

Tuesday, 13th October 2026

(9.30 am)

MR JONATHAN EMMETT (continued)

Questions by MR MOSS (continued)

SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: Yes, Mr Moss.

MR MOSS: Thank you, sir. Mr Emmett, good morning.

A couple of matters, please, arising overnight. First of all, I asked you yesterday about the percentage coverage in England and Wales of Young Futures Panels and I think you confirmed that overnight some work has been done by your team, who have been able to inform the Inquiry that approximately a third of upper tier local authorities have a Young Futures Panel, 64 out of 175.

But it is fair to note that those are concentrated in the areas with violence reduction units, so the 53 pilot panels cover collectively areas that account for more than 80 per cent of knife crime. From the work that has been done overnight, do you understand that to be the position?

A. Yes, that is correct.

Q. Secondly, I think there was a correction you wanted to make in relation to the CCS, the Clinical Consultancy Service, headed by Dr Taylor?

A. Yes, just for the avoidance of doubt, the Clinical Consultancy Service do not themselves conduct mental

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is being commissioned to do that?

A. I don't have that detail here but I'm very happy to write to you with it.

Q. If that could be covered in the update we would be very grateful. Thank you very much, Mr Emmett.

So I was dealing, sir, at the close of play yesterday with the role of the internet, still looking at current areas of work, and I was turning to explore take down powers with you, Mr Emmett. Could we have back on the screen your statement, page 89 HOM000964_0089, paragraph 271 please. You explain there that:

"Currently, Government and law enforcement lacks powers to compel a provider of online service to take down specific pieces of illegal content."

You say:

"This leaves the Government or law enforcement potentially exposed in responding swiftly to significant or rapidly evolving harm."

From the context, I think that applies to terrorist, so TACT material and material that would be illegal because of the terrorism legislation, is that right?

A. Yes, that is correct.

Q. A fortiori, therefore, would apply also in relation to extreme violent content?

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health or neurodiversity assessments, but can, under certain circumstances, facilitate the commissioning of such in very limited circumstances.

Q. Thank you. Then thirdly, I asked you the position in relation to risk assessments and I understand that you may have been able to gather, again, more information overnight in relation to that?

A. Yes, I mean the context of that question, again, for the avoidance of doubt, we regard risk assessment as crucial. The exact shape of a tool will depend of course upon the system that it is designed to integrate with, but the Home Office, through the taskforce, has commissioned work to strengthen the evidence base on NIEV characteristics, behaviours of concern, risk factors and protective factors, which is intended to inform work on NIEV risk assessments and tools. We will provide more detail on that work as it progresses to the Inquiry in the usual way. I think you also asked if there was a lead contender amongst existing --

Q. Yes, around SAVRY/AREVA.

A. We are aware of all those frameworks and are monitoring the work of specialists closely using our colleagues in the CT-ARC but we do not currently have a lead contender.

Q. Thank you, and the work that is being commissioned, who

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A. Yes, that's correct.

Q. Should we understand that in broad terms the reason for that is that the settlement in the Online Safety Act imposes a duty on platforms to have systems and processes in place to deal with illegal content rather than a specific duty to remove material and any system of a notice being served requiring such removal?

A. Yes, that's correct.

Q. Thank you. If we look at page 90, over the page please, at paragraph 274 HOM000964_0090, we will see that two options have been considered in relation to this. The first is to reform an existing power in the 2006 Act for terrorism-related content.

Now, the Inquiry is aware of that and I don't need to go through the detail because it relates to terrorism but I think you candidly say that a curiosity about that power is that it's never, in fact, been used?

A. That's correct, yes.

Q. So reform of that to make it, no doubt, more effective and more applicable to the modern age and then option 2, we, I'm afraid, are navigating quite a few redactions here although it is material that the Core Participants are able to see but what we can say in open hearing session is that option 2 is a broader power which could apply to other types of illegal content beyond

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1 terrorism-related content, is that right?

2 **A.** Yes, that's correct.

3 **Q.** Thank you, and then at paragraph 277, please, so over

4 the page, HOM000964_0091 you say that:

5 "In relation to Option 1, the Home Office has been

6 working on plans to update [those sections of the 2006

7 Act] to provide a relevant authority with an enforceable

8 power to require technology companies to remove specific

9 terrorist content from their platforms."

10 So the concept there is a CRN, a content removal

11 notice, and we can see that, while that may be in the

12 relatively early stages because it is initial advice, it

13 is concrete in the sense that you have been able to

14 inform the Inquiry that initial advice has been put to

15 Mr Jarvis, the Security Minister in July of this year?

16 **A.** Yes.

17 **Q.** If extreme violent content becomes unlawful, as is the

18 plan under the National Security Bill as announced in

19 the King's speech, could work be done to extend the

20 content removal notice approach to extreme violent

21 content?

22 **A.** In principle, yes it could, but I should emphasise, as

23 I do so in my statement, that no ministerial decision

24 has been taken on the concept of the content removal

25 notice.

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1 UK could be more muscular in restricting material going

2 beyond the current terms of the OSA, both in relation to

3 terrorism material and extreme violent content material?

4 **A.** At a general level that's certainly true. On the

5 operation of the OSA and its bedding in, I refer you to

6 my colleagues from the Department for Digital, Culture,

7 Media and Sport, I understand they are giving evidence,

8 and to the general approach of the Government, to more

9 recent statements made by the Secretary of State for

10 that department and indeed measures such as the

11 children's social media ban and so forth.

12 **Q.** Thank you. In broad terms, is the Home Office pressing

13 at least for careful consideration of going further?

14 **A.** I think, as my statement illustrates, there are a number

15 of areas where the Government is already going further

16 and the Home Office clearly has been pressing strongly

17 for those to be taken forward.

18 **Q.** Thank you. Just looking at some of the limitations of

19 the OSA, if we look at 278 at the bottom of this page,

20 you set out that it does provide a significant framework

21 but the position is more complex for violent ideologies

22 or material that is harmful but lawful, particularly for

23 adult users. You are referring there to the fact that

24 there are different provisions if it crosses the

25 criminal threshold.

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1 **Q.** No. But is there thinking to align the two, such that

2 if the in-principle decision is made to go forward with

3 content removal notice -- and I appreciate we are in the

4 area of developing Government policy -- but if the

5 decision is taken in principle to go forward with a CRN

6 approach, is the current thinking that that will be

7 restricted to terrorism material or is there the

8 potential to link it up to what, by then, may be

9 unlawful material because it is extreme violent content?

10 **A.** That's certainly a point upon which we will provide

11 advice to ministers at the relevant time.

12 **Q.** Thank you, and no doubt that's another area where we can

13 keep the Inquiry informed with whatever levels of

14 confidentiality may be appropriate given the developing

15 nature. Thank you.

16 **A.** Yes.

17 **Q.** In general terms here, in your statement and in others,

18 we have seen the concept that, my words, there needs to

19 be some time to allow the Online Safety Act to bed in

20 and for Ofcom and others to be able to be in a position

21 to have a developed process. We know that guidance has

22 been issued and that enforcement -- we can see

23 developments in that area but it is all still relatively

24 new. But should the Inquiry understand generally from

25 your statement that there are various ways in which the

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1 You also say that even those powers depend upon:

2 "... the provider having reasonable grounds to infer

3 that the content is illegal and acting on that

4 assessment."

5 You point out that:

6 "If the Home Office or law enforcement considers the

7 material to be illegal, [over the page HOM000964_0092]

8 but the platform does not ... it [is not] captured by

9 the platform's illegal content processes ..."

10 Or the duty to take down under those processes. Is

11 that right, that it is their assessment of whether it is

12 unlawful?

13 **A.** Yes, there isn't an independent assessment available on

14 whether or not a particular piece of content is lawful.

15 **Q.** Then paragraph 279, you deal with jurisdictional

16 limitations. So "the Act applies only to in-scope

17 services with the necessary UK link" and again, I think

18 there is some complexity that sits behind that that

19 I won't explore with you, I will pick up with others.

20 But one shouldn't think that the provisions in the OSA

21 apply to everything that can be accessed on the

22 internet; it applies to services in broad terms that

23 have a sufficient UK link, yes?

24 **A.** Yes, that are used by persons in the UK.

25 **Q.** You say, in paragraph 280, if we scroll down a little

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1 bit, that:
 2 "Some material relevant to NIEV may sit below
 3 existing criminal thresholds while still contributing to
 4 fixation, grievance, desensitisation or escalation."
 5 That, of course, must be right, especially when we
 6 don't, at the moment, have an extreme violent content
 7 criminal offence. So, in broad terms, for violence
 8 without ideology, one is looking at other, my words,
 9 traditional offences such as incitement to assault and
 10 matters of that kind?
 11 A. Yes.
 12 Q. So while, of course, some of that material, so inciting
 13 assault would be an offence, when you say "some material
 14 relevant to NIEV may sit below existing criminal
 15 thresholds", isn't that a bit of an understatement?
 16 Doesn't a very large amount of material, not just by
 17 volume but by proportion, sit below existing criminal
 18 thresholds?
 19 A. I think that is a fair observation. Behind my statement
 20 here is that material relevant to NIEV might be a broad
 21 categorisation, so I would include in it, for example,
 22 illegal terrorist material. But I suspect strongly that
 23 you are right, in pure numbers terms, that it might be
 24 more accurate to say the majority of material relevant
 25 to NIEV currently sits below and in the future, even if

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1 Is one of them:
 2 "... strengthening design/risk duties around
 3 recommendation systems and amplification ..."
 4 We touched on that a little yesterday:
 5 "... improving transparency around how platforms
 6 handle violent-but-lawful material ..."
 7 Carefully phrased. Does that mean that there is
 8 currently a lack of transparency by platform providers
 9 in that regard?
 10 A. So I think we explored this briefly yesterday in the
 11 context of Mr Hadley's comments on APIs. That's the
 12 thrust of the comment here.
 13 Q. Yes. The major platforms -- and we will ask questions
 14 of them when we come to the Inquiry -- but from your
 15 knowledge and experience, are they open, candid and
 16 transparent about the extent to which their algorithms,
 17 for example, amplify violent content? Do they openly
 18 explain whether they do or they don't and in broad terms
 19 what their safeguards are?
 20 A. Not to my knowledge or experience, no.
 21 Q. Do you know why they don't?
 22 A. It wouldn't be for me to comment on that.
 23 Q. Thank you. Then:
 24 "... strengthening child protections where violent
 25 material is not clearly illegal but is plainly

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1 the planned extreme violent content measures were to
 2 come to pass, I think it would remain true that some
 3 material relevant will sit below existing criminal
 4 thresholds.
 5 Q. But at the moment, and again I may be at risk of going
 6 into hypothetical cases, but your statement itself
 7 reflects that, sadly, some people choose to show graphic
 8 images, whether caught on phone or CCTV, of actual
 9 attacks, which can be very graphic, showing the
 10 infliction of very serious injury or death in a graphic
 11 way. But at the moment, if that is not linked with some
 12 form of incitement to carry out such acts, it is not, on
 13 the face of it, unlawful. So all that sort of material
 14 online is currently sitting below existing criminal
 15 thresholds?
 16 A. Yes, which is precisely the rationale behind the planned
 17 extreme violent content measure, although I should, of
 18 course, add that there will be appropriate safeguards,
 19 as we explained yesterday.
 20 Q. Yes, thank you. We will pick up obviously options for
 21 amendments to the OSA or strengthening of the OSA but if
 22 we just look at your page 93, HOM000964_0093,
 23 paragraph 286. You deal with some of these. So:
 24 "Expanding priority illegal content where
 25 justified ..."

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1 inappropriate for children ..."
 2 In that regard, at the moment, pornography, suicide
 3 material, self-injury and eating disorder material,
 4 matters of that kind, is treated as priority -- sorry,
 5 as primary priority content. While violent material
 6 that is harmful to children but falls short of any
 7 incitement offence is only priority content material.
 8 Few would disagree with putting pornography, suicide
 9 material, self-harm and eating disorder into the higher
 10 category but why is violent material that is graphic and
 11 harmful to children in the slightly lower category?
 12 A. Well, I'm not qualified to speak to the development of
 13 the OSA categories as it was at the time. But I can say
 14 that going forward, as we consider the extreme violent
 15 content offence, that we are also actively considering
 16 the designation of extreme violent content as primary
 17 priority content, but that's a decision yet to be taken.
 18 Q. From discussions in Government, is there any resistance
 19 to upgrading violent material that's harmful to children
 20 as primary priority content? Because it doesn't ban
 21 that material, it just has higher safeguards that are
 22 required in terms of the precautions and systems that
 23 are taken to prevent children from accessing it?
 24 A. So that's a decision yet to be taken.
 25 Q. Thank you. You deal in your statement also with the

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proposed social media ban for under-16s. Itself, of course, a huge topic. I just want to pick up a few aspects of it, Mr Emmett, with you if I may. Page 95 HOM000964_0095 please, paragraph 293.

So you say that:

"The proposed social media ban represents significant progress in the online harms space, moving from reliance on platform-led safety measures towards a more preventative model of child protection online."

Then in paragraph 296, page 96 HOM000964_0096, just at the bottom of the page there, you say:

"The Home Office has worked closely with DSIT [as was] throughout policy development, including through cross-Whitehall engagement and feeding into DSIT-led deep dives with [over the page] a cross-Home Office position rooted in operational evidence. The Home Office has supported the overall objective ..."

But you say:

"... lobbying for the policy to go [behind] a simple platform-based restriction. In particular, it has pressed for a broader, harm-led approach which captures high-risk features and functionalities and ensures gaming, AI chatbots and adjacent services are not treated as safe by default where they contain social-media-style or harmful features ..."

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circumvention. Robust age assurance and effective enforcement by Ofcom of the ban ... will be critical."

You say that your department has also been pressing for:

"... greater consideration of VPNs, alternative services, work-arounds, enforcement costs and deliverability."

Looking at that position on VPNs, are you able to give us any update on how the risk of circumvention of the age ban through the use of VPNs is progressing?

A. I don't have any update on that point.

Q. Thank you, that's something that we may be able to pick up with others. If we look, still on that point, at page 98, HOM000964_0098 paragraph 306 to 308, lower half of the page please, so you say that the age-related protections are primarily a question for DSIT, as was, now DCMS. Of course we will pick it up with them, but you point to the balance that needs to be struck because VPNs do have a range of legitimate purposes. It is the penultimate line in 308, as we see on the screen.

Obviously, the legitimate purposes, as you say in your own statement, include privacy. Has any thought been given to whether VPNs for children, that children are allowed to purchase and use, should be restricted to disguising the precise location within the UK as opposed

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I won't go to the exhibits that underlie that but should we understand, in general terms, therefore, that the Home Office has been pressing for that to apply to more types of material, not just traditional social media, but types of interface on platforms that are adjacent to social media and carry, as the Home Office would see it, similar risks?

A. Yes, that's correct. We would describe it as an approach -- which I talk about in 293 -- an approach of looking at high-risk functionalities as they exist on a variety of platforms and considering the extent to which it is appropriate for children to access those high-risk functionalities.

Q. Give us some practical examples of what that encompasses?

A. So there is ongoing policy development now, but I can give examples such as live streaming, stranger-to-stranger contact, or autoplay and recommender feeds. All of which are high-risk features, all of which we consider there is a good case for restricting children's access to those features on particular platforms.

Q. Thank you. Then in 297, you say that:

"A key Home Office priority has been ensuring the regime is effective in practice and resilient to

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to their location within the world? Because if a VPN had the effect that it says: this user is somewhere within the UK, those who were interacting with the user would know that the UK provisions have to apply but it would still give the child the privacy that a VPN seeks. Put another way, why does a child need to be anonymous as to their location to the whole world as opposed to anonymous as to their location in the UK, when there are UK-based protections?

A. I think that is a very interesting notion. It's not one that I'm aware that we have looked at specifically. I should say I'm not a technology specialist, so I don't know if the underlying technology associated with VPNs makes that a practical proposition.

Q. All right. We can pick that up with others. Thank you very much.

And then, back at page 96, HOM000964_0096, just so that it is not overlooked, you also flag up at paragraph 298 that:

"... some of the most serious online harms occur on platforms that are encrypted or designed around high levels of user privacy."

Again, some of those platforms we'll be receiving evidence from and you say, at the end of that paragraph, that:

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"The Home Office is ... continuing to work with DCMS ... to identify how to mitigate displacement risks so that the [under-16s] ban reduces overall harm rather than pushing children into riskier spaces."

On the face of your statement -- again, we will explore this with others -- but that must be a difficult consideration, that if you ban some of the most prominent platforms where there is a degree of control and interface, and push them to private links, you may be displacing the risk and going into a less safe space?

A. So there is -- certainly that risk exists. It is certainly something which we consider. It is one of the reasons behind, as we explored earlier, in 293, I talked about the high-risk functionalities work.

Q. Thank you. I just want to look at device interventions, if we look at paragraph 97 HOM000964_0097, paragraph 300, in a different but important area of Government work. You explain that:

"The Government has announced that smartphones and tablets should implement comprehensive nudity detection by default at operating system level -- to prevent the taking, sharing and viewing of nude imagery -- coupled with age assurance for users to switch it off by proving they are over-18."

Now, that's a policy development that has been

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operating system allows, just as anything relating to nudity would lead to it being pixelated or a message going to the parent who is linked to the child's account, the same can be applied for violent and gore material, and if the Inquiry has understood that open-source facility correctly, that does open up the question of whether a similar measure of requiring that to be on devices could be taken. Do you know if work on that is being taken forward?

A. It is quite an involved question. I'm not aware specifically of work on that point, which doesn't mean it isn't being taken forward, it may be the limits of my knowledge. On the general point about innovation in industry, and the possibilities of device and operating-system-level interventions, I would say that the significance of this moment is the ability to take an ecosystem approach to harm, in this case nude imagery not being made available to children by default, so that they cannot create or receive it. But that opens -- but of course, that requires a device-level age assurance, ie the understanding of whether or not a user of a particular device is a child, which opens the door, if you like, to consideration of other ways in which it might be appropriate to curate a child's experience of the online environment.

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announced and widely debated and the Inquiry is aware of it. But I want to pick up what you say in the next sentence because of its potential benefit for the NIEV risk. You say:

"This builds on existing partial implementations of nudity detection in Apple iOS and Google Android and device OS-level ... assurance on Apple's operating system]. As such, government is currently engaging with tech companies."

So it looks as though the tech companies' voluntary child protection measures in their operating systems is something which, because they have developed that tech, there is now the potential to require that to be a protection. So the Government, no doubt for good reason, is building upon what has already been established by the tech companies themselves and is looking then to make that mandatory and you have to prove that you are over 18 to take it off.

Could I ask about this, the Inquiry is aware that in relation to, for example, the Apple protection systems, that if you have their family sharing systems and their protection systems, you can also set it so that a child is not able to view unpixelated violence and gore material. So if one looks at open-source Apple explanations of what the child protection systems -- its

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Some of that, as you say, is already being done to degrees by technology companies and yes, I'm certain in the future there will be a debate about where, if anywhere, it is appropriate for the State to insert itself in that.

Q. But certainly, the risk of extreme violent content is such that there is a move already to criminalise it and it may be that outside observers would have strong sympathy with the initial focus being on nude imagery. But if the tech is there to have a voluntary system, at device level or operating system level, to screen out violence and gore for children, that seems, on the face of it, to be a rich vein that should be urgently explored in terms of limiting children's access to such material?

A. So, you will forgive me for my careful approach to this point. I think I have to rest on no decisions have been taken in that regard but I take your observation that it is a rich vein to be explored.

Q. Thank you. Your statement deals with internet use in schools, to some extent we can pick that up with DfE and others. I wanted to ask you about one aspect please, page 99 HOM000964_0099, paragraph 310. If we could just have -- that's perfect thank you. So you deal there with the Children's Wellbeing and Schools Act 2026 and

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provisions in relation to safeguarding and the new power for the Secretary of State -- in context, I think Secretary of State for Education not the Home Secretary -- to make regulations requiring providers of specified internet services to prevent or restrict access, by relevant children, to internet services.

Then these words:

"... (or to specified functionalities or other features of such services)."

Then in 311, you say that:

"The Home Office view is that, although this is obviously not a NIEV-specific power, it may help reduce some risks associated with NIEV pathways"

Can you help us to understand -- again, I am sure you will say if decisions have been taken, you will let us know. I am sure you will say that decisions have not yet been taken; but can you help us understand this in more concrete terms of what this opens up? Is that opening up, for example, the potential for regulations to be made about the way in which amplification and algorithms are used and their functionality being restricted for children; is it that sort of area that's envisaged?

A. So I'm afraid this is a space where I will say please do rely on the evidence given by my colleague Kate Dixon

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a significant threshold was passed concerning the risk they may pose to others."

Now, that language is reflecting the Inquiry's Phase 1 report. In relation to that, focusing, for the moment, on the restriction of access to the internet, has the Home Office started to scope out how that would work in practice, what the threshold would be, who would be able to apply?

A. So, yes, we have absolutely started to work through this in practice, indeed, at the NIEV Strategic Taskforce Strategic Delivery Board. Most recently, we took a considered paper on this, which was about the most principled decisions for the next phase of this work. We are not yet at the stage of being determinative about the threshold or indeed the precise nature of the powers but it is a piece of work that is pursuing at some pace.

Q. Thank you. It is apparent from the questions which they have tabled that this is an area of particular concern for the victims and they have asked a series of questions on this. One of which is: can it be right that such an order at the moment can only be obtained for terrorism, given that the only critical difference between NIEV and terrorism is an absence of ideology?

A. So, at the present time, the only such order that I'm aware of, which is currently operationalised, is the

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from the Department for Education, who will be far more expert in the area. My high-level understanding of this in relation to relevant children and relevant features is that it is a general power, which can be applied depending upon the case that presents, so the restriction of access to particular set of services given a particular set of risks in the context of a child's safeguarding.

Q. Thank you. Again, we will pick that up with witnesses to come. Thank you. Mr Emmett, it is very helpful for you to set the framework in this way and we understand why some matters will be picked up with others.

Could I turn to civil orders in the sphere of restriction of internet use. So over the page please, HOM000964_0100, paragraph 312. I want to come back to this area in the context of Youth Diversion Orders a little bit later this morning, but just focusing on the intent at the moment. The Inquiry will have asked you about this area, potential civil orders, because of findings and recommendations in the Phase 1 report, and you say:

"In principle, the Home Office is interested in considering the introduction of civil orders that could be used to restrict or monitor access to the internet by a person assessed as presenting a risk of NIEV, if

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Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures, which is a very high bar. You are aware of work and we may discuss it later on, the terrorism-focused Youth Diversion Order, which --

Q. Assume for the moment that they have come into force. You have then got TPIMs and the Youth Diversion Orders. So two measures. The TPIM being at a higher level but none for the NIEV risk, however it features on the scale of risk, and so the question that they have asked me to explore is whether that can be right?

A. Well, that's precisely why we are looking at a civil order directed at the NIEV risk. We have yet to provide advice to ministers on that specific point but it is absolutely in our work plan to do so, in the context of the Inquiry's recommendations, of course.

Q. Thank you. They also flag that the way in which this was raised by the learned Chair in the Inquiry's Phase 1 report, was to be tightly focused on children, young people, who have already been responsible for significant violence and show sign of a fascination with violence being fostered online and they seek your assistance as to whether the Home Office is working to that sort of a formulation. So to keep it proportionate to a narrow group or whether it is envisaged that it might be a broader power. Are you able to update on

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1 that or is that all still work in progress being scoped
 2 out?
 3 A. So it is to be determined but I absolutely recognise the
 4 question, and this is something which we grappled with,
 5 for example, in the introduction of the Youth Diversion
 6 Order for counter-terrorism, what the threshold should
 7 be. In that case, a reasonable belief that
 8 an individual has engaged in a terrorist offence.
 9 Were we to set the threshold for a civil order in
 10 relation to non-ideological extreme violence in
 11 a similar space, there is some concern that we might not
 12 then be able to apply it more broadly where risk arises.
 13 There is obviously a question, as I say in 313, on the
 14 restriction of civil liberties versus the protection of
 15 the public and that is a conversation -- policy
 16 development conversation which we will have over the
 17 course of the coming months and we will offer ministers
 18 advice on where to net out. I wouldn't assume that we
 19 will net out in the same position that we have, for
 20 example, for terrorism, although that is of course one
 21 of the options.
 22 Q. Is consideration being given to the implication of those
 23 in this risk group turning 18? So I think the concern
 24 there would be that while, because of their age and
 25 immaturity, those under 18, there may be justifications

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1 addressing risk that is extend beyond its scope."
 2 You explain that:
 3 "That work is led in the Home Office by the ETSSU
 4 [team]."
 5 Then you, very helpfully and in detail, set out
 6 a selection of characteristics currently considered to
 7 be the most significant in that context. So, if we just
 8 look at that -- and there is a lot to this, so I'm just
 9 going to, if you will forgive me, Mr Emmett, just deal
 10 with headlines really. But we see, in paragraph 428,
 11 that you start with algorithmic promotion and
 12 recommender systems, noting, at paragraph 429 in
 13 particular, that:
 14 "Further work should consider whether personalised
 15 recommender systems should be restricted, or in some
 16 cases prohibited, for children (as part of the policy
 17 development for the implementation of the social media
 18 ban for under-16s and restrictions on high risk
 19 features)."
 20 Then over the page HOM000964_0145 at 145,
 21 paragraph 430, you have got "harmful but lawful content"
 22 and I have been exploring that with you. You have got
 23 "advertising transparency" and you have made the point,
 24 at 432, of how, dependent online services are on
 25 advertising revenue and the lever, my summary, that can

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1 for being more interventionist, I think the concern
 2 being raised by victim teams in this context is that
 3 they wouldn't want to see the power to apply for an
 4 order drop off completely on those posing the risk
 5 turning 18?
 6 A. I absolutely recognise that concern and it is one with
 7 which I would agree. So we are considering very
 8 carefully whether an age threshold is necessary and if
 9 so, what that threshold ought to be.
 10 Q. Thank you. If we could turn next then, please, to
 11 paragraph 427 of your statement at page 144. You say
 12 that:
 13 "The department recognises that it is necessary to
 14 take a more strategic approach to understanding and
 15 addressing the characteristics of the services and
 16 ecosystems which make up the online information
 17 environment which are assessed to be the most
 18 significant drivers of threat and risk."
 19 You say:
 20 "The OSA represents a significant first step in
 21 addressing online harms and improving platform
 22 accountability. However, the scale and complexity of
 23 the online environment require[s] a broader and more
 24 strategic approach across government, complementing the
 25 regulatory framework established by the OSA and

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1 be applied by the fact that online advertisers may not
 2 want their adverts to feature next to certain types of
 3 material and so how that can be used to increase safety.
 4 Then, "anonymity" at paragraph 434. So the
 5 expectation of people at the moment being anonymous
 6 online and how that can contribute.
 7 You have "risky or unlawful user behaviour" at the
 8 bottom of the page, paragraph 436:
 9 "A child making an explicitly extremist statement in
 10 an educational setting might reasonably expect that
 11 statement (depending upon context) to inform the
 12 consideration of further action by the management of
 13 that establishment. At the present time, with the
 14 exception of [child sexual exploitation and abuse
 15 material], there is no requirement for online services
 16 or other appropriate online bystanders to report risky
 17 or unlawful user behaviour."
 18 So you are flagging that up as an area that needs
 19 thinking about. "Social media", including, at 439 -- so
 20 438 is social media, but 439:
 21 "... not only age-based access controls, but ...
 22 the design of services, the speed and effectiveness of
 23 content moderation ..."
 24 Then, at paragraph 440, we have VPNs, which I have
 25 touched on. At 442:

28

1 "Device-level age assurance and safety features",
2 again, which I have been asking you about.

3 At 444 on page 147, HOM000964_0147, we get onto
4 "privacy and end-to-end encryption". "Toxic
5 communities" at 446. Again, I just want to get these
6 headlines onto the record, all of these areas helpfully
7 detailed in your statement. 448 "Escalatory
8 behaviours". You explain, in 449:

9 "Further work should focus on whether clearer
10 indicators can be developed to help frontline
11 professionals, platforms and law enforcement distinguish
12 isolated concerning online behaviour from patterns that
13 may indicate increasing risk."

14 Then over the page, HOM000964_0148, paragraph 450
15 "Artificial Intelligence" in general, and at 452, "AI
16 Chatbots". Paragraph 454, page 148, at the bottom
17 there:

18 "Stranger contact."

19 Then, over the page, at 456 HOM000964_149, "Infinite
20 scrolling/addictive design features". Now, in broad
21 terms, Mr Emmett, again, in very helpful terms, you
22 looked to the future in these and said essentially the
23 tone of your statement is: consideration needs to be
24 given to this in addition to the relatively recently
25 established bedrock of the OSA. Is that a fair summary

29

1 ban and in respect of the device-level nudity controls,
2 as two examples and I have indicated that in the context
3 of the social media ban, you know, work continues on the
4 high-risk design features which might be -- caught in
5 that context. So I think there is a timetable for that
6 work. My colleague from the Department for Digital,
7 Culture, Media and Sport will be able to talk in more
8 detail about the precise nature of that, but there is
9 ongoing work and obviously we continue to work on these
10 specific areas of concern.

11 I think it must also be understood that there must
12 be prioritisation about, sort of, which ones we go after
13 at which time and, of course, political consideration
14 about when it is appropriate to balance public
15 protection against, for example, freedom of speech and
16 other rights.

17 **Q.** With your senior leadership position in the
18 NIEV Taskforce, which of those areas are the top 1, 2
19 or 3 on your priority list?

20 **A.** So, I mean, my top priority right now is measures
21 already being taken to restrict extreme violent content.
22 I really strongly believe that reducing the overall pool
23 of the most extreme material and its availability to
24 children in the UK, will make a significant difference
25 in the long term and then following from that,

31

1 of what you are seeking to do in this section?

2 **A.** Yes.

3 **Q.** It is a very broad question given how much it covers but
4 since the drafting of the statement, and you signing the
5 statement, have there been any particular developments
6 in those areas that you need to update us on?

7 **A.** So I think the most significant developments relate to
8 the consideration of high-risk design features alongside
9 the social media ban but as I have indicated, although
10 in principle, there be controls around certain high risk
11 design features, that precise detail of that has yet to
12 come through but I think it is fair for me to say that
13 a number of the areas which I mention have attracted
14 attention in that context.

15 **Q.** Yes, and please understand, Mr Emmett, that it would be
16 quite unfair of me to advance this of any criticism of
17 you, and I overtly don't seek to do so, but should there
18 be greater clarity on the timetable to start action on
19 these areas? Because at the moment, while in your
20 statement you helpfully flag the areas that require
21 further work, there doesn't seem to be a clear,
22 mapped-out timescale for action in those areas.

23 **A.** So there isn't a clear, mapped-out timescale for actions
24 in all of these areas, but of course, the Government has
25 been clear on its intent in respect of its social media

30

1 obviously, the measures under the social media ban,
2 which is in effect a more precautionary approach to
3 curating children's experience online feels, to me, to
4 be the most important strategic intervention at this
5 time.

6 **Q.** Thank you. Again, as an exploration of the challenge to
7 Government rather than any challenge to you, Mr Emmett,
8 in your individual position, the outside observer might
9 think that because of the rapid development of both
10 internet services and AI, to some extent the risk posed
11 by the internet and AI on these has already left the
12 station. I mean, the risks are already out there and to
13 extend that metaphor, the Government doesn't have the
14 luxury of much time to wait on the platform thinking
15 about how to catch up?

16 **A.** So I would certainly agree that the risks are
17 manifesting now, such that in some contexts the role of
18 the online information environment could be said to be
19 intrinsic to the nature of threats that we see across
20 a range of different areas today. So I would certainly
21 agree on that point.

22 **Q.** Thank you. Just to explore one further aspect of this.
23 Could we have on the screen, please, our transcript for
24 seminar 6B, which was 17 September and this was the
25 seminar looking at technological aspects online harms,

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1 and could we go, within that, please, to page 203 of the
2 transcript.

3 So it was Mr Hadley of Tech Against Terrorism, whose
4 work I suspect you will be very familiar with, who
5 had -- was answering here but the question that he had
6 been asked was whether there were realistic steps that
7 an enthusiastic Government could take that would
8 actually make a difference to the sort of websites and
9 access to websites on the internet. If we pick it up at
10 line 23, what he said was:

11 "So the tendency in my experience is Government
12 departments have their own isolated open-source
13 intelligence capabilities, and their own platform
14 partnership capabilities as well. So you might have one
15 department with their own open source team, their own
16 platform engagement team, and that's not necessarily
17 coordinated with [the] other departments, and therefore
18 if Government were to work as a whole, focus on OSINT
19 [open source intelligence, obviously] and a platform
20 partnership in a unified fashion, I think it would have
21 enormously more impact.

22 "So in short yes, I think an enthusiastic nation
23 state could make a difference. There would need to be
24 significant political pressure, which there isn't.
25 There would need to be evidence, which there isn't

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1 capability that sits within my team and the Home Office,
2 is significant, extremely well connected to academic
3 expertise and other open source teams.

4 I would also observe, on the point about platform
5 engagement, so the ability of Government to collectively
6 engage with technology companies on a range of issues,
7 that is an enormously complex thing to do but certainly,
8 from a Home Office perspective, the role of the emerging
9 technology safety and security unit, the ETSSU team to
10 which you referred earlier, that team was created
11 specifically with that in mind in the context of a kind
12 of whole of Home Office, whole of public safety
13 engagement with technology companies.

14 So I recognise much of what Mr Hadley says. We are
15 making steps in the right direction. Ultimately, the
16 judgment on how far that should be pushed is, as
17 Mr Hadley rightly points out, a political one.

18 **Q.** Thank you. Just finally in this area, I just want to
19 touch on some aspects about multi-agency working and
20 particularly in online lives because still on the topic
21 of the internet. One of the features of the evidence
22 from the Inquiry's expert cadre was a concern from the
23 case studies that they had assessed, that the online
24 lives of the young people involved who were the
25 perpetrators in those case studies was largely invisible

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1 because of the failures of open-source intelligence.

2 "But certainly when -- in the heyday of ISIS using
3 the internet I think the UK was pretty successful in
4 applying pressure on those platforms. I would also,
5 just wrapping up, argue that the UK is a big market for
6 these major technology companies. In some cases the
7 second or third largest commercial market for some of
8 these businesses.

9 "So I would say an enthusiastic Government could
10 remind these platforms that this is a significant market
11 for these companies. The UK does have soft power. It
12 does have influence. It just needs to choose to use
13 it."

14 What's your response to that comment and that
15 challenge, as it were?

16 **A.** So Mr Hadley makes a number of observations. I think
17 I'm -- I will confine myself to not commenting on
18 matters which are essentially political in nature, and
19 ultimately the choices about how the UK Government
20 chooses to engage with, regulate, encourage technology
21 platforms are choices which must be made by ministers.
22 I recognise some of Mr Hadley's characterisation there,
23 although I would note that, for example, in the
24 counter-terrorism sphere, our open-source intelligence
25 capabilities, primarily in the shape of the RICU

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1 to their parents and to professionals.

2 They flagged the concern that placing responsibility
3 for serious violence in the sphere of online harms on
4 parents is not a sufficient protection because parents
5 don't have sufficient experience. Put shortly, the
6 children are likely to be more tech savvy in most cases
7 than their parents. My summary.

8 Looking to the future and what needs to be done in
9 terms of case management of VFIs or NIEV in the cohort,
10 do you have a sense of who should be responsible at the
11 frontline for digital assessment and digital safety
12 planning? Because it might be thought that that
13 requires a specific skill-set?

14 **A.** A very broad question which raises a number of really
15 challenging issues. So, I think even before you get to
16 digital safety planning, you get to the question of how
17 visible is an individual's online activity and to whom
18 and at what stage. I don't intend to go into a huge
19 amount of detail about that, other than to note that, in
20 my view, the legal basis capability and capacity to
21 understand the nature of an individual's activity on the
22 open internet, once they have already been identified as
23 having potential risk factors, is vital in this work.
24 That is a capability which already exists to a degree in
25 relation to the Prevent programme, as conducted by our

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colleagues in Counter Terrorism Policing and we need to have a really clear view of the limitations of that capability in a pre-criminal space but also the kind of vital function that it provides.

There's then a question about the -- I'm sorry, I forget your precise phrase, but the kind of measures you take to address an individual's concerning behaviour, effectively. There are a range of measures here. We talked about civil orders and the potential to restrict access to certain services or restrict access to the internet altogether, that is something which is done in certain terrorism cases, today; it is envisaged to be done in the Youth Diversion Order space. Both of those are further down the line of risks so they are less in the early intervention space.

There is also a question, which we address today again in our Prevent work, of whether you can provide interventions that help a person to understand, to talk about and to explore what their online behaviour is, how that might be affecting them and how they might want to change that behaviour and that's something that some Prevent intervention providers are skilled in delivering.

Q. Would you agree that whatever multi-agency structure is adopted for VFIs -- and I'm thinking here about the VFI

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Q. So I think twice now, and I don't say it critically, you have reverted to the Prevent capability in this area, and you are referencing work that is done, in terms of assessments of those who are referred to Prevent and what the risks may be and I don't want to go into the detail of what is done in those aspects, but really, if part of the VFI cohort is to be referred towards a pathway out of Prevent, isn't there a challenge that those capabilities and understanding of online risks and the ability, quite legitimately, to look at open source, but also to have discussions with children about those risks and in that area, there needs to be the capacity to understand those aspects, to assess them and to intervene in them and that's going to fall, in one way or another, to the local authority level, rather than to counter-terrorism bodies.

I'm just seeking to see whether we agree that that is a specific aspect of challenge in this area because you would have to spread that knowledge and capability beyond Prevent?

A. I absolutely agree. I do apologise, I draw on Prevent as the grounded professional expertise but I absolutely agree the point, that in any system designed to deal with this threat, that an understanding of the online context, the ability to share that with those who

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cohort who don't end up with Prevent, as the system is currently designed at least -- but if one envisages that there is a multi-agency pathway outside of Prevent that is seeking to mitigate the risk of harm to others by dealing, in broad terms, with the young people's unmet needs, so a mixture of safeguarding, health, but mitigating risk to others; would you agree -- maybe it is an obvious point -- but in the modern digital age, it is going to be essential that those teams have online understanding and access to online expertise because so much of the risk is coming from the online environment?

A. I would absolutely agree with that point, both the general and the specific. So, again, to take counter-terrorism as an example, the general understanding of the online terrorist milieu is provided very strongly by the RICU capability, those insights are shared with Prevent practitioners to inform how they approach it, but there is also the specific which remains challenging, and that is what is a given individual actually doing on the open internet in the places that can be seen, in the digital town square, as we have described, and how can we ensure that professionals in a multi-agency context have an understanding of that and how it interacts with the other risk factors that might be present.

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operate within the system so they understand it, and the ability of those within that system to understand an individual's engagement with it are all important components.

SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: Mr Emmett, can I just take you back to Mr Moss' original question on this because I think, for completely understandable reasons, there's one part of it you didn't address. He asked: who should take responsibility at the frontline for digital assessment and digital safety planning? So, against the backdrop that you need, as you have agreed those with appropriate digital expertise, where should responsibility lie?

A. I can explain where responsibility currently lies in respect of counter-terrorism, which I think I have already done.

SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: You have, absolutely, but for the future in relation to this cohort?

A. So for the future, in relation to this cohort, I think it is highly likely that responsibility for the assessment of an individual's online activity -- and I hasten to emphasise, their open internet activity -- is probably most likely a responsibility for policing. Although it could also be the responsibility of, for example, a local authority, although they would require the appropriate skills and capability and so forth but

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1 I think the law is reasonably clear on that point.
 2 In terms of planning the protective factors, as
 3 I explore elsewhere in my witness statement, it is
 4 essential that there is a holistic support plan put
 5 around any individual in the early intervention space;
 6 it must be a multi-agency plan. We can readily agree
 7 that it must include or should include components
 8 relevant to that individual's online activity. The way
 9 we used to deal with that in CT is that we can provide
 10 expert intervention, family intervention or individual
 11 intervention that has an online component. We train our
 12 intervention providers in it. One makes the natural
 13 assumption that some similar capability will need to be
 14 available to another multi-agency construct.

15 **MR MOSS:** This may be unfairly simplistic but, looking at
 16 the need both to assess it and guide the young person,
 17 one of the challenges in this area is police doing
 18 an assessment, yes, but if one imagines a 15-year-old
 19 boy in a room with a police officer being asked about
 20 internet use, one can readily understand the 15-year-old
 21 completely clamming up. If you imagine a teacher or
 22 a DSL in a school setting, being ask to deal with this,
 23 one of the problems one can readily foresee, apart from
 24 the pressures on teaching resourcing, is that a lot of
 25 this will be at home or out of the school setting and it

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1 of most appropriate persons to engage a young person on
 2 this.
 3 Again, my experience in counter-terrorism says that
 4 for particular issues, a specialist intervention
 5 provider who has particular knowledge in that,
 6 a practical mentor, for example, who can explore the
 7 nature of an individual's engagement with the online
 8 environment and indeed the fulfilment that can be found
 9 in offline activities is really important and becoming
 10 more important in our caseload and I would imagine that
 11 exactly the same would hold true of any system designed
 12 to deal with the NIEV risk.

13 **Q.** Thank you. Perhaps just before we take our mid-morning
 14 break, we can move on to the tenth topic of
 15 effectiveness of interventions and legal orders, some of
 16 which grounds we have covered already. Can we just look
 17 at page 65 HOM000964_0065, to start please.

18 Paragraph 187 of your statement. You say there:

19 "There is no clear evidence based framework for what
 20 interventions reduce risk in individuals with violence
 21 fascination and/or individuals identified at risk of
 22 committing NIEV. Although it is possible on a more
 23 granular level (case by case) to identify interventions
 24 which have, whilst not fully mitigating an individual's
 25 risk, reduced that risk. So examples of these

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1 may be that teachers and teachers unions will say they
 2 have their work cut out with school internet safety.

3 Looking at, in broad terms, children's social care,
 4 it might be thought that they don't wish, in general
 5 terms, given their prioritisation on safeguarding and
 6 the risks to the child, to risk alienating them but
 7 also, certainly if Phase 1 of the Inquiry was anything
 8 to go by, there is a knowledge gap in terms of
 9 children's social care awareness of online risks.

10 So I raise it genuinely in the sense of, isn't this
 11 a really problematic area that does require very careful
 12 thought and is going to be one of those areas that has
 13 a price tag associated with it?

14 **A.** Yes, I think that's very likely and I think it is
 15 helpful to distinguish -- so I recognise the social care
 16 knowledge gap you describe. My colleague Kate Dixon
 17 from the Department for Education will, no doubt, wish
 18 to talk about it. It strikes me that it is not
 19 acceptable in the digital age for there to be a gap of
 20 that type. An individual's experience of the online
 21 environment is fundamental to shaping their experience,
 22 particularly for certain young people, particularly for
 23 those who may be at risk in all sorts of ways. So that
 24 gap needs to be filled at a base level, and then there
 25 is something -- I recognise what you say about the kind

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1 interventions are supporting an individual to obtain
 2 work, identifying mainstream hobbies or interests that
 3 provide a positive focus, helping with social
 4 integration to overcome social anxiety and isolation,
 5 integration into faith communities and supporting
 6 positive faith engagement."

7 You say this:

8 "The task of assessing the successive interventions
 9 however is inherent by difficult in all fields ..."

10 You say that the reason for that is:

11 "... because a successful outcome is defined by the
 12 absence of an event that may never have occurred in any
 13 event."

14 So just pausing there. That's the lack of offending
 15 but you don't know whether the offending would have
 16 happened but for the intervention. So a common problem.
 17 You then say this:

18 "Whereas in Prevent there is now a widely understood
 19 or agreed approach to changing behaviour or measuring
 20 impact over time, that is not currently the case for
 21 NIEV."

22 You go to say:

23 "As a result, local professionals may feel
 24 ill-equipped to act ..."

25 So a couple of points arising from that. If we can

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1 just go back to the foot of the previous page, please,
2 when you said that there is "now a widely understood or
3 agreed approach to changing behaviour or measuring
4 impact over time" in Prevent, what were you referring
5 to?

6 **A.** So I refer generally to the overall approach in Prevent.
7 It is widely understood that the approach is
8 a multi-agency consideration of the risk factors which
9 apply, a nationally structured way of doing that through
10 the Prevent assessment form and then the delivery of
11 a range of interventions which may include, and most
12 regularly does include, a specialist intervention
13 provider tailored to the particular requirements of that
14 case. There is then a structured risk assessment
15 associated with that case, so that over time, cases
16 where the risk of being drawn into terrorism has
17 reduced, are exited from Prevent. So that's what I mean
18 in that context.

19 That hopefully helps to contextualised my follow-on
20 comment --

21 **Q.** Before we go on to the NIEV aspect, which I will come
22 back to, Ms St Vincent of RSI, albeit in the context of
23 perhaps a wider critique of Prevent, in her seminar
24 placed the challenge: well, there is a complete absence
25 of data, she would say, on the measuring impact over

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1 sort of comparative points.

2 As to the kind of lack of any evidence whosoever,
3 you have heard from Professor Paul Gill on his work, the
4 kind of landmark -- what we hope will be a kind of
5 landmark assessment of the Channel programme, which has,
6 uniquely, been able to engage with a relatively small
7 but still significant number of those beneficiaries. We
8 look forward to the publication of that and that will be
9 a really important step for us in kind of adding to the
10 evidence base for what works.

11 **Q.** Yes, thank you. Then, you were going to go on to talk
12 about why that comment reflects on the different
13 situation for NIEV and is that because, although there
14 have been referrals for a long time for mixed and
15 unclear ideology, that there isn't so much of a dataset
16 of those who have gone through the process who have been
17 taken on for that ideology, or for FEVMCA; what's the
18 position?

19 **A.** So I think my comment there is rather more aimed at the
20 narrow definition of NIEV as being individuals who fall
21 outside of Prevent and then by (unclear) comments, it's
22 obvious.

23 **Q.** I follow.

24 **SIR ADRIAN FULFORD:** As a common sense approach, it is
25 likely that, to the extent they have been successful,

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1 time of the Prevent programme and so, I paraphrase her
2 seminar, I hope not unfairly, that one of her criticisms
3 of Prevent is how much it intervenes in particularly
4 children's lives and particularly those with
5 neurodiversity, but you can't say that it is
6 proportionate or necessary because there is no
7 assessment of the benefits, or at least no data has been
8 released to support that.

9 Now, I'm at risk here of a big diversion into the
10 pros and cons of Prevent, but given that you had led
11 with this comment about "in Prevent there is a widely
12 understood [and] agreed approach to ... measuring impact
13 over time", I did just want to test that against
14 Ms St Vincent's. Is there any metric of that?

15 **A.** So we have explored, on a number of occasions, the kind
16 of challenge, exactly as I set out in this paragraph, of
17 proving success when it is measured by the absence of
18 an event. Prevent has supported, I think at this stage
19 in its life cycle since 2015, more than 6,000 people who
20 have been beneficiaries, as we would put it, of the
21 programme. Tragically a very small number of these
22 people have gone on to commit acts of terrorism but the
23 vast, vast majority have not. It is impossible to say,
24 and it will probably always be impossible to say,
25 whether or not they would have done but I offer those as

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1 what's worked for Prevent will, in general terms, work
2 for those who come within the NIEV cohort?

3 **A.** I would agree with that statement up to a point. Of
4 course, one of the key aspects of the early stages of
5 Prevent in particular was the unique inclusion of
6 an ideological component. That was the thing that
7 marked out the challenge that we were facing in 2015 and
8 what we had to do.

9 We have shifted over time, and indeed, our
10 intervention providers now, many of them remain focused
11 on ideology, but some are not, and that is quite
12 deliberate on our part. So, yes, on the generality.
13 I think what we lack at this time is an understanding of
14 whether a sort of different and specialist intervention
15 provider might prove even more successful in cases that
16 exhibit these risk factors.

17 **SIR ADRIAN FULFORD:** Thank you very much.

18 **MR MOSS:** Thank you. Then if we could have back on screen,
19 please, page 53 HOM000964_0053 paragraph 148.

20 You will remember, Mr Emmett, that yesterday, when
21 I was exploring with you the history of policy
22 developments after the attack, we went to this early
23 2026 assessment with HSAI carrying out a "rapid review
24 of evidence held ... on interventions for VFIs ..."

25 Looking at it now, for what it tells us principally

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1 about the interventions themselves, you will remember
 2 that you referred to the fact that "behaviour based,
 3 multi-agency, individual interventions", rather than
 4 profiling or prediction, are likely to be more
 5 successful. "Bystander interventions", and you remember
 6 that I raised with you the particular importance of
 7 education in that with peer groups. Then, scrolling
 8 down just a little bit, at (3):

9 "Early community based and multi-agency support that
 10 addresses [the] wider social, psychological and
 11 practical needs, building relationships and
 12 strengthening community cohesion works better than
 13 security-led measures ..."

14 Dr Martin, one of our seminar speakers who works in
 15 the Gateshead Vanguard scheme, her seminar presentation
 16 focused on the interconnected nature of risk and need.
 17 So that to understand the risk and mitigate the risk,
 18 you needed to understand what the needs of the young
 19 person were and she advocated their approach, in that
 20 context, of understanding the story of the young person
 21 in devising interventions. So critical to understand
 22 their vulnerabilities, their trauma, their adverse
 23 events and mental health conditions.

24 All of that approach, even -- whether or not
 25 Vanguard may be a suitable vehicle to be expanded,

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1 required, in order to provide credible intervention and
 2 inform ongoing risk assessment."

3 Could you just help us a little bit more about those
 4 observations you make about those that may need to be at
 5 a national level? Can you just give us some concrete
 6 examples of what you have in mind? Obviously draw any
 7 lines of sensitivities as you need to.

8 **A.** Yes, happily. This, again, is rooted in our
 9 counter-terrorism experience. There is nothing new
 10 about multi-agency risk management processes. The
 11 layering on that was required to deal with the terrorism
 12 threat as it presented in 2015 and presents today is the
 13 layering on of partly Home Office approved intervention
 14 providers who can deal with particular aspects of
 15 terrorist threat ideology, for example, and now some
 16 other more practical interventions. I'm simply making
 17 the same point here, that there is much that can be and
 18 should be and must be devolved locally, including,
 19 I would suggest, a significant up-skilling on online in
 20 a wide variety of kind of safeguarding professionals but
 21 it is possible, nigh probable, that there be some
 22 particular specialist capabilities that could more
 23 sensibly be held nationally so that we can assure the
 24 quality of those capabilities, we can assure the
 25 training of those individuals and they can be made

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1 certainly the learning from that approach of what's
 2 effective for their cohort would seem, would you agree,
 3 to fit very well with the findings here of HSAI?

4 **A.** Yes, absolutely. I watched and was struck by that
 5 presentation.

6 **Q.** Thank you. If we can go to page 139 HOM000964_0139
 7 please and paragraph 410. Back on your section on
 8 interventions, you say:

9 "Given the nature of the NIEV threat, additional
 10 specialist interventions may be required, which could
 11 include expert mentoring, psychological interventions or
 12 online/cyber type specialist interventions."

13 We have touched on this. You say:

14 "These could in many cases be provided at a local or
 15 regional level via multi-agency services or policing
 16 bodies with support from the relevant service or
 17 department ..."

18 But you say that:

19 "... some interventions capabilities may need to
 20 sit at the national level, where these are particularly
 21 specialist, or when dealing with particularly high level
 22 of risk."

23 You say:

24 "This could include cases where specialist and up to
 25 date knowledge of the online information environment is

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1 available as risk arises in particular places.

2 I mean, it is partly, I think, just to do with
 3 incidents of caseload. So thankfully, the incidence of
 4 very serious cases is likely to be, in public policy
 5 terms, relatively low. It may be more efficient,
 6 frankly, to maintain a cadre of individuals nationally
 7 who are able to engage with, in essence, the most
 8 troubled individuals and then to deploy them at the
 9 request of local multi-agency bodies as appropriate.

10 **Q.** So, do you have in mind -- I don't mean precisely this
 11 sort of aspect, but something akin to the MAPPA levels,
 12 as opposed to the MAPPA categories, whereby you have
 13 level 1, 2 and 3 and level 3 is reserved for high-risk
 14 cases of particular focus, where you may need to have
 15 different skill-sets for the highest risk cases?

16 **A.** So that wasn't specifically what I had in mind. I can
 17 see why you are drawn to it. I had in mind more the
 18 typical Channel experience, where you are looking across
 19 what can we provide locally and what do we need to
 20 provide locally, mental health, social care and all the
 21 rest of it, and what is the additional layer that we
 22 might require because there is an ideological challenge
 23 or because there is a particular practical mentoring
 24 challenge that can't be met through local capability and
 25 is better provided nationally.

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1 Q. Thank you. If we look at paragraph 190, please, at
 2 page 66 HOM000964_0066. In terms of the difficulties
 3 with interventions, if there is a lack of consent -- and
 4 we will come back to legal orders in a moment -- but you
 5 make the point, at paragraph 190, that:
 6 "In the absence of parental consent the current
 7 legal framework ..."
 8 For Prevent and Channel, you are referring to here:
 9 "... does not allow for mandated engagement by
 10 children and young people in Channel. The Home Office
 11 has considered the possible application of Gillick
 12 competency principles ..."
 13 And you explain:
 14 "... (principles in medical law used to determine
 15 if a child under 16 can consent to their own medical
 16 treatment ...) to permit under 18s (within an age range)
 17 to provide consent on their own account ..."
 18 So just pausing there, consideration is being given,
 19 it would seem, to the concept that you might have cases
 20 where the parents don't want these types of
 21 interventions in Prevent and Channel, but the child
 22 themselves may seem to be more prepared to engage and is
 23 old enough to have an understanding and one would wish,
 24 in that case, to be able to take the child's consent
 25 into account. Is that the concept? Have I correctly

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1 under 18, could create barriers and hurdles?
 2 A. Yes, you would certainly want to consider that and
 3 I would observe, from our most recent Prevent
 4 statistics, that consent for children under the age
 5 of 18 in the category "Fascination with Extreme Violence
 6 and Mass Casualty Attacks", is, I think, either the
 7 highest or the second highest across the range. So
 8 there is something about parents, when presented with
 9 that particular form of risk, being willing to consent.

10 MR MOSS: Thank you. Sir, I wonder if that's a convenient
 11 moment to take 15 minutes?

12 SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: Certainly. We will sit again at
 13 11.10 am. Thank you very much.

14 (10.55 am)

(A short break)

16 (11.10 am)

17 SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: Yes, Mr Moss.

18 MR MOSS: Thank you, sir. So still dealing, Mr Emmett, with
 19 topic 10, the effectiveness of existing interventions
 20 and legal orders. A couple of points of updating
 21 assistance please. So page 109, HOM000964_0109,
 22 paragraph 339, you say that:

23 "Following work to build an evidence base around
 24 interventions gaps in autumn 2024 the Home Office
 25 introduced a practical mentoring pilot, [running]

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1 understood it?
 2 A. That is the correct concept and as I go on to say, our
 3 view is that the CTSA, as currently configured, doesn't
 4 permit that flexibility to us, specifically around
 5 Channel.
 6 Q. I think it is effectively a statutory bar, is it not --
 7 A. Yes, in effect.
 8 Q. -- because section 41 confines the consent, not in
 9 Gillick terms, but section 41 says: the necessary
 10 consent means, if the individual is aged 18 years or
 11 over, his or her consent, but (b) if the individual is
 12 aged under 18 years, the consent of his or her parent or
 13 guardian, and once the statute says that's what's
 14 required, you can't bring into play Gillick
 15 competencies; is that the problem that you have run up
 16 against?
 17 A. Yes, exactly so.
 18 Q. All right. So the lesson from that, perhaps, is that if
 19 one is designing some aspects of a new system for VFIs,
 20 if that was going to be based in statute, one would wish
 21 to potentially avoid that trap in any new statutory
 22 provision. So you would have to allow for a child of
 23 a younger age to give consent or you would certainly
 24 want to consider that problem, that putting in statute
 25 the consent has to be that of the parent if they are

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1 from ... August 2025 to ... March 2026 ..."

2 Then, helpfully, we can see on the lower part of the
 3 screen at the moment that HSAI were to undertake
 4 a "evaluation of the practical mentoring pilot" and at
 5 the time of signing your statement, you anticipated that
 6 would be completed by the end of August. Are you able
 7 to update us on what that evaluation has shown?

8 A. With apologies, I am not certain whether that has been
 9 completed or not. I can clearly check and will do so at
 10 speed.

11 Q. Thank you. So, if you will forgive me, we will add that
 12 to the "homework list" if you would for matters to be
 13 followed up in writing. Similarly, page 110,
 14 HOM000964_0110, paragraph 340, you deal there with
 15 Ms Ellsmore's second witness statement, with the Home
 16 Office family support service pilot, which was to run
 17 initially until 31 March of this year, but extended to
 18 31 August 2026.

19 You said, at the end of that paragraph, that:

20 "A fuller assessment of the intervention's impact,
 21 effectiveness and outcomes will be captured through
 22 a formal evaluation."

23 Do you know where that has reached?

24 A. Yes, I do. That is anticipated at the end of
 25 January 2027 and will, of course, share it as soon as it

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1 is available, I will look to see if I can share a draft
 2 prior to that point.
 3 **Q.** Thank you very much. Then, turning to the effectiveness
 4 of current laws. If we could just look at page 142,
 5 HOM000964_0142, paragraph 420 please. You say that:
 6 "Work to consider civil orders for individuals at
 7 risk of NIEV has already started ..."
 8 I have asked you about the online aspects of that,
 9 and you say:
 10 "Such an order is likely to be an important tool to
 11 manage risk, ... complexity of delivery ..."
 12 Does it follow from that that the assessment of your
 13 team is that there is no currently available civil
 14 preventative order which is well matched to dealing
 15 with, in particular, the pre-criminal risk of NIEV?
 16 **A.** Yes, that's correct.
 17 **Q.** I don't want to go over the ground that I have covered
 18 in relation to online risks, but if one takes something
 19 like the Youth Diversion Order approach, apart from
 20 ensuring that the civil order contained precautions
 21 around online use, the potential benefit of
 22 an equivalent for the NIEV risk would be to put
 23 a requirement of compliance with interventions. So
 24 attending mentoring sessions becoming a condition, so
 25 taking it out of the voluntary consent requirement. Is

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1 that we had on the kind of conception of safeguarding
 2 and the extent to which a child potentially posing
 3 a risk to others is themselves therefore, as
 4 a safeguarding risk because of the act they might
 5 undertake. That is our view and remains so.
 6 But this is something that has come up -- it came up
 7 very early in the work that we did in the sort of VFI
 8 period, if you like, and I mention it here for
 9 completeness. It is an area that could be considered.
 10 It is not currently actively being considered.
 11 **Q.** Thank you. Then over the page, please, at 422,
 12 HOM000964_0143, the duty to warn and the fact that:
 13 "Phase 1 of the Inquiry indicated that options to
 14 make specified categories of people under a legal duty
 15 to warn about, or a duty to report, the criminality of
 16 another ..."
 17 You reference there the fact that the
 18 cross-government response to recommendation 67 indicates
 19 that "the government is exploring the merits of this
 20 proposal with the Law Commission."
 21 In relation to that, the Inquiry has communicated,
 22 at various stages, with the Law Commission and the Law
 23 Commission is aware of the next scheduled update round.
 24 So it may be that we need to leave the Law Commission,
 25 given their independence, to explain where they have

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1 the work that the taskforce is doing in scoping the
 2 civil order including those sort of considerations?
 3 **A.** Yes, absolutely. Which is precisely why, of course, the
 4 question of thresholds is so important.
 5 **Q.** Thank you. Then just very briefly on other potential
 6 legislative changes. At the bottom, if we keep the
 7 screen as it is, we can see that you are saying that, as
 8 regards a general public protection duty, you could
 9 consider placing a general duty on frontline
 10 professionals to be alert to and report concerns where
 11 somebody may pose a risk to public safety. But you say
 12 that:
 13 "... would be a significant step, but could provide
 14 statutory backing to supporting a cultural change
 15 towards public protection risk, and more systematic
 16 consideration of this."
 17 So, of course, the context to this is that in the
 18 terrorism area there is a specific Prevent duty and
 19 I think you are postulating here whether that could be
 20 widened out to a broader public protection risk. Where
 21 has thinking reached in relation to that aspect?
 22 **A.** So we are not actively pursuing that line of thinking at
 23 the moment. I think I make it clear here, and perhaps
 24 elsewhere, this would be a very significant step if
 25 contemplated. It partly relates to an earlier exchange

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1 reached themselves.
 2 Do you have any knowledge beyond that on the
 3 position they have reached or is it really a matter for
 4 them --
 5 **A.** I'm afraid, it is a matter for the Law Commission.
 6 **Q.** Thank you. Can we turn then to topic 11, the options
 7 for longer term reform. I just want to deal with this,
 8 first of all, at an overview level. So if we could go
 9 to page 120 HOM000964_0120 of your statement and if we
 10 could just scroll down a little so that "(H) longer term
 11 reform" is at the top of the page.
 12 So you have a significant section in your statement
 13 that deals with this, under your heading (H). Again, it
 14 is an area of your statement where there is a lot of
 15 detail, which is all part of your evidence and I'm not
 16 going to go through the totality of it. I do want to
 17 pick up please, if we may, just at page 121,
 18 HOM000964_0121, paragraph 368 and could we have 369 on
 19 the page as well. So you say that:
 20 "In this section [you are seeking to] look ahead,
 21 drawing on our current understanding of the NIEV threat,
 22 our experience of how the counter-terrorism system has
 23 developed as part of that complex multi-agency landscape
 24 and an understanding of the tools and levers available
 25 to government to explore options and considerations for

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1 longer term reform of efforts to counter the NIEV
 2 threat. This will include highlighting areas of work,
 3 including pilot activity ..."
 4 We have looked at some of those:
 5 "... where success is far from guaranteed, and the
 6 consideration of very significant reform, delivery of
 7 which may or may not prove proportionate, practical or
 8 affordable."
 9 So, is it right to understand that you are flagging
 10 up here considerable uncertainties -- which isn't raised
 11 as a criticism -- but there are uncertainties about what
 12 may be practical and affordable and some of that is
 13 going to be informed by pilot activity that you have set
 14 out in the statement?
 15 **A.** Yes, that's correct. Proportionate practical,
 16 affordable.
 17 **Q.** You say, in 369, that:
 18 "Much of [the] work is being conducted through
 19 [your] Taskforce ... As this work progresses in the
 20 course of the period of the Inquiry we shall ensure that
 21 the Inquiry receives timely and substantive updates ..."
 22 We know there is a mechanism for that to happen, and
 23 you say:
 24 "In due course I anticipate that the conclusions of
 25 this Inquiry and the work of the Taskforce will enable
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1 suitable, effective and deliver value for money?
 2 **A.** That is correct.
 3 **Q.** The reasons for that, you give three. So:
 4 "This is partly because further detailed policy work
 5 and testing with delivery partners is required to
 6 understand the scope for strengthening existing
 7 arrangements (reflecting the scale and complexity of the
 8 challenge) ..."
 9 So I think that largely speaks for itself; further
 10 detailed policy work needs to be done to test it. Is
 11 some of that actively in train? Is there active work
 12 going on to test with delivery partners? Presumably
 13 delivery partners would be local authorities, social
 14 care --
 15 **A.** Yes, sorry --
 16 **Q.** Schools?
 17 **A.** Sorry, I didn't clock that you had finished. Yes, that
 18 is underway. I was reflecting on this actually
 19 overnight and the Inquiry might wish to note that in our
 20 interim guidance, of course, we cite some of that work.
 21 So we cite specific examples that we are aware of, where
 22 delivery partners in different parts of the countries
 23 are taking different approaches and it is understanding
 24 of that work and then factoring that into further
 25 detailed policy work that is core to what the taskforce
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1 Ministers to make clear decisions on options to tackle
 2 the problem of children and young people being
 3 radicalised to extreme violence."
 4 This is an aspect that we touched on yesterday
 5 I think, when you said the taskforce is adequately
 6 resourced but when we get to the hard decisions on this,
 7 there's definitely going to be a significant cost
 8 associated with it?
 9 **A.** Absolutely.
 10 **Q.** Thank you. So if we go then to paragraph 371, you say
 11 there:
 12 "A range of referral routes, assessment approaches,
 13 risk management mechanisms and risk owners, together
 14 with relevant interventions, are being examined by
 15 government."
 16 Then, importantly, you say this:
 17 "However, we are not yet at the point where
 18 government has a clear view on what system or
 19 combination of systems would be the most suitable,
 20 effective, and deliver value for money at this stage."
 21 So just pausing there. We will come onto the
 22 reasons for this in a moment, but it is important to be
 23 clear, your evidence is that the Government, at the
 24 moment, does not have a clear view on what system or
 25 combination of systems would meet those tests of being
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1 is doing.
 2 **Q.** Sir, I won't bring it up, if you will forgive me, but
 3 there are literally boxes to the side which, my words,
 4 show potential good practice in that update and we can
 5 pick that up in due course. All right.
 6 Could we just scroll down a little bit. I'm going
 7 to come back to the second area, but the third area,
 8 which is the top of 122 HOM000964_0122, says:
 9 "... but also because we see obtaining the views of
 10 the [learned] Chair as an important element of this
 11 long-term piece of work."
 12 So first and third reasons: detailed policy work to
 13 test with delivery partners and the recommendations of
 14 this Inquiry as seen as important.
 15 I want to turn to the second reason. It is at the
 16 bottom of 121 HOM000964_0121:
 17 "... partly because of the realities of the very
 18 significant funding pressures which meant progressing
 19 the extensive work required to model and assess the
 20 viability and utility of a National Prevention Gateway
 21 was not feasible ..."
 22 Mr Emmett, that goes, I suggest, significantly
 23 beyond what we were exploring yesterday. Yesterday, we
 24 explored the realities of the position that the high
 25 ambition options were not being taken forward because
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1 they were not realistic within the constraints of the
 2 spending review. So that's not taking forward the
 3 substantive change. Here, what you appear to be saying
 4 is that one of the reasons why the Government doesn't
 5 currently have a clear view is that the funding
 6 pressures mean that you can't even do the work required
 7 to model and assess the viability and utility of those,
 8 and that is a different point.

9 A. So we have prioritised, in our work, an understanding of
 10 that which is already taking place in various different
 11 fora across the country. Again, I point you to the work
 12 of the interim guidance. We have not, to date,
 13 prioritised the kind of overall assessment in detail of
 14 "a national prevention gateway" beyond the analysis that
 15 the Inquiry already has. The rationale for that is
 16 partly based upon resources. We can either seek to
 17 scope that work or we can seek to understand what works
 18 practically today and we are also, as we say at point 3
 19 and I think these points interact, acutely conscious of
 20 the role of this Inquiry in examining matters which are
 21 very, very relevant to the second.

22 So, yes, in an ideal world I would do all of those
 23 things in parallel. Well, would I do all of those
 24 things in parallel? I may choose not to. I may, in
 25 fact, choose to understand at a high level, which

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1 assess, even what might be thought to be the best
 2 contenders, without taking any final decision. So work
 3 on that rather on hold, because of a funding restraint.
 4 While it might be understood you don't want to model and
 5 assess every conceivable option, it may seem concerning
 6 that funding pressures are limiting your taskforce's
 7 ability to take steps to model and assess the viability
 8 of leading contenders?

9 A. I mean, I think when you mention the role of this
 10 Inquiry, you get to the heart of it. I would put it
 11 very much more strongly I think than professional
 12 courtesy. I mean part of the indication of the
 13 Government's commitment to and recognition of the
 14 importance of this issue is this Inquiry, its unique
 15 status in terms of being forward-looking and I think for
 16 all of us involved, that is something which we are
 17 seeking to manage through the most effective way
 18 possible. I have no desire to duplicate the work of
 19 this Inquiry, nor to get ahead of it. Indeed, we have
 20 made various commitments to the extent that we will not,
 21 insofar as events are there. I think we also recognise
 22 the importance of the airing of these issues in public
 23 because they do go to the heart of some of the important
 24 questions about thresholds and what is and is not
 25 appropriate when seeking to protect the public from

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1 I think we do, what the characteristics of such
 2 a gateway might look like and in broad terms what it
 3 might cost, but I think it is really essential to
 4 understand what works at the local level. It is
 5 essential to understand the recommendations of this
 6 Inquiry before we get to the point of determining, at
 7 a level of detail, what that looks like.

8 It is, of course, in the taskforce's work
 9 programme -- and I think I said this elsewhere in my
 10 statement -- to be able to provide ministers with that
 11 strategic decision point, which meets the point of
 12 recommendations from the Chair so that they can take the
 13 relevant decisions.

14 Q. Thank you. We have touched upon the unusual nature of
 15 Phase 2 of this Inquiry and the overlap between a public
 16 Inquiry trying to examine in public matters that the
 17 Government is taking forward as a matter of urgent
 18 policy for itself and one way of looking at your third
 19 aspect is a professional courtesy towards the Inquiry in
 20 awaiting its outcome before taking decisions and taking
 21 that into account.

22 But on this second aspect, do you understand the
 23 concern to which that may give rise, because it may give
 24 the impression that, for example, funding pressures are
 25 currently preventing you from doing work to model and

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1 a very serious but thankfully rare occurrence but one
 2 which nonetheless deserves this sort of debate.

3 So I think, yes, I am of course constrained by
 4 resourcing in the work that I can do. I am choosing to
 5 focus attention now on some of the practical things that
 6 are happening at local level, by way of piloting to
 7 understand what works. In due course, that is intended
 8 to enable me, in conjunction with the conclusions of
 9 this Inquiry, to give ministers advice on precisely this
 10 point which is the cost and feasibility and viability of
 11 a broader approach.

12 For me, I think now to prioritise seeking to cost
 13 out at detail a particular approach to a national
 14 prevention gateway when frankly, the meaning of that is
 15 still very much for debate, I don't actually think that
 16 that would be a sensible use of resource at this stage.

17 Q. I follow, thank you. Could we look then at
 18 paragraph 377, please HOM000964_0123. If we just scroll
 19 down a little bit so we have the totality of that, or as
 20 much as possible on screen. Thank you.

21 You do set out a helpful synopsis at a high level
 22 and you say it is not meant to be exhaustive, but
 23 "elements of a system approach" that are seen to be
 24 important and you give further detail of them in
 25 paragraphs that follow. I won't go through the

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1 totality. But perhaps it is important to get these on
 2 record. So:
 3 "(1) Support to frontline professionals to identify
 4 NIEV risk -- as they would other public protection or
 5 safeguarding risks.
 6 "(2) A way of raising a concern to an agency or
 7 multi-agency structure that can take action to provide
 8 support to an individual and manage the NIEV risk.
 9 "(3) A way of assessing whether someone does pose
 10 a risk of NIEV or is being drawn in to NIEV, and what
 11 support or intervention is required to reduce [the]
 12 risk.
 13 "(4) An appropriate level of management for
 14 individual cases appropriate to the risk, to enable the
 15 exchange of information between relevant parties and
 16 appropriate actions and mitigations to be identified."
 17 Just pausing there, you will recall that in
 18 a slightly different context earlier, I was asking about
 19 the MAPPA level 1, level 2, level 3, which is how MAPPA
 20 chooses to deal with that. So I'm not saying exactly
 21 that model but something akin to that, would you
 22 agree --
 23 A. Yes.
 24 Q. -- needs to be thought about:
 25 "(5) Suitable support and intervention options,

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1 There was the latter age of the expert cadre's
 2 evidence last week emphasis on governance, in
 3 particular:
 4 "(8) A culture that prizes shared risk ownership and
 5 management over the transfer of risk between
 6 organisations ..."
 7 You give a cross-reference there. So I'm not going
 8 to go through the totality but that, I think, is your
 9 high-level indication of key points of what
 10 a multi-agency structure would have to have in order to
 11 be successful?
 12 A. Yes, it is and I wouldn't want the brevity -- I know
 13 I do expand on it on more detail and we don't have to do
 14 it detail -- I would not want the brevity to undermine
 15 the fact that some of these are very significant
 16 undertakings indeed. Support to professionals sounds
 17 like a simple thing to do, it is hard when there is
 18 an emerging threat and the details remain --
 19 Q. You are not suggesting there easy to achieve or simple
 20 but nevertheless, it is a distillation of the
 21 taskforce's thinking --
 22 A. Yes.
 23 Q. -- about, my words, this is what we are looking for and
 24 this is what we need to achieve?
 25 A. Exactly so.

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1 which would include multi-agency support (based on the
 2 likely complex and varying needs of each
 3 individual) ..."
 4 Then over the page, please HOM000964_0124:
 5 "... plus specialist interventions which may not be
 6 readily accessible at the local level."
 7 "(6) Clear consideration of online elements,
 8 including how to identify people online who are at risk,
 9 considering someone's online behaviour and interactions
 10 when assessing risk, and having sufficient understanding
 11 of the online information environment to deploy the
 12 right support and interventions to manage the NIEV risk
 13 linked to an individual."
 14 Just pausing there. I won't repeat my questions to
 15 you about resourcing that at a local agency level, but
 16 in your statement I think you recognise the need for
 17 there to be that focus on the online element?
 18 A. Yes, I mean, notwithstanding the very high-level nature
 19 of these comments, I really wanted to draw it out
 20 specifically even though it is, of course, implicit in
 21 all of the foregoing.
 22 Q. Yes, and:
 23 "(7) Appropriate governance, management and
 24 performance oversight consummate to the risk being
 25 managed."

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1 Q. Then looking at, in more granular detail, about the
 2 options. If we look at the Government evaluation. It
 3 is page 124 HOM000964_0124, paragraph 379. So:
 4 "A Home Office scoping exercise sought to
 5 identify -- on a very preliminary basis -- some of the
 6 main pros and cons in relation to some of those options,
 7 and the options for more fundamental change ..."
 8 Then you tabulate those below. I won't go through
 9 them all but if we can take some examples because the
 10 detail speaks for itself. But in relation to MAPPA, the
 11 first on there, so you say:
 12 "Pros.
 13 "Builds on established statutory framework for MAPPA
 14 Category 4 terrorism-related risk."
 15 So perhaps from the Home Office/NIEV viewpoint, you
 16 are flagging there: well, there's already a particular
 17 category for terrorism risk, you could have something
 18 similar, and it has the benefit of national consistency
 19 and governance. But then you flag:
 20 "Requires legislative change.
 21 "Increases pressure on MAPPA resources.
 22 "Requires robust proportionality considerations for
 23 those without convictions."
 24 I think we touched on, and you agreed, yesterday
 25 that another potential disadvantage of MAPPA is that it

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1 is not, in practical terms, generally focused on
 2 adolescents?
 3 A. Yes.
 4 Q. Thank you. Then, if we just go over the page, please
 5 HOM000964_0125, the Potentially Dangerous Person scheme,
 6 putting that on a statutory footing; again, you give
 7 pros and cons in relation to that. There is a question
 8 from the victims' teams together of: to what extent work
 9 has been done on the feasibility of expanding PDP panels
 10 as an option for the management of VFIs, perhaps
 11 flagging that that might be thought to be one of the
 12 more leading contenders. Can you help at all in
 13 relation to that?
 14 A. So beyond the initial assessment which is summarised
 15 here and there is more detail underpinning it, we have
 16 not done further work on the potential for expanding PDP
 17 panels at this point.
 18 Q. Thank you. Putting MASH on a statutory footing. Now,
 19 there may be potential for areas of confusion here
 20 because MASH could come in at different levels. One is
 21 that in the screening stage, but another is in the case
 22 holder stage. The reference though, in the cons, to
 23 "risk of mission creep" can you expand on what was meant
 24 by that?
 25 A. I'm afraid I would need to refer to the underlying

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1 sort of designed for managing risk of -- high risk of
 2 serious violence. But again, when you combine the early
 3 intervention point, we are hoping, we are ideally
 4 designing something which will get ahead of this, so we
 5 are managing individuals before they present that risk.
 6 Q. Thank you. It was recently, last week, so you may not
 7 have had a chance to follow the totality of it, but
 8 Ms Gianfrancesco, who obviously brings experience both
 9 of social care and as a Channel Chair, as part of the
 10 expert cadre was commending the approach that she and
 11 her colleagues had taken in Brighton, in which
 12 effectively they had a high-risk adolescent team with
 13 linked multi-agency meetings, which were co-chaired by
 14 social care, local authority and the police. Part of
 15 her evidence was, my summary, that she felt you wouldn't
 16 need to completely re-invent the wheel here and that
 17 there are a lot of multi-agency meetings. She commended
 18 in particular the multi-agency meetings for child
 19 exploitation as being a model that could be followed.
 20 Pointing, again, that in that area there's already -- if
 21 they are effective -- multi-agency meetings involving
 22 social care and the police and other teams. She talked
 23 about the fact that by having a joint approach to risk
 24 and not having a single lead agency, they had managed to
 25 maintain high attendance in a multi-agency -- for

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1 documents in order to do so.
 2 Q. All right. Well, perhaps we can pick that up. Then
 3 Prevent, we have the dilution risk, "risk of diluting
 4 its core counter-terrorism purpose", for example, is set
 5 out there. In Vanguard, at the bottom, I just wanted to
 6 ask about this, where it says:
 7 "May be overall health-focused and would require
 8 redesigning to support public protection aims."
 9 Is that a reference to the desirability, although it
 10 would be needs-led, that there may need to be cases that
 11 veer more towards police disruption activity if the risk
 12 increases?
 13 A. I don't think it is necessarily even that far. It is
 14 simply noting that where a structure is focused very
 15 strongly on risk to the person, it may not be, as
 16 currently configured, adequately sensitised to the wider
 17 public protection aims, which we would be seeking.
 18 Q. Thank you. Then "Expand [Young Futures] Panels ..." we
 19 see at the bottom and I think you tentatively indicated
 20 yesterday that that might be a lead contender, certainly
 21 in your own thinking?
 22 A. I think "lead contender" probably slightly overstates
 23 it. I think it is a really interesting contender
 24 because it is looking in that early intervention space
 25 but, as we note, it wasn't initially configured to be

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1 multi-agency meetings.
 2 However, she identified two particular challenges if
 3 that would to be upscaled as the pathway for VFI cases.
 4 The first one was that it would not, as currently
 5 constituted in that area, work for adults. Because it
 6 was linked to children's social care, once the young
 7 person reached the age of 18, they would try to have
 8 a short follow-up period but then they are into the
 9 adult environment. So she said that that would be
 10 an important challenge to meet.
 11 Secondly, she said that there would undoubtedly need
 12 to be resourcing at the input of online expertise. But,
 13 broadly speaking, she was saying you can take existing
 14 social care hosted multi-agency meetings and adopt them
 15 and she thought that was the most fruitful way forward.
 16 Do you have any observations on that?
 17 A. I mean I have an awful lot of sympathy with that view.
 18 I did watch the seminar and was struck by that. I think
 19 my sort of, kind of thought beyond that is that it is
 20 illustrative, is it not, of a point -- well (a) her
 21 point which I thought was really well made which is it
 22 may not be necessary for us to completely reinvent the
 23 wheel. I think others have observed that in many of
 24 these constructs we have similar group of people, with
 25 a similar set of experiences and the same set of

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1 statutory responsibilities sitting around a table
 2 considering a different cohort or challenge at any given
 3 time and that there are elements of each of these
 4 systems which are really strong, world class, in some
 5 cases and work, but that there is, for the NIEV threat,
 6 no single system which appears to address all of it.

7 I suppose that gets to the heart of the task which
 8 you have been set and which the taskforce has also been
 9 set, which is to think about whether it is the case that
 10 we want to narrow down on a particular pre-existing
 11 system and its remit or whether there is a sort of
 12 further system which is required, or whether there is
 13 a more significant reform of the system of systems, if
 14 you like, which is required. That is really what
 15 I speak to when I talk about the potential scale of
 16 reform and the potential costs associated with it.
 17 Sorry, it is a bit long.

18 **Q.** Not at all. Certainly, you would support ideas around
 19 that approach of adapting what's there already
 20 because -- again, I don't raise this critically -- one
 21 doesn't see that in your left-hand column here of
 22 options but we should very much have that on the list?

23 **A.** Certainly. In fact, in the earlier point that we were
 24 making about paragraph 377, I slightly reflect that
 25 I would like to add a ninth and the ninth would probably

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1 analysis of the potential advantages and challenges such
 2 an approach might entail)."

3 Then in 386, you go through the taskforce's
 4 understanding of the proposition and say it seems to
 5 have three broad elements. If we go over the page
 6 HOM000964_0132. The first one is that:

7 "... a 'Big Front Door' could be designed to replace
 8 the current requirement for frontline professionals to
 9 direct referrals to a variety of different agencies or
 10 multi-agency groups with a requirement to direct
 11 referrals, irrespective of the type of concern, to
 12 a single triage function which could assess against
 13 a range of risk factors and refer onwards to a suitable
 14 specialist intervention pathway."

15 So looking at that aspect, one way of designing this
 16 would be as a single front door for all types of
 17 referral, whether safeguarding or public protection
 18 risk, yes?

19 **A.** Yes.

20 **Q.** Thank you. You say:

21 "Second, that multi-agency risk management of
 22 particular sets of risk (for example those relating to
 23 the risk of abuse in the home, those relating to the
 24 potential to become involved in criminality, those
 25 relating to terrorism ...) could be brigaded around

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1 be along the lines of: wherever possible, work with the
 2 grain of existing systems, if it is practical to achieve
 3 those effects by doing that.

4 **Q.** Thank you. If we could just add to the list of points
 5 for written follow-up, that point on mission creep and
 6 what was meant by that and MASH?

7 **A.** Yes.

8 **Q.** Because, if you take it from me for the moment, with my
 9 learned friend Mr Jamieson's assistance, if you look at
 10 the underlying document, which is HOM000384, there is no
 11 further explanation in the underlying document of what
 12 "mission creep" meant?

13 **A.** I shall speak with the authors.

14 **Q.** Thank you.

15 Could we turn then next to the Big Front Door
 16 concept and look, please, at page 131 HOM000964_0131 of
 17 your statement, paragraph 385. What you say there is:

18 "... given that the testing of Lord Anderson's
 19 proposition [for Big Front Door] is both central to the
 20 current and planned work of the NIEV Taskforce and also
 21 highly likely of significant interest to the Inquiry,
 22 I think it appropriate to set out here the department's
 23 current thinking on this, including areas which may
 24 prove to be particularly challenging (noting that
 25 Lord Anderson's Report provides a helpful initial

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1 a series of specialist intervention pathways along the
 2 Prevent and Channel model."

3 So that after assessment at the Big Front Door
 4 stage, the process could have a series of pathways to
 5 specialist intervention, but some or all of them could
 6 have elements of the Prevent and Channel model?

7 **A.** Yes.

8 **Q.** And thirdly:

9 "... that a capability would need to exist to
 10 manage the onward transfer of individual cases within
 11 and between those specialist pathways according to the
 12 assessment of risk at a particular point, thus ensuring
 13 the right interventions were available for the right
 14 person at the right time."

15 So as a matter of common sense, you couldn't have
 16 this system if the referral to one of the pathways was
 17 a once-and-for-all, you would have to have a process for
 18 transferring them as circumstances changed and,
 19 therefore, you would need to have a capability to track
 20 where they were at any time?

21 **A.** Yes, indeed, and you know, perhaps one might also
 22 consider that it is neat, in conceptual terms, to think
 23 about individual specialist pathways but it might be
 24 less of a practical proposition.

25 **Q.** Thank you. Because of their overlap?

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1 A. Yes, precisely because of their overlap and I wonder and
 2 have wondered quite a lot about whether -- sort of going
 3 back to Ms Gianfrancesco's comments, you have got
 4 similar professionals with the same statutory duties
 5 sitting in similar rooms considering different cohorts.
 6 There is something here about sort of understanding the
 7 nature of the conversation being had at a particular
 8 point, what pathway are we in, but that doesn't
 9 necessarily require a whole different architecture that
 10 sits around it.

11 Q. Thank you. Then if we look at 387, please. On the
 12 Department's behalf you say:

13 "On the face of it this is an attractive proposition
 14 although, as Lord Anderson notes 'the difficulties and
 15 complications should not be underestimated' and one
 16 which the NIEV Taskforce will test in the course of its
 17 work."

18 Should we understand that you were, there,
 19 emphasising the concerns about how difficult and
 20 complicated this may be? One senses perhaps that --
 21 from your statement, that you are emphasising that
 22 perhaps in contrast with some of the proponents of the
 23 Big Front Door who might suggest not that much reform is
 24 needed, not that much would be involved?

25 A. So, it is worth pausing on that statement. On the face

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1 but one possibility would be to have a front door which
 2 deals with the public protection type risks and doesn't
 3 try to deal with all of the safeguarding ones. So would
 4 then filter cases from VFI short of Prevent, to: this
 5 looks like a Prevent case and there would be a left and
 6 a right-hand turn. But it wouldn't seek to take the
 7 more -- my simplistic term -- traditional safeguarding,
 8 risk to the child in the home, type referrals at all.
 9 That might still rest with MASH?

10 A. Yes, that's certainly a possibility, and yet again, it
 11 sort of depends on thresholds, doesn't it, because I've
 12 no doubt, in more "traditional safeguarding space",
 13 there are also children who are also at risk of carrying
 14 a knife and may commit violent criminality.

15 Q. Spread across the two areas of risk?

16 A. Exactly so.

17 Q. You then give comments on each broad element and you
 18 deal firstly with the first aspect, saying that you:

19 "... consider that the operation of a 'Big Front
 20 Door' type model would highly likely need to be based on
 21 locally delivered triage of referrals relating to
 22 a defined set of risks."

23 I think you agreed with me yesterday that
 24 Dr Taylor's analysis of: let's think about screening,
 25 triage and checklist-type approaches is a good

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1 of it, it is an attractive proposition. I might also
 2 have said, and perhaps should have done so, on the face
 3 of it, this is an attractive proposition that could take
 4 a wide range of forms. It could take a wide range of
 5 forms. There are more and less ambitious versions of
 6 this proposition that break down broadly in the terms
 7 that I have described.

8 At the upper end, you would be talking about
 9 a pretty fundamental change to the kind of safeguarding
 10 public protection landscape across potentially a very
 11 wide range of harms, conceptually attractive though that
 12 might be, I think it is right -- and I do say so here --
 13 to caution, as Lord Anderson does, on the difficulties
 14 and complications.

15 There are versions, if you like, at a lower end
 16 which might be constrained in terms of their scope,
 17 which might be constrained in terms of the pathways for
 18 which they are a front door, depending on the maturity
 19 of those pathways which might be more readily
 20 achievable, more easily.

21 So I suppose I am also trying to say here that the
 22 concept "Big Front Door" could mean an awful lot of
 23 different things to an awful lot of different people.

24 Q. To just take one example -- and this perhaps comes from
 25 the letter from Dr Taylor, which I won't go back to --

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1 discipline to have in mind of precisely what is meant at
 2 that stage?

3 A. Yes, I was reflecting on the precise language here.
 4 I mean Dr Taylor puts it more precisely. I think that
 5 I probably mean locally delivered screening and then
 6 there is a triage function that takes place properly
 7 within a specialist pathway because there is that risk
 8 in that particular pathway.

9 Q. Thank you, then over the page HOM000964_0133, you say:

10 "Lord Anderson's specific suggestion [at point 2]
 11 that MASH might be an appropriate framework through
 12 which to conduct such locally based triage across
 13 a range of risks ... raises the particular challenge of
 14 the statutory position of MASH and generally, although
 15 with some exceptions, the current focus of MASH
 16 exclusively on risk to an individual."

17 So I think you are, there, flagging up that this
 18 would not be an insignificant change to the role of MASH
 19 as currently constituted, which itself is variable, so
 20 that itself would be a significant change?

21 A. That is correct.

22 Q. Then, under point (3), you turn to the second aspect of
 23 what's understood to be the facets of the Big Front
 24 Door:

25 "... such pathways already exist to a greater or

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1 lesser extent ... but that there would be significant
2 challenges involved in placing them all ... on a broadly
3 equitable footing in terms of their ability to absorb,
4 assess and agree appropriate risk mitigation measures
5 for individuals referred to them."

6 Just pausing there, that seems to be referencing the
7 fact that the pathways are very different and trying to
8 put them in some sort of equal standing or equal footing
9 may be problematic. Do we infer that perhaps because
10 they are appropriately very different?

11 **A.** I was going to make exactly that point. So the pathways
12 are different, does that matter? Or to what extent does
13 it matter? I would suggest it probably -- there are
14 good reasons for those differences but it probably
15 starts to bite particularly hard when we get to my third
16 point here.

17 **Q.** Thank you.

18 **MR MOSS:** I'm told that there is a technical difficulty,
19 sir, and I'm very sorry but could I ask you to rise just
20 for five minutes. I think there is a problem with the
21 recording, in fact.

22 **SIR ADRIAN FULFORD:** Yes, it keeps saying "not connected".

23 **MR MOSS:** Forgive me.

24 **SIR ADRIAN FULFORD:** We will rise for a moment to sort it
25 out.

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1 potentially significant practical and cultural barriers
2 which would need to be overcome. Perhaps the most
3 significant is likely to be the provision of mechanisms
4 to track a potentially very large number of complex and
5 sensitive cases) depending upon the agreed scope of such
6 a system through an extremely complex patchwork of IT
7 systems in such a way as to meet all relevant legal
8 requirements and to enable the seamless transfer of all
9 of the information necessary to make informed decisions
10 about risk over the lifetime of a case."

11 I think that is going to the fact that if you just
12 have a Big Front Door and it refers out and does nothing
13 more, you risk cases getting lost in the system, what if
14 they need to be transferred, what if they get close to
15 one, you need to have a system to track it and you are
16 then going into the difficulties of getting public
17 sector systems on different hardware with different
18 software to talk to one another. Is that a fair
19 overview?

20 **A.** That is right, and I suppose it is with a number of
21 these points there is a question of what's proportionate
22 at a particular stage; what level of assurance do we
23 need over all of these cases versus potentially a subset
24 of these cases, depending upon the risks that have been
25 assessed at a particular stage.

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1 (11.53 am)

(A short break)

3 (12.03 pm)

4 **SIR ADRIAN FULFORD:** Yes, Mr Moss.

5 **MR MOSS:** Thank you, sir. I'm sorry both to you and to the
6 witness for the difficulties.

7 **SIR ADRIAN FULFORD:** No, no, not your fault.

8 **MR MOSS:** Mr Emmett, we were on subparagraph (3), looking at
9 the second element and you say that:

10 "Given the potentially wide variety of risks in
11 play, and that intervention takes place at earlier or
12 later stages of this risk playing out, it may be
13 considered that (as at present) varying degrees of legal
14 status, national standards, resourcing and so on would
15 continue to be accepted as proportionate responses to
16 different risks ..."

17 So the pathways you say shouldn't be on a "equal
18 footing", they would need to have appropriate variation,
19 but you then say:

20 "... this may exacerbate the challenges set out on
21 the third component."

22 When we turn to that, it is point 4, lower down the
23 page, please, you say:

24 "In line with comments made by the Chair in his
25 opening statement, we consider that there are

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1 **Q.** Then, having made those observations on the three
2 essential components, as the Department understands the
3 Big Front Door to be, you say at 388:

4 "Stepping back, it is foreseeable that the work
5 undertaken by the NIEV Taskforce may identify further
6 potential advantages and challenges with this very
7 significant proposal."

8 I don't overlook the fact that you say "potential
9 advantages". But if we go over the page you say:

10 "We do not at this stage rule out a proposition for
11 ministers which draws on some or indeed all of these
12 elements to a greater or lesser extent."

13 Forgive me, to some extent, that could mean all
14 things to all people. On one view, we do not at this
15 stage rule out a proposition for ministers, sounds
16 a little bit lukewarm. Should we read it that way or
17 does it literally mean nothing is ruled out and nothing
18 is ruled in?

19 **A.** Certainly the latter.

20 **Q.** Thank you. You go on in the, again, helpful section of
21 your statement headlined "Wider work that will inform
22 conclusions" as to aspects that are going to need to
23 feed into the considerations that you have set out on
24 the Big Front Door. I'm certainly not going to go
25 through all of those, but I do just want to pick up

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1 because it reflects your earlier subparagraph (4) on the
2 point about case management, so for that we need
3 page 138, paragraph 406.

4 We see I think four lines down:

5 "The gold standard for recording and maintaining
6 awareness and assessment of NIEV risk would be
7 a national case management system similar to that used
8 by Prevent or for management of counter-terrorism
9 nominals. This would be a significant piece of
10 infrastructure to design and build, with equally
11 significant resourcing and cost implications."

12 So that is to have the gold standard type of system.
13 I suppose looking at what the expert cadre were saying
14 was actually essential for information sharing, they
15 were really pointing towards just having some sort of
16 relatively simple and accessible way for agencies to
17 have a common understanding of key events and key
18 vulnerabilities, which is kept up to date.

19 But if one was looking for a less ambitious
20 solution, you would still have to have some sort of case
21 management tracking as well as a system for having key
22 events and key vulnerabilities, you would have to know
23 where the case was in the system?

24 A. I think there is an awful lot in that. Who would need
25 to know where the case was in the system at any one

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1 policing. It is right that that very sensitive data is
2 treated very, very carefully. It is important really to
3 focus on the outcome, which is that we wish there to be
4 an analysis done upon it, which helps us to improve the
5 system as a whole.

6 Q. The research aspects, thank you.

7 Turning then to topic 12, recent developments.
8 Could we just have on screen, it is a while since we
9 introduced it yesterday morning, your second statement,
10 HOM000988.

11 You deal in this statement with two aspects on which
12 there was a ministerial announcement following the five
13 country ministerial meeting in Australia earlier this
14 year.

15 Given that we have lost a little bit of time, you
16 will forgive me for taking this very shortly because the
17 detail is in the statement. If we could deal, first of
18 all, with the Five Country Ministerial Countering
19 Violent Extremism Hub, you set out the history of that
20 and how it came about. If we could look at page 5,
21 paragraph 7.

22 Forgive me it maybe the false reference. Thank you.

23 You say:

24 "The exact terms of reference for the hub and its
25 priority areas of focus are yet to be agreed and will be

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1 time? The people responsible for managing it. Does
2 that require a case management system? Not necessarily.
3 Is it good practice to have such? Yes it is. Is that
4 much more challenging in a multi-agency environment?
5 Yes, it is. So I think there are degrees of this.

6 I think what's important to note in particular when
7 I make this comment about the gold standard being a
8 national case management system, I wouldn't want the
9 nature of that case management system to be
10 misunderstood. So it is not the case that Prevent cases
11 are managed nationally. There is a national capability
12 to record the data relevant to their management which
13 allows Counter Terrorism Policing in particular to then
14 interrogate that data set, to form views about the
15 system, and it allows us to assure ourselves that
16 particular steps are being taken.

17 But those steps and the actual management of the
18 cases takes place locally, rightly so, because that's
19 where the expertise lies.

20 Q. I think one of the challenges in a different context is
21 that the Home Office does not have access to that data
22 at individual case level, in terms of some work that
23 might be done?

24 A. We have access to portions of that data. It is
25 an ongoing conversation between ourselves and CT

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1 progressed by the CVEWG. The hub is a further step
2 forward in longstanding joint work by the five countries
3 to tackle a wide range of extremist, terrorist and
4 violent harms. Subject to agreement from participating
5 nations, the hub will explore early intervention and
6 preventative support and examine the impact of emerging
7 technologies on a range of harms including terrorism,
8 violent extremism, and non-ideological extreme violence,
9 among other topics."

10 Drawing on your paragraph 7, can you just help us to
11 understand in concrete terms what the hub will add to
12 the existing domestic work in this area?

13 A. So, the exact form which the hub takes, it remains to be
14 agreed between the five countries. What we have here
15 I think as I set out at my paragraph 8 is a really
16 important symbolic commitment for the five countries to
17 collaborate even more closely on that range of harms.
18 We are working to determine exactly what that looks
19 like.

20 MR MOSS: I'm sorry, I'm just going to ask you to break. We
21 do need to rise again, I'm sorry.

22 (12.15pm)

(A short break)

24 (12.50 pm)

25 SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: Yes, Mr Moss.

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1 **MR MOSS:** Thank you, sir. Again, I apologise for the
2 ongoing technical difficulties both to you, sir, and to
3 the witness.

4 Mr Emmett, I was just asking you to deal with what
5 the new hub, as envisaged and planned, would add to what
6 is already planned domestically?

7 **A.** So I think I had just covered that the exact terms of
8 reference for the hub and its priority areas of focus
9 are to be confirmed. I set out in my witness statement,
10 at paragraph 9, an extract from the draft terms of
11 reference but I must emphasise that because the hub is
12 a multilateral construct involving international
13 partners, those must be treated as draft until we have
14 had those conversations.

15 **Q.** Certainly at a high level, on the face of it,
16 an apparent advantage will be learning from what the
17 Five Eyes' partners are doing in this area in sharing --
18 I know it is a bit of a well-worn cliché, but sharing
19 best practice and what works on interventions?

20 **A.** Absolutely. It builds on many years of experience of
21 doing this across a range of violent harms, most
22 specifically terrorism. This is an even closer level of
23 co-operation, we hope and absolutely that, sharing best
24 practice but also, as I point out at 9(3), where we
25 think -- our aspiration certainly is, when we think

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1 really just a question of you just confirming what's
2 apparent.

3 So, the consultation begins on 1 October, so it's
4 started, and it ends on 11 November 2026?

5 **A.** Yes, that is right.

6 **Q.** If we go to page 5 ILT000359_0005, we will see that
7 under the "Background" section, paragraph 2 helpfully on
8 screen at the moment:

9 "The need to review controls on plant-derived toxins
10 has been brought into sharp focus by the findings of
11 [this Inquiry] ..."

12 Then details are given which I don't need to go
13 through because they are obviously very well known to
14 our current Core Participants and was dealt with in the
15 Phase 1 report.

16 Then if we could just go to the bottom of the page:

17 "In summary, these risks suggest a need to consider
18 whether existing requirements are sufficient, or whether
19 stronger control roles would be proportionate ..."

20 If we can just go to the whole page, please, just
21 zoom out. Then "The proposals", we see the heading at
22 the bottom of that page. Then over the page
23 ILT000359_0007:

24 "Option 0: 'Do nothing' ..."

25 "Option 1: Comprehensive package of reforms."

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1 about engaging with the technology industry, being able
2 to do so in a collaborative way, based on shared
3 analysis, not just one country's analysis. But that is
4 to be confirmed.

5 **Q.** Thank you. Then in relation to the online-offline
6 diversion programme, it is paragraph 11 of your
7 statement and beyond what was set out from the
8 ministerial announcement and what is in your statement
9 there, I think you indicate that the next planned
10 meeting of the working group is at the end of November
11 and so it certainly won't be until after that we can
12 start to get more information?

13 **A.** Yes, that's correct.

14 **Q.** Thank you. So far as my questioning is concerned, just
15 one other matter, if I may, Mr Emmett, which is
16 an update since you provided your statement and that's
17 in relation to ricin and castor seeds. So if we could
18 just have on screen ILT000359, please. We will be able
19 to see from this document, this is -- now has been open
20 to consultation:

21 "Amendments to the Poisons act 1972 Framework ..."

22 If we just go to page 2 ILT000359_0002. I'm going
23 to be careful, Mr Emmett, to use you, if I may, as
24 a vehicle for this, recognising that there's actually
25 a different team who works in this area, but it is

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1 Over the page, please, and over the page again
2 ILT000359_0009:

3 "Option 2: Comprehensive package of reforms, plus
4 licence fee changes, alignment of record-keeping
5 requirements and amend definition of regulated poison."

6 I'm not, for a moment, going to go through the
7 detail of that but I think you can confirm that that
8 consultation is now live, looking at those three
9 options?

10 **A.** Yes, I can.

11 **Q.** Thank you very much. Mr Emmett, those are my questions.

12 Thank you for your patience with me. Sir, in terms of
13 the Core Participants, Ms Sutherland is going to ask
14 questions and has permission to do so on behalf of all
15 three of the victims' teams and Mr Rosser has permission
16 to ask questions on behalf of the Youth Justice Board.
17 I don't know whether before they ask their questions, if
18 you have any questions arising?

19 Questions by SIR ADRIAN FULFORD

20 **SIR ADRIAN FULFORD:** Thank you very much, Mr Moss.

21 Three questions from me, Mr Emmett.

22 The first is this and I want to go back to the
23 policy definition.

24 You said in evidence yesterday that one of the
25 things to which there had been given careful

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consideration was whether AR met the definition of NIEV and you gave a number of examples of the things that you had borne in mind in relation to that. For instance, the choice of location, the methods of violence.

Can I just make sure that I properly understood what you meant by that. Was that a -- obviously, there were a number of other factors as well, but in describing choice of location and methods of violence, am I right in understanding that you were, there, focusing on what happened on 29 July 2024?

A. Yes.

SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: Right, and would it be right to say that an important feature, from the point of view of your conclusion that he fitted the NIEV definition, was because of what actually happened on 29 July?

A. Yes, that's correct.

SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: Right. Strip that away, you are then left with a very different picture, in that his behaviour on that day was very much to be distinguished from everything that he had done before?

A. I think that is correct, Chair. I would observe that that analysis of an individual who motivates to violence, illustrates the inherent challenge of any early intervention programme which is designed to detect and indeed intervene in those sorts of risks.

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behaviour of the perpetrator(s)."

Then 163:

"These acts may primarily seek to appeal to a smaller in-group ... for recognition, notoriety or social status."

Now, if you take AR prior to the 29 July 2024, as known to the authorities, he was someone who had, as it were, self-reported at one stage for having carried a knife into school; he had attempted to attack a particular other schoolboy at school, had failed to find him and had attacked someone else and was found to have been carrying a knife in his bag and he had been found, on another occasion, carrying a knife. Now, we also know, but unknown to the authorities, that he had been doing other things, for instance, seeking to, and in some cases succeeding, in getting weapons over the internet.

Now, that's a very rough description, it doesn't capture everything but I hope it captures the main things. Now, if that's all you have got, "the act, extreme violence", well, he set about another boy with a hockey stick, leading it would undoubtedly have been upsetting for his victim but not on the scale of things particularly serious and he's found on a bus carrying a knife. Very difficult, isn't it, to say that that

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I think it is perfectly plausible that AR, given the features that he presented to various places which your Inquiry (unclear) in detail could have been assessed as presenting a risk of Non-Ideological Extreme Violence, even if the precise act was, of course, unknown at that time.

SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: Well, can we look at that, Mr Emmett?

A. Let's do that.

SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: So if we could have up on screen, please, page 56 of Mr Emmett's first statement HOM000964_0159 and if we could go to paragraph 159.

Just to remind ourselves on this and I'm going to pull out various particular features of it rather than read the whole thing out. As component 1 is:

"The Act.

"Extreme violence."

Then there's the purposes which include intending to shock, intimidate or outrage a wider audience. You then go back to "The Act", then purpose again and then I want to dwell in a little bit more detail on paragraph 162, which is "intent to shock, intimidate or outrage [a] wider audience".

Then the last sentence of that paragraph is:

"This implicit intent may be evident in the choice or location or target(s), method[s] of violence, or the

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comes within a definition -- a workable definition where you are not hoovering up everyone of "extreme violence"?

A. I absolutely agree, Chair, and the distinction here, which I would draw is the risk that an individual might later go on to commit, which is of course precisely what we are looking for in the terrorism space and in an early intervention space it would be what we are looking for here. So are there risk factors which would indicate that someone is at risk of committing Non-Ideological Extreme Violence, as opposed to a risk of committing other criminal activity. You rightly point out that there were other risk factors which were known to the authorities at the time and there are some other risk factors which have subsequently become clear which were not known to authorities at the time.

SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: Absolutely, and I am focusing on the ones that were known. Now, on the ones that were known, this is -- in terms of actually what he did, this is an attack on another schoolboy with a hockey stick that doesn't result in serious injury. Now -- but that's not the end of it because in order to come within the definition which currently is the policy definition which is currently preferred, in order to come within the cohort, you would need to have a conclusion that the violence is communicative and it is intended to shock,

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1 intimidate or outrage an audience beyond the immediate
 2 victims, often generating fear in broader society.
 3 Now, Mr Emmett, are you suggesting that what he did
 4 at school that day gets you remotely within that
 5 requirement?
 6 **A.** No, I'm not suggesting that at all.
 7 **SIR ADRIAN FULFORD:** No. So, can we then think about AR.
 8 On this definition, as of the 28 July, 2024, he would
 9 fall outside?
 10 **A.** With respect, Chair, I think the point here is whether
 11 an act meets the test, which we set out here, is one
 12 question. Whether an individual is a risk -- at risk of
 13 committing such an act is another, and it is the former
 14 question with which I think I'm most deeply concerned.
 15 So can we -- and we have explored this over the course
 16 over the last couple of days, and you have much more
 17 detail -- can we, by reference to the risk factors that
 18 present in an individual, attempt to understand who
 19 might perform such an act? Not that they have performed
 20 such an act because should they do so, of course, they
 21 would be subject to other measures.
 22 **SIR ADRIAN FULFORD:** Mr Emmett, I'm not going to take time
 23 on this but at the moment, you need to know that I am
 24 struggling very considerably with the notion that AR, as
 25 of 29 July 2024, could have satisfied the various

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1 the challenges that you have set out.
 2 **SIR ADRIAN FULFORD:** But in order to reach that conclusion,
 3 you would have had to have concluded that there was
 4 a risk that he would, in whatever he was going to do in
 5 the future, intend to shock, intimidate or outrage
 6 a wider audience. So, on the facts known as of 28th,
 7 you would have had to have looked at his past behaviour
 8 and then said: on that, I think there is a reasonable
 9 basis for reaching that conclusion?
 10 **A.** Yes.
 11 **SIR ADRIAN FULFORD:** Right. All right. Well, I hope,
 12 Mr Emmett, you understand my concern?
 13 **A.** I do, sir.
 14 **SIR ADRIAN FULFORD:** Right. The next two are much easier.
 15 You have indicated, correctly, that Channel panels have
 16 a duty to share information, so there is a positive
 17 duty. Would you -- depending, of course, on the detail
 18 of the arrangements -- would you have in mind a similar
 19 duty in relation to those who come within the policy
 20 definition?
 21 **A.** That's certainly something that could be considered. As
 22 I have said, I think, on a number of occasions, the
 23 statutory basis for Channel is one of its great
 24 strengths and part of that statutory basis is its
 25 information-sharing duty.

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1 essential components, viz extreme violence and (3) with
 2 an "explicit or implicit intent to shock, intimidate or
 3 outrage a wider audience". Now, those are two of the
 4 factors which he would have had to have satisfied for
 5 him to have been taken within the cohort, and my problem
 6 is, as of 28 July, I find it implausible to conclude
 7 that he would have come within the cohort.
 8 **A.** I don't want to take too much time, Chair. If I may,
 9 one final reflection on this is -- and I know I have
 10 over used terrorism comparisons, but the terrorism
 11 comparison is, I think, really helpful here. When we
 12 consider our early intervention programme for Prevent
 13 and counter-terrorism, we are not, in some senses,
 14 seeking to identify terrorists. If we identified
 15 terrorists they would be pursued for their terrorist
 16 acts. We are identified people who are at risk, are
 17 vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism.
 18 **SIR ADRIAN FULFORD:** I understand that.
 19 **A.** For that reason, what we are trying to look at is the
 20 risk of that act occurring.
 21 **SIR ADRIAN FULFORD:** Absolutely.
 22 **A.** So, I would submit to you that it is possible to
 23 conceive of AR, at the date that you mentioned, being
 24 assessed as at risk of committing an act which could be
 25 classified in the way we have set out, but I also see

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1 **SIR ADRIAN FULFORD:** Fine. Third and lastly is this. You
 2 will appreciate given the pace with which -- with the
 3 extraordinary support that I had from the Inquiry team
 4 and the Core Participants, in relation to getting
 5 through Phase 1, that I wish to do the same with
 6 Phase 2.
 7 A slight anxiety that I have, as a result of the
 8 evidence we have heard over the last two days, is that,
 9 although quite understandably, there is work in parallel
 10 taking place, on the one hand in the context of the
 11 Inquiry and on the other hand within the unit which you
 12 lead, there are some pieces of work, of which we have
 13 some knowledge, which will not necessarily be complete
 14 until at some stage into next year and I just take, for
 15 example, what you have set out. There is no need to
 16 turn it up, but it is paragraphs 368 and 369 of your
 17 first statement.
 18 That there is pilot activity which will show what is
 19 practical and affordable, that is going to conclude at
 20 some stage next year and critically in relation to that,
 21 that one or more of the pilots, in relation to the topic
 22 under consideration, you have made the express
 23 observation that success in those pilots is far from
 24 guaranteed.
 25 Now, it would obviously be best for the Inquiry, for

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us to know what the results are of critical pilots of that kind before we offer up final conclusions to the Home Secretary. Not necessarily that we have to know, but that it would be preferable.

I'm going to ask you, Mr Emmett, as one of the things that you are going to do in writing for the Inquiry after your evidence is completed, is to reflect on those big ticket items in terms of current work, where results may be available in due course that could have a real influence on sensible suggestions that are made for change in the future and the date by which those are likely to be available to us. I do not want to delay the delivery of the report, but this is a factors that causing me, I will make it clear -- this is causing me some anxiety.

I think at paragraph 388, for instance, you refer to the NIEV Taskforce undertaking work on the Big Front Door, which is clearly a vital issue for us to consider. It would be very useful to know when conclusions, preliminary or otherwise, are likely to emerge from your taskforce on that issue. Can you do that for me?

A. I very much recognise the anxiety you have, sir, and I will do my best to set out our programme of work. I will observe that in some cases, of course, there will be questions of resourcing, which I will take away with

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is that right?

A. That's correct.

Q. And so I think your view is that "NIEV" is more appropriate terminology to use than "VFI"?

A. That is our view.

Q. A great deal of time and expense has been used trying to identify a definition but isn't the problem that you have been trying to define characteristics that are nonbinary, so a continuum of behaviour?

A. I think I have covered that to an extent in my evidence over the past couple of days. We are attempting -- we have taken the approach of defining a harm, not a cohort of individuals, and we absolutely recognise, as many of the expert witnesses have done, that there are different characteristics and different factors of an individual's life that might lead them to present at being at risk of committing Non-Ideological Extreme Violence. I think, as is implicit in your question, that is the most appropriate way to consider this harm, to consider the individuals who might present a risk of it and then to consider the structures that might be necessary to identify and support those individuals away from commission of that sort of harm.

Q. So it requires an objective assessment of characteristics, as opposed to a subjective judgment; is

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your comments very strongly in mind. In others, there may be practical challenges to completing work, given other organisations.

SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: I understand. For those who hold the purse strings, given the importance of this, there may be an argument for saying that it is necessary to fund that preliminary work so that this Inquiry is in a position to make sensible recommendations.

A. Thank you.

SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: Thank you very much. Ms Sutherland?

Questions by MS SUTHERLAND

MS SUTHERLAND: Thank you, sir. Mr Emmett, my name is Sara Sutherland. I'm instructed by the surviving children but also ask questions on behalf of the bereaved families and the adult victims of the Southport attacks. I'm going to ask you questions about five different topics. I'm not going to stray into areas where you have already given evidence, but they are, first of all, the definition of NIEV. Second, interim guidance, Prevent, a couple of questions which you may or may not be able to assist me with relating to national security and VFI risk.

Mr Emmett, the Home Office holds responsibility for coordination and policy development for addressing the risks for those who pose or hold NIEV characteristics,

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that right?

A. I mean, any structured, professional judgment requires those who undertake it to be as objective as they can.

Q. That would require consistent training, consistent education for those applying it, is that right?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you consider it is for the Home Office, with the resources, the experience and the knowledge that you, as a department, have, to inform that training?

A. So, it is certainly for the Home Office to inform that training. We have begun the process of doing so, of course, with the interim guidance to which you refer but it is not solely for the Home Office. When we consider that the most likely route, and indeed the current route for management of this sort of risk, is the multi-agency structures which have been referred to, a great many departments have responsibility for those multi-agency structures and the training of the individuals within them. So, as I think I spoke about earlier in my evidence, when we consider our terrorism experience and how we map it onto this challenge, it is about providing leadership to a system in which other departments play a suitable role, ensure that their relevant sectors receive appropriate training, consummate with the risk and so forth.

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1 Q. Well, you mention the interim guidance. If we could
2 have a look, please, at HOM00100, paragraph 1. That's
3 the interim guidance. *(Pause)*.
4 MR MOSS: Try HOM001011.
5 MS SUTHERLAND: Thank you. Paragraph 1, please
6 HOM001011_0002. This feeds into the question that
7 I have just asked you about the responsibility for
8 informing training. The purpose and scope of this
9 interim guidance was "developed collaboratively with
10 frontline practitioners" and goes on to say:
11 "It has been developed to support ..."
12 This is the second line from the bottom:
13 "It has been developed to support frontline
14 practitioners, including those working in social care,
15 community safety, education, health and policing."
16 So this interim guidance provided by the Home Office
17 is an opportunity to inform frontline practitioners,
18 would you agree with that?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. So, as part of that, they need the training and the
21 knowledge to understand what this document means, would
22 you agree with that?
23 A. This document signposts some of the characteristics --
24 well, obviously it sets out a working definition and
25 signposts some characteristics. We hope and understand

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1 we think, in a guidance document of this kind, which is
2 intended for very broad circulation, it is more
3 effective to point out the types of pathways that are
4 available in high-level terms and, you know, we say, at
5 paragraph 9, MAPPA, VRUs, community safety, local
6 policing and so forth.
7 We think that is a better approach than trying to be
8 prescriptive because we recognise -- and as I think the
9 case studies in the guidance demonstrate -- that
10 different local areas are taking different approaches to
11 filling the gap which we are here to consider.
12 Q. In respect of paragraph 7, you do provide some examples.
13 You say:
14 "Current evidence suggests that younger age,
15 neurodiversity, mental health difficulties, social
16 isolation, and adverse life experiences are among the
17 most commonly present risk factors. However, these are
18 not predictive or causal in isolation."
19 Do you think it would assist to have "these are not
20 exhaustive, predictive or causal in isolation"?
21 A. It would certainly be possible to add the caveat
22 "exhaustive" there.
23 Q. At paragraph 8, you speak to local risk assessments, and
24 it is the third line down:
25 "Local risk assessments should consider the

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1 that that raising of awareness is a real baseline for
2 this very -- potentially very wide cohort.
3 Of course the various sectors here already have some
4 training, various pieces of training in place and we
5 would wish, over time, for that training to -- and
6 indeed the guidance documents associated with all sorts
7 of different things, to reflect this particular risk.
8 This is the start point for that process.
9 Q. If we have a look at paragraph 7 please HOM001011_0003:
10 "Current research on NIEV suggests there is no
11 single profile or pathway."
12 Now, we have heard evidence about a multitude of
13 agencies of teams, of policies, of practices. "Current
14 research on NIEV suggests there is no single profile or
15 pathway."
16 Do you think it would be of assistance to provide
17 frontline practitioners with a breakdown as to the
18 options available to them; where do they go next?
19 A. So in terms of the pathway?
20 Q. Pathways, procedures, agencies?
21 A. So we cover that, in part, at the statutory
22 responsibilities section of the interim guidance. We
23 don't seek to layout in detail all of the potential
24 pathways here and that is partly because, as we have
25 heard, they vary very significantly by locality and so

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1 interaction of multiple factors ..."
2 Talking about risk assessments, you are relying on
3 there (a) being risk assessments and (b) that they are
4 robust and fit for purpose; is that right?
5 A. Yes, that is correct.
6 Q. That would also require the local risk assessments to be
7 fully informed about NIEV characteristics and the risks
8 they pose?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. Do you think, on issuing this guidance, this was
11 a missed opportunity to provide a template risk
12 assessment for frontline practitioners that offers them
13 some guidance?
14 A. So we recognise, as I have said previously, the
15 multiplicity of structures and systems and different
16 types of risk assessment that are in use. That is why
17 we have chosen, as I have said, for the first iteration
18 of this guidance, to issue it broadly and to keep it at
19 a simple level so that it can reach a wide audience and
20 be understood by that wide audience and for that reason
21 it doesn't go into some professional tools such as risk
22 assessments that you describe.
23 In terms of risk assessment -- and we considered it,
24 to a degree during my evidence, we -- in the course of
25 the work of the NIEV Taskforce, we are very clear that

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1 a risk assessment tool -- or understanding the
2 characteristics of a risk assessment tool which might be
3 appropriate for Non-Ideological Extreme Violence is
4 really important; we have commissioned work in that
5 regard on the evidence base, the behaviours of concern,
6 the risk factors, protective factors and so forth. We
7 will, in due course, provide more details to the Inquiry
8 about that work. But, at the moment, we don't have that
9 risk assessment tool and wouldn't, therefore, have been
10 able to issue the guidance in the timescale that we
11 have.

12 **Q.** Doesn't that define on the type of risk assessment you
13 are proposing? So, for example, we know, from some of
14 the evidence that's been provided, there have been
15 workshops carried out that have identified particular
16 risk factors. So, for example, a risk assessment that
17 is a triage tool, that is used and sets out risk factors
18 that are objective assessments, that can be identified
19 and used as a starting point, alongside that interim
20 guidance.

21 **A.** So, your intention here, with the interim guidance and
22 the factors set out in paragraph 7 and below
23 paragraph 8, is precisely to inform that local risk
24 assessment process rather than to provide, at this
25 stage, a sort of pro forma for the doing of it,

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1 **MS SUTHERLAND:** Thank you very much. Subsection (3),
2 please. Thank you.

3 This is your assessment of e-learning packages
4 within Prevent and this was the mandatory knowledge
5 check assessment, to test understanding of the key
6 learning outcomes within Prevent. So it is
7 an interesting comparator and at (3), this says:
8 "... performance was notably weaker from the
9 Referrals course, with only 56% correctly identified the
10 first step following a Prevent referral, and 59%
11 understood when information can be shared about someone
12 of concern."

13 That is a long way from where you would want it to
14 be, those percentages?

15 **A.** I mean, yes, and that illustrates the real challenge
16 that we have with any early intervention programme. We
17 are attempting to reach a very, very large pool of
18 public sector professionals, in this case, subject to
19 the Prevent duty. By some estimates, that is in the 3
20 to 4 million people range. The training to which this
21 part of the witness statement refers has been
22 undertaken, I think in paragraph 81 we say 3 million
23 times, it is probably closer to around 3.5 million times
24 since it was launched. So a very wide pool of people,
25 and yes, I would prefer that those scores were higher

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1 recognising that there will be a wide variety of
2 different local practice and it is better to inform that
3 now than to really get ahead of the conclusions of this
4 work and look at a single risk assessment tool.

5 **Q.** Isn't that one of the difficulties with the silos and
6 the lack of communication about individuals and the lack
7 of assessment of individuals and the risk they pose,
8 that you don't have a national starting point,
9 a national triage point that is then used to inform the
10 local policies?

11 **A.** So I think there is a number of things in that. There
12 is, as we have pointed out and I point out throughout my
13 evidence, there are a wide variety of local multi-agency
14 constructs dealing with different forms of risk. As
15 I have said in the course of the last two days, we do
16 not yet have clear sight of what a different way of
17 doing this would look like and that is, of course, the
18 core to the purpose of this Inquiry.

19 I'm terribly sorry, I have lost the thread of your
20 question.

21 **Q.** Let's move on because an interesting comparator might be
22 something that you refer to in your witness statement.
23 I'm hoping this reference is right. It is HOM000964 and
24 it is paragraph 83.

25 **MR MOSS:** Page 28 HOM000964_0028.

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1 but that is the challenge of delivering very core, basic
2 awareness training to a very large group of people.

3 **Q.** So coming back to the interim guidance, looking at those
4 percentages, is that not an opportunity to set out for
5 people: these are the risks that you are looking for and
6 these are the options available to you?

7 **A.** I mean, I think to the extent that we are confident to
8 set out those risks, and to the extent that we
9 understand the options now, that is the intent behind
10 that interim guidance document. We emphasise that it is
11 (a) interim and (b) -- well, it is interim because this
12 is work which is developing. Our understanding of the
13 risk cohort develops -- continues to develop and
14 decisions around precisely what, if any, changes will be
15 made to structures in order to deal with that risk
16 cohort are also developing. So I'm afraid, it is
17 slightly in the nature of the guidance that it must be
18 interim and therefore framed as it is.

19 **Q.** All right. If I could ask you to look at page 68
20 HOM000964_0068, paragraph 195 please. I just wanted
21 today ask you a little bit about this paragraph, if
22 I may:

23 "... our efforts to prevent extreme violence ...
24 are severely hampered by poor information sharing."

25 You speak there to cultural reluctance concerning

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1 preventative information sharing and technical,
 2 practical barriers, as you say "likely to be
 3 significant". So cultural reluctance, no common
 4 standard for recording or sharing information about
 5 individual cases.
 6 That happens at a regional level but is a national
 7 problem. Isn't it for the Home Office to look at
 8 overcoming those deep-rooted, institutional cultural
 9 problems?
 10 A. So, it is for all of the departments and agencies
 11 involved in this work to look at overcoming those
 12 problems. It is for the Home Office, through the
 13 Non-Ideological Extreme Violence Taskforce, to bring
 14 those departments together and to work through that. So
 15 we must provide the leadership in the spur, but it is
 16 not something which a single department can deliver of
 17 its own accord. It must be done by all of those
 18 concerned. Yes.
 19 Q. You also talk about the case management system and we
 20 have heard some information about that. We know that
 21 Prevent has a case management tracker from which data
 22 can be extracted. There is the technology there.
 23 Theoretically, is it possible to adopt a similar
 24 approach for those displaying NIEV characteristics?
 25 A. Theoretically, yes.

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1 (b) it is something that I would like to see done. It
 2 is not necessarily for the Home Office itself to access
 3 that data for that work to be done. So it is a matter
 4 that I am taking up with my colleagues in Counter
 5 Terrorism Policing. It is really about how we apply the
 6 appropriate analytic resource to that data.
 7 Q. Does it affect the level of assurance you have about the
 8 effectiveness of Prevent referrals as a means of
 9 identifying risk?
 10 A. So certainly, a structured analysis of that data is one
 11 way that we look to try to improve our delivery of
 12 Prevent. There are many others, you will appreciate.
 13 Q. I just want to ask you briefly about workings of Prevent
 14 and the interim guidance provides a case study, or
 15 several case studies, I think. One of which is MASH and
 16 Prevent working alongside in Birmingham. Is that what
 17 should happen? Prevent should work alongside other
 18 agencies? It isn't referred and then stops, they work
 19 alongside?
 20 A. I mean, Prevent is part and parcel. We recognise, and
 21 have recognised for many years, Prevent can only operate
 22 effectively if it is part and parcel of the wider
 23 safeguarding landscape. So yes, whilst we are not
 24 prescriptive on what we expect, our experience is that
 25 those who are working in delivering Prevent, who have

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1 Q. In fact, I think, does the Prevent Case Management
 2 Tracker actually allow a type of concern category as "no
 3 ideology identified"?
 4 A. Yes, it does.
 5 Q. And so, the Prevent Case Management Tracker has been, in
 6 some regards, extended to account for that but it is
 7 also possible to mirror that technology?
 8 A. I would broadly agree with that characterisation.
 9 I think I have to pause and say it has been extended to
 10 account for cases where it is assessed that there is
 11 a risk that that person is drawn into terrorism and
 12 displays the factor that you describe.
 13 Q. I think it looks as though it says -- there is
 14 a tick-box, in effect, "no ideology identified"?
 15 A. Correct.
 16 Q. I said there were a couple of other topics. I'm just
 17 going to touch on those, if I may. Prevent. In your
 18 witness statement, you say the Home Office cannot access
 19 the pre-section 36 data, so that's the pre-referral
 20 data. Do you think that creates a risk that you have
 21 missed or do not have access to warning characteristics,
 22 warning signs?
 23 A. So, it is certainly the case that a structured analysis
 24 of that data, a really detailed one is (a) challenging,
 25 I think our previous witnesses have referred to it, and

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1 many other responsibilities as well alongside that, are,
 2 where it works best, very closely engaged with their
 3 wider safeguarding arrangements.
 4 Q. Does the referrer retain any accountability for the
 5 risks somebody poses once they are referred in?
 6 A. I mean, I deal with risk in my witness statement. Not
 7 that specific question. My very firm view is that risk
 8 relates to the statutory responsibilities of individual
 9 agencies and it can't be transferred between agencies in
 10 that sense. So, to the extent is that the referrer in
 11 a case in Prevent might have a set of statutory
 12 responsibilities, those remain, irrespective of the
 13 referral.
 14 Q. We have heard about the cliff edge between -- at age 18
 15 in some services. The new interim guidance for NIEV
 16 applies to both children and adults, is that right?
 17 A. That is correct.
 18 Q. So there is no cliff edge?
 19 A. Not in terms of the guidance. Although, we do point out
 20 that obviously being of a younger age is one of the risk
 21 factors to be considered.
 22 Q. Just on the matter of national security, aside from the
 23 statutory definition of "terrorism", is an ideological
 24 element necessary for an incident to be considered
 25 national security related?

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1 **A.** I don't recognise the category "national security
2 related incident" in those terms.
3 **Q.** Let me move on. There is one final question that
4 I have. In your witness statement -- and perhaps,
5 please, could we pull this up, it is page 51
6 HOM000964_0051, paragraph 140(1). It is redacted, but
7 it said:
8 "... made recommendations for the Home Office and
9 DSIT including:
10 "(1) Home Office to define the level of VFI risk we
11 accept ..."

12 What is the level of risk that is accepted?
13 **A.** So we have not sought, at this stage with ministers, to
14 define an illegal of risk to be accepted.

15 **Q.** Is that something that is going to be considered?

16 **A.** That is not something which is currently -- in those
17 terms, it is not something that's currently in my work
18 plan, although as you will appreciate, when offering
19 strategic advice to ministers, following the conclusion
20 of this Inquiry, an implicit component of that must be
21 about the level of risk.

22 **MS SUTHERLAND:** Thank you, Mr Emmett.

23 **SIR ADRIAN FULFORD:** Thank you very much indeed,
24 Ms Sutherland. Mr Rosser?

25 Questions by MR ROSSER

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1 **Q.** Do you agree that such analysis would be helpful to
2 inform a decision as to whether Youth Diversion Orders
3 should be deployed in the way that they are intended to
4 be?
5 **A.** I observe that the question of the deployment of Youth
6 Diversion Orders relates specifically to
7 counter-terrorism policy, rather than to Non-Ideological
8 Extreme Violence. I'm not able to speak to the detail
9 of the analysis that was done. I'm confident that such
10 analysis as was done demonstrates the requirement for
11 them.
12 **Q.** You say it demonstrates the requirement for them. Is
13 the evidence that it demonstrates that there is a gap
14 rather than it demonstrates, on the evidence relied upon
15 to go down this route, that civil orders are effective?
16 **A.** As I said, I don't have that detail with me here.
17 **Q.** Perhaps we move on to page 125 HOM000964_0125, and this
18 is a table that you have put together. Perhaps we could
19 just go down to that which relates to expanding the role
20 of Youth Offending Team.

21 When considering the expansion of Youth Offending
22 Teams, has any consideration been given as to whether
23 an amendment would be required to the Children's Act, to
24 expand the role of Youth Offending Teams?

25 **A.** So, you will appreciate there is a lot of detailed

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1 **MS ROSSER:** Mr Emmett, I ask questions on behalf of the
2 Youth Justice Board. If we could first go, please,
3 to -- staying within your statement, but at page 142
4 HOM000964_0142 and at paragraphs 419 to 420, please.
5 I'm grateful. You have given evidence, within your
6 statement, around the introduction of Youth Diversion
7 Orders. Has the Home Office considered analysing the
8 effectiveness of other existing civil orders, such as
9 knife crime prevention orders or gang injunctions, to
10 determine whether Youth Diversion Orders are likely to
11 be effective?

12 **A.** So I can't speak to the detail of the analysis done in
13 designing of the Youth Diversion Orders specifically
14 there. What I can say is that in the context of
15 considering civil orders for the NIEV risk, we have done
16 a considerable analysis across a very wide range of
17 existing civil orders and concluded that there remains
18 a gap which is not currently filled. But I realise
19 that's not the question that you are asking.

20 **Q.** No. So perhaps, if I can just zone in on the exact
21 question. Whilst there may have been analysis to
22 ascertain whether there is a gap, was there analysis to
23 determine the effectiveness of civil orders where there
24 is not a gap?

25 **A.** I'm not able to speak to that detail.

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1 analysis underpinning this and I think I said earlier
2 I'm not really able to speak to the detail of it.
3 I observe -- I think the current phraseology is now
4 "Youth Justice Services", but I do not know whether
5 specific consideration was given to amendment to the
6 Children's Act.

7 **Q.** You are quite right in terms of the terminology.

8 **A.** I do try.

9 **Q.** I'm grateful. I anticipate the answer will be the same
10 to my next question but are you aware as to whether any
11 consideration has been given as to whether this
12 expansion would also require amendments to the policy of
13 Working Together to Safeguard Children, in order to
14 strengthen the responsibilities for local authorities?

15 **A.** So we haven't given explicit consideration to that,
16 although I'm very conscious of the central role of that
17 particular piece of guidance.

18 **MS ROSSER:** I'm grateful. Thank you, Chair.

19 **SIR ADRIAN FULFORD:** Thank you very much indeed.

20 Mr Emmett, although the Home Office is the
21 commissioning department for this Inquiry, I am
22 nonetheless extremely grateful to you for the very high
23 level of effort that has gone into the preparation of
24 your witness statement and for the careful and
25 reflective evidence that you have given over the last

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1 two days. It's been of very considerable assistance and
 2 you leave with my gratitude now, although I think we may
 3 be seeing you again later.
 4 **A.** Certainly, sir.
 5 **SIR ADRIAN FULFORD:** Thank you very much indeed, Mr Emmett.
 6 **MR MOSS:** Sir, just before we let Mr Emmett go, 25 November
 7 is the date, I think, Mr Emmett is currently slotted to
 8 come back and has agreed to come back. Just for
 9 formality's sake, can Mr Emmett, given that he is coming
 10 back, have permission to have all necessary
 11 conversations with colleagues given that, on one sense,
 12 he is part-heard?
 13 **SIR ADRIAN FULFORD:** Yes, you are not bound by a vow of
 14 silence, Mr Emmett.
 15 (The witness withdrew)
 16 **MR MOSS:** Deputy Chief Constable Court, please.
 17 **SIR ADRIAN FULFORD:** If you could take the oath, Mr Court.
 18 **DCC PAUL COURT (affirmed)**
 19 **SIR ADRIAN FULFORD:** Yes, Mr Jamieson.
 20 Questions by MR JAMIESON
 21 **MR JAMIESON:** Sir, thank you. Mr Court, we will aim to have
 22 a break at about 2.20 pm; we have been going for some
 23 time. Please may we have your full name and rank for
 24 the record, please?
 25 **A.** Good afternoon. I'm Deputy Chief Constable Paul Court
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1 of Sussex Police. You are responsible for the
 2 operational running of that force and lead something to
 3 the order of 5,700 officers and staff; is that right?
 4 **A.** That is correct.
 5 **Q.** You have 21 years' experience across three different
 6 police forces in a variety of roles?
 7 **A.** That is correct.
 8 **Q.** You are also, particularly for our purposes, the lead
 9 for VFI work for the National Police Chief's Council,
 10 the NPCC; is that right?
 11 **A.** That's also correct.
 12 **Q.** Please may we go on to page 2 NPCC000002_0002 of the
 13 statement and just down to the bottom, paragraph 8.
 14 Again, for brevity's sake, I hope you will take these
 15 propositions from me and you will tell me if I get them
 16 right or not. The NPCC is a non-statutory,
 17 collaborative body created by the agreement of Chief
 18 Constables and other parties, is that right?
 19 **A.** That is correct.
 20 **Q.** It is best understood as a coordinating body. It brings
 21 UK police leaders together to set the direction in
 22 policing, particularly around issues of national
 23 concern?
 24 **A.** That is correct.
 25 **Q.** The Chief Constables of each force retain and remain
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1 of Sussex police.
 2 **Q.** You have kindly provided us with a statement. Please
 3 could we have that on the screen. The reference is
 4 NPCC -- I've not even said it and there it is,
 5 brilliant, NPCC000002. Your name is there at the start.
 6 Please could we go all the way to page 26
 7 NPCC000002_0026.
 8 We will see that it is dated 6 August 2026. We have
 9 redacted the signature but that was your signature that
 10 was there?
 11 **A.** That is correct.
 12 **Q.** Is that statement true and accurate to the best of your
 13 knowledge and belief?
 14 **A.** It is.
 15 **Q.** Thank you. Please may we go back to the first page
 16 NPCC000002_0001.
 17 The reason I have gone through that is we have
 18 proven that statement, that's part of our record of
 19 evidence. We don't now need to go through every
 20 paragraph of it but there are bits of it that I would
 21 seek your assistance with, please.
 22 May we just scroll up that first page a little and
 23 for brevity's sake, I hope you will allow me just to
 24 introduce you and you will correct me if I get it wrong.
 25 In your day job, you are the Deputy Chief Constable
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1 operationally independent. The NPCC cannot compel any
 2 of them to adopt any policy or position?
 3 **A.** Yes.
 4 **Q.** But the idea is that everybody feeds in and a mutually
 5 beneficial policy is adapted, is that right?
 6 **A.** Yes.
 7 **Q.** Thank you. Please may we just go to paragraph 11 which
 8 is on page 3 NPCC000002_0003, at the top:
 9 "Following the Southport [tragedy], a national
 10 portfolio role was created for a Chief Officer to lead
 11 on VFI."
 12 That is you, and have you done that since inception?
 13 **A.** I have, yes.
 14 **Q.** You have set out the circumstances in which that came to
 15 be. At paragraph 12, you explain that a lead role:
 16 "... is not explicitly defined however it involves
 17 policy and practice development, the coordination of
 18 implementation and the continued performance monitoring
 19 of the business area."
 20 So that's an encapsulation of your responsibilities
 21 in this VFI space?
 22 **A.** That is correct.
 23 **Q.** Thank you very much. Having done all of that, let's get
 24 to the substance, please. May we go to page 4
 25 NPCC000002_0004 and to paragraph 19. My first topic is
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1 the policy development work that you have done as VFI
 2 lead, so that we can understand the work that you have
 3 done to form your views. You set out there, at
 4 paragraph 19, that since your appointment you have
 5 undertaken wide engagement with a variety of policing
 6 and law enforcement bodies, Government departments, the
 7 Prevent Commissioner, and other persons and figures with
 8 interest in this area; is that right?

9 A. That is right, yes.

10 Q. If we could just go over the page, NPCC000002_0005, you
 11 also attend -- we have just been hearing from Mr Emmett
 12 who is in charge of the NIEV Strategic Delivery Board.
 13 You attend that --

14 A. That's right.

15 Q. -- board, I believe. Thank you. If we could go down to
 16 paragraph 23, you tell us that in January of this year
 17 you held a workshop with key NPCC portfolio leads. Does
 18 that mean other Chief Officers who have related areas of
 19 responsibility?

20 A. Yes, where there is an intercept with their portfolio
 21 and that of VFI, I have brought them together.

22 Q. So you have sat down together around a table and came up
 23 with some key points of agreement? I'm not going to
 24 read them all out at this paragraph, but if we just go
 25 over to paragraph 24, the next page NPCC000002_0006, we

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1 So there, I think you are looking ahead to the
 2 beginning of the NIEV Taskforce that we have heard
 3 about?

4 A. That is correct.

5 Q. But that pause in momentum that you were recording had
 6 occurred, does that continue or do we now have momentum,
 7 from your perspective?

8 A. My view is we now have momentum, by virtue of the fact
 9 we have the NIEV Taskforce.

10 Q. So importantly, you were recording that, from your
 11 perspective, things had slowed down but now they have
 12 picked back up again?

13 A. Yes, and if I may just add, when I took on the role,
 14 many people who take on a NPCC portfolio are taking over
 15 something that's already created. This wasn't created.
 16 So there was an element of sort of scoping the landscape
 17 and actually me being clear that there is a role for
 18 a VFI lead within NPCC, that was important to me. Of
 19 course at the time, the VFI unit was in place. When
 20 that ended in the October time, there was a need for me
 21 to -- acknowledging, at that point, that there was going
 22 to be no sort of policy development within the Home
 23 Office which I could contribute to and then implement,
 24 there was a need for me to fill that gap.

25 That's why that workshop in January came about.

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1 can see that following that discussion, you developed
 2 a policy paper which you then subsequently presented to
 3 the Chief Constables' Council in July of this year and
 4 that was accepted?

5 A. That is correct.

6 Q. So coming out of your engagement work and indeed that
 7 round table, and it is that document that I would like
 8 to look at now, please. So the reference for that is
 9 NPCC000004.

10 So, we can see that this was a document that you
 11 completed in the May of this year but, as you have just
 12 confirmed, adopted by the NPCC Council in the July. The
 13 first section is your summary of the current position of
 14 VFI policy development within HMG. I will not dwell on
 15 that because we have heard from Mr Emmett. But what
 16 I would like your explanation of, please, is what you
 17 have said there, at paragraph 1.4:

18 "Whilst there was significant momentum behind VFI
 19 work in early 2025, the Home Office ... have since been
 20 working to a much narrower remit. However, since
 21 January 2026 there has been a stronger steer [from]
 22 ministers in part due to the evidence heard at [this
 23 Inquiry]. The [Home Office] are intending to stand up
 24 a small team to develop recommendations on the response
 25 to [NIEV] (which includes VFI and COM networks)."

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1 There was need for me to say to police leaders: we are
 2 going to have to develop that. Shortly after that, of
 3 course, the NIEV Taskforce was created which, in many
 4 respects, I suppose superseded the need for that
 5 workshop. It was doing much of the thinking and policy
 6 development which I could then slot into and so that's
 7 why you see that workshop taking place in the January.
 8 That was me filling a gap, not knowing, at that point,
 9 that the NIEV Taskforce was going to come online and so
 10 that was my im -- not impetus, I suppose, but me
 11 starting to set things up to start developing policy
 12 within policing.

13 Q. Thank you. I think what might be important from our
 14 perspective in -- reflecting that back at you is that,
 15 with your large experience of territorial policing, you
 16 were clear that the existing heads didn't cover the
 17 ground and even though the taskforce had gone away,
 18 there was still a need for work to be done?

19 A. Yes, and I think the concept of VFI was in its infancy,
 20 such that it would have been very difficult at the time
 21 for me to say: actually, this is the NPCC lead who
 22 I thought it should have sat with. There was many for
 23 whom they could have picked up this work, I guess, with
 24 it being cross-cutting, I can see a role for me in
 25 bringing this together.

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1 Q. May we just look, please, at the paragraph immediately
2 underneath, 1.5. Because what you do here is you offer
3 a reflection about the role that police should have in
4 this space. You say this:

5 "There remains a risk that with the [Home Office]
6 leading a taskforce that this is viewed by other
7 departments a policing 'problem' to resolve. The NPCC
8 should push back against this and encourage wider
9 ownership thereby ensuring genuine prevention focused
10 approach is taken."

11 Can you explain what you meant by that?

12 A. Yes, I think if you were to bring policing to a table
13 and there is going to be a law enforcement lens put in
14 front of the solutions, based on our own vocational
15 experiences, it seemed to me and to others that the
16 development of effective solutions to deal with the VFI
17 or NIEV harm, needed other partners around the table and
18 my concern was that other partners would see a Home
19 Office picking this up, if you like, and therefore the
20 contribution to that being less. I thought it was
21 important that we make the point that more people need
22 to be round the table and contributing to it, rather
23 than just law enforcement alone.

24 I would want to stress that this statement is not
25 one that says policing shouldn't be involved or don't

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1 Q. Thank you. We will just, please, go on to page 2
2 NPCC000004_0002 and simply note -- I'm not going to read
3 them out, given what you have said about the time at
4 which this workshop took place, but those bullet points
5 from the workshop, you have repeated in your statement
6 and so we have got them there, but can we move onto
7 subheading (3):

8 "Defining the NPCC position on VFI."

9 At 3.1, you are making clear that here, you are
10 seeking to set out a "consistent approach on behalf of"
11 territorial policing in relation to VFIs. I just want
12 to note -- we are going to note a number of issues and
13 then I'm going to come back to them in more detail.

14 But what you say at 3.2, is this:

15 "There is no consistent definition of what
16 constitutes of VFI. Subsequently there is no complete
17 data set and no single agency is tracking the cohort.
18 To understand the risk and demand associated with
19 VFIs ..."

20 I emphasise these words:

21 "... agreement on a definition is essential."

22 That's your position, in charge of all of those
23 officers and staff, as a frontline force; you need
24 a definition?

25 A. Absolutely, and that remains my position; we need

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1 wish to be involved; I want to be very clear on that.

2 But there is a need for others to be involved in it and
3 I think there is a significant role for us to play in
4 it.

5 Q. Thank you. That's well understood, thank you. Just,
6 again, to turn that around, we will come onto
7 interventions later, if I may, but I think what you are
8 telling us is that it is important to, when we are
9 thinking about this problem, essentially turn it around
10 think the sort of interventions we want at the end, the
11 bodies that can deliver those, have to be involved in
12 the structure that manages this problem?

13 A. Policing has a key role in the management of VFIs, that,
14 I'm very clear of. However, if I was to put
15 a prevention lens in front of this problem, then it
16 is -- you know, arguably, you could say that there are
17 other agencies -- and I am thinking here education,
18 health, for instance -- for whom -- probably have the
19 answer that's going to provide the prevention, rather
20 than enforcement. Policing has a certain set of tools
21 in its bag. Arguably, when we are employing those
22 tools, we have gone beyond the point of prevention and
23 we are now in a pursue capability and, of course, that
24 isn't what we want with the cohort we are talking about
25 here and the harm that they could cause.

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1 a definition, and there is a multitude of reasons for
2 that, both operationally and organisationally. In terms
3 of operationally, it is my job, ultimately as the NPCC
4 lead, to communicate this across the
5 150/160,000 officers that work within policing and that
6 doesn't include our police staff. So there is a key
7 important element to that there. Definition also helps
8 us understand risk and therefore demand, and that helps
9 us then calculate the resource that we need to put to
10 this, with something which is ambiguous or unclear,
11 understanding exactly what resource requirement needs to
12 be put into it becomes far more difficult.

13 So there is a multitude of reasons why that
14 definition is essential, both operationally and you
15 know, from a management point of view as well.

16 Q. Thank you. I will come back to definitions in a moment
17 in a little more detail but those are all important
18 points that you have just raised with us.

19 May we just go over the page NPCC000004_0003, to
20 paragraph 3.6. You note that due to a lack of clear
21 referral routes, that Prevent has become the most used
22 front door or triage and:

23 "... is now overwhelmed by referrals which it was
24 not designed to manage."

25 Then the final sentence:

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1 "That said, CTP would still wish to assess and
2 consider a proportion of VFI referrals (referred to
3 within Prevent as FEVMC -- Fixated with Extreme Violence
4 and Mass Casualty)."

5 Two points really to pick up here. Firstly, do you
6 have a role in Prevent or in Counter Terrorism Policing,
7 in your role?

8 **A.** Not in my daily role, no.

9 **Q.** I think what I'm asking, just to be clear: is this your
10 reflection or is this you feeding back what CTP have
11 said to you?

12 **A.** This would be my reflection. I think CTP, obviously
13 this is for them to give evidence to the Inquiry on, but
14 I think they would share the same thing. I think there
15 is -- I struggle to think of examples where you would
16 not wish to have an interface between Prevent and local
17 policing in the assessment of these. I can see that
18 there will need to be some interface. What that looks
19 like? To be determined. But certainly as a high-level
20 policy position, yes, I can see that.

21 **Q.** Just draw that out for me. It may be obvious to you
22 maybe, but just spell out for us, why does that
23 interface need to be there?

24 **A.** Well, I think, simply put, if you were to look at many
25 of the case studies that you see around VFIs, you would

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1 **SIR ADRIAN FULFORD:** Absolutely.

2 **MR JAMIESON:** Paragraph 3.8, here, I think you are dealing
3 with the question -- you will tell me if I'm right, of
4 whether or not a new VFI-specific, bespoke multi-agency
5 framework should be created and you say this:

6 "In the absence of the development of a new
7 framework which would require both legislation and
8 funding, existing frameworks may be adapted to allow for
9 the management of VFI. Existing mechanisms provide for
10 referral, assessment and ongoing management by the
11 relevant agencies. In the current form, these
12 frameworks may be suboptimal in bringing the right focus
13 on VFI in that [I think that word is supposed to be
14 'many'] are police-led. These frameworks do not
15 necessarily have the right interventions or legislative
16 levers to ensure a full multi-agency approach."

17 Does that paragraph reflect these features? There
18 needs to be a multi-agency structure to manage this
19 cohort?

20 **A.** Correct.

21 **Q.** None of the current candidates, from your perspective,
22 have all of the criteria that such a structure would
23 need?

24 **A.** Correct.

25 **Q.** But tell me if I'm putting words in your mouth, the last

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1 want to de-conflict and ensure that those individuals
2 aren't part of CTP casework or indeed, where they
3 aren't, that they don't need to be. So the Prevent
4 assessment needs to take place. I think there is
5 arguably a case in much of the VFI caseload where you
6 would want to undertake that assessment and for that
7 reason, I think that interface will always be needed.

8 **Q.** Yes, and the final sentence about CTP still wishing to
9 assess and consider a proportion of these referrals
10 under that heading "FEVMC", is that a proxy, a sort of
11 recognition of the most risky of these individuals, or
12 does that mean something else?

13 **A.** You know, it is interesting when you read back what you
14 have written a few months later, you read the word,
15 "a portion" sounds like almost like a small subset of
16 it. I would probably qualify that now, to say
17 actually -- I can see that being a majority, that
18 proportion. Yes.

19 **Q.** But you are clear, from your perspective, that those
20 individuals are for Prevent to assess, that's what you
21 think is appropriate?

22 **A.** Yes.

23 **Q.** Thank you. May we just now look at -- I make no apology
24 for spending a bit of time on this document because, as
25 I say, you have put all of that engagement work into it.

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1 thing that you would want is the creation of another
2 bespoke structure in an already crowded field,
3 specifically for this cohort?

4 **A.** That would cause me some concern. I think there is
5 a risk in doing so, in that one structure/forum/meeting
6 thinks that the other structure/forum/meeting is dealing
7 with it and I can give an example of it. If you were to
8 look, by way of example, the Multi-Agency Child
9 Exploitation meeting, it is possible that a VFI is also
10 subject to child exploitation by way of example, if you
11 were to use that. Does the MACE meeting -- which is the
12 abbreviation of what I have described there -- think
13 that a VFI meeting is dealing with it, or does the VFI
14 meeting think the MACE is dealing with it?

15 So, I think we should be cautious in creating
16 something new if what we have at the moment can be
17 strengthened or adapted in order to, I suppose, bring
18 a single version of the truth to that individual in the
19 management of them. Remembering, of course, that in
20 these forums, be that MAPPA, MACE, or what we would
21 require, indeed, for the VFI, it would probably be the
22 same partners and indeed, the same individuals from
23 those same agencies who are sat around that table, and
24 may be relying much upon the same analysis information
25 evidence that's been provided in the discussion of how

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1 to manage them.

2 **Q.** It is very -- I was about to make that precise point

3 with you because that's exactly what one of our seminar

4 experts, or one of our expert panel said. Effectively,

5 this is the same group of people sitting around, often,

6 the same table. The other point that you made in

7 advance of that, when you used your child exploitation

8 example, I think, was a recognition that with these

9 individuals, need and risk, somebody who is at risk of

10 child exploitation is potentially somebody who is a risk

11 of harm to the public, two sides of the same coin,

12 I think, which is --

13 **A.** Quite, and I think they can present in a multitude of

14 ways through -- and through a multitude of agencies, for

15 those reasons. So, yes, I do --

16 **Q.** So what there needs to be is a group of those

17 professionals, the appropriate ones relevant to the

18 individual, with the right information, that can provide

19 the right intervention that deals with both need and

20 because of that risk?

21 **A.** Yes.

22 **Q.** Thank you. I think we have dealt with your

23 paragraph 3.10 in that discussion, where you describe

24 the primary problem mostly sitting outside of law

25 enforcement and the broad consensus that there needs to

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1 of managing the risk regardless of ... threat type -- it

2 should be based on harm. In the development of any new

3 system, we should avoid 'labelling' to avoid the

4 solution being limited to a very specific risk cohort."

5 Can you help me?

6 **A.** Yes, I think in terms of being threat agnostic, I think

7 my view would be that what we design needs to have

8 a degree of flexibility to it. At the current time, we

9 are talking about a NIEV cohort and I'm not sure what we

10 will be talking about in 24/36 months' time. We may be

11 talking about -- either a variation on a NIEV cohort, or

12 a new cohort, but who present a similar risk to the

13 public and therefore --

14 **Q.** I'm just going to pause there. What are the, sort of,

15 candidate other groups that you are thinking about in

16 that space?

17 **A.** I will be very frank, I can't -- I can't think what the

18 next concept -- not concept but what the next harm or

19 threat may be in a couple of years' time, but I suppose

20 the point that I'm trying to make there is that what we

21 design needs to stand the test of time and have a degree

22 of flexibility to how a threat may change.

23 **Q.** Because there's something amorphous about this risk?

24 **A.** Yes, yeah, and I think that's -- and there's a risk of

25 labelling, of saying, okay, well, the person hasn't

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1 be a holistic approach. I think that's essentially what

2 you and I have just been talking about?

3 **A.** Yes, and if I just may add at this point, again, when

4 you reflect back to the precision of the words you used.

5 I have used the word "solutions" there and I think

6 probably when I authored this, to a large extent, I was

7 actually thinking about the interventions: what is it

8 that we are actually offering, as agencies, in order to

9 deal with these people on the ground? That's my primary

10 consideration: what does what we are talking about in it

11 this forum actually mean to the -- what's happening in

12 the room? What's happened? What's the interaction with

13 the individual look like? Be it child or adult.

14 **Q.** Yes, because it is no good to identify a risk identify

15 a problem if there's nothing you can do about it?

16 **A.** It is a talking shop that then has no value and that is

17 not what we want at all in this.

18 **Q.** Perhaps beyond "has no value", perhaps has a sort of

19 false reassurance with it: we've talked about this,

20 we've identified it, we've done something about it.

21 Whereas, in fact, the opposite has happened?

22 **A.** Quite.

23 **Q.** May I just ask, with your assistance, as to what the

24 next paragraph or two means:

25 "The solution should be threat agnostic and capable

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1 fallen into the label or categorisation we have given

2 them, but still presents a similar threat. Well, they

3 still need to be dealt with.

4 So, I'm very conscious that labelling can start to

5 mean that people get excluded from assistance where they

6 may need it, because they don't meet the exact threat

7 type that we've said this -- this is for. And so, for

8 that reason, it needs to be more threat-agnostic and

9 more flexible, either to the changing cohort over time

10 or to a new cohort for whom we may wish to adapt into

11 whatever safeguarding framework we design or strengthen.

12 **Q.** I'm going to leave this document in a moment but just

13 before I do, a question from the combined families

14 group, I think, meets essentially what you and I have

15 been talking about. The question is, should there be

16 a structured assessment Big Front Door that can deal

17 with these issues holistically rather than siloed panels

18 that deal with siloed issues?

19 Or is it --

20 **A.** Yes. If I can explain how I try to think about how

21 I would operationalise the policy we design.

22 **SIR ADRIAN FULFORD:** That would be very helpful.

23 **A.** Because -- sir, I was trying to think very logically

24 about what does this flow through.

25 I think there's -- and the Inquiry has heard

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1 evidence, you'll correct me if I've got this wrong --
 2 but I think there may be four parts to the process.
 3 I think there is a referral stage. I think there is
 4 an assessment (risk) stage. I think there then is
 5 a management stage, and finally, there is
 6 an intervention stage.

7 So, someone needs to refer something. Someone needs
 8 to read that referral and decide what it is about. They
 9 then need to decide this needs management. At which
 10 point it needs to convene and bring people together to
 11 discuss how to manage it. And then we need some form of
 12 intervention and/or action in terms of dealing with the
 13 threat.

14 So, yeah, I want to be clear in the evidence. When
 15 I'm talking about referral, I want to talk about -- be
 16 talking about that initial people putting a piece of
 17 paper in, for example. That's the part I'm talking
 18 about. I am not talking about the assessment that then
 19 happens, which could happen within a MASH setting, for
 20 argument's sake.

21 So, in terms of the front door, it seems to me that
 22 our Multi-Agency Safeguarding Hubs, whilst they aren't
 23 on a statutory footing, and whilst there is variation
 24 across the country, insofar as some do deal with adults
 25 and some don't, but all do deal with children, it seems

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1 an exemplar, simply the force that I work in and know,
 2 and so the evidence I give is to give an example, but,
 3 you know, within our MASH within Sussex we have about
 4 30 staff working in it who look at just short of about
 5 70,000 referrals a year. It is the volume that's going
 6 through there, and that is the sort of resource we put
 7 to it. That will be replicated across the country.
 8 But -- and that is the front door for Sussex. And so
 9 those front doors do exist, it is just not singular,
 10 insofar it's not a national function.

11 **MR JAMIESON:** I can say --

12 **SIR ADRIAN FULFORD:** That's very helpful.

13 **MR JAMIESON:** I'm so sorry, sir --

14 **SIR ADRIAN FULFORD:** No, no, you go. No, no, I was just
 15 thanking the witness for a helpful answer.

16 **MR JAMIESON:** That doesn't mean if you don't get thanked it
 17 wasn't helpful!

18 **SIR ADRIAN FULFORD:** Oh, I wouldn't be so sure.

19 **MR JAMIESON:** Thank you, similarly, from me.

20 The Inquiry has received some other evidence of some
 21 other good examples of local practice that we will be
 22 looking at. If I may, I will come back in your evidence
 23 later to the idea of multi-agency structures, because
 24 I think what we would be very interested to pull out
 25 from you is the idea of what characteristics

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1 to me that there is place for those referrals to happen,
 2 within the 43 localities -- or the 43 forces across the
 3 country, as there is in my own force, where certainly
 4 the local authority and the police are together in the
 5 same place able to undertake that assessment.

6 So I think that there is a front door. It isn't
 7 national, insofar as it is not a single centre that's
 8 looking at a referral regardless of its geography, but
 9 then I'm not sure that that is beneficial, because
 10 I think it needs the local ownership.

11 So I think that the -- I think that the MASHs could
 12 certainly be strengthened, and I think there is
 13 a further question -- we spoke about its interface with
 14 Prevent and I think there is -- you know, there is
 15 consideration as to what does Prevent look like actually
 16 sat in the office? And/or some other agencies you may
 17 choose to strengthen your MASH.

18 But I do think the front door exists. I think it is
 19 imperfect, which I think is what I describe in the
 20 position paper here at parts, which is, you know, some
 21 of them aren't necessarily ideal as they are currently
 22 structured. But I can certainly see that we have
 23 a front door.

24 I mean, in my evidence when I refer to Sussex,
 25 I would want to be clear, I am not presenting Sussex as

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1 a successful multi-agency structure needs to have.
 2 Although, in your area, MASH is obviously doing
 3 an important job.

4 May I just ask about one further piece of evidence
 5 gathering that you did in your role as VFI lead.

6 **A.** Yes.

7 **Q.** Please may we go back to your statement at page 6
 8 NPCC000002_0006 and paragraph 29. I think it fits with
 9 what you have just been telling us.

10 So, at paragraph 29, you tell us that there was
 11 a recent survey done by the National Centre for Violence
 12 Against Women & Girls and Public Protection -- many
 13 acronyms in this case -- and the NPCC MASH lead, which
 14 isn't you, it is another chief officer within the NPCC.

15 **A.** That is correct.

16 **Q.** And you, I think, added some questions to that survey
 17 that was going out and covering MASHs generally?

18 **A.** Yes.

19 **Q.** The questions that you asked relevant to your VFI lead
 20 role, so all of those MASHs were asked -- or all of
 21 those forces, I should say, were asked:

22 "Do your MASH(s) have any involvement in sharing
 23 information for VFI?"

24 Firstly, and secondly:

25 "Describe how the force manages a person identified

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1 as VFI who is not subject to any criminal investigation
 2 or convictions."
 3 Now, the first point is -- I raised this with you
 4 already -- the document that's come back, or the
 5 analysis of that survey, has not yet been disclosed to
 6 the Inquiry. We have got some conclusions here in your
 7 statement.
 8 A. Yeah.
 9 Q. Please can we have that --
 10 A. Certainly.
 11 Q. Thank you.
 12 But here at paragraph 30 you say:
 13 "Based on the findings of the survey, of the
 14 41 forces who responded, only 13 forces indicated that
 15 they had any specific involvement of MASH."
 16 Now, does that mean, of the 41 forces who came back
 17 to you, only 13 of them have anything to do with MASH at
 18 all? Or does that mean only 13 of them have anything to
 19 do with VFIs in a MASH?
 20 A. The latter.
 21 Q. Okay.
 22 So all 41 forces had something to do with a MASH or
 23 were engaged in a MASH?
 24 A. Yes, so there is a MASH in all forces.
 25 Q. Right.

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1 MASH survey results.
 2 I mean, I should point out that the survey was going
 3 out and I have jumped on the back of it with two brief
 4 questions. Of course, you'd -- I'd want to ask much
 5 more detail, but that is a brief summary of those from
 6 the two, you know, basic questions or crude questions
 7 that I asked of them.
 8 Q. What you were told at paragraph 31:
 9 "... VFIs are generally managed through existing
 10 [processes] safeguarding, public protection and
 11 Prevent ... rather than there [being] a single bespoke
 12 process."
 13 A. Yes.
 14 Q. "... Prevent was the primary route by which a VFI was
 15 identified. [And] there [was] escalation into
 16 specialist public protection arrangements such as
 17 [MAPPA] ... (PDP) or Prevent where the level of risk
 18 warrants it."
 19 Does the fact that you have discussed different
 20 structures there mean that there was regional variation
 21 across the forces?
 22 A. From memory of the results, yes.
 23 Q. And that where the subject of the concern was a child,
 24 cases were:
 25 "... commonly managed through child at risk

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1 A. We had 41 -- so there's 43 forces in the country.
 2 41 responded to this, of which 13 indicated an
 3 involvement of VFIs within their MASH.
 4 Q. So all of your forces responded?
 5 A. Bar two. There's 43 forces and I note 41 responded to
 6 the survey.
 7 Q. I won't ask you to name and shame.
 8 A. Unfortunately I couldn't tell you, sir.
 9 Q. Okay. But 41 of the 43 have an involvement in MASH of
 10 some sort or another?
 11 A. Yes.
 12 Q. So the link is there?
 13 A. Yes.
 14 Q. But of those, only 13 responded positively to your first
 15 question? Is that how I should interpret that: does
 16 your MASH have any involvement in the sharing of
 17 information for VFI?
 18 A. Yes.
 19 Q. In terms of the second question:
 20 "Describe how the force manages a person identified
 21 as VFI ..."
 22 If we go over to page 7 NPCC000002_0007, your
 23 paragraph 31, is that your summary of the information
 24 that was given?
 25 A. Yes. So 31, 32 and 33 are my brief analysis of those

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1 processes, significant harm assessments, strategy
 2 discussions ..."
 3 A. Yes.
 4 Q. "... or children's social care referrals."
 5 Are those local authority managed bodies? Is that
 6 what we are talking about there?
 7 A. Yes.
 8 Q. "Where the subject is an adult ..."
 9 You have named some other structures, including:
 10 "... MAPPA, PDP or Adult at Risk pathways."
 11 A. That's right.
 12 Q. Then you have identified three particular forces,
 13 including your own, who had got particular practice?
 14 A. Yes.
 15 MR JAMIESON: Thank you.
 16 A long topic, but that I think does encapsulate the
 17 work you have done to develop your policy. And it is
 18 about 2.20 pm, sir, so would that be a convenient
 19 moment?
 20 SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: It certainly would. We will take
 21 a 10-minute break, Mr Court. I will rise.
 22 (2.17 pm)
 23 (A short break)
 24 (2.33 pm)
 25 SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: Yes, Mr Jamieson.

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1 **MR JAMIESON:** Thank you, sir.

2 Mr Court, that was a really helpful exercise just to
3 headline all your thinking. What I'm going to do now is
4 come back to a number of those topics that we talked
5 about in a bit more detail.

6 So the first of those is definitions.

7 May we look, please, at your statement again,
8 page 6, paragraphs 26 to 28, which is the top half of
9 the page, I think.

10 I just want to note that you tell us there, in your
11 work as the NPCC lead you have come across three
12 different terms, three different definitions, that you
13 tell us about there: VFIs; the NIEV, which is
14 a definition we have been hearing about over the last
15 two days; and also the FEVMCA, which you set out there,
16 the fascination with committing extreme violence or mass
17 casualty attack, which is a subset of the Prevent
18 caseload, isn't it?

19 **A.** Yes.

20 **Q.** I'm not going to get into the weeds of the differences
21 of those definitions but if we go on in your statement,
22 please, to page 9, at paragraph 38, and -- yes.
23 Essentially you are talking here about the term VFI, and
24 I'm going to ask you if this applies to everything --
25 the other two terms as well.

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1 assists in [the] cohort identification."

2 You know who you are talking about, in simple
3 language?

4 **A.** Yes.

5 **Q.** Secondly:

6 "More precise classification allows for accurate
7 demand and resource management."

8 You, as a police force, have to combat all sorts of
9 threats and all sorts of different natures, and you have
10 to make decisions as to where you will target your
11 resource?

12 **A.** Yes. And we spoke, didn't we, about the referral
13 process. I need to understand, if we adopt
14 a definition, how many more referrals would be received
15 by the MASH, and, you know, taking it down to the
16 numbers, what full time equivalent staff do I need to
17 put into that unit to be able to receive that demand.
18 And if there is no clear definition, then those
19 referrals -- and bearing in mind, I represent policing
20 here nationally, so I'm talking very much in my mind
21 there about Sussex, but I need to be able to also
22 explain to other forces what their demand is likely to
23 look like and where they may need to put resource if we
24 adopt a certain definition versus others.

25 **Q.** So one of the real benefits on the ground of having

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1 You say you don't:

2 "... have empirical evidence as to the consistency
3 of the use of the term VFI ... it would be my
4 professional judgment that there will be varying levels
5 of knowledge and understanding amongst professionals."

6 Does that apply to all three definitions?

7 **A.** Yes.

8 **Q.** Some people are going to know what it is and what it
9 means; some people aren't?

10 **A.** Correct. And I think the term VFI is probably more
11 commonly known than the others because it was -- the
12 earliest one we used. So those who do know it are
13 probably more likely to know VFI than any others.

14 **Q.** Yes, thank you.

15 Just as to why this matters, when I was asking you
16 about your position paper, you began to explain some of
17 the operational difficulties, the frontline difficulties
18 in not having a definition, and you set those out here
19 in clear terms at paragraph 39, or at least some of
20 them.

21 So you say -- I think you use the word "essential"
22 in your position paper, but you say here:

23 "... important that there is agreed terminology and
24 definitions across agencies for the following reasons.

25 "It allows for better threat management as it

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1 a fixed definition is you can start to identify how big
2 this cohort is?

3 **A.** Yes.

4 **Q.** You can't do one without the other?

5 **A.** Quite.

6 **Q.** Thirdly, a definition will give you a framework to
7 evaluate, proposed and implement a change to be assessed
8 against.

9 You can see what works and what doesn't?

10 **A.** Quite.

11 **Q.** Fourthly:

12 "Improves clarity of understanding amongst staff on
13 the concept."

14 There are an awful lot of people who need to
15 understand, I think 6,000 or so in your police force,
16 I think you mentioned 150,000 people more widely.

17 **A.** Yes.

18 **Q.** The simpler the definition, the easier it is to achieve
19 a wide understanding?

20 **A.** Yeah, and I think with the definition I also recognise
21 that there will be professionals, for argument's sake,
22 who are sat around in the management meeting who will
23 need to have a more clear understanding of the
24 definition than maybe a response officer who needs to
25 maybe understand the risk factors more.

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1 So I think you would, of course, want everyone to
 2 have the best knowledge, but there will be a need for
 3 varying levels of knowledge depending on what your,
 4 sort of, professional interaction is with that cohort.
 5 **Q.** So, a broadly understood term?
 6 **A.** Yes.
 7 **Q.** But that allows for that specialist differentiation
 8 further down the line?
 9 **A.** Yes.
 10 **Q.** I just want to bring into that, in case anybody thought
 11 there was tension between your clear recommendation
 12 there that you need a workable definition and what you'd
 13 said to me earlier, before we broke, about this threat
 14 being agnostic, or, indeed, I think what you set out
 15 there at paragraph 40, the need to avoid binary
 16 labelling and to keep flexibility, how does that work?
 17 How do we have a clear workable definition but keep
 18 flexibility?
 19 **A.** Let me speak more broadly about policing decisions.
 20 They are subject to the subjectivity of the human
 21 involved in that process. They are subject to the
 22 experience of those officers and to the professional
 23 judgment of those officers. And so that poses a risk,
 24 the risk being that me and you could look at the same
 25 thing and determine that they do fit into that category

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1 flexibility?
 2 **MR JAMIESON:** Sir, that is page 6 NPCC000002_0006, please,
 3 paragraph 27. So that's the definition of VFIs.
 4 **SIR ADRIAN FULFORD:** As you understand it to be as used by
 5 Government?
 6 **A.** I think it does. I think there are three elements to
 7 the definition that are required. I think there is
 8 an act, there is a purpose, and there is a motivation.
 9 And I think that if I was to read that definition, do
 10 I think those three are, in those terms, met? Yes,
 11 I think it probably does.
 12 **SIR ADRIAN FULFORD:** Thank you.
 13 Sorry, Mr Jamieson.
 14 **MR JAMIESON:** No, no, not at all, sir. That's very helpful.
 15 May I just reflect back what I think is what you are
 16 saying about these two concepts: to having a workable
 17 definition that has all the benefits that you have
 18 talked about but also keeping our mind open, not being
 19 binary about it.
 20 **A.** Yes.
 21 **Q.** You and I could see the same person, who is beginning to
 22 get involved in low-level violence.
 23 **A.** Yes.
 24 **Q.** From a policing perspective: isolated, growing sense of
 25 grievance. Perhaps. You and I might disagree as to

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1 or they don't. And in fact our authorised professional
 2 practice around risk principles says as much. It says
 3 that actually we can both come to a different decision
 4 or a different reflection on a particular circumstance
 5 and neither of us are necessarily wrong, depending upon
 6 our rationale for it.

7 I suppose that's why I caution against the label,
 8 because if it is binary, the person you have said is in,
 9 is in, and the person I have said is not in is now not
 10 getting help, and yet the difference in the harm those
 11 pose or the risk of those two individuals may either be
 12 identical, because we have looked at the same
 13 circumstance, or very, very similar. And that's why the
 14 label is -- would be of a concern to me.

15 So I think it is important that we discuss this
 16 concept and have a definition around it. And again, we
 17 can then start to work through the things that I've said
 18 there. But we should also be -- we also need to
 19 recognise there needs to be a degree of professional
 20 judgment and that this is a scale, rather than one box
 21 or another, and there will always potentially be that
 22 grey area in the middle.

23 **SIR ADRIAN FULFORD:** Just giving this some practical
 24 application; does the definition that you have set out
 25 at paragraph 27 work or not? Does that give sufficient

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1 whether or not that person satisfies the definition of
 2 a VFI. Whether or not they do, those risk factors are
 3 still there?

4 **A.** Yes.

5 **Q.** And so it is important to have the definition to
 6 identify the riskiest people --

7 **A.** Yes.

8 **Q.** -- but that shouldn't cause the wider safeguarding or
 9 public protection system to lose sight of those risk
 10 factors?

11 **A.** Yes.

12 **Q.** Have I encapsulated your view?

13 **A.** That is correct.

14 **Q.** Thank you.

15 On the subject of definitions, then, our learned
 16 Chair has just asked you about the VFI definition.
 17 Very, very recently the Home Office has published their
 18 interim NIEV guidance.

19 Please may we have that on the screen. HOM001011.

20 As you can see, date of issue 6 October 2026. Have
 21 you seen this before?

22 **A.** I saw it this weekend, possibly Monday.

23 **Q.** So were you amongst the people that this was issued to
 24 when it was distributed?

25 **A.** Yes.

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1 Q. So you have had very limited time to look at it but
2 perhaps it is still worth us -- please may we go to
3 page 6. Sorry, page 1 HOM001011_0002, paragraph 6. So
4 the bottom of the page there, we have the NIEV
5 definition, and it comes with a caveat before we get to
6 it:

7 "We have developed a working definition of NIEV for
8 the purposes of this guidance and to support the
9 development of relevant policies for managing NIEV
10 risks."

11 Then this:

12 "The definition is not statutory, legal, or
13 operational in nature ..."

14 So it is not in any piece of legislation. It
15 doesn't have legal force. And I think "operational", it
16 is not for me to interpret it, but perhaps that means it
17 is not designed to be used on the ground. So we take
18 that caveat with it. But the definition that comes is
19 then:

20 "The use or threat of extreme violence, not driven
21 by a clear ideological purpose, which is communicative
22 in nature and intended to shock, intimidate or outrage
23 the public or a section of the public."

24 So, just in relation to that definition, firstly, it
25 is defining not a person but a type of harm?

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1 ideology, be that driven by political, racial or,
2 you know, religious views, doesn't necessarily mean they
3 don't have an ideology that's contributing to them being
4 a part of this cohort.

5 Q. On one level, incel culture --

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. -- Com Networks --

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. -- those are ideologies?

10 A. Arguably they are. We could get --

11 Q. We could get philosophical about it?

12 A. Exactly that. We could do. You know, is someone driven
13 by misogyny or are they driven by an ideology? You
14 know, you could debate and write a thesis on it, I'm
15 sure, but that's where I think the confusion would arise
16 amongst teams in trying to explain that definition.

17 Q. So does -- you come to the point: is this a definition
18 that potentially has the potential to confuse at
19 frontline level?

20 A. I think it could do. When I read it myself, I then
21 compared it to section 1 and had to give it a degree --
22 quite a degree of thought, in trying to work out,
23 you know, when you see these things -- again, as I said
24 before, if it is not translating to actual action on the
25 frontline, then what I do is pointless.

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1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Secondly, this question of "not driven by a clear
3 ideological purpose", was there some learning that came
4 out of your roundtables as to what "ideology" means in
5 this space, or can mean?

6 A. So, my interpretation of those words are how would
7 I explain those to the folk that I lead. I think that
8 we mean by "not driven by" -- when I say "I think",
9 I think the author may be referring to that we -- in
10 that "not driven to a clear ideological purpose",
11 I would read that as not meeting the definition as per
12 section 1, definition of "terrorism". That's how
13 I would try to explain to people, because in my mind
14 that seems like the easiest way, arguably, to say it:
15 doesn't meet the section 1 definition.

16 Q. So "no ideology" means no terrorist, here, to you?

17 A. Yes, but, of course, "ideological" appears, doesn't it,
18 as a more of a broader concept within section 1, which
19 is why that could become confusing.

20 Your point -- coming specifically to the question
21 that you asked me, I have obviously engaged with various
22 partners, third sector partners included, over the last
23 12 months, and I think that a voice that I heard and
24 I listened to was one that described ideology and said
25 that just because someone doesn't have a terrorist

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1 So when I'm reading these two things, I'm trying to
2 work out the case studies these applied to and how
3 I explain them, and it took me some time to, sort of,
4 de-conflict what a section 1 terrorist may be classified
5 as and another person via this definition, and I think
6 the ideological element to it is potentially where that
7 arises.

8 Q. Thank you. And that is from your perspective, with all
9 of your experience as a --

10 A. That's from my professional experience, yeah, and it
11 would be my view.

12 Q. Just before I take this document down, this is the final
13 version of this. Did you get to see a draft before it
14 was circulated?

15 A. I did do, although I can't tell you that I read it in so
16 much detail, but I think one was circulated to all
17 stakeholders within that board.

18 MR JAMIESON: Thank you very much.

19 Sir, I was going to move from definitions. Are
20 there any more questions --

21 SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: No, thank you very much.

22 MR JAMIESON: Can we go to the next topic, which is risk
23 assessment. Can we go to page 11 NPCC000002_0011,
24 please.

25 In fact, just before I do that, we don't need to

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1 turn this up but, sir, for your note, at page 19 of the
2 Deputy Chief Constable's statement, paragraphs 84 to 89,
3 you confirm for us that one of the consequences of there
4 being no definition of the cohort that we are talking
5 about is that currently there is no NPCC or other
6 national guidance for police officers or training in
7 relation to VFI or NIEV, so we don't have those
8 resources at the moment?

9 **A.** Correct, and I'm also very conscious that that may
10 appear as an inaction on my part, and leadership, I'm
11 just conscious --

12 **Q.** No, that's not what I suggested --

13 **A.** Yeah, but I'd also want to just be very clear that when
14 I communicate to such a large workforce, we have to
15 communicate it once, get it right, and make sure it is
16 what we're advising. So that is the reason for it not
17 being, rather than not willing to.

18 **SIR ADRIAN FULFORD:** It is not indolence.

19 **A.** Yes, no, exactly.

20 **MR JAMIESON:** No, I didn't suggest for a moment that it was.

21 But just building on that topic, so what you have
22 set out for us there, at paragraphs 47 and 48, is --
23 similarly, as there's no guidance or training, neither
24 is there, for the same reasons, a policy or guidance on
25 the risk assessment of VFIs, because you don't have

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1 **A.** Yes, I have given one example there of the Multi-Agency
2 Child Protection Teams which are recently introduced, as
3 of this year. There are other mechanisms which do
4 exactly as that says, but MAPPA does the same -- you
5 could change "child" to "the offender", it does exactly
6 the same thing within that process in our management of
7 sexual offenders and violent offenders.

8 **Q.** Thank you.

9 What I'm going to do is, rather than dwell on any
10 particular structure, I'm going to ask you some
11 questions really to draw out what some of the features
12 of an effective multi-agency risk assessment might look
13 like.

14 Before we get there, again, may I ask you a question
15 that comes from the families?

16 **A.** Certainly.

17 **Q.** A practical question. In one of these multi-agency
18 forums that you sit in or participate in, where you have
19 a conflict in assessment between the police on one hand
20 and perhaps a safeguarding agency on the other, as the
21 level of risk, so one thinks riskier than the other, how
22 do you resolve that? How do you come to a joint
23 assessment where you've got individual agencies with
24 very different views?

25 **A.** I can't provide specific examples but my reflections of

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1 a concept to train to or to assess to at the moment.

2 You set out there at paragraph 48 some no doubt
3 well-considered actions that could be taken or should be
4 taken in that circumstance, looking for some further
5 intelligence, potentially an investigation and a risk
6 assessment. But you, as a VFI lead, would have no
7 assurance that those actions were happening in
8 individual police forces would you?

9 **A.** No.

10 **Q.** May we just go down the page just a little to
11 paragraph 49. So we have that. Thank you so much.

12 Now, what I want to do here is you are making -- or
13 you are discussing a particular multi-agency forum. The
14 multi-agency Child Protection Team.

15 I'm just going to strip that away for the moment and
16 just look at the particular features of that forum that
17 you are recommending to us. So it records the
18 interventions, manages risk and ensures suitable
19 oversight. Then you go on to note that implementation
20 of that particular structure is patchy and, as a result,
21 there will be a lack of consistency and maturity of
22 joint decision-making.

23 Is the effect of that paragraph that, for risk
24 assessments to be effective, it needs to be
25 multi-agency?

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1 practitioners working with risk -- and this is reflected
2 in conversations I have had within the NHS -- is that
3 public officials tend to be risk averse, and so if you
4 were to ask me what do I would think would happen in
5 that scenario, I think we would err on the side of
6 caution. That is what I see in my own force more
7 broadly in the way that we manage risk: we will err on
8 the side of caution and take a more risk-averse
9 approach. So I think that would happen.

10 I think if you are asking me practically and
11 technically how it would happen, I suspect it would be
12 at the discretion of the Chair, and I would have thought
13 within those meetings that there will be a terms of
14 reference or an MOU, which ultimately would give the
15 Chair a decision-making responsibility.

16 Now, I'm not saying that because I have seen one
17 that says as such but, from my, you know, experience
18 over the years, that's how I think it would result.
19 I think we would end up in the room anyway, erring on
20 the side of caution. And if that wasn't the case,
21 I think it would be the Chair who would decide,
22 ultimately.

23 **Q.** Again, just using the vehicle of that question to draw
24 out some features, you have got a clearly accountable
25 person, the Chair?

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1 A. Yes.

2 Q. You have a framework which everybody understands how it
3 operates. There you are giving us an example of
4 a memorandum of understanding.

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. And an audited -- a recordable, auditable decision there
7 at the end: this is what we are going to do.

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. If I looked at your paragraph 49, some of the features
10 that you were telling us of that particular agency or
11 that particular structure, it could record the
12 interventions that were alighted upon, manage risk and
13 ensure oversight.

14 So does that mean, or is it part of that, triaging,
15 directing this case to one particular outcome, to one
16 particular intervention as part of the story? But
17 that's not the end of the story, there needs to be
18 an evaluation as to whether that works, whether that has
19 engaged with the risk, whether the risk is otherwise
20 going up in other circumstances. Do we need that
21 feedback loop to our structures?

22 A. You need two things, I think. You need a review process
23 and then you need a discharge process.

24 So you have a part where it is going to continue
25 going round in a loop until such a time that you are

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1 So, fundamentally, what is the foundation for
2 effective multi-agency working? It is strategic buy-in,
3 so that everybody knows it is important. And if you
4 don't have that, you will have people who don't
5 prioritise it and therefore the risk goes unmanaged.

6 Q. Thank you. I think I can probably tell from some of the
7 frustration that is in your voice when you tell us about
8 those things that those are features -- or lack of those
9 features are all too common, sad incidents of these
10 multi-agency structures. Often the right people are not
11 there or the right information is not the room and the
12 decisions are not made?

13 A. I think there are examples of that. I think -- you
14 know, if I was to balance my own argument back out as
15 well, I would say that there is a significant demand
16 upon professionals working in the safeguarding arena in
17 which they aren't afforded that. And so I -- you know,
18 I would offer that as mitigation to those as well, that
19 this is a fine balancing act in terms of how we manage
20 the demand of the number of cases that will pass through
21 these. We see that certainly within the domestic abuse
22 arena, through the MARAC meetings. You know, the demand
23 that goes into there is significant. So there are
24 reasons why these things happen.

25 Q. Yes.

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1 happy that the risk has reduced or there is no risk,
2 depending on what you have set your risk tolerance as
3 within that meeting.

4 I just -- if I can -- just may draw out, because
5 I think, you know --

6 Q. Please.

7 A. -- the premise of your question is around what is most
8 important in these. I mean, I'm really clear on what
9 success in policing is about, and it is about effective
10 leadership, ultimately. In these multi-agency settings,
11 that's never more so been the case, that you need
12 strategic buy-in, with strategic leaders, in order for
13 these forums to happen. Because again, practically, on
14 the ground, what do we need? We need people to turn up
15 when that meeting is in their, you know, diary, and we
16 need people to turn up when they have time to consider
17 the content of the meeting, to consider the cases
18 beforehand, and are able to attend with the information
19 and with suitable delegated authority.

20 It is no point having individuals turning up to
21 a multi-agency meeting who don't have the delegated
22 authority to make decisions, who then take away a whole
23 load of actions to say: I will have to come back to you.

24 That will build in delay. For all the delay you
25 build in you've then got an unmanaged risk.

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1 A. But obviously it is for the strategic leadership of
2 those organisations to determine and prioritise based on
3 where they see the most risk, and that has to be,
4 you know, a fundamental tenet of whatever is designed or
5 strengthened as a consequence of this Inquiry.

6 Q. I will move on in just a moment, but one of the ways of
7 reducing that burden on those professionals, who
8 doubtless are managing all sorts of responsibilities, is
9 to streamline, reduce, rationalise the number of these
10 meetings that they need to engage with?

11 A. Yes. I think if I was to -- if my head of public
12 protection was here now, they would say that so much of
13 their time is spent in a multitude of meetings that
14 actually their ability to do their work outside of those
15 is a struggle. It is a high-demand, high-pressurised
16 job, with high risk. And of course you want to get that
17 right.

18 But where we can streamline and provide a single
19 funnel, rather than having to pick the funnel, that
20 makes it easier for us to communicate. And if we can
21 communicate it easier, we are going to get a more
22 effective outcome as a consequence.

23 Q. Thank you. I will shortly come back to multi-agency
24 structures, but can I just bottom out this question of
25 risk assessments with you.

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1 If we go over the page, please NPCC000002_0012, to
2 paragraph 53, you tell us that there is, underway at the
3 moment, through the NPCC MASH working group:

4 "... the development of a single risk assessment
5 tool for policing and that working group is seeking
6 involvement from multi-agency partners. This single
7 tool would form the primary risk assessment tool for
8 frontline professionals. The intention is that there
9 would be a series of secondary risk assessment tools
10 which are tailored to specific threats and would be
11 completed by specialists."

12 So are those bolt-ons to the primary assessment:

13 "As a primary risk assessment tool, it will need to
14 be broad enough to identify broad factors of harm rather
15 than specific thematic factors. The work remains
16 ongoing to develop this."

17 I did just want to talk to you about this because
18 this is potentially very interesting from our
19 perspective.

20 So that doesn't sound like something that's been
21 designed specifically for VFI, NIEV risk. Quite the
22 opposite. So tell us, what is this tool designed to do?
23 Who is it for?

24 A. Okay, so I just want to caveat my answer here, which is
25 that I'm not the NPCC for MASH and leading on this work,
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1 you like. And we know from the Prevent referrals and we
2 know within our own MASHs that we can get a lot in that
3 is of little value. Maybe not so -- not even the case
4 that the information is not important, just that the way
5 it is presented isn't.

6 And so I can see the benefit of that single risk
7 assessment tool with a modular approach sat behind it.
8 Unfortunately, I'm not close enough to the detail, and
9 if you need more detail on it, I am happy to provide is
10 to the Inquiry from that lead.

11 Q. Thank you, that's precisely what I was going to ask you.
12 Please could we be provided with, in simple terms,
13 however far that has got and the up-to-date thinking on
14 it.

15 Because on the face of it, it is extremely
16 attractive isn't it?

17 A. Yeah.

18 Q. If a single risk assessment that tells any multi-agency
19 practitioner how risky this person -- what the level of
20 need, what the level of vulnerability of this person is,
21 with a space for the specialist input to inform that,
22 the common language that you talked about for
23 multi-agency working effectively is going to be
24 facilitated.

25 Sir, did you want to come in?

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1 so I just caveat my -- my knowledge is broad, it is not
2 in depth, and I would not want to mislead the Inquiry
3 with any answer I give, because I'm not close to the
4 detail at the moment on it.

5 But as is my understanding, that there will be
6 a generic risk assessment. So there are risk
7 assessments already in place within forces that allow
8 an assessment of vulnerability in all its guises, or
9 wherever that comes from, particularly within child
10 protection and domestic abuse.

11 My understanding is that there will be a broader
12 risk assessment -- a broader vulnerability risk
13 assessment, which is singular, which will apply to
14 everyone. Where you, for instance -- and it may be the
15 case here, that your cause for completing that
16 vulnerability assessment is a VFI for argument's sake,
17 then you would go to the VFI risk assessment that then
18 sits behind it. So this is a more modular approach.
19 You can do the generic to start with, with a -- then
20 a more specific one.

21 I can see the benefits of that. I think that allows
22 you to have a clearer pathway to where those things are
23 assessed. You know, I think it helps with demand
24 management because there is better precision in
25 undertaking that risk assessment at the front door, if
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1 **SIR ADRIAN FULFORD:** Including the end date, when that work
2 is likely to be completed.

3 **MR JAMIESON:** Yes, thank you.

4 We can, I am sure, pick that up with those who
5 assist you in correspondence.

6 A. Thank you.

7 Q. But you can see how interested we are in it.

8 At paragraph 54 you have just put a little detail of
9 what you have just told us there. You can see why you
10 have told us about it, is that that may have a relevance
11 to our cohort, but it is not work that specifically
12 factored on this cohort at the moment?

13 A. Unfortunately not.

14 Q. Thank you.

15 A. I can foresee there was that work developed, that I --
16 that may be a piece of work that then forms part of my
17 implementation plan, following the recommendations of
18 the Inquiry. So I can see that I will need to do work
19 on it once we have done some other substantial work
20 up front.

21 Q. Thank you. May we just go over the page
22 NPCC000002_0013, please, to paragraph 56. I'm not going
23 to read all of this out now because we have covered most
24 of it in what we have talked about but you have set out
25 for us, and for our evidence base, some factors that
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1 a new risk assessment tool would need if it were to be
 2 effective or to meet challenges, which includes, as
 3 I look towards -- (a) it's got to work with what's there
 4 already. It has to provide data, engage with data, (c),
 5 it has to be accompanied with guidance that explains how
 6 it works. You have to train to it; that's (d), so
 7 people can work it effectively, and the common language.
 8 Again, that's what you have, I think, talked about
 9 already of this central assessment. So I won't spend
 10 time on that but you have set them out for us.

11 If we could just scroll up a little bit.

12 Essentially, this is -- that's what we need in terms of
 13 a tool, but 57, this is where we are currently. You say
 14 this:

15 "I am unable to make a proper assessment of how
 16 effectively forces across the country coordinate
 17 management plans, case ownership and monitoring
 18 arrangements for VFIs."

19 You can't give assurance:

20 "From my engagement to date, it is apparent that
 21 there is an absence of agreement on how to manage the
 22 risk post-referral, including the subsequent
 23 intervention pathways. This remains the primary problem
 24 that needs addressing by all agencies particularly where
 25 the individual has not met the criminal threshold.

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1 guided or aimed at people who are either criminal or on
 2 the cusp of being criminal?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. And the early intervention that this cohort requires is
 5 a series of interventions that you are not well placed
 6 to provide?

7 A. Correct.

8 Q. Thank you. May we move then, I think briefly, to the
 9 next topic which is multi-agency working. There are
 10 just another couple of paragraphs to bring out. Can we
 11 just go to page 14 NPCC000002_0014, please, and to
 12 paragraph 59. I think this is something you have
 13 touched on already but I really wanted your help to
 14 understand these words.

15 You are talking about here some of the -- or the
 16 characteristics that an effective multi-agency structure
 17 needs to have and you are drawing the distinction
 18 between responsibility and accountability. Can you just
 19 explain the difference between those two concepts for
 20 us?

21 A. So, within the response to a VFI you may have
 22 a responsibility to do something. The responsibility is
 23 an onus, I guess, upon you to undertake action. The
 24 accountability though is fundamentally who? How do you
 25 define a word without still using the word? The

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1 There is a risk that the existing 'front doors' will
 2 result in a heavily law enforcement focused approach."

3 Just to unpack that paragraph. It is obvious, from
 4 the discussions we have had and from the Inquiry's wider
 5 evidence, there are lots of potential front doors, lots
 6 of multi-agency fora. The primary problem is what
 7 happens after you have been through that front door and
 8 say you have got a person; what are you going to do with
 9 them?

10 A. Yes, and I think from the a law enforcement perspective
 11 where, you know, a significant proportion of this cohort
 12 don't meet the criminal threshold. That presents
 13 a challenge to us because, in our toolkit there isn't
 14 necessarily something there that we feel comfortable we
 15 can use in order to mitigate that risk and have to rely,
 16 therefore, on other partners to provide that
 17 intervention or engagement with that individual and, you
 18 know, if someone has committed a criminal offence, in
 19 many ways we have got the legal tools available to
 20 minimise or start to control that risk. Where that's
 21 absent, it is far more challenging for us.

22 Q. I don't think anybody listening to this could think that
 23 you were trying to remove police from the multi-agency
 24 structure -- far from it. But you are pointing out for
 25 us two things: your powers and tools are principally

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1 accountability is --

2 Q. Give us an example if that's easier.

3 A. Well, who is going to be held to account for this case
 4 when it either goes right or wrong? Who is that
 5 figurehead for whom that risk ultimately sits with?

6 I might have a responsibility in responding to the risk,
 7 but the accountable person is the one that ultimately is
 8 going to be the figurehead, I suppose, for want of
 9 a better word.

10 Q. Is that accountability a lever to ensure the strategic
 11 buy-in that you were telling us about before?

12 A. Yes, I think it is. I think that's why a lot of the
 13 statutory provision works because it provides
 14 accountability, albeit there were examples where
 15 non-statutory process does work, but certainly statutory
 16 process brings that accountability.

17 Q. Thank you. May we just go to paragraph 63, which
 18 I think is at the bottom of this page, just to pick up
 19 a couple of extra features.

20 I'm just going to pick this up as we go through.

21 You advocate that there may be benefit in the structure
 22 having a statutory framework which establishes the
 23 agency with primary ownership along with a named
 24 professional. You justify that, by saying:

25 "It is ... important that agencies recognise that

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1 responsibility for the risk remains with the identifying
 2 agency until it has been formally accepted, understood
 3 and managed through safeguarding processes."
 4 So if there is to be a transfer from one agency to
 5 another, the risk still sits with the referring agency
 6 until it has been accepted?
 7 **A.** Yes.
 8 **Q.** Otherwise you get a referral that goes nowhere and round
 9 in a carousel?
 10 **A.** Correct.
 11 **Q.** Thank you. May we also, please, look at paragraph 77.
 12 Up to page 17 NPCC000002_0017, please. You also
 13 recommend that the necessary multi-agency structure has
 14 a case management function, a structured case management
 15 function:
 16 "... which allows for the assessment of
 17 an individual, a coordinated approach to any planned
 18 interventions and a continued monitoring of the risk."
 19 Can you give us an explanation again or
 20 a contextualisation of what that means?
 21 **A.** So I know it is of interest to the Inquiry in terms of
 22 what does case management look like. I think if I was
 23 to give a practical example of where that works
 24 effectively and is in place was if you were to look at
 25 the ViSOR system which is the violent and sexual

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1 shared database, that very much feeds into and allows
 2 the joint understanding of risk, the information
 3 sharing, something which we're going to come on to.
 4 **A.** It is in fact the tool that allows you to run your MAPPA
 5 processes.
 6 **Q.** Now, I'm not going to go through all of this because
 7 what you have very helpfully done in your statement --
 8 sir, for your note, paragraph 65 to 76 -- is set out
 9 an evaluation of some other multi-agency structures,
 10 MAPPA and PDPs as to why they may or may not meet these
 11 criteria that we have been talking about but you have
 12 set that out for us. I'm not going to go through it.
 13 What I am going to ask you about, if I may, is just
 14 a couple of questions about Prevent, which you deal with
 15 at page 18 NPCC000002_0018 and paragraph 80. You have
 16 put into your statement there something you have covered
 17 already in your position paper: people using Prevent
 18 because it is there and they know about it. You have
 19 also included at paragraph 81 the fact that, however
 20 this shakes down, wherever Prevent fits in the scheme of
 21 things, you consider there is still a role to assess and
 22 consider many, if not all, VFI referrals -- I think you
 23 have amended your language there from the position
 24 paper -- to allow de-confliction and may I suggest the
 25 management of the riskiest or the -- yes, the management

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1 offender management system.
 2 **SIR ADRIAN FULFORD:** Could you give the name again?
 3 **A.** Yes, it is ViSOR.
 4 **MR JAMIESON:** Is that joint with probation?
 5 **A.** That's joint with probation. It operates across the
 6 country. It allows you to manage all those aspects of
 7 a case. It allows you to transfer cases across regions.
 8 So there is -- this isn't something that doesn't already
 9 exist in some guise. It does. There is a case
 10 management system that effectively manages those
 11 individuals. They are high-risk individuals in that
 12 case. Of course. So there is a blueprint that the
 13 Inquiry may look at that would help in working out
 14 actually how do we manage this cohort.
 15 **SIR ADRIAN FULFORD:** And it works.
 16 **A.** And it works and it has been in place for a significant
 17 period of time. I can't remember what year it was
 18 brought in but this is not something that is new. Now,
 19 there's a question as to how good is the technology?
 20 That is a different question. But the technology
 21 exists. The database exists. It allows you to do that
 22 shared understanding of risk and it allows you to
 23 transfer risk. So, for me, it seems like a blueprint
 24 that may be beneficial to look at.
 25 **MR JAMIESON:** That particular case management function, the

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1 of the potentially riskiest individuals.
 2 May I just use Prevent, though, for this purpose.
 3 One of the things that you have told us here in
 4 evidence, and you say in your statement in a number of
 5 places, is about the need to have appropriate
 6 interventions.
 7 **A.** Yes.
 8 **Q.** And the lack of an evidence base as to what
 9 interventions are going to work. Before you gave
 10 evidence, Mr Emmett was giving evidence about how we
 11 know in simple terms that the Prevent interventions work
 12 for the Prevent cohort and he has given his evidence
 13 about that.
 14 I wonder if it would be useful for us just to look
 15 at the sort of interventions that Prevent has access to.
 16 If we look at the Prevent Assessment Framework, the
 17 reference for that is CTPHQ000127. This is the Prevent
 18 Assessment Framework. The Inquiry has looked at this
 19 before. We don't need to go all the way through. My
 20 purpose of looking at it is the very final page, please.
 21 Page 16 CTPHQ000127_0016 of this document.
 22 This is a form. This is a check-box or a tick sheet
 23 for the person who is completing this assessment. When
 24 they come to the end of it to think about the sort of
 25 interventions that the individual might need. That's

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1 the purpose of this form.

2 The first option is a theological, ideological
3 support from a mentor which is often put forward as the
4 sort of classical value that Prevent offers. We have
5 talked about a wider concept of ideology but, for the
6 moment, I'm going to put that to one side and I'm going
7 to put that intervention to one side.

8 But if we look at the other interventions that those
9 who complete this framework are asked to think about,
10 I'm just going to ask the value of your expertise as to
11 whether these look like the sort of things that might
12 well be useful for the vulnerability risk cohort that we
13 are talking about.

14 So the second option is a:

15 "Life and social skills (work on life skills or
16 social skills, such as dealing with peer pressure)."

17 And perhaps bullying:

18 "Anger management sessions (formal or informal work
19 dealing with anger).

20 "Cognitive/behavioural contact ..."

21 So CBT and:

22 "... general work on attitude and behaviour.

23 "Constructive leisure pursuits (supervised or
24 managed ...)"

25 Perhaps taking people out of their environment that

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1 health.

2 Q. Yes.

3 A. And it is quite possible you could argue back to me and
4 say, well. It fits within one of them on the other
5 page, I don't know, living a healthy lifestyle or
6 something like that. But I think the absence of not
7 seeing that word "digital online" causes me to sort of
8 raise an eyebrow as to that probably should be in there.

9 Q. If I may, I will do the opposite of that. I will not
10 argue it away; I will say that is an important
11 observation. I think what I might reflect back to you
12 is important both for the VFIs that we are talking about
13 and potentially the classic Prevent cohort as well?

14 A. Yes, indeed. I'm sure.

15 Q. So if we caveat it with saying there needs to be
16 something else on the list but the remainder of those
17 interventions, do they seem appropriate for the areas of
18 need that we are talking about with our VFI NIEV cohort?

19 A. Yes, and if I can just add that those type of
20 interventions that you see there are why the partners
21 that I've mentioned is so important that they are there
22 and why this isn't a policing problem solely to fix,
23 because the delivery of those is going to be through:
24 now, we can provide the access and the gateways, we do
25 so with drugs and alcohol through custody support, and

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1 may have become small, introducing them to peers,
2 sports, whatever it might be:

3 "Educational skills contact ..."

4 Focused on education or training, progression in
5 that direction:

6 "Careers focused activities ..."

7 "Family support contact (activities aimed at
8 supporting family and personal relationships, including
9 formal parenting programmes.

10 "Physical and/or mental health support (work aimed
11 at assessing or addressing any physical or mental health
12 issues).

13 "Housing support ..."

14 I won't read them all:

15 "Drugs and alcohol support ..."

16 General:

17 "Mentoring ... personal guidance or pastoral care)."

18 Other than the first ideological one, which we put
19 to one side, do those seem like the sort of
20 interventions that may benefit the risks and
21 vulnerabilities that have been identified in relation to
22 this cohort?

23 A. Yes, I think they do. I think probably what stands out
24 as missing, though, if I was to see anything, I don't
25 see in the list anything related to digital or online

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1 there are other examples, but I think that highlights
2 the point in that list, the benefit of, you know, local
3 authorities, by way of example, having a key and
4 important role around that table.

5 Q. Thank you very much. That document can come down.
6 Please may we go back to your statement, page 20
7 NPCC000002_0090, paragraph 90. We are on to our next
8 topic, information sharing, another one we have dealt
9 with in passing but I do just want to very quickly
10 bottom this out with you.

11 You set out -- essentially, at paragraphs 90 to 95
12 you set out what I will summarise in this way: there are
13 ample legal powers to allow information sharing in
14 relation to VFIs already.

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. They exist? But at paragraph 97 you zone in on the
17 problem. Perhaps we could just crop in on the bottom
18 half of the page now. Thank you. The barrier to
19 information sharing, which occurs almost universally, is
20 not a lack of legal powers, it is a cultural problem,
21 and you describe it in this way. You say:

22 "... there is a defensive posture towards
23 information management rather than an open posture which
24 democratises data. As organisational policies are
25 framed around 'data protection' ..."

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1 Which leads to that defensiveness.
 2 Can you explain what that culture is, how it
 3 manifests itself, and how we fix it?
 4 **A.** So my view around information sharing is formed very
 5 much -- my previous role prior to leaving Merseyside in
 6 2021 was as the Head of Digital Policing and the
 7 innovation and trying to bring in technologies around
 8 it. So it was a great source of frustration in terms of
 9 our more defensive posture in terms of data protection.
 10 I was working in Merseyside at the time. This is no
 11 different, I suspect, to all forces; so it is not
 12 a direct criticism of Merseyside, of course.

13 But I think the very fact that the Act is called
 14 data protection tells you -- it suggests that we don't
 15 want to share. Indeed, the only reason we collect data
 16 is to use it. If we're not going to use it, we
 17 shouldn't be collecting it and therefore we should have
 18 a data enablement perspective on when we do it.

19 I think the risk appetite of your senior information
 20 responsible officer, I think that can lead throughout
 21 the organisation. I think that's a part of it. I think
 22 people knowing how to share information and having the
 23 means to do so is probably another way as well. If
 24 I have information about a person, how am I physically
 25 going to share that? Am I sending it in an email? You

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1 to sitting with the same senior people around the same
 2 table discussing those issues, the flow of information
 3 became much easier. Would you agree with that? Is that
 4 part of your experience as well?

5 **A.** I would but it leaves gaps, of course, because you don't
 6 want the system manging high risk based on
 7 relationships, particularly -- you know, it is probably
 8 less so in other organisations, our experience, but the
 9 turnover in policing in some of our key roles is high
 10 just by virtue of the way the organisation runs. So
 11 that is a risky strategy where it is based on
 12 relationships, but it is certainly something I would
 13 recognise both as my time in part of the command team in
 14 Liverpool and certainly as a chief officer in Sussex.

15 **Q.** Thank you.

16 Just in relation to the legislation, on the screen
 17 now we have got your comment on paragraph 96, the new
 18 Children's Wellbeing and Schools Act, which provides
 19 a statutory information sharing duty which gives a clear
 20 obligation on agencies to share information and then
 21 these words:

22 "... where it is necessary to safeguard and promote
 23 the welfare of children."

24 So it is a specific power or a specific obligation
 25 to share information in those circumstances. My

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1 know, the transfer of information and what do I include
 2 within it? So I think there is a very practical
 3 operational, how do I actually physically do this which,
 4 you know, in 2026 seems daft to be saying, doesn't it,
 5 with the technology but I think it is the truth of the
 6 matter.

7 But I think -- strategically, I do think we have
 8 a posture which is more defensive than it should be. To
 9 some degree, I'm not sure we are necessarily helped with
 10 the legislation in all aspects. If you decide that you
 11 want a case management system, by way of example, for
 12 VFIs and you want to test it, you are going to be
 13 hindered by part 4 of the Data Protection Act, I think.

14 So I think there are some frustrations in the
 15 introduction of technology. I think our strategic
 16 posture in policing is more defensive than it should be
 17 and we should be more of a data enablement perspective.
 18 I think operationally -- these are very transactional
 19 points -- I'm not certain that staff would know how to
 20 do it.

21 **Q.** One of the things the Inquiry heard during the seminars
 22 from other experienced professionals in multi-agency
 23 structures is one of the ways that this culture, this
 24 reticence to share information could be got round is
 25 through strong local relationships. So if you are used

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1 question is but, arguably, it doesn't apply where the
 2 concern is not safeguarding the individual child but it
 3 is about the risk that that child poses to the world at
 4 large. Is your experience -- do specific powers like
 5 this help or do they displace the general wide Common
 6 Law Data Protection Act powers to share information in
 7 the minds of practitioners? Do they help with the
 8 cultural --

9 **A.** I think prior to the 2026 Act I think we already had the
 10 powers to do so. I think this may be -- it is possible
 11 that the inclusion of this within this Act gives
 12 a clearer accountability in relation to a very specific
 13 point. The risk here, of course -- well, there's a
 14 number of risks with it -- is the child versus adult and
 15 the cliff edge which is one of the concerns I had in the
 16 policy position, which is what do we do when
 17 an individual turns 18.

18 I think there is also a question here around mindset
 19 which is that where an individual is engaging in
 20 behaviour that causes risk to others, I would argue they
 21 are also a risk to themselves and --

22 **Q.** But is that a line of thinking that's common across --
 23 because I can certainly see that and we have heard other
 24 evidence about that?

25 **A.** I don't necessarily think it is because I think we think

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1 about the people who are going to come to harm rather
 2 than thinking about the perpetrator is also coming to
 3 harm. Now, of course if we change that mindset, it
 4 enables us to think about the problem in a different
 5 way. I think it enables us to think about it without
 6 the law enforcement lens before our eyes and actually
 7 allows us to put a prevention lens before our eyes.

8 **Q.** So we are unlikely to be able to legislate our way out
 9 of this cultural problem?

10 **A.** No.

11 **Q.** Thank you. I will leave data protection or, I'm sorry,
 12 information sharing and move on to a new topic which we
 13 haven't dealt in detail yet, which is online harms. You
 14 set the scene for this at page 22 NPCC000002_0022 of
 15 your statement, please, paragraph 105, where you
 16 encapsulate other evidence that this Inquiry has heard:
 17 "The online environment allows VFI access to harmful
 18 content and information which may be useful during
 19 ideation or preparation of the use of violence. The
 20 internet has enabled significant amounts of violent
 21 content and the means by which that can be distributed
 22 at scale."
 23 You go on to tell us about algorithms and the online
 24 environment, so the problem, and at 106, you say:
 25 "Consequently, I would consider it highly likely
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1 your attention. My biggest concern is it normalises it
 2 and there doesn't feel like there is anything present
 3 within that digital world which is actually saying this
 4 is unacceptable, even if it is legal. There is no harm
 5 warning that comes with these things and says that what
 6 you are looking at isn't right or indeed healthy,
 7 whichever.

8 **Q.** Thank you.

9 One of the key issues that the Inquiry is hearing
 10 from a number of witnesses is that it is very difficult
 11 to get visibility on an individual's online life,
 12 feeding into our question of risk assessment, what is
 13 this person looking at, what are they consuming, what is
 14 the algorithm pushing to them?

15 If we could go over the page, please
 16 NPCC000002_0023, to paragraph 110. You tell us that
 17 there are a number of avenues by which territorial
 18 police forces "would be able to identify concerning
 19 patterns of behaviour, such as online browsing and
 20 search activity" to gain some visibility. I just wanted
 21 to explore these alternatives with you to make sure that
 22 we have understood them.

23 The first is intelligence reporting by a third party
 24 with knowledge of an individual's activity, such as
 25 a close family member or teacher, a retail outlet or an
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1 that the online environment could exacerbate existing
 2 vulnerabilities, normalise violence and contribute to
 3 an escalation in the risk posed by the VFI."

4 Which I think, I may say, chimes with significant
 5 other evidence that the Inquiry has received and will
 6 receive.

7 Where do you draw those insights from, I ask in
 8 passing? Is that from your career? Is that from the
 9 interactions that you have had? Where have you gained
 10 that understanding?

11 **A.** I think there's a number of routes that that comes from.
 12 I think the case studies that I see -- I couldn't quote
 13 them to you now -- but, you know, you see enough case
 14 studies as the VFI role that's shared with you where you
 15 see that that is present. You see it in the more
 16 broader investigations and work that we undertake within
 17 policing. You see it within your own personal life, as
 18 well. You can't help but be drawn by the fact that you
 19 search for one thing on your internet browser and then
 20 you have videos on a video app surfacing. Next, the
 21 connectivity between them and between those apps in --
 22 well, it is exponential, isn't it? You search for one
 23 thing and it pops up everywhere else.

24 So the availability of it is high. The algorithms
 25 are there to make it addictive and to bring it more to
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1 internet service provider.

2 Just in relation to those, the first alternative,
 3 the close family member or teacher, the Inquiry has
 4 received evidence from a number of witnesses, including
 5 the one just before you, about how important bystander
 6 close contact information is in the proper assessment of
 7 the risk or potential emerging and escalating risk that
 8 such individuals might pose. Does that accord with your
 9 experience?

10 **A.** It does, and if I can bring you back to the points
 11 I make in the policy position around the biggest
 12 challenge here is those that have not met the criminal
 13 threshold. In the absence of that, our ability to
 14 interrogate someone's digital footprint is lessened and
 15 therefore you must rely on others who are interacting
 16 with that person during their day-to-day life to report
 17 that to us. That's where we are going to get the
 18 insight and I think that's why there is such
 19 a responsibility on those who have responsibility for
 20 those individuals to report to us, not least it may give
 21 us the opportunity to do a criminal intervention if
 22 needed. But we need the information from people;
 23 without it, we struggle.

24 **Q.** May I just sort of seek to elucidate this example with
 25 real-world experience. So how is this going to happen?
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1 You are right you can't just go and arrest somebody.
 2 You can't take their devices for no reason. How is
 3 a police force going to receive or be told about a close
 4 family member concern? How is that, in a typical case,
 5 going to arise?
 6 **A.** I think there is a number of ways I could see it arising
 7 in my own force. We have the benefit of officers in
 8 schools. I could see their officer's engagement with
 9 schools could cause teachers to have those informal
 10 conversations or indeed the formal conversations.
 11 I think there is an avenue in which education engages
 12 with police in a more informal way to develop that
 13 intelligence.
 14 Short of that, the family member coming forwards and
 15 telling us via conventional means as to how you tell
 16 police. Of course, there are anonymous ways of doing so
 17 and then there are ways where you can tell us
 18 directly with who you are but in my mind the key ways in
 19 which an individual is going to tell us about a loved
 20 one or someone they have responsibility for engaging in
 21 unhealthy behaviours online.
 22 **Q.** So perhaps that way, perhaps at school, perhaps
 23 an anonymous piece of information, perhaps some sort of
 24 engagement in child protection work would be another
 25 route.

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1 **A.** Yes.
 2 **Q.** And is there presently, you have mentioned MASHs,
 3 a comprehensive national coverage as to where that sort
 4 of information can go?
 5 **A.** There is a comprehensive coverage insofar as if we are
 6 talking about children, then your central MASH which has
 7 detectives working in it and doing those assessments and
 8 receiving those vulnerability forms would be able to
 9 undertake an assessment. So that is consistent.
 10 **Q.** I'm sorry -- thank you, that's really helpful. Our
 11 cohort are, as far as we understand it, adolescents and
 12 so will span 18, 19, early 20s. So if we have somebody
 13 of that nature?
 14 **A.** Correct, and that would be one of the weaknesses in
 15 proposing that the MASH in its current form operating
 16 the way it does would be a repository for it. So, no,
 17 in that case, there would be a weakness in the system.
 18 MASHs would need to expand to undertake work related to
 19 adults and, you know, I spoke about the volumes in
 20 Sussex. If you were then to apply to over-18s, on other
 21 forces you can start to see the resource you would then
 22 have to put into it. But that's a problem for policing
 23 to determine if we decided that that was the right way,
 24 of course, but ...
 25 **Q.** Thank you. Sorry, I cut you off to divert you into

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1 **A.** Yes.
 2 **Q.** But assuming that information comes in, "I'm concerned
 3 about this person and what they are looking at, at the
 4 internet", what are the police going to do with that
 5 information? How can they use it?
 6 **A.** How can they use it? Well, ultimately through whatever
 7 deployment method you decide, based on what is reported,
 8 it's going to route its way to two ways. That type of
 9 information is either going to find itself in
 10 an intelligence directorate where it will be assessed
 11 from an intelligence point of view, which may
 12 necessitate a referral into your MASH. If you have
 13 deployed officers to it by whatever means, then they
 14 will complete some form of vulnerability assessment that
 15 we spoke about before which would then find its way into
 16 a MASH.
 17 **Q.** Because that's the point, is it, because if that
 18 information stays within the police, you are hampered by
 19 what you have told us already, which is really police
 20 interventions are for crime or just pre-crime
 21 interventions. If the relevance of this information is
 22 that it is a risk factor, a warning of an early
 23 intervention opportunity for developing risk, you need
 24 to have somewhere you can provide that information to
 25 that can do something about it?

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1 adults. Was there anything else you wanted to say about
 2 MASHs and children?
 3 **A.** No.
 4 **Q.** The second of your ways in which police can obtain this
 5 insight is through effective investigation of potential
 6 offences. So, you know, we are further along the
 7 progression of risk at this point, but perhaps a -- you
 8 know, we know from the facts of AR that were
 9 interactions with the police, arrests and criminal
 10 behaviour. So those would, and in other cases could,
 11 provide opportunities for devices to be seized and
 12 interrogated. But in policing work in general, is there
 13 not a very substantial demand for the interrogation of
 14 devices and the evaluation of content across all sorts
 15 of offences?
 16 **A.** Yes, you know, the backlogs within our device
 17 examination I think are well evidenced in policing.
 18 There is not only the demand in terms of the number of
 19 devices we examine, but then you have the volume of data
 20 that you receive back once it is examined.
 21 I suppose one of the challenges as an operational
 22 person then trying to distill that volume of data into
 23 something which is either intelligence or information
 24 that can be used by partners would present another
 25 challenge. Could I say to you I'm really confident that

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1 where risks are identified in the data that comes back
 2 from a device's examination, they would find themselves
 3 into a MASH, I would be less confident in that.

4 Q. Somebody, for instance, a youth, a young adult, who is
 5 arrested and perhaps even prosecuted for an offence of
 6 minor violence (which is not to minimise the impact on
 7 the victim of it, but in the scale of criminal offences
 8 a minor violence), in reality, the taking of their
 9 devices, the downloading of their devices, the
 10 interrogation of their devices to surface some sort of
 11 public health risk is unlikely, I think we can say, or
 12 am I wrong about that.

13 A. I do not think we would do it.

14 Q. It just wouldn't happen in the real world?

15 A. Not unless there was significant evidence on that device
 16 that was going to help us prove it but, even then, there
 17 is a proportionality to the cost and time.

18 Q. Because the purpose of the police in that circumstance,
 19 we have arrested somebody from an assault, is to prove
 20 the assault has happened.

21 A. Quite.

22 Q. For which you need the witnesses that saw it happen.
 23 What's on the phone or not on the phone is not relevant
 24 unless there is some trigger to make you look at it?

25 A. Correct.

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1 monitoring in real time of whether a user of a device is
 2 going to risky sites. Now, risky sites for a sex
 3 offender may be different to the cohort that we are
 4 talking about --

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. -- but it exists. But the point that you are making is
 7 that in order for that to be a proportionate, fair,
 8 lawful thing to do, there has to be some threshold
 9 before that software is installed --

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. -- in a way that's mandatory and, in that particular
 12 environment, you have got qualifying convictions and
 13 I think also future risk of serious harm?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. Then, fourthly, you say:

16 "Policing has invested in additional capacity and
 17 capability within the online child sexual exploitation
 18 and abuse covert intelligence team ... Through Home
 19 Office Prevent funding, the emerging threats team has
 20 expanded this capability to identify VFI networks and
 21 offenders."

22 What can you tell us about this work and its
 23 relevance?

24 A. In short, it is a team which expands its work of, you
 25 know, threat identification, I guess, into looking at

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1 Q. So there it is a possibility but in the real world that
 2 is unlikely to provide significant insight?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Thank you. What may be slightly more likely,
 5 individuals who are on existing orders and you give the
 6 example of sex offenders. Perhaps monitoring software
 7 will be installed on their devices. That is possible,
 8 but is that limited to people who have previous
 9 convictions and present a particular level of risk?

10 A. Yes. So as it currently stands, that would be if you
 11 were convicted of a sex offence you would have the
 12 software deployed. It is very good software and it
 13 helps our ViSOR teams manage individuals. If people
 14 search for things that indicate they are -- or searching
 15 for risky things, I guess is the best way of saying it,
 16 it surfaces itself to police immediately. So the
 17 monitoring software is very useful but it is only for
 18 those convicted. Now, if it was determined that some
 19 form of civil order was going to be produced, if that's
 20 the road that we go down, it may be that a condition of
 21 that civil order is such. You would, of course, have to
 22 balance all the civil liberty issues that come with that
 23 but it is available but -- well, it is not practical at
 24 the moment.

25 Q. In simple terms, the technology exists to allow for the

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1 those things that may touch upon VFI particularly around
 2 Com Networks, for instance.

3 So how should paragraph (d) be read? I guess that
 4 is more an investment in the intelligence world which,
 5 again, you then have to still link that into your
 6 process.

7 Q. So that's not targeted at individuals --

8 A. No.

9 Q. -- that's targeted at --

10 A. The problem more broadly.

11 Q. -- forum sites where --

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. That is something that exists and that you are telling
 14 us about. Thank you.

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. I think, similarly, you are telling us that that work is
 17 managed by a different NPCC lead?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Would it be possible for us to have some further
 20 information from that lead as to how that work is
 21 relevant to our Inquiry's terms?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Thank you.

24 That brings me to my final topic, which is the
 25 suitability of the current laws and the options for

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1 reform. Could we just go over the page to page 24
2 NPCC000002_0024, please, and paragraph -- so you have --
3 under this, you have included this in your statement,
4 effectiveness of current laws and systems.

5 Sir, for your note, between paragraphs 112 and 118
6 you have made some recommendations and offered some
7 observations in relation to a potential new preventative
8 civil order. We have had some discussion of that as we
9 are going along but we will just draw out some features
10 now.

11 At paragraph 112, again, you agree with something
12 that Mr Emmett has just told us. Effectively, there's
13 no appropriate order to cover the ground at the moment
14 from your perspective?

15 A. No.

16 Q. And I don't need to go through an exhaustive list of
17 examples. There just isn't one?

18 A. No.

19 Q. You say, at 113:

20 "The introduction of an order in circumstances where
21 an individual has not yet been convicted but is engaging
22 in behaviours which are deemed to be higher risk, may
23 benefit law enforcement."

24 You offer this example, of:

25 "The introduction of such legislation would not be
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1 need to be a threshold before such an order is involved?

2 A. I'd probably just stress on the thoughts around orders
3 this is a law enforcement lens before my eyes, not
4 a prevention one, and it's me looking for tools that
5 policing can use for policing to reduce the risk, albeit
6 I think that the orders should be available to be
7 applied for by other agencies if we are looking at
8 prevention.

9 Q. But by the time we are in this territory, we are in your
10 milieu, which is this risk is high and we're in
11 a disruption space rather than an early intervention
12 space?

13 A. Yes, quite.

14 Q. At paragraph 114 you tell us that such an order "would
15 be most beneficial" both if it could prohibit behaviour
16 but also proscribe behaviour, so require particular
17 action to be undertaken. You give an example of
18 engaging with mental health treatment. You make this
19 observation that such an order, requiring that
20 proscriptive action would then take away the need to
21 obtain parental or guardian consent. You are requiring
22 that action.

23 Then at 115, I won't go through all of it, but you
24 draw attention to the fact that conditions that were
25 driving at mitigating online internet digital risk would
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1 novel as similar orders to manage sexual offenders prior
2 to conviction already exist."

3 Where this fits in our system of intervention and
4 risk management, obviously if you are getting to the
5 point where you need a civil order, a conviction,
6 a crime hasn't happened yet but I think you are
7 acknowledging we are getting close to that point at the
8 time we would be seeking to impose a civil order?

9 A. Yes, you know, I would imagine if we're applying to
10 a court for one this threshold is going to be quite
11 significant in it being granted.

12 Q. So this isn't going to deal with all of the early
13 intervention work that we need to do?

14 A. It won't.

15 Q. But this is an extra tool in the armoury?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. But it is something that we don't have at the moment and
18 you draw attention to similar orders to manage sexual
19 offenders. Are you talking about sexual harm prevention
20 orders there?

21 A. Yes, the one that is pre-conviction --

22 Q. SHPOs.

23 A. -- which is a SHPOs net, yes.

24 Q. I think those in fact require a different conviction.

25 For our purposes, you are recognising there is going to
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1 very much need to be part of that order from your
2 perspective.

3 A. *(Witness nods)*

4 Q. I think I should also pick up and emphasise -- if we
5 just go over the page NPCC000002_0025 to paragraph 120,
6 which may be at the bottom of this page -- the caveat to
7 that, which is important I put on the record, is that
8 whilst you advocate for the use of an order and a new
9 order that wouldn't be cost neutral. It would have
10 a cost to law enforcement because if those sort of
11 orders are going to have penal consequences, the police
12 have to detect and enforce breaches.

13 A. Yes, offender management and order management is
14 becoming an increasing demand upon policing within both
15 the domestic abuse setting and, more broadly, around
16 post release from prison. You know, the focus upon
17 offender management now and policing has had to increase
18 and therefore there is a finite resource that deals with
19 that through our offender management. It's the same
20 with the ViSOR, ViSOR is a very good example. You look
21 at people within the ViSOR, the demand within that arena
22 is growing. The number of people who have those orders
23 is growing and we have to manage it. If we don't manage
24 it, it is pointless having the order in the first place
25 and so it would be remiss of me not to say that if we
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1 are going to have these orders available, there is
2 a cost that comes with that.
3 **Q.** There aren't going to be hundreds and thousands of these
4 orders applied for but it is still, nevertheless, an
5 important tool to have in the toolkit for an appropriate
6 case?

7 **A.** Yes, but even if you were to look at -- I know you say
8 there, there won't be hundreds of thousands, but even if
9 you look at the effort that goes into a single domestic
10 abuse protection notice, for instance, that it's not
11 an insignificant amount even for a single notice. So
12 even tens of these notices within a force could have
13 a disproportionate impact on your proactive results.

14 **Q.** I think Jonathan Hall KC's different sort of order but
15 the TPIMs --

16 **A.** Yes.

17 **Q.** -- I think there are no more than half a dozen in place
18 in the country at any time, which gives some idea of
19 scope.

20 I will just finally note that at paragraph 121 you
21 indicate your support for the new offence which is being
22 developed of planning a mass casualty attack. You
23 support that. I don't think I need to ask you any more
24 about it.

25 Thank you very much. Those are all of my questions.
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1 consideration by Prevent may arise, in which case, under
2 the sort of general picture you are presenting, it would
3 be referred off in that direction.

4 **A.** Yes.

5 **Q.** Right. Now, what I'm interested in is what you say
6 nonetheless at paragraph 81, which seems to envisage
7 that, although we have hived this off to a very large
8 extent from Prevent, so you have dealt with Prevent
9 being overwhelmed, you have dealt with -- I do not think
10 there's empirical evidence for this but the assumption
11 that's been made that the Southport attack has led to
12 a very considerable increase in Prevent work. So one --
13 I could understand a point of view that one wants to
14 reduce the burden on them.

15 It could be said that at paragraph 81 you are
16 putting it all back again because you are really
17 suggesting that all of those who come within the VFI
18 cohort or NIEV cohort, wherever we end up, is going to
19 want to be a sort of shadow assessment by Prevent. Or
20 would it be by having a CTP officer present at the
21 reformulated MASH or whatever it is?

22 **A.** Sir, I think your observation is the right one, and I'm
23 thinking on my feet here because my instinct is to say
24 I would need to start flowcharting this out and start
25 putting the demand against it. Let me just think more
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1 Sir, do you have any questions?

2 Questions by SIR ADRIAN FULFORD

3 **SIR ADRIAN FULFORD:** Thank you very much, Mr Jamieson.

4 I have one question and one piece of curiosity I'm going
5 to explore with you, Mr Court.

6 The question is this, could we have paragraph 81
7 please of Mr Court's statement back on the screen, which
8 is page 18 NPCC000002_0018 of the statement.

9 You have very interestingly, if I may say so, set
10 out your four parts, referral assessment/risk,
11 management and intervention and the idea that although
12 current -- none of the current structures would properly
13 deal with it, somewhat re-jigged, reformulated, in your
14 view, they could be made to work?

15 **A.** Yes.

16 **SIR ADRIAN FULFORD:** Am I right in thinking that -- well,
17 I was going to say am I right in thinking that you are
18 envisaging this happening outside of the Prevent
19 framework, and you are nodding.

20 **A.** Yes, sir.

21 **SIR ADRIAN FULFORD:** That's what I thought.

22 **A.** Yes, sir.

23 **SIR ADRIAN FULFORD:** Presumably one of the avenues that
24 would need to be taken is that at the assessment risk
25 stage, it may be that the preconditions for
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1 broadly.

2 **SIR ADRIAN FULFORD:** Would you want some more time to think
3 about this, Mr Court?

4 **A.** If I can do because I'd almost play it through my
5 head --

6 **SIR ADRIAN FULFORD:** Why don't you give us a short answer
7 now but if you felt the need to put this in writing,
8 I am sure we could facilitate it if you have got the
9 time to do it.

10 **A.** Yes, if I can do, sir, I would appreciate it. I think
11 my initial instinct to what you said there is, I think
12 that the process that I'm suggesting goes in place may
13 provide a degree of filter. It may filter out a lot of
14 the inappropriate referrals that come in.

15 I think that in my head I think I'm envisaging that
16 that MASH is going to have a professional looking at it
17 going, "this is nailed on a VFI, let's get it over to
18 Prevent", rather than Prevent being overwhelmed by all
19 these things and going "that's never a VFI". So I think
20 that they would provide a filter and I think that would
21 help with your demand management of it. But I'm happy
22 to -- if I can give that some more thought --

23 **SIR ADRIAN FULFORD:** Could you.

24 **A.** -- and write back to you, then I would appreciate it.

25 **SIR ADRIAN FULFORD:** Now you articulate it in that way,
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1 I can see it, that you're going to have a lot of
2 referrals that end up with an assessment that, although
3 perhaps there is some work that needs to be done with
4 the individual, they don't in fact pose the level of
5 risk that would mean that they should attract the kind
6 of intervention that we are contemplating, and that we
7 have heard evidence that actually the cohort may be
8 relatively small, within a few hundreds, rather than
9 more. That's very helpful. But do take the
10 opportunity.

11 **A.** Thank you.

12 **SIR ADRIAN FULFORD:** The other thing was this: sort of
13 wearing other hats, I have been acutely aware of the
14 backlog in getting device examination and that is an
15 issue that's arisen in quite a stark form in relation to
16 AR in that he was sitting in his bedroom for a very,
17 very long period of time, I think almost undoubtedly
18 visiting who knows how many sites that were completely
19 inappropriate, and then deleting his browser history
20 shortly before he set off to carry out the terrible
21 attacks in July.

22 Given your previous digital role in Manchester, do
23 you anticipate that AI may in due course be able to
24 assist with this in that it does have the ability to
25 carry out certain tasks which take human beings a vast

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1 **A.** Yes, and our -- you know, nationally policing digital
2 teams are stretched with backlogs and devices. However,
3 if you are telling me that you are going to give me
4 information about a high-risk VFI, that's my problem to
5 fix then because of the harm they may present and I have
6 to then prioritise it. That is a problem for
7 a strategic leader in policing to unpick and it does
8 mean that some people within that categorisation won't
9 then get a service -- that's how prioritisation works,
10 of course -- but that's for me to work through.

11 **SIR ADRIAN FULFORD:** Yes, this would take precedence over
12 car ringing or something else?

13 **A.** Possibly, yes, exactly.

14 **SIR ADRIAN FULFORD:** Thank you very much.

15 **MR JAMIESON:** Sir, thank you. Ms Sutherland has Rule 10
16 permission but doesn't want to take it up.

17 **SIR ADRIAN FULFORD:** Mr Court, thank you very much indeed.

18 That has been extremely useful evidence and thank you
19 very much for taking the time to think about it, to set
20 it out on paper, and then come to share it with us. I'm
21 very grateful to you.

22 **MR JAMIESON:** 10 o'clock tomorrow, sir?

23 **SIR ADRIAN FULFORD:** Yes, certainly. Thank you all very
24 much. We will sit again at 10 o'clock.

25 **(4.00 pm)**

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1 amount of time in a very much reduced period?

2 **A.** In short, yes, I think there is an inevitability that
3 the volume of data that (a) the number of devices and
4 (b) the volume of data contained within them is beyond
5 the scope of a human to look at it. There is never --
6 well, I would be cautious about ever removing a human
7 from a process in policing. AI helps us but shouldn't
8 be the decision-maker within it. So there will still
9 need to be a decision-maker that reviews the product at
10 the end. But, yes, I do think there is a role for AI.
11 And there are tools, there are very good tools
12 available. Like anything in technology, it becomes cost
13 prohibitive at a certain point and you also had to be
14 able to -- you also have to have the digital
15 infrastructure within a force to be able to receive such
16 technology. But the broad answer to your question is
17 yes, I think there is a role but I would not remove the
18 decision-maker within that.

19 **SIR ADRIAN FULFORD:** I ask the question because if there is
20 to be a recommendation that with an appropriate
21 threshold, there should be the ability to interrogate
22 devices pre-criminality, one only wants to recommend
23 that if in fact there are then going to be the resources
24 to enable appropriate searches to take place to see what
25 the individual has been looking at.

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1 **(The Inquiry adjourned until 10.00 am the following day)**

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