intensive supervision get the support that they need.

24 **SIR ADRIAN FULFORD:** I absolutely understand that. So my
 25 concern is the person who is, as it were, standing
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1 outside. So it is not what happens to them
2 afterwards -- and I completely agree, if I may say so,
3 that, having gone through the front door, therefore
4 being accepted, as it were, at the first stage, then
5 very careful consideration needs to be given as to what,
6 if anything, needs to be done and if things need to be
7 done, at what level.

8 But it is -- but you agree that somebody who is
9 fascinated with extreme violence, and has an intent to
10 inflict extreme violence, ought at least to go through
11 the door and then their fate after that will depend on
12 the individual circumstances?

13 **A.** That would be my view.

14 **SIR ADRIAN FULFORD:** Yes. So I think it would be invidious
15 of me to ask you to comment on the evidence and the
16 ideas of others -- and I have particularly in mind the
17 exchange that I had with Mr Emmett yesterday -- I think
18 that wouldn't be the right thing to do, but that view is
19 very helpful. Thank you very much. Mr Illingworth.

20 **Questions by MR ILLINGWORTH**

21 **MR ILLINGWORTH:** Thank you, sir. I'm conscious of the time,
22 I will be as fast as I can.

23 **SIR ADRIAN FULFORD:** Don't feel under pressure,
24 Mr Illingworth.

25 **MR ILLINGWORTH:** Thank you. Good afternoon DAC Evans, I ask
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1 **Q.** And those are two distinct concepts?

2 **A.** They are, but they are complementary in that they are
3 part of the wider CONTEST system.

4 **Q.** So what I'm going to suggest to you is that we may need
5 two complementary concepts for VFIs. So for VFIs we
6 have a term that the Government have drafted, which
7 defines a specific form of violence that we want to
8 protect society against; so Non-Ideological Extreme
9 Violence. And that defines the characteristics of the
10 act.

11 But don't we also need to define the cohort of
12 individuals who are at risk of being mobilised into that
13 form of violence in the same way that we have for
14 section 36?

15 **A.** Potentially. I think that's what you would need to do
16 in whatever a future model is, whether it is
17 a section 36 decision. But I think it goes to the
18 Chair's point of you would then have to decide, once
19 somebody had come in through the large front door, those
20 that related to VFI, there would have to be a threshold
21 or a decision point -- whether it was statutory or not
22 would be a matter for obviously others to design -- that
23 was the reason they moved into the intensive support.

24 **Q.** Yes. Thank you. So if a new system for VFIs is going
25 to have two categories in the same way that CT has
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1 questions on behalf of the three victim groups. I had
2 two topics for you, please, on the design of the future
3 system. The first is to do with definitions and
4 statutory responsibilities and the second is to do with
5 handover between the different pathways.

6 So, on definitions and statutory responsibilities,
7 you have given your views on changes to the Prevent
8 threshold as part of the National Security System.
9 I would like to explore an alternative in which the
10 section 36 Prevent threshold remains the same.

11 So, in CT, there is a clearly defined specific form
12 of violence that we care about, which is obviously
13 terrorism; a series of offences associated with that
14 definition; and then, separately, we have a defined
15 cohort of individuals who are vulnerable to being drawn
16 into that specific form of violence within Prevent. Do
17 you agree with that?

18 **A.** Sorry, I didn't quite understand the end part of that.

19 **Q.** So we have a specific form of violence and associated
20 offences?

21 **A.** Within terrorism --

22 **Q.** So that's Pursue. Then we have Prevent, which cares
23 about a defined cohort of individuals who are vulnerable
24 to being drawn into terrorism. That's the definition.

25 **A.** That's correct. The two strands, yes.
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1 Pursue and Prevent, if it has violence we are concerned
2 about and a cohort of people who may end up committing
3 that violence, and if the Government introduces this new
4 proposed offence for planning non-ideological mass
5 casualty attacks, could that lead to us operating
6 a system where there is a statutory duty, modelled on
7 section 36, which requires duty holders to prevent
8 individuals being drawn into mass casualty attack
9 planning or to prevent them being drawn into acts of
10 non-ideological extreme violence?

11 **A.** I mean that certainly is possible. I think you would
12 need to explore that in more detail. In some ways it
13 is -- I'm conscious now we are comparing Prevent and
14 Pursue, not just the prevention space, which is
15 a slightly different composition.

16 So I wouldn't say it couldn't be explored. I think
17 you would have to understand what that meant. The
18 terrorism legislation that we deal with in Pursue is
19 obviously quite far ranging, it is beyond a single
20 offence, it is a whole suite of offences around that
21 specific category, whereas the violence mass casualty
22 planning offence, that the Government proposes, a single
23 offence that would co-exist around the other primary
24 legislation that enforces.

25 I would certainly not rule out those considerations,
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1 but to be honest I would have to understand it in
2 a little bit more detail and give it more thought as to
3 whether that would be a workable solution and others
4 beyond the CT system would obviously have views about
5 how those could work.

6 **Q.** Thank you. In terms of the working definition that the
7 learned Chair has just taken you to, the definition of
8 VFIs, is it fair to say that that working definition
9 merges those two concepts? So it contains both the act
10 of violence and the cohort of individuals that might end
11 up committing that violence?

12 **A.** It can do. I think the Chair asked me specifically
13 about that definition. I think when I gave evidence
14 earlier I highlighted that there is a need to consider
15 all of the different versions of a definition that we
16 have heard in evidence and we have already worked with
17 and understand what is the most -- what is the
18 definition that is operationally applicable.

19 And the VFI is quite close, NIVE and NIEV. I think
20 there is probably a combination of those that would make
21 the most fitting operationally applicable definition.
22 I'm not sure that we are there yet. So I wouldn't want
23 to specifically hone in on that definition because
24 I think there's more work to do to get to the right
25 place to ensure it protects the public and also it

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1 talks about, if a particular officer or staff member is
2 particularly concerned, then they should take those
3 steps. There are different layers depending on at what
4 point the referral is exiting the system, what the level
5 of risk is that is around it. But, as I say, I am doing
6 that from memory around the very tactical detail of that
7 policy. So, with the Chair's leave, I will be very
8 happy to clarify that in writing if that's of
9 assistance?

10 **Q.** Thank you.

11 **SIR ADRIAN FULFORD:** Would that be satisfactory,
12 Mr Illingworth?

13 **MR ILLINGWORTH:** Absolutely, sir. Just, finally, in this
14 new system, if a case is referred out of Prevent into
15 the new pathway, because, for example, it looked like,
16 perhaps, it might be a section 36 threshold case and
17 officers looked at it and decided actually it is not for
18 Prevent, so it is going to go into the other pathway;
19 what safeguards need to be in place at the point
20 a referral is made around reviewing that decision,
21 checking whether it has actually been picked up and
22 actioned within that other pathway?

23 **A.** It would have to be a very clear process for that. If
24 you were putting it into a multi-agency structure, built
25 into the system that was designed there would need to be

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1 recognises the concerns of the families and victims.

2 **Q.** Thank you very much. Second topic was handovers,
3 please. You have given evidence on how Prevent might
4 work alongside a separate pathway for VFIs and you have
5 touched on the issue of handing over between those two
6 pathways in a new system.

7 Just to help us understand how the process works at
8 the moment, as we understand it, under the Prevent SOP,
9 if a case is being referred on outside of Prevent, there
10 doesn't appear to be any requirement for the person in
11 Prevent making the referral to positively confirm that
12 the referral has been accepted before they close the
13 case to Prevent. Is that correct?

14 **A.** So I would have to get the SOP up and go into the detail
15 of the guidance. There is guidance for officers about
16 where they should refer them to. I am doing this from
17 memory, so forgive me, and I can clarify this in
18 writing.

19 It talks about the -- the ideal would be a named
20 individual or where you will understand the same as we
21 do in Prevent there are email addresses, routes in front
22 doors, where particular departments receive referrals
23 and if that is a fixed route where referrals can be
24 received, that can be acceptable. I believe also from
25 memory there is a caveat in the guidance or the SOP that

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1 a clear route in, that was defined in policy, either at
2 a national level or if it was a model that was more
3 locally designed, I would expect the senior leadership
4 of the relevant agencies to have a clear and documented
5 route that said: if it leaves one pathway, it enters the
6 next through this.

7 I'm doing this off the top of my head, you could
8 design it in lots of different ways. The assumption is,
9 when it lands in that system, you own it until you pass
10 it back. So you would have to codify who owned what, up
11 to what point and how it landed in the next system.

12 That would depend on the overarching design, but
13 I would agree that is critical to reducing the risk that
14 the Chair highlighted in Phase 1 of things just bouncing
15 between departments or sitting somewhere and not being
16 picked up correctly.

17 **Q.** Thank you very much, DAC Evans. Thank you, sir.

18 **SIR ADRIAN FULFORD:** Thank you very much Mr Illingworth.
19 Very helpful. It has been a long day for you, thank you
20 very much indeed.

21 Thank you for the careful statements that you have
22 prepared, which have been of huge assistance and for
23 your very thoughtful evidence, both this morning and
24 this afternoon. I'm very grateful to you.

25 **A.** Thank you Chair, I hope it has been helpful.

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1 **MR MOSS:** Thank you, sir. Tomorrow we are 10.00 am. The
2 two witnesses for tomorrow are Helen Rance at the
3 National Crime Agency and DS Steve Watkins of
4 Northamptonshire Police.
5 **SIR ADRIAN FULFORD:** Thank you very much indeed. We will
6 sit tomorrow at 10.00 am.
7 **(4.36 pm)**
8 **(The Inquiry adjourned until 10.00 am the following day)**

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