

Wednesday, 9 September 2026

(9.00 am)

Introductions

SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: Yes, Mr Moss.

MR MOSS: Thank you, sir. Good morning.

This is our second day of seminars and today we are addressing the role of Prevent in managing violence fixation individuals. Sir, with your permission, as I did yesterday, I will introduce now each of our five speakers so that they have a clear start for their speaking slots during the course of today.

Our first speaker this morning will be the Right Honourable Lord Anderson of Ipswich KBE KC. In 2018, Lord Anderson was both made a crossbench peer and appointed KBE for his services to national security and for civil liberties. In practice as a barrister, he specialises in EU law, public law and human rights, taking silk in 1999. His many roles and appointments of direct relevance and benefit to this Inquiry include but are not limited to the following: by appointment to the Home Secretary, Lord Anderson served as the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation between 2011 and 2017; in November 2017, published the following month, December 2017, Lord Anderson reported to the then Home Secretary providing independent assessment on the

1

to his annual reports on UK terrorism legislation, he has authored free-standing reports on how prisons and probation should manage terrorist risk offenders and numerous papers on current terrorist issues. Importantly and as again addressed in our opening statement for Phase 2, in March of last year Mr Hall reported to the Home Secretary in his report, the "Classification of Extreme Violence Used in [the] Southport Attack on 29 July 2024".

Sir, our third speaker joining us remotely today will be Dr Paul Betts. Dr Betts spent three decades as a police officer, retiring in I think March 2023 with the rank of Detective Chief Superintendent, seconded to Counter Terrorism Policing Headquarters. Relevant to this Inquiry's work, his final role in policing was serving as the National Prevent Coordinator for Counter Terrorism Police.

However, also of interest and benefit to the Inquiry, his earlier police roles included work focused on leading partnership approaches to delivering effective interventions with children and families, and that included responsibility for the delivery of the Youth Justice and Integrated Offender Management programme for West Midlands Police from 2013 to 2016.

Dr Betts' post-policing academic roles have included

3

internal reviews conducted by MI5 and Counter Terrorism Police following the four terrorist attacks in Manchester and London of that year. Following AR's conviction, in early 2025, Lord Anderson was appointed by the then Home Secretary as the interim, Independent Prevent Commissioner responsible for providing an independent strategic oversight and review for the functions for the Prevent strategy.

Sir, as you know, we will be receiving evidence in due course in Phase 2 from his successor, Timothy Jacques, who was appointed in March of this year as Lord Anderson's successor.

Of course Lord Anderson produced the report "Lessons for Prevent" looking at the lessons for the Prevent programme from both the murder of the MP David Amess and of course from the Southport attack by AR, and I addressed that report in our opening address in this phase of the Inquiry.

Our second speaker will be Jonathan Hall KC. Mr Hall is, of course, the current Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation and has been in that post since May 2019. In February 2024, he was also appointed as the first Independent Reviewer of State Threats Legislation, reviewing the new offences and powers created by the National Security Act 2023. In addition

2

two years as senior lecturer at Westminster Law School and he's currently an Associate Professor at the Rabdan Academy in the UAE. He is also a current member of the Policing Working Group at the European Society of Criminology and an Honorary Professor of Criminal Justice at the University of Birmingham Law School.

Our fourth speaker today will be Alasdair Roxburgh. Mr Roxburgh is the Legal, Policy and Advocacy Adviser of the Child Rights International Network. CRIN are a human rights organisation focused on children's rights and campaign for a shift in how governments and societies view and treat those who are under 18. I hope Mr Roxburgh will forgive me for not going into the other half of his role with the charity, but of direct interest to the Inquiry is that Mr Roxburgh leads the charity's work on counter-terrorism by looking at how laws, policies and practices impact on child rights.

And our fifth speaker will be Sarah St Vincent. Ms St Vincent is the Executive Director of Rights & Security International and a human rights expert. Her expertise and experience spans not just national security but, also relevant to the Inquiry, technology as well as gender issues. Her previous roles include serving as the director of Cornell's University Clinic to End Tech Abuse, and as a researcher on US national

4

security and surveillance at Human Rights Watch. She has also been a legal project manager at the Advice in Individual Rights in Europe Centre, where she developed expertise in EU law and the European Convention on Human Rights.

So, sir, those are our speakers for today.

SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: Thank you very much.

MR MOSS: Lord Anderson, please.

Presentation by LORD ANDERSON

LORD ANDERSON: Good morning everybody. Good morning, sir.

Can I start by saying on behalf of all those contributing today that while nothing obviously can undo the terrible harm that has been done in Southport and by other so-called violence-fixated individuals, we wish the Inquiry well in finding a solution to the extremely difficult problem it has been asked to solve and we will all try to help as best we can.

I may not use my whole 45 minutes. It is a point that you have probably heard before, sir, from barristers and we end up sometimes overrunning, but most of what I had to say is in my report, "Lessons for Prevent" published last July and I want to be as brief as possible in opening so we have plenty of time for discussion.

What I'm going to do is start with some facts which

5

second.

So, on that theme, can I go to the Prevent duty. It was the first thing about Prevent that was given statutory force in the 2015 Counter-Terrorism and Security Act. Public authorities have to "have due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism".

What is terrorism? Well, in outline, it is the use or threat of serious violence or damage, with a view to intimidating a section of the population or influencing the Government, and for the purpose, crucially, of advancing a political, religious, racial or ideological cause. That's what the law says in the Terrorism Act 2000.

That does not mean that Prevent is limited to people, or the Prevent duty or Channel are limited to people who are already motivated by a fixed political, religious, racial or ideological mindset, and there's a very good reason for that. Anybody who works in this field, and there are many far more expert than me, will tell you that it is much more difficult to, to use a common term, deradicalise people who already have strong fixed ideologies than it is to divert them from a damaging path when, if you like, they are still on a journey.

7

I think go quite a long way to answering the very specific questions that are put to me and I'm going to deal with those facts under three heads. First, the scope of Prevent. Then, a short word about violence-fixated individuals and, thirdly, something about the statistics and then we will get onto the questions that I have been asked, which were largely about the capacity of Prevent to accommodate these so-called VFIs.

So starting with the scope, there are three elements to Prevent in the Government's counter-terrorism strategy, its CONTEST strategy. You can see that the word "ideological" appears in the first one, "Tackling the ideological causes of terrorism", through CSOs, a function that used to be performed by RICU in the Home Office.

Secondly, is the one that we are concerned with, that's "Intervening early to support people susceptible to radicalisation". That is the Prevent duty that is Channel.

Then the third one is enabling people who have already engaged in terrorism, very often imprisoned, to disengage and rehabilitate.

So although the first is explicitly about ideology, the other two are not and we are concerned with the

6

And of course there are different pathways to terrorism anyway. Terrorism is by its nature always political, racial, religious or ideological. There is always that motivation for a terrorist attack, or for the preparation of a terrorist attack. But that does not mean that everybody involved in that is dominated or motivated chiefly by ideology. People are attracted to terrorism by a variety of routes and, as the Prevent Duty guidance very clearly sets out in the last bullet point on that slide:

"There is no single pathway or conveyor belt to being radicalised."

As the guidance says, the factors include:

"Exposure to radicalising influences, real and perceived grievances ... and a person's own susceptibility."

What about ideology? Well, I dealt with this in Lessons for Prevent at 1.27 and following. I think the first point there is that adherence even to a hateful or anti-democratic ideology does not always imply a willingness to commit or support violence in its name. Just to give one example, of the Great Replacement theory, which is the theory that elites are complicit in the replacement by mass migration of European populations by non-white, principally Muslim people.

8

Many of us consider that a pretty disreputable theory but it is held by democratically elected politicians around the world who would never dream of becoming involved in terrorist violence.

It also of course helps to inspire terrorists, such as the man who killed 51 people in the New Zealand mosque attacks whose manifesto was entitled "The Great Replacement". So that is simply an illustration of the fact that you can adhere to an extreme and highly unpleasant ideology without that necessarily qualifying you for Prevent. There has to be some link with being drawn into terrorism.

But then the converse to that is the point I made just now, the pathways into terrorism are not exclusively ideological and I referred there, sir, to in my view a very valuable book by Petter Nesser, the Norwegian researcher, "*A comprehensive study of European jihadists*", and he divides them into categories of which the ideologue is one. In the classic Islamist cell, there will always be an ideological leader but the number of people in that category were outweighed -- was outnumbered by the people who came in through criminal associations, they might be people who had been befriended in prisons because they know how to source firearms, or people who are basically loyal to their

9

recent figures we have, were passed onto Channel and there is a significant burden on Counter Terrorism Police every time people are referred to Prevent.

Then the second phase, once the case has been passed onto Channel, is the Channel panel which is convened by the local authority. There are about 200 of them across Great Britain, though I should say that in Scotland they are not called Channel panels, they are called PMAPs. They first of all have to decide whether to adopt the case that Counter Terrorism Police have referred to them and they don't always adopt. I think 21 per cent falls to about 18 per cent if you are actually looking at adoptions.

They then have to seek consent of the people who have been referred, of course if they are under 18 of course that's their parents. They have to put together a support plan which is a classic multi-agency way of people round the table -- it is always, in my experience, a virtual table -- but there will be people there from education, mental health if called for, of course the police are present and any other relevant agencies, and they will put together a package, which may include, but doesn't always include, an intervention provider. Intervention provider is of course the USP of Prevent. This is the mentor, if you like, the person

11

friends or their neighbours. So there are different pathways in, not all of them ideological.

Just a word about resources because a lot of this discussion on VFIs and how they are to be accommodated focuses quite rightly on what Prevent in its current form can absorb and I just wanted to indicate what in my view are the two main areas where resources are required when people are referred to Prevent.

The first part is when Counter Terrorism Police are brought in to do an initial appraisal of the Prevent referral. The stages are all set out in chapter 1 of Lessons for Prevent, but just to summarise, the Fixed Intelligence Management Unit, which is part of Counter Terrorism Police, have a look at police records. They deconflict, as it is called. There is a gateway assessment by the Counter Terrorism Case Officer, who decides whether there is sufficient to progress the case to more detailed information gathering. That information gathering is also conducted by Counter Terrorism Police, though at the time of the Southport attacker's referrals to Prevent, that wasn't the case; there was a pilot operating in the North West called Dovetail, which that function was performed by a local authority, and it is then passed onto Channel.

About 21 per cent of Prevent referrals, the most

10

who will meet the subject one-on-one, talk to them, try and work out what's motivating them and try to put them onto a different path or encourage them to look at different paths. The best intervention providers are extremely impressive people and very creative in what they do. It is not just a question of talking. I could give plenty of examples of intervention providers who found other useful ways of getting through to troubled people and making some sort of impact on them.

The Channel panel also has responsibility for deciding when to close a case. There is no time limit on how long it may remain open, and then there are post-closure reviews which are required and sometimes they choose to do reviews that aren't required as well.

So that, if you like, is the nature of the burden. The first category of burden falls every time a Prevent referral is made. Of course not everyone gets as far as information gathering but nonetheless the deconfliction is always done. The second is the burden that falls on the Channel panel and therefore on everyone sitting around that table, including the local authority and Counter Terrorism Police.

Well, violence-fixated individuals, I did have a look at the slides for yesterday. I wasn't able I'm afraid to listen to the evidence. But I was interested

12

1 to see that a couple of speakers raised a definitional
2 question here and I hate, sir, to be the pedantic
3 lawyer, but it does seem to me something that I'm quite
4 sure you are going to want to address. Because I'm
5 frankly a little confused about what this phrase means.

6 I will start with a minor point. When I was
7 reporting on Prevent, I was sternly warned off the
8 phrase "violence fixated individual". There was
9 a footnote in my report that explains why. It is
10 because "fixation" is said to have a particular meaning
11 to mental health practitioners which did not reflect the
12 range of those who are fascinated by school massacres or
13 by mass violence or whatever it might be. Therefore I
14 was instructed to -- well, I was not instructed to do
15 anything but I was encouraged to call them
16 "violence-fascinated individuals", which is what I did.

17 So I was a little surprised, sir, to see that in
18 your Terms of Reference that we have gone back to
19 "fixated". Whether that is some change to what mental
20 practitioners think or whether it is left hand and right
21 hand, I don't know.

22 But there is a broader point of definition as well.
23 There is of course a Prevent category which is called
24 "fascination with mass violence" -- sorry, let's get it
25 right. It is 5.4 of my report. You know there is

13

1 not fascinated with any sort of attack or any sort of
2 mass violence. Who knows? Perhaps it might even go
3 into, for example, elements of gang violence.

4 So I don't know quite how that broad interpretation
5 in your Terms of Reference is going to be interpreted.
6 That very much, sir, is a matter for you, but I did just
7 want to draw attention, as I know others have done, to
8 this issue of terminology and the phrase came up
9 yesterday of "non-ideological extreme violence" which
10 seems to conform with the broader rather than the
11 narrower definition.

12 I will just say a few words about this. The first
13 I can't resist. You will remember very well, sir, as do
14 I, Lord Lloyd, the law Lord, very difficult to say,
15 a tongue twister. But as Northern Ireland was -- the
16 troubles were drawing to a close in the mid-90s, he was
17 asked to report on the terrorist threat for the future
18 and whether we needed in Great Britain an anti-terrorism
19 law for the first time. We hadn't had any permanent law
20 until then and he surveyed the threat and he went
21 through the Northern Irish threat, he went through the
22 various types of Middle Eastern terrorism and others,
23 but then he said:

24 "Most significantly of all, perhaps, there are
25 indications that some individuals with fanatical

15

1 a large number, I think about 16 categories into which
2 Prevent referrals are divided, and one of them is called
3 "Fascination with extreme violence or mass casualty
4 attacks".

5 As I say there, persons of this nature have been
6 treated by Counter Terrorism Police as Prevent-relevant
7 since 2019, although there has been significant
8 inconsistency over how they are progressed through the
9 system.

10 That is what I understand, certainly for the
11 purposes of my report, what a violence fixated
12 individual is. But the definition in your terms of
13 reference is on the face of it broader. I think it is
14 "individuals at risk of extreme violence, where ideology
15 is not the primary driver".

16 I should myself probably have been more critical at
17 5.4 of my report where I used both definitions but
18 understood that the broad one is to be understood in the
19 narrow sense that I have outlined. So when I talk about
20 VFIs in the remainder of this report, I'm talking about
21 those people who are fascinated with extreme violence or
22 mass casualty attacks. One could imagine, if one took
23 a broad view of individuals at risk of extreme violence
24 where ideology is not the primary driver, that it could
25 be very much broader. It could include people who were

14

1 leanings or personal grievances are increasingly
2 attracted to terrorist methods."

3 And he predicted that this may come to represent the
4 greatest threat of all in the longest term. I don't
5 know what his sources of information were, and it was
6 a remarkable prediction and it shows that we are not
7 looking at a phenomenon that has only sprung up in the
8 last few years, and indeed Jonathan Hall, who will speak
9 next, has produced an extremely useful report early last
10 year in which he has set out various examples of people
11 who are possibly using a terrorist **modus operandi** but
12 weren't prosecuted, or wouldn't have been, had they
13 survived, prosecuted as terrorists.

14 I tried to set out in Lessons from Prevent what
15 I understood this phenomenon to be about, and I won't
16 burden you with that now but you get the message. These
17 are not all people who have no ideology, far from it,
18 very many of them are interested in lots of different
19 ideologies and, as I say there, it is a phrase actually
20 that was given to me by a CSO on the frontline:

21 "Extremist content intercepts in unpredictable ways
22 unformed young minds experiment with fragments of
23 ideology."

24 All of that rather recalls the former category of
25 mixed, unstable and unclear ideology that used to be

16

operated in Prevent, I thought quite a helpful category. Jonathan disagrees about that but anyway now it is in history, it has been replaced by various much more detailed categories.

Then finally on this, a point made by Ken McCallum, Director General of MI5. I should say incidentally in October 2024 he speaks to the public once a year. In October '24 he spoke about people viewing both extreme right-wing and Islamist extremist instructional material. So it is an example of this idea that VFIs are not necessarily non-ideological; they just don't have a very fixed ideology which is their primary driver.

He made a point last year, which I think is also very significant.

"Some situations," he says, "are clear cut but it is often messier. In 2025 it can be hard to tell in the immediate aftermath of an appallingly violent crime whether the incident is terrorist or state-directed and thus a national security matter, or non-ideological driven by a unique personal grievance, fixation or mental disturbance."

That's something we are all familiar with when there has been an attack. For example, you think of the attack on the Liverpool Women's Hospital and the time it

17

because it would just be too complicated. If anyone is going to cite these statistics I would encourage them to go back to the gov.uk tables and make sure you have taken that into account.

What you are seeing in the year to September '25, so in other words that is the year that encompasses not the Southport attack but the aftermath of the Southport attack and the guilty plea and all the publicity that went with that, we saw a huge increase in Prevent referrals. Prevent referrals had been pretty consistently at 6 or 7,000 for about ten years but they leapt to more than 10,000, up 39 per cent, an even bigger increase in those who are adopted into Channel. So.

The first category you have that first category of burden. The second category of burden applies to the very much larger numbers adopted into Channel. That increase was a good deal greater. Of those who were not adopted into Channel, 61 per cent of the remainder were signposted to other services.

Only 56 per cent of those adopted into Channel consented to support, which I know is something, sir, which you drew attention to in the first phase of this Inquiry, and it seems to me an extremely important factor when trying to work out what is to be done about

19

took to sort out what was going through that person's mind, if indeed it was ever possible to do so.

You can even think of the Southport attack, how perhaps none of us really knew until the plea, and until the sentencing remarks, whether the defendant was going to be sentenced as a terrorist or not. The judge made it clear that the offence was every bit as serious as terrorism but didn't sentence him as a terrorist, though, twist in the tale, he was convicted of one terrorist offence because he had downloaded the Al-Qaeda Training Manual.

So very difficult to distinguish, particularly in the aftermath of an attack, all the more difficult to distinguish when the people are much younger, when they may be many years off being at the stage to even contemplate an attack, when perhaps they are adolescent and lots of ideas swimming around in their heads, how easy is it to say whether they are one or the other? That obviously has significance for MI5.

Right, well, this is a rather dry bit but I think, I hope, a very interesting bit. I have used the statistics that were published in August for the year to September 2025. They are only England and Wales. Some of the statistics are sort of beta statistics. There is a caveat about them. I have tried to ignore that

18

Prevent.

Those are large numbers, very large numbers by Prevent standards. But just for a bit of context, I have put down at the bottom there the number of referrals to child social care in 2024/25 was 632,800. So there is context everywhere.

What are the predominant concerns? Well, VFIs, that is the category, as I said, described by the Home Office as "fascination with extreme violence or mass casualty attacks where no other ideology", that's what I call VFIs; they were 8 per cent of referrals to Prevent, 14 per cent of Channel adoptions.

That compares quite similarly with Islamist extremism which was 8 per cent, one might say only 8 per cent of referrals to Prevent but 12 per cent of Channel adoptions. So they were quite a similar profile.

They are both outweighed by extreme right-wing, which is 20 per cent of referrals, 42 per cent of Channel adoptions. So in all those cases you are seeing higher figures for the adoption than you are for the referral. But dwarfing all of them is what I have called "no ideology". Now that is actually two Home Office categories. One is called "No ideology, other susceptibility to radicalisation identified", and the

20

second is called "No ideology identified", but I have put them together under the banner heading of "No ideology".

I think these figures are important because you sometimes hear the following chain of logic: (1) There has been an increase in VFI referrals; (2) Prevent is over-burdened; (3) therefore removing VFIs will relieve the burden on Prevent.

But these figures indicate that it is more complicated than that, because dominating everything is this great preponderance of people who don't have a fascination of violence or mass casualty attacks but who -- and indeed who have no ideology, and it is true that if you look at the 56 per cent referrals, only 23 per cent of adoptions, it would seem they are being weeded out, probably mostly by Counter Terrorism Police at the gateway assessment, or information gathering, and possibly also by the Channel panels not taking on so many of those cases.

But 23 per cent of a large number is still a large number, and you see that on this slide, which is about Prevent referrals, Channel adoptions and consent rates. I have put them here in absolute numbers so we can see practically how many people we are dealing with here.

The Prevent referrals for -- yes, I should just

21

There have been previous spikes. For example, after the well publicised terrorist attacks of 2017 there was a spike of I think between 20 and 25 per cent of Prevent referrals in the following year which went back down again to its previous level.

We still don't know whether the increase that we saw in the year to 2025 is a permanent shift or whether it is gradually going to subside. But if you break down the adoptions by quarter, you can see that, whereas VFI Channel adoptions were running very low, the last quarter of 2024 before the guilty plea and all the publicity, they shot up, they more than quadrupled for the first half of 2025, and although they reduced a bit in the first quarter that coincided with the school holidays. The Home Office may have more information, I don't know. I can't mention any figures until they have been published but those are the most recent ones that I know about.

Then of those which are adopted, about 66 per cent of VFIs consented. Very often of course it was their parents giving consent because of their age. So slightly higher than the general consent rate which does vary quite a bit by the reason for which they are referred. So the 12 months' total of VFIs adopted into Channel was 152. So I think quite useful just to have

23

explain these figures. So "no ideology", 23 per cent. That means it is 23 per cent of all Channel adoptions. It doesn't mean that 23 per cent of "no ideology" referrals get as far as the Channel panel and they are adopted by a Channel panel; it means it is almost a quarter of all Channel adoptions are "no ideology".

So, looking at the raw numbers, starting with VFI, you have 818 Prevent referrals for VFI, of which 244 were adopted into Channel. This is in the year to September '25, and if you compare the figures for other types of ideology, again, it is quite similar to Islamist extremism. They are 212 were adopted into Channel, that was 25 per cent of Prevent referrals.

Extreme right-wing, three times as many, 756 adopted into Channel, which was 36 per cent of the referrals, and "no ideology", as I say, although the adoption rate was quite low, as we saw from the previous slide, 412 were still adopted into Channel. That's 7 per cent only of the Prevent referrals but it is still a large number and indeed a much larger number of the VFI referrals.

The figures also break down VFI Channel adoptions by quarter. Nobody really knew when I was doing my report whether Southport, if you like, the post-Southport increase in Prevent referrals and adoptions would be a spike or a shift.

22

that figure in mind when one is looking at this question of pressure on Prevent. 152, that is across the 200 Channel panels that are operating in Great Britain.

Profile of VFI Prevent referrals. Well, 49 per cent of them were 11-15 as opposed to extreme right-wing, it was only 45 per cent, and Islamist extremism only 18 per cent. They tend to be a good deal older. In terms of place, there was a higher proportion of VFI referrals from the North-West than there was of other types of referrals. Whether that reflects additional sensitivity about the Southport case I don't know.

And sex, 11 per cent plus of VFI referrals were female. That is more than extreme right-wing; it's less than Islamist extremism. I say "plus" because there are various categories other than male and female. Those who unambiguously are classed as female are 11 per cent. There are some others in respect of which the position is more complicated.

So, with those facts in mind I turn to the questions I have been asked, and the first is: "to what extent is Prevent currently equipped to address non-ideological, fixation-driven violence, and where are its limitations?"

My summary answer is that: "The pathways to ideological and non-ideological violence are not always

24

easy to distinguish, in young and old alike".

I will come back to that.

The second thing I would say is that: "Prevent can be of value in non-ideological cases". I dealt with that briefly at 3.67 of Lessons for Prevent, really on the basis of the various conversations that I had with intervention providers, particularly intervention providers who have special expertise in dealing, for example, with autism spectrum disorder, but not only that.

The limitations, it seems to me that I'm asked about, the limitations on Prevent's ability to address VFIs, I would put in three main categories. The first is the capacity of Prevent that we discussed; second is the statutory parameters; and third there is the skillset of the intervention providers.

I would like to look at those limitations one by one. The first is about demand and capacity and, to put it bluntly, the problem in my view is not that there are too many ARs in Prevent. I wish AR had been accepted into Channel. We don't know whether it would have made a difference but it might have done. The problem, in my view, is there are too many people who pose no realistic threat of involvement in extreme violence, which one might very roughly remember by the 56 per cent figure.

25

particularly easily with people who are fixated with violence, perhaps playing with a range of different ideologies and haven't fixed on anything very clear, be it racial, religious, political or ideological. My sense is that is just about manageable under the law as it stands because you are dealing with people at this prior stage who haven't yet -- you don't have to prove they're terrorists; it is not like Pursue; you just have to prove that they are at risk or they have a susceptibility. But certainly the ambit of the Act could be extended for clarity. William Shawcross has already suggested some different statutory changes which I agree with, which the Home Office I think is committed to making and that is one that could be made at the same time.

Then the mix of intervention providers, I dealt with that in my report. I didn't make a recommendation because I was satisfied that it was happening already. Whether it is happening at the right speed, I don't know.

So my second question was: "Should VFIs be brought within Prevent as a distinct cohort, or managed through a separate statutory and operational network?"

Now, I would quibble slightly with the wording there because ever since, as I mentioned earlier, the letter

27

William Shawcross in his report also thought there were too many extreme right-wing people being referred to Prevent. Well, I don't know about that. But as I recall there, 56 per cent of the referrals are non-ideological and non-VFI, and there are things you can do about that.

I attended training, the training that Prevent referrers get and the training that Channel panels get, and frankly each of the sessions I went to there were two examples. In each session I thought one example shouldn't have been anywhere near Prevent. That was perhaps my subjective view and I would have put them in this category of people without an ideology and, I might add, without any evidence to propensity to violence, both as it happens female. These sessions seem to be very neatly balanced with one male and female, even though, as you have seen, the statistics suggest 90 per cent male.

But there is more you can do on the process, training, mechanisms such as Team Around Schools that help people think more carefully about referrals and the concept of dual referrals. I haven't got time to go into that but it is all in my report.

What about the statutory parameters? Well, it is true that being drawn into terrorism doesn't sit

26

of 2019, it seems to me that people I would define as VFIs, the narrow category of VFIs, have been eligible for Prevent. The practice may not have been very consistent but my recommendation on this was not that anything new should happen, it was that the 2019 status quo, which remained reflected in guidance, should be adhered to and further clarified.

But the alternative put to me is: should the VFIs be managed through a separate statutory and operational network? So the first point I have just made. The second point was that Shawcross referred or recommended that referrals should have an identifiable ideological element. Now the Government accepted all Shawcross' recommendations. Suella Braverman, who was then the Home Secretary, accepted them all. But I think it is fair to say that this one at least has not been implemented on the ground, although undoubtedly there was a lack of clarity over the various bits of possibly not very -- not always very visible guidance and the clear line that was taken in Sir William Shawcross' report.

I go on to say -- so they are currently in is what those two bullet points say. The third one says, it is not ideal but they should remain eligible for Prevent and Channel until something better can be devised. They

28

are capable of being dealt with in Prevent and Channel and the argument of overstretch is diminished when one looks at where the overstretch really comes from.

In relation to the alternative put to me, I would say a bespoke VFI network would bring its own implications. On that I really make two points. The first is that ideological and VFI cases can be hard or impossible to distinguish. You can look at that in a number of respects. There is a wealth of literature, which some of you will be very familiar with, about whether some of these people, for example, who obsess about school massacres do have an ideology. There have been more than 50 attacks worldwide in which the attackers have explicitly drawn support from the Columbine massacres in the United States. There is a thing called "Columbine fandom". Others have equated a sort of school massacre fixation with nihilism which they might describe as an ideology.

There are also concepts like misogyny where the experts are divided, as far as I can see. Experts gave evidence to the Home Affairs Committee in Parliament, the House of Commons, last year, and they disagreed openly about whether misogyny was an ideology or not. I'm not talking about Incel, which thankfully represents a relatively small part of the caseload, but a common or

29

So you can have these neat little categories, "You're VFI", "You're ideological", but I think they rather run up against the reality of uncertainty, the point of course that Jonathan Evans made.

Then finally, dynamically, I'm not sure if that's the right word, but someone who is currently 14 and experiencing unfocused anger and grievance may find a single ideological outlet for it in the future. Very difficult to write them off at that stage and say, no, no, they are plainly a VFI and there is no risk of them progressing into a specific ideology. So that's really my first point.

My other point again is a practical one. Bespoke network sounds great because we can all draw distinctions between VFIs and terrorists, but who is going to be sitting round that table deciding what to do with them? Well, the police are going to be there, the local authority is going to be there; education, health, mental health, family input. It is going to be the same people, isn't it, in reality? There is not an unused cohort of experts in young people who are just waiting to be summoned to deal with this new category of VFIs. People already have these jobs and somehow, to the extent a multi-agency approach is needed, it has to be accommodated with people we already have. Of course you

31

garden misogyny, which I'm afraid is a feature of almost all types of extremism.

So I think conceptually it is very difficult to say "Has this person got an ideology or not?" even if you know all about them.

Then of course practically you often don't know all about them. As you saw in the case of the Southport attacker, there was a range of mindset material there and the guy had been Googling the London Bridge attack. He had expressed -- he had spoken approvingly of the Manchester Arena attack, he downloaded the Al-Qaeda Training Manual. Does that mean he is an Islamist? Obviously not. But it can be very difficult to tell.

It is not just with the young. I sat in a couple of Channel panels where they were looking at older men, men in their 50s. Well, they seemed quite young to me, but they were older men who were alcoholics and nobody knew, until they had dried out, whether they were just extremely unpleasant and violent people who had got hold of guns or were interested in getting hold of guns, or whether as, for example, the killer of Jo Cox turned out to be, they were fully paid up subscribers to extreme right-wing groups. Until the guy had dried out it wasn't possible to talk to them, to assign them an intervention provider or to find out.

30

could put them round a different table and put a separate badge on them, but if you are not very careful, you simply introduce another stage into the analysis, which is the stage of deciding which avenue is the right one. I think there is a real risk it becomes bureaucratic, it consumes time and doesn't really solve the problems that you are trying to solve.

Well, very quickly, my last question: "What legal, governance, resource and public legitimacy issues would arise from expanding Prevent's remit beyond ideological radicalisation?"

I would start with the same quibble: its remit already extends beyond ideological radicalisation. As I said at the start, there is no conveyor belt, many paths into terrorism, and indeed the status quo includes VFIs. As we saw from the 2019 letter, quoted in your Phase 1 report, sir, as it was in my report, and signed by CTP and by the Home Office and basically, and despite William Shawcross' recommendations, not really departed from since, albeit it certainly has not been wide enough known. We have discussed, I think, the issues which could mitigate the difficulties.

But the final point I would make, and I wasn't asked to speak about this thank goodness because it could have taken another 40 minutes, but if you are looking to the

32

1 long-term, I have said I think Prevent is robust enough
 2 to accommodate VFIs as I understand them, at least in
 3 the short-term. Is it ideal? No. I think for a range
 4 of reasons which I go into in my report, it is not
 5 ideal; and for a long-term solution I would like to see
 6 Prevent embedded in a broader multi-agency violence
 7 prevention strategy, as counseled by the Institute for
 8 Strategic Dialogue, the Independent Commission on UK
 9 Counter Terrorism Law, which produced the most
 10 impressive series of chapters on Prevent, and the
 11 Children's Commissioner very recently in her
 12 recommendations of last month. Very easy to say that;
 13 rather more difficult to spell out exactly what it means
 14 in practice.

15 I was delighted, sir, to see in your Phase 1 report
 16 that you propose to give detailed consideration to
 17 restructuring fundamentally the way that our society
 18 handles those who pose a real risk of killing or causing
 19 serious harm to others, including VFIs. If I may say
 20 so, sir, the future does not lie in ever more segmented
 21 groups with their own procedures, their own personnel,
 22 their own little pots of money. We have quite a enough
 23 of that already in our landscape. It varies from place
 24 to place. It is obscure, it is inconsistent and it is
 25 unclear. I think the future lies in a broader front

33

1 in such calculations. Lord Anderson, thank you very
 2 much indeed.

3 Mr Hall, please.

4 **Presentation by MR HALL**

5 **MR HALL:** So I have done quite a lot of reviews on managing
 6 risk and the key principle that I have alighted on is
 7 this point here: "Right information to the Right People
 8 at the Right Time".

9 The example from the review I did of released
 10 terrorist offenders, concerned the Sudesh Amman attack.
 11 He was the guy who was under armed surveillance and he
 12 was shopping for knives, and he began stabbing people on
 13 Streatham High Street. He was a known, very dangerous
 14 person, been released from prison.

15 When I looked at this problem I could see what was
 16 happening, which is that you had a multi-agency
 17 partnership sitting around the table, you had some --
 18 I mean I wasn't there because it was before I started
 19 but I saw a very similar one. You would have a couple
 20 of police officers saying nothing in suits who were
 21 custodians of highly sensitive intelligence, which was
 22 that there was armed surveillance, but the people who
 23 really had the power who could have said "Sudesh Amman
 24 should be back in prison" were in fact not the police
 25 and not MI5, but in fact probation.

35

1 door, something they seem to be able to manage in other
 2 countries, including those I looked at specifically for
 3 my report. Less stigma as you go through it, but more
 4 ability to specialise once you go through it. So if
 5 your problem really is an ideological one then it can be
 6 subject to an ideological, if you like, remedy.

7 Perhaps that would please even Sir William Shawcross
 8 who felt Prevent should be purely ideological. Well, it
 9 has a place, there is a place undoubtedly for
 10 ideological measures within the process. But I would
 11 say behind the big front door, it is counterproductive
 12 and contributes to a low consent rates. If the front
 13 door says "terror" over the top, I would be a bit
 14 reluctant to refer a friend or family member through a
 15 door that said "terror"; I would be a bit more sanguine,
 16 I think, about a front door that was a bit broader.

17 That doesn't help you solve your detailed problem,
 18 sir, but I hope at least it has answered the questions
 19 you have asked me about whether I think Prevent can cope
 20 with VFIs as it is. Thank you very much indeed.

21 **SIR ADRIAN FULFORD:** Thank you very much, Lord Anderson.

22 **LORD ANDERSON:** I'm afraid I wasn't any shorter than --

23 **SIR ADRIAN FULFORD:** No, two minutes over, I think.

24 **MR MOSS:** One of the lessons is that the learned Chair of
 25 this Inquiry does not give allowance for the late start

34

1 This happened because it is a reason to return
 2 someone to prison if you are not of good behaviour, and
 3 for a dangerous terrorist to be looking repeatedly at
 4 knives in shop windows just about falls within the
 5 category of "not of good behaviour", but of course they,
 6 the Prison Service who would have done the recall,
 7 didn't know about the fact that there was armed
 8 surveillance and that he was looking at knives.

9 So that was a really good example to me of when you
 10 have got these high risk situations you often have the
 11 difficulty that the people who have got the right
 12 powers, in this case HMPPS, the Prison Service who had
 13 the power to recall a released prisoner, they didn't
 14 have the information from the armed surveillance
 15 officers who could say "This really dangerous guy is now
 16 looking at knives in shop windows", and they certainly
 17 didn't have it at the right time.

18 So that's my sort of overarching impression from
 19 having done reports on released terrorist offenders,
 20 terrorists in prison and separation centres, most
 21 recently the case of Hashem Abedi.

22 So I'm going to look at the questions that have been
 23 set by the Inquiry, I think probably most from the point
 24 of view of how do you manage the risk? I'm not
 25 a Prevent specialist. I have never done a review like

36

Lord Anderson of Prevent.

I obviously have given you this example but the caveat is that's where the risk has already been identified but I would not underestimate that point. Once you have the identification of someone like AR, who has the power to do something in the real world, who knows the important information and has that information got to the people with the power to act?

So, on the question of identification, my impression from having spoken to Home Office, CTP, MI5 is that you are never going to discover VFIs in the same way as you discover terrorists.

So let me give you an example. It is quite often the case that people who are dealing with potential terrorists will get hold of their devices and they will want to see what is on their devices -- quite a good way of seeing whether or not there is what barrister's know is mindset material which might demonstrate that that person is in fact fantasising about violence.

NDES, the National Digital Exploitation Service, which is part of Counter Terrorism Police, just doesn't have the capacity to look at the phones of people who are in this sort of category. They certainly have the capacity to look at the phones of people who are being looked at as a subject of interest, who are subject to

37

lead to this sort of intervention, I wouldn't have thought so. I would have thought that risks creating a false positive if that's the only information you have about that person, you need more.

Similarly, if you were to try to do some online discovery programme, then finding that someone is looking at gore, would not again be enough to say: well we need to start drilling into this person.

I have referred to a couple of papers here, the Smith paper and the Edison paper. The first study finds that 84 per cent of the US population -- I don't know if there is a UK equivalent -- aged over 13 are true crime consumers, meaning they watch or listen to true crime through any medium; and the other paper says there is a significant overlap in the true crime community with dedicated gore communities, and gore content is frequently shared amongst its members.

As part of preparation for this I went to meet two young people who are currently serving long sentences: one more in the ideological space, one more in the non-ideological space, sort of school shooting type stuff. I spoke with them at length obviously with their consent. I spent two hours with each of them. Really interesting for both of them that gore was an entry point. In fact one of them was keen to try and

39

disruptive action by Counter Terrorism Police, but they don't for this broader set. MI5 has its own statute and it will have its own internal permissions as to when it can share information outside and when it can use its toolbox of special techniques.

International co-operation, it is quite important that there is a reasonably coherent definition of terrorism which means that one country can ask another country for information and the other country doesn't come back and say "Actually, is this really terrorism or is this something different? Is this about school shootings?" You have that at the moment with President Trump drone striking drugs dealers as terrorists. That calls into question terrorism.

Because of resources, because of permissions as they currently are and because of this international co-operation question, which is really important, you are not going to, I think, suddenly be able to push all VFIs into the counter-terrorism system.

If you did try and do what I call a discovery programme, there would be this grievous risk of false positives because someone who carries a knife on a bus, I think as AR did I think, I mean could be a really dangerous person, but I mean whether or not -- who knows how many people carry knives on buses, that should then

38

replicate gore and create their own gore.

Gore is certainly an indication and it is certainly a way in, but on its own it is not enough given the number of people who consume this horrible stuff, and then of course you have the question which you have been looking, I think rightly, about cohort definition and the risk of false positives. Serial killer seems to me to be a violence fixated individual; a repeated domestic abuser could be an extreme violent non-extremist, whatever.

Similarly, there is a risk of false positives if you had a mandatory platform reporting on potential VFIs. Again, if, for example, you could create a domestic law that required tech platforms to report to say the Home Office about individuals where they have consumed a certain amount of gore, it would be very -- or talked about school massacres -- as you know there is a lot of school massacre platforms, communities, many of these people, most of these people I am sure will not go on to carry out an attack, but you would risk a huge amount of overloading of the system, it would simply not be practicable.

I have made a small reference here to the Tumbler Ridge case. That was what happened earlier this year. It turns out that ChatGPT knew this person was attack

40

1 planning, or very, very interested in attack planning
 2 carried out -- went on to carry out this terrible
 3 massacre in Canada. There is a legal case at the moment
 4 because it turned out that high-ups within ChatGPT,
 5 including Sam Altman, were aware of this and decided
 6 this didn't meet their threshold of reporting.

7 So I think you could imagine a situation where, as
 8 part of the developing online regulation, there is
 9 an obligation to report in a sort of, I think what in
 10 terrorism legislation is section 38B which is where you
 11 know an attack is about to happen. But I think that is
 12 possible.

13 But apart from those extreme cases of attack
 14 planning, if you simply put an obligation on tech
 15 platforms it would create too many false positives.
 16 I mean I just added here that one of the problems with
 17 the current online set-up -- and so much of this goes
 18 back to the online aspect -- is that the Online Safety
 19 Act, OSA is arguably too focused on systems rather than
 20 outcomes. In other words, it talks about proportionate
 21 systems to prevent people encountering violent, gore,
 22 terrorist content, but it is sufficient for a tech
 23 platform to have a proportionate system. In other
 24 words, it is almost recognised that a certain amount of
 25 this material will exist. It is not very good at

41

1 individual sitting in a bedsit in Brighton? That
 2 attribution is a real problem, although I think more
 3 possibly could be done here. I have mentioned about
 4 maybe more looking at the really high harm areas. So if
 5 you know that there are Columbine-type -- we know there
 6 are Columbine-type sites. If you know there are Brits
 7 within them, I think having a better view of those seems
 8 like not necessarily a bad idea.

9 There are problems I think with some of the law.
 10 The law is quite old. RIPA, which is the Regulation of
 11 Investigatory Powers Act, it deals with protection of
 12 privacy, but I think that the guidance that has been
 13 issued to investigators means that they are quite
 14 nervous because they are worried about creating
 15 a profile. I have even come across a rule saying that
 16 you can look at an account once but not twice. If you
 17 do, it is a profile.

18 CMA, that is the Computer Misuse Act. If you want
 19 to create a false profile and interact with a computer,
 20 which is what you would want to do if you were
 21 a Government online investigator, then there is
 22 nervousness within some part of the system that this
 23 would amount to a Computer Misuse Act offence. I think
 24 one of the things the Government does need to look at is
 25 to make sure that necessary restrictions on people

43

1 dealing with, and I still don't think we have really
 2 dealt with, apart from actually in Inquiries which
 3 I think are really good at dealing with individual
 4 incidents, are those really high harm situations. In
 5 other words, how do you hold the tech platforms to
 6 account where stuff on their wretched platforms has in
 7 fact radicalised someone and then has arguably led to
 8 an attack?

9 Then what about, if you don't have the tech
 10 platforms having a duty to scan the internet and to
 11 report potential VFIs, what about the Government doing
 12 it? I am interested in the fact that Government doesn't
 13 do a huge amount of scanning of the internet. I was
 14 slightly surprised to find that there is not some sort
 15 of overlord monitoring everything coming in. There are
 16 arguments why you wouldn't necessarily want that. But
 17 equally I was quite surprised by how little scanning
 18 there is. I know the Government is looking at trying to
 19 look more narrowly at particular areas of potential
 20 harm, and there are various programmes running at the
 21 moment. The really difficult thing though is
 22 attribution. In other words, even if you could find
 23 that "White knight 1234/Columbine killer", that is the
 24 handle of the person, was talking about this stuff, how
 25 on earth do you realise that that is a particular

42

1 abusing computer systems don't in fact make it
 2 impossible to do reasonably common sense things, and of
 3 course there is also the cost.

4 On identification, I'm going to assume that there is
 5 not going to be some massive programme of identifying
 6 VFIs, but one will rely on existing mechanisms for
 7 coming to the attention of authorities. So you have the
 8 counter-terrorism investigation, you have Prevent, you
 9 have someone being arrested for one offence and then
 10 when they look in their room they find loads of knives,
 11 flags, whatever.

12 Local police intelligence. Parental signal seems to
 13 me completely vital here. Sorry, "signal" is a slightly
 14 pompous word. What I mean is if a parent is willing to
 15 say something about their child to the authorities you
 16 know there is a massive problem. I don't overstate
 17 that. I say that because when I met the two young
 18 people I have also had a lot to do with their parents as
 19 well -- no, that's not true. With one of them, and then
 20 there was another case where I didn't meet the child.
 21 But it was interesting that the parents were very, very
 22 worried about their child and it was as if their
 23 feeling, which they were willing to articulate, wasn't
 24 sufficiently being captured by the system.

25 As I say, ideally I think, the Government would look

44

1 at some of these high harm sites.

2 So we now come to this question of what are we
3 really looking for? The view that I have come to hold
4 is that identification is more a matter of looking at
5 the individual. So, the sort of person who might become
6 an AR rather than trying to categorise the sorts of
7 material they are looking at.

8 Now I have referred here to academic categorisation
9 of material. If you look at the counter-terrorism
10 academic field, you will find any number of people
11 simply going online, looking at some horrible site and
12 then working out, well, this is white nationalism as
13 opposed to ethnic nationalism as opposed to white
14 supremacism; it is a version of accelerationism, it's
15 transnationalism, it's Satanism, it's nihilism.

16 So there is a whole industry of people who spend
17 their time trying to categorise the sort of material
18 they see and then say: in the light of this material
19 what lessons can we learn?

20 My own view is that this sort of categorisation
21 process is really an adult perspective. It is trying to
22 put order in a rather arid and sterile way, and I have
23 made a reference to the "Key to all mythologies" trap.
24 In other words, it is a sort of arid approach to what
25 is, as Lord Anderson has said, often quite a fluid

45

1 extreme right-wing material was because of
2 an interaction on a mainstream platform where the
3 algorithm was then serving up "Oh, this is the
4 explanation", and the explanation was pretty dark and it
5 was Great Replacement-type explanation.

6 So that does happen, but the other one I went to see
7 it was nothing algorithmic at all; it was simply someone
8 who had developed an interest and was then using the
9 internet as basically a massive search engine, Twitter,
10 TikTok, Google, to try and find and very readily found
11 stuff, and was also using the dark web as well.

12 So one of the problems about just saying this is
13 an online solution and really you can just make it hard
14 for people to find this stuff, is there are some people
15 who really will go out and look for it. Obviously there
16 are some websites, archives, very useful if like me you
17 want to find old copies of policy papers that have been
18 destroyed which also index the whole of the internet.
19 That is something just to bear in mind.

20 So rather than looking at the content as a way in,
21 and this is me not talking with data but quite
22 impressionistically, and I will explain why in a moment;
23 it is increasingly clear to me that they are almost
24 a recognisable group. Internet addled. This is all the
25 internet.

47

1 situation where young people are experimenting and
2 looking at lots of different things; and if they are
3 looking at one thing one day, they will look at
4 something another day, and as has been indicated already
5 and I have come across a case of this sort, someone who
6 was looking at IRA material, extreme right-wing material
7 and Islamist material and school shooting material, and
8 this sort of material quickly becomes out of date.

9 There are trends within the extremist world. For
10 example, you may know about this, but there is a whole
11 thing about making TikTok videos of dancing mass
12 killers. So you find a Brenton Tarrant, a whole stream
13 of this. People then appear on the screen, they set it
14 to music. One of the young people I spoke to, that was
15 what they were doing. In fact, before they got even
16 deeper into attack planning was creating these TikTok
17 videos. Although, like I think Lord Anderson and
18 others, the Columbine theme is really persistent.
19 I just wouldn't understate just how important that is.

20 Be careful I think about -- when we are thinking
21 about content, be careful about this idea of algorithmic
22 radicalisation. It is quite a trendy thing amongst
23 academics and people talk about it. It certainly
24 happens. In one of the cases of the individuals I went
25 to speak to, it was clear that his first encounter with

46

1 This sort of weird stuff does not happen. The
2 Columbine stuff, you don't see people demonstrating on
3 street corners about it. It is an online thing. The
4 isolation thing is absolutely central. I noticed that
5 Dr Irani yesterday -- I did watch some of her
6 evidence -- talked about this: isolated young people who
7 are reaching adolescence, they may have got through
8 primary school, they get into secondary school, they are
9 trying to create a sense of meaning and purpose in their
10 lives, they are isolated, very often because they are
11 autistic. Again, certainly my experience, when I talk
12 to Counter Terrorism Police, it is almost as if "Oh my
13 word, it is just another one like that" with autistic
14 spectrum disorder. I need to develop this a bit
15 further.

16 But the group of people, the sorts of people, I mean
17 AR had many of these features; Nicholas Prosper, the one
18 who carried out the attack, the killing in Luton. So
19 many. I invite anyone looking at the BBC news covering
20 all of these attacks. It is extraordinary how many
21 people meet this profile. So that's why the way in,
22 I would suggest, is not through the material, which
23 changes, it is quite hard to read, but by looking at the
24 sorts of people who need the support and potentially the
25 intervention and the risk management.

48

1 Now, that's why I think I was rather attracted --
 2 I heard what Professor Cassam said yesterday about his
 3 idea of NIVE. So you have a non-ideological violent
 4 extremist, rather than the Government's latest iteration
 5 which I think is non-ideological extreme violence. It
 6 is better to have an extremist, because you are putting
 7 the emphasis on the person rather than trying to
 8 categorise the violence, which I think is difficult.

9 So what about the autism question? There is
 10 a problem if you look at the literature because -- and
 11 I first spoke about autism and young people and
 12 terrorism as it happens, but it equally applies to VFIs,
 13 in 2019. I remember speaking to the National Autistic
 14 Society because I was nervous about not getting this
 15 right, because if you look at the literature there is
 16 a huge amount of "You mustn't stigmatise". There are a
 17 lot of papers, simply people reviewing previous papers,
 18 and they all say "Well, there's no evidence and we must
 19 be very careful not to stigmatise." Very important not
 20 to stigmatise, that's true. But anecdotally in my own
 21 experience is it is incredibly central to this cohort of
 22 people.

23 Let me give you a quote from the Children's
 24 Commissioner's very recent report which I have cited in
 25 the annex. The Commissioner quotes from a practitioner,

49

1 of them will assess terrorist risk and consider both the
 2 harm from the person as well as the person. It is
 3 particularly important that awareness is raised in the
 4 health sector."

5 And the impression you got from the Threshold's
 6 review is that when people see autism it makes them
 7 often worry about it. Are we miscategorising someone?
 8 Are we stigmatising someone? I think the honest answer
 9 is in fact if someone has autism, if you don't give them
 10 help I think you may be stigmatising in practice even
 11 though it doesn't feel right to do it.

12 That seems to me really, really important. I have
 13 constantly tried to challenge Counter Terrorism Police
 14 and the Home Office: could there be statistics on this?
 15 One of the problems about getting statistics on autism
 16 is that so much autism is suspected but not diagnosed,
 17 and it is very difficult to get an appointment with the
 18 Child and Adolescent Mental Health Services to do the
 19 diagnosis. Quite often a Prevent referral could -- or
 20 getting into counter-terrorism could give you an access
 21 to a doctor which you couldn't -- in other words it
 22 bumps you up the waiting list. But it is quite hard to
 23 get robust statistics. But I would really encourage as
 24 broad a way of capturing this. All I can say is my own
 25 experience is it is almost monotonous the number of

51

1 and this is the first quote from the practitioner:

2 "A child may have a neurodevelopmental profile of
 3 ASD. They get bullied at school so they kind of isolate
 4 themselves from school, but we know that adolescents,
 5 you know, they are coming to that period when they are
 6 seeking independence, their peers are important to them
 7 so they find what they can't in school, they find
 8 through an online community."

9 So that is a psychology practitioner with experience
 10 working with children referred to Prevent. Absolutely
 11 spot on. Both of the people I spoke to at length was
 12 exactly that profile.

13 Why does this make a difficulty? I was looking at
 14 the Government Threshold review, which is a review into
 15 Prevent. I think it is one of the papers you have:

16 "Mental health was one of the most significant
 17 factors which could affect and potentially skew
 18 decision-making. Some practitioners and frontline
 19 professionals were more likely to dismiss or not
 20 consider Prevent referrals when mental health concerns
 21 were a factor."

22 I think here it is using mental health to include
 23 autism:

24 "Practitioners need to be clear that Prevent should
 25 work with safeguarding and mental health services. None

50

1 people who seem to have this profile.

2 So the answer is rarely I think ideological
 3 deprogramming of the ideology because the ideology can
 4 be a bit random, but you need to work out, and
 5 psychologists working in Government are quite good at
 6 this, what is the need that this online interaction is
 7 fulfilling for the individual? And as I say, the need
 8 it is usually fulfilling is the need for meaning,
 9 purpose, friendship by very, very isolated people.
 10 I won't mention the EGR-R is just the risk assessment
 11 tool but I think he talked about that yesterday so
 12 I won't talk about that now.

13 Management. I have two slides, so I can go a bit
 14 slower. So for management, there is this phrase which
 15 sounds a bit jargony, but I think it is quite useful
 16 one: the need to own -- there needs to be a body,
 17 a person who owns the risk. In other words, the person
 18 who is saying: at the end of the day, all of these
 19 people are chatting, but I have to be the one who does
 20 something and actually steps up and makes sure that
 21 a decision is taken. Because as we all know it is very
 22 easy to say it is the other person's problem, but
 23 someone has to own the risk.

24 My own -- after my seven years of doing this job --
 25 I think the police are best at holding this risk but

52

1 they need a basis to intervene. So what do I mean about
2 that? If you say to the police "We have this person who
3 is a risky individual," it is quite hard for them -- for
4 the inspector, to assign a constable and sergeant to do
5 something. Why are they doing it? They have calls
6 coming in about crimes, they have to solve things. So
7 if you give the police a basis for looking at a person
8 and for managing their risk, that is really valuable.

9 One example of that, if someone has come out of
10 prison is they are on a licence, and if they are
11 a terrorist and they have come out on a terrorist
12 licence then the police may have some sort of role
13 there.

14 If they are under an order, so a Serious Crime
15 Prevention Order or a Youth Diversion Order, which is
16 the new measure that's coming in under the -- has come
17 in under the Crime and Policing Act, if there is a civil
18 order which says "The police have the right to check
19 your phone" because the order says you must surrender
20 your phone on demand and you must use certain monitoring
21 software, or you are not allowed to use certain sites,
22 then the police have the right to go onto your door,
23 knock on it and say: "Can I come in please, right,
24 I have this basis now, can I come and see your phone."
25 That gives them the right to get involved. The one that

53

1 wouldn't it have been amazing if a police officer had
2 been able to look round the door, because I think they
3 saw -- knives were there, similar with Nicholas Prosper.

4 So that ability to pop your head round the door is I
5 think really good for the police but they do need
6 a basis to do that. It is never going to work that you
7 just say, "Well, Dixon of Dock Green is going to go
8 round, look at all the likely customers." That doesn't
9 work.

10 Multi-agency, I don't think I need to justify why
11 you need multi-agency because obviously there are lots
12 of components to this. Potentially housing. Almost
13 certainly mental health or autism, schooling et cetera.
14 So it is obviously going to have to involve some
15 multi-agency response.

16 When I did my report on MAPPA, what I found was
17 that -- so this is the multi-agency public protection
18 arrangements to do with released terrorist offenders
19 effectively, but it also applies to sex offenders and
20 murderers and things like that -- is that it could
21 become a little bit, "Right, it's the 11th of the month,
22 we ought to sit round and have our discussion." "Right,
23 what have you got?" "Okay, I have got a great bit of
24 information here." "Fine. Okay when shall we meet
25 again?"

55

1 I'm particularly keen on is what's called part 4, which
2 is the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008. These are the
3 notification provisions.

4 So if you come out of a terrorism sentence of over
5 two years, you have to notify your vehicle, and lots of
6 other things, your bank account. They have expanded the
7 list. Your address. But what it does, it allows the
8 police, and there is a body of police called the Part 4
9 Monitoring Team in London. They will have different
10 regions with Part 4 Monitoring Teams. It is called
11 NOMs, I think. It allows them to go and knock on
12 someone's door and say "We have this duty to make sure
13 you are complying with your obligations, tell us about
14 which phone you have got," for example. It could be
15 quite important if you are talking about one of these
16 internet addled people. You can ask to see the phone.
17 If the person doesn't provide you the phone it is
18 an offence. That gives you the basis to intervene
19 particularly in a high risk situation. If you are
20 worried that a person is becoming obsessive then you can
21 arrest them. Then you can obviously go in and search
22 their phone compulsorily, but it also allows you to go
23 and look round the door.

24 The thing that really struck me about the pictures
25 from I think it was Nicholas Prosper and AR as well, is

54

1 And it wasn't very responsive when there was
2 a sudden spike in risk, and particularly if, lets say,
3 Counter Terrorism Police have some sensitive
4 information, it was quite difficult to feed that into
5 the system. So the recommendation that I made, and it
6 was taken up, was to create more responsive call groups.
7 So when you have a high threat situation, and let's say
8 there is intelligence held that someone is on
9 a particular platform where there is real concern but
10 that intelligence can't be shared, that you have a small
11 security cleared part of that multi-agency system who
12 can receive the intelligence and also act quickly. They
13 can call a virtual meeting. Teams et cetera, are
14 fantastic for this. It really means there is no excuse
15 not to be able to respond in live time.

16 Intervention providers; in preparation for this
17 I did meet some intervention providers and no doubt the
18 people I met, provided by the Home Office for me to
19 meet, were particularly good. But I thought they were
20 particularly good and I think that there is real
21 potential strength in the system here. The thing that
22 they are I think having to struggle with now is that in
23 the past, intervention was about you had
24 an ideological -- so for the Islamist threat an
25 ideological deprogrammer, might be an Imam or former,

56

someone who would discuss "Do you really hate the British state? Isn't it better ..." All that sort of stuff, trying to bring them out ideologically, and you would have a practical mentor, someone who'd say: "Look, this is where you ... hey, you want to get a job? Have you thought about this aspect, that aspect?"

It is very different where you are dealing with someone who is really spending eight or nine hours online. Remember many kids come into this through gaming. They will be gaming until 3 or 4 at night. 12 hours is not an abnormal thing. So most of their lives and most of their interactions, and if you are isolated perhaps all the interactions you have are online. Just do not understate how important that is.

So why are the intervention providers important? They obviously can discuss with this person, with the person who has been identified under Prevent or wherever, they can discuss in a way that probably that person can discuss with no one else. If you think about it, imagine they are a member of some weird school shooting online group. They are not going to say, "Oh I am slightly worried about this" to people on that group. Their parents could even be terrified of them, as in AR's case, or their parents are a bit worried to trespass because they are quite happy that their unusual

57

a really important function.

In terms of -- what I mean by whatever works -- this is another point about terrorism. Unlike normal crime, where it tends to be reactive, someone commits a rape or a murder, you prosecute. For terrorism, and the same would be true for national security and state threats, you use what you call a disruptive model. In other words, once you have identified the risk you do whatever it takes to try and prevent that risk from eventuating.

So there are all sorts of potential options, what practitioners call tool in the tool box. There has even been a programme called Cyber Prevent where they go to young people who are at risk of becoming hackers and say: "You are actually going to get a really bad sentence, you could be extradited to America. Have you thought about white hatting? You are really quite techy. Why don't you go to university?"

And it has been quite a successful programme. That might actually be quite relevant to some of these internet people that we are talking about. Getting a GP. I found it very striking that some people who clearly ought to be at least in front of a GP don't even have a GP, and they don't know how to do it and their parents aren't, for whatever reason, able to take them to the GP. So it is possible, and I think you heard

59

child has found some sort of meaning online. So they may not discuss it at all. The intervention provider may be the only person in the world that they can actually talk about this thing with. I found that a very impressive point, that if the point is to try and move someone away from finding so much meaning online in these groups, to have at least one person that they can talk to.

The grandma point. I was impressed by one of the intervention providers. I said: "How do you do it? How do you manage to get these people who are online all the time, they might meet you for an hour and then they'll go back online, it's like 'Yada yada, I spoke to the Feds, it's all a stitch-up.'" And she said to me: "What I do is I say: you are talking about how you would want to slice people up and online gore and all that sort of stuff. What would your grandma think about that?"

Apparently that is a really effective technique, and it is just to try and get people to relate with what they talk about and ideate online, and believe me they do ideate online, "I can't wait to do this, I'm going to do this to my school mate or whatever, to real people."

So I thought that the intervention providers, even though it is really challenging because they are dealing with people whose main lives are online I think fulfil

58

from the Clinical Consultancy Service, to get a way into the health service and then ensure that a GP will be made available. That could then lead to treatment or at least diagnosis of autism spectrum disorder or PTSD.

Then ultimately, where you are dealing with a risky individual, there is the possibility of arrest. Don't underestimate the importance of arrest. It means you can go into someone's room and their house, potentially their phone if it is justified to obtain evidence. That could be for a criminal offence, but if you are a risk manager, you are not really thinking "Oh, I'm really worried so much about," I don't know, "the benefits fraud of this person." You are thinking: the real benefit here is that I can arrest that person and as long as it is a lawful arrest I will take that opportunity in order to disrupt the risk and stop it from happening. Then you have all the civil orders that could potentially be made -- youth Diversion Orders. Criminal Behaviour Orders -- which can carry online device restrictions.

So if you look at the modern orders for terrorist offenders -- and this would apply I think equally for your VFIs -- they contain a great big list of potential restrictions on internet use and the benefit of that is that it allows the police the opportunity to go in and

60

1 check and if that person is looking a bit risky, then it
2 gives them the opportunity to arrest them if they have
3 breached it, which they often do.

4 But, this requires quite a lot of expertise, and
5 when I met the intervention providers, one thing that
6 I really got was that they feel quite isolated, and when
7 I have spoken to people working in this sort of field
8 I got the sense that they just need more of a sort of
9 a playbook setting out: this is what you can do in these
10 situations.

11 Sentence types if convicted. A theme that I picked
12 up is that there are cases where police will take
13 someone to court, they will be prosecuted and convicted
14 but they are getting unusual sentences.

15 So counsel is saying, as counsel will: first
16 offence, or he's a troubled young man, important not to
17 stigmatise him too much, please don't send him to prison
18 fine. That is all actually right and justified, but
19 then at the point when you would want some sort of
20 restrictive order, so if it is a Youth Rehabilitation
21 Order plus something else on top, at that stage, I'm
22 told, magistrates and Crown Court judges aren't picking
23 up the signals that that person is actually a danger and
24 would benefit from the greater restriction that you
25 would get under one of those orders.

61

1 is a paper by Dukic and various other people, really,
2 really interesting where they tested the different
3 chatbots and they tested them in really subtle ways.
4 You know, if you want to get round the guard rails you
5 can say "Write a poem about building a bomb", et cetera,
6 et cetera. But also "I'm a historian trying to work out
7 how to build a bomb, "I'm a lawyer who" et cetera, et
8 cetera. Some chatbots are really rotten and bad, and
9 I understand why the Government is looking at regulating
10 some of the AI aspects, I really do, but some are
11 particularly good. Shout out does have to go to Claude.
12 Really impressive.

13 "Claude was the only model," I'm quoting now, "...
14 to consistently de-escalate conversations while
15 recognising broader radicalisation pathways, highlighted
16 the potential for conversational AI to support
17 prevention and intervention efforts. This suggests that
18 conversational AI systems can, under certain conditions,
19 do more than avoid harm. They may also support
20 secondary and tertiary prevention by recognising
21 vulnerability and guiding users towards safer forms of
22 engagement."

23 Since we are talking about online people, I wonder
24 about both the negative and the positive. In the sense
25 of you might have a list of prohibitions, what you can't

63

1 Now, that's just I think a question of ensuring that
2 when criminal cases, if AR had come in front of
3 a criminal court, first of all that the risk is
4 articulated, and it may also be that you should have
5 some judicial training, so that judges are trained and
6 acutely aware of the risk of these sorts of people. And
7 so when counsel is saying, "By the way, we would like to
8 have this order as well," assuming it is justified and
9 lawful and proportionate et cetera, the judge is not
10 going to go "No, no, no there's no point."

11 I have recommended a mass casualty attack planning
12 offence. That was one of my recommendations after
13 Southport. I have been told that that is now getting
14 its way through the system, which is good.

15 The final thing I would say about this is don't
16 discount some tech solutions. I haven't really been
17 able to -- I constantly talk about this with
18 practitioners: look, if this person is getting most of
19 their meaning online, would a solution come online? It
20 may actually be -- so for some autistic people
21 communicating face to face with someone, there are too
22 many signals, whereas communicating online is more
23 straightforward and simple, it feels less noisy, it
24 feels more comfortable. Could you have, if you like,
25 a de-radicalising chatbot or something like that? There

62

1 go on to on your device, but also something positive,
2 that if you are going to use the internet you must
3 search via Claude, for example. Chatbots are basically
4 becoming search engines and it seems to me the
5 opportunities are quite strong.

6 Now, this is sort of me just hypothesising, but I do
7 think if you are dealing with an online problem, online
8 solutions shouldn't be discounted.

9 Then, finally on the impediments towards management,
10 initially I was wondering well what about a Fixated
11 Threat Assessment Centre. These people who haunt
12 the King and celebrities and Tom Cruise; that works
13 because royalty and celebrities tend to gravitate
14 towards certain locations like London, so it is possible
15 to have a central unit. But this is a geographically
16 widespread issue, so you are bound to be relying upon
17 local partners in your multi-agency thing. I just don't
18 think that it would be feasible to have one national
19 unit that was responsible for managing all of the people
20 who could be in Scotland and Northern Ireland and --
21 I don't know if you are looking at Scotland and Northern
22 Ireland -- but anyway, Northumbria and Devon.

23 New programmes. This is something I have come
24 across, particularly when I have done prison stuff is if
25 you say, right, we are going to create a completely new

64

1 system it takes ages and the people who are at the very
2 top will be really scared, that they will be the ones
3 who received information and then didn't act on it, or
4 you will be very scared that you had the information and
5 didn't pass it on. I have seen evidence of gross --
6 just like downloading of huge amounts of information
7 which is no good to anyone, just because people say
8 "I don't want to be the one who doesn't pass it on," and
9 it can lead to over-complexity.

10 So I'm worried about the idea of a completely new
11 programme. Also, I'm worried about this whole of
12 society thing. I mean it is often said, I think rather
13 flippantly, that this is a whole of society problem and
14 in a moral way it is a whole of society problem, but it
15 is not as if there is a huge amount of capacity. Local
16 authorities have not got lots of people just waiting, as
17 Lord Anderson was saying, on tenterhooks to help these
18 people, to go into their houses to sort their lives out.
19 Local authorities are dealing with people with the most
20 extraordinary needs, who need to be hoisted into bed or
21 need four people because they have such complicated
22 mental health problems. I think you have to be
23 realistic about it, and I do think you need to think
24 about competing priorities and queue jumping.

25 When I was looking at I think MAPPA, I was very
65

1 it. When you talk about vulnerability you mean
2 susceptibility. I think, sir, you have already
3 identified this point about this risk too, so I won't
4 develop that.

5 Youth Offending teams, beware the point about lack
6 of clearance and local processes. By this I mean, if
7 you do have -- which you might have in a VFI case, if
8 you do have sensitive information, then you have to have
9 someone who is capable of receiving it with the correct
10 clearances.

11 **MR MOSS:** I am so grateful.

12 **MR HALL:** Can I make one final point?

13 **MR MOSS:** Could we just for one moment, just for a technical
14 reason we do need to take a break, and if I could ask
15 you to rise sir, forgive me.

16 **(10.35 am)**

17 **(Short break for technical reason)**

18 **(11.11 am)**

19 **SIR ADRIAN FULFORD:** Yes, Mr Moss.

20 **MR MOSS:** Thank you, sir. I'm very grateful. I apologise
21 for the disruption. That issue has now been resolved.
22 It takes our technical people with all of their
23 expertise 15 or 20 minutes to set up a remote speaker
24 like Dr Betts. So if we may, I will return to what I
25 think was the last minute or so of Mr Hall's

67

1 conscious that local housing providers were being
2 pressurised by Counter Terrorism Police: could you find
3 this person a place on the housing list so they are not
4 just living in an approved premises, they can go into
5 some stable housing? But if I was a member of the
6 public, I might go, hang on a second, why does this
7 bloke get to jump the housing list because he has
8 committed a terrorism offence? I think you have to be
9 thoughtful about how it works with the rest of society.

10 Online is definitely central. I think particularly
11 intervention providers need more support. I mean when
12 I quiz them about this, they are driving around the
13 country I think doing great jobs, but they don't really
14 have some sort of -- some location where they have --
15 the Home Office are trying to create some sort of centre
16 of expertise for online de-radicalisation but I think
17 they need much more support.

18 Youth management, so if you are talking about -- can
19 I just have two minutes?

20 Youth management, too focused on welfare not risk on
21 the child. I have a rule when I write reports, I never
22 use the word "concern" and I never use the word
23 "vulnerability", because they are just double-headed
24 dragons. What you are really talking about by "concern"
25 is: I have raised an issue, I don't want to deal with

66

1 presentation just at the beginning of the plenary
2 session.

3 So Dr Betts, thank you for joining us remotely, if
4 I can ask you now to give us your presentation.

5 **DR BETTS:** No problem, can I check you can hear me, Mr Moss?

6 **MR MOSS:** We can, thank you.

7 **Presentation by DR BETTS**

8 **DR BETTS:** Thank you so much for giving me the opportunity.
9 I apologise that I can't be there in person from my home
10 here in the UAE, but a small medical problem prohibits
11 me flying at the moment. So there we have it.

12 I want to put a few caveats on the limitations of
13 what I can say and what my expertise extends to, such as
14 it is in this space.

15 I guess the first thing to say is I will touch on
16 a few areas today that are definitely outside of my
17 field of expertise. There are people that are far
18 better qualified than me if the Inquiry wanted to speak
19 to people with relevant details, and I'm pleased to hear
20 that you have engaged a number of people in those areas,
21 such as forensic psychology and things that are not my
22 field.

23 I guess most of this -- the reason you have asked me
24 to speak to you is based on my kind of long experience
25 leading systemic change within the counter-terrorism

68

division. I did that from 2017 to 2023, as you said in the introduction, but it extends beyond that actually into multi-agency partnership spaces, especially around dealing with areas such as Multi-Agency Safeguarding Hubs, Early Help offers, and I chaired a Youth Offending Board for a number of years.

So, I think I'm quite well placed to be able to speak to you about some of those issues from a kind of strategic and operational perspective rather than necessarily an academic one.

The other thing I just wanted to say and note on the record really is that I retired in March 2023 from policing. So, although I have kind of kept an eye on these matters and I'm grateful to people like Lord Anderson and Jonathan Hall for their work, that I still read and keep a passing interest in, I have been outside of the security space now for sort of three and a half years. Some of the things I have mentioned I'm aware there have been progress on, I don't know whether that progress has gone far enough and fast enough, and again others would be in a better position than I to comment.

What I would like to say from the outset really is that the -- my overwhelming impression and when I speak to anybody in an academic setting or anywhere else about

69

account of these four areas. So when I describe the conceptual framework, which is an academic phrase, this is what I describe.

There are four things that need attention. So how do you identify a case? That is very obvious but Jonathan has spoken before me about that. The second area is how do you assess a case? So what does that look like. The third point I have called "interventions", Jonathan called "case management". You could use either, but it will become clear and obvious when I speak to you about what I mean by that. And then the fourth area which I think often attention isn't paid to is actually how do you close a case? What happens when you say we are done, we think we have mitigated risk and we can all move forward?

So they are the four areas that I'm going to talk about today. There is though a consistent problem and this is one about data. It's been very obvious to me from the first two speakers where some of these gaps lie and I would just like to raise it as probably the central kind of thread or central theme of what I want to talk to you about. I don't come at this as a kind of stuffy university professor that likes to talk about data. I was talking about this when I was sat in Scotland Yard and other offices in London talking about

71

preventing violence or countering violent extremism, is that the biggest hallmark for me and the biggest takeaway for me is the level of complexity involved. So it is a really complex issue. I think both Jonathan and Lord Anderson's speeches this morning have alluded to that.

There is though, I think, a conceptual model that just helps you arrange your ideas and recommendations and I found when I was kind of sat in the chair for the years that I did that, that being able to talk to staff, stakeholders and others using this type of conceptual model I'm going to talk to you about today, just helps me solidify what a very, very complex system might look like and actually perhaps offers a route through. That was the main purpose of what I wanted to speak about today.

Could I have the next slide please.

Okay perfect, so I will also note here, I have four themes and actually both Jonathan and David I think have spoken about some of these areas. So if I have points that are duplicative, I won't expand on them other than perhaps to reference them. We have all kind of spoke about this, so to save time.

But there are four key areas. Again, in my experience, any system that is re-designed needs to take

70

this.

There are significant gaps in our understanding of the risk in this area and outcomes in this area and how this might be addressed, and one of the key challenges I think for UK Plc and the Inquiry that you are Chairing, sir, is how you are going to sort of navigate a way through this problem, when nobody can really describe the problem to you in an adequate way because there is data absent and I will explain what I mean by that.

Can I have the next slide.

So on case identification, I have kind of just called this slide "The radar works?" You know, what seems fairly obvious to me from, again, now the outside looking in is that since 2017, the sort of great British public seem pretty well attuned to be able to spot risk. So it seems more often than not, when we have a terrorist arrest or conviction or another act of violent atrocity, there is often a Prevent footprint in that case. I will talk about the data problem in a moment because nobody can tell you how many cases are in that space, but it feels that anecdotally at least there is enough kind of information available to suggest that actually people are quite good at spotting something unusual, let's describe it as that.

72

Jonathan said about it feels like a high bar to refer a child into this as a parent. I would agree with that. I think the biggest number of referrals by sector come from education and that's been the case for many years and I would actually extend Jonathan's idea about it is a high bar for a parent to refer a child into Counter Terrorism Policing; I would say it is a high bar for a teacher to refer a pupil they have a reasonable relationship with, and will have had for no doubt a number of years, into Counter Terrorism Policing.

So it feels to me that where people are raising flags, you know, the state really needs to pay attention to that, and I think this is where, you know, at different points that attention has perhaps not has been as robust as it may have been.

So this leads us of course to the question of ideology and I don't again need to rehearse Lord Anderson's views about ideology and violence-fascinated or fixated individuals.

There are two key points at the bottom of that slide where ideology does matter in a practical sense. I was drawn to the sentencing remarks of the judge in the AR case that says actually it doesn't really matter whether it is ideology or not in terms of the material impact and violence. That was certainly something that I had

73

those days DE, domestic extremist, relevant.

So they are kind of applying an ideological test when an ideological test is not necessarily, or should not necessarily, be a bar to intervention in case adoption. I read the Phase 1 report and saw Sara Skodbo's and Nik Adams' letter. Obviously I worked with both in my time. A view at a policy level was "Prevent need to pick this stuff up", but actually operationally on the ground there is, or there was, a significant problem around cultural legacy that needs to be unpicked and needs some strong leadership.

Just a point on data. So one of the things that, when I was sat in the chair again that struck me, was that if we got referrals from family or if we got referrals that were repeated and especially from the same source, that felt to me, you know, when I was there, as something that we should be paying greater attention to. And I was pleased to see again when I read Phase 1 that that felt like it had trickled through maybe after I left that people were actually paying better attention to those things.

But what I'm going to just highlight the data issue here for you, is that's based on anecdote. That's based on people within counter-terrorism, HQ and so on, receiving emails saying "This has happened in a town or

75

felt long before that and certainly in my tenure tried to encourage our staff to take that view too, that if you are concerned about somebody it was right and proper that they were identified and put into the system.

The challenge that you have in not having them in Prevent of course or in Channel, and we will talk about this as we go, is that there isn't a plan B. So there is nowhere else really to host these people. So when I used to speak to chief constables about this, they would say to me: "Paul, if you don't have them in Prevent, I haven't got an answer for you about what I'm going to do with them."

There is a challenge around that that is linked very clearly to the idea of ideology and whether Prevent should be preserved for ideological matters as Sir William Shawcross recommended.

The second point I think is one about like a culture of -- a legacy -- a cultural problem really exists within Counter Terrorism Policing. And again progress undoubtedly will have been made on this with the things that have happened since I left, but there was -- it was a constant concern of mine that one of the ways that counter-terrorism officers are able to put work down, to move work away and get on with other things is by making this assessment that things are no longer CT, or back in

74

city around the country," and "Oh, you know, they were in Prevent and they were referred by their family." And it struck me that there were a number of these incidents that were significant and meant that we needed to pay better attention to that.

But that attention is paid based on anecdote and case study, not on any empirical basis. So I didn't see, it may now exist, as I say, in places that I no longer have access to, anybody could tell you whether those things were important. They feel important but to build a system based on case study and anecdote is not the correct route through this, in my opinion.

Next slide, please.

Okay. Case assessment or risk assessment. So this is -- again, there are far better qualified people than I to speak about this but, from an operational perspective, this really sits in the heart of the problem about once you identify a case what do you do next, how do you assess it.

I note the work of Jonathan Kenyon and others on developing EGR-R, again since I left, and that was work that was involved in the early stages of. The state of the art, such as it exists within my own kind of knowledge and understanding, is the favour of the structured professional judgement approach, called SPJ,

76

over what we used to do 20 years ago which was much more tick box, much more actuarial approach where you would maybe produce a red, amber and green and you could watch people's risk move up and down. So definitely the state of the art has moved away from that and towards things like formulation and other things.

There are three major issues with that that I see and have noted on the slides, and I guess that the reason I have put in bold the word "professional" in the middle structured professional judgement, again just comes through some experience really.

So we are -- the bulk of that assessment remains sat within counter-terrorism policing. And it is really just peeling the layer back to say well actually how qualified, skilled, trained and experienced are those professionals making those judgements? And my overriding sort of reflection, looking back on my time in that career, were whether we had the right people at all doing that assessment.

So I remember in the early stages of looking at risk assessments in Prevent, and talking to people that were eminently qualified in this field, the best application of that structured professional judgement is people with appropriate skills, qualification and training in things like psychology. By chance you may come across a police

77

to run that assessment on a dynamic and rolling basis, depending on what happens from the information from your interventions, whatever intelligence sources might be available. So you need an ability to assess that risk on an ongoing and dynamic basis which might be for six weeks but it could be for six years, it depends how long this case is open.

So there is a real issue around that and I would sort of humbly suggest, noting my limitations, that a screening tool probably can't do that for you; you need several tools, in my experience, to be able to do this.

The final point really then is that, at the end of this journey. So at the point that you have designed your case management plan, delivered your case management interventions, how do you put the case down with a degree of confidence that that risk is mitigated? And that feels again like an assessment, a risk assessment or a structured professional judgement, and I guess the point is who is best placed to do that in a multi-agency setting, and are they making those choices based on all the information? Sadly, we know from other Preventing Further Death reports and inquiries and inquests that often people who are in decision-making roles don't have full access to the

79

officer with that but it is unlikely. So I think there is a question, just an open question about whether the police are the right people to make that assessment, and certainly the assessments that I had sort of operational sight of from organisations like the Prison Service and probation, have a whole different professorial culture and expertise and experience in this space, normally far outstrips the assessment that can be made by a police officer. That's not saying the police couldn't do it, or couldn't employ people that can do it, but right now they are probably not geared up to be able to do that. So it is a key question.

The second major point on this I think is about risk assessment, and I note the recommendation from Phase 1 was could we move towards like a single assessment we might be able to share. I would say, having been around this for a number of years, that's very, very difficult, because you have a number of problems that you are trying to assess.

So, the first one, and David alluded to this, we are now up to 10,000 cases a year that need to be screened. So that screening requires some kind of assessment to occur.

Once things are adopted into whatever system emerges from this Inquiry, you then need the ability to continue

78

information which may or may not have changed their choices. So there is a really important point here about risk assessment.

This brings me to the sort of right half of my slides and the issue around the data that again I need to highlight. People that are properly qualified in this space will talk to me about the risk of what and why. What is the risk that you are trying to understand? And obviously if you are developing an assessment for somebody who is at risk of committing a terrorist atrocity, that might be very different from somebody who is at risk of a school shooting or just being fascinated with the idea of violence that at some point might flip into a real world actuation of those ideas.

Hugely complex, as I say, and I think it is not hugely well understood, in my experience, and this is a data gap. So, unless we get the data right, that begins to understand what are the drivers, what are the outcomes that we are seeking to produce, what are the problems and how well are they understood and diagnosed, then it is very difficult to retrofit an assessment that looks for the right things.

So, the data gap, I'm going to consistently say to you today is real and is something that needs urgent

80

attention across Government.

My last point I think on this slide then is just about information sharing. To make an effective assessment you clearly need information. So, having said on the one half the police may not be qualified, from what I have seen internationally, citing this type of system, you know, a CVE programme or a PVE programme or a violence reduction programme with the police kind of makes sense to me having been around the world and looked at different models. The reason I say that is highlighted in bold at point number 1.

I remember being in Scandinavia talking to people about "We think we have fixed this here and the system sits with school and social care, and it is a much more palatable approach than it being securitised." So I asked them a direct question: so if I'm sat chairing a multi-agency panel in Sweden, for argument's sake, that's very socially driven and so on and so forth, how do I know there's not a security service investigation running or intelligence available into this individual I'm making choices about? Well, you don't. So, it feels to me that wherever you end up, there has got to be a way, and I know this is kind of legally difficult and security-wise very difficult, of being able to share sensitive and secret data on an ongoing basis with

81

easily have called it "case management" but I wanted to try and focus on interventions. I think there's maybe going to be a conversation about structurally what this might look like, so I will skip over this for the benefit of time, and both speakers have spoken to this anyway. There are a couple of key points to land, I think, that might just help with framing of ideas and recommendations around this.

So the first one is this idea that, you know, again I think publicly has felt too difficult a Rubicon to cross a little bit is can we accept that somebody sat in Prevent, very broadly, and that may include Channel or whatever else comes out, might also be being pursued at the same time in a covert space. It feels to me that that is inevitable, that you cannot be sat on information or intelligence about somebody that is, you know, at risk of attack planning and not have a proper, you know, robust national security investigation running in the background. But it also feels to me that in a kind of democratic and liberal society that we aspire to live in in the UK, that if that person is a child and has other vulnerabilities, and Jonathan spoke eloquently about some of those like neurodivergence or poor mental health, or the list is endless really, that the state at the same time isn't trying to support that individual.

83

whatever comes into this space to deal with people that there is a concern about.

And so, sort of as a counterpoint to the point on the left of the slide about "Are the police the right people?", right now it feels like the police are probably the only agency that are in a position to be able to receive and access that data and act upon it in the way that Jonathan described core groups in the changes to category 4 of MAPPA that we were both involved in.

So that's the first point about information. The second point about information I think is that information doesn't stop when you have done the initial kind of screening and decided to pop it into Channel or not. So there's got to then be a basis of ongoing information sharing, and that seems an obvious point. But I think often when you read back at things like Preventing Further Death reports and others, information sharing gets a bit stop and start rather than ongoing and dynamic, where kind of people are separated into their own agency camps. So I would say that's just one to bear in mind as you move through your recommendations.

Next slide please.

Okay, so I have called it "interventions". I could

82

Right now, the only game in town for that is probably Channel. But, you know, it would be -- it needs some political leadership I think to be able to say, okay, we are comfortable that you could be in Channel and also under armed surveillance in the way that Jonathan described the Sudesh Amman case. That is not something that anybody has ever said out loud that I'm aware of, but it is a conversation that needs to be had and a recommendation that needs to be considered, I think.

So, just moving on to what does an effective intervention plan look like. So I'm going to make my data point again, that really this needs to be driven by data. So what are the needs of individuals? Jonathan has put forward this idea in his input about internet-addled I think were the words he used, but people with neurodiversity, loners, people spending a lot of time on the internet online, and so on and so forth, and often young people. But the reality is we just don't know. So there isn't a set of data that I'm aware of that can show you this because that data is simply not collected.

So in trying to redesign a system I think we can lean on probation practices and public protection practices in spaces like MAPPA or integrated offending management I have referred to in the slide, where we

84

1 know that what good looks like in reducing risk is the
 2 kind of bolstering of protective factors around
 3 individuals and I have put the IOM ones on there, things
 4 like housing, employment, and education and cognitive
 5 abilities and substance misuse. So we know that,
 6 actually, you know, if you can make sure people have
 7 those kind of human needs met, that you have
 8 a reasonable chance of diverting them into a different
 9 space.

10 Jonathan, in his input, spoke about the other side
 11 of that, which I will describe as control. When I used
 12 to talk to my staff about this, I would talk about
 13 a controlled change continuum. So we need to be able to
 14 build protective factors and have control measures in
 15 place that allow us to manage risk, and Jonathan spoke
 16 about the basis for risk and using things like civil
 17 orders and so on, and I take no position on whether they
 18 are a good or a bad thing but if you want the cops to
 19 get involved in the management of this stuff, they do
 20 need a basis to do so. So they need some sort of
 21 ability to control people's risky behaviour and
 22 potentially to be sanctioned around further risky
 23 behaviour, whilst, at the same time, having the door
 24 open to a kind of rehabilitative effect. And IRM feels
 25 like a good place to look for that. It is well used and

85

1 Okay, excellent. So on deselection, I have put on
 2 there that an absence of ideology doesn't mean that
 3 there is no risk, and I think too often in my service
 4 and you know I have seen this through other reports
 5 subsequently, the idea that we can put cases to bed, you
 6 know we can take no further action with them, where we
 7 kind of go "This isn't CT relevant", and that's largely
 8 based from this idea that comes from section 1 attacks
 9 that David referred to this morning, about this idea
 10 that you have to have some sort of idea that accompanies
 11 your intent to commit a crime.

12 So we are making choices on the basis of TACT
 13 legislation really, but that isn't relevant to whether
 14 somebody is going to cause a future risk of violence.
 15 Those two things are separate but we tend to, or there
 16 is like a cultural thing I think where we tend to kind
 17 of assume they are the same thing. So you are almost
 18 applying like a Pursue bar to a decision about
 19 prevention, and those two things are entirely different
 20 but I'm not sure that it is well understood in that way.

21 Again, without constantly banging on the drum, the
 22 data is problematic here. If you don't understand what
 23 are the drivers of future violence, and Jonathan spoke
 24 about his hypothesis around access to gore material
 25 online, or isolation, or the internet, or things like

87

1 well tested and so on.

2 A couple of points emerge from that. So where
 3 Jonathan speaks about the police are in a good space
 4 around being able to own this and kind of manage it, the
 5 police often -- none of the things that are on my list
 6 on my slides, they don't house anybody, they don't fix
 7 mental health problems, they don't get them off drugs.
 8 So it leads you immediately to this idea of multi-agency
 9 partnership and an ability to reach into services that
 10 broadly are locally delivered. Most of these things are
 11 through local authorities and health, really.

12 So there is a question about, you know, are all
 13 interventions available across all local authorities
 14 that we are concerned about? I think the number
 15 Lord Anderson put out was almost 200 top tier local
 16 authorities. But you need this kind of complex web of
 17 private, public and voluntary sector provision to be
 18 able to meet all of these various needs, and the
 19 challenge in this space for definite is that the data is
 20 absent to tell you what those needs are. We can have
 21 a guess, but really we need to be better than that; we
 22 need to be able to say look we have done the analysis
 23 and we understand what people's needs are.

24 I have probably said enough about that. Could we
 25 just have the next slide please.

86

1 autism spectrum or other neurodivergence, or just poor
 2 mental health, if you don't understand what's driving
 3 this and what those interlinks are, it is very, very
 4 difficult to be able to say that we are now confident
 5 that there is no future risk in this case.

6 It feels to me that in absence of that data and
 7 research and information we are almost putting
 8 practitioners in this impossible space. How do they
 9 know that they can confidently close this case and not
 10 need to worry about it too much again? I think the data
 11 point -- I know it is a point I keep making -- but it
 12 feels like it is really important to be able to meet the
 13 four areas that I'm discussing.

14 The point on periodic review, I think my point about
 15 that is really that if you have done the work and
 16 understand the problem in a more sophisticated way, then
 17 you could have confidence to close cases, and if you
 18 have the confidence to close cases you shouldn't need to
 19 review them in the absence of new information.

20 You know, I think the idea that we need to review
 21 cases is probably a lack of surety in our ability to
 22 deselect a case as it stands at the moment.

23 Next slide, please.

24 I'm aware of time here so I will just try and sort
 25 of move through the last few slides in a couple of

88

minutes. But I'm not going to talk about this much because I think Jonathan explained this in a much more eloquent way than I about online tech and those things, but there is a key point really, which is a paper that I published with a Norwegian colleague of mine a couple of years ago, on this kind of overlap with this idea of people with multiple and complex needs and being drawn into the counter-terrorism space.

It feels to us that how these multiple areas of vulnerability, contact with the Criminal Justice System, poor mental health, substance misuse, those types of things, how they intersect with people being drawn into this is poorly understood. The challenge again is one about data. So if we can't understand how many young people get referred to Prevent that have poor mental health or are open to CAMHS or are something like looked after children which we know is a significant kind of marker in youth offending and kind of outcomes for children, and if we don't know those questions for Prevent, it feels difficult to be able to make recommendations about how you make the system better. But all we can say is, there is a frequency, there is a battle rhythm, a drum beat to this where people keep popping up over the ten years or so I have been involved in this, committing acts of violent atrocity, terrorist

89

to me central to the questions that the Inquiry is trying to wrestle with in making recommendations for systemic change.

Next slide, please.

Again, so I had a little go at trying to work out where some of this lies, and again I said at the start I probably have more questions than answers for you.

There is an issue about who would do this. So I don't know the answer to this. Generally, in counter-terrorism spaces things tend to become centralised. So, you know, Channel data kind of all funnels up to Counter Terrorism Police and the Home Office. Who does this? I don't know. You know, even is it possible to do this? I don't know. I was consistently sort of told when I was at work it wasn't possible to do this because we don't collect that type of data, we are looking for ideology. But I think the conversation has maybe moved on.

The data though, even if it is sort of centrally positioned feels to me like it's hyper-local. By that I mean it is going to be sat in school reports, data held by GPs and family nurses and social care, and people that sit across this myriad of local authorities rather than somebody that's sat within the Home Office or Ministry of Justice or Department for Health in

91

or not, have a lot of these markers. I'm not saying these markers lead to this. But it feels to me that there is something in there that requires much deeper thought and much better data analysis.

Next slide, please.

I might have made this point too much so let me just look at it again.

Yes, so I guess all of us really have already into spoken about this, but the point I think at the bottom is the one just to focus in on in terms of what are the outcomes that we are looking to achieve here and that's probably, in fact definitely not for me to say. But the fact is we don't know. I can't tell you from my time in Counter Terrorism Policing how many of the 7,000 or so people a year that were referred in my period went on to commit acts of serious violence. I have no idea. We don't know whether they committed worse crime, less crime, more volume crime. We don't know about how many of those people were impacted by acts of self harm or suicide. So there is a harm I think that is not just perpetrated on others, there is a harm to themselves and we certainly know of some public cases of people who have been in the system, young people, who have gone on to take their own life.

These type of outcomes and this type of data feels

90

London are less likely to have access to those real nuggets of information, of a teacher's observation on a child or something which feels like that's the kind of data that I'm describing.

So there's obviously got to be some coordination if you are convinced that this is something that needs to be done but how all of that works, again, you would need a data analyst, not me, really to help.

There is another issue and I think other people this afternoon are perhaps going to speak about this, about this shouldn't become then a charter for oh, you have made a referral to Prevent, let's go on a fishing expedition about everything we know about Paul. But there's got to be a balance there, I think, about how do we access this data, what does the law allow us to do in this space is, balancing rights and protection around that data and so on.

But I think the data that is potentially currently available is not being scooped up. Often it is scooped up in areas afterwards in things -- I have seen too many of these, public inquiries, inquests when something has gone wrong and then suddenly all the data emerges, and this has been the case for decades now around child death reviews, serious case reviews, domestic homicide reviews, they all feel very similar. So the data is

92

available. It is more a question of how do we bring it together in a way that is systemic and makes sense and allows us to make better sense of the problem we are trying to solve and use that data then to inform solutions and I guess that's the issue.

Just a final point on there. Again, it comes to culture. So the way that police officers and staff are inducted into Counter Terrorism Policing is significant around -- they will have gone through additional vetting, they come into the space and a lot of their early inputs and training is around security and information security, because it is a unique space and environment for police officers.

So, it is almost counterintuitive then that we are saying to them "We would really like you to share more information with the local schools or the local health practitioner", because they are not sure. I think again I have spoken to Jonathan and I have discussed this at length over many years, there are tons of gateways legally that would allow that and safeguard the police sharing information, but I think there is a kind of disconnect between what maybe staff understand is the legal position and what the culture reinforces in terms of security. So again there is a balance to be struck about getting that right and there is a culture and

93

So what I would say is, in all four of my themes in my conceptual framework, data is woven through them and it would help every single area. You could commission expert forensic psychologists to develop brilliant structured professional judgement tools. They are going to need the data. If we want smarter referrals from professionals, teachers and health professionals and police officers and so on, they need the data to inform the training.

Same with commission interventions. I didn't cover the point on commissioning, but this idea is do you want to centrally commission things? Which is kind of the way Channel definitely used to operate, I don't know any more, around intervention providers. But what we are talking about is a much broader suite of interventions that are potentially helpful around things like neurodiversity, substance misuse, use of the internet. There are all these different ideas swilling around in the absence of the data to be able to build them on.

The final point, and I will make it again because it is important, is that the data will inform your decisions to close cases, to deselect cases, and if you can be more confident around that, you are able to not clog up the system with this kind of continual need to revisit decisions and so on and so forth, in the absence

95

leadership challenge I think that needs to be addressed in that.

Next slide, please.

So what might all this data achieve? So I think -- I will start on the right. I think on the right side I have spoken to Tim Jacques about this. You know, it felt to me as well when I was sat in the chair at Scotland Yard that better transparency would probably produce a democratic dividend for us. In the respect that I think if you are opaque about sharing information with people, they will fill in the blanks themselves and I think sometimes that leads to some unhelpful dialogue around areas like Prevent especially.

So I think more transparency, not less, feels really important and it feels like data is a key way of doing that. So I think there is a big dividend to come, but strategically and operationally how does any of this help? I have alluded to it, as I have spoken. You better understand the risk in the system. You understand more about people that go on to harm themselves or others, what they have done, why they have done it and what led to it, what did that trajectory look like and it should be able, over time, for you to be able to spot who is likely to go on to commit harm and why and then put proper interventions in place.

94

of, I would say, new information or new intelligence which clearly -- or a new referral -- which would necessitate that.

The final slide then, please, and I think I'm about on time. Yes.

So I have given a little bit of thought to where answers might be found and there is two kind of distinct points on the slide, I guess.

So the first thing I would say, having been around this for a few decades, is that the best answer obviously in whether you are looking at why children offend or have families received Early Help or keep them out the way the kind of acute end of child protection processes, these type of things, how you reduce re-offending for burglars and violent offenders and so on. It feels to me it is multi-agency and it's local. I don't see it in any sense in it being anything else. I think my point about professorial expertise and cultures is kind of improved in that multidisciplinary setting. People who choose to become probation officers or youth workers tend to have slightly different professional culture and professional expertise, qualifications and experience than police officers. I think often the power here is when you put those people together, looking at a similar problem, they

96

bring all of that to the table and you end up with a better solution than a single agency owning this. So local and multi-agency feels sensible to me.

The second point on there is about having a senior Chair. So it needs to be somebody who is accountable and has the ability to reach into that very sort of networked web of provision I have described across private sector, public sector, voluntary sector that exists in every town and city up and down the land, but really somebody local needs to be in a position to be able to go and broker that, bring it in, make some decisions, be sat on the right boards frankly locally, crime and disorder boards, or health and wellbeing partnerships that commission these services going forward. But they are only going to commission stuff based on need.

So unless we are able to pull the data forward to say we've got a real problem here with 5,000 of the 10,000 a year -- and I'm making this up -- have neurodivergent issue, we need to bolster our CAMHS provision. It would make a really compelling case but you can't make that case in those rooms if you don't bring the data. It is kind of a circular argument in some respects.

I have put some structural options on there. I have

97

resourced, dedicated team and a Change project with proper leadership and proper project management leadership to land this because of the number of stakeholders. There is a lot of interested parties in what emerges from this type of work and that's probably my key message, is really if it is possible to take the time and do a kind of proper change management exercise around whatever emerges from Phase 2.

That probably concludes everything I have to say, sir. So thank you very much.

MR MOSS: Thank you very much indeed for your presentation and to reassure you, we were able to hear you loud and clear throughout. Thank you very much.

Mr Roxburgh.

Presentation by MR ROXBURGH

MR ROXBURGH: Good morning, I would like to start today by just remembering the victims in Southport, along with the suffering of all of those who survived the attack and which their families have endured. I live a short distance from Southport and I'm acutely aware of the pain felt in the community, the need for answers to how this happened and the desire that the horrors seen that day are not repeated.

This is at the forefront of my mind each day when I go to work. As was said earlier, I'm the Legal,

99

obviously read Lord Anderson's paper and other things. I think they are all worthy of consideration and I think they all have benefits. I think there are trade-offs with all of them and maybe we will get into that in the conversation.

The last point, having led this stuff previously, there has to be underpinning here by -- apologies for my use of acronyms on this slide, I tried to avoid it, but Standard Operating Procedures. So staff need a Standard Operating Procedure. It works phenomenally well in the MAPPA space. So the MAPPA guidance, that provide this Biblical reference really that all staff use, about how you make decisions, who makes decisions, all these kinds of things. So when we designed or re-designed counter-terrorism nominal management, so looking at MAPPA category 4's and registered terrorist offenders and orders and so on in the community, we really lent on that and it was a whole set of those things developed with clear leadership and accountability put in place. And I would say then ongoing and sort of well-informed training for the people that were doing that job, and that's kind of where it lands.

The last point, and I promise you it is my last point, bang on 44 minutes I think, is again trying to do this piecemeal can't work. It needs a properly

98

Policy and Advocacy Adviser for Child Rights International Network, or CRIN. I lead the organisation's work on child rights and counter-terrorism and in relation to children in armed conflict.

In regards to my work in counter-terrorism, I have been principally focused on the Prevent programme's role and impact upon children, along with reviewing wider counter-terrorism laws' and policies' impact upon child rights.

I'm hopeful today can be a useful discussion and the insights provided can make a meaningful contribution. I will try my best to stick to time. I'm aware we are a little bit tight on it as well and some areas which I'm going to touch on have already been raised by others as well. Where possible I will avoid repetition to help us progress well through the day.

I have been asked today to consider the role of Prevent in managing violence fixated individuals, or VFIs, specifically to reflect on what legal, governance and legitimacy risks arise if Prevent's remit is expanded to cover VFIs, and how clearly Prevent currently distinguishes between ideological risk and violence risk, and how does this matter operationally.

In addressing these questions there are some brief

100

contextual elements to address so as to help frame my reflections on the questions posed.

Firstly, Prevent is a programme designed more than 20 years ago initially to address a specific risk posed at the time. Since then the programme has been repeatedly expanded to encompass a much broader range of risks. The Prevent duty, as was touched on earlier, was introduced and legislated for creating a legal duty on individuals to make those referrals, and the number of children reported to it has grown substantially from 3,000 children referred to the programme in 2016 to 4,700 last year.

Despite Prevent's prominent role in countering the threat of terrorism in the UK, there is a remarkable lack of publicly available evaluations of the programme, and while there have been improvements in data release in recent years, quality remains poor as has been touched on already. This makes effectively judging its potential role in addressing new risks such as violence-fixated individuals-fixated individuals, challenging.

Secondly, and as Lord Anderson raised earlier, the term "violence-fixated individuals" remains a relatively new one, which is loosely defined as and, as it stands, has little substantial basis in research.

101

To begin with let's consider some of the legal risks in relation to it. As I mentioned already, as it stands, the terms remains ill defined. Different definitions are moving around. Similarly to Lord Anderson, I'm going to take one of the definitions offered that has been around in the system for a few years now which looks at how -- under the title "Fascination with extreme violence or mass casualty attacks". The definition of that is as follows, it is a new category introduced in May 2024:

"The category reflects when an individual does not appear to have an ideological ideology, but seems to have an interest in committing extreme or mass violence, which makes them a concern for Prevent. This could include those interested in school massacres but also where violence is targeted at other settings or individuals and is not based on specific ideological motivation."

Now consider the elements to this. The phrase "seems to have an interest in committing extreme or mass violence". What does this mean? What does "seems to have an interest" mean? The interpretation of this could be extraordinarily broad. The following sentence expands this further. While mentioning school massacres, it also covers "other settings or

103

There are negligible amounts of publicly available statistics on the topic. Part of this is because there is no agreed definition across multiple people, professions and actors as to what this is defined as.

This means that we need to develop this to be able to better learn what this term means, the scale of the risk. As it is currently worded in some of the Home Office guidance it is open to broad interpretation. We are yet to hear from practitioners working with children on the ground about how well they understand it in turn. How does a teacher understand it in the classroom? How does a health worker understand it themselves? How even does a police officer understand that when meeting with a child in different circumstances. This all needs to be addressed for us to have a well-informed conversation about how we address the potential risk.

What is clear though from Prevent's history is where there is a lack of clear definition around the risks being addressed, the programme's effectiveness can be questionable and the negative impact it can have upon children and their rights considerable.

The first question then I have been asked to reflect on is what legal, governance or legitimacy risks arise if Prevent's remit is expanded to encompass VFIs and has greater prominence in that programme?

102

individuals", again very broad. Different elements of a child's behaviour, particularly during adolescence, could fall within this remit.

For starters, if a child is showing such a concerning interest in extreme violence, we need to consider if a programme designed to counter terrorism and associated criminal offences is the best place to address these issues. If a child is fascinated with knives are they best placed in this counter-terrorism space or in a youth diversionary mechanism which is much more tied to knife crime reduction programmes or to more suitable programmes?

This poses a very practical challenge to those who are legally bound by the Prevent duty. If you are a teacher in a school and encounter a child either fascinated or interested in knives, who has expressed an interest in harming another child, they are bound under the current definition to refer them to Prevent. Indeed, in many areas Prevent might be the only option they can send a child to, other mechanisms might not be available which could, in some areas, be more suitable.

If we switch the word "fascinated" with the word "interested", as the PCMT suggests, this broadens the scope even further. "An interest" and "a fascination" are loose terms which are ill defined and could be very

104

all encompassing.

This loose definition poses a dual risk. Firstly, research indicates in the education space, which generates the vast majority of referrals to Prevent, teachers, for understandable reasons, take a "better safe than sorry" approach. This broad definition risks a continued uptick in referrals that we have seen already, something already risks a potential overwhelm of the system.

This can clearly be seen in the latest statistics released, with the 39 per cent increase with the year ending September 2024. Taking into account some of the other wider statistics that are available out there, we know in 2025 around 2 per cent of children said they had carried a knife of some sort. 2 per cent may seem like a small number but it equates to around 86,000 children. Where do we delineate the difference between being interested in a knife, carrying a knife, a fascination with extreme violence?

Secondly, it means that children may be referred to Prevent as a first point of call due to the legal duty that is incumbent upon many people in the public sector, over and above other interventions or divergence mechanisms, some of which have a stronger evidence base as to their effectiveness.

105

it is important that they make the right type of intervention. There is a stark difference between a counter-terrorism type of intervention and potentially a community policing type of intervention. They have different roles, at different points in time. But if we start with counter-terrorism at an exceptionally serious level, to move down from that can be trickier to then follow a path through and for a child, and potentially their family, to trust them.

Entering into counter-terrorism laws and policies is an exceptionally serious area but it is not necessarily the right one. There is a strong evidence basis for other youth violence reduction and diversion programmes which have been successful, particularly around knife crime, and consideration should be given to those and what can be learned from them. The Youth Endowment Fund, in particular, has done good work on evaluating such interventions and their extensive research is worth consideration. That is something the Children's Commissioner for England has recently raised as well.

Finally, it is important to consider the ramifications to the programme's expansion in relation to data retention in Prevent. This may seem trivial in the wider context of this conversation, but it is no less important.

107

What I'm saying here is, where do we make sure the right intervention is made in the right place? There is a real patchwork across the country. In some areas Prevent may be the only option open to a teacher. That might not be the best place for that child. Knife crime reduction programmes aren't universal around the country, they are patchy and there are differentiating levels. But there is a stronger evidence base for some of the interventions they can provide, which aren't always that dissimilar to some of the Channel interventions used as well.

The combination of the legal requirements of the Prevent duty and the broad definitions may continue to have a marked increase in the number of children being referred to Prevent. Some of the stuff that's happened in the last few years in terms of redefining, expansion of the programme, new training, will only be really hitting the ground relatively soon. So while we have seen that uptick already there could be a further uptick in the number of referrals happening.

At the same time, it potentially needlessly pushes children into the auspices of counter-terror policing above potentially more suitable interventions. Additionally, where a child is displaying behaviours of such a concern that the police may need to be involved,

106

Children's childhoods are increasingly being defined by public and private bodies' desire to capture data in relation to them. Data capture plays a central role in what children are shown in digital spaces which is of serious concern, particularly in relation to harmful content that they are being exposed to and which Jonathan touched on earlier as well.

But retention by State agencies can also shape their lives in other ways. Prevent is no different in this area. Data on children is routinely shared between a variety of professorial bodies, with Counter Terrorism Police and others. There are clearly times when this is appropriate and guidance as to what is appropriate and proportionate is key.

Of particular concern is the sharing of information about a child's health or neurodiverse conditions. Prevent is not necessarily equipped to assess this sort of information and there is no established link between conditions and a child's susceptibility to carrying out atrocities. It amounts to a serious breach in a child's privacy. If such information is deemed relevant in relation to a child's behaviour, then Prevent should not be the space in which concerns around a child are addressed. Instead, a model, such as MASH, should be used which draws together a range of professionals with

108

relevant knowledge and experience to make an assessment. Indeed, this is a starting point will often be more appropriate for children so as to get a rounded picture of them and their lives.

The collection sharing and retention of data for the purposes of Prevent and Channel must comply with human rights law, data protection law, and with Common Law obligations, such as the duty of confidentiality. Under human rights law, the interference by public authorities with the right to privacy is permissible only if it is in accordance with the law and necessary in a democratic society in the interests of legitimate aims, such as national security, public safety, or the prevention of disorder or crime.

The interference must also be proportionate to the aim view. It is justifiable for some data to be retained, but only in specific circumstances and the wider capture of data must be cautioned against. This is something that needs review again if Prevent is to be expanded and should be considered if other programmes are developed as well.

The second element I have been asked to consider is the governance risks if Prevent's remit is expanded to include VFIs. There has been a longstanding governance issue in relation to the oversight of Prevent. CRIN has

109

improvements. CRIN welcomes calls from the likes of Lord Anderson and his review for greater data transparency. This would be of significant benefit to assess not only the programme's performance in helping children but the wider ramifications of it as well. This data sharing needs to be in the round. It cannot just be those children who progress through the system and go through to Channel. It needs also to be those children who are referred to Prevent and then come out of it. What happens to them? What is their prognosis? Where do they go? What other interventions are provided in this space?

This improvement in data quality is absolutely essential if we are to understand both Prevent's overall performance and its ability to handle new risks, such as with VFIs. We do, though, recognise that there has been some incremental improvements in data release in recent years. Data released in late 2024, 2025 and again recently in 2026 has shown some improvements and there is acknowledgement from the Home Office that some of the elements shared need further improvements still, particularly in relation to mental health and neurodiverse conditions. But we would urge a much fuller release of data so it can be examined in the round by a range of different bodies, both within the

111

long raised issues with a lack of independent oversight and a lack of political oversight as to the programme's impact and effectiveness. Indeed, CRIN's experience has been that Home Office at times has been unwilling to share evaluations of the performance of Prevent and its impact.

We are told persistently that the programme is well evaluated but we are not shown these evaluations. This is deeply regrettable, as such information is invaluable for independent analysis and the credibility of the programme. It seems clear that these evaluations will only be shared if the Home Office is forced to do so, either by senior ministers or by the judiciary.

In relation to data on Prevent, as has been touched on already, there are again a number of issues. CRIN's experience has been that the Home Office has been opaque, at best, in sharing it and, at worst, we have felt a level of obstruction when we have made requests even on relatively basic terms under the Freedom of Information Act.

At times it has been hard to delineate if this has been down to poor management of data relating to the programme, or a deliberate effort to deter scrutiny of the programme. Either way, it is a symptom of a programme that is in need of significant governance

110

public sector and from organisations such as my own.

Fundamentally, good quality, regularly published data is a protection against abuse of child rights and helps ensure interventions are effective, proportionate, appropriate and non-discriminatory.

The creation of the post of the Independent Prevent Commissioner is again a welcome step. It is crucial that this post is fully independent, that the post-holder is given access to all areas of Prevent, considers the programme's impact in the round, both for children who progress through Prevent into Channel and beyond but also those children who are referred to Prevent but not then progressed in other ways as well.

The postholder must also regularly publish reviews of the programme's impact. This will make a significant improvement not only in accountability and governance of Prevent, but also in helping a range of people whether it be academics, civil society organisations, or public sector bodies and professional bodies to be able to better understand and better analyse the threats being posed, the issues emerging, and the interventions which are most effective.

It is not acceptable, given the impact on child rights and the apparent important roles Prevent has been given in countering children being drawn into terrorism

112

1 and the suggested role it plays in addressing
2 violence-fixated individuals, that good governance and
3 good accountability is not present.

4 If society is to accept the use of Prevent on a
5 widening cohort of children, it must be coupled with
6 this and must be disclosed in the public realm. Good
7 governance is needed to ensure there is not a
8 disproportionate securitisation of children's childhoods
9 and to ensure interventions are appropriate, effective,
10 and rights compliant.

11 In regards to legitimacy risks in the use of Prevent
12 to address VFIs, there are a number of considerations.
13 Failure to identify AR as a risk was not the first time
14 Prevent has either not identified or ensured
15 an individual is no longer at risk of carrying out a
16 violent atrocity. This has likely already weakened
17 public confidence in the programme.

18 These failures are now leading to overdue questions
19 as to the programme's performance which are yet to be
20 answered in full and likely denting confidence in the
21 programme further still. Anecdotally, I have heard from
22 some professorial bodies that they do hold concerns on
23 this but they do still maintain and fulfil their duty
24 they are complied to do so, but they want greater
25 understanding of what is happening to children in the

113

1 recent report was 65 per cent of children are referred
2 back to education providers after that initial referral.
3 This is obviously a significant number. It is leaving
4 teachers in a very challenging position as to how they
5 can best support a child and address any risky
6 behaviours.

7 All of this undermines trust with professionals who
8 are crucial in identifying potential risks. They need
9 to be given the information, the research, the insight
10 to support them, identifying any risky behaviours and to
11 make the best interventions for a child.

12 More broadly considering child rights and
13 international best practice, the Prevent programme
14 infringes upon a number of rights potentially, including
15 a child's to a private life, freedom of expression and
16 of assembly. Prevent's place in a pre-criminal space
17 centred in criminal justice is also of concern. It
18 places a child in a policing environment over and above
19 other potential, more appropriate services. In doing
20 so, it risks creating mistrust and divides between
21 children and key services such as education and
22 healthcare. This potentially makes it more likely their
23 child may hide risky behaviours that they are
24 demonstrating and this is of serious concern.

25 This is why we are of the view that a multi-agency

115

1 system so they can better support them as well.

2 Among those who are subject to Prevent duty, there
3 are also questions about the level of confidence in this
4 programme. For all the evidence I have seen, there is
5 no doubt in my mind that those whom the duty applies to
6 take the responsibility very seriously.

7 In relation to children, the sector which makes the
8 most significant number of referrals, as we have heard
9 from already, is the education sector. Here, research
10 shows that teachers take the responsibility seriously,
11 with many taking a better safe than sorry approach. But
12 they also raise concerns. Their capacity is limited to
13 have sufficient contact time with a child whom they have
14 concerns over. Training is limited, especially in light
15 of the seemingly every expanding scope of Prevent.
16 Perhaps most crucially of all, teachers raise issues and
17 concerns over the lack of feedback as to what happens to
18 a child once they have been referred to Prevent, even
19 though that child may still be in their classroom
20 setting.

21 Others raise concerns repeatedly regarding
22 re-referring children and seeing them rejected by the
23 programme, leaving them with few other options as to how
24 to handle concerns about a child's behaviour. One of
25 the things we noted in the Children's Commissioner's

114

1 approaches that initial point of call is a far better
2 format and space to begin a child in. You get a much
3 more rounded view of a child and what can be done for
4 them.

5 These issues, coupled with the legal and governance
6 concerns which I have raised already, raise serious
7 questions as to whether Prevent can play a legitimate
8 and effective role in addressing VFIs. If Prevent's
9 remit is to be expanded to cover them more explicitly,
10 the legal governance and legitimacy risks I have raised
11 here need addressing. In the medium term, if Prevent is
12 being used, there must be a significant improvement in
13 its governance, this should include improved publication
14 of good quality data. Not only the sheer amount of data
15 but the quality of it is also important here.

16 The publication of any past evaluations not
17 currently in the public domain would be of huge benefit
18 to a range of practitioners and a programme of ongoing
19 evaluation which assesses the programme as whole is
20 important.

21 More fundamentally, lessons should be learned from
22 Prevent's longstanding issues when considering VFIs.
23 There is a need to clearly understand, define and assess
24 the scale of the risk posed by VFIs. This requires
25 significant research and this in turn should inform what

116

type of interventions are most appropriate.

Assuming that Prevent is the best intervention, it is a risky approach without good research and clear evidence. Any intervention must not compromise a child's engagement with other key services, including health and education. Crucially, it should be designed to recognise the world children grow up in today, especially digital spaces, and some of the risks they pose to a child. These are all crucial elements to be met for a programme to have legitimacy.

The second question I have been asked to consider this morning is: "How clearly does Prevent clearly distinguish between ideological risk and violence risk, and how does this matter operationally?"

A longstanding critique of Prevent that organisations like my own have had is that the programme does not distinguish between ideological risk and violence risk. Indeed, for many members of the public they may well assume that individuals referred to Prevent are at risk of committing violence. This is not necessarily the case. The way in which Prevent is designed focuses on countering the risk of being drawn into extremism. This does not necessarily equate to violence. Consider for instance some of the legal definitions that underpin Prevent's and UK

117

Children have a capacity to learn, including from their mistakes, very quickly. A violence fixation may dissipate rapidly. An interest in knives or a misunderstanding of the role of violence in resolving disputes may be something a teenager matures out of swiftly.

It is difficult to separate out what is a real ongoing problem. We recognise this as a challenge. Atrocities take at least some level of planning. A knife, a terrorist manual, or a documentary on a genocide today do not necessarily mean a child will be engaging in extreme violence tomorrow. However, we do know that engagement with the Criminal Justice System at an early age is an indicator of future criminality.

Everything we can do to avoid criminalising a child is usually a step in the right direction for the child and for the community in which they go on to live their life.

The current system places too much emphasis on the views and opinions a child may hold or be interested in over and above risky behaviours a child may be demonstrating, such as the purchasing of weapons, making repeated threats, talking in specific terms in relation to planning a violent atrocity, as well as underpinning risks, an absence from education, not engaging with

119

counter-terrorism law. The UK defines extremism as a vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and belief, as well as calling for the death of members of our armed forces.

While at the end of that definition we have a specific element which considers a violent action towards or armed forces, the rest of it does not necessarily imply violence and indeed the use of the phrase "fundamental British values" is particularly subjective, again not suggesting violence risk here.

Some of the recent subcategories shared by the Home Office attempt to make a clearer distinction between ideological views that are of concern and even abhorrent, but not necessarily illegal and violent, and more overtly violent concerns as well. This is an important separation and one we need to delve into more and have a clear understanding of in any such programme going forward.

But there remains a lack of clarity on this. As I have touched on already, even a definition used in relation to violence fixation is not clear. Everyone who is going through their teenage years in particular is developing and probably doing so at a quick pace.

118

services, isolation, an unhealthy interest in some violent contents in online spaces.

Operationally this has potential to have serious impact. Take for instance in the classroom, which is the most likely place a child is identified as being a concern under Prevent as it stands. A child may regularly be interested in war and different types of conflicts. They may also come into conflict with other students. This is not an unusual combination but it could be interpreted in different ways. For a teacher under pressure, who is subject to the Prevent duty, they may decide to err on the side of caution and refer them to Prevent. This would be going in the wrong direction.

What is the consequence of this for a child? If they are a genuine risk and their behaviour is genuinely risky it may help them, but if they are not, and the data suggests that the vast majority of them are not, then a child is being placed in Counter Terrorism Policing space, a potential division is made between them and key services, it could marginalise and isolate them. At the same time, this can lead to a significant number of referrals being made to Counter Terrorism Policing which are totally unnecessary.

Operationally it would make much more sense to have a programme designed around behaviours that demonstrate

120

a clear risk of violence, rather than of views. Some of these already exist in parallel spaces such as knife crime reduction programmes. But much more research should be carried out as to those who pose a risk of carrying out violence atrocities so as to better understand the indicators of risk, and effective interventions.

More broadly, there remains a stark lack of attention as to addressing underpinning factors that leave children at risk of being drawn into criminality, including neglectful home environments, poverty, marginalisation, discrimination and a lack of access to key services.

Prevent is poor in distinguishing between ideologies and violence risk on paper and likely even worse in practice, particularly at a referral stage. Given the broader questions as to the programme's effectiveness, this should be of concern when considering its ability to address violence-fixated individuals. It has long suffered from legal ambiguity, which, when coupled with poor governance, should raise questions as to how central a role it plays in addressing those focused on committing violent atrocities.

Our ability to address Prevent's capability to address VFIs, is limited by a lack of publicly available

121

evaluations, poor data, and the urgent need for research into what indicators of an individual focused on committing violence may show, and what interventions crucially are most effective. In the short-term, clear definitions of who should be referred to Prevent are needed, coupled with improved training for those subject to Prevent duty. These should be orientated around behaviours being demonstrated by a child.

More broadly, while this conversation is focused on Prevent and its potential to manage risks posed by VFIs, I would caution against the starting assumption that this is the best route simply because it is the existing route. Other programmes should be considered, and given the rapidly evolving nature of risk presented, a fundamental rethink and redesign of how we safeguard children should be considered, along with how Prevent interacts with them. Thank you.

MR MOSS: Mr Roxburgh, thank you very much indeed.

Sir, may I suggest that if we were to take a 10-minute break and come back at 12.40 pm, promptly if we can, we will be back on track with our timing.

SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: Thank you very much. We will do that.

(12.30 pm)

(A short break)

(12.40 pm)

122

SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: Yes, Mr Moss.

MR MOSS: Thank you, sir. Ms St Vincent please.

Presentation by MS ST VINCENT

MS ST VINCENT: Okay, great. Thank you so much. My name is Sarah St Vincent. I'm the Executive Director of Rights & Security International. I know that the reasons we are all here today are of course horrific. It is an honour for us to be here, it is a privilege to be participating.

RSI's mission is to promote human rights in contexts such as national security and counter terrorism. We got our start 36 years ago advocating for equal justice in Northern Ireland. After 9/11 we expanded our mandate to look at especially Islamophobic national security activities throughout the UK. We have international projects these days as well.

So before I start talking about RSI's work on Prevent and our answers to the questions that we were asked, I do want to note that the people who are given the most air time on issues such as counter-terrorism and Prevent, tend to be people who look like me, whereas the people who experience most of the pain and fear and stigma and shame of a Prevent referral, are not people who look like me. People who are speaking about counter-terrorism tend to be, like me, white, lawyerly

123

and with many of the markers of social approval that some of us in this room have.

I think it is crucial for the Inquiry and all of us to be listening to a range of voices on Prevent, including the people who are at the receiving end of very, very difficult situations.

So to say a bit more about RSI's work on Prevent; we have been researching Prevent since 2016. Well before my time. I joined in 2020. We have especially investigated the impact on children in education, on British Muslims, on racialised minority groups and peaceful activism and, as I said, I think there is a need to hear from some of those voices.

We have carried out extensive freedom of information work, as well as various forms of desk research interviews and legal analysis. This means we may have a perspective that may differ from what the Inquiry heard during the first part of today.

We don't focus on the stated intention of Prevent, although I will discuss that to some extent, but rather what it means in practice for the people who experience it, and whether Prevent and Channel activities comply with human rights law, which is binding.

A bit more about our work on Prevent. We have done extensive freedom of information work, especially in

124

recent years, regarding the equality impacts of Prevent and whether the Government's implementation of the programme does enough to avoid and combat bias. I will tell you now the answer is no. This has entailed gathering equality related data or more often discovering that it is missing altogether or of very poor quality. We have sought religion data; it is overwhelmingly missing. We have sought race data; which the Government now publishes; it is overwhelmingly incomplete and not self reported. There are various other very large gaps in the data and I was glad to hear several voices today calling for much better information on the actual impact of these programmes.

On Prevent and autism; we became aware several years ago of concerns that Prevent was having a disproportionate impact on autistic people, especially children. We did a good deal of freedom of information and other work on this and examined what the academic literature has to say about whether autism causes violence.

We found little to no basis in the available academic literature for saying that it does. The Home Office seems to agree with us. It's now apparently conceded in a statement to the Financial Times in March of 2026 that autism and other types of neurodivergence

125

have been hearing in many of the talks today. Indeed this is one reason we still don't have an agreed definition of terrorism in international law. So we talk about terrorism at an international level, there is no agreement about what exactly it is we are talking about.

Human motivations are often difficult or impossible to untangle. We cannot read minds and people may describe their own motivations in certain ways for a variety of reasons and this is certainly true of children.

What anyone regards as part of an ideology, let alone an extremist ideology, as the Home Office likes to term it, will be determined by the perspectives and cultural background of the person making that determination. There is some form of ideology baked into nearly everything we do; we often simply don't recognise it, we are too close to see it. For example, is misogyny an ideology? When is domestic violence ideological? Is it ever not ideological? We could argue about these things all day. One might argue that's not the best use of our time.

RSI also does not currently accept the concept or term "violence-fixated individuals" which I say with respect. This is not a diagnosis we have been able to

127

do not cause violence. I refer to an article of 31 March 2026 by Helen Warrell. The quote is:

"The Home Office spokesperson emphasised that there is no causal link between neurodiversity or mental health and radicalisation and that mental health and neurodiversity are distinct."

I would also note the Children's Commissioner has expressed concerns regarding potential overrepresentation of autistic people in Channel and that the Crest report summarily begins with the line:

"That there is no evidence that autistic people are any more likely than anyone else to engage in violence."

So to say a bit more about the questions that we have been asked to cover. One is: what are the strengths and limitations of Prevent as a mechanism for addressing non-ideological fixation driven violence and what safeguards are needed to ensure proportionality, particularly for young people or those with complex vulnerabilities?

I'm going to give some caveats from our perspective as a charity and the mandate and perspectives within which we operate. The first is that RSI does not accept that ideological or non-ideological could be objectively defined or distinguished, especially when it comes to violence. Again I think that's a common thread that we

126

identify in the international classification of diseases or the diagnostic and statistical manual version 5, which is the current one. While we have only carried out a cursory search through the academic literature, we are not aware of the term VFI being commonly used in academic literature. It appears to us to be a new and UK specific term, particularly UK Government specific term.

The term "proportionality" appears in the question but under human rights law, as my colleague Alasdair was just explaining, the threshold question is necessity not proportionality. And I will get into that a bit more when I talk about the law.

We are also not able to discuss any purported strengths of the programme because our position is that Prevent inherently violates human rights and it should end, therefore, we are unable to discuss what one might term strengths. I'm going to try to do my best to talk about safeguards as requested.

So delving into the substance, the first thing to say about Prevent is that it is not an evidence based means of violence prevention. It is also not an efficient one, although that's not going to be my focus today. My focus today is on the compliance of the policy with human rights law.

128

Under human rights law, violence prevention is of course a legitimate aim but the lack of evidence base means we would say Prevent and Channel cannot be regarded as necessary to achieving that aim. The question to ask about any of this is: how do you know? When people say Prevent is effective in preventing violence, how do you know? What are the studies? Where is the data? Again this is a theme we have heard multiple times today.

I would say the actual purpose of Prevent is surprisingly unclear. It is difficult to find any grounding for the approach that is taken in Prevent in the available literature, nor have we seen the Government produce or point to published peer reviewed research in support of a design of Prevent or Channel, even though it has been around for 20 years and there is an abundance of academic literature on violence prevention; there are entire disciplines devoted to violence prevention.

We also haven't seen signs that the Government has considered the approach taken in Prevent or Channel in comparison with other possible approaches. So if we want to say Prevent is effective; is it more effective than what the alternatives might be? Has the Government ever considered any alternatives and, if so, what were

129

of attenuation in it and not a lot of academic grounding.

There has been significant academic critique of this theory. I would emphasise again that people can be referred regardless of whether anyone believes they ever intend to become violent. It is not a violence prevention programme.

Predictably, given this very broad framing, everything I've just said, Prevent attracts a lot of chaff. You heard Lord Anderson tell you about the thousands of referrals, only 18 per cent of which ever become Channel cases, not that we accept Channel either. But that tells you there is an enormous number of false positives under Prevent. Again, giant use of time, giant use of resources. If you were going to design a violence prevention programme, especially one this large, this well resourced, is this what you would choose?

I would say as well, what we have been seeing around us, including in recent days, the Government ostensibly tackles what it calls extreme right-wing radicalisation through Prevent. But we have been seeing violent anti-migrant riots and racist riots in the UK every summer for the past several years. So if Prevent is designed to tackle ideology and prevent violence,

131

its reasons for choosing this approach, let alone sticking with it for so long and in the face of so very many objections and again so much pain?

While the actual purpose of Prevent may be unclear, the activity involved is an attempt to detect ideology. A specific ideology may not be necessary for a referral, but the Government promotes the idea of ideology through training and measures type of concern; we get annual publications on that. Or, more abstractly still, what Prevent sometimes -- what people, I should say -- Prevent itself doesn't do anything. Prevent is a policy. It is the thousands of people who become agents of the State in implementing Prevent; the teachers, the NHS personnel, the police, the local authorities who are tasked not only with detecting what people think or what they seem to think, but what they might some day think, potential future ideology and this all becomes rather abstract.

For a Prevent referral, there does not need to be any sign that the person has any intention in engaging in violence or is even interested in violence.

The theory seems to be that we can predict whether people will become violent based on what they think, or what we think they think, or what we think they might some day think. That is a line of reasoning with a lot

130

I would ask, how is that going?

So some of the problems with Prevent as violence prevention; the first -- so I'm going to come onto the details in law of some of the extensive human rights violations that we have identified and analysed.

The first thing I want to talk about is that the Prevent duty does not apply in Northern Ireland and I would like to tell people, this tells you everything you need to know about Prevent. Northern Ireland is the region of the UK that has the most deadly recent history of violence. Northern Ireland has had, in effect, a non-international armed conflict in which thousands of people have died. The Prevent duty does not apply in Northern Ireland.

So the Government's flagship counter-terrorism programme or violence prevention programme does not apply in an entire one of the devolved nations of the UK.

So if Prevent is a rigorous, effective, credible, apolitical, violence prevention programme, why has the Government never extended the Prevent duty to Northern Ireland? Not that it should. I think we can all guess at the answers but again ask yourself whether that kind of decision-making suggests a rigorous programme.

Prevent has attracted criticism even from former top

132

counter-terrorism and police officials, it doesn't have very many defenders. So, if we think about extending Prevent, we are thinking about extending a programme that doesn't have a great deal of support or credibility and I would really question the choice to move in that direction.

Prevent has other serious credibility problems -- sorry, I have gone on too fast. People in many British Muslim communities and other UK communities, as well as civil society, widely perceive the design and implementation of Prevent as Islamophobic and racist. When Prevent was first created in 2003, it explicitly targeted Muslims and Islam. There is a widespread perception today that people who make Prevent referrals are giving British Muslims and especially Muslim children extra scrutiny and that people who are being referred to Prevent are often being referred out of bias and fear.

So, if you want to expand Prevent, you will be expanding a programme that already faces a lot of mistrust, one might say, for good reason in a wide variety of communities and one that has very serious reputational problems. One could also add that Prevent causes great harm and pain to children and parents who are affected by it.

133

and referrals. There may be some ad hoc protections in terms of how the people receiving and reading the referrals handle them but essentially anyone can refer anyone else for anything. I could be referred for my religious faith, you could be referred for yours, you could be referred for a political statement, you could be referred for something that you think is not a political statement.

Prevent allows and even encourages referrals based on and I quote "gut feeling". The risk of bias here is obvious. What does gut feeling mean? What does it rely on? What kind of heuristics do our brains use?

There are no systemic level protections against bias of which we are aware. There is evidence in the available data, the really low quality data that I told you about, that has remained low quality for years despite a known problem, of greatly disproportionate impact on people in Britain of Asian, Black or what the Government has termed Middle Eastern decent. The Government also continues to talk a great deal about Islamism in the context of Prevent, you will see this in letters and materials, some of the things that have shown up in the Phase 1 report, even though, as Lord Anderson told us, Islamism is increasingly a small percentage of referrals.

135

Some other problems with Prevent as violence prevention; so the types of ideology that are selected for explicit inclusion in Prevent material such as training materials and types of concern in the annual reporting, often appear to be politicised or arbitrary. At a minimum there is very little, if any, protection against Prevent becoming politicised or against bias or arbitrariness. In the materials we have seen, some religious faiths but not others are explicitly mentioned. You will see no mention of, let's say, Christian extremism, whatever that might mean. Some faiths are singled out, others are not. Misogyny is missing. As I recall anti-LGBTQ+ bias is missing. Racism per se is missing. It is often cast as extreme right-wing, but I don't know that that's really accurate in the sense that racism really cuts across society and across a range of groups. The list goes on.

Under the prior Government we saw a new emphasis on so called left wing extremism in the training materials available to us. When RSI exposed this in the media, they changed the training, which I mention as an instance of potential politicisation. When you talk about ideas, that lends itself very easily to politicised descriptions and choices.

Prevent includes few or no protections against bias

134

I think there is a very real sense where, when we talk about Prevent, we all know that we are talking about a programme that is designed to scrutinise Muslims and what we see in the statistics that we do have, incomplete as they are, is that people who are recorded -- so race is not self reported and this is a problem, and it is not self reported because people are not notified of Prevent referrals. This is also a problem. But that, in the figures, people recorded as Asian are twice the percentage one would expect to see if it were proportionate to the population of England and Wales. People who are Black are twice what you would expect to see people. People who are recorded as Middle Eastern are more like four times what you would expect to see. The statistics are alarming and we don't see the Government giving any indication it is taking a closer look at why they look the way they do, these stats.

There is also evidence in the available data of a greatly disproportionate impact on people with autism diagnoses or people -- and again this is a problematic term -- have what the Government is calling suspected autism. Meanwhile people recorded as white are consistently under represented in the data available to us.

136

For safeguarding concerns about a potentially troubled child, one would think that one of the most obvious ports of call would be the parents, but Prevent systematically cuts parents out of the loop. Again the Government has told us -- this is in the report that we have circulated, "Caught in the Web" -- that it doesn't routinely notify people of Prevent referrals. I think one could say that the policy is based on an assumption that the parents might be the radicalisers or the parents might be part of the problem. There is no obligation to tell the parents or guardian and there is no even analysis, as far as I'm aware, of: we would tell the parent unless we were specifically concerned that the parent was part of the problem. No. Telling parents and guardians is not part of how Prevent operates.

So I'm going to move on to why Prevent's human rights harms matter. Of course the first thing to say is they matter because they are human rights violations. People have rights. There is a reason why we have rights under these treaties and they have a lot to do with lessons learned from history.

The State is obligated to respect everyone's human rights, and I'll note this is not a question of balance. The State is obligated to carry out all of its human

137

freedom of expression, which includes the right to receive and impart information; freedom of religion and belief. And then there is also the convention bans discrimination in how the State respects rights. It doesn't ban discrimination outright, but it says that everyone must enjoy these rights on an equal and non-discriminatory basis. Within the right to privacy there are also data protection concerns, some of which have been gestured at earlier and I would refer you to our two reports "Caught in the Web", and "Secret, confused And Illegal" where we outline some of the data protection failings and gaps under these programmes.

The freedoms of thought and opinion are absolute. The Human Rights Committee -- this is rare. Very occasionally the Human Rights Committee, which construes the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which the UK is a party, puts out what are called general comments, which are rigorous legal analyses of what the ICCPR requires. These are often years in the making involving a great deal of input from states, nonprofit organisations and others.

The Human Rights Committee General, comment 34, says:

"Paragraph 1 of Article 19", that is the freedom of expression as found in the ICCPR "requires protection of

139

rights obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights, all of the time. That means it is not a balance, for example, between respecting and protecting the right to life and respecting and protecting the other rights found in the conventions, such as privacy, free expression, freedom of religion and so on. The State has to respect all rights for everyone all the time, unless it has validly derogated from the treaty under the process set out in the treaty.

Prevent and Channel are starting out with not very much international credibility either. They have been the subject of repeated critiques and pointed questions at UN level, including by the Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. Again, this is not really where you want to be starting or winding up with, with your anti-violence programme.

A programme that has raised such enormous community level concerns about rights violations for 20 years is not going to be an effective one. There is huge mistrust of Prevent, including for the reasons I have been outlining.

Moving on to talk about what some of those human rights harms are. (unclear) to list some of these out here. Some of the ones that we tend to analyse include: the right to respect for private and family life;

138

the right to hold opinions without interference. This is a right to which the covenant permits no exception or restriction. Freedom of opinion extends to the right to change an opinion whenever and for whatever reason a person so freely chooses. No person may be subject to the impairment of any rights under the covenant on the basis of his or her actual, perceived or supposed opinions. All forms of opinion are protected, including opinions of a political, scientific, moral, historical, or religious nature. It is incompatible with paragraph 1 to criminalise the holding of an opinion. The harassment, intimidation or stigmatisation of a person including arrest, detention, trial or imprisonment for reasons of the opinions they may hold, constitute a violation of Article 19, paragraph 1."

There is also the Human Rights Committee General comment 22, which says:

"The right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, which includes the freedom to hold beliefs, in Article 18.1, is far reaching and profound. It encompasses freedom of thoughts on all matters, personal conviction and the commitment to religion or belief, whether manifested individually or in community with others. The Committee draws the attention of State parties to the fact that the freedom of thought and the

140

freedom of conscience are protected equally with the freedom of religion and belief. The fundamental character of these freedoms is also reflected in the fact that this provision cannot be derogated from. No exceptions. Even in times of public emergency, as stated in article 4.2 of the covenant."

In other words, the freedoms of thought and opinion are absolute. The State cannot attempt to pressure or coerce people into holding or abandoning certain thoughts or opinions. It is unlawful.

Going into some specific concerns about Channel. I should say, by the way, these are stock photographs. As a starting point and many other concerns flow from this, we say Channel is not consensual even though the Government likes to say it is and this is because -- I should say, first of all, the power relationships in the room are not exactly equal, whether a child or even their parents are really consenting when faced with State authorities, I think, will depend a lot on how empowered that child or those parents are and depending on, for example, their immigration status or how afraid they might be of the authorities or the police or having children taken away, social services, any of that, will really colour how we see the voluntariness or not of their consent.

141

involved and a record in police databases is always one of the results. If you are referred to Prevent, there will be a long lasting record of that in police databases even if it is later found not to require any further action. However, the programme isn't presented to people as a policing programme even though the police are always involved.

Under human rights law the Government is not allowed to push people towards the version of a religious or political belief that it prefers. Let me say that again: under human rights law, the UK Government is not allowed to push people towards the version of a religious or political belief that it prefers.

For example, it is not allowed to push people toward what it perceives as moderate Islam. People have a human right to hold literally whatever religious or political beliefs they like, although the State is allowed to circumscribe the expression or manifestation of those beliefs in some circumstances.

I want to say something briefly about population level versus individual level violence prevention, with the caveat that I'm not a public health expert and it would be much better to ask someone who was.

It brings me back to the question of what Prevent is really for. One would think that a population level

143

Beyond that our research indicates that if people do not agree to participate in Channel, they instead become the subjects of what is called a police-led partnership or PLP instead. A PLP, from what we can see, involves many of the same types of monitoring and intervention but with greater secrecy. It is not consent if there is no ability to decline and it is also not consent unless it is informed consent. And so I am asking, what happens if people don't consent? What might happen if they don't consent? Are they told about the alternatives and if you are told the alternative is that you are put in a police-led partnership, how much of a choice is that? Are you really consenting? And what might be the consequences of not saying yes to Channel? Might you face immigration consequences? Might you face social services intervention?

I think we really need to unpack this idea that Channel is consensual. We would say for a variety of reasons it is not; the consent is illusory.

We have additional concerns around the sharing of personal data under Channel especially under personal sensitive data -- I won't delve into the details but that is mentioned in one of our reports. Like Prevent we would say Channel is policing. I know it is often framed as safeguarding, but the police are always

142

intervention would treat violence as a society wide issue requiring systemic solutions, for example, in law.

If the goal is population level violence prevention, then trying to achieve that through by relying on whether a teacher or a doctor or a nurse or a local authority happens to make a referral and then whether this highly individualised intervention takes place, all through a programme that attracts an enormous amount of, as I said, chaff or false positives, that doesn't seem very logical for an attempt at population level change. I would defer to public health experts on that.

If the goal is individual level violence prevention then why is it so very broad? Again, attracting every year huge numbers of false positives? Why is it not more focused? And where is the evidence not only that Prevent is an effective form of violence prevention, but that it is more effective than alternatives would be?

Our conclusion is that Prevent is actually about intelligence gathering at a large scale, albeit using some surprisingly unreliable methods. At this point it's continued existence may also simply reflect institutional inertia or an institutional need to have a valve for concerns about people, regardless of what happens after the referral is made.

Some overarching points on proportionality and

144

safeguards. I want to emphasise this very strongly. The legal question before we get to any discussion on proportionality, is necessity. Violence prevention is absolutely a legitimate aim. So that's part of the test well. So the test is legality, legitimate aim, proportionality. Does the programme have a legitimate aim? I think we can say that any violence prevention programme has a legitimate aim. Is it legal? Does it follow the law? Is there a published law? Then the question is, is it necessary? Not is it reasonable or proportionate, although that can be a follow on test, but is it necessary?

So it is not correct to focus on what is proportionate without first addressing necessity. Again if you have no evidence I think it is very hard to make the necessity argument.

The court also asks -- the European Court of Human Rights -- is this the least restrictive means of achieving the legitimate aim? What alternatives has the State considered? Why has it rejected them?

So I also want to -- so the necessity test would be for things like for freedom of expression, freedom of religion and belief, privacy, freedom of assembly and association. For measures involving secret surveillance, the threshold is even higher; the test is

145

Independent Prevent Commissioner. But the Commissioner is Government appointed and appears to sit within the Government; so we would say not actually independent of the implementing institution or institutions and the extent of the watchdog nature that that role serves or is even intended to serve is unclear.

Again, there are serious gaps and other problems in the equality monitoring data that the Home Office is producing or more often not producing. There are ostensibly some data retention limits on some databases but as we documented, Prevent data can go just about anywhere in terms of the intelligence agencies and other authorities and it may well sit there forever.

On safeguards, so looking here at safeguards that the European Convention would require, clear legal framework with foreseeable consequences. There must be a law or binding regulations. It is not enough just to have a policy statement. For anything like secret surveillance, there has to be some form of notification or something like the Investigatory Powers Tribunal; independent authorisation and review typically by a judge or something that is very, very court like. The court really scrutinises this strictly. And effective remedies for any harms. It cannot be the case that the

147

strict necessity. This comes from *Klass v Germany*, a case that goes back to the 1970s.

The court has reiterated this numerous times in cases over the decades. To have secret surveillance, it must be strictly necessary to achieving a legitimate aim. It is a high threshold. Again, it is not legally correct to jump to proportionality and necessity means the least restrictive means of achieving a legitimate aim.

I would add further that it is for the Government to show that the measure is necessary to achieving a legitimate aim, it is not for the rest of us to show that it is not necessary, it is for the Government.

So thinking again about why -- so when we think about necessity as well, part of what that means -- and this is also part of the legality principle -- is that the programme cannot hand unfettered discretion to the authorities to interfere with, say, privacy of expression rights and there should also be protections against bias and arbitrariness.

Safeguards. So this is an attempt by us to answer the question asked about safeguards. Again, we would say that Prevent as a whole violates rights. Some ostensible safeguards within Prevent -- and again I say this with no disrespect -- there is what is termed the

146

Government just violates rights and then nothing happens. People have to be able to get redress. Under Prevent we never see that. We usually don't even see people try because they are scared. There also need to be clear data retention limits. Again, discrimination in respect of rights is not permitted.

I am not going to go into detail on this because I'm conscious that I'm coming up on time but just to say that children also have rights under the Convention On the Rights of the Child to which the UK is a party. Children do not have lesser human rights just because they are children. It may affect the test of what's say necessary to achieving legitimate aim but it is not the case that children's rights are attenuated by virtue of their age.

Again, I'm not going to delve into this but disabled people also have rights under the Equality Act 2010, including protection from discrimination, harassment and victimisation and kind of the stereotyping we fear we are seeing. I mention this because under equality laws I understand that autism and other forms of neurodivergence may qualify as disabilities. That is not a statement by me about whether a neurodivergent should always be understood as a disability or about who gets to decide that, but I note that disability is

148

protected under the Equality Act including via the Public Sector Equality Duty. Under the PSED, the Public Sector Equality Duty, the Government is obligated to have due regard to the need to tackle prejudice against -- certainly not promote prejudice against -- disabled people.

The Government is also obligated to have due regard to eliminating discrimination and harassment. One could ask how this fits with the large overrepresentation of autistic people in Prevent.

So pronouncements about disabilities or disabled people, no matter by whom and no matter with what intentions, that are not demonstrably grounded in research run a serious risk of promoting stereotypes. And when I say grounded in research, I would add the caution that disabled people have faced hundreds of years of stereotyping in science and medicine. So we all need to take a close look at what the research is and what the underlying assumptions might have been. It is not acceptable in human rights terms to make unsupported assertions about autistic people or anybody else.

So to briefly summarise, Prevent is designed to detect ideology or future ideology not risks of violence per se.

Prevent is not evidence based. We have never seen

149

the evidentiary basis for it. We don't see the evidence coming out of it, certainly not in a peer reviewed, strongly scrutinised way. Prevent plainly violates several human rights. It interferes with people's rights without demonstrating necessity arguably without legality. It is widely resented and mistrusted. It does not apply throughout the UK, it only applies in three out of the four nations. Channel has many of the same shortcomings.

The safeguards mandated by the European Convention on Human Rights or interferences of the relevant rights include legality, meaning clear and specific laws, demonstrable necessity to achieving the aim, nondiscrimination and adequate remedies for the harms.

I will leave things there. Thank you again for inviting us to speak.

SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: Thank you very much indeed.

MR MOSS: Ms St Vincent, thank you very much for your presentation.

Sir, with your permission, could we break now please and have a slightly longer break at this stage, so work can be done on questions for the plenary session. So could we say a prompt start, ready to go at 2.30 pm, sir?

SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: Certainly.

150

(1.15 pm)

(The short adjournment)

(2.30 pm)

SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: Yes, Mr Moss.

MR MOSS: Thank you, sir. May I first of all, please, just invite Mr Hall to deal with the matters that were left over from his final slide, if I may.

Presentation by MR HALL (continued)

MR HALL: Thank you very much. This is the question of data sharing which I really would suggest no-one should underestimate. Let's imagine you constructed a big front door and then there were two paths. You'd have the path of traditional Prevent management, whether it's police-led partnerships or consensual chaired by the local authority, that would be dealing with normal counter-terrorism risk. Let's imagine you had another strand that was dealing with violence-fixated individuals who didn't fall within counter-terrorism. You would very quickly find that people would be very nervous about sharing information, so local authorities to police, Ministry of Justice, et cetera.

When I did my MAPPA report, I remember going around all the different agencies and saying, "Why are you not sharing information?" and it all came back to the lawyers who were saying, "Yes we think there are

151

gateways under the Data Protection Act but it is complicated and we need more time". In the end, I made a recommendation that they created a bespoke statutory gateway to allow disclosure and that was done under the Criminal Justice Act. I am told, anecdotally, that of all the stuff that I've done that is probably the most impactful. I'm told already that where you have cases which are looking more and more -- sorry, less and less like traditional terrorism having come through Prevent that this issue, have we got the basis to share information, what is the right gateway, that is already causing problems.

Whatever management structure you have, please have a statutory gateway for sharing information.

SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: That was worth adding. Thank you very much.

MR MOSS: Sir, thank you.

Could I just deal with one important matter in this way. Sir, as you know, a number of questions that we might have addressed with the panel this afternoon arise in the field of data and the importance of that we have heard lots of information about, including in today's seminars. But because of the importance of that issue, we have considered the matter over the lunch adjournment and we are in fact going to pick those matters up, if we

152

may, in writing -- so with each of the seminar speakers from today -- not because it is unimportant but because it is very important, and so that we have the detail. So we will be following up in writing, in particular, to get specific assistance with particularly which data that may be currently available but is not being released. They would propose for further work or release and which data, which may not be currently being gathered in, but should be gathered in because it would inform the process and assist with issues of legality, they would recommend as well and, because of the detail of that, it's not probably apt for dealing with *ad hoc* in a discussion. So we will follow up on that in detail.

Could I just make clear to our seminar speakers that that does not in any way prevent you or seek to encourage you not to talk about data, but just to reassure you that such is the importance of that arising from the seminars this morning that, sir, with your permission, we will deal with that in writing if we may.

SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: Please. Very sensible.

MR MOSS: Thank you.

Sir, as yesterday, before I turn to some questions, are there any questions that you would like to pose first?

153

sort of stuff. You can always spoof a geo-block by using a VPN. What I think is quite interesting is that the Government is bringing in -- as of yesterday, they have announced what they call "device level controls" for taking nude pictures and the idea is that you would mandate tech companies by law to have a filter on the operating systems -- so literally the IOS on your iPad or your iPhone or whatever -- which if it detects a certain pattern of behaviour, in this case taking a picture of a nude person yourself, would require you to verify your identity to prove that you're over a certain age.

So, yes I think is the answer. That device level is probably where you are at. It won't be instantaneous because people have old devices, but I think one would want to mandate at an operating system level so that you can't get round the geo-block with a VPN. But in a word, yes.

SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: You would generally supportive of the idea and you think it may be feasible, at least to the extent that you have indicated?

MR HALL: Yes, and I think I would go further. I would not want to wait for an evidence-based model. I think the chips are in. I mean, you can read any number of books and reports and learned articles. I would be very

155

SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: Just two from me. Thank you very much.

This is generally directed at the four of you, however many would wish to contribute. We have heard, unsurprisingly, quite a lot over the last couple of days about the extent of time that some young people spend, so it appears, on the internet in a wide variety of different locations, some of which one might say are very, very undesirable indeed for young minds and young people, particularly if they are isolated, which raises a whole variety of questions as to what one could contemplate doing about that.

The question I want to ask is whether, and the extent to which, you each feel that legislation has any place in this in terms of trying to impose some kind of workable restriction on an evidence-based basis, on access to either the internet altogether or, much less dramatically than that, being able to impose some kind of controls over the extent to which people can roam freely over the web, the dark web and everywhere else.

So, Mr Hall?

MR HALL: I think, yes, legislation does have a role. The question is always enforcement and whether you can get round geo-blocking measures. US companies will say, "We want the right to beam gore" and there are, as you know, platforms dedicated to gore and live surgery and all

154

worried about waiting for three years' worth of evidence.

SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: Thank you. Lord Anderson?

LORD ANDERSON: I'm generally supportive of the concept of device level controls and also of the concept of barring access or seeking to bar access to the internet at certain times of day or for certain age groups, but I do think they are fallible, highly fallible, and I do not think they are a substitute for what we really have to do which is to seek to enforce upon the tech companies themselves, albeit they may not be based here, the duty of care which, under our law, they owe to the citizen and, in particular, to the child and to the young person.

I do appreciate there are great geopolitical difficulties in achieving that, but I don't think that's a goal we should lose sight of as we start trying to regulate, and possibly penalise, our own citizens.

SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: Thank you very much. Ms St Vincent?

MS ST VINCENT: We would not be supportive. I think it is not necessarily the case that the evidence is in. There may be anecdotes but I think what we would really need to see is a review of the existing literature on whether there is a causal relationship between viewing violent materials and engaging in violent acts. We, in

156

preparing for my speaking here today, did at least a cursory review and I think that that evidence is not necessarily in. Indeed, we have seen previous moral panics around things like comic books, video games, and so on, violent films, various types of violent material, and over time it's been disproven that there's a causal link between those materials and violence.

Now, you may say, "Well, it's the internet and it's omnipresent and it's also very explicit and you can just binge it endlessly", maybe, but again I would want to see research on whether there is actually causation there, especially before something so serious as a restriction is undertaken.

Secondly, you said there's a need to avoid moral panics and a need to avoid assuming causal relationships. Secondly, it would need to be compliant with the Human Rights Act and so we would be looking mainly at Articles 8 and 10, the right to privacy and the right to free expression which includes the right to receive and impart information. There is one way of reading the Convention that would say that the right to receive and impart information is absolute. I think we would need to look further into that, but that's one reading of it and you can imagine why that might be.

But the test would be: is it necessary to achieving

157

the companies. Why? Does the internet look the way it looks? Why do their profit models look the way they do? Why do we all have the instant capability to upload violent materials? Not that we shouldn't but maybe we ought to be looking at the origin. If the concern is the material, how does the material get there and why do things look the way they do?

SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: Mr Roxburgh?

MR ROXBURGH: I think if we look at what's happened in Australia since the introduction of the laws they placed there, the Australia regulator's own compliance data has found that around seven in ten under-16s still held their accounts on banned platforms and there was no notable change in some factors like cyber-bullying or image-based abuse complaints in that time as well.

Concerningly as well, the ban has potentially driven children to increasingly less regulated spaces online -- so potentially more risky platforms in those terms as well. That's obviously a risk concern.

I think as Lord Anderson notes as well, there's a need to tackle the root causes of harm and harmful content and that's tech companies' business models and designs which drive a lot of that.

I think it is worth noting as well from research in the UK 60 per cent of children have seen real-world acts

159

legitimate aim? I think that test is usually pretty easy to fulfil. Is it lawful? Is there a clear and specific law that is narrow enough not to allow unfettered discretion or arbitrariness or bias, and is this necessary to achieving the legitimate aim? I think in order to show that it is necessary, you would need to have the evidence base for it.

I think that an ID requirement would have a chilling effect if we all had to put in an ID before we viewed any kind of material that someone had deemed to be violent, and how is someone going to make that determination, what is violent, what is graphic, what is not and who gets to decide that? If you make people put in an ID, you're just not going to review it and so the chilling effect of that could violate the Human Rights Act as well.

I would invite us to a thought experiment. If it weren't the internet, if it were a library, what would we accept? Are we going to say that some people are not allowed in certain rooms, are not allowed to read certain books? If the internet is different, why is that?

I want to pick up on something Lord Anderson has said which is: before we jump to surveillance of and restrictions on individuals, why don't we think about

158

of violence online. That increases for 85 per cent for those most at risk of violence as well. Perhaps most troubling of all, among a lot of troubling statistics, 27 per cent had content promoting violence against women and girls promoted to them by platforms.

SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: Thank you very much. Dr Betts?

DR BETTS: So I haven't got a strong answer to it. I would probably just go back to what I said during my main presentation, that I think the drivers of violence are not well understood. I guess almost what Ms St Vincent is saying is accurate here, in that you could leap at -- you know, I'm old enough to remember "video nasties" and the kind of legislation that followed around that and I just wonder whether we're in a similar space. I don't know. I don't know whether it does drive violence or not. I don't think it's particularly well understood.

I also think that more work is needed around different types of violence. You know, I think it's perhaps too easy to talk about violence as a kind of unproblematic concept. Different types of violence might have different drivers and, indeed, different protective factors that make things better or worse. I just think that's not well understood, including the role of the internet. That's one of several possibilities.

160

1 **SIR ADRIAN FULFORD:** Thank you very much indeed.

2 **MR HALL:** Can I jump in here since we're allowed to.

3 On this evidence point, I think it is wrong to say
4 that there is no evidence of causation because there are
5 certain patterns of behaviour. For example, we know
6 that there are individuals who have recently been
7 convicted in this country who wanted to copy AR. The
8 only reason that they want to copy AR is because they
9 fetishised material that's online about the attack, and
10 they do so in forums that are dedicated to that sort of
11 violence and they want to appear online in future forums
12 as someone with a particularly high, what they would
13 call, "kill count".

14 I don't think that you can say there is no evidence
15 where there are people who are only committing
16 particular types of violence. It may be that if it
17 wasn't for the internet they would commit other sorts of
18 violence, but the specific sort of violence which we are
19 particularly worried about is only committed because
20 they see it online in particular forums where they are
21 looking for status and notoriety.

22 So I would just question this point about we need
23 more evidence, we need more data, and I would be
24 interested to know actually what your rebuttal to that
25 is.

161

1 legal teams is that, as you know, in February 2023 the
2 Government accepted the Shawcross recommendation 15 that
3 referrals should have an identifiable ideological
4 element. Lord Anderson, you referred to that as being
5 something that had not perhaps been put into effect
6 actually on the ground.

7 But we also know, not least from documents like key
8 principles of Prevent, that it stated that a clear
9 identifiable ideology is not mandatory to make, or
10 indeed to adopt, a Prevent referral.

11 With your particular experience and insight, do you
12 consider that that tension between those statements have
13 an actual practical impact on the effectiveness of
14 Prevent in relation to this cohort?

15 **LORD ANDERSON:** Well, I would say that until 2025 there was
16 uncertainty or ignorance among many Prevent
17 practitioners, and many of those subject to the Prevent
18 duty, as to whether that duty did extend to those we
19 might, for shorthand, describe as VFIs.

20 How far that has got to do with the twists and turns
21 of the Government accepting Shawcross's recommendations
22 and then saying things that are plainly inconsistent
23 with recommendation 15, I don't know. I think it had
24 a lot to do with that letter of 2019 probably not being
25 as well known as it should have been. I cited some

163

1 **SIR ADRIAN FULFORD:** Well, one more answer. Can I ask it to
2 be short because we have a lot of ground to cover.

3 **MS ST VINCENT:** Sorry, I didn't say there was no evidence.
4 What I said was you need to look at the academic
5 evidence base, people who have done well-designed
6 studies, scientifically designed studies, to see is the
7 viewing of violent material a causal factor in the
8 commission of violence. I take Dr Betts' point that we
9 may need to be looking at different types of violence as
10 well, but what I'm saying is not looking at what's
11 happened here or there but look at the published
12 literature on what is it that causes violence and does
13 the viewing of violent material cause violence?

14 **SIR ADRIAN FULFORD:** Thank you very much. That has taken up
15 longer than I anticipated but it was very useful. I'm
16 going to ration myself and pass over to you, Mr Moss.

17 **MR MOSS:** Sir, thank you.

18 As yesterday, three topic areas to cover, probably
19 splitting the time roughly equally between them. The
20 first general topic area is VFI or NIEV, leaving aside
21 for the moment exactly how it is defined, and the
22 current scope of Prevent.

23 So, may I start with this and direct this, certainly
24 in the first instance, to you, Lord Anderson. One of
25 the issues that has been raised by some of the victim

162

1 figures in my report of the small proportion of VFI
2 referrals that actually made it as far as Channel.
3 Curiously, the region of the country with the highest
4 percentage, I recall, was the North West, although very
5 sadly the referrals of AR did not make it that far.

6 So there was certainly a lack of certainty. There
7 was certainly a degree of ignorance in relation to
8 a subject that had not hit the media or the public
9 consciousness to the extent that it did in mid-2024 and,
10 in particular, early 2025.

11 The Government, I think, to be fair, has tried to
12 put that right. It didn't wait until February 2026. It
13 put out an interim item of guidance in March 2025 (that
14 I referred to, I think, at 5.7 of my report) in which it
15 made the position on VFIs very clear. We are now
16 seeing, as you have seen from the statistics, larger
17 numbers of people being referred who are VFIs and larger
18 numbers being accepted into Channel.

19 **MR MOSS:** Thank you.

20 Could I open that out to the panel in this way: if
21 we can put to one side for the moment the question of
22 whether Prevent is the right or the best pathway, is the
23 concept that someone without any clear ideology but
24 a fascination with violence, that they are at risk of
25 being drawn into terrorism and therefore do fall within

164

1 Prevent, is that a workable and reliable compromise or
2 would you prefer changes to the formal tests and role of
3 Prevent to make that more overt and clear? Mr Roxburgh?

4 **MR ROXBURGH:** I think on that specifically there's need for
5 greater clarity on it because you have a dual challenge
6 here which we are trying to balance out. If you have
7 too broad a definition, the risk is you capture far too
8 much and the wrong people end up in the system at
9 different stages pressing through it. If you have it
10 too narrow, you potentially miss people as well. How
11 therefore do you get the balance?

12 I think on that, not being clear on what the
13 behaviours demonstrated within that space are of concern
14 is particularly key. So just because they don't fit
15 an ideology, but they might be demonstrating other
16 behaviours, is the differentiating between the two. You
17 need to be identifying what is the stuff that is
18 indicators that this person is a genuine risk in that
19 environment.

20 **MR MOSS:** Ms St Vincent, would you have anything to add to
21 that?

22 **MS ST VINCENT:** What I would say is what is a fascination
23 with violence, and who decides? That's not a medical
24 diagnosis that I'm aware of and it is not
25 a psychological diagnosis that I'm aware of. So who is
165

1 the definition says.

2 I think if you think about it correctly, it is not
3 a stretch. So I agree with Lord Anderson that someone
4 who is fascinated by violence, whatever that means, of
5 this sort is likely to be at risk of then pursuing
6 violence in order to advance one of those types of
7 causes. So I would try and get rid of the word
8 "ideological" and "ideology" and go back to the meaning
9 of the word terrorism.

10 **MR MOSS:** Thank you.

11 Dr Betts, do you have anything specifically on this
12 to add?

13 **DR BETTS:** Yes. Just to say, I think it is a really
14 important point not to be missed because, you know, in
15 my experience, the clarity that could derive from these
16 recommendations for practitioners is really important.
17 I said in my main kind of evidence that I think, you
18 know, Jonathan's point about that information sharing is
19 the same; the lawyers will argue there are stacks of
20 legal gateways, but practitioners frankly will be
21 frightened about taking some of those gateways in the
22 absence of real clarity on it, and I think this is
23 exactly the same.

24 **MR MOSS:** Thank you.

25 Next this: Lord Anderson, but I will open it up to
167

1 deciding whether someone is fascinated with violence and
2 what does that mean?

3 In terms of being drawn into terrorism, I note the
4 passive voice there. How is the entry into terrorism
5 happening and also what does "terrorism" mean? As you
6 know, we think Prevent should end; so we would say that
7 no-one is suitable for referral to Prevent.

8 **MR MOSS:** We will come on to what the alternative might be
9 in further questions.

10 Lord Anderson?

11 **LORD ANDERSON:** Just very briefly, it is a bit of a stretch
12 but, in my view, the current law is just about wide
13 enough to encompass those we have referred to as VFIs.
14 My full reasons for that I won't repeat but they are at
15 5.19 of my report. That said, it would be tidier and
16 preferable, since we are apparently going to amend the
17 law anyway, if it were amended to put this beyond doubt.

18 **MR HALL:** I think there is a terminological problem with
19 using the words "ideology" and "ideological". Actually,
20 this is about terrorism. The definition of terrorism is
21 carrying out some act of violence to intimidate the
22 public in order to advance a political, racial,
23 religious, or ideological cause. People tend to as
24 shorthand talk about this being ideological and someone
25 having to have an ideology, but that's not in fact what
168

1 others in a moment, what do you in practical terms make
2 of the increase in referrals that you referred to in the
3 most recent statistics? Does that suggest that the
4 purpose of Prevent and Channel is either not understood
5 by those making referrals when one looks at the very
6 significant increase in overall numbers? Are they being
7 used inappropriately as a risk displacement service or
8 a referral of last resort? Or, on the other hand, does
9 it in fact simply show that there has been
10 an improvement in the willingness to make referrals and
11 an improvement to the understanding that it covers both
12 unclear ideology and those whose problem is
13 a fascination with violence?

14 **LORD ANDERSON:** Well, I will focus, if I may, on the
15 56 per cent of referrals in the latest figures. That is
16 the ones which are neither ideological nor VFIs.

17 I would say the number has increased. I think that
18 has a lot to do with risk aversion after Southport.
19 Nobody wants to be the person that did not refer the
20 next AR, and we will have to see, as I mention, whether
21 that is a durable effect or not. I think it has
22 something to do, as you suggest, with a phenomenon that
23 William Shawcross noted, which is some people are at
24 their wits' end for other remedies and think that
25 Prevent, because it is relatively well funded, might
168

prevent something useful. I think it has something to do with training and I mentioned that. My own experience of the training was that possibly, certainly on the basis of the exercises that I undertook, there was a degree of encouragement at least to consider referring people who might be a very long way from violence, which is not to say they were without other problems.

I think lying behind that might be the history of Prevent and some points that Sarah was making about how Prevent has been controversial from the start. I think a lot of the attempts to persuade people to use the Prevent duty and a lot of the training has been based around the concept we've got to encourage people to use it because there are so many people out there trying to deter you from using it, and possibly a consequence of that has been a tendency to over-inclusiveness. So I would say that the training needs looking at.

MR MOSS: Thank you. Any of the other panel wish to come in on that?

MS ST VINCENT: I would say briefly that I think in this, as with other Prevent trends, the Home Office has been disturbingly incurious. I think it is for the Home Office to look at why there might be an increase in referrals, and the fact that we would see such a large

169

in terms of range of reasons. Stuff we've seen is greater awareness of the programme, an increase in the better safe than sorry approach from those subject to Prevent duty, and referral of last resource. Anecdotally, we know people really struggle to get children access into other services. On occasions, that leads to different outcomes, one of which is it could behaviour has deteriorated and they then look to Prevent or they use Prevent as a shortcut through to other services potentially in that situation as well.

What's key on this we need to understand what's happening to these children with the increase in referrals. Where are they going? We know a majority of them are again referred back particularly into education settings. What's happening to them then? What other services, if any, are engaging with them? What's the prognosis in that space as well so we can understand a bit more about what this uptick looks like, what the underlying drivers are, and what's happening to children subsequently?

MR MOSS: Thank you.

Mr Hall, one of the issues that has been raised by, again, one of the victims' teams is the emphasis in your written presentation in your slides to the national security apparatus, taking it in short, not really being

171

jump in referrals but no apparent explanation from the Home Office and no serious effort to look at that is really disturbing.

MR MOSS: Dr Betts? Anyone else?

DR BETTS: Yes, just from me -- I think -- sorry, I can't see in the room.

MR MOSS: Please don't worry. Do go on, Dr Betts, and I will come back to Mr Roxburgh.

DR BETTS: There are two other hypotheses that are just worth testing in this space. One is actually is it indicative of a growing problem? That can't be ruled out at this stage. The other one, I think, is kind of where else do you refer? If you're sat as a school teacher or in another profession with a kind of problem, as I said in my main evidence, they seem to be quite good at spotting this stuff, where else are you going to send it?

I think there are 17 violence reduction units, so not every local authority has one. The police isn't, you know, a routine call for this type of activity. So, you know, I think those two things are both worth consideration.

MR MOSS: Thank you. Mr Roxburgh, I think you wanted to come in.

MR ROXBURGH: Yes, I would echo both what Lord Anderson said

170

necessarily set up to look out for and identify VFIs in the same way as counter-terrorism subjects of interest.

They go back to the fact that, while AR did not have an ideology, the sentencing judge concluded that his culpability for the extreme level of violence was equivalent in seriousness to it and, of course, that's something that you emphasised in your own report, those aspects, in looking at whether there should be a change in definitions.

But the question arising from that is, if the national security apparatus is not trained on this threat, does the current whole structure leave a gap in the identification and management of individuals who may present a risk of extreme violence without an ideological or terrorist motivation, and is the issue then much wider than simply Prevent?

MR HALL: Yes. There are obviously gaps because there are terrible, terrible crimes like Wayne Couzens. I mean -- there are these awful iconically bad attacks, murders, killings which are not detected and when they have happened you think: how on earth -- what could we have done as a society?

I think there is a really profound moral question here about what the VFI fits in. I think I can look at it in two ways. Are you saying, question, that you put

172

1 more resources into dealing with people like AR because
 2 their attacks, if they take place, are particularly
 3 impactful? And that's more or less what the sentencing
 4 judge is saying: it is the equivalent to terrorism. It
 5 is so serious that compared to other attacks, other
 6 sorts of murders, other sorts of violence that might
 7 exist in the world, any number of killings that take
 8 place in the UK, this type of attack is so bad that you
 9 have to add extra resources. It is something I struggle
 10 with. I'm always thinking about terrorism, why is
 11 terrorism worse than, from the perspective of the
 12 victim, someone who is stabbed over a drugs deal, for
 13 example? Why is it you put so many resources into one
 14 and not the other? I think the answer is that terrorism
 15 undermines us all as a society. It's sort of a real
 16 sense of losing control of our own society in a way that
 17 individual murders -- and this is a terrible thing for
 18 us to say -- individually of course it does, but from
 19 wider society. So do you say in a way these VFI attacks
 20 undermine society in a way that's so akin to terrorism
 21 it merits that sort of response? Or are you saying,
 22 this is the alternative, it doesn't matter whether this
 23 sort of attack is as serious as terrorism or not, but it
 24 is close enough to terrorism that it falls so closely
 25 within the counter-terrorism system that since we pick

173

1 people don't spend much time interacting with flesh and
 2 blood human beings in bricks and mortar settings, and
 3 that's why I made the careful recommendation that all
 4 feasible and rights compliant avenues should be explored
 5 as a matter of priority to enable evidence of online
 6 activity to be more effectively used, including in
 7 assisting in the identification of potential subjects
 8 for Prevent. I cited the work of Adam Hadley who many
 9 here will know from Tech Against Terrorism, who promoted
 10 the case for a centralised consolidated open source
 11 intelligence agency. This is not spooky stuff, spying
 12 on people; it is more effectively examining the traces
 13 that people choose to leave on the open internet, and it
 14 seemed to me that's one way into this problem. It is
 15 a difficult problem and will be difficult from the point
 16 of view of civil liberties but that is not a reason for
 17 not thinking about it.

18 **MR MOSS:** We can pick that up with him next week. Thank
 19 you.

20 So, Mr Roxburgh and Ms St Vincent, if I may, one of
 21 the questions again that the bereaved families have
 22 asked to be put forward based upon your presentations is
 23 to emphasise that AR had been referred to Prevent three
 24 times in 16 months. He was closed each time on the
 25 footing that there was no counter-terrorism or domestic

175

1 up people like that within the CT system of Prevent, we
 2 need to engineer Prevent and counter-terrorism risk
 3 management in a way that it can also deal with these.

4 So the answer is yes there is a gap, and I suppose
 5 the question you have always have to answer is: why do
 6 you say this particular form of violence, on what basis
 7 do you say this particular form of violence needs
 8 additional work and resources compared to all the other
 9 violence that take place?

10 **MR MOSS:** Thank you. Does anyone wish to come in on that?
 11 Lord Anderson?

12 **LORD ANDERSON:** Just quickly if I may, when you talk about
 13 identifying VFIs or indeed identifying people who are
 14 potentially going to be drawn into terrorism, for the
 15 purposes of Prevent, the mechanism that we have all
 16 grown used to is a Prevent duty which places a duty on
 17 flesh and blood individuals in bricks and mortar
 18 settings, principally schools, medical settings and
 19 local authorities, families and friends of course as
 20 well, who, when somebody comes to their attention, can
 21 tell the authorities about it.

22 So in a sense some of the comments that have been
 23 made about identification have to be translated into
 24 that prior setting. I think the challenge is, as has
 25 been said by other speakers, when so many of these young

174

1 extremism concern and handed to what one closure record
 2 called "mainstream safeguarding". Then, in the words of
 3 the legal representatives for those important Core
 4 Participants, they say: who then did very little, and
 5 the Chair's findings about the adequacy and inadequacy
 6 of what was done are set out in full in the report.

7 The question is, on your analysis, what should have
 8 happened to somebody like AR with that background who is
 9 reported?

10 **MR ROXBURGH:** So I think first of all early intervention is
 11 really key. So the first point whereby illegal and
 12 worrying behaviours are being shown, so when he is
 13 bringing a knife into a school environment and admitting
 14 that he is doing that, an intervention very early on
 15 there, even if it is a knife crime reduction programme
 16 or something needs to be implemented as soon as
 17 possible.

18 Now my understanding, and do correct me if I'm
 19 wrong, is he did later engage with a programme which had
 20 the focus on knife crime, but that was eight months or
 21 so after he first was found to be bringing a knife into
 22 school and was excluded from Range High School at that
 23 point. That's a delay between that first and that
 24 second point.

25 So first of all, really early interventions when

176

risky or illegal behaviours are happening. Diversionary mechanisms at that stage are really important.

Secondly, I think then when a child is in the system, if you like, it is really crucial that there is someone there taking responsibility for that child in the system. So who is the person who is liaising between different agencies, who is potentially building a relationship potentially with the child or with the child's parents or guardians as well? So someone who is independently professorial but who can build that relationship to see where that child is tracking towards, what are their patterns of behaviour, how are they engaging with different services. Essentially a coordination point, someone to take ownership of what's happening with that child at different stages, which are points I believe were missing as well.

Finally on the repeat Prevent referrals. I think there are probably two things here. First of all the context from where the referrals were coming from. They were coming from a school which had particular specialisms and expertise. I think the fact that they were coming from there should have raised additional concerns for those reviewing the reports. I think secondly repeat referrals, and I think there have been some policy changes since then, should also garner

177

society to seek to change the opinions or beliefs of someone who was, for example, an extreme or violent misogynist? Would you not support, for example, a programme in prison which seeks to rehabilitate those who have previously engaged in violence against women? How does that differ from a programme which seeks to prevent individuals from being drawn into violent ideologies?

MS ST VINCENT: Under human rights law the State cannot use pressure or coercion to try to get people to change their opinions or believes full stop. People have a human right to think or believe whatever they like. We may not be comfortable with that but that's what the Human Rights Conventions say. You and I might find those believes odious, and we are entitled to those opinions as well, but people have a human right to hold misogynist beliefs and many do.

People -- sorry, the Government is not permitted to try and enter people's heads and change what they think or what they believe, and I think we can all see what the dangers of that kind of practice might be. What the state is permitted to limit in some circumstances, under those tests that I outlined, is how people express or manifest those opinions or beliefs or thoughts.

When it comes to, say, various forms of

179

greater attention as to what may be happening with that child, even if it doesn't meet the level at which Prevent may take on an individual at that stage as well.

There is a few different things there I think, but essentially the key things are early intervention, someone taking ownership in the system for a child rather than the child being bounced from agency to agency, who can build a relationship, see a wider picture with that child, build a relationship with parents; and finally, if there is repeat referrals having a greater look at what's going on with that, even if it isn't meeting a threshold for, say, Prevent.

MR MOSS: Ms St Vincent, is there something you wish to add to that?

MS ST VINCENT: We don't have the institutional knowledge of UK agencies to be able to say, so I appreciate that. I would not say we endorse that because we don't have the knowledge, we don't have anything to add here.

MR MOSS: Thank you. Can I ask you then this direct to you, Ms St Vincent. Again it has been raised by one of the Core Participants, that noting that you suggest that changing opinions and beliefs is or risks being a rights violation, really the question is where does that lead? What's the practical implication of that? Is it your view that it would never be necessary in a democratic

178

encouragement or education that are not coercive, whether those are human rights compliant is going to be a fact-specific enquiry I would say the case law of the European court suggests.

In terms of the hypothetical, I would say a prison is inherently an environment with a great deal of coercion. People aren't free to leave. We could ask whether consent is consent. There might be a truly voluntary programme for people who have engaged in various forms of violence or other behaviours and wish to change their ways or wish to explore other ideas, but whether those activities are rights compliant would be a fact-specific enquiry.

MR MOSS: Can you understand the concern that may lie behind that question? That for the families of those who have been murdered who harbours views encouraging of extreme violence, that the concept that one couldn't, even in prison, legitimately seek to warn them and educate them against those thoughts and acting on them, may be difficult to see as being good for society?

MS ST VINCENT: What I'm saying -- to be clear, I'm not saying that in a prison you could not have a voluntary programme or that you couldn't have various types of programme. What I am saying is the State cannot seek to pressure or force someone to change their mind.

180

1 **MR MOSS:** Thank you. If you move now to the second topic,
 2 how effective is Prevent at managing the risk from this
 3 cohort, could I ask the panel this: Ms St Vincent in her
 4 presentation spoke clearly about concerns about
 5 safeguards that would be required in RSI's view to
 6 ensure legality. Could I give the panel an opportunity
 7 to respond to that, to deal practically with what
 8 safeguards are needed to ensure that referrals involving
 9 children and how they are handled are proportionate and
 10 developmentally informed and do not disproportionately
 11 affect children from particular ethnic, religious or
 12 social backgrounds? Lord Anderson?

13 **LORD ANDERSON:** I would agree with those who have said that
 14 information is key. To give Prevent credit and while
 15 giving them credit I really have to say in response to
 16 Sarah's earlier comment that as the Prevent Commissioner
 17 I was entirely independent of the Home Office, and I'm
 18 quite capable as the Home Office will confirm of saying
 19 things that they didn't like to hear, but one does have
 20 to give them credit for some things and they did in
 21 about 2016 start publishing data. The reason that Sarah
 22 and others are keen to see more data on race, on ASD, on
 23 mental disability and so on is precisely so that they
 24 can do the necessary advocacy.

The other thing I would say in favour of the Home

181

1 people appear in uniform, when they appear, do they
 2 appear at the school, do they appear at the home, and of
 3 course proper thought has to be given to the questioning
 4 of a child, particularly if an adult is not present.

5 So our law provides for safeguards, if those
 6 safeguards are not thought sufficient then our courts
 7 entertain claims, and they have entertained claims about
 8 Prevent and some of those claims have been successful.

9 So I would say the mechanisms are there. I welcome
 10 the fact that there is pressure and that there is
 11 challenge on Prevent to make sure the safeguards are
 12 adequate and, at the end of the day, thank goodness, in
 13 this country, governed by the rule of law, it is the
 14 courts that decide whether they are sufficient.

15 **MR MOSS:** Thank you.

16 Mr Hall, appreciating that you are careful to give
 17 the caveat that you are not a Prevent programme
 18 specialist, is there anything that you would wish to add
 19 to that?

20 **MR HALL:** I think at the individual level, I think you need
 21 as much clarity as possible for the decision-maker. So
 22 when the decision-maker is making a decision, whether
 23 the person is neurodiverse, black, white, Christian,
 24 Muslim, whatever, they are making a decision on the
 25 basis of clarity rather than on the basis of just

183

1 Office in this respect, is that partly because Prevent
 2 has been so criticised, and I don't say all this
 3 criticism has been unconstructive, I don't say that at
 4 all, because it has been criticised for much of the last
 5 20 years, there is a lot of internal soul searching
 6 going on and always has been. There is a group, I think
 7 called HASI, within the Home Office which does a lot of
 8 internal monitoring of efficacy and there is an external
 9 monitoring programme going on as well.

10 The central answer on the question of safeguards is
 11 that, as you well know, consent to a Prevent
 12 intervention is voluntary and in almost half of cases,
 13 that consent is not given. I would suggest that that
 14 statistic is quite difficult to square with the
 15 assertion that consent is effectively forced or imposed
 16 on people by pressure. One might say that there is
 17 a problem with a very large proportion of those referred
 18 to Prevent not giving their consent.

19 But of course I do appreciate there are arguments
 20 about stigma. I think people referred to any sort of
 21 safeguarding programme are capable of experiencing
 22 stigma, even if it is child social services with a far,
 23 far higher number of referrals, and that may be
 24 particularly intense in relation to Prevent. A lot of
 25 thought needs to be given about, you know, whether

182

1 nebulous concern.

2 So I think having clear definitions is useful. Also
 3 picking up something Paul was saying, I think having the
 4 confidence to say no. I'm always worried with these
 5 risk management programmes, there's always the risk of
 6 people thinking "What if I'm the one who doesn't do the
 7 referral and then that is the person who goes and
 8 carries out some terrible attack?"

9 So -- I know this is uncomfortable because we are in
 10 an Inquiry, but I'm just going to be honest with you
 11 because I pick this up when I speak to people, people in
 12 officialdom are worried about being the one whose neck
 13 is in the noose when it comes to an inquest or
 14 an Inquiry. So you have to make sure the people who are
 15 making the decisions have the courage and the confidence
 16 and the ability to say "no" in the right case, rather
 17 than just defensively saying, "Better do it." And
 18 that's really a uncomfortable thing to say, I know, but
 19 I think it is quite important. Otherwise the system
 20 becomes overwhelmed and it leads to individuals being
 21 wrongly retained or referred. At a macro level, data, I
 22 completely agree, civil society organisations
 23 completely, whether I agree with them or not, really
 24 good and the media as well. The media has really a much
 25 better function at holding account than I had realised

184

1 actually before I did this job. So lots of data and
2 information please.
3 **MR MOSS:** Dr Betts.
4 **DR BETTS:** Two quick points. I suppose the question is: how
5 do we know Prevent is effective at managing VFIs? I
6 think there is a broader question: how do we know
7 Prevent is effective? That speaks to what people in the
8 room have said.

9 What does "good" look like? What are we trying to
10 achieve from programme? I still feel it is kind of
11 unclear in respect of Prevent and VFIs. So I put this
12 in my slides that I sent across. I don't know if that
13 is about reducing criminal justice outcomes, if it is
14 about reducing acts of atrocious violence, or is it
15 about any violence? Is it about serious violence? It
16 is a very difficult -- there is no clarity on what does
17 "good" look like here and I think it is very difficult
18 for practitioner then to work towards something if they
19 don't really understand what that looks like.

20 The other second quick point I want to make is,
21 I agree to some extent about the points made about
22 consent is the safeguard. My bigger concern I guess is
23 what happens to the 50 per cent we are concerned about
24 that don't consent? So what do we do with those? And
25 actually where do you draw any kind of authority or

185

1 Prevent taking on children of that age, that even into
2 teenage years --
3 **MR MOSS:** Because in those cases it would be parental --
4 **MR ROXBURGH:** Parental. It is complex because you don't
5 know what's going on with that child in the round as
6 much as well I think that's where a much more
7 multi-agency approach, whether that be MASH or whether
8 that be Dovetail or something similar where you can look
9 at in the round. It's much more important if you have
10 concerns over a child at that point, because their
11 ability consent, with or without parental guidance, is
12 something that should be factored in quite seriously.

13 **MR MOSS:** Thank you. Now Ms St Vincent, if I may, I was
14 giving the panel an opportunity to respond to what was
15 in your presentation. Can I offer you a brief
16 opportunity if there is anything you want to say in
17 reply?

18 **MS ST VINCENT:** Yes, thank you. So I think Lord Anderson
19 and I have having a perhaps slightly different
20 vocabulary. I would say no one consents to a Prevent
21 referral. People aren't even notified of a referral.

22 I think what you are referring to is a Channel
23 intervention. As I said in my presentation, we would
24 say that that is not voluntary; it is not really
25 consent-based. I would also say consent means being

187

1 programme to intervene with those people? I think
2 that's a point that can't be missed, that's all.

3 **MR MOSS:** Thank you.

4 Mr Roxburgh?

5 **MR ROXBURGH:** I would echo what has already been said about
6 more and better data. That's absolutely key. That
7 allows it to be reviewed by civil society organisations,
8 the media and others as well. That is an important
9 step.

10 Secondly, clearly there is a lot of internal
11 evaluations we are told have been carried out on Prevent
12 in the past. Publication of them would be of
13 significant benefit. If there are security concerns
14 about content of that, that could be something the
15 Independent and Prevent Commissioner looks at and can
16 make a judgement on that sort of information as well,
17 just someone to have a look at that. We can't hide
18 behind that as a screen on that.

19 I think just quickly on the consent bit. That's
20 particularly complex when you are talking about children
21 and depending on the age of the child. So, Prevent has
22 a number of children who are referred to it each year
23 under the age of 10. They are very, very young. So
24 their ability understand processes and systems is of
25 serious concern. I have significant concerns about

186

1 able to say no; if you don't have the ability to say no
2 then what you are giving is not consent. The idea is no
3 means no, and if it something other than that then what
4 we are talking about is not consent.

5 I think your original question, was it something
6 about what kinds of safeguards, could there be a version
7 of Prevent with safeguards?

8 **MR MOSS:** Yes.

9 **MS ST VINCENT:** What I would say is the very design of
10 Prevent, when you have a society-wide programme and you
11 give hundreds of thousands of teachers, medical staff,
12 local authority personnel, police and so on, unfettered
13 discretion to refer someone, you wind up with bias. Of
14 course you do, because bias is rife in society, racism,
15 sexism, Islamophobia, other religious discrimination,
16 all of it; and what I would invite you to ask the Home
17 Office, the Met Police and the Counter Terrorism police,
18 for example, is do they even try to prevent that? Ask
19 them if they have anti-bias trainings in Prevent.
20 Trainings aren't always effective --

21 **MR MOSS:** When you say ask the Home Office and so on that,
22 are you saying do the Home Office have that training or
23 do those who make the referrals have that training?

24 **MS ST VINCENT:** Either.

25 **MR MOSS:** For those who make the referral, doesn't society

188

1 want to hear -- doesn't society need to deal with those
2 referrals, even if there is a risk of bias, because some
3 of them will be raising genuine concerns about a risk to
4 the lives of others?

5 **MS ST VINCENT:** So if a referral is raising a genuine
6 fact-based concern about the lives to others, first of
7 all I would ask why we are not in the realm of a call to
8 law enforcement. Secondly, that is not bias. What
9 I mean is a referral that's based on prejudice. So if
10 you are asking --

11 **MR MOSS:** Training for those who -- whatever the system
12 might look at, you would want training for those who
13 were under whatever duty it is to make a referral to
14 have training in relation to rights equality to guard
15 against bias in referrals that are made.

16 **MS ST VINCENT:** I'm actually not necessarily saying that
17 because I think the evidence is very much not in on
18 whether trainings actually makes a difference. What I'm
19 saying is we have seen no sign that the Home Office or
20 other bodies such as the Met Police and Counter
21 Terrorism Police even try to prevent or address
22 potential bias in the system, including not even doing
23 the bare minimum potentially of providing training. So
24 I would invite you to ask them about that.

25 **MR MOSS:** Thank you.

189

1 Office.

2 **MR MOSS:** Thank you. Could I invite Dr Betts, Lord Anderson
3 and you Mr Hall, if appropriate, but please obviously
4 use extreme care to ensure anonymity and any security
5 issues that you need to be careful about, but are you
6 able to give just briefly any case studies or case
7 examples with the appropriate caution to help the
8 audience understand what kinds of interventions have
9 proved to be successful through Prevent?

10 **LORD ANDERSON:** Dr Betts will know more than me. Let me
11 just give a few. I preface it by saying there are four
12 anonymised examples in annex 4 of my report which
13 I eventually managed to get out of the Home Office.

14 About nine years ago I made a programme for Radio 4
15 called "Understanding Prevent". That starts with
16 an in-depth interview with a young former far right
17 extremist and with the intervention provider who
18 deradicalised him. I don't claim any particular skill
19 in the interviewer but I do suggest that that is
20 gripping listening for anyone who is interested in how
21 intervention providers do their job. In that case, by
22 turning up for a weekly game of pool in the hostel where
23 the young man lived and just discussing things with him
24 until scales began to fall from eyes.

25 But I mentioned earlier that the intervention

191

1 Next this, please. Lord Anderson I won't, if you
2 will forgive me, repeat the very helpful statistics that
3 you gave in your talk with the caveats to go back to the
4 gov.uk link for the caveats, but you referred to the end
5 figure of 152 I think for VFIs, and a difficult question
6 though it is, and if the answer to this is, "I don't
7 know," you must of course say so. But do you, with your
8 experience have any sense of how that figure of 152
9 being adopted may compare to the cohort of VFIs, however
10 they are defined, who actually require support?

11 **LORD ANDERSON:** No, I can't give you an answer to that I'm
12 afraid.

13 **MR MOSS:** Thank you. And those who are signposted to other
14 services, and this may go back to the data aspects, do
15 you know whether any empirical check is done on the data
16 as to checking what that service did and what the person
17 took on, perhaps outside of the below Thresholds review
18 that was done? Outside of that review, do you know if
19 that is done?

20 **LORD ANDERSON:** I don't believe that the CTCO who decided
21 not to refer to the Channel panel, or indeed the Channel
22 panel that decided not to adopt the case would do those
23 retrospective checks. They would take the view that it
24 is not their case any more. If I'm wrong about that
25 I am sure I will be corrected in some form by the Home

190

1 providers can be quite innovative in their approach.
2 I will give a couple of examples of that, being very
3 careful not to make them traceable in any way.

4 For example, another young man with extreme
5 antisemitic views, the intervention provider decided
6 "Well rather than simply talk to him, I will take him to
7 the Holocaust Memorial Centre," which she did with
8 impressive results.

9 Another would be a young man who was interested in
10 going to fight in Syria. He was particularly interested
11 in the military aspects, the guns and the excitement of
12 the battlefield. Well, the intervention provider was
13 able to say, "If you are interested in that sort of
14 thing I happen to be going to a military event at the
15 weekend where service veterans are going to be doing
16 a bit of climbing. Do you want to come along?" So he
17 went to a place where the a military charity was
18 facilitating a climbing expedition for persons who had
19 lost their limbs in combat fighting for the British Army
20 and, having seen that, there was no question in that
21 young man's mind that he was going to go to war.

22 So that's what I mean by the range of interventions
23 being sometimes quite creative and sometimes quite
24 effective.

25 No one knows, it has been quite rightly said, how

192

1 effective and the only thing I would add, in case it is
 2 not clear to everyone but I am sure it is, that I was
 3 able to record in my report the existence of
 4 an independent evaluation of the effectiveness of
 5 Channel, commissioned by the Home Office but being
 6 conducted independently by IPSOS UK and by UCL with
 7 support from HSAI and led by Professor Paul Gill whose
 8 reputation in this field is well known to everyone.
 9 That's a very thorough evaluation. It is drawing on
 10 a range of sources, including the PCMT data, case files,
 11 the survey of Channel practitioners and interviews with
 12 Channel subjects, Channel panels and intervention
 13 providers. I can't give you an update as to when that
 14 report is to be expected but it seems to me very
 15 important because we do need better evidence on how
 16 effective Channel is.

17 **MR MOSS:** Thank you. Dr Betts, similar caution of course,
 18 you don't need me to remind you but --

19 **DR BETTS:** No problem. I mean this was kind of a constant
 20 conversation between Cathryn Ellsmore and I at the time
 21 when we held those roles together. We certainly did
 22 an awful lot of work trying to find and anonymise cases
 23 that that are available, and obviously Lord Anderson
 24 refers to a few of those.

25 What I would say is there isn't a sort of a bullet
 193

1 developed and matured and I think the conversation is
 2 now way beyond: they are in this space is, they get
 3 an intervention provider, to use the Arabic word because
 4 of where I am, "Khallas", "It is done". Well, it is not
 5 done, there is an awful lot of work that needs to be
 6 done and that needs to be quite sophisticated.

7 **MR MOSS:** Thank you. Mr Roxburgh, building on that can I
 8 perhaps come to you, again just to help inform the
 9 debate but to put potentially a point of challenge which
 10 would be, if you take that combination of what
 11 Lord Anderson has described, accepting for the moment
 12 there may be a challenge that is too anecdotal and it is
 13 not data driven. But putting that to one side for
 14 the moment, if you took those two answers together and
 15 looked at Lord Anderson's examples of intervention
 16 providers, what I think Dr Betts is talking about, about
 17 the support being wider, what is it that is missing from
 18 effective interventions in case management that's
 19 potentially available under Prevent that you think would
 20 be better done by a youth violence or knife crime
 21 intervention approach?

22 **MR ROXBURGH:** First of all, the Youth Violence Knife
 23 Intervention Approach, the reason why I cite that a lot
 24 is because it is a really good body of evidence around
 25 different programmes around that. It is extensively
 195

1 here. I think the way that he describes this kind of
 2 creativity amongst intervention providers is important,
 3 but I would say this is now way beyond intervention
 4 providers, and certainly when I first arrived in this
 5 space over ten years ago, in 2016, the end of 2016,
 6 almost like the default position was, if you are in
 7 Channel you were going to get an intervention provider
 8 and that was that. I think the sophistication of the
 9 approaches that Lord Anderson is describing has matured.
 10 I think the way that the system evolved -- and I'm
 11 treading carefully in what I describe here -- but the
 12 way the system involved after AR at the end of 2018
 13 through to I guess to the present day but certainly up
 14 to 2023, there was a much different set of conversations
 15 going on about what does an effective approach look like
 16 that includes intervention providers, I'm not dismissing
 17 that, but it is way beyond that but is also about
 18 appropriate care for looked-after children. Housing
 19 provision, Jonathan mentioned that earlier. You know
 20 the intersection of kind of substance misuse,
 21 sofa-surfing, all the things that I would more commonly
 22 associate I guess with youth offending, Integrated
 23 Offender Management programmes, effective probation
 24 practice, all of those things, properly tailored and
 25 sequenced interventions were being worked on and
 194

1 researched, it is in the public realm. There is
 2 an analysis that covers the potential cost, the strength
 3 of the evidence is provided and so forth, but also
 4 because it offers something different which it may not
 5 be the same but it is tangential to some of the risks.
 6 So early knife carrying could be a potential indicator
 7 of risky behaviour going into the future, so making
 8 an intervention at that point is strong.

9 I think part of the point around that is the quality
 10 of the research in the first place. It sounds like
 11 a report is coming soon around Channel's interventions.
 12 That would be very welcome in the public space to
 13 understand that. But what we also need to understand is
 14 what is happening to those children who get reported
 15 to -- referred to Prevent, but aren't accepted and
 16 what's happening to them? Are they going into other
 17 systems? Other elements to that? That's the bit that
 18 causes me the greatest concern in many ways, because we
 19 don't know what is happening. Because that is the
 20 biggest cohort of children and we have the least
 21 information about what happens to them at that point and
 22 their outcomes in the short, medium and long-term.

23 The knife crime programmes I think have potentially
 24 a lot for us to learn from, not least because of the
 25 standard of evaluation, the conversation around their
 196

1 effectiveness and their roles in different places as
2 well.

3 **MR MOSS:** Thank you. I'm going to turn now, if I may, to
4 topic C, alternative structures and the future role for
5 Prevent.

6 I may make the mistake here of asking seminar
7 speakers to give an answer to the overall problem, but
8 that it is an important topic. So could I ask the panel
9 please to focus on what might be a medium-term solution
10 rather than immediate fixes, but to consider aspects
11 about what's been dubbed the "big front door" approach.
12 I think you have pen and paper and I apologise that the
13 first part comes in three parts.

14 So thinking specifically about an initial triage
15 stage of a big front door, what first of all would you
16 see as the benefit of an initial triage that is not by
17 Prevent but is by some other body?

18 So to bring things together, some examples that
19 might be thought of there is it removes cases that
20 should never go to Prevent from getting put into
21 Prevent; it may assist with the stigmatisation issue
22 that Ms St Vincent in particular has focused on; and it
23 may have an advantage that it is a single place for
24 referrers because it is very difficult for those making
25 the referrals to know whether it is ideological or not

197

1 but adverse factors remained which were not related to
2 terrorism.

3 Third, as you suggested, you would help to reduce
4 the stigma that some people and some families do feel
5 about being referred to a place that appears chiefly
6 interested in them as a potential terrorist. I'm not
7 saying that's how people behave on the ground but it's
8 how Prevent might very well look from the outside. And
9 some of the referrals currently being pushed into
10 Prevent I suspect would avoid it altogether, and
11 anything that did end up in Prevent would do so only
12 after it had been decided, after proper assessment, that
13 this was the right option.

14 The fourth advantage would be, particularly if you
15 are minded, as Sir William Shawcross was, to say that
16 Prevent was really conceived for ideological
17 interventions and shouldn't be distorted into anything
18 else, well, it could be that again, if that's what you
19 decided to do. You could place it behind the front door
20 for that no doubt small minority of people referred, in
21 respect of whom an ideological intervention would be
22 appropriate.

23 In terms of downsides, I mentioned quite a few of
24 these in my report. I think I referred to them as
25 challenges in the modern idiom, but possibly "downsides"

199

1 ideological, or whether it is "mere knife crime".

2 Secondly on this, other than the resource challenge
3 and the question of which body, are there downsides to
4 the big front door approach?

5 And thirdly, if you are going to have a big front
6 door triage exercise, how do you at that stage sift out
7 or identify the cases which are extremely worrying
8 because they potentially do meet the test for intensive
9 support because there may be extremist-like behaviour or
10 vulnerabilities, whether it is terrorism or extreme
11 violence?

12 So those three sub-questions.

13 Lord Anderson, may I come to you first?

14 **LORD ANDERSON:** Well, thank you. The advantages of doing
15 the initial triage not through Prevent, it seems to me,
16 are probably four in number.

17 First, you would be replacing a complex and
18 overcrowded landscape of multi-agency work with a more
19 coherent and connected scheme, which would have coherent
20 operating protocols that could be written down,
21 exercised and tested.

22 Secondly, you would be providing systemic step-down
23 process back into mainstream interventions, a point you
24 raised earlier in another context, if it turned out
25 there was no risk of radicalisation suitable for Prevent

198

1 would have been more accurate. It is 5.40 of my report.
2 You would need to amend the statutory thresholds for
3 adoption into MASH, if MASH is the instrument you used
4 for children.

5 You would have to improve the cultural impediments,
6 what I call the tools, powers, thresholds, performance
7 metrics and culture which disincentivise meaningful
8 joint work between departments and between agencies.
9 There would be issues regarding access by MASH to
10 sensitive data held by Counter Terrorism Policing,
11 although a senior former police officer suggested to me
12 a way round that, which I set out at footnote 295.

13 Then, as Department for Education and others have
14 consistently pointed out, there are areas in which MASH
15 is are very well adapted to this triage system, areas in
16 which they are not well adapted at all. So you would
17 need, if you were going to use the MASH as your
18 instrument, to reform and make them more consistent. Of
19 course as Paul has said, there are other bases you
20 should use as well, there are VRUs and so on. It seemed
21 to me that the base point for all this has to be mapping
22 the position as it originally stands.

23 I noted in my report that in 2025, the Cabinet
24 Office commissioned a piece of work from the Home Office
25 and DfE which would map the full Range of police-led and

200

1 authority-led multi-agency structures and how they
 2 expect cases to move through them with minimal friction,
 3 time delay and duplication of effort. I would love to
 4 have seen that document, if it was ever produced,
 5 because it seems to me the baseline for planning what
 6 you have in mind. I didn't succeed getting hold of it.
 7 Whether you, sir, with your statutory powers have any
 8 better luck, I don't know. But I think that's probably
 9 all I can usefully say in response to that question.

10 **MR MOSS:** Then specifically on early stage triage and how
 11 you would identify those cases, is that getting into the
 12 MASH or whoever was doing the triage having sufficient
 13 access to sensitive information, or would they pass it
 14 on to Prevent or a Prevent-like body in a similar way
 15 now if that body, the triage body rather than the
 16 referrer said "Actually this shows signs of worry, we
 17 know enough to pass this to Counter Terrorism Policing
 18 because we as a triaging body have concerns in addition
 19 to the referrer." Is that enough? But how do you do
 20 those assessments?

21 **LORD ANDERSON:** That's a point I try to address at footnote
 22 295, on the advice of a former police officer. In
 23 essence, it would be for the staff performing the triage
 24 within the wide front door to send a query to CTP, and
 25 if certain priority indicators are met, then to seek a
 201

1 speech, and we have had some recent free speech crises
 2 where people in authority, police, have arrested people
 3 because of things they have put on social media.

4 I can imagine a situation in which if you said, well
 5 really this is basically an all harms sweep-up, that you
 6 would get some very bad edge cases which I don't think
 7 would justify the sort of system. So the strength of
 8 the Shawcross thing, and I probably disagree slightly
 9 with David on this, is it that it does capture the point
 10 about this subterranean root system undermining national
 11 security.

12 **MR MOSS:** I'm going to come back to the pathways of what are
 13 after the triage, but is there anything on the triage
 14 approach?

15 **MR HALL:** I think that is the point I wanted to make.

16 **MR MOSS:** Thank you. Dr Betts.

17 **DR BETTS:** I'm going to make two points in response to each
 18 of your questions and hopefully they will land.

19 On the initial triage and the benefit, I think
 20 I said in my main presentation multi-agency and
 21 multidisciplinary is a key benefit, and that's different
 22 to the information I read in Sir Adrian's report on
 23 Phase 1 where often you have people making decisions in
 24 the CTP space on their own with a certain professional
 25 culture, let's describe it that way, and I think that's
 203

1 RAG rating from CTP. I don't think I will try and
 2 explain it all now. The best I can do is set out in
 3 that footnote.

4 **MR MOSS:** Mr Hall, do you have views that differ on those
 5 three points, or is there anything you would like to
 6 add?

7 **MR HALL:** Yes, just one thing to add. I think why I have
 8 some sympathy with the William Shawcross point on
 9 ideology. Prevent is an unusual scheme, and
 10 counter-terrorism is an unusual set of powers, and I
 11 think it is justified because it's about national
 12 security, and my worry about trying to expand these
 13 sorts of schemes beyond national security is that then
 14 you beg all sorts of questions. Why not someone who
 15 looks like they are very misogynistic? Why one not
 16 someone who is a racist? Why not someone who is getting
 17 involved in gang violence?

18 I think it is one thing to say for the purpose of
 19 national security that you sweep up a lot of information
 20 about individuals, you put a duty on schools, et cetera,
 21 to safeguard national security. That seems to be quite
 22 justifiable but to say that that duty would exist for
 23 other sorts of harms, I think that worries me in
 24 principle but also begs the question: what harms and
 25 where do you end? I do think about things like free
 202

1 an important benefit from what I have seen in MASHs.

2 The second point is in MASHs and what sits behind
 3 the door, and again Lord Anderson makes this point in
 4 his report better than I, but all information you need
 5 is in the room and that's the point of it. So you get
 6 more information more quickly, which allows you to make
 7 those decisions and that's the point of a MASH, it is
 8 the entire point of a MASH really.

9 So, at the moment, we have got a kind of
 10 disaggregated system that's sort of by email and so on
 11 and so forth. Having multidisciplinary professionals in
 12 a room with the information, you should get a better
 13 decision. That is the first point.

14 The point on downsides, again, I'm going to kind of
 15 refer back to what I said in my main evidence. You have
 16 to ensure continuity to national security data. I say
 17 that as guardedly as I can. But we cannot be in
 18 a position we have been in in other inquiries where
 19 people who have key decision-making powers are not cited
 20 on critical information about somebody's intent that's
 21 held in the national security space. So that's really
 22 difficult to resolve, it is not easy and kind of does
 23 lend itself then to CTP. But that's one to consider.

24 The second sort of downside of it, to use your
 25 words, is MASHs don't exist everywhere. It is not
 204

a statutory function, it is a kind of elective position that directors of social care around the country will make. So there are a multiplicity of models, as there are in something like a youth offending system. There are lots of ways of doing this, and from my experience being sat in the chair, there is a huge differential in expertise around the country that you would perhaps expect to find, based on the type of referrals they get and how often.

So that's the simplest way I can explain it. So in places like London and our bigger cities in the north of England, they have lots of referrals, the staff working there get lots of expertise in how to work with this. In more rural settings often that's not the case. If you are going to get five referrals a year you are not going to develop the expertise you are looking for really in this space. So that's second --

MR MOSS: That as I understand it emphasising a point that's drawn out in Lord Anderson's report, that some MASHs, without criticism of the other, are much further advanced because of the way they are set up and the work they already do, whereas others would need a lot of training and potentially resource to bring them up to that same level; is that a fair summary?

DR BETTS: Yes, 100 per cent. So it's the same in policing.

205

what to me it seems to me to be getting at is that in this country there is a need for a more coherent approach to violence prevention. And I do note that things like gender-based violence or homophobic violence or transphobic violence are always treated as something lesser. They are often treated as like the weather: they just happen, what can we do? They are not as well resourced, there's not as much energy into them, whereas programmes like Prevent that are about frankly more prestigious or eye-catching issues such as national security ostensibly, wind up with a lot of the resources, the staffing, the legal duty, all of this.

So I think to sort of getting at various parts of this, what's happening here and I think the danger of calling it, say, a "big front door approach", is that we have programmes here that were founded on some original sins, if you like. Prevent was Islamophobic. It was founded initially to target Muslims, that's explicit, I'm not going to repeat that --

MR MOSS: I'm going to stop you --

MS ST VINCENT: Yeah, yeah.

MR MOSS: -- because I would like you to focus, if you would, on the specific question, which is what are the benefits of the big front door and what are the disadvantages?

207

If you are in a force that has a hundred murders a year, your homicide team are going to know how to deal with murder. If you have one every five years, you might need to borrow some expertise and that's what happens, right? So this is the same in this space.

MR MOSS: Thank you.

DR BETTS: The third point, how do you sift in and out? It is kind of back to my slightly tedious but very important point about risk assessment and structured professional judgements. If you can't get that bit right, you can't have any confidence in cases that you are selecting or deselecting. And the second point on that, just to address that directly, is that this decision isn't just on triage; it is then ongoing. It's got to be an ongoing basis until the point you put the case down. I can't emphasise that enough, that the importance of those assessments has to be in the middle of whatever system comes out of this Inquiry.

MR MOSS: Thank you.

Ms St Vincent, take as read and well expressed already the overall reservations that you have, but do you have any comments specifically on these three issues?

MS ST VINCENT: I do. I understand the spirit behind the idea of the big front door approach and I think part of

206

MS ST VINCENT: I think I would need to look at the proposal more closely. I think there would be benefits to looking at violence, various forms of violence without looking at is it supposedly ideological, not ideological, related to terrorism, not related to terrorism, including by looking holistically at things like gender-based violence and how they fit in.

What I would not do is try to add another layer to Prevent or before Prevent or keep trying to build on this structure that is fundamentally flawed.

MR MOSS: We will come to the pathways after the triage in due course. Mr Roxburgh?

MR ROXBURGH: I think a big front door which potentially looks like MASH, or some variation of MASH, would be much more preferable. It would be more coherent. It would have a more appropriate range of skills and expertise in the room. Potentially it could be more timely, or at least timely in the sense of identifying what sort of service or intervention a child may require. It could also deal with multiple risk factors around the child, so if they are in poor housing, if they are at risk at home, if they have particular behaviours in online spaces or low level criminality, it can look at that much more in the round and deal with them as a whole.

208

1 The drawback of that, and the risk with that is the
 2 child gets lost in it, because you have a multitude of
 3 services. Who is taking the responsibility for that
 4 child in there? That comes back to what I was saying
 5 earlier about the importance there being someone who is
 6 an independent professional, helping support that child,
 7 building a relationship with that child, tracking that
 8 child's progress, their engagement with different
 9 services, whether that's simply tracking attendance, or
 10 whether that's engaging with different therapies,
 11 whatever that might look at, that is really important
 12 for the best interests of the child in that space as
 13 well.

14 I think structurally there is a lot of conversation
 15 to be had on that. There is good examples on a local
 16 level. I think if we go down that approach there needs
 17 to be structural redesign, both with some of the legal
 18 elements but also in terms of how government runs at a
 19 national level through to a local level to aid and
 20 encourage better working between different departments,
 21 different specialisms in different ways as well.

22 In terms of your final question, around sifting out,
 23 identifying cases that need more support. I think for
 24 that to be possible you need more research and
 25 understanding of what are the behaviours that indicate

209

1 for more management of the risk, for support and for
 2 effective interventions? What does that look like that?
 3 Who is best to do it?

4 Ms St Vincent, can I start with you?

5 **MS ST VINCENT:** So without endorsing the idea, I think
 6 I would say, and we would say, the only people who are
 7 qualified to assess whether someone poses a risk to
 8 themselves or others would be qualified medical
 9 professionals.

10 **MR MOSS:** What about the assessment within that type of case
 11 of the significance of the online interests and what
 12 that might say about the risks that that individual
 13 poses? How is a registrar psychiatrist or psychologist
 14 going to be sufficiently skilled to assess that from the
 15 point of view of what's happening online?

16 **MS ST VINCENT:** You would need to ask a registered
 17 psychiatrist I'm afraid. What we would say again is the
 18 only people qualified to assess whether someone might
 19 pose a danger to themselves or others are qualified
 20 medical professionals.

21 **MR MOSS:** Do you not get useful information about that risk
 22 from things such as trying to get sight of devices,
 23 potentially, however it is done and it would need to be
 24 done lawfully, but isn't that going to feed into the
 25 assessment? Can it really be right that it is only

211

1 risk, where that is more needed, better help,
 2 professionals, whatever background they be, identify
 3 those individuals. At the moment I don't think we are
 4 not clear on that.

5 **MR MOSS:** I want to turn, still looking at these important
 6 issues about structures, to the pathways after the big
 7 front door triage stage. So, I want you to envisage
 8 here that the big front door triage, whoever has carried
 9 it out, has identified, let us say, that the person who
 10 has been referred has taken a knife into school and that
 11 other information that has drawn in perhaps shows
 12 a mental health vulnerability, but also shows worrying
 13 signs of a fascination with gore and previous mass
 14 casualties attacks.

15 Now, in that sort of a case, what should the pathway
 16 look like? Who does that type of case go to? For these
 17 purposes I want you please to take it as read that if
 18 there were clear signs of vulnerability of ideological
 19 terrorism in a conventional sense, so extreme
 20 right-wing, or Islamist terrorism, that they would be
 21 going to Prevent because that aspect is actually beyond
 22 the Terms of Reference of this Inquiry. So I want to
 23 focus very clearly on that sort of a case.

24 To whom should that type of case then be referred
 25 for assessment of the level of the risk in more detail,

210

1 medical professionals?

2 **MS ST VINCENT:** I assume that medical professionals would
 3 take case histories and the only people qualified to
 4 assess the danger that someone poses to themselves or
 5 others is a qualified medical professional.

6 **MR MOSS:** Thank you. Mr Roxburgh?

7 **MR ROXBURGH:** I think again it would have to be
 8 a combination of specialisms. Potentially, CAMHS,
 9 potentially educational specialists in that space, you
 10 need to look at it in the round. It is more often than
 11 not where the child has a multitude of factors with very
 12 different risks, you need to have those different
 13 elements which is why I'm so supportive of a more MASH
 14 approach to bring those different expertise in, to
 15 understand something in the round, to understand those
 16 patterns of behaviours. Because the way a child behaves
 17 in school may be different to how a child behaves at
 18 home, may be different to how a child behaves in online
 19 spaces as well.

20 The best way you can get a picture of that child as
 21 a whole is to have a range of expertise to make that
 22 assessment.

23 **MR MOSS:** On the tech risks, this is somebody where there is
 24 a known concern that there are looking at gore, there
 25 has been information to that effect and mass casualty

212

1 attacks, how is that assessed within that
2 multidisciplinary environment?

3 **MR ROXBURGH:** It depends what information is available to
4 the experts in the room. So they might not have any of
5 that information necessarily. It might be a very base
6 level that someone has observed them viewing or
7 consuming content which is of significant concern. That
8 is very difficult to do. Whether it is necessary and
9 whether it is proportionate to engage through those
10 devices further is a question that needs to be handled
11 very carefully, so as to ensure that rights aren't
12 breached in that sort of space as well. That's a very
13 delicate line to be going through but it needs to be
14 done in the round.

15 I think if you go down a route where you go
16 primarily down a policing approach, the risk potentially
17 there is a child might begin to hide those behaviours
18 more. If they fell like they have got into trouble for
19 viewing something in the first place and they are
20 engaged through a policing route, they may endeavour to
21 hide that sort of risky behaviour more. You can risk
22 driving it underground.

23 Having an approach which looks at things in the
24 round, which has a range of professionals overall, that
25 could be more helpful in making an overall assessment.

213

1 **MR HALL:** I think I see it as going to a different body with
2 the police able to look at criminal records, access
3 sensitive intelligence if there is any available, with
4 a subject matter expert. A lot of these cases seem to
5 be quite similar. I have been really struck by the lack
6 of a sense that there are people who just sort of "Ah,
7 this is one of those cases this is the way of doing it."

8 So someone who is an expert for example in the sort
9 of civil orders that might be available. Local
10 authority, certainly. So are there any family issues?
11 Housing issues? CAMHS yes. I think one of the first
12 questions that I would like to have seen addressed more
13 is can we involve the parents? Because overt management
14 is much easier than covert management, and it gives you
15 routes in that you might not have. You might be able to
16 say to the parents, "Listen, we would like to look at
17 your kid's phone," and may be they would agree and they
18 would actually persuade their child.

19 In terms of then working out what to do if the
20 police thought, bearing in mind you have a previous
21 conviction, this person has already been carrying
22 a knife, it looks like they were involved in some sort
23 of weak attack planning. At that stage, I think your
24 subject matter expert would say, look, these sorts of
25 things but a really good example of what you should do

215

1 **MR MOSS:** Would you have police and, in appropriate case,
2 Counter Terrorism Police in the room?

3 **MR ROXBURGH:** It would depend on the circumstances. Like
4 potentially yes. You would have policing in the room,
5 whether it is Counter Terror Policing or not would
6 depend on what's being presented in that space. But
7 sort of you would have the relevant specialisms, that
8 may include the police, especially if a child has
9 demonstrated stuff which is either potentially illegal,
10 whether they have given indications that they might be
11 planning on doing something, whether they made specific
12 threats on some fronts as well. What level and type of
13 policing would depend on what has been presented in that
14 circumstance.

15 **MR MOSS:** Thank you.

16 Mr Hall, I turn to you and you mentioned some
17 sympathy with Sir William Shawcross' views, if the
18 pattern in this case, and this may not be typical, but
19 if the pattern was a reasonable degree of confidence
20 that they didn't have an extremist Islamist terrorist
21 ideology or extreme right-wing ideology, but did seem to
22 be a case of fascination with violence for its own sake,
23 in terms of pathway, do you see that going to Prevent or
24 to some different body, and if it is a different body,
25 what does it look like and what powers does it have?

214

1 is try and get hold of the device. So maybe send some
2 police to the door, knock on the door, and then
3 depending on the reaction, of course police just using
4 their common law powers. Then it may be if you got no
5 consent, no agreement, if you had an odd reaction from
6 the person involved, then you could start working up
7 a civil order that would give you access to it.

8 **MR MOSS:** Lord Anderson, which body and which powers?

9 **LORD ANDERSON:** Some cases which are referred to Prevent do
10 go on to Pursue because they are thought to meet the
11 criminal threshold potentially so the police
12 investigate. I would imagine the same would be true in
13 the non-criminal context if you are referring someone
14 who looked to say they had been committing a criminal
15 offence.

16 If you are below that level I very much agree with
17 Alasdair, the people making the decision need to be
18 multi-agency, whether you are calling in a MASH, whether
19 you are calling in the Channel panel, what they really
20 need to do is put together a support plan. As Paul
21 said, Prevent is not just about intervention providers,
22 they are the jewel in the Crown, they are the USP, but
23 there are other factors as well, be it housing, be it
24 education, be it mental health, that have to be
25 considered as well.

216

1 Whether it is the body just inside the big front
2 door that effectively acts as the Channel panel and
3 comes up with that support plan, or you whether you make
4 a reference to Prevent which, in the new system, remains
5 in something like its current form with its own Channel
6 panels and its own support plans, I don't know. You
7 would have to decide the extent to which you wanted to
8 preserve Prevent and put it behind the front door, or
9 the extent to which you wanted to subsume the functions
10 of the Channel panel into the original triage body.

11 But I think the general point is it does require
12 a multidisciplinary decision. I think it is sensible
13 for there to be police input into that decision. But as
14 with Prevent currently, that decision could involve
15 a wide range of inputs.

16 One risk incidentally, and I was asked earlier for
17 downsides or challenges, is going to be about funding.
18 The point has rightly been made that for whatever reason
19 governments are more willing to fund a counter-terrorism
20 projects than they are other kinds of project. We are
21 all in a way spinning stories about a world in which
22 there is funding for these things to be done properly.

23 One has to be mindful in designing any new system,
24 that you are still going to require police consent and
25 you are going to require proper funding by government to

217

1 **SIR ADRIAN FULFORD:** Thank you very much.
2 Lord Anderson, Mr Hall, Mr Roxburgh, Ms St Vincent
3 and Dr Betts, I would like to thank all five of you very
4 profoundly for your contributions today. It's been
5 particularly useful to get a wide range of views on
6 these problems, so that we are sure that we are looking
7 at this from every possible angle and are not just being
8 funnelled down one particular route because we are only
9 hearing one kind of voice. And so with profound thanks
10 from myself and the team, we will now rise. We are
11 10.00 am tomorrow.

12 **MR MOSS:** 10.00 am tomorrow, seminar three: violence-fixated
13 individuals, lessons from threat management and
14 multi-agency processes other than Prevent.

15 **SIR ADRIAN FULFORD:** You are welcome to come back if you
16 wish.

17 **(4.03 pm)**

18 **(The Inquiry adjourned until 10.00 am the following day)**

19
20
21
22
23
24
25

219

1 make sure that the support can be funded once it has
2 been found to be necessary.

3 **MR MOSS:** Thank you.

4 Dr Betts, you will have to forgive me because we
5 have reached the end of our normal time of close, but,
6 briefly, is there anything you would like to add to that
7 on which body and which pathway after the triage?

8 **DR BETTS:** I just support what others have said. The only
9 point I guess of disagreement that's probably worth
10 raising is just with what Ms St Vincent had to say.
11 I think it is not only medics that make choices about
12 the risk that people present in the future. The cops do
13 that on a fairly regular basis across a whole range of
14 issues, including domestic violence and other places.
15 I think things like MAPPA, parole boards, HM Prison
16 Probation Service, Youth Offending Teams. There are
17 a whole suite of professionals who are charged with this
18 task on a daily basis and they are the people who need
19 to be sat in this space.

20 Social care feels important to me here. I think
21 things like Team Around the Child, Team Around the
22 Family, Early Help, people again who are better
23 qualified than me to talk to you about that; they all
24 feel like worthy of exploration in this space.

25 **MR MOSS:** Thank you. Thank you, sir.

218

1 I N D E X

2		
3	Introductions	1
4	Presentation by LORD ANDERSON	5
5	Presentation by MR HALL	35
6	Presentation by DR BETTS	68
7	Presentation by MR ROXBURGH	99
8	Presentation by MS ST VINCENT	123
9	Presentation by MR HALL (continued)	151

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

220

DR BETTS: [12] 68/5 68/8 160/7 167/13 170/5 170/9 185/4 193/19 203/17 205/25 206/7 218/8 LORD ANDERSON: [14] 5/10 34/22 156/4 163/15 166/11 168/14 174/12 181/13 190/11 190/20 191/10 198/14 201/21 216/9 MR HALL: [12] 35/5 67/12 151/9 154/21 155/22 161/2 166/18 172/17 183/20 202/7 203/15 215/1 MR MOSS: [67] 1/5 5/8 34/24 67/11 67/13 67/20 68/6 99/11 122/18 123/2 150/18 151/5 152/17 153/22 162/17 164/19 165/20 166/8 167/10 167/24 169/19 170/4 170/7 170/23 171/21 174/10 175/18 178/13 178/19 180/14 181/1 183/15 185/3 186/3 187/3 187/13 188/8 188/21 188/25 189/11 189/25 190/13 191/2 193/17 195/7 197/3 201/10 202/4 203/12 203/16 205/18 206/6 206/19 207/20 207/22 208/11 210/5 211/10 211/21 212/6 212/23 214/1 214/15 216/8 218/3 218/25 219/12 MR ROXBURGH: [12] 99/16 159/9 165/4 170/25 176/10 186/5 187/4 195/22 208/13 212/7 213/3 214/3 MS ST VINCENT: [19] 123/4 156/20 162/3 165/22 169/21 178/15 179/9 180/21 187/18 188/9 188/24 189/5 189/16 206/24 207/21 208/1 211/5 211/16 212/2 SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: [23] 1/4 5/7 34/21 34/23 67/19 122/22 123/1 150/17 150/25 151/4 152/15 153/21 154/1 155/19 156/3 156/19 159/8 160/6 161/1 162/1 162/14 219/1 219/15	' '24 [1] 17/8 '25 [2] 19/5 22/10 'Yada [1] 58/13 1 1.15 pm [1] 151/1 1.27 [1] 8/18 10 [2] 157/18 186/23 10,000 [3] 19/12 78/21 97/19 10.00 [3] 219/11 219/12 219/18 10.35 [1] 67/16 100 per cent [1] 205/25 11 [1] 123/13 11 per cent [2] 24/12 24/16 11-15 [1] 24/5 11.11 [1] 67/18 11th [1] 55/21 12 hours [1] 57/11 12 months' [1] 23/24 12 per cent [1] 20/15 12.30 pm [1] 122/23 12.40 pm [2] 122/20 122/25 1234/Columbine [1] 42/23 13 [1] 39/12 14 [1] 31/6 14 per cent [1] 20/12 15 [3] 24/5 163/2 163/23 15 or [1] 67/23 152 [4] 23/25 24/2 190/5 190/8 16 [1] 14/1 16 months [1] 175/24 16s [1] 159/12 17 [1] 170/18 18 [2] 4/12 11/15 18 per cent [3] 11/12 24/7 131/11 18.1 [1] 140/20 19 [2] 139/24 140/15 1970s [1] 146/2 1999 [1] 1/18 2 2 per cent [2] 105/14 105/15 2.30 pm [2] 150/23 151/3 20 [1] 23/3 20 minutes [1] 67/23 20 per cent [1] 20/19 20 years [5] 77/1 101/4 129/16 138/18 182/5 200 [3] 11/6 24/2 86/15 2000 [1] 7/14	2003 [1] 133/12 2008 [1] 54/2 2010 [1] 148/17 2011 [1] 1/22 2013 [1] 3/24 2015 [1] 7/4 2016 [6] 3/24 101/11 124/8 181/21 194/5 194/5 2017 [6] 1/22 1/23 1/24 23/2 69/1 72/15 2018 [2] 1/13 194/12 2019 [7] 2/22 14/7 28/1 28/5 32/16 49/13 163/24 2020 [1] 124/9 2023 [5] 3/12 69/1 69/12 163/1 194/14 2024 [8] 2/22 3/9 17/7 23/11 103/10 105/12 111/18 164/9 2024/25 [1] 20/5 2025 [11] 2/4 17/17 18/23 23/7 23/13 105/14 111/18 163/15 164/10 164/13 200/23 2026 [5] 1/1 111/19 125/25 126/2 164/12 21 per cent [2] 10/25 11/11 212 [1] 22/12 22 [1] 140/17 23 per cent [5] 21/15 21/20 22/1 22/2 22/3 244 [1] 22/8 25 [2] 20/5 23/3 25 per cent [1] 22/13 27 per cent [1] 160/4 29 [1] 3/9 295 [2] 200/12 201/22 3 3,000 [1] 101/11 3.67 [1] 25/5 31 [1] 126/1 34 [1] 139/22 36 [1] 123/12 36 per cent [1] 22/15 38B [1] 41/10 39 per cent [2] 19/12 105/11 4 4's [1] 98/16 4,700 [1] 101/12 4.03 pm [1] 219/17 4.2 [1] 141/6 40 minutes [1] 32/25 412 [1] 22/17 42 per cent [1] 20/19 44 minutes [1] 98/24 45 minutes [1] 5/18 45 per cent [1] 24/6 49 per cent [1] 24/4	5 5,000 [1] 97/18 5.19 [1] 166/15 5.4 [2] 13/25 14/17 5.40 [1] 200/1 5.7 [1] 164/14 50 [1] 29/13 50 per cent [1] 185/23 50s [1] 30/16 51 [1] 9/6 56 per cent [5] 19/21 21/14 25/25 26/4 168/15 6 60 per cent [1] 159/25 61 per cent [1] 19/19 632,800 [1] 20/5 65 per cent [1] 115/1 66 per cent [1] 23/19 7 7 per cent [1] 22/18 7,000 [2] 19/11 90/14 756 [1] 22/14 8 8 per cent [3] 20/11 20/14 20/15 818 [1] 22/8 84 per cent [1] 39/11 85 per cent [1] 160/1 86,000 [1] 105/16 9 9 September 2026 [1] 1/1 9.00 [1] 1/2 9/11 [1] 123/13 90 per cent [1] 26/18 90s [1] 15/16 A abandoning [1] 141/9 Abedi [1] 36/21 abhorrent [1] 118/16 abilities [1] 85/5 ability [17] 25/12 34/4 55/4 78/25 79/4 85/21 86/9 88/21 97/6 111/15 121/18 121/24 142/7 184/16 186/24 187/11 188/1 able [44] 12/24 34/1 38/18 55/2 56/15 59/24 62/17 69/7 70/10 72/16 74/23 78/11 78/16 79/11 81/24 82/7 84/3 85/13 86/4 86/18 86/22 88/4 88/12 89/20 94/23 94/24 95/19 95/23 97/11 97/17 99/12	102/5 112/19 127/25 128/14 148/2 154/17 178/16 188/1 191/6 192/13 193/3 215/2 215/15 abnormal [1] 57/11 about [306] above [4] 105/23 106/23 115/18 119/21 absence [7] 87/2 88/6 88/19 95/19 95/25 119/25 167/22 absent [2] 72/9 86/20 absolute [4] 21/23 139/13 141/8 157/22 absolutely [5] 48/4 50/10 111/13 145/4 186/6 absorb [1] 10/6 abstract [1] 130/18 abstractly [1] 130/9 abundance [1] 129/17 abuse [3] 4/25 112/3 159/15 abuser [1] 40/9 abusing [1] 44/1 academic [14] 3/25 45/8 45/10 69/10 69/25 71/2 125/18 125/22 128/4 128/6 129/17 131/1 131/3 162/4 academics [2] 46/23 112/18 Academy [1] 4/3 accelerationism [1] 45/14 accept [6] 83/11 113/4 126/22 127/23 131/12 158/19 acceptable [2] 112/23 149/20 accepted [6] 25/20 28/13 28/15 163/2 164/18 196/15 accepting [2] 163/21 195/11 access [17] 51/20 76/9 79/25 82/7 87/24 92/1 92/15 112/9 121/12 154/16 156/6 156/6 171/6 200/9 201/13 215/2 216/7 accommodate [2] 6/8 33/2 accommodated [2] 10/4 31/25 accompanies [1] 87/10 accordance [1] 109/11 account [7] 19/4 42/6 43/16 54/6 71/1 105/12 184/25 accountability [3]
---	--	---	--	--

A	ad [2] 135/1 153/12	adult [2] 45/21 183/4	148/15 155/12 156/7	52/21 55/8 57/2 57/13
accountability... [3]	Adam [1] 175/8	advance [2] 166/22	186/21 186/23 187/1	58/2 58/11 58/14
98/19 112/16 113/3	Adams' [1] 75/6	167/6	aged [1] 39/12	58/16 59/10 60/17
accountable [1] 97/5	adapted [2] 200/15	advanced [1] 205/21	agencies [7] 11/22	61/18 62/3 64/19
accounts [1] 159/13	200/16	advancing [1] 7/12	108/8 147/13 151/23	67/22 70/22 71/15
accurate [3] 134/15	add [15] 26/14	advantage [2] 197/23	177/7 178/16 200/8	77/19 79/22 86/12
160/11 200/1	133/23 146/10 149/15	199/14	agency [30] 11/17	86/13 86/18 89/22
achieve [4] 90/11	165/20 167/12 173/9	advantages [1]	31/24 33/6 35/16	90/8 91/11 92/7 92/22
94/4 144/4 185/10	178/13 178/18 183/18	198/14	55/10 55/11 55/15	92/25 94/4 95/1 95/18
achieving [10] 129/4	193/1 202/6 202/7	adverse [1] 199/1	55/17 56/11 64/17	97/1 98/2 98/3 98/4
145/19 146/5 146/8	208/8 218/6	advice [2] 5/2 201/22	69/3 69/4 79/21 81/17	98/12 98/13 99/18
146/11 148/13 150/13	added [1] 41/16	Adviser [2] 4/8 100/1	82/6 82/21 86/8 96/16	102/14 105/1 112/9
156/16 157/25 158/5	adding [1] 152/15	advocacy [3] 4/8	97/2 97/3 115/25	114/4 114/16 115/7
acknowledgement	addition [2] 2/25	100/1 181/24	175/11 178/7 178/8	117/9 123/7 124/3
[1] 111/20	201/18	advocating [1]	187/7 198/18 201/1	127/21 130/18 132/22
acronyms [1] 98/8	additional [5] 24/10	123/12	203/20 216/18 219/14	136/2 137/25 138/2
across [16] 11/6 24/2	93/9 142/20 174/8	Affairs [1] 29/21	agents [1] 130/13	138/7 138/8 138/14
43/15 46/5 64/24	177/22	affect [3] 50/17	ages [1] 65/1	140/8 140/21 141/16
77/25 81/1 86/13	Additionally [1]	148/12 181/11	ago [7] 77/1 89/6	144/7 149/17 151/5
91/23 97/7 102/3	106/24	affected [1] 133/25	101/4 123/12 125/15	151/23 151/24 152/6
106/3 134/16 134/17	addled [3] 47/24	afraid [6] 12/25 30/1	191/14 194/5	154/25 158/9 159/3
185/12 218/13	54/16 84/15	34/22 141/21 190/12	agree [11] 27/13 73/2	160/3 173/15 174/8
act [22] 7/5 7/13	address [17] 2/17	211/17	125/23 142/2 167/3	174/15 175/3 176/10
27/10 37/8 41/19	13/4 24/21 25/12 54/7	after [18] 23/1 52/24	181/13 184/22 184/23	176/25 177/18 179/20
43/11 43/18 43/23	101/1 101/4 102/16	62/12 75/20 89/17	185/21 215/17 216/16	182/2 182/4 186/2
53/17 54/2 56/12 65/3	104/8 113/12 115/5	115/2 123/13 144/24	agreed [2] 102/3	188/16 189/7 194/21
72/18 82/7 110/20	121/19 121/24 121/25	168/18 176/21 194/12	127/2	194/24 195/22 197/15
148/17 149/1 152/1	189/21 201/21 206/13	194/18 199/12 199/12	agreement [2] 127/5	200/16 200/21 201/9
152/5 157/17 158/16	addressed [9] 2/17	203/13 208/11 210/6	216/5	202/2 202/14 203/5
166/21	3/5 72/4 94/1 102/15	218/7	Ah [1] 215/6	204/4 207/12 217/21
Act2023 [1] 2/25	102/19 108/24 152/20	aftermath [3] 17/18	Al [3] 63/10 63/16	218/23 219/3
acting [1] 180/19	215/12	18/13 19/7	63/18	allow [5] 85/15 92/15
action [4] 38/1 87/6	addressing [10] 1/7	afternoon [2] 92/10	aid [1] 209/19	93/20 152/4 158/3
118/8 143/5	100/25 101/19 113/1	152/20	aim [15] 109/16	allowance [1] 34/25
active [1] 118/2	116/8 116/11 121/9	afterwards [1] 92/20	129/2 129/4 145/4	allowed [8] 53/21
activism [1] 124/12	121/22 126/16 145/14	again [72] 3/5 22/11	145/5 145/7 145/8	143/8 143/12 143/14
activities [3] 123/15	adequate [1] 176/5	23/5 31/13 39/7 40/13	145/19 146/6 146/9	143/18 158/20 158/20
124/22 180/12	adequate [3] 72/8	48/11 55/25 69/21	146/12 148/13 150/13	161/2
activity [3] 130/5	150/14 183/12	70/24 72/14 73/17	158/1 158/5	allows [8] 54/7 54/11
170/20 175/6	adhere [1] 9/9	74/19 75/13 75/18	aims [1] 109/12	54/22 60/25 93/3
actors [1] 102/4	adhered [1] 28/7	76/15 76/21 77/10	air [1] 123/20	135/9 186/7 204/6
acts [7] 89/25 90/16	adherence [1] 8/19	79/18 80/5 83/9 84/12	akin [1] 173/20	alluded [3] 70/5
90/19 156/25 159/25	adjourned [1] 219/18	87/21 88/10 89/13	Al [2] 18/10 30/11	78/20 94/18
185/14 217/2	adjournment [2]	90/7 91/5 91/6 92/7	Al-Qaeda [2] 18/10	almost [14] 22/5 30/1
actual [5] 125/13	151/2 152/24	93/6 93/17 93/24	30/11	41/24 47/23 48/12
129/10 130/4 140/7	admitting [1] 176/13	95/20 98/24 104/1	alarming [1] 136/15	51/25 55/12 86/15
163/13	adolescence [2] 48/7	109/19 110/15 111/18	Alasdair [3] 4/7	87/17 88/7 93/14
actually [39] 11/12	104/2	112/7 118/12 126/25	128/10 216/17	160/10 182/12 194/6
16/19 20/23 38/10	adolescent [2] 18/16	129/8 130/3 131/4	albeit [3] 32/20	alone [2] 127/13
42/2 52/20 58/4 59/14	51/18	131/14 132/23 136/21	144/19 156/11	130/1
59/19 61/18 61/23	adolescents [1] 50/4	137/4 138/15 143/11	alcoholics [1] 30/17	along [4] 99/17 100/8
62/20 69/2 70/14	adopt [4] 11/9 11/11	144/13 145/14 146/6	algorithm [1] 47/3	122/16 192/16
70/19 71/13 72/24	163/10 190/22	146/14 146/22 146/24	algorithmic [2] 46/21	already [32] 6/22
73/5 73/23 75/8 75/20	adopted [13] 19/13	147/8 148/5 148/16	47/7	7/17 7/22 27/12 27/18
77/14 85/6 144/18	19/17 19/19 19/21	150/15 157/10 171/14	alighted [1] 35/6	31/23 31/25 32/13
147/3 157/11 161/24	22/5 22/9 22/12 22/14	171/23 175/21 178/20	alike [1] 25/1	33/23 37/3 46/4 67/2
163/6 164/2 166/19	22/18 23/19 23/24	195/8 199/18 204/3	all [128] 5/11 5/17	90/8 100/15 101/18
170/10 185/1 185/25	78/24 190/9	204/14 211/17 212/7	10/2 10/11 11/9 15/24	103/2 105/8 105/8
189/16 189/18 190/10	adoption [4] 20/21	218/22	16/4 16/17 16/24	106/19 110/15 113/16
201/16 210/21 215/18	22/16 75/5 200/3	against [16] 31/3	17/23 18/13 19/8	114/9 116/6 118/22
actuarial [1] 77/2	adoptions [12] 11/13	109/18 112/3 122/11	20/20 20/22 22/2 22/6	121/2 133/20 152/7
actuation [1] 80/14	20/12 20/16 20/20	134/7 134/7 134/25	23/11 26/23 28/13	152/11 186/5 205/22
acute [1] 96/13	21/15 21/22 22/2 22/6	135/13 146/20 149/5	28/15 30/2 30/5 30/6	206/21 215/21
acutely [2] 62/6	22/21 22/24 23/9	149/5 160/4 175/9	31/14 38/18 45/23	also [81] 2/22 3/18
99/20	23/10	179/5 180/19 189/15	47/7 47/24 48/20	4/3 4/22 5/2 9/5 10/19
	Adrian's [1] 203/22	age [8] 23/21 119/14	49/18 51/24 52/18	12/10 17/14 21/18

A also... [71] 22/21 26/1 29/19 44/3 44/18 47/11 47/18 54/22 55/19 56/12 62/4 63/6 63/19 64/1 65/11 70/18 83/13 83/19 84/4 103/15 103/25 108/8 109/15 111/8 112/12 112/14 112/17 114/3 114/12 115/17 116/15 120/8 126/7 127/23 128/14 128/22 129/20 133/23 135/20 136/8 136/19 139/3 139/8 140/16 141/3 142/7 144/21 145/17 145/21 146/16 146/19 148/4 148/9 148/17 149/7 156/5 157/9 160/17 163/7 166/5 174/3 177/25 184/2 187/25 194/17 196/3 196/13 202/24 208/20 209/18 210/12 alternative [6] 28/8 29/4 142/11 166/8 173/22 197/4 alternatives [5] 129/24 129/25 142/11 144/17 145/19 although [14] 6/24 14/7 22/16 23/13 28/17 43/2 46/17 69/13 124/20 128/23 143/17 145/11 164/4 200/11 Altman [1] 41/5 altogether [3] 125/6 154/16 199/10 always [24] 8/2 8/4 8/20 9/20 11/11 11/18 11/23 12/19 24/25 28/19 106/10 142/25 143/1 143/7 148/24 154/22 155/1 173/10 174/5 182/6 184/4 184/5 188/20 207/5 am [17] 1/2 40/19 42/12 57/22 67/11 67/16 67/18 142/8 148/7 152/5 180/24 190/25 193/2 195/4 219/11 219/12 219/18 amazing [1] 55/1 amber [1] 77/3 ambiguity [1] 121/20 ambit [1] 27/10 amend [2] 166/16 200/2 amended [1] 166/17 America [1] 59/15 Amess [1] 2/15 Amman [3] 35/10 35/23 84/6	among [3] 114/2 160/3 163/16 amongst [3] 39/17 46/22 194/2 amount [9] 40/16 40/20 41/24 42/13 43/23 49/16 65/15 116/14 144/8 amounts [3] 65/6 102/1 108/20 analyse [2] 112/20 138/24 analysed [1] 132/5 analyses [1] 139/19 analysis [8] 32/4 86/22 90/4 110/10 124/16 137/12 176/7 196/2 analyst [1] 92/8 Anderson [43] 1/13 1/14 1/21 1/24 2/4 2/13 5/8 5/9 34/21 35/1 37/1 45/25 46/17 65/17 69/15 86/15 101/22 103/5 111/2 131/10 135/24 156/3 158/23 159/20 162/24 163/4 166/10 167/3 167/25 170/25 174/11 181/12 187/18 190/1 191/2 193/23 194/9 195/11 198/13 204/3 216/8 219/2 220/4 Anderson's [6] 2/12 70/5 73/18 98/1 195/15 205/19 anecdotal [1] 195/12 anecdotally [5] 49/20 72/22 113/21 152/5 171/5 anecdote [3] 75/23 76/6 76/11 anecdotes [1] 156/22 anger [1] 31/7 angle [1] 219/7 annex [2] 49/25 191/12 annex 4 [1] 191/12 announced [1] 155/4 annual [3] 3/1 130/8 134/4 anonymise [1] 193/22 anonymised [1] 191/12 anonymity [1] 191/4 another [16] 32/3 32/25 38/8 44/20 46/4 48/13 59/3 72/18 92/9 104/17 151/16 170/14 192/4 192/9 198/24 208/8 answer [18] 24/24 51/8 52/2 74/11 91/9 96/10 125/4 146/21 155/13 160/7 162/1	173/14 174/4 174/5 182/10 190/6 190/11 197/7 answered [2] 34/18 113/20 answering [1] 6/1 answers [6] 91/7 96/7 99/21 123/18 132/23 195/14 anti [6] 8/20 15/18 131/23 134/13 138/16 188/19 anti-bias [1] 188/19 anti-democratic [1] 8/20 anti-migrant [1] 131/23 anti-violence [1] 138/16 anticipated [1] 162/15 antisemitic [1] 192/5 any [60] 11/21 15/1 15/1 15/19 23/16 26/14 34/22 39/14 45/10 70/25 76/7 94/17 95/13 96/17 115/5 115/10 116/16 117/4 118/19 126/12 128/14 129/5 129/11 129/25 130/20 130/20 134/6 136/16 140/6 141/23 143/4 145/2 145/7 147/25 153/16 153/24 154/13 155/24 158/10 164/23 169/19 171/16 173/7 182/20 185/15 185/25 190/8 190/15 190/24 191/4 191/6 191/18 192/3 201/7 206/11 206/22 213/4 215/3 215/10 217/23 anybody [6] 7/19 69/25 76/9 84/7 86/6 149/21 anyone [11] 19/1 48/19 65/7 126/12 127/12 131/5 135/3 135/4 170/4 174/10 191/20 anything [17] 13/15 27/3 28/5 96/17 130/11 135/4 147/19 165/20 167/11 178/18 183/18 187/16 199/11 199/17 202/5 203/13 218/6 anyway [5] 8/2 17/2 64/22 83/6 166/17 anywhere [3] 26/11 69/25 147/13 apart [2] 41/13 42/2 apolitical [1] 132/20 apologies [1] 98/7 apologise [3] 67/20	68/9 197/12 appallingly [1] 17/18 apparatus [2] 171/25 172/11 apparent [2] 112/24 170/1 apparently [3] 58/18 125/23 166/16 appear [8] 46/13 103/12 134/5 161/11 183/1 183/1 183/2 183/2 appears [6] 6/13 128/6 128/9 147/2 154/6 199/5 application [1] 77/22 applies [5] 19/16 49/12 55/19 114/5 150/7 apply [5] 60/22 132/7 132/13 132/17 150/7 applying [2] 75/2 87/18 appointed [5] 1/15 2/4 2/11 2/22 147/2 appointment [2] 1/20 51/17 appointments [1] 1/18 appraisal [1] 10/10 appreciate [3] 156/15 178/16 182/19 appreciating [1] 183/16 approach [27] 31/24 45/24 76/25 77/2 81/15 105/6 114/11 117/3 129/12 129/21 130/1 171/3 187/7 192/1 194/15 195/21 195/23 197/11 198/4 203/14 206/25 207/3 207/15 209/16 212/14 213/16 213/23 approaches [4] 3/20 116/1 129/22 194/9 appropriate [14] 77/24 108/13 108/13 109/3 112/5 113/9 115/19 117/1 191/3 191/7 194/18 199/22 208/16 214/1 approval [1] 124/1 approved [1] 66/4 approvingly [1] 30/10 apt [1] 153/12 AR [19] 2/16 25/20 37/5 38/23 45/6 48/17 54/25 62/2 73/22 113/13 161/7 161/8 164/5 168/20 172/3 173/1 175/23 176/8 194/12 AR's [2] 2/3 57/24 Arabic [1] 195/3	arbitrariness [3] 134/8 146/20 158/4 arbitrary [1] 134/5 archives [1] 47/16 are [575] area [8] 71/7 71/12 72/3 72/3 95/3 107/11 108/10 162/20 areas [22] 10/7 42/19 43/4 68/16 68/20 69/4 70/20 70/24 71/1 71/16 88/13 89/9 92/20 94/13 100/14 104/19 104/21 106/3 112/9 162/18 200/14 200/15 aren't [10] 12/14 59/24 61/22 106/6 106/9 180/7 187/21 188/20 196/15 213/11 Arena [1] 30/11 arguably [3] 41/19 42/7 150/5 argue [3] 127/21 127/21 167/19 argument [3] 29/2 97/23 145/16 argument's [1] 81/17 arguments [2] 42/16 182/19 arid [2] 45/22 45/24 arise [4] 32/10 100/21 102/23 152/20 arising [2] 153/18 172/10 armed [9] 35/11 35/22 36/7 36/14 84/5 100/4 118/6 118/9 132/12 Army [1] 192/19 around [60] 9/3 12/21 18/17 26/20 35/17 66/12 69/3 74/13 75/10 76/1 78/16 79/8 80/5 81/9 83/8 85/2 85/22 86/4 87/24 92/16 92/23 93/9 93/11 94/13 95/14 95/16 95/18 95/23 96/9 99/8 102/18 103/4 103/6 105/14 105/16 106/6 107/14 108/23 120/25 122/7 129/16 131/19 142/20 151/22 157/4 159/12 160/13 160/17 169/14 195/24 195/25 196/9 196/11 196/25 205/2 205/7 208/21 209/22 218/21 218/21 arrange [1] 70/8 arrangements [1] 55/18 arrest [8] 54/21 60/6 60/7 60/14 60/15 61/2 72/18 140/13
---	---	---	--	--

A arrested [2] 44/9 203/2 arrived [1] 194/4 ARs [1] 25/20 art [2] 76/23 77/5 article [5] 126/1 139/24 140/15 140/20 141/6 Article 18.1 [1] 140/20 Article 19 [1] 139/24 article 4.2 [1] 141/6 articles [2] 155/25 157/18 Articles 8 [1] 157/18 articulate [1] 44/23 articulated [1] 62/4 as [340] ASD [2] 50/3 181/22 Asian [2] 135/18 136/10 aside [1] 162/20 ask [21] 38/8 54/16 67/14 68/4 129/5 132/1 132/23 143/23 149/9 154/12 162/1 178/19 180/7 181/3 188/16 188/18 188/21 189/7 189/24 197/8 211/16 asked [18] 5/16 6/7 15/17 24/20 25/11 32/23 34/19 68/23 81/16 100/18 102/22 109/22 117/11 123/19 126/14 146/22 175/22 217/16 asking [3] 142/8 189/10 197/6 asks [1] 145/17 aspect [4] 41/18 57/6 57/6 210/21 aspects [5] 63/10 172/8 190/14 192/11 197/10 aspire [1] 83/20 assembly [2] 115/16 145/23 assertion [1] 182/15 assertions [1] 149/21 assess [12] 51/1 71/7 76/19 78/19 79/4 108/17 111/4 116/23 211/7 211/14 211/18 212/4 assessed [1] 213/1 assesses [1] 116/19 assessment [30] 1/25 10/16 21/17 52/10 64/11 74/25 76/14 76/14 77/12 77/19 78/3 78/8 78/14 78/15 78/22 79/1	79/18 79/19 80/3 80/10 80/22 81/4 109/1 199/12 206/9 210/25 211/10 211/25 212/22 213/25 assessments [4] 77/21 78/4 201/20 206/17 assign [2] 30/24 53/4 assist [2] 153/10 197/21 assistance [1] 153/5 assisting [1] 175/7 associate [2] 4/2 194/22 associated [1] 104/7 association [1] 145/24 associations [1] 9/23 assume [4] 44/4 87/17 117/19 212/2 assuming [3] 62/8 117/2 157/15 assumption [2] 122/11 137/8 assumptions [1] 149/19 at [250] atrocious [1] 185/14 atrocities [4] 108/20 119/9 121/5 121/23 atrocitiy [5] 72/19 80/11 89/25 113/16 119/24 attack [31] 2/16 3/9 8/4 8/5 15/1 17/24 17/25 18/3 18/13 18/16 19/7 19/8 30/9 30/11 35/10 40/20 40/25 41/1 41/11 41/13 42/8 46/16 48/18 62/11 83/17 99/18 161/9 173/8 173/23 184/8 215/23 attacker [1] 30/8 attacker's [1] 10/21 attackers [1] 29/14 attacks [17] 2/2 9/7 14/4 14/22 20/10 21/12 23/2 29/13 48/20 87/8 103/9 172/19 173/2 173/5 173/19 210/14 213/1 attempt [5] 118/14 130/5 141/8 144/10 146/21 attempts [1] 169/12 attendance [1] 209/9 attended [1] 26/7 attention [16] 15/7 19/23 44/7 71/4 71/12 73/12 73/14 75/18 75/21 76/5 76/6 81/1 121/9 140/24 174/20 178/1 attenuated [1]	148/14 attenuation [1] 131/1 attracted [4] 8/7 16/2 49/1 132/25 attracting [1] 144/13 attracts [2] 131/9 144/8 attribution [2] 42/22 43/2 attuned [1] 72/16 audience [1] 191/8 August [1] 18/22 auspices [1] 106/22 Australia [2] 159/10 159/11 authored [1] 3/2 authorisation [1] 147/22 authorities [18] 7/5 44/7 44/15 65/16 65/19 86/11 86/13 86/16 91/23 109/9 130/15 141/19 141/22 146/18 147/14 151/20 174/19 174/21 authority [12] 10/24 11/6 12/21 31/18 144/6 151/15 170/19 185/25 188/12 201/1 203/2 215/10 authority-led [1] 201/1 autism [17] 25/9 49/9 49/11 50/23 51/6 51/9 51/15 51/16 55/13 60/4 88/1 125/14 125/19 125/25 136/20 136/23 148/21 autistic [9] 48/11 48/13 49/13 62/20 125/16 126/9 126/11 149/10 149/21 available [24] 60/3 72/23 79/4 81/20 86/13 92/19 93/1 101/15 102/1 104/21 105/13 121/25 125/21 129/13 134/20 135/15 136/19 136/24 153/6 193/23 195/19 213/3 215/3 215/9 avenue [1] 32/4 avenues [1] 175/4 aversion [1] 168/18 avoid [8] 63/19 98/8 100/16 119/15 125/3 157/14 157/15 199/10 aware [14] 41/5 62/6 69/19 84/7 84/20 88/24 99/20 100/13 125/14 128/5 135/14 137/12 165/24 165/25 awareness [2] 51/3 171/2 away [4] 58/6 74/24 77/5 141/23	awful [3] 172/19 193/22 195/5 B back [31] 13/18 19/3 23/4 25/2 35/24 38/10 41/18 58/13 74/25 77/14 77/17 82/17 115/2 122/20 122/21 143/24 146/2 151/24 160/8 167/8 170/8 171/14 172/3 190/3 190/14 198/23 203/12 204/15 206/8 209/4 219/15 background [4] 83/19 127/15 176/8 210/2 backgrounds [1] 181/12 bad [7] 43/8 59/14 63/8 85/18 172/19 173/8 203/6 badge [1] 32/2 baked [1] 127/16 balance [6] 92/14 93/24 137/24 138/3 165/6 165/11 balanced [1] 26/16 balancing [1] 92/16 ban [2] 139/5 159/16 bang [1] 98/24 banging [1] 87/21 bank [1] 54/6 banned [1] 159/13 banner [1] 21/2 bans [1] 139/3 bar [6] 73/1 73/6 73/7 75/4 87/18 156/6 bare [1] 189/23 barring [1] 156/5 barrister [1] 1/16 barrister's [1] 37/17 barristers [1] 5/20 base [7] 105/24 106/8 129/2 158/7 162/5 200/21 213/5 based [26] 68/24 75/23 75/23 76/6 76/11 79/22 87/8 97/16 103/17 128/21 130/23 135/9 137/8 149/25 154/15 155/23 156/11 159/15 169/13 175/22 187/25 189/6 189/9 205/8 207/4 208/7 baseline [1] 201/5 bases [1] 200/19 basic [1] 110/19 basically [5] 9/25 32/18 47/9 64/3 203/5 basis [29] 25/6 53/1 53/7 53/24 54/18 55/6 76/7 79/1 79/5 81/25 82/15 85/16 85/20	87/12 101/25 107/12 125/21 139/7 140/7 150/1 152/10 154/15 169/4 174/6 183/25 183/25 206/15 218/13 218/18 battle [1] 89/23 battlefield [1] 192/12 BBC [1] 48/19 be [410] beam [1] 154/24 bear [2] 47/19 82/22 bearing [1] 215/20 beat [1] 89/23 became [1] 125/14 because [113] 9/24 10/3 13/4 13/10 18/10 19/1 21/4 21/10 23/21 24/14 27/6 27/18 27/25 31/14 32/24 35/18 36/1 38/15 38/15 38/16 38/22 41/4 43/14 44/17 47/1 48/10 49/6 49/10 49/14 49/15 52/3 52/21 53/19 55/2 55/11 57/25 58/24 64/13 65/7 65/21 66/7 66/23 72/8 72/21 78/18 84/20 89/2 91/16 93/12 93/17 95/20 99/3 102/2 122/12 128/15 136/7 137/19 141/15 148/4 148/7 148/11 148/20 152/23 153/2 153/2 153/9 153/11 155/15 161/4 161/8 161/19 162/2 165/5 165/14 167/14 168/25 169/15 172/17 173/1 178/17 182/1 182/4 184/9 184/11 187/3 187/4 187/10 188/14 189/2 189/17 193/15 195/3 195/24 196/4 196/18 196/19 196/24 197/24 198/8 198/9 201/5 201/18 202/11 203/3 205/21 207/22 209/2 210/21 212/16 215/13 216/10 218/4 219/8 become [11] 45/5 55/21 71/10 91/10 92/11 96/20 130/12 130/23 131/6 131/12 142/2 becomes [4] 32/5 46/8 130/18 184/20 becoming [5] 9/3 54/20 59/13 64/4 134/7 bed [2] 65/20 87/5 bedsit [1] 43/1 been [127] 2/21 5/2 5/13 5/16 6/7 9/23
---	--	---	--	---

B been... [121] 11/4 11/15 14/5 14/7 14/16 16/12 17/3 17/24 19/10 21/6 23/1 23/17 24/20 25/20 26/11 28/2 28/3 28/16 29/13 30/9 32/20 35/14 36/22 37/3 40/5 43/12 46/4 47/17 55/1 55/2 57/17 59/12 59/18 62/13 62/16 67/21 69/16 69/19 71/18 73/4 73/14 73/15 74/20 78/16 81/9 89/24 90/23 92/23 96/9 100/7 100/15 100/18 101/5 101/16 101/17 102/22 103/6 107/14 109/22 109/24 110/4 110/4 110/14 110/16 110/16 110/21 110/22 111/16 112/24 114/18 117/11 124/8 126/14 127/1 127/25 129/16 131/3 131/19 131/22 138/11 138/21 139/9 149/19 157/6 161/6 162/25 163/5 163/25 168/9 169/11 169/13 169/17 169/22 171/22 174/22 174/25 175/23 177/24 178/20 180/16 182/2 182/3 182/4 182/6 183/8 186/5 186/11 192/25 197/11 199/12 200/1 204/18 210/10 212/25 214/13 215/5 215/21 216/14 217/18 218/2 219/4 before [15] 5/19 23/11 35/18 46/15 71/6 74/1 123/17 124/8 145/2 153/23 157/12 158/9 158/24 185/1 208/9 befriended [1] 9/24 beg [1] 202/14 began [2] 35/12 191/24 begin [3] 103/1 116/2 213/17 beginning [1] 68/1 begins [2] 80/19 126/10 begs [1] 202/24 behalf [1] 5/11 behave [1] 199/7 behaves [3] 212/16 212/17 212/18 behaviour [16] 36/2 36/5 60/19 85/21 85/23 104/2 108/22 114/24 120/15 155/9	161/5 171/8 177/12 196/7 198/9 213/21 behaviours [16] 106/24 115/6 115/10 115/23 119/21 120/25 122/8 165/13 165/16 176/12 177/1 180/10 208/23 209/25 212/16 213/17 behind [8] 34/11 169/9 180/14 186/18 199/19 204/2 206/24 217/8 being [73] 7/6 8/12 9/11 18/15 21/15 26/2 26/25 29/1 37/24 44/9 44/24 66/1 70/10 80/13 81/12 81/15 81/24 83/13 86/4 89/7 89/12 92/19 96/17 102/19 105/17 106/15 108/1 108/6 112/20 112/25 116/12 117/22 120/5 120/18 120/22 121/10 122/8 128/5 133/16 133/17 153/6 153/8 154/17 163/4 163/24 164/17 164/18 164/25 165/12 166/3 166/24 168/6 171/25 176/12 178/7 178/22 179/7 180/20 184/12 184/20 187/25 190/9 192/2 192/23 193/5 194/25 195/17 199/5 199/9 205/6 209/5 214/6 219/7 beings [1] 175/2 belief [7] 118/5 139/3 140/22 141/2 143/10 143/13 145/23 beliefs [7] 140/19 143/17 143/19 178/22 179/1 179/17 179/24 believe [5] 58/20 177/16 179/12 179/20 190/20 believes [3] 131/5 179/11 179/15 below [2] 190/17 216/16 belt [2] 8/11 32/14 benefit [13] 1/19 3/18 60/14 60/24 61/24 83/5 111/3 116/17 186/13 197/16 203/19 203/21 204/1 benefits [4] 60/12 98/3 207/24 208/2 bereaved [1] 175/21 bespoke [3] 29/5 31/13 152/3 best [23] 5/17 12/4 52/25 77/22 79/20 96/10 100/13 104/7 104/9 106/5 110/17	115/5 115/11 115/13 117/2 122/12 127/22 128/18 164/22 202/2 209/12 211/3 212/20 beta [1] 18/24 better [39] 28/25 43/7 49/6 57/2 68/18 69/21 75/21 76/5 76/15 86/21 89/21 90/4 93/3 94/8 94/19 97/2 102/6 105/5 112/20 112/20 114/1 114/11 116/1 121/5 125/12 143/23 160/22 171/3 184/17 184/25 186/6 193/15 195/20 201/8 204/4 204/12 209/20 210/1 218/22 Betts [18] 3/11 3/11 67/24 68/3 68/7 160/6 167/11 170/4 170/7 185/3 191/2 191/10 193/17 195/16 203/16 218/4 219/3 220/6 Betts' [2] 3/25 162/8 between [28] 1/22 23/3 31/15 93/22 100/23 105/17 107/2 108/10 108/18 115/20 117/13 117/17 118/14 120/19 121/14 126/4 138/3 156/24 157/7 162/19 163/12 165/16 176/23 177/7 193/20 200/8 200/8 209/20 beware [1] 67/5 beyond [10] 32/10 32/13 69/2 112/12 142/1 166/17 194/3 194/17 202/13 210/21 beyond: [1] 195/2 beyond: they [1] 195/2 bias [16] 125/3 133/17 134/7 134/13 134/25 135/10 135/13 146/20 158/4 188/13 188/14 188/19 189/2 189/8 189/15 189/22 Biblical [1] 98/12 big [15] 34/11 60/23 94/16 151/11 197/11 197/15 198/4 198/5 206/25 207/15 207/24 208/13 210/6 210/8 217/1 bigger [3] 19/13 185/22 205/11 biggest [4] 70/2 70/2 73/3 196/20 binding [2] 124/23 147/18 binge [1] 157/10 Birmingham [1] 4/6 bit [31] 18/7 18/20 18/21 20/3 23/13	23/23 34/13 34/15 34/16 48/14 52/4 52/13 52/15 55/21 55/23 57/24 61/1 82/19 83/11 96/6 100/14 124/7 124/24 126/13 128/12 166/11 171/18 186/19 192/16 196/17 206/10 bits [1] 28/18 black [3] 135/18 136/12 183/23 blanks [1] 94/11 block [2] 155/1 155/17 blocking [1] 154/23 bloke [1] 66/7 blood [2] 174/17 175/2 bluntly [1] 25/19 Board [1] 69/6 boards [3] 97/12 97/13 218/15 bodies [6] 108/11 111/25 112/19 112/19 113/22 189/20 bodies' [1] 108/2 body [16] 52/16 54/8 195/24 197/17 198/3 201/14 201/15 201/15 201/18 214/24 214/24 215/1 216/8 217/1 217/10 218/7 bold [2] 77/9 81/11 97/20 bolster [1] 97/20 bolstering [1] 85/2 bomb [2] 63/5 63/7 book [1] 9/16 books [3] 155/24 157/4 158/21 borrow [1] 206/4 both [22] 1/14 2/15 14/17 17/8 20/18 26/15 39/24 50/11 51/1 63/24 70/4 70/19 75/7 82/9 83/5 111/14 111/25 112/10 168/11 170/21 170/25 209/17 bottom [3] 20/4 73/20 90/9 bounced [1] 178/7 bound [3] 64/16 104/14 104/17 box [2] 59/11 77/2 brains [1] 135/12 Braverman [1] 28/14 breach [1] 108/20 breached [2] 61/3 213/12 break [8] 22/21 23/8 67/14 67/17 122/20 122/24 150/20 150/21 Brenton [1] 46/12 bricks [2] 174/17 175/2 Bridge [1] 30/9	brief [3] 5/22 100/25 187/15 briefly [7] 25/5 143/20 149/22 166/11 169/21 191/6 218/6 Brighton [1] 43/1 brilliant [1] 95/4 bring [9] 29/5 57/3 93/1 97/1 97/11 97/23 197/18 205/23 212/14 bringing [3] 155/3 176/13 176/21 brings [2] 80/4 143/24 Britain [4] 11/7 15/18 24/3 135/18 British [8] 57/2 72/15 118/2 118/11 124/11 133/8 133/15 192/19 Brits [1] 43/6 broad [12] 14/18 14/23 15/4 51/24 102/8 103/23 104/1 105/6 106/13 131/8 144/13 165/7 broadens [1] 104/23 broader [13] 13/22 14/13 14/25 15/10 33/6 33/25 34/16 38/2 63/15 95/15 101/6 121/17 185/6 broadly [5] 83/12 86/10 115/12 121/8 122/9 broker [1] 97/11 brought [2] 10/10 27/21 build [8] 63/7 76/11 85/14 95/19 177/10 178/8 178/9 208/9 building [4] 63/5 177/7 195/7 209/7 bulk [1] 77/12 bullet [3] 8/9 28/23 193/25 bullied [1] 50/3 bullying [1] 159/14 bumps [1] 51/22 burden [8] 11/2 12/15 12/16 12/19 16/16 19/16 19/16 21/8 burdened [1] 21/7 bureaucratic [1] 32/6 burglars [1] 96/15 bus [1] 38/22 buses [1] 38/25 business [1] 159/22 but [303]
--	--	---	--	---

C	211/4 211/25 212/20 213/21 215/13 218/1 can't [22] 15/13 23/16 50/7 56/10 58/21 63/25 68/9 79/10 89/14 90/13 97/22 98/25 155/17 170/5 170/11 186/2 186/17 190/11 193/13 206/10 206/11 206/16 Canada [1] 41/3 cannot [11] 83/15 111/6 127/8 129/3 141/4 141/8 146/17 147/25 179/9 180/24 204/17 capability [2] 121/24 159/3 capable [4] 29/1 67/9 181/18 182/21 capacity [8] 6/8 25/14 25/18 37/22 37/24 65/15 114/12 119/1 capture [5] 108/2 108/3 109/18 165/7 203/9 captured [1] 44/24 capturing [1] 51/24 care [8] 20/5 81/14 91/22 156/12 191/4 194/18 205/2 218/20 career [1] 77/18 careful [8] 32/3 46/20 46/21 49/19 175/3 183/16 191/5 192/3 carefully [3] 26/21 194/11 213/11 carried [8] 41/2 48/18 105/15 121/4 124/14 128/3 186/11 210/8 carries [2] 38/22 184/8 carry [5] 38/25 40/20 41/2 60/19 137/25 carrying [7] 105/18 108/19 113/15 121/5 166/21 196/6 215/21 case [71] 10/16 10/17 10/21 11/4 11/10 12/11 24/11 30/7 36/12 36/21 37/14 40/24 41/3 44/20 46/5 57/24 67/7 71/5 71/7 71/9 71/13 72/12 72/20 73/4 73/23 75/4 76/7 76/11 76/14 76/18 79/7 79/15 79/15 79/16 83/1 84/6 88/5 88/9 88/22 92/23 92/24 97/21 97/22 117/21 146/2 147/25 148/14 155/9 156/21 175/10 180/3 184/16 190/22	190/24 191/6 191/6 191/21 193/1 193/10 195/18 205/14 206/16 210/15 210/16 210/23 210/24 211/10 212/3 214/1 214/18 214/22 caseload [1] 29/25 cases [33] 20/20 21/19 25/4 29/7 41/13 46/24 61/12 62/2 72/21 78/21 87/5 88/17 88/18 88/21 90/22 95/22 95/22 131/12 146/4 152/7 182/12 187/3 193/22 197/19 198/7 201/2 201/11 203/6 206/11 209/23 215/4 215/7 216/9 Cassam [1] 49/2 cast [1] 134/14 casualties [1] 210/14 casualty [7] 14/3 14/22 20/9 21/12 62/11 103/8 212/25 catching [1] 207/10 categories [7] 9/18 14/1 17/4 20/24 24/15 25/13 31/1 categorisation [2] 45/8 45/20 categorise [3] 45/6 45/17 49/8 category [18] 9/21 12/16 13/23 16/24 17/1 19/15 19/15 19/16 20/8 26/13 28/2 31/22 36/5 37/23 82/9 98/16 103/10 103/11 category 4 [1] 82/9 Cathryn [1] 193/20 Caught [2] 137/6 139/10 causal [5] 126/4 156/24 157/6 157/15 162/7 causation [2] 157/11 161/4 cause [5] 7/13 87/14 126/1 162/13 166/23 causes [7] 6/14 125/19 133/24 159/21 162/12 167/7 196/18 causing [2] 33/18 152/12 caution [5] 120/12 122/11 149/16 191/7 193/17 cautioned [1] 109/18 caveat [4] 18/25 37/3 143/22 183/17 caveats [4] 68/12 126/20 190/3 190/4 celebrities [2] 64/12 64/13 cell [1] 9/19	cent [44] 10/25 11/11 11/12 19/12 19/19 19/21 20/11 20/12 20/14 20/15 20/15 20/19 20/19 21/14 21/15 21/20 22/1 22/2 22/3 22/13 22/15 22/18 23/3 23/19 24/4 24/6 24/7 24/12 24/16 25/25 26/4 26/18 39/11 105/11 105/14 105/15 115/1 131/11 159/25 160/1 160/4 168/15 185/23 205/25 central [10] 48/4 49/21 64/15 66/10 71/21 71/21 91/1 108/3 121/22 182/10 centralised [2] 91/11 175/10 centrally [2] 91/19 95/12 centre [4] 5/3 64/11 66/15 192/7 centred [1] 115/17 centres [1] 36/20 certain [17] 40/16 41/24 53/20 53/21 63/18 64/14 127/9 141/9 155/9 155/12 156/7 156/7 158/20 158/21 161/5 201/25 203/24 certainly [26] 14/10 27/10 32/20 36/16 37/23 40/2 40/2 46/23 48/11 55/13 73/25 74/1 78/4 90/22 127/10 149/5 150/2 150/25 162/23 164/6 164/7 169/3 193/21 194/4 194/13 215/10 certainty [1] 164/6 cetera [9] 55/13 56/13 62/9 63/5 63/6 63/7 63/8 151/21 202/20 chaff [2] 131/10 144/9 chain [1] 21/5 chair [6] 34/24 70/9 75/13 94/7 97/5 205/6 Chair's [1] 176/5 chaired [2] 69/5 151/14 chairing [2] 72/6 81/16 challenge [14] 51/13 74/5 74/13 86/19 89/13 94/1 104/13 119/8 165/5 174/24 183/11 195/9 195/12 198/2 challenges [3] 72/4 199/25 217/17 challenging [3] 58/24	101/21 115/4 chance [2] 77/25 85/8 change [15] 13/19 68/25 85/13 91/3 99/1 99/7 140/4 144/10 159/14 172/8 179/1 179/10 179/19 180/11 180/25 changed [2] 80/1 134/21 changes [5] 27/12 48/23 82/9 165/2 177/25 changing [1] 178/22 Channel [78] 6/20 7/16 10/24 11/1 11/5 11/5 11/8 12/10 12/20 19/13 19/17 19/19 19/21 20/12 20/16 20/20 21/18 21/22 22/2 22/4 22/5 22/6 22/9 22/13 22/15 22/18 22/21 23/10 23/25 24/3 25/21 26/8 28/25 29/1 30/15 74/6 82/14 83/12 84/2 84/4 91/11 95/13 106/10 109/6 111/8 112/11 124/22 126/9 129/3 129/15 129/21 131/12 131/12 138/10 141/11 141/14 142/2 142/14 142/18 142/21 142/24 150/8 164/2 164/18 168/4 187/22 190/21 190/21 193/5 193/11 193/12 193/12 193/16 194/7 216/19 217/2 217/5 217/10 Channel's [1] 196/11 chapter [1] 10/11 chapter 1 [1] 10/11 chapters [1] 33/10 character [1] 141/3 charged [1] 218/17 charity [3] 4/14 126/21 192/17 charity's [1] 4/16 charter [1] 92/11 chatbot [1] 62/25 chatbots [3] 63/3 63/8 64/3 ChatGPT [2] 40/25 41/4 chatting [1] 52/19 check [4] 53/18 61/1 68/5 190/15 checking [1] 190/16 checks [1] 190/23 chief [2] 3/13 74/9 chiefly [2] 8/7 199/5 child [87] 4/9 4/17 20/5 44/15 44/20 44/22 50/2 51/18 58/1 66/21 73/2 73/6 83/21
----------	--	---	---	--

C child... [74] 92/3 92/23 96/13 100/1 100/3 100/9 102/14 104/4 104/8 104/15 104/17 104/20 106/5 106/24 107/8 108/23 112/3 112/23 114/13 114/18 114/19 115/5 115/11 115/12 115/18 115/23 116/2 116/3 117/9 119/11 119/15 119/16 119/20 119/21 120/5 120/6 120/14 120/18 122/8 137/2 141/17 141/20 148/10 156/13 177/3 177/5 177/8 177/11 177/15 178/2 178/6 178/7 178/9 182/22 183/4 186/21 187/5 187/10 208/19 208/21 209/2 209/4 209/6 209/7 209/12 212/11 212/16 212/17 212/18 212/20 213/17 214/8 215/18 218/21 child's [10] 104/2 108/16 108/19 108/20 108/22 114/24 115/15 117/5 177/9 209/8 childhoods [2] 108/1 113/8 children [58] 3/21 50/10 89/17 89/19 96/11 100/4 100/8 101/10 101/11 102/9 102/21 105/14 105/16 105/20 106/14 106/22 108/4 108/10 109/3 111/5 111/7 111/9 112/11 112/12 112/25 113/5 113/25 114/7 114/22 115/1 115/21 117/7 119/1 121/10 122/16 124/10 125/17 127/11 133/16 133/24 141/23 148/9 148/11 148/12 159/17 159/25 171/6 171/12 171/19 181/9 181/11 186/20 186/22 187/1 194/18 196/14 196/20 200/4 children's [9] 4/10 33/11 49/23 107/19 108/1 113/8 114/25 126/7 148/14 chilling [2] 158/8 158/15 chips [1] 155/24 choice [2] 133/5 142/13 choices [6] 79/22 80/2 81/21 87/12 134/24 218/11	choose [4] 12/14 96/20 131/18 175/13 chooses [1] 140/5 choosing [1] 130/1 Christian [2] 134/11 183/23 circular [1] 97/23 circulated [1] 137/6 circumscribe [1] 143/18 circumstance [1] 214/14 circumstances [5] 102/14 109/17 143/19 179/22 214/3 cite [2] 19/2 195/23 cited [4] 49/24 163/25 175/8 204/19 cities [1] 205/11 citing [1] 81/6 citizen [1] 156/12 citizens [1] 156/18 city [2] 76/1 97/9 civil [12] 1/16 53/17 60/17 85/16 112/18 133/10 139/16 175/16 184/22 186/7 215/9 216/7 claim [1] 191/18 claims [3] 183/7 183/7 183/8 clarified [1] 28/7 clarity [9] 27/11 28/18 118/21 165/5 167/15 167/22 183/21 183/25 185/16 classed [1] 24/16 classic [2] 9/19 11/17 classification [2] 3/8 128/1 classroom [3] 102/11 114/19 120/4 Claude [3] 63/11 63/13 64/3 clear [34] 1/10 17/16 18/7 27/3 28/20 46/25 47/23 50/24 71/10 98/19 99/13 102/17 102/18 110/11 117/3 118/19 118/23 121/1 122/4 147/16 148/5 150/12 153/15 158/2 163/8 164/15 164/23 165/3 165/12 180/21 184/2 193/2 210/4 210/18 clearance [1] 67/6 clearances [1] 67/10 cleared [1] 56/11 clearer [1] 118/14 clearly [14] 8/9 59/22 74/14 81/4 96/2 100/22 105/10 108/12 116/23 117/12 117/12 181/4 186/10 210/23	climbing [2] 192/16 192/18 Clinic [1] 4/24 Clinical [1] 60/1 clog [1] 95/24 close [11] 12/11 15/16 71/13 88/9 88/17 88/18 95/22 127/18 149/18 173/24 218/5 closed [1] 175/24 closely [2] 173/24 208/2 closer [1] 136/17 closure [2] 12/13 176/1 CMA [1] 43/18 co [2] 38/6 38/17 co-operation [2] 38/6 38/17 coerce [1] 141/9 coercion [2] 179/10 180/7 coercive [1] 180/1 cognitive [1] 85/4 coherent [5] 38/7 198/19 198/19 207/2 208/15 cohort [9] 27/22 31/21 40/6 49/21 113/5 163/14 181/3 190/9 196/20 coincided [1] 23/14 colleague [2] 89/5 128/10 collect [1] 91/16 collected [1] 84/21 collection [1] 109/5 colour [1] 141/24 Columbine [7] 29/15 29/16 42/23 43/5 43/6 46/18 48/2 Columbine-type [2] 43/5 43/6 combat [2] 125/3 192/19 combination [4] 106/12 120/9 195/10 212/8 come [38] 16/3 25/2 38/10 43/15 45/2 45/3 46/5 53/9 53/11 53/16 53/23 53/24 54/4 57/9 62/2 62/19 64/23 71/22 73/4 77/25 93/10 94/16 111/9 120/8 122/20 132/3 152/9 166/8 169/19 170/8 170/24 174/10 192/16 195/8 198/13 203/12 208/11 219/15 comes [15] 29/3 77/11 82/1 83/13 87/8 93/6 126/24 146/1 174/20 179/25 184/13 197/13 206/18 209/4	217/3 comfortable [3] 62/24 84/4 179/13 comic [1] 157/4 coming [11] 42/15 44/7 50/5 53/6 53/16 148/8 150/2 177/19 177/20 177/22 196/11 comment [4] 69/22 139/22 140/17 181/16 comments [3] 139/18 174/22 206/22 commission [7] 33/8 95/3 95/10 95/12 97/14 97/15 162/8 commissioned [2] 193/5 200/24 Commissioner [10] 2/6 33/11 49/25 107/20 112/7 126/7 147/1 147/2 181/16 186/15 Commissioner has [1] 126/7 Commissioner is [1] 147/2 Commissioner's [2] 49/24 114/25 commissioning [1] 95/11 commit [5] 8/21 87/11 90/16 94/24 161/17 commitment [1] 140/22 commits [1] 59/4 committed [4] 27/13 66/8 90/17 161/19 Committee [7] 29/21 138/13 139/14 139/15 139/22 140/16 140/24 committing [9] 80/10 89/25 103/13 103/20 117/20 121/23 122/3 161/15 216/14 common [6] 7/22 29/25 44/2 109/7 126/25 216/4 commonly [2] 128/5 194/21 Commons [1] 29/22 communicating [2] 62/21 62/22 communities [5] 39/16 40/18 133/9 133/9 133/22 community [8] 39/15 50/8 98/17 99/21 107/4 119/17 138/17 140/23 companies [4] 154/23 155/6 156/10 159/1 companies' [1] 159/22 compare [2] 22/10	190/9 compared [2] 173/5 174/8 compares [1] 20/13 comparison [1] 129/22 compelling [1] 97/21 competing [1] 65/24 complaints [1] 159/15 completely [5] 44/13 64/25 65/10 184/22 184/23 complex [9] 70/4 70/13 80/16 86/16 89/7 126/18 186/20 187/4 198/17 complexity [2] 65/9 70/3 compliance [2] 128/24 159/11 compliant [5] 113/10 157/16 175/4 180/2 180/12 complicated [5] 19/1 21/10 24/18 65/21 152/2 complicit [1] 8/23 complied [1] 113/24 comply [2] 109/6 124/22 complying [1] 54/13 components [1] 55/12 comprehensive [1] 9/17 compromise [2] 117/4 165/1 compulsorily [1] 54/22 computer [4] 43/18 43/19 43/23 44/1 conceded [1] 125/24 conceived [1] 199/16 concept [8] 26/22 127/23 156/4 156/5 160/20 164/23 169/14 180/17 concepts [1] 29/19 conceptual [4] 70/7 70/11 71/2 95/2 conceptually [1] 30/3 concern [28] 56/9 66/22 66/24 74/22 82/2 103/14 106/25 108/5 108/15 115/17 115/24 118/15 120/6 121/18 130/8 134/4 159/5 159/19 165/13 176/1 180/14 184/1 185/22 186/25 189/6 196/18 212/24 213/7 concerned [7] 6/17 6/25 35/10 74/3 86/14 137/13 185/23 concerning [1] 104/5
--	---	--	---	--

C Concerningly [1] 159/16 concerns [27] 20/7 50/20 108/23 113/22 114/12 114/14 114/17 114/21 114/24 116/6 118/17 125/15 126/8 137/1 138/18 139/8 141/11 141/13 142/20 144/23 177/23 181/4 186/13 186/25 187/10 189/3 201/18 concluded [1] 172/4 concludes [1] 99/9 conclusion [1] 144/18 conditions [4] 63/18 108/16 108/19 111/23 conducted [3] 2/1 10/19 193/6 confidence [10] 79/17 88/17 88/18 113/17 113/20 114/3 184/4 184/15 206/11 214/19 confident [2] 88/4 95/23 confidentiality [1] 109/8 confidently [1] 88/9 confirm [1] 181/18 conflict [3] 100/5 120/8 132/12 conflicts [1] 120/8 conform [1] 15/10 confused [2] 13/5 139/11 connected [1] 198/19 conscience [2] 140/18 141/1 conscious [2] 66/1 148/8 consciousness [1] 164/9 consensual [3] 141/14 142/18 151/14 consent [29] 11/14 21/22 23/21 23/22 34/12 39/23 141/25 142/6 142/7 142/8 142/9 142/10 142/19 180/8 180/8 182/11 182/13 182/15 182/18 185/22 185/24 186/19 187/11 187/25 187/25 188/2 188/4 216/5 217/24 consent-based [1] 187/25 consented [2] 19/22 23/20 consenting [2] 141/18 142/13	consents [1] 187/20 consequence [2] 120/14 169/16 consequences [3] 142/14 142/15 147/17 consider [15] 9/1 50/20 51/1 100/18 103/1 103/19 104/6 107/21 109/22 117/11 117/24 163/12 169/5 197/10 204/23 considerable [1] 102/21 consideration [5] 33/16 98/2 107/15 107/19 170/22 considerations [1] 113/12 considered [9] 84/9 109/20 122/13 122/16 129/21 129/25 145/20 152/24 216/25 considering [3] 115/12 116/22 121/18 considers [2] 112/10 118/8 consistent [3] 28/4 71/17 200/18 consistently [6] 19/11 63/14 80/24 91/15 136/24 200/14 consolidated [1] 175/10 constable [1] 53/4 constables [1] 74/9 constant [2] 74/22 193/19 constantly [3] 51/13 62/17 87/21 constitute [1] 140/14 constructed [1] 151/11 construes [1] 139/15 Consultancy [1] 60/1 consume [1] 40/4 consumed [1] 40/15 consumers [1] 39/13 consumes [1] 32/6 consuming [1] 213/7 contact [2] 89/10 114/13 contain [1] 60/23 contemplate [2] 18/16 154/11 content [10] 16/21 39/16 41/22 46/21 47/20 108/6 159/22 160/4 186/14 213/7 contents [1] 120/2 CONTEST [1] 6/12 context [7] 20/3 20/6 107/24 135/21 177/19 198/24 216/13 contexts [1] 123/10 contextual [1] 101/1 continual [1] 95/24	continue [2] 78/25 106/13 continued [4] 105/7 144/21 151/8 220/9 continues [1] 135/20 continuity [1] 204/16 continuum [1] 85/13 contribute [1] 154/3 contributes [1] 34/12 contributing [1] 5/12 contribution [1] 100/12 contributions [1] 219/4 control [4] 85/11 85/14 85/21 173/16 controlled [1] 85/13 controls [3] 154/18 155/4 156/5 controversial [1] 169/11 convened [1] 11/5 convention [7] 5/4 138/1 139/3 147/16 148/9 150/10 157/21 conventional [1] 210/19 conventions [2] 138/5 179/14 conversation [11] 83/3 84/8 91/18 98/5 102/15 107/24 122/9 193/20 195/1 196/25 209/14 conversational [2] 63/16 63/18 conversations [3] 25/6 63/14 194/14 converse [1] 9/13 conveyor [2] 8/11 32/14 convicted [4] 18/9 61/11 61/13 161/7 conviction [4] 2/4 72/18 140/22 215/21 convinced [1] 92/6 coordination [2] 92/5 177/14 Coordinator [1] 3/16 cope [1] 34/19 copies [1] 47/17 cops [2] 85/18 218/12 copy [2] 161/7 161/8 core [3] 82/8 176/3 178/21 Cornell's [1] 4/24 corners [1] 48/3 correct [5] 67/9 76/12 145/13 146/7 176/18 corrected [1] 190/25 correctly [1] 167/2 cost [2] 44/3 196/2 could [90] 12/6 14/22 14/24 14/25 27/11	27/14 32/1 32/22 32/24 35/15 35/23 36/15 38/23 40/9 40/13 41/7 42/22 43/3 50/17 51/14 51/19 51/20 54/14 55/20 57/23 59/15 60/3 60/10 60/18 62/24 64/20 66/2 67/13 67/14 70/17 71/10 76/9 77/3 78/15 79/6 82/25 84/4 86/24 88/17 95/3 103/14 103/23 104/3 104/21 104/25 106/19 120/10 120/20 126/23 127/20 133/23 135/4 135/5 135/6 135/6 137/8 149/9 150/20 150/23 152/18 153/15 154/10 158/15 160/11 164/20 167/15 171/7 172/21 180/7 180/22 181/3 181/6 186/14 188/6 191/2 196/6 197/8 198/20 199/18 199/19 208/17 208/20 213/25 216/6 217/14 couldn't [5] 51/21 78/9 78/10 180/17 180/23 counsel [3] 61/15 61/15 62/7 counseled [1] 33/7 count [1] 161/13 counter [72] 2/1 3/14 3/16 4/16 6/11 7/4 10/9 10/13 10/16 10/19 11/2 11/10 12/22 14/6 21/16 33/9 37/21 38/1 38/19 44/8 45/9 48/12 51/13 51/20 54/2 56/3 66/2 68/25 73/7 73/10 74/19 74/23 75/24 77/13 89/8 90/14 91/10 91/12 93/8 98/15 100/4 100/6 100/9 104/6 104/9 106/22 107/3 107/6 107/10 108/11 118/1 120/18 120/22 123/11 123/20 123/25 132/15 133/1 151/16 151/18 172/2 173/25 174/2 175/25 188/17 189/20 200/10 201/17 202/10 214/2 214/5 217/19 counter-terror [1] 106/22 counter-terrorism [34] 4/16 6/11 7/4 38/19 44/8 45/9 51/20 54/2 68/25 74/23 75/24 77/13 89/8 91/10 98/15 100/4	100/6 100/9 104/9 107/3 107/6 107/10 118/1 123/20 123/25 132/15 133/1 151/16 151/18 172/2 173/25 174/2 175/25 202/10 countering [4] 70/1 101/13 112/25 117/22 counterintuitive [1] 93/14 counterpoint [1] 82/3 counterproductive [1] 34/11 countries [1] 34/2 country [13] 38/8 38/9 38/9 66/13 76/1 106/3 106/7 161/7 164/3 183/13 205/2 205/7 207/2 couple [10] 13/1 30/14 35/19 39/9 83/6 86/2 88/25 89/5 154/4 192/2 coupled [4] 113/5 116/5 121/20 122/6 courage [1] 184/15 course [36] 1/11 2/10 2/13 2/16 2/20 8/1 9/5 11/15 11/16 11/21 11/24 12/17 13/23 23/20 30/6 31/4 31/25 36/5 40/5 44/3 73/16 74/6 123/7 129/2 137/18 172/6 173/18 174/19 182/19 183/3 188/14 190/7 193/17 200/19 208/12 216/3 court [9] 61/13 61/22 62/3 145/17 145/17 146/3 147/23 147/24 180/4 courts [2] 183/6 183/14 Couzens [1] 172/18 covenant [4] 139/16 140/2 140/6 141/6 cover [6] 95/10 100/22 116/9 126/14 162/2 162/18 covering [1] 48/19 covers [3] 103/25 168/11 196/2 covert [2] 83/14 215/14 Cox [1] 30/21 create [8] 40/1 40/13 41/15 43/19 48/9 56/6 64/25 66/15 created [3] 2/25 133/12 152/3 creating [5] 39/2 43/14 46/16 101/8 115/20 creation [1] 112/6 creative [2] 12/5 192/23
--	---	--	---	--

C creativity [1] 194/2 credibility [4] 110/10 133/4 133/7 138/11 credible [1] 132/19 credit [3] 181/14 181/15 181/20 Crest [1] 126/10 crime [22] 17/18 39/12 39/13 39/15 53/14 53/17 59/3 87/11 90/17 90/18 90/18 97/13 104/11 106/5 107/15 109/14 121/3 176/15 176/20 195/20 196/23 198/1 crimes [2] 53/6 172/18 criminal [17] 4/5 9/22 60/10 60/19 62/2 62/3 89/10 104/7 115/16 115/17 119/13 152/5 185/13 215/2 216/11 216/13 216/14 criminalise [1] 140/11 criminalising [1] 119/15 criminality [3] 119/14 121/10 208/23 Criminology [1] 4/5 CRIN [4] 4/9 100/2 109/25 111/1 CRIN's [2] 110/3 110/15 crises [1] 203/1 critical [2] 14/16 204/20 criticised [2] 182/2 182/4 criticism [3] 132/25 182/3 205/20 critique [2] 117/15 131/3 critiques [1] 138/12 cross [1] 83/11 crossbench [1] 1/14 Crown [2] 61/22 216/22 crucial [5] 112/7 115/8 117/9 124/3 177/4 crucially [4] 7/11 114/16 117/6 122/4 Cruise [1] 64/12 CSO [1] 16/20 CSOs [1] 6/14 CT [3] 74/25 87/7 174/1 CTCO [1] 190/20 CTP [6] 32/18 37/10 201/24 202/1 203/24 204/23 culpability [1] 172/5 cultural [5] 74/18	75/10 87/16 127/15 200/5 culture [8] 74/17 78/6 93/7 93/23 93/25 96/22 200/7 203/25 cultures [1] 96/19 Curiously [1] 164/3 current [12] 2/20 3/4 4/3 10/5 41/17 104/18 119/19 128/3 162/22 166/12 172/12 217/5 currently [15] 4/2 24/21 28/22 31/6 38/16 39/19 92/18 100/23 102/7 116/17 127/23 153/6 153/8 199/9 217/14 cursor [2] 128/4 157/2 custodians [1] 35/21 customers [1] 55/8 cut [1] 17/16 cuts [2] 134/16 137/4 CVE [1] 81/7 cyber [2] 59/12 159/14 cyber-bullying [1] 159/14 D daily [1] 218/18 damage [1] 7/9 damaging [1] 7/24 dancing [1] 46/11 danger [4] 61/23 207/14 211/19 212/4 dangerous [4] 35/13 36/3 36/15 38/24 dangers [1] 179/21 dark [3] 47/4 47/11 154/19 data [103] 47/21 71/18 71/24 72/9 72/20 75/12 75/22 80/5 80/18 80/18 80/24 81/25 82/7 84/12 84/13 84/19 84/20 86/19 87/22 88/6 88/10 89/14 90/4 90/25 91/11 91/17 91/19 91/21 92/4 92/8 92/15 92/17 92/18 92/22 92/25 93/4 94/4 94/15 95/2 95/6 95/8 95/19 95/21 97/17 97/23 101/16 107/23 108/2 108/3 108/10 109/5 109/7 109/16 109/18 110/14 110/22 111/2 111/6 111/13 111/17 111/18 111/24 112/3 116/14 116/14 120/17 122/1 125/5 125/7 125/8 125/11 129/8 135/15 135/15 136/19 136/24 139/8	139/11 142/21 142/22 147/9 147/11 147/12 148/5 151/9 152/1 152/21 153/5 153/8 153/17 159/11 161/23 181/21 181/22 184/21 185/1 186/6 190/14 190/15 193/10 195/13 200/10 204/16 databases [3] 143/1 143/4 147/11 date [1] 46/8 David [5] 2/15 70/19 78/20 87/9 203/9 David Amess [1] 2/15 day [14] 1/6 46/3 46/4 52/18 99/23 99/24 100/17 127/21 130/17 130/25 156/7 183/12 194/13 219/18 days [4] 75/1 123/16 131/20 154/4 de [4] 62/25 63/14 66/16 75/1 de-escalate [1] 63/14 de-radicalisation [1] 66/16 deadly [1] 132/10 deal [21] 6/3 19/18 24/7 31/22 66/25 82/1 125/17 133/4 135/20 139/20 151/6 152/18 153/20 173/12 174/3 180/6 181/7 189/1 206/2 208/20 208/24 dealers [1] 38/13 dealing [16] 21/24 25/8 27/6 37/14 42/1 42/3 57/7 58/24 60/5 64/7 65/19 69/4 151/15 151/17 153/12 173/1 deals [1] 43/11 dealt [5] 8/17 25/4 27/16 29/1 42/2 death [4] 79/23 82/18 92/24 118/5 debate [1] 195/9 decades [4] 3/11 92/23 96/10 146/4 December [1] 1/24 decent [1] 135/19 decide [6] 11/9 120/12 148/25 158/13 183/14 217/7 decided [7] 41/5 82/14 190/20 190/22 192/5 199/12 199/19 decides [2] 10/17 165/23 deciding [4] 12/11 31/16 32/4 166/1 decision [16] 50/18 52/21 79/25 87/18 132/24 183/21 183/22	183/22 183/24 204/13 204/19 206/14 216/17 217/12 217/13 217/14 decision-maker [2] 183/21 183/22 decision-making [4] 50/18 79/25 132/24 204/19 decisions [8] 95/22 95/25 97/12 98/13 98/13 184/15 203/23 204/7 decline [1] 142/7 deconflict [1] 10/15 deconfliction [1] 12/18 dedicated [4] 39/16 99/1 154/25 161/10 deemed [2] 108/21 158/10 deeper [2] 46/16 90/3 deeply [1] 110/9 default [1] 194/6 defendant [1] 18/5 defenders [1] 133/2 defensively [1] 184/17 defer [1] 144/11 define [2] 28/1 116/23 defined [8] 101/24 102/4 103/3 104/25 108/1 126/24 162/21 190/10 defines [1] 118/1 definite [1] 86/19 definitely [5] 66/10 68/16 77/4 90/12 95/13 definition [17] 13/22 14/12 15/11 38/7 40/6 102/3 102/18 103/9 104/18 105/2 105/6 118/7 118/22 127/3 165/7 166/20 167/1 definitional [1] 13/1 definitions [8] 14/17 103/4 103/5 106/13 117/25 122/5 172/9 184/2 degree [4] 79/17 164/7 169/5 214/19 delay [2] 176/23 201/3 deliberate [1] 110/23 delicate [1] 213/13 delighted [1] 33/15 delineate [2] 105/17 110/21 delivered [2] 79/15 86/10 delivering [1] 3/20 delivery [1] 3/22 delve [3] 118/18 142/22 148/16 delving [1] 128/20	demand [2] 25/18 53/20 democracy [1] 118/3 democratic [5] 8/20 83/20 94/9 109/11 178/25 democratically [1] 9/2 demonstrable [1] 150/13 demonstrably [1] 149/13 demonstrate [2] 37/18 120/25 demonstrated [3] 122/8 165/13 214/9 demonstrating [5] 48/2 115/24 119/22 150/5 165/15 denting [1] 113/20 departed [1] 32/19 Department [2] 91/25 200/13 departments [2] 200/8 209/20 depend [4] 141/19 214/3 214/6 214/13 depending [4] 79/2 141/20 186/21 216/3 depends [2] 79/6 213/3 deprogrammer [1] 56/25 deprogramming [1] 52/3 depth [1] 191/16 deradicalise [1] 7/22 deradicalised [1] 191/18 derive [1] 167/15 derogated [2] 138/8 141/4 describe [10] 29/18 71/1 71/3 72/8 72/25 85/11 127/9 163/19 194/11 203/25 described [5] 20/8 82/8 84/6 97/7 195/11 describes [1] 194/1 describing [2] 92/4 194/9 descriptions [1] 134/24 deselect [2] 88/22 95/22 deselecting [1] 206/12 deselection [1] 87/1 design [4] 129/15 131/15 133/10 188/9 designed [14] 70/25 79/14 98/14 98/14 101/3 104/6 117/6 117/22 120/25 131/25 136/3 149/22 162/5 162/6
---	--	---	---	---

D	151/22 157/1 163/18 164/5 164/9 168/19 172/3 176/4 176/19 181/20 185/1 190/16 192/7 193/21 199/11 214/21	directly [1] 206/13 director [4] 4/19 4/24 17/6 123/5 directors [1] 205/2 disabilities [2] 148/22 149/11 disability [3] 148/24 148/25 181/23 disable [2] 149/11 149/16 disabled [2] 148/16 149/6 disadvantages [1] 207/25 disaggregated [1] 204/10 disagree [1] 203/8 disagreed [1] 29/22 disagreement [1] 218/9 disagrees [1] 17/2 disciplines [1] 129/18 disclosed [1] 113/6 disclosure [1] 152/4 disconnect [1] 93/22 discount [1] 62/16 discounted [1] 64/8 discover [2] 37/11 37/12 discovering [1] 125/6 discovery [2] 38/20 39/6 discretion [3] 146/17 158/4 188/13 discrimination [8] 121/12 138/14 139/4 139/5 148/5 148/18 149/8 188/15 discriminatory [2] 112/5 139/7 discuss [8] 57/1 57/16 57/18 57/19 58/2 124/20 128/14 128/17 discussed [3] 25/14 32/21 93/18 discussing [2] 88/13 191/23 discussion [6] 5/24 10/4 55/22 100/11 145/2 153/13 diseases [1] 128/1 disengage [1] 6/23 disincentivise [1] 200/7 dismiss [1] 50/19 dismissing [1] 194/16 disorder [5] 25/9 48/14 60/4 97/13 109/14 displacement [1] 168/7 displaying [1] 106/24	disproportionate [4] 113/8 125/16 135/17 136/20 disproportionately [1] 181/10 disproven [1] 157/6 disputes [1] 119/5 disreputable [1] 9/1 disrespect [1] 146/25 disrupt [1] 60/16 disruption [1] 67/21 disruptive [2] 38/1 59/7 dissimilar [1] 106/10 dissipate [1] 119/3 distance [1] 99/20 distinct [3] 27/22 96/7 126/6 distinction [1] 118/14 distinctions [1] 31/15 distinguish [6] 18/12 18/14 25/1 29/8 117/13 117/17 distinguished [1] 126/24 distinguishes [1] 100/23 distinguishing [1] 121/14 distorted [1] 199/17 disturbance [1] 17/22 disturbing [1] 170/3 disturbingly [1] 169/23 divergence [1] 105/23 diversion [3] 53/15 60/18 107/13 diversionary [2] 104/10 177/1 divert [1] 7/23 diverting [1] 85/8 divided [2] 14/2 29/20 dividend [2] 94/9 94/16 divides [2] 9/18 115/20 division [2] 69/1 120/19 Dixon [1] 55/7 do [180] 5/25 10/10 12/6 12/14 13/14 15/13 18/2 26/6 26/19 29/12 31/16 36/24 37/6 38/20 39/5 42/5 42/13 42/25 43/17 43/20 44/2 44/18 51/11 51/18 53/1 53/4 55/5 55/6 55/18 57/1 57/14 58/10 58/10 58/11 58/15 58/21	58/21 58/22 59/8 59/23 61/3 61/9 63/10 63/19 64/6 65/23 67/7 67/8 67/14 71/5 71/7 71/13 74/12 76/18 76/18 76/19 77/1 78/9 78/10 78/11 79/10 79/11 79/16 79/20 81/19 85/19 85/20 88/8 91/8 91/14 91/16 92/14 92/15 93/1 95/11 98/24 99/7 105/17 106/1 110/12 111/11 111/16 113/22 113/23 113/24 119/11 119/12 119/15 122/22 123/19 126/1 127/17 128/18 129/5 129/7 130/11 135/12 136/4 136/17 137/21 142/1 148/11 156/7 156/8 156/10 156/15 159/2 159/2 159/3 159/6 159/7 161/10 163/11 163/20 163/24 164/25 165/11 167/11 168/1 168/18 168/22 169/2 170/7 170/13 173/19 174/5 174/7 176/18 179/17 181/10 181/24 182/19 183/1 183/2 184/6 184/17 185/5 185/6 185/24 185/24 185/25 188/14 188/18 188/22 188/23 190/7 190/14 190/18 190/22 191/19 191/21 192/16 193/15 198/6 198/8 199/4 199/11 199/19 201/19 201/19 202/2 202/4 202/25 202/25 205/22 206/7 206/21 206/24 207/3 207/7 208/8 211/3 211/21 213/8 214/23 215/19 215/25 216/9 216/20 218/12 Dock [1] 55/7 doctor [2] 51/21 144/5 document [1] 201/4 documentary [1] 119/10 documented [1] 147/12 documents [1] 163/7 does [74] 7/15 8/5 8/20 13/3 23/22 30/12 33/20 34/25 43/24 47/6 48/1 50/13 52/19 54/7 63/11 66/6 71/7 73/21 84/10 91/13 92/15 94/17 100/24 102/11 102/12 102/13 103/11 103/21 103/21 117/12 117/14 117/17
----------	---	--	--	---

D does... [42] 117/23 118/9 125/3 125/22 126/22 127/23 130/19 132/7 132/13 132/16 135/11 135/11 145/6 145/8 150/7 153/16 154/21 159/1 159/6 160/15 162/12 166/2 166/5 168/3 168/8 172/12 173/18 174/10 178/23 179/6 181/19 182/7 185/9 185/16 194/15 203/9 204/22 210/16 211/2 214/25 214/25 217/11 doesn't [26] 11/23 22/3 26/25 32/6 34/17 37/21 38/9 42/12 51/11 54/17 55/8 65/8 73/23 82/13 87/2 130/11 133/1 133/4 137/6 139/5 144/9 173/22 178/2 184/6 188/25 189/1 doing [20] 22/22 42/11 46/15 52/24 53/5 66/13 77/19 94/15 98/21 115/19 118/25 154/11 176/14 189/22 192/15 198/14 201/12 205/5 214/11 215/7 domain [1] 116/17 domestic [7] 40/8 40/13 75/1 92/24 127/19 175/25 218/14 dominated [1] 8/6 dominating [1] 21/10 don't [98] 11/11 13/21 15/4 16/4 17/11 21/11 23/6 23/16 24/11 25/21 26/3 27/7 27/19 30/6 38/2 39/11 42/1 42/9 44/1 44/16 48/2 51/9 55/10 59/17 59/22 59/23 60/6 60/12 61/17 62/15 64/17 64/21 65/8 66/13 66/25 69/19 71/22 73/17 74/10 79/25 81/21 84/19 86/6 86/6 86/7 87/22 88/2 89/19 90/13 90/17 90/18 91/9 91/13 91/14 91/16 95/13 96/17 97/22 124/19 127/2 127/17 134/15 136/15 142/9 142/10 148/3 150/1 156/16 158/25 160/14 160/15 160/16 161/14 163/23 165/14 170/7 175/1 178/15 178/17 178/18 182/2 182/3	185/12 185/19 185/24 187/4 188/1 190/6 190/20 191/18 193/18 196/19 201/8 202/1 203/6 204/25 210/3 217/6 done [38] 5/13 12/19 15/7 19/25 25/22 35/5 36/6 36/19 36/25 43/3 64/24 71/14 82/13 86/22 88/15 92/7 94/21 94/22 107/17 116/3 124/24 150/22 152/4 152/6 162/5 172/22 176/6 190/15 190/18 190/19 195/4 195/5 195/6 195/20 211/23 211/24 213/14 217/22 door [29] 34/1 34/11 34/13 34/15 34/16 53/22 54/12 54/23 55/2 55/4 85/23 151/12 197/11 197/15 198/4 198/6 199/19 201/24 204/3 206/25 207/15 207/24 208/13 210/7 210/8 216/2 216/2 217/2 217/8 double [1] 66/23 double-headed [1] 66/23 doubt [5] 56/17 73/9 114/5 166/17 199/20 Dovetail [2] 10/23 187/8 down [17] 20/4 22/21 23/4 23/8 74/23 77/4 79/16 97/9 107/7 110/22 198/20 198/22 206/16 209/16 213/15 213/16 219/8 downloaded [2] 18/10 30/11 downloading [1] 65/6 downside [1] 204/24 downsides [5] 198/3 199/23 199/25 204/14 217/17 Dr [21] 3/11 3/11 3/25 48/5 67/24 68/3 68/7 160/6 162/8 167/11 170/4 170/7 185/3 191/2 191/10 193/17 195/16 203/16 218/4 219/3 220/6 Dr Betts [14] 3/11 67/24 68/3 160/6 167/11 170/4 170/7 185/3 191/2 191/10 193/17 195/16 218/4 219/3 Dr Betts' [2] 3/25 162/8 Dr Irani [1] 48/5	Dr Paul [1] 3/11 dragons [1] 66/24 dramatically [1] 154/17 draw [3] 15/7 31/14 185/25 drawback [1] 209/1 drawing [2] 15/16 193/9 drawn [16] 7/6 9/12 26/25 29/14 73/22 89/7 89/12 112/25 117/22 121/10 164/25 166/3 174/14 179/7 205/19 210/11 draws [2] 108/25 140/24 dream [1] 9/3 drew [1] 19/23 dried [2] 30/18 30/23 drilling [1] 39/8 drive [2] 159/23 160/15 driven [7] 17/21 24/22 81/18 84/12 126/16 159/16 195/13 driver [3] 14/15 14/24 17/13 drivers [5] 80/19 87/23 160/9 160/21 171/19 driving [3] 66/12 88/2 213/22 drone [1] 38/13 drugs [3] 38/13 86/7 173/12 drum [2] 87/21 89/23 dry [1] 18/20 dual [3] 26/22 105/2 165/5 dubbed [1] 197/11 due [6] 2/10 7/5 105/21 149/4 149/7 208/12 Dukic [1] 63/1 duplication [1] 201/3 duplicative [1] 70/21 durable [1] 168/21 during [4] 1/11 104/2 124/18 160/8 duty [33] 6/19 7/2 7/16 8/9 42/10 54/12 101/7 101/8 104/14 105/21 106/13 109/8 113/23 114/2 114/5 120/11 122/7 132/7 132/13 132/21 149/2 149/3 156/11 163/18 163/18 169/13 171/4 174/16 174/16 189/13 202/20 202/22 207/12 dwarfing [1] 20/22 dynamic [3] 79/1 79/5 82/20 dynamically [1] 31/5	E each [10] 1/9 26/9 26/10 39/23 99/24 153/1 154/13 175/24 186/22 203/17 earlier [14] 3/19 27/25 40/24 99/25 101/7 101/22 108/7 139/9 181/16 191/25 194/19 198/24 209/5 217/16 early [17] 2/4 6/18 16/9 69/5 76/22 77/20 93/11 96/12 119/14 164/10 176/10 176/14 176/25 178/5 196/6 201/10 218/22 earth [2] 42/25 172/21 easier [1] 215/14 easily [3] 27/1 83/1 134/23 Eastern [3] 15/22 135/19 136/14 easy [7] 18/18 25/1 33/12 52/22 158/2 160/19 204/22 echo [2] 170/25 186/5 edge [1] 203/6 Edison [1] 39/10 educate [1] 180/18 education [15] 11/20 31/18 73/4 85/4 105/3 114/9 115/2 115/21 117/6 119/25 124/10 171/14 180/1 200/13 216/24 educational [1] 212/9 effect [7] 85/24 132/11 158/9 158/15 163/5 168/21 212/25 effective [29] 3/21 58/18 81/3 84/10 112/4 112/22 113/9 116/8 121/6 122/4 129/6 129/23 129/23 132/19 138/19 144/16 144/17 147/24 181/2 185/5 185/7 188/20 192/24 193/1 193/16 194/15 194/23 195/18 211/2 effectively [6] 55/19 101/18 175/6 175/12 182/15 217/2 effectiveness [7] 102/19 105/25 110/3 121/17 163/13 193/4 197/1 efficacy [1] 182/8 efficient [1] 128/23 effort [3] 110/23 170/2 201/3 efforts [1] 63/17	EGR [2] 52/10 76/21 EGR-R [2] 52/10 76/21 eight [2] 57/8 176/20 eight months [1] 176/20 either [11] 71/10 104/15 110/13 110/24 113/14 131/12 138/11 154/16 168/4 188/24 214/9 elected [1] 9/2 elective [1] 205/1 element [4] 28/13 109/22 118/8 163/4 elements [10] 6/10 15/3 101/1 103/19 104/1 111/21 117/9 196/17 209/18 212/13 eligible [2] 28/2 28/24 eliminating [1] 149/8 Elimination [1] 138/14 elites [1] 8/23 Ellsmore [1] 193/20 eloquent [1] 89/3 eloquently [1] 83/22 else [14] 57/19 61/21 69/25 74/8 83/13 96/17 126/12 135/4 149/21 154/19 170/4 170/13 170/16 199/18 email [1] 204/10 emails [1] 75/25 embedded [1] 33/6 emerge [1] 86/2 emergency [1] 141/5 emerges [4] 78/24 92/22 99/5 99/8 emerging [1] 112/21 eminently [1] 77/22 emphasis [4] 49/7 119/19 134/18 171/23 emphasise [4] 131/4 145/1 175/23 206/16 emphasised [2] 126/3 172/7 emphasising [1] 205/18 empirical [2] 76/7 190/15 employ [1] 78/10 employment [1] 85/4 empowered [1] 141/20 enable [1] 175/5 enabling [1] 6/21 encompass [3] 101/6 102/24 166/13 encompasses [2] 19/6 140/21 encompassing [1] 105/1 encounter [2] 46/25 104/15
---	---	---	---	---

E	112/4 113/7 113/9 126/17 181/6 181/8 191/4 204/16 213/11	evaluated [1] 110/8 evaluating [1] 107/17 evaluation [4] 116/19 193/4 193/9 196/25 evaluations [7] 101/15 110/5 110/8 110/11 116/16 122/1 186/11 Evans [1] 31/4 even [50] 8/19 15/2 18/3 18/15 19/12 26/16 30/4 34/7 42/22 43/15 46/15 51/10 57/23 58/23 59/11 59/22 91/13 91/19 102/12 104/24 110/19 114/18 118/15 118/22 121/15 129/16 130/21 132/25 135/9 135/23 137/12 141/5 141/14 141/17 143/4 143/6 145/25 147/6 148/3 176/15 178/2 178/11 180/17 182/22 187/1 187/21 188/18 189/2 189/21 189/22 event [1] 192/14 eventually [1] 191/13 eventuating [1] 59/9 ever [9] 18/2 27/25 33/20 84/7 127/20 129/25 131/5 131/11 201/4 every [11] 11/3 12/16 18/7 95/3 97/9 114/15 131/23 144/13 170/19 206/3 219/7 everybody [2] 5/10 8/6 everyone [7] 12/17 12/20 118/23 138/8 139/6 193/2 193/8 everyone's [1] 137/23 everything [8] 21/10 42/15 92/13 99/9 119/15 127/17 131/9 132/8 everywhere [3] 20/6 154/19 204/25 evidence [42] 2/9 12/25 26/14 29/21 48/6 49/18 60/9 65/5 105/24 106/8 107/12 114/4 117/4 126/11 128/21 129/2 135/14 136/19 144/15 145/15 149/25 150/1 154/15 155/23 156/2 156/21 157/2 158/7 161/3 161/4 161/14 161/23 162/3 162/5 167/17 170/15 175/5 189/17 193/15 195/24 196/3 204/15 evidence-based [1]	155/23 evidentiary [1] 150/1 evolved [1] 194/10 evolving [1] 122/14 exactly [6] 33/13 50/12 127/5 141/17 162/21 167/23 examined [2] 111/24 125/18 examining [1] 175/12 example [31] 8/22 15/3 17/10 17/24 23/1 25/9 26/10 29/11 30/21 35/9 36/9 37/2 37/13 40/13 46/10 53/9 54/14 64/3 127/18 138/3 141/21 143/14 144/2 161/5 173/13 179/2 179/3 188/18 192/4 215/8 215/25 examples [9] 12/7 16/10 26/10 191/7 191/12 192/2 195/15 197/18 209/15 excellent [1] 87/1 exception [1] 140/2 exceptionally [2] 107/6 107/11 exceptions [1] 141/5 excitement [1] 192/11 excluded [1] 176/22 exclusively [1] 9/15 excuse [1] 56/14 Executive [2] 4/19 123/5 exercise [2] 99/7 198/6 exercised [1] 198/21 exercises [1] 169/4 exist [6] 41/25 76/8 121/2 173/7 202/22 204/25 existence [2] 144/21 193/3 existing [3] 44/6 122/12 156/23 exists [3] 74/18 76/23 97/9 expand [3] 70/21 133/19 202/12 expanded [8] 54/6 100/22 101/6 102/24 109/20 109/23 116/9 123/13 expanding [3] 32/10 114/15 133/20 expands [1] 103/24 expansion [2] 106/17 107/22 expect [5] 136/10 136/13 136/15 201/2 205/8 expected [1] 193/14 expedition [2] 92/13	192/18 experience [23] 4/21 11/19 48/11 49/21 50/9 51/25 68/24 70/25 77/11 78/7 79/11 80/17 96/23 109/1 110/3 110/16 123/22 124/21 163/11 167/15 169/3 190/8 205/5 experienced [1] 77/15 experiencing [2] 31/7 182/21 experiment [2] 16/22 158/17 experimenting [1] 46/1 expert [7] 4/20 7/20 95/4 143/22 215/4 215/8 215/24 expertise [19] 4/21 5/4 25/8 61/4 66/16 67/23 68/13 68/17 78/7 96/18 96/22 177/21 205/7 205/13 205/16 206/4 208/17 212/14 212/21 experts [5] 29/20 29/20 31/21 144/11 213/4 explain [5] 22/1 47/22 72/9 202/2 205/10 explained [1] 89/2 explaining [1] 128/11 explains [1] 13/9 explanation [4] 47/4 47/4 47/5 170/1 explicit [3] 134/3 157/9 207/18 explicitly [5] 6/24 29/14 116/9 133/12 134/9 Exploitation [1] 37/20 exploration [1] 218/24 explore [1] 180/11 explored [1] 175/4 exposed [2] 108/6 134/20 Exposure [1] 8/14 express [1] 179/23 expressed [4] 30/10 104/16 126/8 206/20 expression [8] 115/15 138/6 139/1 139/25 143/18 145/22 146/19 157/19 extend [2] 73/5 163/18 extended [2] 27/11 132/21 extending [2] 133/2 133/3
----------	--	--	--	--

E extends [4] 32/13 68/13 69/2 140/3 extensive [4] 107/18 124/14 124/25 132/4 extensively [1] 195/25 extent [12] 24/20 31/24 124/20 147/5 154/5 154/13 154/18 155/21 164/9 185/21 217/7 217/9 external [1] 182/8 extra [2] 133/16 173/9 extradited [1] 59/15 extraordinarily [1] 103/23 extraordinary [2] 48/20 65/20 extreme [38] 3/8 9/9 14/3 14/14 14/21 14/23 15/9 17/8 20/9 20/18 22/14 24/5 24/13 25/24 26/2 30/22 40/9 41/13 46/6 47/1 49/5 103/8 103/13 103/20 104/5 105/19 119/12 131/21 134/14 172/5 172/14 179/2 180/16 191/4 192/4 198/10 210/19 214/21 extremely [6] 5/15 12/5 16/9 19/24 30/19 198/7 extremism [11] 20/14 22/12 24/6 24/14 30/2 70/1 117/23 118/1 134/11 134/19 176/1 extremist [11] 16/21 17/9 40/9 46/9 49/4 49/6 75/1 127/13 191/17 198/9 214/20 extremist-like [1] 198/9 eye [2] 69/13 207/10 eye-catching [1] 207/10 eyes [1] 191/24	152/25 166/25 168/9 169/25 172/3 177/21 180/3 180/13 183/10 189/6 fact-based [1] 189/6 fact-specific [1] 180/3 factor [3] 19/25 50/21 162/7 factored [1] 187/12 factors [11] 8/13 50/17 85/2 85/14 121/9 159/14 160/22 199/1 208/20 212/11 216/23 facts [3] 5/25 6/3 24/19 failings [1] 139/12 Failure [1] 113/13 failures [1] 113/18 fair [3] 28/16 164/11 205/24 fairly [2] 72/14 218/13 faith [1] 135/5 faiths [3] 118/5 134/9 134/12 fall [4] 104/3 151/18 164/25 191/24 fallible [2] 156/8 156/8 falls [5] 11/11 12/16 12/19 36/4 173/24 false [9] 38/21 39/3 40/7 40/11 41/15 43/19 131/13 144/9 144/14 familiar [2] 17/23 29/10 families [7] 3/21 96/12 99/19 174/19 175/21 180/15 199/4 family [9] 31/19 34/14 75/14 76/2 91/22 107/9 138/25 215/10 218/22 fanatical [1] 15/25 fandom [1] 29/16 fantasising [1] 37/19 fantastic [1] 56/14 far [19] 7/20 12/17 16/17 22/4 29/20 68/17 69/20 76/15 78/7 116/1 137/12 140/20 163/20 164/2 164/5 165/7 182/22 182/23 191/16 fascinated [11] 13/12 13/16 14/21 15/1 73/19 80/13 104/8 104/16 104/22 166/1 167/4 fascination [12] 13/24 14/3 20/9 21/12 103/8 104/24 105/18 164/24 165/22 168/13	210/13 214/22 fast [2] 69/20 133/8 favour [2] 76/24 181/25 fear [3] 123/22 133/18 148/19 feasible [3] 64/18 155/20 175/4 feature [1] 30/1 features [1] 48/17 February [3] 2/22 163/1 164/12 February 2023 [1] 163/1 February 2024 [1] 2/22 Feds [1] 58/14 feed [2] 56/4 211/24 feedback [1] 114/17 feel [8] 51/11 61/6 76/10 92/25 154/13 185/10 199/4 218/24 feeling [3] 44/23 135/10 135/11 feels [24] 62/23 62/24 72/22 73/1 73/11 79/18 81/22 82/5 83/14 83/19 85/24 88/6 88/12 89/9 89/20 90/2 90/25 91/20 92/3 94/14 94/15 96/16 97/3 218/20 fell [1] 213/18 felt [8] 34/8 74/1 75/16 75/19 83/10 94/7 99/21 110/18 female [5] 24/13 24/15 24/16 26/15 26/16 fetishised [1] 161/9 few [14] 15/12 16/8 68/12 68/16 88/25 96/10 103/6 106/16 114/23 134/25 178/4 191/11 193/24 199/23 field [8] 7/20 45/10 61/7 68/17 68/22 77/22 152/21 193/8 fifth [1] 4/18 fight [1] 192/10 fighting [1] 192/19 figure [4] 24/1 25/25 190/5 190/8 figures [11] 11/1 20/21 21/4 21/9 22/1 22/10 22/21 23/16 136/9 164/1 168/15 files [1] 193/10 fill [1] 94/11 films [1] 157/5 filter [1] 155/6 final [10] 3/15 32/23 62/15 67/12 79/13 93/6 95/20 96/4 151/7 209/22	finally [6] 17/5 31/5 64/9 107/21 177/17 178/10 Financial [1] 125/24 Financial Times [1] 125/24 find [18] 30/25 31/7 42/14 42/22 44/10 45/10 46/12 47/10 47/14 47/17 50/7 50/7 66/2 129/11 151/19 179/14 193/22 205/8 finding [3] 5/15 39/6 58/6 findings [1] 176/5 finds [1] 39/10 fine [2] 55/24 61/18 firearms [1] 9/25 first [68] 1/12 2/23 6/3 6/13 6/24 7/3 8/19 10/9 11/9 12/16 15/12 15/19 19/15 19/15 19/23 23/13 23/14 24/20 25/13 25/18 28/10 29/7 31/12 39/10 46/25 49/11 50/1 61/15 62/3 68/15 71/19 78/20 82/11 83/9 96/9 102/22 105/21 113/13 124/18 126/22 128/20 132/3 132/6 133/12 137/18 141/16 145/14 151/5 153/25 162/20 162/24 176/10 176/11 176/21 176/23 176/25 177/18 189/6 194/4 195/22 196/10 197/13 197/15 198/13 198/17 204/13 213/19 215/11 Firstly [2] 101/3 105/2 fishing [1] 92/12 fit [2] 165/14 208/7 fits [2] 149/9 172/24 five [4] 1/9 205/15 206/3 219/3 fix [1] 86/6 fixated [19] 5/14 6/5 12/23 13/8 13/19 14/11 27/1 40/8 64/10 73/19 100/19 101/20 101/20 101/23 113/2 121/19 127/24 151/17 219/12 fixation [8] 1/8 13/10 17/21 24/22 29/17 118/23 119/2 126/16 fixation-driven [1] 24/22 fixed [6] 7/17 7/23 10/12 17/12 27/3 81/13 fixes [1] 197/10 flags [2] 44/11 73/12 flagship [1] 132/15	flawed [1] 208/10 flesh [2] 174/17 175/1 flip [1] 80/14 flippantly [1] 65/13 flow [1] 141/13 fluid [1] 45/25 flying [1] 68/11 focus [11] 83/2 90/10 124/19 128/24 128/24 145/13 168/14 176/20 197/9 207/22 210/23 focused [10] 3/19 4/10 41/19 66/20 100/7 121/22 122/2 122/9 144/15 197/22 focuses [2] 10/5 117/22 follow [4] 107/8 145/9 145/11 153/13 followed [1] 160/13 following [10] 1/20 1/23 2/2 2/3 8/18 21/5 23/4 103/23 153/4 219/18 follows [1] 103/9 footing [1] 175/25 footnote [4] 13/9 200/12 201/21 202/3 footprint [1] 72/19 force [3] 7/4 180/25 206/1 forced [2] 110/12 182/15 forces [2] 118/6 118/9 forefront [1] 99/24 forensic [2] 68/21 95/4 foreseeable [1] 147/17 forever [1] 147/14 forgive [4] 4/13 67/15 190/2 218/4 form [8] 10/6 127/16 144/16 147/20 174/6 174/7 190/25 217/5 formal [1] 165/2 format [1] 116/2 former [6] 16/24 56/25 132/25 191/16 200/11 201/22 forms [8] 63/21 124/15 138/14 140/8 148/21 179/25 180/10 208/3 formulation [1] 77/6 forth [5] 81/18 84/18 95/25 196/3 204/11 forums [3] 161/10 161/11 161/20 forward [6] 71/15 84/14 97/15 97/17 118/20 175/22 found [15] 12/8 47/10 55/16 58/1 58/4 59/21
---	---	---	---	---

F found... [9] 70/9 96/7 125/21 138/5 139/25 143/4 159/12 176/21 218/2 founded [2] 207/16 207/18 four [14] 2/2 65/21 70/18 70/24 71/1 71/4 71/16 88/13 95/1 136/14 150/8 154/2 191/11 198/16 fourth [3] 4/7 71/12 199/14 fragments [1] 16/22 frame [1] 101/1 framed [1] 142/25 framework [3] 71/2 95/2 147/17 framing [2] 83/7 131/8 frankly [5] 13/5 26/9 97/12 167/20 207/9 fraud [1] 60/13 free [6] 3/2 138/6 157/19 180/7 202/25 203/1 free-standing [1] 3/2 freedom [19] 110/19 115/15 124/14 124/25 125/17 138/6 139/1 139/2 139/24 140/3 140/18 140/19 140/21 140/25 141/1 141/2 145/22 145/22 145/23 freedoms [3] 139/13 141/3 141/7 freely [2] 140/5 154/19 frequency [1] 89/22 frequently [1] 39/17 friction [1] 201/2 friend [1] 34/14 friends [2] 10/1 174/19 friendship [1] 52/9 frightened [1] 167/21 front [21] 33/25 34/11 34/12 34/16 59/22 62/2 151/12 197/11 197/15 198/4 198/5 199/19 201/24 206/25 207/15 207/24 208/13 210/7 210/8 217/1 217/8 frontline [2] 16/20 50/18 fronts [1] 214/12 fulfil [3] 58/25 113/23 158/2 fulfilling [2] 52/7 52/8 full [6] 79/25 113/20 166/14 176/6 179/11 200/25 fuller [1] 111/24	fully [2] 30/22 112/8 function [5] 6/15 10/23 59/1 184/25 205/1 functions [2] 2/8 217/9 fund [2] 107/17 217/19 fundamental [4] 118/2 118/11 122/15 141/2 fundamentally [4] 33/17 112/2 116/21 208/10 funded [2] 168/25 218/1 funding [3] 217/17 217/22 217/25 funnelled [1] 219/8 funnels [1] 91/12 further [19] 28/7 48/15 79/23 82/18 85/22 87/6 103/24 104/24 106/19 111/21 113/21 143/5 146/10 153/7 155/22 157/23 166/9 205/20 213/10 future [14] 15/17 31/8 33/20 33/25 87/14 87/23 88/5 119/14 130/17 149/23 161/11 196/7 197/4 218/12	generally [4] 91/9 154/2 155/19 156/4 generates [1] 105/4 genocide [1] 119/11 genuine [4] 120/15 165/18 189/3 189/5 genuinely [1] 120/15 geo [3] 154/23 155/1 155/17 geo-block [2] 155/1 155/17 geo-blocking [1] 154/23 geographically [1] 64/15 geopolitical [1] 156/15 Germany [1] 146/1 gestured [1] 139/9 get [56] 6/6 13/24 16/16 22/4 26/8 26/8 37/15 48/8 50/3 51/17 51/23 53/25 57/5 58/11 58/19 59/14 60/1 61/25 63/4 66/7 74/24 80/18 85/19 86/7 89/15 98/4 109/3 116/2 128/12 130/8 145/2 148/2 153/5 154/22 155/17 159/6 165/11 167/7 171/5 179/10 191/13 194/7 195/2 196/14 203/6 204/5 204/12 205/8 205/13 205/15 206/10 211/21 211/22 212/20 216/1 219/5 gets [5] 12/17 82/19 148/25 158/13 209/2 getting [16] 12/8 30/20 49/14 51/15 51/20 59/20 61/14 62/13 62/18 93/25 197/20 201/6 201/11 202/16 207/1 207/13 giant [2] 131/14 131/15 Gill [1] 193/7 girls [1] 160/5 give [23] 8/22 12/7 33/16 34/25 37/13 49/23 51/9 51/20 53/7 68/4 126/20 181/6 181/14 181/20 183/16 188/11 190/11 191/6 191/11 192/2 193/13 197/7 216/7 given [18] 7/3 16/20 37/2 40/3 96/6 107/15 112/9 112/23 112/25 115/9 121/16 122/13 123/19 131/8 182/13 182/25 183/3 214/10 gives [4] 53/25 54/18 61/2 215/14 giving [8] 23/21 68/8	133/15 136/16 181/15 182/18 187/14 188/2 glad [1] 125/11 go [56] 6/1 7/2 15/2 19/3 26/22 28/22 33/4 34/3 34/4 40/19 47/15 52/13 53/22 54/11 54/21 54/22 55/7 58/13 59/12 59/17 60/8 60/25 62/10 63/11 64/1 65/18 66/4 66/6 74/7 87/7 91/5 92/12 94/20 94/24 97/11 99/25 111/8 111/11 119/17 147/12 148/7 150/23 155/22 160/8 167/8 170/7 172/3 190/3 190/14 192/21 197/20 209/16 210/16 213/15 213/15 216/10 goal [3] 144/3 144/12 156/17 goes [4] 41/17 134/17 146/2 184/7 going [103] 4/13 5/25 6/2 13/4 15/5 18/1 18/5 19/2 23/8 31/16 31/17 31/18 31/19 36/22 37/11 38/18 44/4 44/5 45/11 55/6 55/7 55/14 57/21 58/21 59/14 62/10 64/2 64/25 70/12 71/16 72/6 74/12 75/22 80/24 83/3 84/11 87/14 89/1 91/21 92/10 95/5 97/14 97/15 100/15 103/5 118/20 118/24 120/13 126/20 128/18 128/23 131/15 132/1 132/3 137/17 138/19 141/11 148/7 148/16 151/22 152/25 158/11 158/14 158/19 162/16 166/16 170/16 171/13 174/14 178/11 180/2 182/6 182/9 184/10 187/5 192/10 192/14 192/15 192/21 194/7 194/15 196/7 196/16 197/3 198/5 200/17 203/12 203/17 204/14 205/15 205/16 206/2 207/19 207/20 210/21 211/14 211/24 213/13 214/23 215/1 217/17 217/24 217/25 gone [6] 13/18 69/20 90/23 92/22 93/9 133/8 good [42] 1/5 5/10 5/10 7/19 19/18 24/7 36/2 36/5 36/9 37/16 41/25 42/3 52/5 55/5	56/19 56/20 62/14 63/11 65/7 72/24 85/1 85/18 85/25 86/3 99/16 107/17 112/2 113/2 113/3 113/6 116/14 117/3 125/17 133/21 170/16 180/20 184/24 185/9 185/17 195/24 209/15 215/25 goodness [2] 32/24 183/12 Google [1] 47/10 Googling [1] 30/9 gore [15] 39/7 39/16 39/16 39/24 40/1 40/1 40/2 40/16 41/21 58/16 87/24 154/24 154/25 210/13 212/24 got [32] 26/22 30/4 30/19 36/10 36/11 37/8 46/15 48/7 51/5 54/14 55/23 55/23 61/6 61/8 65/16 74/11 75/14 75/14 81/22 82/15 92/5 92/14 97/18 123/11 152/10 160/7 163/20 169/14 204/9 206/15 213/18 216/4 gov.uk [2] 19/3 190/4 governance [13] 32/9 100/20 102/23 109/23 109/24 110/25 112/16 113/2 113/7 116/5 116/10 116/13 121/21 governed [1] 183/13 government [43] 7/11 28/13 42/11 42/12 42/18 43/21 43/24 44/25 50/14 52/5 63/9 81/1 125/9 128/7 129/14 129/20 129/24 130/7 131/20 132/21 134/18 135/19 135/20 136/16 136/22 137/5 141/15 143/8 143/11 146/10 146/13 147/2 147/3 148/1 149/3 149/7 155/3 163/2 163/21 164/11 179/18 209/18 217/25 Government's [4] 6/11 49/4 125/2 132/15 governments [2] 4/11 217/19 GP [5] 59/21 59/22 59/23 59/25 60/2 GPs [1] 91/22 gradually [1] 23/8 grandma [2] 58/9 58/17 graphic [1] 158/12 grateful [3] 67/11 67/20 69/14
---	---	--	--	---

G	guy [4] 30/9 30/23 35/11 36/15	148/18	210/11 212/11 212/25 213/6 213/24 214/8 214/13 215/21 217/18 217/23 218/1	219/9
gravitate [1] 64/13	H	harbours [1] 180/16	Hashem [1] 36/21	heart [1] 76/17
great [19] 8/22 9/7 11/7 15/18 21/11 24/3 31/14 47/5 55/23 60/23 66/13 72/15 123/4 133/4 133/24 135/20 139/20 156/15 180/6	hackers [1] 59/13	hard [8] 17/17 29/7 47/13 48/23 51/22 53/3 110/21 145/15	HASI [1] 182/7	held [7] 9/2 56/8 91/22 159/12 193/21 200/10 204/21
Great Britain [2] 11/7 24/3	had [54] 5/21 9/23 15/19 16/12 18/10 19/10 25/6 25/20 30/9 30/10 30/10 30/18 30/19 30/23 35/16 35/17 35/23 36/12 40/12 44/18 47/8 48/17 55/1 56/23 62/2 65/4 73/9 73/25 75/19 77/18 78/4 84/8 91/5 105/14 117/16 132/11 151/16 158/9 158/10 160/4 163/5 163/23 164/8 175/23 176/19 177/20 184/25 192/18 199/12 203/1 209/15 216/5 216/14 218/10	harm [15] 5/13 33/19 42/4 42/20 43/4 45/1 51/2 63/19 90/19 90/20 90/21 94/20 94/24 133/24 159/21	hate [2] 13/2 57/1	Helen [1] 126/2
greater [11] 19/18 61/24 75/17 102/25 111/2 113/24 142/6 165/5 171/2 178/1 178/11	Hadley [1] 175/8	harmful [2] 108/5 159/21	hatting [1] 59/16	help [19] 5/17 26/21 34/17 51/10 65/17 69/5 83/7 92/8 94/18 95/3 96/12 100/16 101/1 120/16 191/7 195/8 199/3 210/1 218/22
greatest [2] 16/4 196/18	hadn't [1] 15/19	harming [1] 104/17	have [484]	helpful [4] 17/1 95/16 190/2 213/25
greatly [2] 135/17 136/20	half [6] 4/14 23/13 69/18 80/4 81/5 182/12	harms [7] 137/18 138/23 147/25 150/14 202/23 202/24 203/5	haven't [7] 26/22 27/3 27/7 62/16 74/11 129/20 160/7	helping [3] 111/4 112/17 209/6
green [2] 55/7 77/3	Hall [18] 2/19 2/20 3/6 16/8 35/3 35/4 69/15 151/6 151/8 154/20 171/22 183/16 191/3 202/4 214/16 219/2 220/5 220/9	harrassment [2] 140/12 149/8	having [25] 36/19 37/10 42/10 43/7 56/22 74/5 78/16 81/4 81/9 85/23 96/9 97/4 98/6 125/15 141/22 152/9 166/25 178/11 184/2 184/3 187/19 192/20 201/12 204/11 213/23	helps [4] 9/5 70/8 70/12 112/4
grievance [2] 17/21 31/7	Hall's [1] 67/25	has [162] 2/21 3/2 5/2 5/13 5/16 9/11 11/4 12/10 14/7 16/7 16/9 16/10 17/3 17/24 18/19 21/6 27/11 28/16 30/4 31/24 32/20 34/9 34/18 37/3 37/6 37/7 38/2 42/6 42/7 43/12 45/25 46/4 51/9 52/23 53/9 53/16 57/17 58/1 59/11 59/18 66/7 67/21 69/20 71/6 73/14 73/14 75/25 77/5 81/22 83/10 83/22 84/7 84/14 91/18 92/21 92/23 97/6 98/7 101/5 101/10 101/17 101/25 102/24 103/6 104/16 107/17 107/20 109/24 109/25 110/3 110/4 110/14 110/16 110/16 110/21 110/21 111/16 111/19 112/24 113/14 113/16 120/3 121/19 125/4 125/19 126/7 129/16 129/20 129/24 130/20 131/3 132/10 132/11 132/20 132/25 133/7 133/22 135/16 135/19 137/5 138/7 138/8 138/17 145/8 145/19 145/20 146/3 147/20 150/8 154/13 158/23 159/11 159/16 162/14 162/25 163/20 164/11 168/9 168/17 168/18 168/21 169/1 169/11 169/13 169/17 169/22 170/19 171/8 171/22 174/24 178/20 182/2 182/3 182/4 182/6 183/3 184/24 186/5 186/21 192/25 194/9 195/11 197/22 200/19 200/21 206/1 206/17 210/8 210/9 210/10 210/10	her [6] 4/20 4/23 33/11 48/5 140/7 181/3	here [53] 13/2 21/23 21/24 35/7 39/9 40/23 41/16 43/3 44/13 45/8 50/22 55/24 56/21 60/14 68/10 70/18 75/23 80/2 81/13 87/22 88/24 90/11 96/24 97/18 98/7 106/1 114/9 116/11 116/15 118/12 123/7 123/8 135/10 138/24 147/15 156/11 157/1 160/11 161/2 162/11 165/6 172/24 175/9 177/18 178/18 185/17 194/1 194/11 197/6 207/14 207/16 210/8 218/20
grievances [2] 8/15 16/1	hallmark [1] 70/2		he [39] 1/16 2/22 3/1 4/3 9/18 15/16 15/20 15/20 15/21 15/23 16/3 16/10 17/7 17/8 17/14 17/16 18/9 18/10 30/10 30/10 30/11 30/12 35/11 35/11 35/12 35/13 36/8 52/11 66/7 84/15 175/24 176/12 176/14 176/19 176/21 192/10 192/16 192/21 194/1	he's [2] 4/2 61/16
grievous [1] 38/21	hand [4] 13/20 13/21 146/17 168/8		head [1] 55/4	headed [1] 66/23
gripping [1] 191/20	handed [1] 176/1		heading [1] 21/2	Headquarters [1] 3/14
gross [1] 65/5	handle [4] 42/24 111/15 114/24 135/3		heads [3] 6/3 18/17 179/19	health [33] 11/20 13/11 31/18 31/19 50/16 50/20 50/22 50/25 51/4 51/18 55/13 60/2 65/22 83/24 86/7 86/11 88/2 89/11 89/16 91/25 93/16 95/7 97/13 102/12 108/16 111/22 117/6 126/5 126/5 143/22 144/11 210/12 216/24
ground [7] 28/17 75/9 102/10 106/18 162/2 163/6 199/7	handled [2] 181/9 213/10		healthcare [1] 115/22	heavily [4] 9/9 35/21 144/7 156/8
grounded [2] 149/13 149/15	handles [1] 33/18		hear [9] 21/5 68/5 68/19 99/12 102/9 124/13 125/11 181/19 189/1	him [8] 18/8 61/17 61/17 175/18 191/18 191/23 192/6 192/6
grounding [2] 129/12 131/2	hang [1] 66/6		heard [10] 5/19 49/2 59/25 113/21 114/8 124/17 129/8 131/10 152/22 154/3	his [20] 1/15 1/18 2/10 3/1 3/7 3/15 3/19 4/14 16/5 26/1 46/25
group [6] 4/4 47/24 48/16 57/21 57/23 182/6	happen [7] 28/5 41/11 47/6 48/1 142/9 192/14 207/7		hearing [2] 127/1	
groups [8] 30/23 33/21 56/6 58/7 82/8 124/11 134/17 156/7	happened [10] 36/1 40/24 74/21 75/25 99/22 106/16 159/9 162/11 172/21 176/8			
grow [1] 117/7	happening [18] 27/18 27/19 35/16 60/17 106/20 113/25 166/5 171/12 171/15 171/19 177/1 177/15 178/1 196/14 196/16 196/19 207/14 211/15			
growing [1] 170/11	happens [14] 26/15 46/24 49/12 71/13 79/2 111/10 114/17 142/9 144/6 144/24 148/2 185/23 196/21 206/4			
grown [2] 101/10 174/16	happy [1] 57/25			
guard [2] 63/4 189/14	harassment [1]			
guardedly [1] 204/17				
guardian [1] 137/11				
guardians [2] 137/15 177/9				
guess [14] 68/15 68/23 77/8 79/20 86/21 90/8 93/5 96/8 132/22 160/10 185/22 194/13 194/22 218/9				
guidance [10] 8/9 8/13 28/6 28/19 43/12 98/11 102/8 108/13 164/13 187/11				
guiding [1] 63/21				
guilty [2] 19/8 23/11				
guns [3] 30/20 30/20 192/11				
gut [2] 135/10 135/11				

H his... [9] 49/2 84/14 85/10 87/24 111/2 140/7 151/7 172/4 204/4 historian [1] 63/6 historical [1] 140/9 histories [1] 212/3 history [5] 17/3 102/17 132/10 137/22 169/9 hit [1] 164/8 hitting [1] 106/18 HM [1] 218/15 HMPPS [1] 36/12 hoc [2] 135/1 153/12 hoisted [1] 65/20 hold [14] 30/19 30/20 37/15 42/5 45/3 113/22 119/20 140/1 140/14 140/19 143/16 179/16 201/6 216/1 holder [1] 112/9 holding [4] 52/25 140/11 141/9 184/25 holidays [1] 23/15 holistically [1] 208/6 Holocaust [1] 192/7 home [49] 1/21 1/24 2/5 3/7 6/15 20/8 20/23 23/15 27/13 28/15 29/21 32/18 37/10 40/14 51/14 56/18 66/15 68/9 91/12 91/24 102/7 110/4 110/12 110/16 111/20 118/13 121/11 125/22 126/3 127/13 147/9 169/22 169/23 170/2 181/17 181/18 181/25 182/7 183/2 188/16 188/21 188/22 189/19 190/25 191/13 193/5 200/24 208/22 212/18 homicide [2] 92/24 206/2 homophobic [1] 207/4 honest [2] 51/8 184/10 Honorary [1] 4/5 honour [1] 123/7 Honourable [1] 1/13 hope [3] 4/12 18/21 34/18 hopeful [1] 100/11 hopefully [1] 203/18 horrible [2] 40/4 45/11 horrific [1] 123/7 horrors [1] 99/22 Hospital [1] 17/25 host [1] 74/8 hostel [1] 191/22	hour [1] 58/12 hours [3] 39/23 57/8 57/11 house [3] 29/22 60/8 86/6 houses [1] 65/18 housing [10] 55/12 66/1 66/3 66/5 66/7 85/4 194/18 208/21 215/11 216/23 how [112] 3/2 4/11 4/16 9/24 10/4 12/12 14/8 15/4 18/3 18/17 21/24 36/24 38/25 42/5 42/17 42/24 46/19 48/20 57/14 58/10 58/10 58/15 59/23 63/7 66/9 71/4 71/7 71/13 72/3 72/6 72/21 76/19 77/14 79/6 79/16 80/21 81/18 88/8 89/9 89/12 89/14 89/21 90/14 90/18 92/7 92/14 93/1 94/17 96/14 98/12 99/21 100/22 100/24 102/10 102/11 102/11 102/12 102/16 103/7 114/23 115/4 117/12 117/14 121/21 122/15 122/16 129/5 129/7 132/1 135/2 137/15 139/4 141/19 141/21 141/24 142/12 149/9 158/11 159/6 162/21 163/20 165/10 166/4 169/10 172/21 177/12 179/6 179/23 181/2 181/9 185/4 185/6 190/8 191/20 192/25 193/15 198/6 199/7 199/8 201/1 201/10 201/19 205/9 205/13 206/2 206/7 208/7 209/18 211/13 212/17 212/18 213/1 however [6] 3/18 119/12 143/5 154/3 190/9 211/23 HQ [1] 75/24 HSAl [1] 193/7 Hubs [1] 69/5 huge [10] 19/9 40/20 42/13 49/16 65/6 65/15 116/17 138/19 144/14 205/6 hugely [2] 80/16 80/17 human [42] 1/17 4/10 4/20 5/1 5/4 85/7 109/6 109/9 123/10 124/23 127/7 128/10 128/16 128/25 129/1 132/4 137/17 137/19 137/23 137/25 138/2 138/22 139/14 139/15	139/22 140/16 143/8 143/11 143/16 145/17 148/11 149/20 150/4 150/11 157/17 158/15 175/2 179/9 179/12 179/14 179/16 180/2 Human Rights Conventions [1] 179/14 humbly [1] 79/9 hundred [1] 206/1 hundreds [2] 149/16 188/11 hyper [1] 91/20 hyper-local [1] 91/20 hypotheses [1] 170/9 hypothesis [1] 87/24 hypothesising [1] 64/6 hypothetical [1] 180/5 I I about [1] 89/3 I addressed [1] 2/17 I agree [3] 27/13 167/3 185/21 I also [2] 145/21 160/17 I am [9] 40/19 42/12 57/22 142/8 148/7 180/24 190/25 193/2 195/4 I anticipated [1] 162/15 I apologise [3] 67/20 68/9 197/12 I appreciate [1] 178/16 I ask [4] 162/1 178/19 181/3 197/8 I asked [1] 81/16 I assume [1] 212/2 I attended [1] 26/7 I believe [1] 177/16 I call [3] 20/10 38/20 200/6 I can [11] 51/24 52/13 60/14 68/4 68/13 172/24 201/9 202/2 203/4 204/17 205/10 I can't [9] 15/13 23/16 58/21 68/9 90/13 170/5 190/11 193/13 206/16 I chaired [1] 69/5 I check [1] 68/5 I cite [1] 195/23 I cited [2] 163/25 175/8 I come [2] 53/24 198/13 I constantly [1] 62/17 I could [5] 12/6 35/15 67/14 82/25 135/4	I dealt [3] 8/17 25/4 27/16 I describe [3] 71/1 71/3 194/11 I did [11] 1/9 12/23 15/6 35/9 48/5 55/16 56/17 69/1 70/10 151/22 185/1 I didn't [6] 27/17 44/20 76/7 95/10 162/3 201/6 I do [11] 58/15 64/6 123/19 156/7 156/8 156/15 182/19 191/19 202/25 206/24 207/3 I don't [39] 13/21 15/4 16/4 23/16 24/11 26/3 27/19 39/11 44/16 55/10 60/12 64/21 65/8 66/25 69/19 71/22 73/17 91/9 91/13 91/14 95/13 96/17 134/15 156/16 160/14 160/15 160/16 161/14 163/23 182/2 182/3 185/12 190/6 190/20 191/18 201/8 202/1 203/6 217/6 I eventually [1] 191/13 I first [3] 49/11 151/5 194/4 I found [4] 55/16 58/4 59/21 70/9 I give [1] 181/6 I go [4] 7/2 28/22 33/4 99/25 I got [1] 61/8 I guess [11] 68/15 68/23 77/8 79/20 90/8 93/5 96/8 160/10 185/22 194/22 218/9 I had [6] 5/21 25/6 73/25 78/4 91/5 184/25 I happen [1] 192/14 I hate [1] 13/2 I have [83] 6/7 14/19 18/21 18/25 20/4 20/22 21/1 21/23 24/20 28/10 33/1 35/5 35/6 36/25 39/9 40/23 43/3 43/15 44/18 45/3 45/8 45/22 46/5 49/24 51/12 52/13 52/19 53/24 55/23 61/7 62/11 62/13 64/23 64/24 65/5 66/21 69/13 69/16 69/18 70/17 70/18 70/20 71/8 72/11 72/12 77/9 81/6 82/25 84/25 85/3 86/24 87/1 87/4 89/24 90/16 92/20 93/18 93/18 94/6 94/18	94/18 96/6 97/7 97/25 97/25 99/9 100/6 100/18 102/22 109/22 113/21 114/4 116/6 116/10 117/11 118/22 133/8 138/20 186/25 187/19 202/7 204/1 215/5 I haven't [4] 26/22 62/16 74/11 160/7 I heard [1] 49/2 I hope [3] 4/12 18/21 34/18 I invite [2] 48/19 191/2 I joined [1] 124/9 I jump [1] 161/2 I just [10] 10/6 41/16 46/19 64/17 66/19 69/11 152/18 153/15 160/23 218/8 I keep [1] 88/11 I know [10] 19/22 23/18 42/18 81/19 81/23 88/11 123/6 142/24 184/9 184/18 I left [3] 74/21 75/20 76/21 I looked [2] 34/2 35/15 I made [5] 9/13 56/5 152/2 175/3 191/14 I make [1] 67/12 I may [8] 5/18 33/19 151/7 168/14 174/12 175/20 197/3 197/6 I mean [19] 35/18 38/23 38/24 41/16 44/14 48/16 53/1 59/2 65/12 66/11 67/6 71/11 72/9 91/21 155/24 172/18 189/9 192/22 193/19 I mention [3] 134/21 148/20 168/20 I mentioned [4] 27/25 103/2 191/25 199/23 I met [3] 44/17 56/18 61/5 I might [4] 26/13 66/6 90/6 179/14 I need [3] 48/14 55/10 80/5 I never [2] 66/21 66/22 I no [1] 76/8 I note [3] 76/20 78/14 148/25 I noted [1] 200/23 I noticed [1] 48/4 I obviously [1] 37/2 I offer [1] 187/15 I open [1] 164/20 I outlined [1] 179/23 I pick [1] 184/11
---	---	--	--	---

I I picked [1] 61/11 I preface [1] 191/11 I probably [2] 91/7 203/8 I promise [1] 98/23 I published [1] 89/5 I put [1] 185/11 I quiz [1] 66/12 I read [3] 75/5 75/19 203/22 I really [5] 29/6 61/6 63/10 151/10 181/15 I recall [2] 26/4 164/4 I refer [1] 126/1 I referred [3] 9/15 164/14 199/24 I remember [4] 49/13 77/20 81/12 151/22 I retired [1] 69/12 I said [11] 20/8 32/14 91/6 124/12 144/9 160/8 162/4 167/17 170/15 203/20 204/15 I saw [1] 35/19 I say [15] 14/5 16/19 22/16 24/14 44/17 44/25 52/7 58/15 76/8 80/16 81/10 127/24 146/24 149/15 204/16 I see [2] 77/7 215/1 I sent [1] 185/12 I set [1] 200/12 I should [7] 11/7 14/16 17/6 21/25 130/10 141/12 141/16 I speak [3] 69/24 71/11 184/11 I spent [1] 39/23 I spoke [4] 39/22 46/14 50/11 58/13 I start [4] 5/11 123/17 162/23 211/4 I started [1] 35/18 I still [3] 42/1 69/16 185/10 I struggle [1] 173/9 I suggest [1] 122/19 I suppose [1] 174/4 I take [2] 85/17 162/8 I talk [3] 14/19 48/11 128/13 I think [207] 3/12 6/1 8/18 11/11 14/1 14/13 17/14 21/4 23/25 27/13 28/15 30/3 31/2 32/21 33/1 33/3 33/25 34/19 34/23 38/18 38/23 38/23 41/7 41/9 41/11 42/3 43/2 43/7 43/9 43/12 43/23 44/25 46/17 46/20 49/1 49/8 50/15 50/22 51/8 51/10 52/2 52/11 52/15 52/25 54/11	56/20 56/22 59/25 60/22 62/1 65/12 65/22 66/8 66/10 66/13 66/16 67/2 69/7 70/4 70/7 70/19 71/12 72/5 73/3 73/13 74/17 78/1 78/13 80/16 81/2 82/12 82/17 83/2 83/10 84/3 84/9 84/15 84/22 86/14 87/3 87/16 88/10 88/14 88/20 89/2 90/9 90/20 91/17 92/9 92/14 92/18 93/17 93/21 94/1 94/4 94/5 94/10 94/12 94/14 94/16 96/4 96/18 96/24 98/2 98/2 98/3 98/24 124/3 124/12 132/22 137/7 142/17 145/7 145/15 155/2 155/13 155/15 155/22 155/23 156/20 156/22 157/2 157/22 158/1 158/5 158/8 159/9 159/24 160/9 160/18 161/3 163/23 164/11 164/14 165/4 165/12 166/18 167/2 167/13 167/17 167/22 168/17 168/21 169/1 169/9 169/11 169/21 169/23 170/5 170/18 170/21 170/23 172/23 172/24 173/14 174/24 176/10 177/3 177/17 177/21 177/24 178/4 179/20 182/20 183/20 183/20 184/3 185/17 186/1 186/19 187/6 187/18 188/5 189/17 190/5 194/1 194/8 194/10 195/1 195/16 196/9 196/23 197/12 199/24 201/8 202/18 202/23 203/15 203/19 203/25 207/13 208/1 208/2 208/13 209/14 209/23 211/5 212/7 213/15 215/1 215/11 215/23 217/11 217/12 218/11 218/15 218/20 I thought [4] 17/1 26/10 56/19 58/23 I to [2] 69/21 76/16 I told [1] 135/15 I tried [2] 16/14 98/8 I turn [3] 24/19 153/23 214/16 I understand [6] 14/10 33/2 63/9 148/21 205/18 206/24 I understood [1] 16/15 I undertook [1] 169/4 I used [3] 14/17 74/9 85/11	I very [1] 216/16 I want [13] 5/22 68/12 71/21 132/6 143/20 145/1 154/12 158/23 185/20 210/5 210/7 210/17 210/22 I wanted [3] 70/15 83/1 203/15 I was [34] 12/25 13/6 13/7 13/14 13/15 13/17 22/22 27/18 33/15 42/13 42/17 49/1 49/14 50/13 58/9 64/10 65/25 65/25 70/9 71/24 71/24 73/21 75/13 75/16 75/18 91/14 91/15 94/7 125/11 181/17 187/13 193/2 209/4 217/16 I wasn't [4] 12/24 32/23 34/22 35/18 I welcome [1] 183/9 I went [4] 26/9 39/18 46/24 47/6 I will [28] 1/9 13/6 15/12 25/2 47/22 60/15 67/24 68/15 70/18 72/9 72/20 83/4 85/11 88/24 94/5 95/20 100/13 100/16 124/20 125/3 128/12 150/15 167/25 168/14 170/8 190/25 192/2 192/6 I wish [1] 25/20 I won't [7] 16/15 52/10 52/12 67/3 70/21 166/14 190/1 I wonder [1] 63/23 I worked [1] 75/6 I would [80] 19/2 25/3 25/13 25/17 26/12 27/24 28/1 29/4 32/23 33/5 34/10 34/13 37/4 39/2 48/22 51/23 62/15 69/23 71/20 73/2 73/5 73/7 78/16 79/8 82/21 85/12 95/1 96/1 96/9 98/20 99/16 126/7 131/4 131/19 132/1 132/8 133/5 144/11 146/10 149/15 155/22 155/22 155/25 157/10 158/17 160/7 161/22 161/23 163/15 165/22 167/7 168/17 169/18 169/21 170/25 178/17 180/3 180/5 181/13 181/25 182/13 183/9 186/5 187/20 187/25 188/9 188/16 189/24 193/1 193/25 194/3 194/21 201/3 207/22 208/1 208/8 211/6	215/12 216/12 219/3 I wouldn't [1] 39/1 I write [1] 66/21 I'll [1] 137/24 I'm [93] 5/25 6/2 12/24 13/3 13/4 14/20 25/11 29/24 30/1 31/5 34/22 36/22 36/24 44/4 54/1 58/21 60/11 61/21 63/6 63/7 63/13 65/10 65/11 67/20 68/19 69/7 69/14 69/18 70/12 71/16 74/11 75/22 80/24 81/16 81/21 84/7 84/11 84/19 87/20 88/13 88/24 89/1 90/1 92/4 96/4 97/19 99/20 99/25 100/11 100/13 100/15 103/5 106/1 123/5 126/20 128/18 132/3 137/12 137/17 143/22 148/7 148/8 148/16 152/7 156/4 160/12 162/10 162/15 165/24 165/25 173/10 176/18 180/21 180/21 181/17 184/4 184/6 184/10 189/16 189/18 190/11 190/24 194/10 194/16 197/3 199/6 203/12 203/17 204/14 207/19 207/20 211/17 212/13 I've [2] 131/9 152/6 ICCPR [2] 139/19 139/25 iconically [1] 172/19 ID [3] 158/8 158/9 158/14 idea [26] 17/10 43/8 46/21 49/3 65/10 73/5 74/14 80/13 83/9 84/14 86/8 87/5 87/8 87/9 87/10 88/20 89/6 90/16 95/11 130/7 142/17 155/5 155/20 188/2 206/25 211/5 ideal [3] 28/24 33/3 33/5 ideally [1] 44/25 ideas [7] 18/17 70/8 80/15 83/7 95/18 134/23 180/11 ideate [2] 58/20 58/21 identifiable [3] 28/12 163/3 163/9 identification [8] 37/5 37/9 44/4 45/4 72/12 172/13 174/23 175/7 identified [11] 20/25 21/1 37/4 57/17 59/8 67/3 74/4 113/14 120/5 132/5 210/9	identify [8] 71/5 76/18 113/13 128/1 172/1 198/7 201/11 210/2 identifying [8] 44/5 115/8 115/10 165/17 174/13 174/13 208/18 209/23 identity [1] 155/11 ideological [62] 6/13 6/14 7/12 7/18 8/3 9/15 9/20 10/2 15/9 17/11 17/20 24/21 24/25 24/25 25/4 26/5 27/4 28/12 29/7 31/2 31/8 32/10 32/13 34/5 34/6 34/8 34/10 39/20 39/21 49/3 49/5 52/2 56/24 56/25 74/15 75/2 75/3 100/23 103/12 103/17 117/13 117/17 118/15 126/16 126/23 126/23 127/20 127/20 163/3 166/19 166/23 166/24 167/8 168/16 172/15 197/25 198/1 199/16 199/21 208/4 208/5 210/18 ideologically [1] 57/3 ideologies [5] 7/23 16/19 27/3 121/14 179/8 ideologue [1] 9/19 ideology [61] 6/24 8/7 8/17 8/20 9/10 14/14 14/24 16/17 16/23 16/25 17/12 20/10 20/23 20/24 21/1 21/3 21/13 22/1 22/3 22/6 22/11 22/16 26/13 29/12 29/18 29/23 30/4 31/11 52/3 52/3 73/17 73/18 73/21 73/24 74/14 87/2 91/17 103/12 127/12 127/13 127/16 127/19 130/5 130/6 130/7 130/17 131/25 134/2 149/23 149/23 163/9 164/23 165/15 166/19 166/25 167/8 168/12 172/4 202/9 214/21 214/21 idiom [1] 199/25 if [243] ignorance [2] 163/16 164/7 ignore [1] 18/25 ill [2] 103/3 104/25 illegal [5] 118/16 139/11 176/11 177/1 214/9 illusory [1] 142/19 illustration [1] 9/8 image [1] 159/15 image-based [1]
--	--	--	---	--

I	37/9 51/5 69/24	159/17	individuals-fixed	insights [1] 100/12
image-based... [1]	impressionistically [1] 47/22	incredibly [1] 49/21	[1] 101/20	inspector [1] 53/4
159/15	impressive [5] 12/5	incremental [1]	inducted [1] 93/8	inspire [1] 9/5
imagine [8] 14/22	33/10 58/5 63/12	111/17	industry [1] 45/16	instance [4] 117/24
41/7 57/20 151/11	192/8	incumbent [1]	inertia [1] 144/22	120/4 134/22 162/24
151/16 157/24 203/4	imprisoned [1] 6/22	105/22	inevitable [1] 83/15	instant [1] 159/3
216/12	imprisonment [1]	incurious [1] 169/23	influences [1] 8/14	instantaneous [1]
Imam [1] 56/25	140/13	indeed [23] 16/8 18/2	influencing [1] 7/10	155/14
immediate [2] 17/18	improve [1] 200/5	21/13 22/20 32/15	inform [6] 93/4 95/8	instead [3] 108/24
197/10	improved [3] 96/19	34/20 35/2 99/11	95/21 116/25 153/10	142/2 142/4
immediately [1] 86/8	116/13 122/6	104/19 109/2 110/3	195/8	Institute [1] 33/7
immigration [2]	improvement [5]	117/18 118/10 122/18	information [74]	institution [1] 147/4
141/21 142/15	111/13 112/16 116/12	127/1 150/17 154/8	10/18 10/19 12/18	institutional [3]
impact [18] 4/17 12/9	168/10 168/11	157/3 160/21 161/1	16/5 21/17 23/15 35/7	144/22 144/22 178/15
73/24 100/8 100/9	improvements [5]	163/10 174/13 190/21	36/14 37/7 37/7 38/4	institutions [1] 147/5
102/20 110/3 110/6	101/16 111/1 111/17	independence [1]	38/9 39/3 55/24 56/4	instructed [2] 13/14
112/10 112/15 112/23	111/19 111/21	50/6	65/3 65/4 65/6 67/8	13/14
120/4 124/10 125/13	inadequacy [1] 176/5	independent [18]	72/23 79/2 79/22 80/1	instructional [1] 17/9
125/16 135/18 136/20	inappropriately [1]	1/21 1/25 2/5 2/7 2/20	81/3 81/4 82/11 82/12	instrument [2] 200/3
163/13	168/7	2/23 33/8 110/1	82/13 82/16 82/18	200/18
impacted [1] 90/19	Incel [1] 29/24	110/10 112/6 112/8	83/16 88/7 88/19 92/2	integrated [3] 3/23
impactful [2] 152/7	incident [1] 17/19	147/1 147/4 147/22	93/12 93/16 93/21	84/24 194/22
173/3	incidentally [2] 17/6	181/17 186/15 193/4	94/10 96/1 108/15	intelligence [14]
impacts [1] 125/1	217/16	209/6	108/18 108/21 110/9	10/13 35/21 44/12
impairment [1] 140/6	incidents [2] 42/4	independently [2]	110/20 115/9 124/14	56/8 56/10 56/12 79/3
impart [3] 139/2	76/3	177/10 193/6	124/25 125/12 125/17	81/20 83/16 96/1
157/20 157/22	include [14] 1/19	index [1] 47/18	139/2 151/20 151/24	144/19 147/13 175/11
impediments [2]	4/23 8/13 11/23 11/23	indicate [3] 10/6 21/9	152/11 152/14 152/22	215/3
64/9 200/5	14/25 50/22 83/12	209/25	157/20 157/22 167/18	intend [1] 131/6
implementation [2]	103/15 109/24 116/13	indicated [2] 46/4	181/14 185/2 186/16	intended [1] 147/6
125/2 133/11	138/24 150/12 214/8	155/21	196/21 201/13 202/19	intense [1] 182/24
implemented [2]	included [3] 3/19	indicates [2] 105/3	203/22 204/4 204/6	intensive [1] 198/8
28/17 176/16	3/22 3/25	142/1	204/12 204/20 210/11	intent [2] 87/11
implementing [2]	includes [6] 32/15	indication [2] 40/2	211/21 212/25 213/3	204/20
130/13 147/4	134/25 139/1 140/19	136/16	213/5	intention [2] 124/19
implication [1]	157/19 194/16	indications [2] 15/25	informed [4] 98/20	130/20
178/24	including [24] 12/21	214/10	102/15 142/8 181/10	intentions [1] 149/13
implications [1] 29/6	33/19 34/2 41/5	indicative [1] 170/11	infringes [1] 115/14	interact [1] 43/19
imply [2] 8/20 118/10	115/14 117/5 118/3	indicator [2] 119/14	inherently [2] 128/16	interacting [1] 175/1
importance [6] 60/7	119/1 121/11 124/5	196/6	180/6	interaction [2] 47/2
152/21 152/23 153/18	131/20 138/13 138/20	indicators [4] 121/6	initial [8] 10/10 82/13	52/6
206/17 209/5	140/8 140/13 148/18	122/2 165/18 201/25	115/2 116/1 197/14	interactions [2]
important [45] 19/24	149/1 152/22 160/23	individual [22] 5/3	197/16 198/15 203/19	57/12 57/13
21/4 37/7 38/6 38/17	175/6 189/22 193/10	13/8 14/12 40/8 42/3	initially [3] 64/10	interacts [1] 122/17
46/19 49/19 50/6 51/3	208/6 218/14	43/1 45/5 52/7 53/3	101/4 207/18	intercepts [1] 16/21
51/12 54/15 57/14	inclusion [1] 134/3	60/6 81/20 83/25	innovative [1] 192/1	interest [14] 3/18
57/15 59/1 61/16	inclusiveness [1]	103/11 113/15 118/3	input [5] 31/19 84/14	4/15 37/25 47/8 69/16
76/10 76/10 80/2	169/17	122/2 143/21 144/12	85/10 139/20 217/13	103/13 103/20 103/22
88/12 94/15 95/21	incompatible [1]	173/17 178/3 183/20	inputs [2] 93/11	104/5 104/17 104/24
107/1 107/21 107/25	140/10	211/12	217/15	119/3 120/1 172/2
112/24 116/15 116/20	incomplete [2]	individualised [1]	inquest [1] 184/13	interested [19] 12/25
118/18 152/18 153/3	125/10 136/5	144/7	inquests [2] 79/24	16/18 30/20 41/1
167/14 167/16 176/3	inconsistency [1]	individually [2]	92/21	42/12 99/4 103/15
177/2 184/19 186/8	14/8	140/23 173/18	inquiries [4] 42/2	104/16 104/23 105/18
187/9 193/15 194/2	inconsistent [2]	individuals [34] 1/8	79/24 92/21 204/18	119/20 120/7 130/21
197/8 204/1 206/9	33/24 163/22	5/14 6/5 12/23 13/16	Inquiry [20] 1/19 2/18	161/24 191/20 192/9
209/11 210/5 218/20	increase [13] 19/9	14/14 14/23 15/25	3/19 4/15 4/22 5/15	192/10 192/13 199/6
Importantly [1] 3/5	19/13 19/18 21/6	40/15 46/24 73/19	19/24 34/25 36/23	interesting [5] 18/21
impose [2] 154/14	22/24 23/6 105/11	84/13 85/3 100/19	68/18 72/5 78/25 91/1	39/24 44/21 63/2
154/17	106/14 168/2 168/6	101/9 101/20 101/20	124/3 124/17 184/10	155/2
imposed [1] 182/15	169/24 171/2 171/12	101/23 103/17 104/1	184/14 206/18 210/22	interests [3] 109/12
impossible [4] 29/8	increased [1] 168/17	113/2 117/19 121/19	219/18	209/12 211/11
44/2 88/8 127/7	increases [1] 160/1	127/24 151/18 158/25	Inquiry's [1] 3/15	interfere [1] 146/18
impressed [1] 58/9	increasingly [5] 16/1	161/6 172/13 174/17	inside [1] 217/1	interference [3]
impression [4] 36/18	47/23 108/1 135/24	179/7 184/20 202/20	insight [2] 115/9	109/9 109/15 140/1
		210/3 219/13	163/11	interferences [1]

I interferences... [1] 150/11 interferes [1] 150/4 interim [2] 2/5 164/13 interlinks [1] 88/3 internal [5] 2/1 38/3 182/5 182/8 186/10 international [14] 4/9 4/20 38/6 38/16 100/2 115/13 123/6 123/15 127/3 127/4 128/1 132/12 138/11 139/16 internationally [1] 81/6 internet [24] 42/10 42/13 47/9 47/18 47/24 47/25 54/16 59/20 60/24 64/2 84/15 84/17 87/25 95/17 154/6 154/16 156/6 157/8 158/18 158/21 159/1 160/24 161/17 175/13 internet-addled [1] 84/15 interpretation [3] 15/4 102/8 103/22 interpreted [2] 15/5 120/10 intersect [1] 89/12 intersection [1] 194/20 intervene [3] 53/1 54/18 186/1 Intervening [1] 6/18 intervention [57] 11/23 11/24 12/4 12/7 25/7 25/7 25/16 27/16 30/25 39/1 48/25 56/16 56/17 56/23 57/15 58/2 58/10 58/23 61/5 63/17 66/11 75/4 84/11 95/14 106/2 107/2 107/3 107/4 117/2 117/4 142/5 142/16 144/1 144/7 176/10 176/14 178/5 182/12 187/23 191/17 191/21 191/25 192/5 192/12 193/12 194/2 194/3 194/7 194/16 195/3 195/15 195/21 195/23 196/8 199/21 208/19 216/21 interventions [32] 3/21 71/9 79/3 79/16 82/25 83/2 86/13 94/25 95/10 95/15 105/23 106/9 106/11 106/23 107/18 111/11 112/4 112/21 113/9 115/11 117/1 121/7	122/3 176/25 191/8 192/22 194/25 195/18 196/11 198/23 199/17 211/2 interview [1] 191/16 interviewer [1] 191/19 interviews [2] 124/16 193/11 intimidate [1] 166/21 intimidating [1] 7/10 intimidation [1] 140/12 into [107] 4/13 7/7 9/12 9/14 9/18 14/1 15/3 19/4 19/13 19/17 19/19 19/21 22/9 22/12 22/15 22/18 23/24 25/21 26/23 26/25 31/11 32/3 32/15 33/4 38/14 38/19 39/8 46/16 48/8 50/14 51/20 56/4 57/9 60/1 60/8 65/18 65/20 66/4 69/3 73/2 73/6 73/10 74/4 78/24 80/14 81/20 82/1 82/14 82/20 85/8 86/9 89/8 89/12 90/8 93/8 93/10 97/6 98/4 105/12 106/22 107/10 112/11 112/25 117/23 118/18 120/8 121/10 122/2 127/17 128/12 128/20 141/9 141/11 142/22 148/7 148/16 157/23 163/5 164/18 164/25 166/3 166/4 171/6 171/14 173/1 173/13 174/14 174/23 175/14 176/13 176/21 179/7 187/1 196/7 196/16 197/20 198/23 199/9 199/17 200/3 201/11 207/8 210/10 211/24 213/18 217/10 217/13 introduce [2] 1/9 32/3 introduced [2] 101/8 103/10 introduction [2] 69/2 159/10 Introductions [2] 1/3 220/3 invaluable [1] 110/9 investigate [1] 216/12 investigated [1] 124/10 investigation [3] 44/8 81/19 83/18 investigator [1] 43/21 investigators [1] 43/13	Investigatory [2] 43/11 147/21 invite [6] 48/19 151/6 158/17 188/16 189/24 191/2 inviting [1] 150/16 involve [3] 55/14 215/13 217/14 involved [16] 8/6 9/4 53/25 70/3 76/22 82/10 85/19 89/24 106/25 130/5 143/1 143/7 194/12 202/17 215/22 216/6 involvement [1] 25/24 involves [1] 142/4 involving [3] 139/20 145/24 181/8 IOM [1] 85/3 IOS [1] 155/7 iPad [1] 155/7 iPhone [1] 155/8 IPSOS [1] 193/6 Ipswich [1] 1/13 IRA [1] 46/6 Irani [1] 48/5 Ireland [9] 15/15 64/20 64/22 123/13 132/7 132/9 132/11 132/14 132/22 Irish [1] 15/21 IRM [1] 85/24 is [1165] is: [2] 66/25 185/4 is: how [1] 185/4 is: I have [1] 66/25 Islam [2] 133/13 143/15 Islamaphobic [1] 123/14 Islamism [2] 135/21 135/24 Islamist [11] 9/19 17/9 20/13 22/12 24/6 24/14 30/12 46/7 56/24 210/20 214/20 Islamophobia [1] 188/15 Islamophobic [2] 133/11 207/17 isn't [14] 31/20 57/2 71/12 74/7 83/25 84/19 87/7 87/13 143/5 170/19 178/12 193/25 206/14 211/24 isolate [2] 50/3 120/20 isolated [6] 48/6 48/10 52/9 57/13 61/6 154/9 isolation [3] 48/4 87/25 120/1 issue [18] 15/8 64/16 66/25 67/21 70/4 75/22 79/8 80/5 91/8	92/9 93/5 97/20 109/25 144/2 152/10 152/23 172/15 197/21 issued [1] 43/13 issues [25] 3/4 4/23 32/9 32/21 69/8 77/7 104/8 110/1 110/15 112/21 114/16 116/5 116/22 123/20 153/10 162/25 171/22 191/5 200/9 206/23 207/10 210/6 215/10 215/11 218/14 it [673] it's [27] 24/13 45/14 45/15 45/15 55/21 58/13 58/14 71/18 91/20 96/16 125/23 144/21 151/13 153/12 157/6 157/8 157/8 157/9 160/16 160/18 173/15 187/9 199/7 202/11 205/25 206/14 219/4 item [1] 164/13 iteration [1] 49/4 its [26] 6/12 8/2 8/21 10/5 23/5 24/22 29/5 32/12 38/2 38/3 38/4 39/17 40/3 62/14 101/18 110/5 111/15 116/13 121/18 122/10 130/1 137/25 214/22 217/5 217/5 217/6 itself [3] 130/11 134/23 204/23 J Jacques [2] 2/11 94/6 jargony [1] 52/15 jewel [1] 216/22 jihadists [1] 9/18 Jo [1] 30/21 job [5] 52/24 57/5 98/21 185/1 191/21 jobs [2] 31/23 66/13 joined [1] 124/9 joining [2] 3/10 68/3 joint [1] 200/8 Jonathan [23] 2/19 16/8 17/2 31/4 69/15 70/4 70/19 71/6 71/9 73/1 76/20 82/8 83/22 84/5 84/13 85/10 85/15 86/3 87/23 89/2 93/18 108/7 194/19 Jonathan Hall [1] 69/15 Jonathan's [2] 73/5 167/18 journey [2] 7/25 79/14 judge [6] 18/6 62/9 73/22 147/23 172/4 173/4	judgement [6] 76/25 77/10 77/23 79/19 95/5 186/16 judgements [2] 77/16 206/10 judges [2] 61/22 62/5 judging [1] 101/18 judicial [1] 62/5 judiciary [1] 110/13 July [2] 3/9 5/22 jump [5] 66/7 146/7 158/24 161/2 170/1 jumping [1] 65/24 just [116] 4/21 8/22 9/14 10/3 10/6 10/12 12/6 15/6 15/12 17/11 19/1 20/3 21/25 23/25 27/5 27/8 28/10 30/14 30/18 31/21 36/4 37/21 41/16 46/19 46/19 47/12 47/13 47/19 48/13 52/10 55/7 57/14 58/19 61/8 62/1 64/6 64/17 65/6 65/7 65/16 66/4 66/19 66/23 67/13 67/13 68/1 69/11 70/8 70/12 71/20 72/12 75/12 75/22 77/10 77/14 78/2 80/12 81/2 82/21 83/7 84/10 84/19 86/25 88/1 88/24 90/6 90/10 90/20 93/6 99/17 111/7 128/11 131/9 147/12 147/18 148/1 148/8 148/11 151/5 152/18 153/15 153/17 154/1 157/9 158/14 160/8 160/14 160/23 161/22 165/14 166/11 166/12 167/13 170/5 170/9 174/12 183/25 184/10 184/17 186/17 186/19 191/6 191/11 191/23 195/8 202/7 206/13 206/14 207/7 215/6 216/3 216/21 217/1 218/8 218/10 219/7 justice [10] 3/23 4/6 89/10 91/25 115/17 119/13 123/12 151/21 152/5 185/13 Justice Act [1] 152/5 Justice System [2] 89/10 119/13 justifiable [2] 109/16 202/22 justified [4] 60/9 61/18 62/8 202/11 justify [2] 55/10 203/7 K KBE [2] 1/13 1/15 KC [2] 1/13 2/19
---	--	---	---	--

K keen [3] 39/25 54/1 181/22 keep [5] 69/16 88/11 89/23 96/12 208/9 Ken [1] 17/5 Kenyon [1] 76/20 kept [1] 69/13 key [24] 35/6 45/23 70/24 72/4 73/20 78/12 83/6 89/4 94/15 99/6 108/14 115/21 117/5 120/20 121/13 163/7 165/14 171/11 176/11 178/5 181/14 186/6 203/21 204/19 Khallas [1] 195/4 kid's [1] 215/17 kids [1] 57/9 kill [1] 161/13 killed [1] 9/6 killer [3] 30/21 40/7 42/23 killers [1] 46/12 killing [2] 33/18 48/18 killings [2] 172/20 173/7 kind [62] 50/3 68/24 69/8 69/13 70/9 70/22 71/21 71/22 72/12 72/23 75/2 76/23 78/22 81/8 81/23 82/14 82/20 83/20 85/2 85/7 85/24 86/4 86/16 87/7 87/16 89/6 89/17 89/18 91/11 92/3 93/21 95/12 95/24 96/7 96/13 96/19 97/23 98/22 99/7 132/23 135/12 148/19 154/14 154/17 158/10 160/13 160/19 167/17 170/12 170/14 179/21 185/10 185/25 193/19 194/1 194/20 204/9 204/14 204/22 205/1 206/8 219/9 kinds [4] 98/13 188/6 191/8 217/20 King [1] 64/12 Klass [1] 146/1 knew [4] 18/4 22/22 30/17 40/25 knife [20] 38/22 104/11 105/15 105/18 105/18 106/5 107/14 119/10 121/2 176/13 176/15 176/20 176/21 195/20 195/22 196/6 196/23 198/1 210/10 215/22 knight [1] 42/23 knives [10] 35/12 36/4 36/8 36/16 38/25	44/10 55/3 104/9 104/16 119/3 knock [3] 53/23 54/11 216/2 know [120] 2/9 9/24 13/21 13/25 15/4 15/7 16/5 19/22 23/6 23/16 23/18 24/11 25/21 26/3 27/20 30/5 30/6 36/7 37/17 39/11 40/17 41/11 42/18 43/5 43/5 43/6 44/16 46/10 50/4 50/5 52/21 59/23 60/12 63/4 64/21 69/19 72/13 73/12 73/13 75/16 76/1 79/22 81/7 81/19 81/23 83/9 83/17 83/18 84/2 84/19 85/1 85/5 85/6 86/12 87/4 87/6 88/9 88/11 88/20 89/17 89/19 90/13 90/17 90/18 90/22 91/9 91/11 91/13 91/13 91/14 92/13 94/6 95/13 105/14 119/13 123/6 129/5 129/7 132/9 134/15 136/2 142/24 152/19 154/24 160/12 160/15 160/15 160/18 161/5 161/24 163/1 163/7 163/23 166/6 167/14 167/18 170/20 170/21 171/5 171/13 175/9 182/11 182/25 184/9 184/18 185/5 185/6 185/12 187/5 190/7 190/15 190/18 191/10 194/19 196/19 197/25 201/8 201/17 206/2 217/6 knowledge [4] 76/24 109/1 178/15 178/18 known [6] 32/21 35/13 135/17 163/25 193/8 212/24 knows [4] 15/2 37/7 38/24 192/25	182/17 largely [2] 6/7 87/7 larger [4] 19/17 22/20 164/16 164/17 last [22] 3/6 5/22 8/9 16/8 16/9 17/14 23/10 29/22 32/8 33/12 67/25 81/2 88/25 98/6 98/23 98/23 101/12 106/16 154/4 168/8 171/4 182/4 lasting [1] 143/3 late [2] 34/25 111/18 later [2] 143/4 176/19 latest [3] 49/4 105/10 168/15 law [46] 1/17 1/17 4/1 4/6 5/4 7/13 15/14 15/19 15/19 27/5 33/9 40/13 43/9 43/10 92/15 109/7 109/7 109/7 109/9 109/11 118/1 118/3 124/23 127/3 128/10 128/13 128/25 129/1 132/4 143/8 143/11 144/2 145/9 145/9 147/18 155/6 156/12 158/3 166/12 166/17 179/9 180/3 183/5 183/13 189/8 216/4 lawful [3] 60/15 62/9 158/2 lawfully [1] 211/24 laws [5] 4/17 107/10 148/20 150/12 159/10 laws' [1] 100/9 lawyer [2] 13/3 63/7 lawyerly [1] 123/25 lawyers [2] 151/25 167/19 layer [2] 77/14 208/8 lead [7] 39/1 60/3 65/9 90/2 100/2 120/21 178/23 leader [1] 9/20 leadership [6] 75/11 84/3 94/1 98/19 99/2 99/3 leading [3] 3/20 68/25 113/18 leads [6] 4/15 73/16 86/8 94/12 171/7 184/20 lean [1] 84/23 leanings [1] 16/1 leap [1] 160/11 leapt [1] 19/12 learn [4] 45/19 102/6 119/1 196/24 learned [5] 34/24 107/16 116/21 137/22 155/25 least [17] 28/16 33/2 34/18 58/7 59/22 60/4 72/22 119/9 145/18	146/8 155/20 157/1 163/7 169/5 196/20 196/24 208/18 leave [5] 121/10 150/15 172/12 175/13 180/7 leaving [3] 114/23 115/3 162/20 lecturer [1] 4/1 led [9] 42/7 94/22 98/6 142/3 142/12 151/14 193/7 200/25 201/1 left [7] 13/20 74/21 75/20 76/21 82/4 134/19 151/6 legacy [2] 74/18 75/10 legal [26] 4/8 5/2 32/8 41/3 93/23 99/25 100/20 101/8 102/23 103/1 105/21 106/12 116/5 116/10 117/24 121/20 124/16 139/18 145/2 145/8 147/16 163/1 167/20 176/3 207/12 209/17 legality [6] 145/5 146/16 150/6 150/12 153/10 181/6 legally [4] 81/23 93/20 104/14 146/6 legislated [1] 101/8 legislation [9] 1/22 2/21 2/24 3/1 41/10 87/13 154/13 154/21 160/13 legitimacy [6] 32/9 100/21 102/23 113/11 116/10 117/10 legitimate [14] 109/12 116/7 129/2 145/4 145/5 145/6 145/8 145/19 146/5 146/8 146/12 148/13 158/1 158/5 legitimately [1] 180/18 lend [1] 204/23 lends [1] 134/23 length [3] 39/22 50/11 93/19 lent [1] 98/17 less [12] 24/13 34/3 62/23 90/17 92/1 94/14 107/25 152/8 152/8 154/16 159/17 173/3 lesser [2] 148/11 207/6 lessons [12] 2/13 2/14 5/21 8/18 10/12 16/14 25/5 34/24 45/19 116/21 137/22 219/13 let [8] 37/13 49/23	90/6 127/12 130/1 143/10 191/10 210/9 let's [9] 13/24 56/7 72/25 92/12 103/1 134/10 151/11 151/16 203/25 lets [1] 56/2 letter [4] 27/25 32/16 75/6 163/24 letters [1] 135/22 level [34] 23/5 70/3 75/7 107/7 110/18 114/3 119/9 127/4 135/13 138/13 138/18 143/21 143/21 143/25 144/3 144/10 144/12 155/4 155/13 155/16 156/5 172/5 178/2 183/20 184/21 205/24 208/23 209/16 209/19 209/19 210/25 213/6 214/12 216/16 levels [1] 106/8 LGBTQ [1] 134/13 liaising [1] 177/6 liberal [1] 83/20 liberties [2] 1/16 175/16 liberty [1] 118/4 library [1] 158/18 licence [2] 53/10 53/12 lie [3] 33/20 71/19 180/14 lies [2] 33/25 91/6 life [5] 90/24 115/15 119/18 138/4 138/25 light [2] 45/18 114/14 like [119] 7/24 11/25 12/15 22/23 25/17 27/8 29/19 33/5 34/6 36/25 37/5 43/8 46/17 47/16 48/13 55/20 58/13 62/7 62/24 62/25 64/14 65/6 67/24 69/14 69/23 70/14 71/8 71/20 73/1 74/17 75/19 77/6 77/25 78/5 78/15 79/18 82/5 82/17 83/4 83/23 84/11 84/24 85/1 85/4 85/16 85/25 87/16 87/18 87/25 88/12 89/16 91/20 92/3 93/15 94/13 94/15 94/23 95/16 99/16 105/15 117/16 123/21 123/24 123/25 132/8 136/14 142/23 143/17 145/22 147/19 147/21 147/23 152/9 153/24 157/4 159/14 163/7 171/18 172/18 173/1 174/1 176/8 177/4 179/12 181/19 185/9 185/17 185/19
---	---	--	---	---

L	64/17 65/15 65/19 66/1 67/6 86/11 86/13 86/15 91/20 91/23 93/16 93/16 96/16 97/3 97/10 130/14 144/5 151/15 151/20 170/19 174/19 188/12 209/15 209/19 215/9 locally [2] 86/10 97/12 location [1] 66/14 locations [2] 64/14 154/7 logic [1] 21/5 logical [1] 144/10 London [7] 2/3 30/9 54/9 64/14 71/25 92/1 205/11 loners [1] 84/16 long [15] 6/1 12/12 33/1 33/5 39/19 60/15 68/24 74/1 79/7 110/1 121/19 130/2 143/3 169/6 196/22 long-term [2] 33/1 196/22 longer [5] 74/25 76/9 113/15 150/21 162/15 longest [1] 16/4 longstanding [3] 109/24 116/22 117/15 look [69] 10/14 12/3 12/24 21/14 25/17 29/8 36/22 37/22 37/24 42/19 43/16 43/24 44/10 44/25 45/9 46/3 47/15 49/10 49/15 54/23 55/2 55/8 57/4 60/21 62/18 70/13 71/8 83/4 84/11 85/25 86/22 90/7 94/23 123/14 123/21 123/24 136/17 136/17 149/18 157/23 159/1 159/2 159/7 159/9 162/4 162/11 169/24 170/2 171/8 172/1 172/24 178/11 185/9 185/17 186/17 187/8 189/12 194/15 199/8 208/1 208/24 209/11 210/16 211/2 212/10 214/25 215/2 215/16 215/24 looked [8] 34/2 35/15 37/25 81/10 89/16 194/18 195/15 216/14 looked-after [1] 194/18 looking [55] 2/14 4/16 11/12 16/7 22/7 24/1 30/15 32/25 36/3 36/8 36/16 39/7 40/6 42/18 43/4 45/3 45/4 45/7 45/11 46/2 46/3 46/6 47/20 48/19	48/23 50/13 53/7 61/1 63/9 64/21 65/25 72/15 77/17 77/20 90/11 91/17 96/11 96/25 98/15 147/15 152/8 157/17 159/5 161/21 162/9 162/10 169/18 172/8 205/16 208/3 208/4 208/6 210/5 212/24 219/6 looks [13] 29/3 80/23 85/1 103/7 159/2 168/5 171/18 185/19 186/15 202/15 208/14 213/23 215/22 loop [1] 137/4 loose [2] 104/25 105/2 loosely [1] 101/24 Lord [51] 1/13 1/14 1/21 1/24 2/4 2/12 2/13 5/8 5/9 15/14 15/14 34/21 35/1 37/1 45/25 46/17 65/17 69/15 70/5 73/18 86/15 98/1 101/22 103/5 111/2 131/10 135/24 156/3 158/23 159/20 162/24 163/4 166/10 167/3 167/25 170/25 174/11 181/12 187/18 190/1 191/2 193/23 194/9 195/11 195/15 198/13 204/3 205/19 216/8 219/2 220/4 Lord Anderson [40] 1/13 1/14 1/21 1/24 2/4 2/13 5/8 5/9 34/21 35/1 37/1 46/17 65/17 69/15 86/15 101/22 103/5 131/10 135/24 156/3 158/23 159/20 162/24 163/4 166/10 167/3 167/25 174/11 181/12 187/18 190/1 191/2 193/23 194/9 195/11 198/13 204/3 216/8 219/2 220/4 Lord Anderson's [5] 2/12 70/5 73/18 98/1 205/19 lose [1] 156/17 losing [1] 173/16 lost [2] 192/19 209/2 lot [37] 10/3 35/5 40/17 44/18 49/17 61/4 84/17 90/1 93/10 99/4 130/25 131/1 131/9 133/20 137/21 141/19 154/4 159/23 160/3 162/2 163/24 168/18 169/12 169/13 182/5 182/7 182/24 186/10 193/22 195/5 195/23 196/24 202/19	205/22 207/11 209/14 215/4 lots [11] 16/18 18/17 46/2 54/5 55/11 65/16 152/22 185/1 205/5 205/12 205/13 loud [2] 84/7 99/12 love [1] 201/3 low [6] 22/17 23/10 34/12 135/15 135/16 208/23 loyal [1] 9/25 luck [1] 201/8 lunch [1] 152/24 Luton [1] 48/18 lying [1] 169/9	52/20 81/9 93/2 98/13 101/18 103/14 114/7 115/22 189/18 204/3 making [28] 12/9 27/14 46/11 50/18 74/24 77/16 79/21 79/25 81/21 87/12 88/11 91/2 97/19 119/22 127/15 132/24 139/20 168/5 169/10 183/22 183/24 184/15 196/7 197/24 203/23 204/19 213/25 216/17 male [3] 24/15 26/16 26/18 man [5] 9/6 61/16 191/23 192/4 192/9 man's [1] 192/21 manage [7] 3/3 34/1 36/24 58/11 85/15 86/4 122/10 manageable [1] 27/5 managed [3] 27/22 28/9 191/13 management [29] 3/23 10/13 48/25 52/13 52/14 64/9 66/18 66/20 71/9 79/15 79/16 83/1 84/25 85/19 98/15 99/2 99/7 110/22 151/13 152/13 172/13 174/3 184/5 194/23 195/18 211/1 215/13 215/14 219/13 manager [2] 5/2 60/11 managing [7] 1/7 35/5 53/8 64/19 100/19 181/2 185/5 Manchester [2] 2/3 30/11 mandate [4] 123/13 126/21 155/6 155/16 mandated [1] 150/10 mandatory [2] 40/12 163/9 manifest [1] 179/24 manifestation [1] 143/18 manifested [1] 140/23 manifesto [1] 9/7 manual [4] 18/11 30/12 119/10 128/2 many [48] 1/18 7/20 9/1 16/18 18/15 21/19 21/24 22/14 25/20 25/23 26/2 32/14 38/25 40/18 41/15 48/17 48/19 48/20 57/9 62/22 72/21 73/4 89/14 90/14 90/18 92/20 93/19 104/19 105/22 114/11 117/18 124/1 127/1 130/3
----------	--	--	--	---

M	149/12 152/18 152/24 173/22 175/5 215/4 215/24 matters [5] 69/14 74/15 140/21 151/6 152/25 matured [2] 194/9 195/1 matures [1] 119/5 may [102] 2/22 5/18 11/23 12/12 16/3 18/15 23/15 28/3 31/7 33/19 46/10 48/7 50/2 51/10 53/12 58/2 58/3 62/4 62/20 63/19 67/24 73/15 76/8 77/25 80/1 80/1 81/5 83/12 103/10 105/15 105/20 106/4 106/13 106/25 107/23 114/19 115/23 117/19 119/2 119/5 119/20 119/21 120/6 120/8 120/12 120/16 122/3 122/19 124/16 124/17 127/8 130/4 130/6 135/1 140/5 140/14 144/21 147/14 148/12 148/22 151/5 151/7 153/1 153/6 153/8 153/20 155/20 156/11 156/22 157/8 161/16 162/9 162/23 168/14 172/13 174/12 175/20 178/1 178/3 179/13 180/14 180/19 182/23 187/13 190/9 190/14 195/12 196/4 197/3 197/6 197/21 197/23 198/9 198/13 208/19 212/17 212/18 213/20 214/8 214/18 215/17 216/4 May 2019 [1] 2/22 May 2024 [1] 103/10 maybe [10] 43/4 75/20 77/3 83/2 91/18 93/22 98/4 157/10 159/4 216/1 McCallum [1] 17/5 me [86] 4/13 6/2 7/20 13/3 16/20 19/24 25/11 28/1 28/8 29/4 30/16 34/19 36/9 37/13 40/7 44/13 47/16 47/21 47/23 49/23 51/12 54/24 56/18 58/14 58/20 64/4 64/6 67/15 68/5 68/8 68/11 68/18 68/23 70/2 70/3 70/13 71/6 71/18 72/14 73/11 74/10 75/13 75/16 76/3 80/4 80/7 81/9 81/22 83/14 83/19 88/6 90/2 90/6 90/12 91/1 91/20 92/8	94/7 96/16 97/3 123/21 123/24 123/25 143/10 143/24 148/23 154/1 170/5 175/14 176/18 190/2 191/10 191/10 193/14 193/18 196/18 198/15 200/11 200/21 201/5 202/23 207/1 207/1 218/4 218/20 218/23 mean [32] 7/15 8/6 22/3 30/12 35/18 38/23 38/24 41/16 44/14 48/16 53/1 59/2 65/12 66/11 67/1 67/6 71/11 72/9 87/2 91/21 103/21 103/22 119/11 134/11 135/11 155/24 166/2 166/5 172/18 189/9 192/22 193/19 meaning [9] 13/10 39/13 48/9 52/8 58/1 58/6 62/19 150/12 167/8 meaningful [2] 100/12 200/7 means [23] 13/5 22/2 22/5 33/13 38/8 43/13 56/14 60/7 102/5 102/6 105/20 124/16 124/21 128/22 129/3 138/2 145/18 146/7 146/8 146/15 167/4 187/25 188/3 meant [1] 76/4 Meanwhile [1] 136/23 measure [2] 53/16 146/11 measures [5] 34/10 85/14 130/8 145/24 154/23 mechanism [3] 104/10 126/15 174/15 mechanisms [6] 26/20 44/6 104/20 105/24 177/2 183/9 media [6] 134/20 164/8 184/24 184/24 186/8 203/3 medical [9] 68/10 165/23 174/18 188/11 211/8 211/20 212/1 212/2 212/5 medicine [1] 149/17 medics [1] 218/11 medium [4] 39/14 116/11 196/22 197/9 meet [14] 12/1 39/18 41/6 44/20 48/21 55/24 56/17 56/19 58/12 86/18 88/12 178/2 198/8 216/10 meeting [3] 56/13 102/13 178/12 member [4] 4/3	34/14 57/20 66/5 members [3] 39/17 117/18 118/6 Memorial [1] 192/7 men [3] 30/15 30/15 30/17 mental [23] 11/20 13/11 13/19 17/22 31/19 50/16 50/20 50/22 50/25 51/18 55/13 65/22 83/23 86/7 88/2 89/11 89/15 111/22 126/4 126/5 181/23 210/12 216/24 mention [6] 23/16 52/10 134/10 134/21 148/20 168/20 mentioned [11] 27/25 43/3 69/18 103/2 134/10 142/23 169/2 191/25 194/19 199/23 214/16 mentioning [1] 103/24 mentor [2] 11/25 57/4 mere [1] 198/1 merits [1] 173/21 message [2] 16/16 99/6 messier [1] 17/17 met [8] 44/17 56/18 61/5 85/7 117/10 188/17 189/20 201/25 methods [2] 16/2 144/20 metrics [1] 200/7 MI5 [6] 2/1 17/6 18/19 35/25 37/10 38/2 mid [2] 15/16 164/9 mid-2024 [1] 164/9 mid-90s [1] 15/16 middle [5] 15/22 77/10 135/19 136/14 206/17 Midlands [1] 3/24 might [78] 9/23 13/13 15/2 20/14 25/22 25/25 26/13 29/18 37/18 45/5 56/25 58/12 59/19 63/25 66/6 67/7 70/13 72/4 78/16 79/3 79/5 80/11 80/14 83/4 83/7 83/13 90/6 94/4 96/7 104/19 104/20 106/5 127/21 128/17 129/24 130/17 130/24 133/21 134/11 137/9 137/10 141/22 142/9 142/14 142/15 142/15 149/19 152/20 154/7 157/24 160/21 163/19 165/15 166/8 168/25 169/6 169/9 169/24 173/6 179/14	179/21 180/8 182/16 189/12 197/9 197/19 199/8 206/3 209/11 211/12 211/18 213/4 213/5 213/17 214/10 215/9 215/15 215/15 migrant [1] 131/23 migration [1] 8/24 military [3] 192/11 192/14 192/17 mind [11] 18/2 24/1 24/19 47/19 82/22 99/24 114/5 180/25 192/21 201/6 215/20 minded [1] 199/15 mindful [1] 217/23 minds [3] 16/22 127/8 154/8 mindset [3] 7/18 30/8 37/18 mine [2] 74/22 89/5 minimal [1] 201/2 minimum [2] 134/6 189/23 ministers [1] 110/13 Ministry [2] 91/25 151/21 minor [1] 13/6 minority [2] 124/11 199/20 minute [2] 67/25 122/20 minutes [7] 5/18 32/25 34/23 66/19 67/23 89/1 98/24 miscategorising [1] 51/7 misogynist [2] 179/3 179/17 misogynistic [1] 202/15 misogyny [5] 29/19 29/23 30/1 127/19 134/12 miss [1] 165/10 missed [2] 167/14 186/2 missing [7] 125/6 125/8 134/13 134/13 134/14 177/16 195/17 mission [1] 123/10 mistake [1] 197/6 mistakes [1] 119/2 mistrust [3] 115/20 133/21 138/20 mistrusted [1] 150/6 misunderstanding [1] 119/4 misuse [6] 43/18 43/23 85/5 89/11 95/17 194/20 mitigate [1] 32/22 mitigated [2] 71/14 79/17 mix [1] 27/16 mixed [1] 16/25
----------	---	---	---	---

M model [6] 59/7 63/13 70/7 70/12 108/24 155/23 models [4] 81/10 159/2 159/22 205/3 moderate [1] 143/15 modern [2] 60/21 199/25 modus [1] 16/11 moment [15] 38/12 41/3 42/21 47/22 67/13 68/11 72/21 88/22 162/21 164/21 168/1 195/11 195/14 204/9 210/3 money [1] 33/22 monitoring [8] 42/15 53/20 54/9 54/10 142/5 147/9 182/8 182/9 monotonous [1] 51/25 month [3] 1/23 33/12 55/21 months [2] 175/24 176/20 months' [1] 23/24 moral [5] 65/14 140/9 157/3 157/14 172/23 more [125] 7/20 7/21 10/18 14/16 17/3 18/13 19/12 21/9 23/12 23/15 24/13 24/18 26/19 26/21 29/13 33/13 33/20 34/3 34/15 39/4 39/20 39/20 42/19 43/2 43/4 45/4 50/19 56/6 61/8 62/22 62/24 63/19 66/11 66/17 72/17 77/1 77/2 81/14 88/16 89/2 90/18 91/7 93/1 93/15 94/14 94/20 95/14 95/23 101/3 104/11 104/11 104/21 106/23 109/2 115/12 115/19 115/22 116/3 116/9 116/21 118/17 118/19 120/24 121/3 121/8 122/9 124/7 124/24 125/5 126/12 126/13 128/12 129/23 130/9 136/14 144/15 144/17 147/10 152/2 152/8 152/8 159/18 160/17 161/23 161/23 162/1 165/3 171/18 173/1 173/3 175/6 175/12 181/22 186/6 187/6 187/9 190/24 191/10 194/21 198/18 200/1 200/18 204/6 204/6 205/14 207/2 207/9 208/2 208/15	208/15 208/16 208/17 208/24 209/23 209/24 210/1 210/25 211/1 212/10 212/13 213/18 213/21 213/25 215/12 217/19 morning [9] 1/5 1/12 5/10 5/10 70/5 87/9 99/16 117/12 153/19 mortar [2] 174/17 175/2 mosque [1] 9/7 Moss [6] 1/4 67/19 68/5 123/1 151/4 162/16 most [29] 5/20 10/25 15/24 23/17 33/9 36/20 36/23 40/19 50/16 57/11 57/12 62/18 65/19 68/23 86/10 112/22 114/8 114/16 117/1 120/5 122/4 123/20 123/22 132/10 137/2 152/6 160/2 160/2 168/3 mostly [1] 21/16 motivated [2] 7/17 8/7 motivating [1] 12/2 motivation [3] 8/4 103/18 172/15 motivations [2] 127/7 127/9 move [12] 58/6 71/15 74/24 77/4 78/15 82/22 88/25 107/7 133/5 137/17 181/1 201/2 moved [2] 77/5 91/18 moving [3] 84/10 103/4 138/22 MP [1] 2/15 Mr [39] 1/4 2/20 3/6 4/8 4/13 4/15 35/3 35/4 67/19 67/25 68/5 99/14 99/15 122/18 123/1 151/4 151/6 151/8 154/20 159/8 162/16 165/3 170/8 170/23 171/22 175/20 183/16 186/4 191/3 195/7 202/4 208/12 212/6 214/16 219/2 219/2 220/5 220/7 220/9 Mr Hall [13] 2/20 3/6 35/3 151/6 151/8 154/20 171/22 183/16 191/3 202/4 214/16 219/2 220/9 Mr Moss [6] 1/4 67/19 68/5 123/1 151/4 162/16 Mr Roxburgh [17] 4/8 4/13 4/15 99/14 99/15 122/18 159/8	165/3 170/8 170/23 175/20 186/4 195/7 208/12 212/6 219/2 220/7 Ms [18] 4/19 123/2 123/3 150/18 156/19 160/10 165/20 175/20 178/13 178/20 181/3 187/13 197/22 206/20 211/4 218/10 219/2 220/8 Ms St [17] 4/19 123/2 123/3 150/18 156/19 160/10 165/20 175/20 178/20 181/3 187/13 197/22 206/20 211/4 218/10 219/2 220/8 much [74] 5/7 7/21 14/25 15/6 17/3 18/14 19/17 22/20 34/20 34/21 35/2 41/17 51/16 58/6 60/12 61/17 66/17 68/8 77/1 77/2 81/14 88/10 89/1 89/2 90/3 90/4 90/6 95/15 99/10 99/11 99/13 101/6 104/10 111/23 116/2 119/19 120/24 121/3 122/18 122/22 123/4 125/12 130/3 138/11 142/12 143/23 150/17 150/18 151/9 152/16 154/1 154/16 156/19 160/6 161/1 162/14 165/8 172/16 175/1 182/4 183/21 184/24 187/6 187/6 187/9 189/17 194/14 205/20 207/8 208/15 208/24 215/14 216/16 219/1 multi [24] 11/17 31/24 33/6 35/16 55/10 55/11 55/15 55/17 56/11 64/17 69/3 69/4 79/21 81/17 86/8 96/16 97/3 115/25 187/7 198/18 201/1 203/20 216/18 219/14 multi-agency [19] 11/17 33/6 55/10 55/11 55/15 55/17 56/11 64/17 69/3 69/4 86/8 96/16 97/3 187/7 198/18 201/1 203/20 216/18 219/14 multidisciplinary [5] 96/19 203/21 204/11 213/2 217/12 multiple [5] 89/7 89/9 102/3 129/9 208/20 multiplicity [1] 205/3 multitude [2] 209/2 212/11 murder [3] 2/15 59/5	206/3 murdered [1] 180/16 murderers [1] 55/20 murders [4] 172/19 173/6 173/17 206/1 music [1] 46/14 Muslim [4] 8/25 133/9 133/15 183/24 muslims [5] 124/11 133/13 133/15 136/3 207/18 must [16] 49/18 53/19 53/20 64/2 109/6 109/15 109/18 112/14 113/5 113/6 116/12 117/4 139/6 146/5 147/17 190/7 mustn't [1] 49/16 mutual [1] 118/4 my [109] 5/18 5/21 9/16 10/6 11/18 13/9 13/25 14/11 14/17 22/22 24/24 25/19 25/22 26/12 26/23 27/4 27/17 27/21 28/4 31/12 31/13 32/8 32/17 33/4 34/3 36/18 37/9 45/20 48/11 48/12 49/20 51/24 52/24 52/24 55/16 58/22 62/12 68/9 68/13 68/16 68/21 68/24 69/24 70/24 74/1 75/7 76/12 76/23 77/16 77/17 79/9 79/11 80/4 80/17 81/2 84/11 85/12 86/5 86/6 87/3 88/14 90/13 90/15 95/1 95/2 96/18 98/7 98/23 99/6 99/24 100/6 100/13 101/1 112/1 114/5 117/16 123/4 124/9 128/10 128/18 128/23 128/24 135/4 151/22 157/1 160/8 164/1 164/14 166/12 166/14 166/15 167/15 167/17 169/2 170/15 176/18 185/12 185/22 187/23 191/12 193/3 199/24 200/1 200/23 202/12 203/20 204/15 205/5 206/8 myriad [1] 91/23 myself [3] 14/16 162/16 219/10 mythologies [1] 45/23	national [25] 1/15 2/25 3/16 4/21 4/25 17/20 37/20 49/13 59/6 64/18 83/18 109/13 123/11 123/14 171/24 172/11 202/11 202/13 202/19 202/21 203/10 204/16 204/21 207/10 209/19 nationalism [2] 45/12 45/13 nations [2] 132/17 150/8 nature [6] 8/2 12/15 14/5 122/14 140/10 147/5 navigate [1] 72/6 NDES [1] 37/20 near [1] 26/11 nearly [1] 127/17 neat [1] 31/1 neatly [1] 26/16 nebulous [1] 184/1 necessarily [19] 9/10 17/11 42/16 43/8 69/10 75/3 75/4 107/11 108/17 117/21 117/23 118/10 118/16 119/11 156/21 157/3 172/1 189/16 213/5 necessary [17] 43/25 109/11 129/4 130/6 145/10 145/12 146/5 146/11 146/13 148/13 157/25 158/5 158/6 178/25 181/24 213/8 218/2 necessitate [1] 96/3 necessity [10] 128/11 145/3 145/14 145/16 145/21 146/1 146/7 146/15 150/5 150/13 neck [1] 184/12 need [105] 7/6 39/4 39/8 43/24 48/14 48/24 50/24 52/4 52/6 52/7 52/8 52/16 53/1 55/5 55/10 55/11 61/8 65/20 65/21 65/23 66/11 66/17 67/14 71/4 73/17 75/8 78/21 78/25 79/4 79/11 80/5 81/4 85/13 85/20 85/20 86/16 86/21 86/22 88/10 88/18 88/20 92/7 95/6 95/8 95/24 97/16 97/20 98/9 99/21 102/5 104/5 106/25 110/25 111/21 115/8 116/11 116/23 118/18 122/1 124/13 130/19 132/9 142/17 144/22 148/4 149/4 149/17 152/2 156/22 157/14 157/15
--	---	--	--	---

N need... [34] 157/16 157/23 158/6 159/21 161/22 161/23 162/4 162/9 165/4 165/17 171/11 174/2 183/20 189/1 191/5 193/15 193/18 196/13 200/2 200/17 204/4 205/22 206/4 207/2 208/1 209/23 209/24 211/16 211/23 212/10 212/12 216/17 216/20 218/18 needed [9] 15/18 31/24 76/4 113/7 122/6 126/17 160/17 181/8 210/1 needlessly [1] 106/21 needs [35] 52/16 65/20 70/25 73/12 75/10 75/11 80/25 84/2 84/8 84/9 84/12 84/13 85/7 86/18 86/20 86/23 89/7 92/6 94/1 97/5 97/10 98/25 102/14 109/19 111/6 111/8 169/18 174/7 176/16 182/25 195/5 195/6 209/16 213/10 213/13 negative [2] 63/24 102/20 neglectful [1] 121/11 negligible [1] 102/1 neighbours [1] 10/1 neither [1] 168/16 nervous [3] 43/14 49/14 151/20 nervousness [1] 43/22 Nesser [1] 9/16 network [6] 4/9 27/23 28/10 29/5 31/14 100/2 networked [1] 97/7 neurodevelopmental [1] 50/2 neurodivergence [4] 83/23 88/1 125/25 148/22 neurodivergent [2] 97/20 148/23 neurodiverse [3] 108/16 111/23 183/23 neurodiversity [4] 84/16 95/17 126/4 126/6 never [11] 9/3 36/25 37/11 55/6 66/21 66/22 132/21 148/3 149/25 178/25 197/20 new [21] 2/24 9/6 28/5 31/22 53/16 64/23 64/25 65/10	88/19 96/1 96/1 96/2 101/19 101/24 103/10 106/17 111/15 128/6 134/18 217/4 217/23 New Zealand [1] 9/6 news [1] 48/19 next [15] 16/9 70/17 72/11 76/13 76/19 82/24 86/25 88/23 90/5 91/4 94/3 167/25 168/20 175/18 190/1 NHS [1] 130/14 Nicholas [3] 48/17 54/25 55/3 NIEV [1] 162/20 night [1] 57/10 nihilism [2] 29/17 45/15 Nik [1] 75/6 nine [2] 57/8 191/14 nine hours [1] 57/8 NIVE [1] 49/3 no [90] 8/11 12/11 16/17 20/10 20/23 20/24 21/1 21/2 21/13 22/1 22/3 22/6 22/16 25/23 31/9 31/10 31/10 32/14 33/3 34/23 44/19 49/18 56/14 56/17 57/19 62/10 62/10 62/10 62/10 65/7 68/5 73/9 74/25 76/8 85/17 87/3 87/6 88/5 90/16 102/3 107/24 108/9 108/18 113/15 114/5 125/4 125/21 126/4 126/11 127/5 134/10 134/25 135/13 137/10 137/12 137/14 140/2 140/5 141/4 142/7 145/15 146/25 149/12 149/12 151/10 159/13 161/4 161/14 162/3 166/7 170/1 170/2 175/25 184/4 184/16 185/16 187/20 188/1 188/1 188/2 188/3 189/19 190/11 192/20 192/25 193/19 198/25 199/20 216/4 216/5 no-one [2] 151/10 166/7 nobody [5] 22/22 30/17 72/7 72/21 168/19 noisy [1] 62/23 nominal [1] 98/15 NOMs [1] 54/11 non [19] 8/25 15/9 17/11 17/20 24/21 24/25 25/4 26/5 26/5 39/21 40/9 49/3 49/5 112/5 126/16 126/23 132/12 139/7 216/13 non-criminal [1]	216/13 non-discriminatory [2] 112/5 139/7 non-extremist [1] 40/9 non-ideological [12] 15/9 17/11 17/20 24/21 24/25 25/4 26/5 39/21 49/3 49/5 126/16 126/23 non-VFI [1] 26/5 non-white [1] 8/25 nondiscrimination [1] 150/14 none [3] 18/4 50/25 86/5 nonetheless [1] 12/18 nonprofit [1] 139/21 noose [1] 184/13 nor [2] 129/13 168/16 normal [3] 59/3 151/15 218/5 normally [1] 78/7 north [4] 10/22 24/9 164/4 205/11 North West [1] 10/22 North-West [1] 24/9 Northern [10] 15/15 15/21 64/20 64/21 123/13 132/7 132/9 132/11 132/14 132/21 Northumbria [1] 64/22 Norwegian [2] 9/17 89/5 not [335] notable [1] 159/14 note [10] 69/11 70/18 76/20 78/14 123/19 126/7 137/24 148/25 166/3 207/3 noted [4] 77/8 114/25 168/23 200/23 notes [1] 159/20 nothing [4] 5/12 35/20 47/7 148/1 noticed [1] 48/4 notification [2] 54/3 147/20 notified [2] 136/8 187/21 notify [2] 54/5 137/7 noting [3] 79/9 159/24 178/21 notoriety [1] 161/21 November [1] 1/23 now [48] 1/9 9/14 16/16 17/2 20/23 27/24 28/13 36/15 45/2 45/8 49/1 52/12 53/24 56/22 62/1 62/13 63/13 64/6 67/21 68/4 69/17 72/14 76/8 78/10 78/21 82/5 84/1 88/4	92/23 103/7 103/19 113/18 125/4 125/9 125/23 150/20 157/8 164/15 176/18 181/1 187/13 194/3 195/2 197/3 201/15 202/2 210/15 219/10 nowhere [1] 74/8 nude [2] 155/5 155/10 nuggets [1] 92/2 number [39] 9/21 14/1 20/4 21/20 21/21 22/19 22/20 29/9 40/4 45/10 51/25 68/20 69/6 73/3 73/10 76/3 78/17 78/18 81/11 86/14 99/3 101/9 105/16 106/14 106/20 110/15 113/12 114/8 115/3 115/14 120/22 131/13 152/19 155/24 168/17 173/7 182/23 186/22 198/16 number 1 [1] 81/11 numbers [9] 19/17 20/2 20/2 21/23 22/7 144/14 164/17 164/18 168/6 numerous [2] 3/4 146/3 nurse [1] 144/5 nurses [1] 91/22 O objections [1] 130/3 objectively [1] 126/23 obligated [4] 137/23 137/25 149/3 149/7 obligation [3] 41/9 41/14 137/11 obligations [3] 54/13 109/8 138/1 obscure [1] 33/24 observation [1] 92/2 observed [1] 213/6 obsess [1] 29/11 obsessive [1] 54/20 obstruction [1] 110/18 obtain [1] 60/9 obvious [7] 71/5 71/10 71/18 72/14 82/16 135/11 137/3 obviously [20] 5/12 18/19 30/13 37/2 39/22 47/15 54/21 55/11 55/14 57/16 75/6 80/9 92/5 96/11 98/1 115/3 159/19 172/17 191/3 193/23 occasionally [1] 139/15 occasions [1] 171/6 occur [1] 78/23	October [2] 17/7 17/8 October 2024 [1] 17/7 odd [1] 216/5 odious [1] 179/15 off [4] 13/7 18/15 31/9 86/7 offence [10] 18/7 18/10 43/23 44/9 54/18 60/10 61/16 62/12 66/8 216/15 offences [2] 2/24 104/7 offend [1] 96/12 Offender [2] 3/23 194/23 offenders [8] 3/3 35/10 36/19 55/18 55/19 60/22 96/15 98/16 offending [8] 67/5 69/5 84/24 89/18 96/15 194/22 205/4 218/16 offer [1] 187/15 offered [1] 103/6 offers [3] 69/5 70/14 196/4 Office [39] 6/16 20/8 20/24 23/15 27/13 32/18 37/10 40/15 51/14 56/18 66/15 91/13 91/24 102/8 110/4 110/12 110/16 111/20 118/14 125/23 126/3 127/13 147/9 169/22 169/24 170/2 181/17 181/18 182/1 182/7 188/17 188/21 188/22 189/19 191/1 191/13 193/5 200/24 200/24 officer [8] 3/12 10/16 55/1 78/1 78/9 102/13 200/11 201/22 officers [8] 35/20 36/15 74/23 93/7 93/13 95/8 96/20 96/23 offices [1] 71/25 officialdom [1] 184/12 officials [1] 133/1 offs [1] 98/3 often [37] 6/22 17/17 23/20 30/6 36/10 37/13 45/25 48/10 51/7 51/19 61/3 65/12 71/12 72/17 72/19 79/24 82/17 84/18 86/5 87/3 92/19 96/24 109/2 125/5 127/7 127/17 133/17 134/5 134/14 139/19 142/24 147/10 203/23 205/9 205/14 207/6 212/10
---	--	--	---	--

O oh [6] 47/3 48/12 57/21 60/11 76/1 92/11 okay [8] 55/23 55/24 70/18 76/14 82/25 84/3 87/1 123/4 old [5] 25/1 43/10 47/17 155/15 160/12 older [3] 24/7 30/15 30/17 omnipresent [1] 157/9 on [372] once [10] 11/4 17/7 34/4 37/5 43/16 59/8 76/18 78/24 114/18 218/1 one [146] 6/13 6/17 6/21 8/22 9/19 12/1 12/1 14/2 14/18 14/22 14/22 18/9 18/18 20/14 20/24 24/1 25/17 25/18 25/24 26/10 26/16 27/14 28/16 28/23 29/2 31/13 32/5 34/5 34/24 35/19 38/8 39/20 39/20 39/25 41/16 43/24 44/6 44/9 44/19 46/3 46/3 46/14 46/24 47/6 47/12 48/13 48/17 50/15 50/16 51/15 52/16 52/19 53/9 53/25 54/15 57/19 58/7 58/9 61/5 61/25 62/12 64/18 65/8 67/12 67/13 69/10 71/18 72/4 74/17 74/22 75/12 78/20 81/5 82/21 83/9 89/13 90/10 101/24 103/5 107/12 114/24 118/18 126/14 127/2 127/21 128/3 128/17 128/23 131/16 132/17 133/21 133/22 133/23 136/10 137/2 137/2 137/8 138/19 142/23 143/1 143/25 149/8 151/10 152/18 154/7 154/10 155/15 157/20 157/23 160/24 162/1 162/24 164/21 166/7 167/6 168/5 170/10 170/12 170/19 171/7 171/22 171/23 173/13 175/14 175/20 176/1 178/20 180/17 181/19 182/16 184/6 184/12 187/20 192/25 195/13 202/7 202/15 202/18 204/23 206/3 215/7 215/11 217/16 217/23 219/8 219/9	one-on-one [1] 12/1 ones [5] 23/17 65/2 85/3 138/24 168/16 ongoing [9] 79/5 81/25 82/15 82/19 98/20 116/18 119/8 206/14 206/15 online [45] 39/5 41/8 41/17 41/18 41/18 43/21 45/11 47/13 48/3 50/8 52/6 57/9 57/14 57/21 58/1 58/6 58/11 58/13 58/16 58/20 58/21 58/25 60/19 62/19 62/19 62/22 63/23 64/7 64/7 66/10 66/16 84/17 87/25 89/3 120/2 159/17 160/1 161/9 161/11 161/20 175/5 208/23 211/11 211/15 212/18 only [41] 16/7 18/23 19/21 20/14 21/14 22/18 24/6 24/6 25/9 39/3 58/3 63/13 82/6 84/1 97/15 104/19 106/4 106/17 109/10 109/17 110/12 111/4 112/16 116/14 128/3 130/15 131/11 144/15 150/7 161/8 161/15 161/19 193/1 199/11 211/6 211/18 211/25 212/3 218/8 218/11 219/8 onto [7] 6/6 10/24 11/1 11/5 12/3 53/22 132/3 opaque [2] 94/10 110/17 open [11] 12/12 78/2 79/7 85/24 89/16 102/8 106/4 164/20 167/25 175/10 175/13 opening [3] 2/17 3/5 5/23 openly [1] 29/23 operandi [1] 16/11 operate [2] 95/13 126/22 operated [1] 17/1 operates [1] 137/16 operating [7] 10/22 24/3 98/9 98/10 155/7 155/16 198/20 operation [2] 38/6 38/17 operational [5] 27/23 28/9 69/9 76/16 78/4 operationally [6] 75/8 94/17 100/24 117/14 120/3 120/24 opinion [7] 76/12 139/13 140/3 140/4 140/8 140/11 141/7	opinions [11] 119/20 140/1 140/8 140/9 140/14 141/10 178/22 179/1 179/11 179/16 179/24 opportunities [1] 64/5 opportunity [7] 60/16 60/25 61/2 68/8 181/6 187/14 187/16 opposed [3] 24/5 45/13 45/13 opposition [1] 118/2 option [3] 104/19 106/4 199/13 options [3] 59/10 97/25 114/23 or [317] order [14] 45/22 53/14 53/15 53/15 53/18 53/19 60/16 61/20 61/21 62/8 158/6 166/22 167/6 216/7 orders [8] 60/17 60/18 60/19 60/21 61/25 85/17 98/17 215/9 organisation [1] 4/10 organisation's [1] 100/3 organisations [7] 78/5 112/1 112/18 117/16 139/21 184/22 186/7 oriented [1] 122/7 origin [1] 159/5 original [3] 188/5 207/16 217/10 originally [1] 200/22 OSA [1] 41/19 ostensible [1] 146/24 ostensibly [3] 131/20 147/11 207/11 other [108] 4/13 5/14 6/25 11/21 12/8 18/18 19/6 19/20 20/10 20/24 22/10 24/9 24/15 31/13 34/1 38/9 39/14 41/20 41/23 42/5 42/22 45/24 47/6 51/21 52/17 52/22 54/6 59/7 63/1 69/11 70/21 71/25 74/24 77/6 79/23 83/22 85/10 87/4 88/1 92/9 98/1 103/16 103/25 104/20 105/13 105/23 107/13 108/9 109/20 111/11 112/13 114/23 115/19 117/5 120/8 122/13 125/11 125/18 125/25 129/22 133/7 133/9 134/1 138/5 141/7 141/13 147/8 147/13 148/21 161/17	165/15 168/8 168/24 169/7 169/19 169/22 170/9 170/12 171/6 171/9 171/15 173/5 173/5 173/6 173/14 174/8 174/25 180/10 180/11 181/25 185/20 188/3 188/15 189/20 190/13 196/16 196/17 197/17 198/2 200/19 202/23 204/18 205/20 210/11 216/23 217/20 218/14 219/14 others [30] 15/7 15/22 24/17 29/16 33/19 46/18 69/21 70/11 76/20 82/18 90/21 94/21 100/15 108/12 114/21 134/9 134/12 139/21 140/24 168/1 181/22 186/8 189/4 189/6 200/13 205/22 211/8 211/19 212/5 218/8 Otherwise [1] 184/19 ought [3] 55/22 59/22 159/5 our [41] 1/6 1/9 1/12 2/17 2/19 3/5 3/10 4/7 4/18 5/6 33/17 33/23 55/22 67/22 72/2 74/2 88/21 97/20 118/6 121/24 122/21 123/12 123/13 123/18 124/24 126/20 127/22 128/15 135/12 139/10 142/1 142/23 144/18 153/15 156/12 156/18 173/16 183/5 183/6 205/11 218/5 out [77] 8/9 10/11 12/2 16/10 16/14 18/1 19/25 21/16 30/18 30/21 30/23 30/25 33/13 40/20 40/25 41/2 41/2 41/4 45/12 46/8 47/15 48/18 52/4 53/9 53/11 54/4 57/3 63/6 63/11 65/18 83/13 84/7 86/15 91/5 96/13 105/13 108/19 111/9 113/15 119/5 119/7 121/4 121/5 124/14 128/4 133/17 134/12 137/4 137/25 138/9 138/10 138/23 139/17 150/2 150/8 164/13 164/20 165/6 166/21 169/15 170/12 172/1 176/6 184/8 186/11 191/13 198/6 198/24 200/12 200/14 202/2 205/19 206/7 206/18 209/22 210/9 215/19 out: [1] 61/9	out: this [1] 61/9 outcomes [9] 41/20 72/3 80/20 89/18 90/11 90/25 171/7 185/13 196/22 outlet [1] 31/8 outline [2] 7/8 139/11 outlined [2] 14/19 179/23 outlining [1] 138/21 outnumbered [1] 9/22 outright [1] 139/5 outset [1] 69/23 outside [7] 38/4 68/16 69/17 72/14 190/17 190/18 199/8 outstrips [1] 78/8 outweighed [2] 9/21 20/18 over [31] 14/8 21/7 28/18 34/13 34/23 39/12 54/4 65/9 77/1 83/4 89/24 93/19 94/23 105/23 114/14 114/17 115/18 119/21 146/4 151/7 152/24 154/4 154/18 154/19 155/11 157/6 162/16 169/17 173/12 187/10 194/5 over-burdened [1] 21/7 over-complexity [1] 65/9 over-inclusiveness [1] 169/17 overall [6] 111/14 168/6 197/7 206/21 213/24 213/25 overarching [2] 36/18 144/25 overcrowded [1] 198/18 overdue [1] 113/18 overlap [2] 39/15 89/6 overloading [1] 40/21 overlord [1] 42/15 overrepresentation [2] 126/9 149/10 overriding [1] 77/17 overrunning [1] 5/20 oversight [4] 2/7 109/25 110/1 110/2 overstate [1] 44/16 overstretch [2] 29/2 29/3 overt [2] 165/3 215/13 overtly [1] 118/17 overwhelm [1] 105/8 overwhelmed [1] 184/20 overwhelming [1]
---	---	---	---	--

O	215/16 Parliament [1] 29/21 parol [1] 218/15 part [23] 10/9 10/13 29/25 37/21 39/18 41/8 43/22 54/1 54/8 54/10 56/11 102/2 124/18 127/12 137/10 137/14 137/15 145/4 146/15 146/16 196/9 197/13 206/25 part 4 [3] 54/1 54/8 54/10 Participants [2] 176/4 178/21 participate [1] 142/2 participating [1] 123/9 particular [21] 13/10 42/19 42/25 56/9 107/17 108/15 118/24 153/4 156/13 161/16 161/20 163/11 164/10 174/6 174/7 177/20 181/11 191/18 197/22 208/22 219/8 particularly [34] 18/12 25/7 27/1 51/3 54/1 54/19 56/2 56/19 56/20 63/11 64/24 66/10 104/2 107/14 108/5 111/22 118/11 121/16 126/18 128/7 153/5 154/9 160/16 161/12 161/19 165/14 171/14 173/2 182/24 183/4 186/20 192/10 199/14 219/5 parties [2] 99/4 140/25 partly [1] 182/1 partners [1] 64/17 partnership [6] 3/20 35/17 69/3 86/9 142/3 142/12 partnerships [2] 97/14 151/14 parts [2] 197/13 207/13 party [2] 139/17 148/10 pass [5] 65/5 65/8 162/16 201/13 201/17 passed [3] 10/24 11/1 11/4 passing [1] 69/16 passive [1] 166/4 past [4] 56/23 116/16 131/24 186/12 patchwork [1] 106/3 patchy [1] 106/7 path [4] 7/24 12/3 107/8 151/13 paths [3] 12/4 32/15 151/12 pathway [5] 8/11	164/22 210/15 214/23 218/7 pathways [8] 8/1 9/14 10/2 24/24 63/15 203/12 208/11 210/6 pattern [3] 155/9 214/18 214/19 patterns [3] 161/5 177/12 212/16 Paul [7] 3/11 74/10 92/13 184/3 193/7 200/19 216/20 pay [2] 73/12 76/4 paying [2] 75/17 75/21 PCMT [2] 104/23 193/10 peaceful [1] 124/12 pedantic [1] 13/2 peeling [1] 77/14 peer [3] 1/14 129/14 150/2 peers [1] 50/6 pen [1] 197/12 penalise [1] 156/18 people [257] people's [5] 77/4 85/21 86/23 150/4 179/19 per [46] 10/25 11/11 11/12 19/12 19/19 19/21 20/11 20/12 20/14 20/15 20/15 20/19 20/19 21/14 21/15 21/20 22/1 22/2 22/3 22/13 22/15 22/18 23/3 23/19 24/4 24/6 24/7 24/12 24/16 25/25 26/4 26/18 39/11 105/11 105/14 105/15 115/1 131/11 134/14 149/24 159/25 160/1 160/4 168/15 185/23 205/25 perceive [1] 133/10 perceived [2] 8/15 140/7 perceives [1] 143/15 percentage [3] 135/25 136/10 164/4 perception [1] 133/14 perfect [1] 70/18 performance [5] 110/5 111/4 111/15 113/19 200/6 performed [2] 6/15 10/23 performing [1] 201/23 perhaps [21] 15/2 15/24 18/4 18/16 26/12 27/2 34/7 57/13 70/14 70/22 73/14 92/10 114/16 160/2 160/19 163/5 187/19	190/17 195/8 205/7 210/11 period [2] 50/5 90/15 periodic [1] 88/14 permanent [2] 15/19 23/7 permissible [1] 109/10 permission [3] 1/8 150/20 153/20 permissions [2] 38/3 38/15 permits [1] 140/2 permitted [3] 148/6 179/18 179/22 perpetrated [1] 90/21 persistent [1] 46/18 persistently [1] 110/7 person [48] 11/25 30/4 35/14 37/19 38/24 39/4 39/8 40/25 42/24 45/5 49/7 51/2 51/2 52/17 52/17 53/2 53/7 54/17 54/20 57/16 57/17 57/19 58/3 58/7 60/13 60/14 61/1 61/23 62/18 66/3 68/9 83/21 127/15 130/20 140/5 140/5 140/12 155/10 156/14 165/18 168/19 177/6 183/23 184/7 190/16 210/9 215/21 216/6 person's [3] 8/15 18/1 52/22 personal [5] 16/1 17/21 140/21 142/21 142/21 personnel [3] 33/21 130/14 188/12 persons [2] 14/5 192/18 perspective [6] 45/21 69/9 76/17 124/17 126/20 173/11 perspectives [2] 126/21 127/14 persuade [2] 169/12 215/18 Petter [1] 9/16 phase [13] 2/10 2/18 3/6 11/4 19/23 32/17 33/15 75/5 75/19 78/14 99/8 135/23 203/23 Phase 1 [7] 32/17 33/15 75/5 75/19 78/14 135/23 203/23 Phase 2 [3] 2/10 3/6 99/8 phenomenally [1] 98/10 phenomenon [3] 16/7 16/15 168/22 phone [9] 53/19	53/20 53/24 54/14 54/16 54/17 54/22 60/9 215/17 phones [2] 37/22 37/24 photographs [1] 141/12 phrase [8] 13/5 13/8 15/8 16/19 52/14 71/2 103/19 118/11 pick [6] 75/8 152/25 158/23 173/25 175/18 184/11 picked [1] 61/11 picking [2] 61/22 184/3 picture [4] 109/3 155/10 178/9 212/20 pictures [2] 54/24 155/5 piece [1] 200/24 piecemeal [1] 98/25 pilot [1] 10/22 place [26] 24/8 33/23 33/24 34/9 34/9 66/3 85/15 85/25 94/25 98/19 104/7 106/2 106/5 115/16 120/5 144/7 154/14 173/2 173/8 174/9 192/17 196/10 197/23 199/5 199/19 213/19 placed [5] 69/7 79/20 104/9 120/18 159/10 places [7] 76/8 115/18 119/19 174/16 197/1 205/11 218/14 plainly [3] 31/10 150/3 163/22 plan [6] 11/17 74/7 79/15 84/11 216/20 217/3 planning [11] 41/1 41/1 41/14 46/16 62/11 83/17 119/9 119/24 201/5 214/11 215/23 plans [1] 217/6 platform [4] 40/12 41/23 47/2 56/9 platforms [10] 40/14 40/18 41/15 42/5 42/6 42/10 154/25 159/13 159/18 160/5 play [1] 116/7 playbook [1] 61/9 playing [1] 27/2 plays [3] 108/3 113/1 121/22 plea [3] 18/4 19/8 23/11 please [25] 5/8 34/7 35/3 53/23 61/17 70/17 76/13 82/24 86/25 88/23 90/5 91/4 94/3 96/4 123/2
----------	---	---	--	--

P please... [10] 150/20 151/5 152/13 153/21 170/7 185/2 190/1 191/3 197/9 210/17 pleased [2] 68/19 75/18 plenary [2] 68/1 150/22 plenty [2] 5/23 12/7 PLP [2] 142/4 142/4 plus [3] 24/12 24/14 61/21 pm [7] 122/20 122/23 122/25 150/23 151/1 151/3 219/17 PMAPs [1] 11/8 poem [1] 63/5 point [103] 5/18 8/10 8/19 9/13 13/6 13/22 17/5 17/14 28/10 28/11 31/4 31/12 31/13 32/23 35/7 36/23 37/4 39/25 58/5 58/5 58/9 59/3 61/19 62/10 67/3 67/5 67/12 71/8 74/17 75/12 78/13 79/13 79/14 79/20 80/2 80/14 81/2 81/11 82/3 82/11 82/12 82/16 84/12 88/11 88/11 88/14 88/14 89/4 90/6 90/9 93/6 95/11 95/20 96/18 97/4 98/6 98/23 98/24 105/21 109/2 116/1 129/14 141/13 144/20 161/3 161/22 162/8 167/14 167/18 175/15 176/11 176/23 176/24 177/14 185/20 186/2 187/10 195/9 196/8 196/9 196/21 198/23 200/21 201/21 202/8 203/9 203/15 204/2 204/3 204/5 204/7 204/8 204/13 204/14 205/18 206/7 206/9 206/12 206/15 211/15 217/11 217/18 218/9 pointed [2] 138/12 200/14 points [16] 28/23 29/6 70/20 73/14 73/20 83/6 86/2 96/8 107/5 144/25 169/10 177/16 185/4 185/21 202/5 203/17 police [87] 2/2 3/12 3/17 3/19 3/24 10/9 10/14 10/14 10/20 11/3 11/10 11/21 12/22 14/6 21/16 31/17 35/20 35/24	37/21 38/1 44/12 48/12 51/13 52/25 53/2 53/7 53/12 53/18 53/22 54/8 54/8 55/1 55/5 56/3 60/25 61/12 66/2 77/25 78/3 78/8 78/9 81/5 81/8 82/4 82/5 86/3 86/5 91/12 93/7 93/13 93/20 95/8 96/23 102/13 106/25 108/12 130/14 133/1 141/22 142/3 142/12 142/25 143/1 143/3 143/6 151/14 151/21 170/19 188/12 188/17 188/17 189/20 189/21 200/11 200/25 201/22 203/2 214/1 214/2 214/8 215/2 215/20 216/2 216/3 216/11 217/13 217/24 police-led [2] 151/14 200/25 policies [2] 4/17 107/10 policies' [1] 100/9 policing [27] 3/14 3/15 3/25 4/4 53/17 69/13 73/7 73/10 74/19 77/13 90/14 93/8 106/22 107/4 115/18 120/19 120/23 142/24 143/6 200/10 201/17 205/25 213/16 213/20 214/4 214/5 214/13 policy [9] 4/8 47/17 75/7 100/1 128/25 130/12 137/8 147/19 177/25 political [14] 7/12 7/17 8/3 27/4 84/3 110/2 135/6 135/8 139/16 140/9 143/10 143/13 143/17 166/22 politicians [1] 9/2 politicisation [1] 134/22 politicised [3] 134/5 134/7 134/24 pompous [1] 44/14 pool [1] 191/22 poor [11] 83/23 88/1 89/11 89/15 101/17 110/22 121/14 121/21 122/1 125/7 208/21 poorly [1] 89/13 pop [2] 55/4 82/14 popping [1] 89/24 population [7] 7/10 39/11 136/11 143/20 143/25 144/3 144/10 populations [1] 8/25 ports [1] 137/3 pose [6] 25/23 33/18 117/9 121/4 153/24	211/19 posed [5] 101/2 101/4 112/21 116/24 122/10 poses [5] 104/13 105/2 211/7 211/13 212/4 position [13] 24/17 69/21 82/6 85/17 93/23 97/10 115/4 128/15 164/15 194/6 200/22 204/18 205/1 positioned [1] 91/20 positive [3] 39/3 63/24 64/1 positives [7] 38/22 40/7 40/11 41/15 131/14 144/9 144/14 possibilities [1] 160/25 possibility [1] 60/6 possible [15] 5/23 18/2 30/24 41/12 59/25 64/14 91/14 91/16 99/6 100/16 129/22 176/17 183/21 209/24 219/7 possibly [8] 16/11 21/18 28/18 43/3 156/18 169/3 169/16 199/25 post [7] 2/21 3/25 12/13 22/23 112/6 112/8 112/9 post-closure [1] 12/13 post-holder [1] 112/9 post-policing [1] 3/25 post-Southport [1] 22/23 postholder [1] 112/14 potential [24] 37/14 40/12 42/11 42/19 56/21 59/10 60/23 63/16 101/19 102/16 105/8 115/8 115/19 120/3 120/19 122/10 126/8 130/17 134/22 175/7 189/22 196/2 196/6 199/6 potentially [37] 48/24 50/17 55/12 60/8 60/18 85/22 92/18 95/16 106/21 106/23 107/3 107/8 115/14 115/22 137/1 159/16 159/18 165/10 171/10 174/14 177/7 177/8 189/23 195/9 195/19 196/23 198/8 205/23 208/13 208/17 211/23 212/8 212/9 213/16 214/4 214/9 216/11 pots [1] 33/22	poverty [1] 121/11 power [6] 35/23 36/13 37/6 37/8 96/24 141/16 powers [11] 2/24 36/12 43/11 147/21 200/6 201/7 202/10 204/19 214/25 216/4 216/8 practicable [1] 40/22 practical [7] 31/13 57/4 73/21 104/13 163/13 168/1 178/24 practically [3] 21/24 30/6 181/7 practice [9] 1/16 28/3 33/14 51/10 115/13 121/16 124/21 179/21 194/24 practices [3] 4/17 84/23 84/24 practitioner [5] 49/25 50/1 50/9 93/17 185/18 practitioners [13] 13/11 13/20 50/18 50/24 59/11 62/18 88/8 102/9 116/18 163/17 167/16 167/20 193/11 pre [1] 115/16 pre-criminal [1] 115/16 precisely [1] 181/23 predict [1] 130/22 Predictably [1] 131/8 predicted [1] 16/3 prediction [1] 16/6 predominant [1] 20/7 preface [1] 191/11 prefer [1] 165/2 preferable [2] 166/16 208/15 prefers [2] 143/10 143/13 prejudice [3] 149/4 149/5 189/9 premises [1] 66/4 preparation [3] 8/5 39/18 56/16 preparing [1] 157/1 preponderance [1] 21/11 present [6] 11/21 113/3 172/14 183/4 194/13 218/12 presentation [22] 5/9 35/4 68/1 68/4 68/7 99/11 99/15 123/3 150/19 151/8 160/9 171/24 181/4 187/15 187/23 203/20 220/4 220/5 220/6 220/7 220/8 220/9 presentations [1] 175/22	presented [4] 122/14 143/5 214/6 214/13 preserve [1] 217/8 preserved [1] 74/15 President [1] 38/12 pressing [1] 165/9 pressure [7] 24/2 120/11 141/8 179/10 180/25 182/16 183/10 pressurised [1] 66/2 prestigious [1] 207/10 pretty [5] 9/1 19/10 47/4 72/16 158/1 prevent [306] Prevent's [14] 25/12 32/10 100/21 101/13 102/17 102/24 109/23 111/14 115/16 116/8 116/22 117/25 121/24 137/17 Prevent-relevant [1] 14/6 preventing [4] 70/1 79/23 82/18 129/6 prevention [23] 33/7 53/15 63/17 63/20 87/19 109/13 128/22 129/1 129/18 129/19 131/7 131/16 132/3 132/16 132/20 134/2 143/21 144/3 144/12 144/16 145/3 145/7 207/3 previous [8] 4/23 22/17 23/1 23/5 49/17 157/3 210/13 215/20 previously [2] 98/6 179/5 primarily [1] 213/16 primary [4] 14/15 14/24 17/12 48/8 principally [3] 8/25 100/7 174/18 principle [3] 35/6 146/16 202/24 principles [1] 163/8 prior [3] 27/7 134/18 174/24 priorities [1] 65/24 priority [2] 175/5 201/25 prison [15] 35/14 35/24 36/2 36/6 36/12 36/20 53/10 61/17 64/24 78/5 179/4 180/5 180/18 180/22 218/15 prisoner [1] 36/13 prisons [2] 3/2 9/24 privacy [8] 43/12 108/21 109/10 138/6 139/7 145/23 146/18 157/18 private [5] 86/17 97/8 108/2 115/15 138/25
---	--	---	--	---

P privilege [1] 123/8 probably [29] 5/19 14/16 21/16 36/23 57/18 71/20 78/11 79/10 82/6 84/1 86/24 88/21 90/12 91/7 94/8 99/5 99/9 118/25 152/6 153/12 155/14 160/8 162/18 163/24 177/18 198/16 201/8 203/8 218/9 probation [7] 3/3 35/25 78/6 84/23 96/20 194/23 218/16 problem [41] 5/16 25/19 25/22 34/5 34/17 35/15 43/2 44/16 49/10 52/22 64/7 65/13 65/14 68/5 68/10 71/17 72/7 72/8 72/20 74/18 75/10 76/18 88/16 93/3 96/25 97/18 119/8 135/17 136/7 136/9 137/10 137/14 166/18 168/12 170/11 170/14 175/14 175/15 182/17 193/19 197/7 problematic [2] 87/22 136/21 problems [17] 32/7 41/16 43/9 47/12 51/15 65/22 78/18 80/21 86/7 132/2 133/7 133/23 134/1 147/8 152/12 169/8 219/6 Procedure [1] 98/10 procedures [2] 33/21 98/9 process [6] 26/19 34/10 45/21 138/9 153/10 198/23 processes [4] 67/6 96/14 186/24 219/14 produce [4] 77/3 80/20 94/9 129/14 produced [4] 2/13 16/9 33/9 201/4 producing [2] 147/10 147/10 profession [1] 170/14 professional [13] 76/25 77/9 77/10 77/23 79/19 95/5 96/22 96/22 112/19 203/24 206/10 209/6 212/5 professionals [14] 50/19 77/16 95/7 95/7 108/25 115/7 204/11 210/2 211/9 211/20 212/1 212/2 213/24	218/17 professions [1] 102/4 professor [5] 4/2 4/5 49/2 71/23 193/7 Professor Cassam [1] 49/2 Professor of [1] 4/5 Professor Paul [1] 193/7 professorial [5] 78/6 96/18 108/11 113/22 177/10 profile [9] 20/17 24/4 43/15 43/17 43/19 48/21 50/2 50/12 52/1 profit [1] 159/2 profound [3] 140/20 172/23 219/9 profoundly [1] 219/4 prognosis [2] 111/10 171/17 programme [68] 2/15 3/24 38/21 39/6 44/5 59/12 59/18 65/11 81/7 81/7 81/8 101/3 101/5 101/11 101/15 102/25 104/6 106/17 110/7 110/11 110/23 110/24 110/25 113/17 113/21 114/4 114/23 115/13 116/18 116/19 117/10 117/16 118/20 120/25 125/3 128/15 131/7 131/16 132/16 132/16 132/20 132/24 133/3 133/20 136/3 138/16 138/17 143/5 143/6 144/8 145/6 145/8 146/17 171/2 176/15 176/19 179/4 179/6 180/9 180/23 180/24 182/9 182/21 183/17 185/10 186/1 188/10 191/14 programme's [9] 100/7 102/19 107/22 110/2 111/4 112/10 112/15 113/19 121/17 programmes [17] 42/20 64/23 104/11 104/12 106/6 107/13 109/20 121/3 122/13 125/13 139/12 184/5 194/23 195/25 196/23 207/9 207/16 progress [8] 10/17 69/19 69/20 74/19 100/17 111/7 112/11 209/8 progressed [2] 14/8 112/13 progressing [1] 31/11 prohibitions [1] 63/25	prohibits [1] 68/10 project [4] 5/2 99/1 99/2 217/20 projects [2] 123/16 217/20 prominence [1] 102/25 prominent [1] 101/13 promise [1] 98/23 promote [2] 123/10 149/5 promoted [2] 160/5 175/9 promotes [1] 130/7 promoting [2] 149/14 160/4 prompt [1] 150/23 promptly [1] 122/20 pronouncements [1] 149/11 propensity [1] 26/14 proper [9] 74/3 83/17 94/25 99/2 99/2 99/7 183/3 199/12 217/25 properly [4] 80/6 98/25 194/24 217/22 proportion [3] 24/8 164/1 182/17 proportionality [7] 126/17 128/9 128/12 144/25 145/3 145/6 146/7 proportionate [11] 41/20 41/23 62/9 108/14 109/15 112/4 136/11 145/11 145/14 181/9 213/9 proposal [1] 208/1 propose [2] 33/16 153/7 prosecute [1] 59/5 prosecuted [3] 16/12 16/13 61/13 Prosper [3] 48/17 54/25 55/3 protected [3] 140/8 141/1 149/1 protecting [2] 138/4 138/5 protection [13] 43/11 55/17 84/23 92/16 96/13 109/7 112/3 134/6 139/8 139/12 139/25 148/18 152/1 protections [4] 134/25 135/1 135/13 146/19 protective [3] 85/2 85/14 160/22 protocols [1] 198/20 prove [3] 27/7 27/9 155/11 proved [1] 191/9 provide [3] 54/17 98/11 106/9 provided [4] 56/18	100/12 111/11 196/3 provider [9] 11/24 11/24 30/25 58/2 191/17 192/5 192/12 194/7 195/3 providers [24] 12/4 12/7 25/7 25/8 25/16 27/16 56/16 56/17 57/15 58/10 58/23 61/5 66/1 66/11 95/14 115/2 191/21 192/1 193/13 194/2 194/4 194/16 195/16 216/21 provides [1] 183/5 providing [4] 1/25 2/6 189/23 198/22 provision [5] 86/17 97/7 97/21 141/4 194/19 provisions [1] 54/3 PSED [1] 149/2 psychiatrist [2] 211/13 211/17 psychological [1] 165/25 psychologist [1] 211/13 psychologists [2] 52/5 95/4 psychology [3] 50/9 68/21 77/25 PTSD [1] 60/4 public [31] 1/17 7/5 17/7 32/9 55/17 66/6 72/16 84/23 86/17 90/22 92/21 97/8 105/22 108/2 109/9 109/13 112/1 112/18 113/6 113/17 116/17 117/18 141/5 143/22 144/11 149/2 149/2 164/8 166/22 196/1 196/12 publication [3] 116/13 116/16 186/12 publications [1] 130/9 publicised [1] 23/2 publicity [2] 19/8 23/12 publicly [4] 83/10 101/15 102/1 121/25 publish [1] 112/14 published [9] 1/23 5/22 18/22 23/17 89/5 112/2 129/14 145/9 162/11 publishes [1] 125/9 publishing [1] 181/21 pull [1] 97/17 pupil [1] 73/8 purchasing [1] 119/22 purely [1] 34/8 purported [1] 128/14	purpose [8] 7/11 48/9 52/9 70/15 129/10 130/4 168/4 202/18 purposes [4] 14/11 109/6 174/15 210/17 Pursue [3] 27/8 87/18 216/10 pursued [1] 83/13 pursuing [1] 167/5 push [4] 38/18 143/9 143/12 143/14 pushed [1] 199/9 pushes [1] 106/21 put [49] 6/2 11/16 11/22 12/2 20/4 21/2 21/23 25/13 25/18 26/12 28/8 29/4 32/1 32/1 41/14 45/22 68/12 74/4 74/23 77/9 79/16 84/14 85/3 86/15 87/1 87/5 94/25 96/24 97/25 98/19 142/12 158/9 158/13 163/5 164/12 164/13 164/21 166/17 172/25 173/13 175/22 185/11 195/9 197/20 202/20 203/3 206/15 216/20 217/8 puts [1] 139/17 putting [3] 49/6 88/7 195/13 PVE [1] 81/7 Q Qaeda [2] 18/10 30/11 quadrupled [1] 23/12 qualification [1] 77/24 qualifications [1] 96/23 qualified [13] 68/18 76/15 77/15 77/22 80/6 81/5 211/7 211/8 211/18 211/19 212/3 212/5 218/23 qualify [1] 148/22 qualifying [1] 9/10 quality [9] 101/17 111/13 112/2 116/14 116/15 125/7 135/15 135/16 196/9 quarter [5] 22/6 22/22 23/9 23/11 23/14 query [1] 201/24 question [53] 12/6 13/2 24/1 27/21 32/8 37/9 38/14 38/17 40/5 45/2 49/9 62/1 73/16 78/2 78/2 78/12 81/16 86/12 93/1 102/22 117/11 128/9 128/11 129/5 133/5 137/24
--	--	---	---	--

Q	181/22 racial [6] 7/12 7/18 8/3 27/4 138/14 166/22 racialised [1] 124/11 racism [3] 134/14 134/16 188/14 racist [3] 131/23 133/11 202/16 radar [1] 72/13 radicalisation [10] 6/19 20/25 32/11 32/13 46/22 63/15 66/16 126/5 131/21 198/25 radicalised [2] 8/12 42/7 radicalisers [1] 137/9 radicalising [2] 8/14 62/25 Radio [1] 191/14 RAG [1] 202/1 rails [1] 63/4 raise [6] 71/20 114/12 114/16 114/21 116/6 121/21 raised [15] 13/1 51/3 66/25 100/15 101/22 107/20 110/1 116/6 116/10 138/17 162/25 171/22 177/22 178/20 198/24 raises [1] 154/9 raising [4] 73/11 189/3 189/5 218/10 ramifications [2] 107/22 111/5 random [1] 52/4 range [22] 13/12 27/2 30/8 33/3 101/6 108/25 111/25 112/17 116/18 124/4 134/17 171/1 176/22 192/22 193/10 200/25 208/16 212/21 213/24 217/15 218/13 219/5 rank [1] 3/13 rape [1] 59/4 rapidly [2] 119/3 122/14 rare [1] 139/14 rarely [1] 52/2 rate [2] 22/16 23/22 rates [2] 21/22 34/12 rather [25] 15/10 16/24 18/20 31/3 33/13 41/19 45/6 45/22 47/20 49/1 49/4 49/7 65/12 69/9 82/19 91/24 121/1 124/20 130/18 178/7 183/25 184/16 192/6 197/10 201/15 rating [1] 202/1 ration [1] 162/16	raw [1] 22/7 re [4] 70/25 96/15 98/14 114/22 re-designed [2] 70/25 98/14 re-offending [1] 96/15 re-referring [1] 114/22 reach [2] 86/9 97/6 reached [1] 218/5 reaching [2] 48/7 140/20 reaction [2] 216/3 216/5 reactive [1] 59/4 read [12] 48/23 69/16 75/5 75/19 82/17 98/1 127/8 155/24 158/20 203/22 206/20 210/17 readily [1] 47/10 reading [3] 135/2 157/21 157/24 ready [1] 150/23 real [20] 8/14 32/5 33/18 37/6 43/2 56/9 56/20 58/22 60/13 79/8 80/14 80/25 92/1 97/18 106/3 119/7 136/1 159/25 167/22 173/15 real-world [1] 159/25 realise [1] 42/25 realised [1] 184/25 realistic [2] 25/23 65/23 reality [3] 31/3 31/20 84/18 really [126] 18/4 22/22 25/5 29/3 29/6 31/11 32/6 32/19 34/5 35/23 36/9 36/15 38/10 38/17 38/23 39/23 42/1 42/3 42/4 42/21 43/4 45/3 45/21 46/18 47/13 47/15 51/12 51/12 51/23 53/8 54/24 55/5 56/14 57/1 57/8 58/18 58/24 59/1 59/14 59/16 60/11 60/11 61/6 62/16 63/1 63/2 63/3 63/8 63/10 63/12 65/2 66/13 66/24 69/12 69/23 70/4 72/7 73/12 73/23 74/8 74/18 76/17 77/11 77/13 79/13 80/2 83/24 84/12 86/11 86/21 87/13 88/12 88/15 89/4 90/8 92/8 93/15 94/14 97/10 97/21 98/12 98/17 99/6 106/18 133/5 134/15 134/16 135/15 138/15 141/18 141/24 142/13	142/17 143/25 147/24 151/10 156/9 156/22 167/13 167/16 170/3 171/5 171/25 172/23 176/11 176/25 177/2 177/4 178/23 181/15 184/18 184/23 184/24 185/19 187/24 195/24 199/16 203/5 204/8 204/21 205/17 209/11 211/25 215/5 215/25 216/19 realm [3] 113/6 189/7 196/1 reason [18] 7/19 23/23 36/1 59/24 67/14 67/17 68/23 77/9 81/10 127/2 133/21 137/20 140/4 161/8 175/16 181/21 195/23 217/18 reasonable [4] 73/8 85/8 145/10 214/19 reasonably [2] 38/7 44/2 reasoning [1] 130/25 reasons [10] 33/4 105/5 123/6 127/10 130/1 138/20 140/14 142/19 166/14 171/1 reassure [2] 99/12 153/18 rebuttal [1] 161/24 recall [5] 26/4 36/6 36/13 134/13 164/4 recalls [1] 16/24 receive [5] 56/12 82/7 139/2 157/20 157/22 received [2] 65/3 96/12 receiving [5] 2/9 67/9 75/25 124/5 135/2 recent [12] 11/1 23/17 49/24 101/17 111/17 115/1 118/13 125/1 131/20 132/10 168/3 203/1 recently [5] 33/11 36/21 107/20 111/19 161/6 recognisable [1] 47/24 recognise [4] 111/16 117/7 119/8 127/18 recognised [1] 41/24 recognising [2] 63/15 63/20 recommend [1] 153/11 recommendation [9] 27/17 28/4 56/5 78/14 84/9 152/3 163/2 163/23 175/3 recommendations [11] 28/14 32/19	33/12 62/12 70/8 82/23 83/8 89/21 91/2 163/21 167/16 recommended [3] 28/11 62/11 74/16 record [5] 69/12 143/1 143/3 176/1 193/3 recorded [4] 136/6 136/9 136/13 136/23 records [2] 10/14 215/2 red [1] 77/3 redefining [1] 106/16 redesign [3] 84/22 122/15 209/17 redress [1] 148/2 reduce [2] 96/14 199/3 reduced [1] 23/13 reducing [3] 85/1 185/13 185/14 reduction [7] 81/8 104/11 106/6 107/13 121/3 170/18 176/15 refer [14] 34/14 73/2 73/6 73/8 104/18 120/12 126/1 135/3 139/9 168/19 170/13 188/13 190/21 204/15 reference [9] 13/18 14/13 15/5 40/23 45/23 70/22 98/12 210/22 217/4 referral [24] 10/11 12/17 20/22 51/19 92/12 96/2 115/2 121/16 123/23 130/6 130/19 144/6 144/24 163/10 166/7 168/8 171/4 184/7 187/21 187/21 188/25 189/5 189/9 189/13 referrals [72] 10/21 10/25 14/2 19/10 19/10 20/5 20/11 20/15 20/19 21/6 21/14 21/22 21/25 22/4 22/8 22/13 22/15 22/19 22/20 22/24 23/4 24/4 24/9 24/10 24/12 26/4 26/21 26/22 28/12 50/20 73/3 75/14 75/15 95/6 101/9 105/4 105/7 106/20 114/8 120/22 131/11 133/14 135/1 135/3 135/9 135/25 136/8 137/7 163/3 164/2 164/5 168/2 168/5 168/10 168/15 169/25 170/1 171/13 177/17 177/19 177/24 178/10 181/8 182/23 188/23 189/2 189/15 197/25 199/9 205/8
----------	--	--	---	---

R				
referrals... [2] 205/12 205/15	179/4 Rehabilitation [1] 61/20	remarks [2] 18/5 73/22	136/24	3/22 12/10 114/6 114/10 177/5 209/3
referred [52] 9/15 10/8 11/3 11/10 11/15 23/24 26/2 28/11 39/9 45/8 50/10 76/2 84/25 87/9 89/15 90/15 101/11 105/20 106/15 111/9 112/12 114/18 115/1 117/19 122/5 131/5 133/17 133/17 135/4 135/5 135/6 135/7 143/2 163/4 164/14 164/17 166/13 168/2 171/14 175/23 182/17 182/20 184/21 186/22 190/4 196/15 199/5 199/20 199/24 210/10 210/24 216/9	rehabilitative [1] 85/24 rehearse [1] 73/17 reinforces [1] 93/23 reiterated [1] 146/3 rejected [2] 114/22 145/20 relate [1] 58/19 related [4] 125/5 199/1 208/5 208/5 relating [1] 110/22 relation [17] 29/4 100/4 103/2 107/22 108/3 108/5 108/22 109/25 110/14 111/22 114/7 118/23 119/23 163/14 164/7 182/24 189/14 relationship [7] 73/9 156/24 177/8 177/11 178/8 178/9 209/7 relationships [2] 141/16 157/16 relatively [5] 29/25 101/23 106/18 110/19 168/25 release [4] 101/16 111/17 111/24 153/8 released [8] 35/9 35/14 36/13 36/19 55/18 105/11 111/18 153/7 relevance [1] 1/19 relevant [13] 3/14 4/22 11/21 14/6 59/19 68/19 75/1 87/7 87/13 108/21 109/1 150/11 214/7 reliable [1] 165/1 relieve [1] 21/7 religion [7] 125/7 138/6 139/2 140/19 140/22 141/2 145/23 religious [13] 7/12 7/18 8/3 27/4 134/9 135/5 140/10 143/9 143/13 143/16 166/23 181/11 188/15 reluctant [1] 34/14 rely [2] 44/6 135/11 relying [2] 64/16 144/4 remain [2] 12/12 28/24 remainder [2] 14/20 19/19 remained [3] 28/6 135/16 199/1 remains [7] 77/12 101/17 101/23 103/3 118/21 121/8 217/4 remarkable [2] 16/6 101/14	remedies [3] 147/25 150/14 168/24 remedy [1] 34/6 remember [8] 15/13 25/25 49/13 57/9 77/20 81/12 151/22 160/12 remembering [1] 99/17 remind [1] 193/18 remit [7] 32/10 32/12 100/21 102/24 104/3 109/23 116/9 remote [1] 67/23 remotely [2] 3/10 68/3 removes [1] 197/19 removing [1] 21/7 repeat [6] 166/14 177/17 177/24 178/10 190/2 207/19 repeated [5] 40/8 75/15 99/23 119/23 138/12 repeatedly [3] 36/3 101/6 114/21 repetition [1] 100/16 replaced [1] 17/3 replacement [4] 8/22 8/24 9/8 47/5 Replacement-type [1] 47/5 replacing [1] 198/17 replicate [1] 40/1 reply [1] 187/17 report [47] 2/13 2/17 3/7 5/21 13/9 13/25 14/11 14/17 14/20 15/17 16/9 22/22 26/1 26/23 27/17 28/21 32/17 32/17 33/4 33/15 34/3 40/14 41/9 42/11 49/24 55/16 75/5 115/1 126/10 135/23 137/5 151/22 164/1 164/14 166/15 172/7 176/6 191/12 193/3 193/14 196/11 199/24 200/1 200/23 203/22 204/4 205/19 reported [8] 1/24 3/7 101/10 125/10 136/6 136/7 176/9 196/14 reporting [4] 13/7 40/12 41/6 134/5 reports [12] 3/1 3/2 36/19 66/21 79/23 82/18 87/4 91/21 139/10 142/23 155/25 177/23 represent [1] 16/3 representatives [1] 176/3 represented [1]	represents [1] 29/24 reputation [1] 193/8 reputational [1] 133/23 requested [1] 128/19 requests [1] 110/18 require [8] 143/4 147/16 155/10 190/10 208/20 217/11 217/24 217/25 required [5] 10/7 12/13 12/14 40/14 181/5 requirement [1] 158/8 requirements [1] 106/12 requires [6] 61/4 78/22 90/3 116/24 139/19 139/25 requiring [1] 144/2 research [20] 88/7 101/25 105/3 107/18 114/9 115/9 116/25 117/3 121/3 122/1 124/15 129/15 142/1 149/14 149/15 149/18 157/11 159/24 196/10 209/24 researched [1] 196/1 researcher [2] 4/25 9/17 researching [1] 124/8 resented [1] 150/6 reservations [1] 206/21 resist [1] 15/13 resolve [1] 204/22 resolved [1] 67/21 resolving [1] 119/4 resort [1] 168/8 resource [4] 32/9 171/4 198/2 205/23 resourced [3] 99/1 131/17 207/8 resources [9] 10/3 10/7 38/15 131/15 173/1 173/9 173/13 174/8 207/12 respect [11] 24/17 94/9 118/4 127/25 137/23 138/7 138/25 148/6 182/1 185/11 199/21 respecting [2] 138/3 138/4 respects [3] 29/9 97/24 139/4 respond [3] 56/15 181/7 187/14 response [5] 55/15 173/21 181/15 201/9 203/17 responsibility [6]	responsible [2] 2/6 64/19 responsive [2] 56/1 56/6 rest [3] 66/9 118/9 146/12 restriction [4] 61/24 140/3 154/15 157/13 restrictions [4] 43/25 60/20 60/24 158/25 restrictive [3] 61/20 145/18 146/8 restructuring [1] 33/17 results [2] 143/2 192/8 retained [2] 109/17 184/21 retention [5] 107/23 108/8 109/5 147/11 148/5 rethink [1] 122/15 retired [1] 69/12 retiring [1] 3/12 retrofit [1] 80/22 retrospective [1] 190/23 return [2] 36/1 67/24 review [17] 2/7 35/9 36/25 50/14 50/14 51/6 88/14 88/19 88/20 109/19 111/2 147/22 156/23 157/2 158/14 190/17 190/18 reviewed [3] 129/14 150/2 186/7 Reviewer [3] 1/22 2/20 2/23 reviewing [4] 2/24 49/17 100/8 177/23 reviews [8] 2/1 12/13 12/14 35/5 92/24 92/24 92/25 112/14 revisit [1] 95/25 rhythm [1] 89/23 RICU [1] 6/15 rid [1] 167/7 Ridge [1] 40/24 rife [1] 188/14 right [80] 1/12 13/20 13/25 17/9 18/20 20/18 22/14 24/5 24/13 26/2 27/19 30/23 31/6 32/5 35/7 35/7 35/8 36/11 36/17 46/6 47/1 49/15 51/11 53/18 53/22 53/23 53/25 55/21 55/22 61/18 64/25 74/3 77/18 78/3 78/10 80/4 80/18 80/23 82/4 82/5 84/1 93/25 94/5 94/5 97/12 106/2 106/2 107/1 107/12 109/10

R right... [30] 119/16 131/21 134/15 138/4 138/25 139/1 139/7 140/1 140/2 140/3 140/18 143/16 152/11 154/24 157/18 157/19 157/19 157/21 164/12 164/22 179/12 179/16 184/16 191/16 199/13 206/5 206/11 210/20 211/25 214/21 right-wing [13] 17/9 20/18 22/14 24/5 24/13 26/2 30/23 46/6 47/1 131/21 134/15 210/20 214/21 rightly [4] 10/5 40/6 192/25 217/18 rights [76] 1/17 4/9 4/10 4/10 4/17 4/19 4/20 5/1 5/3 5/5 92/16 100/1 100/3 100/10 102/21 109/7 109/9 112/3 112/24 113/10 115/12 115/14 123/5 123/10 124/23 128/10 128/16 128/25 129/1 132/4 137/18 137/19 137/20 137/21 137/24 138/1 138/2 138/5 138/7 138/18 138/23 139/4 139/6 139/14 139/15 139/17 139/22 140/6 140/16 143/8 143/11 145/18 146/19 146/23 148/1 148/6 148/9 148/10 148/11 148/14 148/17 149/20 150/4 150/5 150/11 150/11 157/17 158/15 175/4 178/22 179/9 179/14 180/2 180/12 189/14 213/11 rigorous [3] 132/19 132/24 139/18 riots [2] 131/23 131/23 RIPA [1] 43/10 rise [2] 67/15 219/10 risk [111] 3/3 14/14 14/23 27/9 31/10 32/5 33/18 35/6 36/10 36/24 37/3 38/21 40/7 40/11 40/20 48/25 51/1 52/10 52/17 52/23 52/25 53/8 54/19 56/2 59/8 59/9 59/13 60/10 60/16 62/3 62/6 66/20 67/3 71/15 72/3 72/16 76/14 77/4 77/20 78/13 79/4 79/17 79/18 80/3 80/7 80/8 80/10 80/12 83/17	85/1 85/15 85/16 87/3 87/14 88/5 94/19 100/23 100/24 101/4 102/7 102/16 105/2 113/13 113/15 116/24 117/13 117/13 117/17 117/18 117/20 117/22 118/12 120/15 121/1 121/4 121/6 121/10 121/15 122/14 135/10 149/14 151/16 159/19 160/2 164/24 165/7 165/18 167/5 168/7 168/18 172/14 174/2 181/2 184/5 184/5 189/2 189/3 198/25 206/9 208/20 208/22 209/1 210/1 210/25 211/1 211/7 211/21 213/16 213/21 217/16 218/12 risks [24] 39/2 100/21 101/7 101/19 102/18 102/23 103/1 105/6 105/8 109/23 111/15 113/11 115/8 115/20 116/10 117/8 119/25 122/10 149/23 178/22 196/5 211/12 212/12 212/23 risky [15] 53/3 60/5 61/1 85/21 85/22 115/5 115/10 115/23 117/3 119/21 120/16 159/18 177/1 196/7 213/21 roam [1] 154/18 robust [4] 33/1 51/23 73/15 83/18 role [18] 1/7 3/15 4/14 53/12 100/7 100/18 101/13 101/19 108/3 113/1 116/8 119/4 121/22 147/6 154/21 160/24 165/2 197/4 roles [9] 1/18 3/19 3/25 4/23 79/25 107/5 112/24 193/21 197/1 rolling [1] 79/1 room [12] 44/10 60/8 124/2 141/17 170/6 185/8 204/5 204/12 208/17 213/4 214/2 214/4 rooms [2] 97/22 158/20 root [2] 159/21 203/10 rotten [1] 63/8 roughly [2] 25/25 162/19 round [22] 11/18 31/16 32/1 54/23 55/2 55/4 55/8 55/22 63/4 111/6 111/25 112/10	154/23 155/17 187/5 187/9 200/12 208/24 212/10 212/15 213/14 213/24 rounded [2] 109/3 116/3 route [7] 70/14 76/12 122/12 122/13 213/15 213/20 219/8 routes [2] 8/8 215/15 routine [1] 170/20 routinely [2] 108/10 137/7 Roxburgh [18] 4/7 4/8 4/13 4/15 99/14 99/15 122/18 159/8 165/3 170/8 170/23 175/20 186/4 195/7 208/12 212/6 219/2 220/7 royalty [1] 64/13 RSI [3] 126/22 127/23 134/20 RSI's [4] 123/10 123/17 124/7 181/5 Rubicon [1] 83/10 rule [4] 43/15 66/21 118/3 183/13 ruled [1] 170/11 run [3] 31/3 79/1 149/14 running [4] 23/10 42/20 81/20 83/18 runs [1] 209/18 rural [1] 205/14 S sadly [2] 79/22 164/5 safe [3] 105/6 114/11 171/3 safeguard [4] 93/20 122/15 185/22 202/21 safeguarding [6] 50/25 69/4 137/1 142/25 176/2 182/21 safeguards [17] 126/17 128/19 145/1 146/21 146/22 146/24 147/15 147/15 150/10 181/5 181/8 182/10 183/5 183/6 183/11 188/6 188/7 safer [1] 63/21 safety [2] 41/18 109/13 said [44] 13/10 15/23 20/8 32/14 33/1 34/15 35/23 45/25 49/2 58/10 58/14 65/12 69/1 73/1 81/5 84/7 86/24 91/6 99/25 105/14 124/12 131/9 144/9 157/14 158/24 160/8 162/4 166/15 167/17 170/15 170/25 174/25 181/13 185/8	186/5 187/23 192/25 200/19 201/16 203/4 203/20 204/15 216/21 218/8 sake [2] 81/17 214/22 Sam [1] 41/5 same [23] 27/14 31/19 32/12 37/11 59/5 75/16 83/14 83/25 85/23 87/17 95/10 106/21 120/21 142/5 150/9 167/19 167/23 172/2 196/5 205/24 205/25 206/5 216/12 sanctioned [1] 85/22 sanguine [1] 34/15 Sara [1] 75/5 Sarah [4] 4/18 123/5 169/10 181/21 Sarah's [1] 181/16 sat [15] 30/14 70/9 71/24 75/13 77/12 81/16 83/11 83/15 91/21 91/24 94/7 97/12 170/13 205/6 218/19 Satanism [1] 45/15 satisfied [1] 27/18 save [1] 70/23 saw [9] 19/9 22/17 23/6 30/7 32/16 35/19 55/3 75/5 134/18 say [166] 5/21 11/7 14/5 15/12 15/14 16/19 17/6 18/18 20/14 22/16 24/14 25/3 28/16 28/22 28/23 29/5 30/3 31/9 33/12 33/19 34/11 36/15 38/10 40/14 44/15 44/17 44/25 49/18 51/24 52/7 52/22 53/2 53/23 54/12 55/7 56/2 56/7 57/4 57/21 58/15 59/14 62/15 63/5 64/25 65/7 68/13 68/15 69/11 69/23 71/14 73/7 74/10 76/8 77/14 78/16 80/16 80/24 81/10 82/21 84/3 86/22 88/4 89/22 90/12 95/1 96/1 96/9 97/18 98/20 99/9 124/7 125/19 126/13 127/24 128/21 129/3 129/6 129/10 129/23 130/10 131/19 133/21 134/10 137/8 137/18 141/12 141/14 141/15 141/16 142/18 142/24 143/10 143/20 145/7 146/18 146/23 146/24 147/3 148/8 148/12	149/15 150/23 154/7 154/23 157/8 157/21 158/19 161/3 161/14 162/3 163/15 165/22 166/6 167/13 168/17 169/7 169/18 169/21 173/18 173/19 174/6 174/7 176/4 178/12 178/16 178/17 179/14 179/25 180/3 180/5 181/15 181/25 182/2 182/3 182/16 183/9 184/4 184/16 184/18 187/16 187/20 187/24 187/25 188/1 188/1 188/9 188/21 190/7 192/13 193/25 194/3 199/15 201/9 202/18 202/22 204/16 207/15 210/9 211/6 211/6 211/12 211/17 215/16 215/24 216/14 218/10 say: [2] 39/7 45/18 say: in [1] 45/18 say: well [1] 39/7 saying [35] 5/11 35/20 43/15 47/12 52/18 61/15 62/7 65/17 75/25 78/9 90/1 93/15 106/1 125/22 142/14 151/23 151/25 160/11 162/10 163/22 172/25 173/4 173/21 180/21 180/22 180/24 181/18 184/3 184/17 188/22 189/16 189/19 191/11 199/7 209/4 says [13] 7/13 8/13 17/16 28/23 34/13 39/14 53/18 53/19 73/23 139/5 139/23 140/17 167/1 scale [3] 102/6 116/24 144/19 scales [1] 191/24 scan [1] 42/10 Scandinavia [1] 81/12 scanning [2] 42/13 42/17 scared [3] 65/2 65/4 148/4 scheme [2] 198/19 202/9 schemes [1] 202/13 school [32] 4/1 4/6 13/12 23/14 29/12 29/17 38/11 39/21 40/17 40/18 46/7 48/8 48/8 50/3 50/4 50/7 57/20 58/22 80/12 81/14 91/21 103/15 103/24 104/15 170/13 176/13 176/22 176/22 177/20 183/2 210/10 212/17
---	---	---	--	---

S	security [32] 1/15 2/25 4/20 4/22 5/1 7/5 17/20 56/11 59/6 69/17 81/19 81/24 83/18 93/11 93/12 93/24 109/13 123/6 123/11 123/14 171/25 172/11 186/13 191/4 202/12 202/13 202/19 202/21 203/11 204/16 204/21 207/11	self [4] 90/19 125/10 136/6 136/7 seminar [4] 153/1 153/15 197/6 219/12 seminars [3] 1/6 152/23 153/19 send [5] 61/17 104/20 170/17 201/24 216/1 senior [4] 4/1 97/4 110/13 200/11 sense [20] 14/19 27/5 44/2 48/9 61/8 63/24 73/21 81/9 93/2 93/3 96/17 120/24 134/16 136/1 173/16 174/22 190/8 208/18 210/19 215/6 sensible [3] 97/3 153/21 217/12 sensitive [8] 35/21 56/3 67/8 81/25 142/22 200/10 201/13 215/3 sensitivity [1] 24/11 sent [1] 185/12 sentence [5] 18/8 54/4 59/15 61/11 103/23 sentenced [1] 18/6 sentences [2] 39/19 61/14 sentencing [4] 18/5 73/22 172/4 173/3 separate [5] 27/23 28/9 32/2 87/15 119/7 separated [1] 82/20 separation [2] 36/20 118/18 September [5] 1/1 18/23 19/5 22/10 105/12 September '25 [2] 19/5 22/10 September 2024 [1] 105/12 September 2025 [1] 18/23 sequenced [1] 194/25 sergeant [1] 53/4 Serial [1] 40/7 series [1] 33/10 serious [23] 7/9 18/7 33/19 53/14 90/16 92/24 107/6 107/11 108/5 108/20 115/24 116/6 120/3 133/7 133/22 147/8 149/14 157/12 170/2 173/5 173/23 185/15 186/25 seriously [3] 114/6 114/10 187/12 seriousness [1] 172/6 serve [1] 147/6	served [1] 1/21 serves [1] 147/6 service [13] 36/6 36/12 37/20 60/1 60/2 78/5 81/19 87/3 168/7 190/16 192/15 208/19 218/16 services [22] 1/15 19/20 50/25 51/18 86/9 97/14 115/19 115/21 117/5 120/1 120/20 121/13 141/23 142/16 171/6 171/10 171/16 177/13 182/22 190/14 209/3 209/9 serving [4] 3/16 4/24 39/19 47/3 session [3] 26/10 68/2 150/22 sessions [2] 26/9 26/15 set [18] 10/11 16/10 16/14 36/23 38/2 41/17 46/13 67/23 84/19 98/18 138/9 172/1 176/6 194/14 200/12 202/2 202/10 205/21 set-up [1] 41/17 sets [1] 8/9 setting [6] 61/9 69/25 79/21 96/20 114/20 174/24 settings [7] 103/16 103/25 171/15 174/18 174/18 175/2 205/14 seven [2] 52/24 159/12 seven years [1] 52/24 several [6] 79/11 125/12 125/14 131/24 150/4 160/24 sex [2] 24/12 55/19 sexism [1] 188/15 shall [1] 55/24 shame [1] 123/23 shape [1] 108/8 share [6] 38/4 78/16 81/24 93/15 110/5 152/10 shared [6] 39/17 56/10 108/10 110/12 111/21 118/13 sharing [15] 81/3 82/16 82/19 93/21 94/10 108/15 109/5 110/17 111/6 142/20 151/10 151/20 151/24 152/14 167/18 Shawcross [10] 26/1 27/11 28/11 34/7 74/16 163/2 168/23 199/15 202/8 203/8 Shawcross' [4] 28/13 28/20 32/19	214/17 Shawcross's [1] 163/21 she [4] 5/1 5/3 58/14 192/7 sheer [1] 116/14 shift [3] 4/11 22/25 23/7 shooting [4] 39/21 46/7 57/21 80/12 shootings [1] 38/12 shop [2] 36/4 36/16 shopping [1] 35/12 short [10] 6/4 33/3 67/17 99/19 122/4 122/24 151/2 162/2 171/25 196/22 short-term [2] 33/3 122/4 shortcomings [1] 150/9 shortcut [1] 171/9 shorter [1] 34/22 shorthand [2] 163/19 166/24 shot [1] 23/12 should [60] 3/3 11/7 14/16 17/6 21/25 27/21 28/5 28/6 28/8 28/12 28/24 34/8 35/24 38/25 50/24 62/4 74/15 75/3 75/17 94/23 107/15 108/22 108/24 109/20 116/13 116/21 116/25 117/6 121/4 121/18 121/21 122/5 122/7 122/13 122/16 128/16 130/10 132/22 141/12 141/16 146/19 148/24 151/10 153/9 156/17 163/3 163/25 166/6 172/8 175/4 176/7 177/22 177/25 187/12 197/20 200/20 204/12 210/15 210/24 215/25 shouldn't [6] 26/11 64/8 88/18 92/11 159/4 199/17 Shout [1] 63/11 show [6] 84/20 122/3 146/11 146/12 158/6 168/9 showing [1] 104/4 shown [5] 108/4 110/8 111/19 135/23 176/12 shows [5] 16/6 114/10 201/16 210/11 210/12 side [6] 82/4 85/10 94/5 120/12 164/21 195/13 sift [2] 198/6 206/7 sifting [1] 209/22 sight [3] 78/5 156/17
----------	---	--	---	---

S	Sir Adrian's [1] 203/22 Sir William [4] 28/20 34/7 74/16 199/15 sit [5] 26/25 55/22 91/23 147/2 147/14 site [1] 45/11 sites [3] 43/6 45/1 53/21 sits [3] 76/17 81/14 204/2 sitting [4] 12/20 31/16 35/17 43/1 situation [6] 41/7 46/1 54/19 56/7 171/10 203/4 situations [5] 17/16 36/10 42/4 61/10 124/6 six [2] 79/6 79/6 six weeks [1] 79/6 six years [1] 79/6 skew [1] 50/17 skill [1] 191/18 skilled [2] 77/15 211/14 skills [2] 77/24 208/16 skillset [1] 25/16 skip [1] 83/4 Skodbo's [1] 75/6 slice [1] 58/16 slide [20] 8/10 21/21 22/17 70/17 72/11 72/13 73/20 76/13 81/2 82/24 84/25 86/25 88/23 90/5 91/4 94/3 96/4 96/8 98/8 151/7 slides [8] 12/24 52/13 77/8 80/5 86/6 88/25 171/24 185/12 slightly [10] 23/22 27/24 42/14 44/13 57/22 96/21 150/21 187/19 203/8 206/8 slots [1] 1/11 slower [1] 52/14 small [8] 29/25 40/23 56/10 68/10 105/16 135/24 164/1 199/20 smarter [1] 95/6 Smith [1] 39/10 so [365] so-called [2] 5/14 6/9 social [11] 20/5 81/14 91/22 124/1 141/23 142/16 181/12 182/22 203/3 205/2 218/20 socially [1] 81/18 societies [1] 4/12 society [27] 4/4 33/17 49/14 65/12 65/13 65/14 66/9 83/20 109/12 112/18	113/4 133/10 134/16 144/1 172/22 173/15 173/16 173/19 173/20 179/1 180/20 184/22 186/7 188/10 188/14 188/25 189/1 sofa [1] 194/21 sofa-surfing [1] 194/21 software [1] 53/21 solidify [1] 70/13 solution [6] 5/15 33/5 47/13 62/19 97/2 197/9 solutions [4] 62/16 64/8 93/5 144/2 solve [6] 5/16 32/6 32/7 34/17 53/6 93/4 some [153] 5/25 9/11 12/9 13/19 15/25 17/16 18/23 24/17 27/12 29/10 29/11 35/17 39/5 42/14 43/9 43/22 44/5 45/1 45/11 47/14 47/16 48/5 50/18 53/12 55/14 56/3 56/17 57/20 58/1 59/19 59/21 61/19 62/5 62/16 62/20 63/8 63/10 63/10 66/5 66/14 66/14 66/15 69/8 69/18 70/20 71/19 75/11 77/11 78/22 80/13 83/23 84/2 85/20 87/10 90/22 91/6 92/5 94/12 97/11 97/24 97/25 100/14 100/25 102/7 103/1 104/21 105/12 105/15 105/24 106/3 106/8 106/10 106/15 109/16 111/17 111/19 111/20 113/22 117/8 117/24 118/13 119/9 120/1 121/1 124/2 124/13 124/20 126/20 127/16 130/17 130/25 132/2 132/4 134/1 134/8 134/11 135/1 135/22 138/22 138/23 138/24 139/8 139/11 141/11 143/19 144/20 144/25 146/23 147/11 147/11 147/20 153/23 154/5 154/7 154/14 154/17 158/19 159/14 162/25 163/25 166/21 167/21 168/23 169/10 174/22 177/25 179/22 181/20 183/8 184/8 185/21 189/2 190/25 196/5 197/17 197/18 199/4 199/4 199/9 202/8 203/1 203/6 205/19 206/4 207/16 208/14 209/17 214/12	214/16 214/24 215/22 216/1 216/9 somebody [12] 74/3 80/10 80/12 83/11 83/16 87/14 91/24 97/5 97/10 174/20 176/8 212/23 somebody's [1] 204/20 somehow [1] 31/23 someone [50] 31/6 36/2 37/5 38/22 39/6 42/7 44/9 46/5 47/7 51/7 51/8 51/9 52/23 53/9 56/8 57/1 57/4 57/8 58/6 59/4 61/13 62/21 67/9 143/23 158/10 158/11 161/12 164/23 166/1 166/24 167/3 173/12 177/5 177/9 177/14 178/6 179/2 180/25 186/17 188/13 202/14 202/16 202/16 209/5 211/7 211/18 212/4 213/6 215/8 216/13 someone's [2] 54/12 60/8 something [59] 6/5 13/3 17/23 19/22 28/25 34/1 37/6 38/11 44/15 46/4 47/19 52/20 53/5 61/21 62/25 64/1 64/23 72/25 73/25 75/17 80/25 84/6 89/16 90/3 92/3 92/6 92/21 105/8 107/19 109/19 119/5 135/7 143/20 147/21 147/23 157/12 158/23 163/5 168/22 169/1 169/1 172/7 173/9 176/16 178/13 184/3 185/18 186/14 187/8 187/12 188/3 188/5 196/4 205/4 207/5 212/15 213/19 214/11 217/5 sometimes [7] 5/20 12/13 21/5 94/12 130/10 192/23 192/23 soon [3] 106/18 176/16 196/11 sophisticated [2] 88/16 195/6 sophistication [1] 194/8 sorry [10] 13/24 44/13 105/6 114/11 133/8 152/8 162/3 170/5 171/3 179/18 sort [71] 12/9 15/1 15/1 18/1 18/24 29/17 36/18 37/23 39/1 39/21 41/9 42/14 45/5 45/17 45/20 45/24	46/5 46/8 48/1 53/12 57/2 58/1 58/16 61/7 61/8 61/19 64/6 65/18 66/14 66/15 69/17 72/6 72/15 77/17 78/4 79/9 80/4 82/3 85/20 87/10 88/24 91/15 91/19 97/6 98/20 105/15 108/17 155/1 161/10 161/18 167/5 173/15 173/21 173/23 182/20 186/16 192/13 193/25 203/7 204/10 204/24 207/13 208/19 210/15 210/23 213/12 213/21 214/7 215/6 215/8 215/22 sorts [12] 45/6 48/16 48/24 59/10 62/6 161/17 173/6 173/6 202/13 202/14 202/23 215/24 sought [2] 125/7 125/8 soul [1] 182/5 sounds [3] 31/14 52/15 196/10 source [3] 9/24 75/16 175/10 sources [3] 16/5 79/3 193/10 Southport [15] 2/16 3/9 5/13 10/20 18/3 19/7 19/7 22/23 22/23 24/11 30/7 62/13 99/17 99/20 168/18 space [42] 39/20 39/21 68/14 69/17 72/22 78/7 80/7 82/1 83/14 85/9 86/3 86/19 88/8 89/8 92/16 93/10 93/12 98/11 104/10 105/3 108/23 111/12 115/16 116/2 120/19 160/14 165/13 170/10 171/17 194/5 195/2 196/12 203/24 204/21 205/17 206/5 209/12 212/9 213/12 214/6 218/19 218/24 spaces [10] 69/3 84/24 91/10 108/4 117/8 120/2 121/2 159/17 208/23 212/19 spans [1] 4/21 speak [14] 16/8 32/24 46/25 68/18 68/24 69/8 69/24 70/15 71/11 74/9 76/16 92/10 150/16 184/11 speaker [6] 1/12 2/19 3/10 4/7 4/18 67/23 speakers [9] 1/10 5/6 13/1 71/19 83/5 153/1 153/15 174/25 197/7
----------	---	---	--	---

S speaking [4] 1/11 49/13 123/24 157/1 speaks [3] 17/7 86/3 185/7 special [2] 25/8 38/5 specialise [1] 34/4 specialises [1] 1/17 specialisms [4] 177/21 209/21 212/8 214/7 specialist [2] 36/25 183/18 specialists [1] 212/9 specific [19] 6/2 31/11 101/4 103/17 109/17 118/8 119/23 128/7 128/7 130/6 141/11 150/12 153/5 158/3 161/18 180/3 180/13 207/23 214/11 specifically [8] 34/2 100/20 137/13 165/4 167/11 197/14 201/10 206/22 spectrum [4] 25/9 48/14 60/4 88/1 speech [2] 203/1 203/1 speeches [1] 70/5 speed [1] 27/19 spell [1] 33/13 spend [3] 45/16 154/5 175/1 spending [2] 57/8 84/16 spent [2] 3/11 39/23 spike [3] 22/25 23/3 56/2 spikes [1] 23/1 spinning [1] 217/21 spirit [1] 206/24 SPJ [1] 76/25 splitting [1] 162/19 spoke [12] 17/8 39/22 46/14 49/11 50/11 58/13 70/22 83/22 85/10 85/15 87/23 181/4 spoken [10] 30/10 37/10 61/7 70/20 71/6 83/5 90/9 93/18 94/6 94/18 spokesperson [1] 126/3 spoof [1] 155/1 spooky [1] 175/11 spot [3] 50/11 72/16 94/24 spotting [2] 72/24 170/16 sprung [1] 16/7 spying [1] 175/11 square [1] 182/14 St [20] 4/18 4/19	123/2 123/3 123/5 150/18 156/19 160/10 165/20 175/20 178/13 178/20 181/3 187/13 197/22 206/20 211/4 218/10 219/2 220/8 St Vincent [2] 4/18 123/5 stabbed [1] 173/12 stabbing [1] 35/12 stable [1] 66/5 stacks [1] 167/19 staff [10] 70/10 74/2 85/12 93/7 93/22 98/9 98/12 188/11 201/23 205/12 staffing [1] 207/12 stage [16] 18/15 27/7 31/9 32/3 32/4 61/21 121/16 150/21 170/12 177/2 178/3 197/15 198/6 201/10 210/7 215/23 stages [5] 10/11 76/22 77/20 165/9 177/15 stakeholders [2] 70/11 99/4 standard [3] 98/9 98/9 196/25 standards [1] 20/3 standing [1] 3/2 stands [6] 27/6 88/22 101/24 103/3 120/6 200/22 stark [2] 107/2 121/8 start [22] 1/10 5/11 5/25 13/6 32/12 32/14 34/25 39/8 82/19 91/6 94/5 99/16 107/6 123/12 123/17 150/23 156/17 162/23 169/11 181/21 211/4 216/6 started [1] 35/18 starters [1] 104/4 starting [7] 6/10 22/7 109/2 122/11 138/10 138/15 141/13 starts [1] 191/15 state [22] 2/23 17/19 57/2 59/6 73/12 76/22 77/4 83/24 108/8 130/13 137/23 137/25 138/7 139/4 140/24 141/8 141/19 143/17 145/20 179/9 179/22 180/24 state-directed [1] 17/19 stated [3] 124/19 141/6 163/8 statement [6] 3/6 125/24 135/6 135/8 147/19 148/23 statements [1] 163/12	states [2] 29/15 139/21 statistic [1] 182/14 statistical [1] 128/2 statistics [18] 6/6 18/22 18/24 18/24 19/2 26/17 51/14 51/15 51/23 102/2 105/10 105/13 136/4 136/15 160/3 164/16 168/3 190/2 stats [1] 136/18 status [4] 28/5 32/15 141/21 161/21 statute [1] 38/2 statutory [11] 7/4 25/15 26/24 27/12 27/23 28/9 152/3 152/14 200/2 201/7 205/1 step [4] 112/7 119/16 186/9 198/22 step-down [1] 198/22 steps [1] 52/20 stereotypes [1] 149/14 stereotyping [2] 148/19 149/17 sterile [1] 45/22 sternly [1] 13/7 stick [1] 100/13 sticking [1] 130/2 stigma [5] 34/3 123/23 182/20 182/22 199/4 stigmatisation [2] 140/12 197/21 stigmatise [4] 49/16 49/19 49/20 61/17 stigmatising [2] 51/8 51/10 still [17] 7/24 21/20 22/18 22/19 23/6 42/1 69/16 111/21 113/21 113/23 114/19 127/2 130/9 159/12 185/10 210/5 217/24 stitch [1] 58/14 stock [1] 141/12 stop [5] 60/16 82/13 82/19 179/11 207/20 stories [1] 217/21 straightforward [1] 62/23 strand [1] 151/17 strategic [3] 2/7 33/8 69/9 strategically [1] 94/17 strategy [4] 2/8 6/12 6/12 33/7 stream [1] 46/12 Streatham [1] 35/13 street [2] 35/13 48/3 strength [3] 56/21	196/2 203/7 strengths [3] 126/15 128/15 128/18 stretch [2] 166/11 167/3 strict [1] 146/1 strictly [2] 146/5 147/24 striking [2] 38/13 59/21 strong [6] 7/23 64/5 75/11 107/12 160/7 196/8 stronger [2] 105/24 106/8 strongly [2] 145/1 150/3 struck [5] 54/24 75/13 76/3 93/24 215/5 structural [2] 97/25 209/17 structurally [2] 83/3 209/14 structure [3] 152/13 172/12 208/10 structured [6] 76/25 77/10 77/23 79/19 95/5 206/9 structures [3] 197/4 201/1 210/6 struggle [3] 56/22 171/5 173/9 students [1] 120/9 studies [4] 129/7 162/6 162/6 191/6 study [4] 9/17 39/10 76/7 76/11 stuff [23] 39/22 40/4 42/6 42/24 47/11 47/14 48/1 48/2 57/3 58/17 64/24 75/8 85/19 97/15 98/6 106/15 152/6 155/1 165/17 170/16 171/1 175/11 214/9 stuffy [1] 71/23 sub [1] 198/12 sub-questions [1] 198/12 subcategories [1] 118/13 subject [14] 12/1 34/6 37/25 37/25 114/2 120/11 122/6 138/12 140/5 163/17 164/8 171/3 215/4 215/24 subjective [2] 26/12 118/12 subjects [4] 142/3 172/2 175/7 193/12 subscribers [1] 30/22 subsequently [2] 87/5 171/20	subside [1] 23/8 substance [5] 85/5 89/11 95/17 128/20 194/20 substantial [1] 101/25 substantially [1] 101/10 substitute [1] 156/9 subsume [1] 217/9 subterranean [1] 203/10 subtle [1] 63/3 succeed [1] 201/6 successful [4] 59/18 107/14 183/8 191/9 successor [2] 2/10 2/12 such [33] 9/5 26/20 35/1 65/21 68/13 68/21 69/4 76/23 101/19 104/4 106/25 107/18 108/21 108/24 109/8 109/12 110/9 111/15 112/1 115/21 118/19 119/22 121/2 123/11 123/20 134/3 138/6 138/17 153/18 169/25 189/20 207/10 211/22 sudden [1] 56/2 suddenly [2] 38/18 92/22 Sudesh [3] 35/10 35/23 84/6 Sudesh Amman [2] 35/10 35/23 Suella [1] 28/14 suffered [1] 121/20 suffering [1] 99/18 sufficient [6] 10/17 41/22 114/13 183/6 183/14 201/12 sufficiently [2] 44/24 211/14 suggest [11] 26/17 48/22 72/23 79/9 122/19 151/10 168/3 168/22 178/21 182/13 191/19 suggested [4] 27/12 113/1 199/3 200/11 suggesting [1] 118/12 suggests [5] 63/17 104/23 120/17 132/24 180/4 suicide [1] 90/20 suitable [5] 104/12 104/21 106/23 166/7 198/25 suite [2] 95/15 218/17 suits [1] 35/20 summarily [1] 126/10 summarise [2] 10/12
---	---	---	--	---

S	switch [1] 104/22 sympathy [2] 202/8 214/17 symptom [1] 110/24 Syria [1] 192/10 system [50] 14/9 38/19 40/21 41/23 43/22 44/24 56/5 56/11 56/21 62/14 65/1 70/13 70/25 74/4 76/11 78/24 81/7 81/13 84/22 89/10 89/21 90/23 94/19 95/24 103/6 105/9 111/7 114/1 119/13 119/19 155/16 165/8 173/25 174/1 177/4 177/6 178/6 184/19 189/11 189/22 194/10 194/12 200/15 203/7 203/10 204/10 205/4 206/18 217/4 217/23 systematically [1] 137/4 systemic [6] 68/25 91/3 93/2 135/13 144/2 198/22 systems [7] 41/19 41/21 44/1 63/18 155/7 186/24 196/17	30/24 46/23 48/11 52/12 58/4 58/8 58/20 62/17 67/1 70/10 70/12 71/16 71/22 71/23 72/20 74/6 80/7 85/12 85/12 89/1 127/4 128/13 128/18 132/6 134/22 135/20 136/2 138/22 153/17 160/19 166/24 174/12 190/3 192/6 218/23 talked [3] 40/16 48/6 52/11 talking [23] 12/6 14/20 29/24 42/24 47/21 54/15 58/15 59/20 63/23 66/18 66/24 71/24 71/25 77/21 81/12 95/15 119/23 123/17 127/5 136/2 186/20 188/4 195/16 talks [2] 41/20 127/1 tangential [1] 196/5 target [1] 207/18 targeted [2] 103/16 133/13 Tarrant [1] 46/12 task [1] 218/18 tasked [1] 130/15 teacher [7] 73/8 102/11 104/15 106/4 120/10 144/5 170/14 teacher's [1] 92/2 teachers [7] 95/7 105/5 114/10 114/16 115/4 130/14 188/11 team [7] 26/20 54/9 99/1 206/2 218/21 218/21 219/10 teams [6] 54/10 56/13 67/5 163/1 171/23 218/16 tech [13] 4/25 40/14 41/14 41/22 42/5 42/9 62/16 89/3 155/6 156/10 159/22 175/9 212/23 technical [3] 67/13 67/17 67/22 technique [1] 58/18 techniques [1] 38/5 technology [1] 4/22 techy [1] 59/17 tedious [1] 206/8 teenage [2] 118/24 187/2 teenager [1] 119/5 tell [14] 7/21 17/17 30/13 54/13 72/21 76/9 86/20 90/13 125/4 131/10 132/8 137/11 137/12 174/21 Telling [1] 137/14 tells [2] 131/13 132/8 ten [4] 19/11 89/24	159/12 194/5 ten years [2] 19/11 89/24 tend [10] 24/7 64/13 87/15 87/16 91/10 96/21 123/21 123/25 138/24 166/23 tendency [1] 169/17 tends [1] 59/4 tension [1] 163/12 tenterhooks [1] 65/17 tenure [1] 74/1 term [19] 7/22 16/4 33/1 33/3 33/5 101/23 102/6 116/11 122/4 127/14 127/24 128/5 128/7 128/8 128/9 128/18 136/22 196/22 197/9 termed [2] 135/19 146/25 terminological [1] 166/18 terminology [1] 15/8 terms [28] 13/18 14/12 15/5 24/8 59/2 73/24 90/10 93/23 103/3 104/25 106/16 110/19 119/23 135/2 147/13 149/20 154/14 159/18 166/3 168/1 171/1 180/5 199/23 209/18 209/22 210/22 214/23 215/19 terrible [6] 5/13 41/2 172/18 172/18 173/17 184/8 terrified [1] 57/23 terror [4] 34/13 34/15 106/22 214/5 terrorism [124] 1/22 2/1 2/21 3/1 3/14 3/17 4/16 6/11 6/14 6/22 7/4 7/7 7/8 7/13 8/2 8/2 8/8 9/12 9/14 10/9 10/14 10/16 10/20 11/2 11/10 12/22 14/6 15/18 15/22 18/8 21/16 26/25 32/15 33/9 37/21 38/1 38/8 38/10 38/14 38/19 41/10 44/8 45/9 48/12 49/12 51/13 51/20 54/2 54/4 56/3 59/3 59/5 66/2 66/8 68/25 73/7 73/10 74/19 74/23 75/24 77/13 89/8 90/14 91/10 91/12 93/8 98/15 100/4 100/6 100/9 101/14 104/6 104/9 107/3 107/6 107/10 108/11 112/25 118/1 120/18 120/22 123/11 123/20 123/25 127/3	127/4 132/15 133/1 151/16 151/18 152/9 164/25 166/3 166/4 166/5 166/20 166/20 167/9 172/2 173/4 173/10 173/11 173/14 173/20 173/23 173/24 173/25 174/2 174/14 175/9 175/25 188/17 189/21 198/10 199/2 200/10 201/17 202/10 208/5 208/6 210/19 210/20 214/2 217/19 terrorist [31] 2/2 3/3 3/4 8/4 8/5 9/4 15/17 16/2 16/11 17/19 18/6 18/8 18/10 23/2 35/10 36/3 36/19 41/22 51/1 53/11 53/11 55/18 60/21 72/18 80/11 89/25 98/16 119/10 172/15 199/6 214/20 terrorists [8] 9/5 16/13 27/8 31/15 36/20 37/12 37/15 38/13 tertiary [1] 63/20 test [11] 75/2 75/3 145/4 145/5 145/11 145/21 145/25 148/12 157/25 158/1 198/8 tested [4] 63/2 63/3 86/1 198/21 testing [1] 170/10 tests [2] 165/2 179/23 than [62] 7/20 7/23 15/10 19/12 20/21 21/10 23/12 23/22 24/9 24/13 24/14 24/15 29/13 34/22 41/19 45/6 47/20 49/4 49/7 63/19 68/18 69/9 69/21 70/21 72/17 76/15 81/15 82/19 86/21 89/3 91/7 91/24 96/23 97/2 101/3 105/6 114/11 121/1 126/12 129/24 144/17 154/17 162/15 171/3 172/16 173/11 178/7 183/25 184/17 184/25 188/3 191/10 192/6 197/10 198/2 201/15 204/4 212/10 215/14 217/20 218/23 219/14 thank [65] 1/5 5/7 32/24 34/20 34/21 35/1 67/20 68/3 68/6 68/8 99/10 99/11 99/13 122/17 122/18 122/22 123/2 123/4 150/15 150/17 150/18 151/5 151/9 152/15 152/17 153/22 154/1 156/3 156/19 160/6
----------	--	---	---	--

T				
thank... [35] 161/1 162/14 162/17 164/19 167/10 167/24 169/19 170/23 171/21 174/10 175/18 178/19 181/1 183/12 183/15 186/3 187/13 187/18 189/25 190/13 191/2 193/17 195/7 197/3 198/14 203/16 206/6 206/19 212/6 214/15 218/3 218/25 218/25 219/1 219/3				
thankfully [1] 29/24				
thanks [1] 219/9				
that [1179]				
that's [87] 6/18 7/13 11/16 17/23 20/10 22/18 31/5 31/11 36/18 37/3 39/3 44/19 48/21 49/1 49/20 53/16 62/1 73/4 75/23 75/23 78/9 78/17 81/18 82/11 82/21 87/7 90/11 91/24 92/3 93/5 98/22 99/5 106/15 126/25 127/22 128/23 134/15 145/4 156/16 157/23 159/19 159/22 160/23 160/24 161/9 165/23 166/25 172/6 173/3 173/20 175/3 175/14 176/23 179/13 184/18 186/2 186/2 186/6 186/19 187/6 189/9 192/22 193/9 195/18 196/17 199/7 199/18 201/8 201/21 203/21 203/25 204/5 204/7 204/10 204/20 204/21 204/23 205/10 205/14 205/17 205/18 206/4 207/18 209/9 209/10 213/12 218/9	119/17 120/15 127/9 141/18 141/21 141/25 148/15 159/2 159/13 168/24 173/2 174/20 177/12 179/11 180/11 180/25 182/18 186/24 187/10 190/24 191/21 192/1 192/19 196/22 196/25 197/1 203/24 209/8 215/18 216/4 them [114] 7/23 9/18 10/2 11/6 11/10 12/1 12/2 12/2 12/3 12/9 13/15 14/2 16/18 18/25 19/2 20/22 21/2 21/23 24/5 26/12 28/15 30/5 30/7 30/24 30/24 31/9 31/10 31/17 32/1 32/2 33/2 39/22 39/23 39/24 39/25 43/7 44/19 50/6 51/1 51/6 51/9 53/3 53/25 54/11 54/21 57/3 57/23 59/24 61/2 61/2 63/3 66/12 70/21 70/22 74/5 74/10 74/12 81/16 85/8 86/7 87/6 88/19 93/15 95/2 95/19 96/12 98/4 103/14 104/18 107/9 107/16 108/3 109/4 111/10 114/1 114/22 114/23 115/10 116/4 116/9 120/12 120/16 120/17 120/20 120/21 122/17 135/3 145/20 160/5 162/19 171/14 171/15 171/16 180/18 180/18 180/19 181/15 181/20 184/23 186/12 188/19 189/3 189/24 192/3 196/16 196/21 199/6 199/24 200/18 201/2 205/23 207/8 208/25 213/6 theme [5] 7/2 46/18 61/11 71/21 129/8 themes [2] 70/19 95/1 themselves [9] 50/4 90/21 94/11 94/21 102/12 156/11 211/8 211/19 212/4 then [100] 1/24 2/5 6/4 6/6 6/21 9/13 10/24 11/4 11/14 12/12 15/20 15/23 17/5 23/19 27/16 28/14 30/6 31/5 34/5 38/25 39/6 40/5 42/7 42/9 43/21 44/9 44/19 45/12 45/18 46/13 47/3 47/8 53/12 53/22 54/20 54/21 58/12 60/2 60/3 60/5 60/17 61/1 61/19 64/9 65/3	67/8 71/11 78/25 79/13 80/22 81/2 82/15 88/16 92/11 92/22 93/4 93/14 94/25 96/4 98/20 101/5 102/22 107/7 108/22 111/9 112/13 120/18 139/3 144/4 144/6 144/13 145/9 148/1 151/12 163/22 167/5 171/8 171/15 172/16 176/2 176/4 177/3 177/25 178/19 183/6 184/7 185/18 188/2 188/3 200/13 201/10 201/25 202/13 204/23 206/14 210/24 215/19 216/2 216/4 216/6 theory [5] 8/23 8/23 9/1 130/22 131/4 therapies [1] 209/10 there [347] there's [14] 7/18 49/18 62/10 81/19 82/15 83/2 92/5 92/14 157/6 157/14 159/20 165/4 184/5 207/8 therefore [6] 12/20 13/13 21/7 128/17 164/25 165/11 these [80] 6/8 16/16 19/2 21/4 21/9 22/1 26/15 29/11 31/1 31/23 36/10 40/18 40/19 45/1 46/16 48/17 48/20 52/18 54/2 54/15 58/7 58/11 59/19 61/9 62/6 64/11 65/17 69/14 70/20 71/1 71/19 74/8 76/3 86/10 86/18 89/9 90/1 90/2 90/25 92/21 95/18 96/14 97/14 98/13 100/25 104/8 110/8 110/11 113/18 116/5 117/9 121/2 122/7 123/16 125/13 127/21 136/17 137/21 138/23 139/6 139/12 139/19 141/3 141/12 167/15 171/12 172/19 173/19 174/3 174/25 184/4 199/24 202/12 206/22 210/5 210/16 215/4 215/24 217/22 219/6 they [322] they'll [1] 58/12 they're [1] 27/8 thing [34] 7/3 25/3 29/16 42/21 46/3 46/11 46/22 48/3 48/4 54/24 56/21 57/11 58/4 61/5 62/15 64/17 65/12 68/15 69/11	85/18 87/16 87/17 96/9 128/20 132/6 137/18 173/17 181/25 184/18 192/14 193/1 202/7 202/18 203/8 things [68] 26/5 43/24 44/2 46/2 53/6 54/6 55/20 68/21 69/18 71/4 74/20 74/24 74/25 75/12 75/21 76/10 77/5 77/6 77/24 78/24 80/23 82/17 85/3 85/16 86/5 86/10 87/15 87/19 87/25 89/3 89/12 91/10 92/20 95/12 95/16 96/14 98/1 98/14 98/18 114/25 127/21 135/22 145/22 150/15 157/4 159/7 160/22 163/22 170/21 177/18 178/4 178/5 181/19 181/20 191/23 194/21 194/24 197/18 202/25 203/3 207/4 208/6 211/22 213/23 215/25 217/22 218/15 218/21 think [286] thinking [8] 46/20 60/11 133/3 146/14 173/10 175/17 184/6 197/14 thinking: [1] 60/13 thinking: the [1] 60/13 third [7] 3/10 6/21 25/15 28/23 71/8 199/3 206/7 thirdly [2] 6/5 198/5 this [436] thorough [1] 193/9 those [124] 4/12 5/6 5/11 6/3 13/12 14/21 19/13 19/18 19/21 20/2 20/20 21/19 23/17 23/19 24/15 24/19 25/17 28/23 33/18 34/2 41/13 42/4 43/7 61/25 68/20 69/8 75/1 75/21 76/10 77/15 77/16 79/21 80/14 83/23 85/7 86/20 87/15 87/19 88/3 89/3 89/11 89/19 90/19 92/1 96/24 97/22 98/18 99/18 101/9 103/15 104/13 107/15 111/7 111/8 112/12 114/2 114/5 121/4 121/22 122/6 124/13 126/18 138/22 141/20 143/19 152/25 157/7 159/18 160/2 163/12 163/17 163/18 166/13 167/6 167/21	168/5 168/12 170/21 171/3 172/7 176/3 177/23 179/4 179/15 179/15 179/23 179/24 180/2 180/12 180/15 180/19 181/13 182/17 183/5 183/8 185/24 186/1 187/3 188/23 188/25 189/1 189/11 189/12 190/13 190/22 193/21 193/24 194/24 195/14 196/14 197/24 198/12 201/11 201/20 202/4 204/7 206/17 210/3 212/12 212/14 212/15 213/9 213/17 215/7 though [18] 10/20 11/7 18/9 26/17 42/21 51/11 58/24 70/7 71/17 91/19 102/17 111/16 114/19 129/16 135/23 141/14 143/6 190/6 thought [22] 17/1 26/1 26/10 39/2 39/2 56/19 57/6 58/23 59/16 90/4 96/6 139/13 140/18 140/25 141/7 158/17 182/25 183/3 183/6 197/19 215/20 216/10 thoughtful [1] 66/9 thoughts [4] 140/21 141/10 179/24 180/19 thousands [4] 130/12 131/11 132/12 188/11 thread [2] 71/21 126/25 threat [12] 7/9 15/17 15/20 15/21 16/4 25/24 56/7 56/24 64/11 101/14 172/12 219/13 threats [5] 2/23 59/6 112/20 119/23 214/12 three [16] 3/11 6/3 6/10 22/14 25/13 69/17 77/7 150/8 156/1 162/18 175/23 197/13 198/12 202/5 206/22 219/12 three decades [1] 3/11 threshold [7] 41/6 50/14 128/11 145/25 146/6 178/12 216/11 Threshold's [1] 51/5 thresholds [3] 190/17 200/2 200/6 through [51] 6/14 9/22 12/8 14/8 15/21 15/21 18/1 27/22 28/9 34/3 34/4 34/14 39/14 48/7 48/22 50/8 57/9

T	told [12] 61/22 62/13 91/15 110/7 135/15 135/24 137/5 142/10 142/11 152/5 152/7 186/11 tolerance [1] 118/4 Tom [1] 64/12 tomorrow [3] 119/12 219/11 219/12 tongue [1] 15/15 tons [1] 93/19 too [24] 19/1 25/20 25/23 26/2 41/15 41/19 61/17 62/21 66/20 67/3 74/2 83/10 87/3 88/10 90/6 92/20 119/19 127/18 133/8 160/19 165/7 165/7 165/10 195/12 took [4] 14/22 18/1 190/17 195/14 tool [4] 52/11 59/11 59/11 79/10 toolbox [1] 38/5 tools [3] 79/11 95/5 200/6 top [5] 34/13 61/21 65/2 86/15 132/25 topic [6] 102/2 162/18 162/20 181/1 197/4 197/8 total [1] 23/24 totally [1] 120/23 touch [2] 68/15 100/15 touched [5] 101/7 101/18 108/7 110/14 118/22 toward [1] 143/14 towards [10] 63/21 64/9 64/14 77/5 78/15 118/9 143/9 143/12 177/12 185/18 town [3] 75/25 84/1 97/9 traceable [1] 192/3 traces [1] 175/12 track [1] 122/21 tracking [3] 177/11 209/7 209/9 trade [1] 98/3 trade-offs [1] 98/3 traditional [2] 151/13 152/9 trained [3] 62/5 77/15 172/11 training [29] 18/11 26/7 26/7 26/8 26/20 30/12 62/5 77/24 93/11 95/9 98/21 106/17 114/14 122/6 130/8 134/4 134/19 134/21 169/2 169/3 169/13 169/18 188/22 188/23 189/11 189/12 189/14 189/23 205/23	trainings [3] 188/19 188/20 189/18 trajectory [1] 94/22 translated [1] 174/23 transnationalism [1] 45/15 transparency [3] 94/8 94/14 111/3 transphobic [1] 207/5 trap [1] 45/23 treading [1] 194/11 treat [2] 4/12 144/1 treated [3] 14/6 207/5 207/6 treaties [1] 137/21 treatment [1] 60/3 treaty [2] 138/9 138/9 trends [2] 46/9 169/22 trendy [1] 46/22 trespass [1] 57/25 triage [18] 197/14 197/16 198/6 198/15 200/15 201/10 201/12 201/15 201/23 203/13 203/13 203/19 206/14 208/11 210/7 210/8 217/10 218/7 triaging [1] 201/18 trial [1] 140/13 Tribunal [1] 147/21 trickier [1] 107/7 trickled [1] 75/19 tried [6] 16/14 18/25 51/13 74/1 98/8 164/11 trivial [1] 107/23 trouble [1] 213/18 troubled [3] 12/8 61/16 137/2 troubles [1] 15/16 troubling [2] 160/3 160/3 true [10] 21/13 26/25 39/12 39/13 39/15 44/19 49/20 59/6 127/10 216/12 truly [1] 180/8 Trump [1] 38/13 trust [2] 107/9 115/7 try [24] 5/17 12/1 12/2 38/20 39/5 39/25 47/10 58/5 58/19 59/9 83/2 88/24 100/13 128/18 148/4 167/7 179/10 179/19 188/18 189/21 201/21 202/1 208/8 216/1 trying [29] 19/25 32/7 42/18 45/6 45/17 45/21 48/9 49/7 57/3 63/6 66/15 78/19 80/8 83/25 84/22 91/2 91/5 93/4 98/24 144/4 154/14 156/17 165/6	169/15 185/9 193/22 202/12 208/9 211/22 Tumbler [1] 40/23 turn [7] 24/19 102/10 116/25 153/23 197/3 210/5 214/16 turned [3] 30/21 41/4 198/24 turning [1] 191/22 turns [2] 40/25 163/20 twice [3] 43/16 136/10 136/12 twist [1] 18/9 twister [1] 15/15 twists [1] 163/20 Twitter [1] 47/9 two [30] 4/1 6/25 10/7 20/23 26/10 28/23 29/6 34/23 39/18 39/23 44/17 52/13 54/5 66/19 71/19 73/20 87/15 87/19 96/7 139/10 151/12 154/1 165/16 170/9 170/21 172/25 177/18 185/4 195/14 203/17 two hours [1] 39/23 two minutes [1] 66/19 two years [2] 4/1 54/5 type [23] 39/21 43/5 43/6 47/5 70/11 81/6 90/25 90/25 91/16 96/14 99/5 107/1 107/3 107/4 117/1 130/8 170/20 173/8 205/8 210/16 210/24 211/10 214/12 types [18] 15/22 22/11 24/10 30/2 61/11 89/11 120/7 125/25 134/2 134/4 142/5 157/5 160/18 160/20 161/16 162/9 167/6 180/23 typical [1] 214/18 typically [1] 147/22	unable [1] 128/17 unambiguously [1] 24/16 uncertainty [2] 31/3 163/16 unclear [8] 16/25 33/25 129/11 130/4 138/23 147/7 168/12 185/11 uncomfortable [2] 184/9 184/18 unconstructive [1] 182/3 under [48] 4/12 6/3 11/15 21/2 27/5 35/11 53/14 53/16 53/17 57/17 61/25 63/18 84/5 103/7 104/17 109/8 110/19 120/6 120/11 128/10 129/1 131/14 134/18 136/24 137/21 138/1 138/9 139/12 140/6 142/21 142/21 143/8 143/11 148/2 148/9 148/17 148/20 149/1 149/2 152/1 152/4 156/12 159/12 179/9 179/22 186/23 189/13 195/19 under-16s [1] 159/12 underestimate [3] 37/4 60/7 151/11 underground [1] 213/22 underlying [2] 149/19 171/19 undermine [1] 173/20 undermines [2] 115/7 173/15 undermining [1] 203/10 underpin [1] 117/25 underpinning [3] 98/7 119/24 121/9 understand [34] 14/10 33/2 63/9 80/9 80/19 86/23 87/22 88/2 88/16 89/14 93/22 94/19 94/20 102/10 102/11 102/12 102/13 111/14 112/20 116/23 121/6 148/21 171/11 171/17 180/14 185/19 186/24 191/8 196/13 196/13 205/18 206/24 212/15 212/15 understandable [1] 105/5 understanding [8] 72/2 76/24 113/25 118/19 168/11 176/18 191/15 209/25 understate [2] 46/19 57/14 understood [12]
----------	---	--	---	--

U understood... [12] 14/18 14/18 16/15 80/17 80/21 87/20 89/13 148/24 160/10 160/16 160/23 168/4 undertaken [1] 157/13 undertook [1] 169/4 undesirable [1] 154/8 undo [1] 5/12 undoubtedly [3] 28/17 34/9 74/20 unfettered [3] 146/17 158/4 188/12 unfocused [1] 31/7 unformed [1] 16/22 unhealthy [1] 120/1 unhelpful [1] 94/12 uniform [1] 183/1 unimportant [1] 153/2 unique [2] 17/21 93/12 unit [3] 10/13 64/15 64/19 United [1] 29/15 units [1] 170/18 universal [1] 106/6 university [4] 4/6 4/24 59/17 71/23 unlawful [1] 141/10 unless [5] 80/18 97/17 137/13 138/8 142/7 Unlike [1] 59/3 unlikely [1] 78/1 unnecessary [1] 120/23 unpack [1] 142/17 unpicked [1] 75/10 unpleasant [2] 9/10 30/19 unpredictable [1] 16/21 unproblematic [1] 160/20 unreliable [1] 144/20 unstable [1] 16/25 unsupported [1] 149/20 unsurprisingly [1] 154/4 untangle [1] 127/8 until [13] 15/20 18/4 18/4 23/16 28/25 30/18 30/23 57/10 163/15 164/12 191/24 206/15 219/18 unused [1] 31/20 unusual [6] 57/25 61/14 72/25 120/9 202/9 202/10 unwilling [1] 110/4	up [56] 5/20 15/8 16/7 19/12 23/12 30/22 31/3 41/17 47/3 51/22 52/20 56/6 58/16 61/12 61/23 67/23 75/8 77/4 78/11 78/21 81/22 89/24 91/12 92/19 92/20 95/24 97/1 97/9 97/19 117/7 135/23 138/16 148/8 152/25 153/4 153/13 158/23 162/14 165/8 167/25 172/1 174/1 175/18 184/3 184/11 188/13 191/22 194/13 199/11 202/19 203/5 205/21 205/23 207/11 216/6 217/3 up.' [1] 58/14 update [1] 193/13 upload [1] 159/3 upon [9] 64/16 82/7 100/8 100/9 102/20 105/22 115/14 156/10 175/22 ups [1] 41/4 uptick [4] 105/7 106/19 106/20 171/18 urge [1] 111/23 urgent [2] 80/25 122/1 us [36] 3/10 4/25 9/1 18/4 39/11 54/13 68/3 68/4 73/16 85/15 89/9 90/8 92/15 93/3 94/9 100/17 102/15 123/8 124/2 124/3 125/23 128/6 131/20 134/20 135/24 136/25 137/5 146/12 146/21 150/16 154/23 158/17 173/15 173/18 196/24 210/9 use [32] 5/18 7/8 7/21 38/4 53/20 53/21 59/7 60/24 64/2 66/22 66/22 71/10 93/4 95/17 98/8 98/12 113/4 113/11 118/10 127/22 131/14 131/15 135/12 169/12 169/14 171/9 179/9 191/4 195/3 200/17 200/20 204/24 used [20] 3/8 6/15 14/17 16/25 18/21 74/9 77/1 84/15 85/11 85/25 95/13 106/11 108/25 116/12 118/22 128/5 168/7 174/16 175/6 200/3 useful [11] 12/8 16/9 23/25 47/16 52/15 100/11 162/15 169/1 184/2 211/21 219/5 usefully [1] 201/9 users [1] 63/21	using [11] 16/11 47/8 47/11 50/22 70/11 85/16 144/19 155/2 166/19 169/16 216/3 USP [2] 11/24 216/22 usually [4] 52/8 119/16 148/3 158/1 V validly [1] 138/8 valuable [2] 9/16 53/8 value [1] 25/4 values [2] 118/3 118/11 valve [1] 144/23 variation [1] 208/14 varies [1] 33/23 variety [7] 8/8 108/11 127/10 133/22 142/18 154/6 154/10 various [17] 15/22 16/10 17/3 24/15 25/6 28/18 42/20 63/1 86/18 124/15 125/10 157/5 179/25 180/10 180/23 207/13 208/3 vary [1] 23/23 vast [2] 105/4 120/17 vehicle [1] 54/5 verify [1] 155/11 version [5] 45/14 128/2 143/9 143/12 188/6 version 5 [1] 128/2 versus [1] 143/21 very [161] 5/7 6/1 6/22 7/19 8/9 9/16 12/5 14/25 15/6 15/13 15/14 16/18 17/12 17/15 18/12 18/21 19/17 20/2 23/10 23/20 25/25 26/16 27/3 28/3 28/19 28/19 29/10 30/3 30/13 31/8 32/2 32/8 33/11 33/12 34/20 34/21 35/1 35/13 35/19 40/16 41/1 41/1 41/25 44/21 44/21 47/10 47/16 48/10 49/19 49/19 49/24 51/17 52/9 52/9 52/21 56/1 57/7 58/5 59/21 65/1 65/4 65/25 67/20 70/13 70/13 71/5 71/18 74/13 78/17 78/17 80/11 80/22 81/18 81/24 83/12 88/3 88/3 92/25 97/6 99/10 99/11 99/13 104/1 104/13 104/25 114/6 115/4 119/2 122/18 122/22 124/6 124/6 125/6 125/11 130/2 131/8 133/2 133/22 134/6	134/23 136/1 138/10 139/14 144/10 144/13 145/1 145/15 147/23 147/23 150/17 150/18 151/9 151/19 151/19 152/15 153/3 153/21 154/1 154/8 154/8 155/25 156/19 157/9 160/6 161/1 162/14 162/15 164/4 164/15 166/11 168/5 169/6 176/4 176/14 182/17 185/16 185/17 186/23 186/23 188/9 189/17 190/2 192/2 193/9 193/14 196/12 197/24 199/8 200/15 202/15 203/6 206/8 210/23 212/11 213/5 213/8 213/11 213/12 216/16 219/1 219/3 veterans [1] 192/15 vetting [1] 93/10 VFI [20] 21/6 22/7 22/8 22/20 22/21 23/9 24/4 24/8 24/12 26/5 29/5 29/7 31/2 31/10 67/7 128/5 162/20 164/1 172/24 173/19 VFIs [49] 6/9 10/4 14/20 17/10 20/7 20/11 21/7 23/20 23/24 25/13 27/21 28/2 28/2 28/8 31/15 31/22 32/16 33/2 33/19 34/20 37/11 38/19 40/12 42/11 44/6 49/12 60/23 100/20 100/22 102/24 109/24 111/16 113/12 116/8 116/22 116/24 121/25 122/10 163/19 164/15 164/17 166/13 168/16 172/1 174/13 185/5 185/11 190/5 190/9 via [2] 64/3 149/1 victim [2] 162/25 173/12 victimisation [1] 148/19 victims [1] 99/17 victims' [1] 171/23 video [2] 157/4 160/12 videos [2] 46/11 46/17 view [23] 4/12 7/9 9/16 10/7 14/23 25/19 25/23 26/12 36/24 43/7 45/3 45/20 74/2 75/7 109/16 115/25 116/3 166/12 175/16 178/25 181/5 190/23 211/15 viewed [1] 158/9	viewing [6] 17/8 156/24 162/7 162/13 213/6 213/19 views [9] 73/18 118/15 119/20 121/1 180/16 192/5 202/4 214/17 219/5 Vincent [20] 4/18 4/19 123/2 123/3 123/5 150/18 156/19 160/10 165/20 175/20 178/13 178/20 181/3 187/13 197/22 206/20 211/4 218/10 219/2 220/8 violate [1] 158/15 violates [4] 128/16 146/23 148/1 150/3 violation [2] 140/15 178/23 violations [3] 132/5 137/19 138/18 violence [151] 1/7 3/8 5/14 6/5 7/9 8/21 9/4 12/23 13/8 13/13 13/16 13/24 14/3 14/11 14/14 14/21 14/23 15/2 15/3 15/9 20/9 21/12 24/22 24/25 25/24 26/14 27/2 33/6 37/19 40/8 49/5 49/8 70/1 73/19 73/25 80/13 81/8 87/14 87/23 90/16 100/19 100/24 101/20 101/23 103/8 103/13 103/16 103/21 104/5 105/19 107/13 113/2 117/13 117/18 117/20 117/24 118/10 118/12 118/23 119/2 119/4 119/12 121/1 121/5 121/15 121/19 122/3 125/20 126/1 126/12 126/16 126/25 127/19 127/24 128/22 129/1 129/7 129/17 129/19 130/21 130/21 131/6 131/16 131/25 132/2 132/11 132/16 132/20 134/1 138/16 143/21 144/1 144/3 144/12 144/16 145/3 145/7 149/23 151/17 157/7 160/1 160/2 160/4 160/9 160/15 160/18 160/19 160/20 161/11 161/16 161/18 161/18 162/8 162/9 162/12 162/13 164/24 165/23 166/1 166/21 167/4 167/6 168/13 169/7 170/18 172/5 172/14 173/6 174/6 174/7 174/9 179/5 180/10 180/17 185/14 185/15
--	--	--	--	--

V violence... [15] 185/15 195/20 195/22 198/11 202/17 207/3 207/4 207/4 207/5 208/3 208/3 208/7 214/22 218/14 219/12 violence-fascinated [2] 13/16 73/19 violence-fixated [10] 5/14 6/5 12/23 101/20 101/23 113/2 121/19 127/24 151/17 219/12 violent [30] 17/18 30/19 40/9 41/21 49/3 70/1 72/19 89/25 96/15 113/16 118/8 118/16 118/17 119/24 120/2 121/23 130/23 131/6 131/22 156/24 156/25 157/5 157/5 158/11 158/12 159/4 162/7 162/13 179/2 179/7 virtual [2] 11/19 56/13 virtue [1] 148/14 visible [1] 28/19 vital [1] 44/13 vocabulary [1] 187/20 vocal [1] 118/2 voice [2] 166/4 219/9 voices [3] 124/4 124/13 125/12 volume [1] 90/18 voluntariness [1] 141/24 voluntary [6] 86/17 97/8 180/9 180/22 182/12 187/24 VPN [2] 155/2 155/17 VRUs [1] 200/20 vulnerabilities [3] 83/22 126/19 198/10 vulnerability [6] 63/21 66/23 67/1 89/10 210/12 210/18	145/21 154/12 154/24 155/16 155/23 157/10 158/23 161/8 161/11 185/20 187/16 189/1 189/12 192/16 210/5 210/7 210/17 210/22 wanted [10] 10/6 68/18 69/11 70/15 83/1 161/7 170/23 203/15 217/7 217/9 wants [1] 168/19 war [2] 120/7 192/21 warn [1] 180/18 warned [1] 13/7 Warrell [1] 126/2 was [197] 1/14 2/4 2/11 2/22 3/15 7/3 7/3 9/7 9/21 10/22 10/23 12/25 13/6 13/7 13/8 13/14 13/14 13/15 13/17 15/15 15/16 16/5 16/20 18/1 18/2 18/5 18/7 18/9 19/18 20/5 20/14 22/13 22/15 22/17 22/22 23/2 23/20 23/25 24/6 24/8 24/9 26/11 27/18 27/18 27/21 28/4 28/5 28/11 28/14 28/18 28/20 29/23 30/8 32/17 33/15 34/16 35/11 35/11 35/12 35/13 35/15 35/18 35/21 35/22 36/7 36/8 36/9 39/24 39/25 40/24 40/25 42/13 42/17 42/24 44/20 44/21 44/22 46/6 46/14 46/16 46/25 47/1 47/3 47/4 47/5 47/7 47/7 47/8 47/11 49/1 49/14 50/11 50/13 50/16 54/25 55/16 56/1 56/4 56/6 56/6 56/23 58/9 61/6 62/12 63/13 64/10 64/19 65/17 65/25 65/25 66/5 67/25 70/9 70/15 71/24 71/24 73/21 73/25 74/3 74/21 74/21 75/7 75/9 75/13 75/13 75/16 75/18 76/21 76/22 77/1 78/15 86/15 91/14 91/15 94/7 98/18 99/25 101/7 101/7 113/13 115/1 125/11 125/15 128/10 133/12 137/14 143/23 151/17 152/4 152/15 159/13 162/3 162/4 162/15 163/15 164/4 164/6 164/7 169/3 169/5 169/10 172/5 175/24 175/25 176/6 176/20 176/21 176/22	179/2 181/17 184/3 187/13 187/14 188/5 190/18 192/9 192/10 192/12 192/17 192/20 192/21 193/2 193/19 194/6 194/8 194/14 198/25 199/13 199/15 199/16 201/4 201/12 207/17 207/17 209/4 214/19 217/16 wasn't [10] 10/21 12/24 30/24 32/23 34/22 35/18 44/23 56/1 91/15 161/17 watch [4] 5/1 39/13 48/5 77/3 watchdog [1] 147/5 way [63] 6/1 11/17 33/17 37/11 37/16 40/3 45/22 47/20 48/21 51/24 57/18 60/1 62/7 62/14 65/14 72/7 72/8 81/23 82/8 84/5 87/20 88/16 89/3 93/2 93/7 94/15 95/13 96/13 110/24 117/21 136/17 141/12 150/3 152/19 153/16 157/20 159/1 159/2 159/7 164/20 169/6 172/2 173/16 173/19 173/20 174/3 175/14 192/3 194/1 194/3 194/10 194/12 194/17 195/2 200/12 201/14 203/25 205/10 205/21 212/16 212/20 215/7 217/21 Wayne [1] 172/18 ways [13] 12/8 16/21 63/3 74/22 108/9 112/13 120/10 127/9 172/25 180/11 196/18 205/5 209/21 we [353] we're [2] 160/14 161/2 we've [3] 97/18 169/14 171/1 weak [1] 215/23 weakened [1] 113/16 wealth [1] 29/9 weapons [1] 119/22 weather [1] 207/6 web [7] 47/11 86/16 97/7 137/6 139/10 154/19 154/19 websites [1] 47/16 Wednesday [1] 1/1 weeded [1] 21/16 week [1] 175/18 weekend [1] 192/15 weekly [1] 191/22 weeks [1] 79/6 weird [2] 48/1 57/20 welcome [4] 112/7 183/9 196/12 219/15	welcomes [1] 111/1 welfare [1] 66/20 well [121] 4/23 5/15 7/8 8/17 12/14 12/23 13/14 13/22 15/13 18/20 20/7 23/2 24/4 26/3 26/24 30/16 31/17 32/8 34/8 39/7 44/19 45/12 47/11 49/18 51/2 54/25 55/7 62/8 64/10 69/7 72/16 77/14 80/17 80/21 81/21 85/25 86/1 87/20 94/7 98/10 98/20 100/14 100/16 100/17 102/10 102/15 106/11 107/20 108/7 109/21 110/7 111/5 112/13 114/1 117/19 118/5 118/17 119/24 123/16 124/8 124/15 131/17 131/19 133/9 145/5 146/15 147/14 153/11 157/8 158/16 159/15 159/16 159/19 159/20 159/24 160/2 160/10 160/16 160/23 162/1 162/5 162/10 163/15 163/25 165/10 168/14 168/25 171/10 171/17 174/20 177/9 177/16 178/3 179/16 182/9 182/11 184/24 186/8 186/16 187/6 192/6 192/12 193/8 195/4 197/2 198/14 199/8 199/18 200/15 200/16 200/20 203/4 206/20 207/7 209/13 209/21 212/19 213/12 214/12 216/23 216/25 well-designed [1] 162/5 well-informed [1] 98/20 wellbeing [1] 97/13 went [11] 15/20 15/21 19/9 23/4 26/9 39/18 41/2 46/24 47/6 90/15 192/17 were [79] 6/7 9/21 11/1 14/25 15/16 16/5 18/22 19/18 19/19 20/11 20/16 22/9 22/12 22/18 23/10 24/5 24/12 26/2 26/9 30/15 30/17 30/17 30/18 30/20 30/22 35/20 35/24 39/5 41/5 43/20 44/21 44/23 46/15 50/19 50/21 55/3 56/19 56/19 66/1 74/4 75/15 75/20 76/1 76/2 76/3 76/4 76/10 77/18 77/21 82/9 84/15 90/15 90/19	98/21 99/12 122/19 123/18 129/25 131/15 136/11 137/13 151/6 151/12 151/25 158/18 166/17 169/7 177/16 177/19 177/20 177/22 189/13 194/7 194/25 199/1 200/17 207/16 210/18 215/22 weren't [2] 16/12 158/18 West [4] 3/24 10/22 24/9 164/4 Westminster [1] 4/1 what [285] what's [20] 12/2 54/1 88/2 148/12 159/9 162/10 171/11 171/11 171/15 171/16 171/19 177/15 178/11 178/24 187/5 196/16 197/11 207/14 211/15 214/6 whatever [26] 13/13 40/10 44/11 58/22 59/2 59/8 59/24 78/24 79/3 82/1 83/13 99/8 134/11 140/4 143/16 152/13 155/8 167/4 179/12 183/24 189/11 189/13 206/18 209/11 210/2 217/18 when [99] 7/24 10/8 10/9 12/11 13/6 14/19 17/23 18/14 18/14 18/16 19/25 22/22 24/1 29/2 35/15 36/9 38/3 38/4 44/10 44/17 46/20 48/11 50/5 50/20 51/6 55/16 55/24 56/1 56/7 61/5 61/6 61/19 62/2 62/7 64/24 65/25 66/11 66/21 67/1 69/24 70/9 71/1 71/11 71/14 71/24 72/7 72/17 74/8 75/3 75/13 75/16 75/18 82/13 82/17 85/11 91/15 92/21 94/7 96/24 98/14 99/24 102/13 103/11 108/12 110/18 116/22 121/18 121/20 126/24 127/19 128/13 129/6 133/12 134/20 134/22 136/1 141/18 146/14 149/15 151/22 168/5 172/20 174/12 174/20 174/25 176/12 176/25 177/3 179/25 183/1 183/22 184/11 184/13 186/20 188/10 188/21 193/13 193/21 194/4 whenever [1] 140/4 where [78] 5/3 10/7 14/14 14/17 14/24 20/10 24/22 29/3
---	---	--	--	---

W where... [70] 29/19 30/15 37/3 40/15 41/7 41/10 42/6 44/20 46/1 47/2 56/9 57/5 57/7 59/4 59/12 60/5 61/12 63/2 66/14 71/19 73/11 73/13 73/21 77/2 82/20 84/25 86/2 87/6 87/16 89/23 91/6 96/6 98/22 100/16 102/17 103/16 105/17 106/1 106/24 111/11 129/7 136/1 138/15 139/11 144/15 152/7 155/14 161/15 161/20 170/13 170/16 171/13 177/11 177/19 178/23 185/25 187/6 187/8 191/22 192/15 192/17 195/4 202/25 203/2 203/23 204/18 210/1 212/11 212/23 213/15 whereas [5] 23/9 62/22 123/21 205/22 207/8 whereby [1] 176/11 wherever [2] 57/18 81/22 whether [85] 10/17 11/9 13/19 13/20 15/18 17/19 18/5 18/18 22/23 23/6 23/7 24/10 25/21 27/19 29/11 29/23 30/18 30/21 34/19 37/17 38/24 69/19 73/23 74/14 76/9 77/18 78/2 85/17 87/13 90/17 96/11 112/17 116/7 124/22 125/2 125/19 130/22 131/5 132/23 140/23 141/17 144/5 144/6 148/23 151/13 154/12 154/22 156/23 157/11 160/14 160/15 163/18 164/22 166/1 168/20 172/8 173/22 180/2 180/8 180/12 182/25 183/14 183/22 184/23 187/7 187/7 189/18 190/15 197/25 198/1 198/10 201/7 209/9 209/10 211/7 211/18 213/8 213/9 214/5 214/10 214/11 216/18 216/18 217/1 217/3 which [194] 5/25 6/7 8/23 9/18 10/13 10/23 11/5 11/17 11/22 12/13 13/11 13/16 13/23 14/1 15/9 16/10 17/12 17/14 19/22 19/23 20/14 20/19	21/21 22/8 22/15 23/4 23/19 23/22 23/23 24/17 25/24 27/12 27/13 28/6 29/10 29/13 29/17 29/24 30/1 32/4 32/4 32/21 33/4 33/9 35/16 35/21 37/18 37/21 38/8 38/17 40/5 41/10 42/2 43/10 43/20 44/23 47/18 48/22 49/5 49/8 49/24 50/14 50/17 51/21 52/14 53/15 53/18 54/1 54/14 60/19 61/3 62/14 65/7 67/7 71/2 71/12 77/1 79/5 80/1 85/11 89/4 89/17 92/3 95/12 96/2 96/2 99/19 100/14 101/24 103/7 103/14 104/10 104/21 104/25 105/3 105/24 106/9 107/14 108/4 108/6 108/23 108/25 112/21 113/19 114/7 116/6 116/19 117/21 118/8 119/17 120/4 120/23 121/20 124/23 125/8 126/22 127/24 128/3 131/11 132/12 134/21 135/14 139/1 139/8 139/15 139/17 139/18 140/2 140/17 140/19 148/10 151/10 152/8 153/5 153/8 153/8 154/7 154/9 154/13 154/18 155/8 156/10 156/12 157/19 158/24 159/23 161/18 164/14 165/6 168/16 168/23 169/7 171/7 172/20 174/16 176/19 177/16 177/20 178/2 179/4 179/6 182/7 191/12 192/7 195/9 196/4 198/3 198/7 198/19 199/1 200/7 200/12 200/14 200/16 200/25 203/4 203/6 204/6 207/23 208/13 212/13 213/7 213/23 213/24 214/9 216/8 216/8 216/9 217/4 217/7 217/9 217/21 218/7 218/7 while [11] 5/12 63/14 101/16 103/24 106/18 118/7 122/9 128/3 130/4 172/3 181/14 whilst [1] 85/23 white [8] 8/25 42/23 45/12 45/13 59/16 123/25 136/23 183/23 who [193] 2/11 4/12 6/21 7/17 7/19 7/22 9/3 9/6 9/22 9/23 9/25	10/16 11/14 12/1 12/7 13/12 14/21 14/25 15/2 16/8 16/11 16/17 19/13 19/18 21/11 21/13 21/13 24/16 25/8 25/23 27/1 27/7 28/14 29/11 30/17 30/19 31/6 31/15 31/21 33/18 34/8 35/11 35/20 35/22 35/23 36/6 36/11 36/12 36/15 37/5 37/6 37/14 37/22 37/24 37/25 38/22 38/24 39/19 40/4 45/5 45/16 46/5 47/8 47/15 48/6 48/18 48/24 52/1 52/17 52/18 52/19 53/2 56/11 57/1 57/8 57/17 58/11 59/13 59/21 63/7 64/11 64/20 65/1 65/3 65/8 65/20 67/9 79/20 79/24 80/10 80/12 90/22 90/23 91/8 91/13 94/24 96/20 97/5 98/13 99/18 104/13 104/16 111/7 111/9 112/11 112/12 114/2 115/7 118/24 120/11 121/4 122/5 123/19 123/21 123/22 123/24 123/24 124/5 124/21 130/12 130/15 133/14 133/16 133/24 136/5 136/12 136/13 143/23 148/24 151/18 151/25 158/13 161/6 161/7 161/15 162/5 164/17 165/23 165/25 167/4 169/6 172/13 173/12 174/13 174/20 175/8 175/9 176/4 176/8 177/6 177/6 177/7 177/9 177/10 178/8 179/2 179/5 180/9 180/15 180/16 181/13 184/6 184/7 184/14 186/22 188/23 188/25 189/11 189/12 190/10 190/13 190/20 191/17 191/20 192/9 192/18 196/14 202/14 202/16 202/16 204/19 209/3 209/5 210/9 210/16 211/3 211/6 215/6 215/8 216/14 218/17 218/18 218/22 who'd [1] 57/4 whoever [2] 201/12 210/8 whole [18] 5/18 45/16 46/10 46/12 47/18 65/11 65/13 65/14 78/6 98/18 116/19 146/23 154/10	172/12 208/25 212/21 218/13 218/17 whom [5] 114/5 114/13 149/12 199/21 210/24 whose [5] 9/7 58/25 168/12 184/12 193/7 why [45] 13/9 42/16 47/22 48/21 49/1 50/13 53/5 55/10 57/15 59/17 63/9 66/6 80/8 94/21 94/25 96/11 115/25 132/20 136/17 137/17 137/20 144/13 144/14 145/20 146/14 151/23 157/24 158/21 158/25 159/1 159/2 159/3 159/6 169/24 173/10 173/13 174/5 175/3 189/7 195/23 202/7 202/14 202/15 202/16 212/13 wide [9] 32/20 133/21 144/1 154/6 166/12 188/10 201/24 217/15 219/5 widely [2] 133/10 150/6 widening [1] 113/5 wider [9] 100/8 105/13 107/24 109/18 111/5 172/16 173/19 178/8 195/17 widespread [2] 64/16 133/13 will [109] 1/9 1/12 2/9 2/19 3/11 4/7 4/13 4/18 5/16 6/6 7/20 9/20 11/19 11/22 12/1 13/6 15/12 15/13 16/8 21/7 25/2 29/10 37/15 37/15 38/3 40/19 41/25 44/6 45/10 46/3 47/15 47/22 51/1 54/9 57/10 60/2 60/15 61/12 61/13 61/15 65/2 65/2 65/4 67/24 68/15 70/18 71/10 72/9 72/20 73/9 74/6 74/20 80/7 83/4 85/11 88/24 93/9 94/5 94/11 95/20 95/21 98/4 100/13 100/16 106/17 109/2 110/11 112/15 119/11 122/21 122/22 124/20 125/3 127/14 128/12 130/23 133/19 134/10 135/21 141/19 141/23 143/3 150/15 153/4 153/13 153/20 154/23 166/8 167/19 167/20 167/25 168/14 168/20 170/8 175/9 175/15 181/18 189/3 190/2 190/25 191/10 192/2 192/6 202/1	203/18 205/2 208/11 218/4 219/10 William [10] 26/1 27/11 28/20 32/19 34/7 74/16 168/23 199/15 202/8 214/17 William Shawcross [1] 202/8 willing [3] 44/14 44/23 217/19 willingness [2] 8/21 168/10 wind [2] 188/13 207/11 winding [1] 138/16 windows [2] 36/4 36/16 wing [14] 17/9 20/18 22/14 24/5 24/13 26/2 30/23 46/6 47/1 131/21 134/15 134/19 210/20 214/21 wise [1] 81/24 wish [10] 5/14 25/20 154/3 169/19 174/10 178/13 180/10 180/11 183/18 219/16 within [28] 27/22 34/10 36/4 41/4 43/7 43/22 46/9 68/25 74/19 75/24 76/23 77/13 91/24 104/3 111/25 126/21 139/7 146/24 147/3 151/18 164/25 165/13 173/25 174/1 182/7 201/24 211/10 213/1 without [16] 9/10 26/13 26/14 87/21 117/3 140/1 145/14 150/5 150/5 164/23 169/7 172/14 187/11 205/20 208/3 211/5 wits' [1] 168/24 women [2] 160/4 179/5 Women's [1] 17/25 won't [9] 16/15 52/10 52/12 67/3 70/21 142/22 155/14 166/14 190/1 wonder [2] 63/23 160/14 wondering [1] 64/10 word [15] 6/4 6/13 10/3 31/6 44/14 48/13 66/22 66/22 77/9 104/22 104/22 155/18 167/7 167/9 195/3 worded [1] 102/7 wording [1] 27/24 words [15] 15/12 19/6 41/20 41/24 42/5 42/22 45/24 51/21 52/17 59/8 84/15 141/7 166/19 176/2
---	--	--	--	--

W words... [1] 204/25 work [43] 3/15 3/19 4/16 12/2 19/25 50/25 52/4 55/6 55/9 63/6 69/15 74/23 74/24 76/20 76/21 88/15 91/5 91/15 98/25 99/5 99/25 100/3 100/6 107/17 123/17 124/7 124/15 124/24 124/25 125/18 150/21 153/7 160/17 174/8 175/8 185/18 193/22 195/5 198/18 200/8 200/24 205/13 205/21 workable [2] 154/15 165/1 worked [2] 75/6 194/25 worker [1] 102/12 workers [1] 96/21 working [10] 4/4 45/12 50/10 52/5 61/7 102/9 205/13 209/20 215/19 216/6 works [7] 7/19 59/2 64/12 66/9 72/13 92/7 98/10 world [10] 9/3 37/6 46/9 58/3 80/14 81/9 117/7 159/25 173/7 217/21 worldwide [1] 29/13 worried [12] 43/14 44/22 54/20 57/22 57/24 60/12 65/10 65/11 156/1 161/19 184/4 184/12 worries [1] 202/23 worry [5] 51/7 88/10 170/7 201/16 202/12 worrying [3] 176/12 198/7 210/12 worse [4] 90/17 121/15 160/22 173/11 worst [1] 110/17 worth [7] 107/18 152/15 156/1 159/24 170/10 170/21 218/9 worthy [2] 98/2 218/24 would [248] wouldn't [5] 16/12 39/1 42/16 46/19 55/1 woven [1] 95/2 wrestle [1] 91/2 wretched [1] 42/6 write [3] 31/9 63/5 66/21 writing [3] 153/1 153/4 153/20 written [2] 171/24 198/20 wrong [6] 92/22	120/13 161/3 165/8 176/19 190/24 wrongly [1] 184/21 Y yada [1] 58/13 Yard [2] 71/25 94/8 yeah [2] 207/21 207/21 year [23] 2/3 2/11 3/6 16/10 17/7 17/14 18/22 19/5 19/6 22/9 23/4 23/7 29/22 40/24 78/21 90/15 97/19 101/12 105/11 144/14 186/22 205/15 206/1 years [37] 4/1 16/8 18/15 19/11 52/24 54/5 69/6 69/18 70/10 73/5 73/10 77/1 78/17 79/6 89/6 89/24 93/19 101/4 101/17 103/7 106/16 111/18 118/24 123/12 125/1 125/14 129/16 131/24 135/16 138/18 139/20 149/16 182/5 187/2 191/14 194/5 206/3 years' [1] 156/1 yes [24] 1/4 21/25 67/19 90/8 96/5 123/1 142/14 151/4 151/25 154/21 155/13 155/18 155/22 167/13 170/5 170/25 172/17 174/4 187/18 188/8 202/7 205/25 214/4 215/11 yesterday [9] 1/9 12/24 15/9 48/5 49/2 52/11 153/23 155/3 162/18 yet [3] 27/7 102/9 113/19 you [650] you might [1] 67/7 You'd [1] 151/12 you're [5] 31/2 31/2 155/11 158/14 170/13 young [28] 16/22 25/1 30/14 30/16 31/21 39/19 44/17 46/1 46/14 48/6 49/11 59/13 61/16 84/18 89/14 90/23 126/18 154/5 154/8 154/8 156/13 174/25 186/23 191/16 191/23 192/4 192/9 192/21 younger [1] 18/14 your [58] 1/8 13/18 14/12 15/5 32/16 33/15 34/5 34/17 53/19 53/20 53/22 53/24 54/5 54/6 54/7 54/13 55/4 58/17 60/23 64/1 64/17 68/4	70/8 79/2 79/15 79/15 82/22 87/11 95/21 99/11 138/16 150/18 150/20 153/19 155/7 155/8 155/11 161/24 163/11 171/23 171/24 172/7 175/22 176/7 178/24 187/15 188/5 190/3 190/7 200/17 201/7 203/18 204/24 206/2 209/22 215/17 215/23 219/4 yours [1] 135/5 yourself [2] 132/23 155/10 youth [18] 3/23 53/15 60/18 61/20 66/18 66/20 67/5 69/5 89/18 96/21 104/10 107/13 107/16 194/22 195/20 195/22 205/4 218/16 Z Zealand [1] 9/6		
---	---	--	--	--