

Tuesday, 15 September 2026

(10.00 am)

Introductions

SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: Yes, Mr Moss.

MR MOSS: Thank you. May it please you, sir, this is our fourth seminar and today's subject is the internet, online platforms and pathways to violence.

As with all our seminars, we have the advantage today of four speakers who are leaders in their field. Our first speaker today will be Milo Comerford. Mr Comerford is Senior Director of Policy and Research in Counter Extremism at the Institute for Strategic Dialogue.

He is an internationally recognised subject matter expert on extremism, providing regular briefing for senior decision-makers on the evolving threat landscape and he features frequently in international media, including BBC news, Politico, CNN, the Washington Post and the New York Times.

Following academic study in philosophy and theology in Oxford, Mr Comerford's posts have included a senior analyst at the Tony Blair Institute for Global Change where he led major studies on online extremism, extreme propaganda and educational responses to extremism. He is an advisory member of the Prevention Practitioners

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firms and transnational organisations, including NATO, Europol, the World Bank, Google and others. She has also worked for the United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism as a specialist adviser.

Sir, our third speaker will be Dr Joe Whittaker. Dr Whittaker is Programme Director of Cyber Threats at Swansea University, with a primary research interest in online radicalisation. For his doctoral research Dr Whittaker created a database, as we understand it, of 231 Islamic state terrorists who operated within the US and analysed their online behaviours. His earlier academic background was in international politics with a focus on the Middle East and politics and philosophy.

Dr Whittaker researches how recommendation algorithms promote extremist content and terrorist use of video games as well as how online counter narratives are deployed. Dr Whittaker has wider research interests that include political polarisation on social media. He is affiliated with the cyber terrorism programme in Swansea which is internationally renowned and takes an interdisciplinary approach to different aspects of terrorism studies.

Sir, our fourth speaker will be Professor Paul Gill. Professor Gill is Professor in Security and Crime Science at UCL here in London. He was previously

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Network, a network of more than a thousand frontline practitioners working to tackle terrorism and targeted violence across the US, as well as a member of Spotify's Safety Advisory Council.

Sir, our second speaker will be Dr Julia Ebner. Dr Ebner is an expert on online radicalisation, conspiracy myths and threats to democracy and minority rights and terrorism prevention. She holds postgraduate qualifications from Oxford, Peking University and the LSE. She leads the Violent Extremism Lab at the University of Oxford Centre for the Study of Social Cohesion and is Co-Executive Director at the Institute for Strategic Dialogue. She is a research affiliate at Magdalen College Oxford and lectures at Oxford University's Department of Politics and International Relations.

In addition to her wide academic publications and contributions in the international press, Dr Ebner has published books include: "Going mainstream: How extremists are taking over", "The Rage: The vicious circle of Islamist and far-right extremism", "The Language of Terrorists: Distinguishing trolls from violent extremists", and "Going Dark: The secret lives of extremists".

She advises governments, intelligence agencies, tech

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a postdoctoral research fellow at the International Centre for the Study of Terrorism in Pennsylvania State University. In addition to his PhD in political science, Professor Gill's academic qualifications include an MA in international relations and a Bachelor of Social Science International from the School of Politics and International Relations, University College Dublin.

The quality of the Professor's research, sir, is readily apparent from those who have funded it. Including the European Research Council, Public Safety Canada, the Office for Naval Research, the Department of Homeland Security, the Defence, Science and Technology Laboratory, the European Union and the National Institute of Justice.

His various research projects so funded have focused upon various aspects of terror behaviour, including such wide-ranging matters as IED development, creativity, terrorist network structures and lone-actor terrorism. Professor Gill is widely published in leading psychology, criminology and political science journals, as you will remember, sir, some of our speakers touched on last week in referencing some of his work.

Our first speaker, Mr Comerford, please.

Presentation by MR COMERFORD

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1 **MR COMERFORD:** Thank you very much for inviting me along.
 2 I just want to say it is a huge honour to be here to
 3 contribute in some small way to, we hope, preventing
 4 such a terrible tragedy from happening again.
 5 I'm going to be presenting today on some of ISD's
 6 research on the evolving threat landscape online, and
 7 building on 20 years of expertise in monitoring these
 8 online spaces, what the direction of travel is for these
 9 threats and how online harms translate into offline
 10 violence.
 11 First of all, just a bit of background on ISD as
 12 an organisation. For over 20 years now we have been
 13 producing a range of research that stretches from
 14 digital ethnography within harmful online communities,
 15 so being truly embedded within these spaces, the origins
 16 of many of these harmful acts that we are here to talk
 17 about today; threat detection and prevention work, which
 18 includes work with law enforcement directly and in
 19 referring harmful activity encountered online;
 20 practitioner-focused capacity building and resource
 21 development to support those on the frontline; as well
 22 as prevention policy advisory and in particular a focus
 23 on digital regulation where ISD has been really helping
 24 to drive the wave of digital regulation that is coming
 25 to hold social media platforms to account for the

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1 last year.
 2 So how ISD came to focus on the topics and scope of
 3 this Inquiry was almost a form of necessity as a think
 4 tank working on these topics. In the context of
 5 monitoring online extremist communities we increasingly
 6 saw how platforms were fostering a range different
 7 trends. This includes a rise in post-organisational
 8 terrorism and violence, so the phenomenon of looser
 9 structures that are tied to fluid online communities.
 10 The notion of hybridisation as aforementioned. This is
 11 where extremist movements are increasingly
 12 cross-fertilising with other harmful actors, that
 13 includes hostile states, sexual predators and criminal
 14 networks, as well as the increasing ubiquity of
 15 aesthetics potentially over coherent ideological
 16 frameworks within these communities. What we mean by
 17 this is the stylistic dimensions of these online
 18 communities being a fundamental reference point and the
 19 violence that emanates from them having a highly
 20 stylised aesthetic dimension, and the importance of
 21 online subcultures in motivating this kind of activity
 22 as well.

23 I'm going to start -- I am sure there will be
 24 a number of discussions today around definitions.
 25 I want to start with a few that ISD works from. ISD

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1 content they host on their services, in the EU and UK,
 2 and further afield.

3 So within this context we have expertise in a broad
 4 ideological spectrum of threats, across a large team of
 5 analysts and subject matter experts and we work on these
 6 issues across a wide geographic spread. As well in the
 7 UK, we have teams in the US, Canada and Germany.

8 With regard to the terms of reference of this
 9 specific Inquiry, there is a range of different ISD
 10 research, policy advisory work and action programming
 11 which is rooted in that expertise on that rapidly
 12 evolving and -- a term that I will use a few times in
 13 this presentation -- an increasingly hybridised online
 14 threat environment. As you can see on this slide, this
 15 includes translating the implications of some of these
 16 developments for a broad range of policy and
 17 practitioner communities focused on both prevention and
 18 intervention. It also includes engagement with
 19 different parts of Government, including the
 20 Home Office, teams such as Prevent and RICU, who I know
 21 will have the opportunity to speak to the Inquiry as
 22 well, Ofcom, the National Crime Agency, the Metropolitan
 23 Police and the Commission for Countering Extremism.
 24 I also presented evidence on these topics at the Home
 25 Affairs Committee's inquiry on new forms of extremism

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1 defines extremism as "the advocacy of political and
 2 social change in line with a system of belief that
 3 claims a superiority and dominance of one identity-based
 4 'in-group' over an 'out group'."

5 In short, there are some key words embedded within
 6 this that are really about supremacy, about that sort of
 7 desire for political and social change and the idea of
 8 dominance of an identity-based group over another.

9 Perhaps unlike other researchers who look at violent
 10 extremism and terrorism specifically, we are also
 11 looking also beyond just violent extremism and have
 12 an interest in the broader manifestations of extremism
 13 as a desire to enact political and social change through
 14 that framework. I think an important clarification at
 15 the beginning -- I am sure there will be a lot of
 16 discussion around ideology as a sort of phenomenon.
 17 This definition is not to say that ideology is
 18 explanatory of extremism, or that extremism is about or
 19 driven by ideology, but rather it is a framework for the
 20 violent, political or social change we are talking about
 21 in this definition.

22 We define the sort of adjacent phenomenon of
 23 nihilistic violence -- this is the preferred term we
 24 use -- as a distinct but deeply related phenomenon to
 25 extremism as violent acts lacking in ideological

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motivation and driven by a misanthropic worldview. So our work shows this to be a spectrum, which ranges from ideologically-motivated extremism to misanthropic nihilistic violence, as we display on this slide, rather than a binary. This is not a case of things being either/or, but really of these phenomena being highly interrelated, and I will spend a bit more time talking about these distinctions between these phenomena and many of the acts of violence we have seen recently in the UK and further afield have elements of both of these at their heart, and that speaks to us both about hybridisation that I previously discussed.

These nihilistic networks that we'll talk about today range from more established groupings. You may have come across references to groups like 764, or the Com network, or groups like the True Crime Community which perhaps more closely resemble violent extremists groups in some of their mobilisation dynamics, and some have indeed been designated as such by authorities. 764 has been designated a terrorist group by the Canadian and New Zealand governments, for example. But this also ranges to much broader violent fandoms and communities with less centralisation, so less resembling those kind of groupings.

I know there has been discussion during this Inquiry

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it, that sort of desire to tear down established systems and rebuild something as a form of ideology, and you see that reflected in some terminologies such as "nihilistic violent nihilistic extremism", which has become a common term in some contexts, including in the US. But based on this definition here of extremism, we see that as a fundamental contradiction in terms because extremism is by definition an ideological project based on this definitional -- or framed within the context of an ideological framework.

Shortly, just a few slides on what it is we are talking about here when we talk about these online communities. Here we understand nihilistic communities as online groupings that advocate for acts of cruelty, violence and depravity for their own sake, rather than for the service of any coherent ideological or moral objective. They are generally driven by a deep misanthropy and a desire to gain acceptance or notoriety in online communities. Many extremists are fundamentally motivated by a deep nihilism and misanthropy. But this phenomenon is a distinct trend to extremist violence which eschews those ideologically-motivated frameworks that I discussed previously.

While nihilistic violence and

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around the concept of violence fixation, which I think is adjacent phenomenon to what we are describing here. Personally ISD doesn't use this terminology. We think that violence fixation doesn't provide insights on the specific pathways to violence, rather than just a fixation of it, and it also fails to reflect the performative nature of the violence that we see coming from these communities, which is really fundamentally about achieving online notoriety, so beyond just obsession.

The term "violence fixated individual" is also not especially recognised outside the UK, so it is not necessarily that helpful in describing this phenomenon as a sort of transnational force which is really fundamental to these communities; they are highly international networks.

In general, and I am sure we will hear from across the experts today, this is a very emergent definitional area with diverging opinions. You have those who perhaps see this more as the spectrum that we present here. You have those who might fundamentally dispute the ideological nature of extremism and therefore the distinction with nihilism in the first place, and those who see nihilism itself as a form of ideology, especially the accelerationism that is at the heart of

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ideologically-motivated violence might increasingly resemble one another, and this was a remark made by Lord Anderson in his Lessons from Prevent paper, the scale of harm, the manifestations of this might look similar, that lack of political or ideological dimension is distinct from extremist attacks. These phenomena share similar aesthetics and, in some cases, pathways towards violence. We see a particular overlap with online communities of Neo-Nazi influenced accelerationism that are often shared between nihilistic and ideologically motivated communities online. This was particularly the case in the case of AR whose digital activity reflected a volatile mix of misanthropy, nihilism, antisocial resentment and sporadic engagement with different violent subcultures. In some cases this saw extremism reduced to violent content alone, as in the case of his possession of an Al-Qaeda training manual that was not an indication of ideology but rather part of a broader set of violent materials that he was engaging with online.

Another key distinction to draw from -- in these nihilistic communities from, if you like, more established forms of extremism is the broader spectrum of harms that are associated with them. So beyond terrorism, the kind of harms we often see in scope as

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both indicators of harms in and of themselves, span sexual exploitation, cybercrime and various forms of real world violence that might go beyond violent extremism, including self-harm, animal abuse, interpersonal violence and mass casualty attacks, such as school shootings. We of course have a number of different plots that have been associated in the UK with this more ambiguous ideological underpinning and links to fringe online communities.

I have been asked to present on some of the online pathways to violence associated with these with online communities; in particular, how non-ideological or fixation-driven violence is being enabled, reinforced or accelerated within the online environment and how this differs from more familiar online extremist pathways.

I'm going to start with this question of enabling, which is really at its heart about a cross-platform online ecosystem where online pathways are fundamental to the processes that we see of moving towards violence. This is an incredibly cross-platform ecosystem. These violent individuals are not confined to any specific mainstream or even fringe platform, but rather platforms and services are used in an agnostic way based on their purpose in plotting and enacting acts of violence. So you might see larger social media platforms, for

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as Discord and Telegram, where they engage in grooming, exploitation and extortion.

Telegram is the most important platform for coordinating activities and exchanging sexexploitation material that emerges in ISD's research, but Discord also plays an important role for members of the network to identify potential victims, groom them and ultimately broadcast their abuse.

Another way that online platforms are central to this phenomenon is the idea of communities and reinforcement of these dynamics. Of course it is important to say that there is not evidence that AR himself was an active member of a community of -- that are described here, but it is incredibly important I think to understand the community-driven dimension of this, that is so fundamental and so fundamentally related to platform functionalities. These spaces can cultivate grievances, offer identify and belonging, particularly to young men, and serve as gateways to normalisation or dehumanisation towards whichever group is perceived as the source of harm and injustice.

I have a few examples of groups that ISD has been particularly active in monitoring, including the Com Network which targets vulnerable children, coercing victims to conduct self-harm, serious violence and other

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example, used as sort of hunting grounds, private messaging applications used for grooming and control, and more niche platforms used for branding and propaganda.

This cross-platform dynamic enables these networks evade platform-specific moderation efforts and to move freely between various online environments to perpetuate a variety of harms. These networks use larger mainstream social media platforms to identify targets for grooming and exploitation, casting a very wide net for potentially vulnerable users who they can initiate contact with, using targeted profile and hashtag searches to identify suitable candidates for victimisation. This includes potentially vulnerable communities that might be engaging with suicidal content, self-harm content and other forms of harm.

Nihilistic networks use platforms such as TikTok for aesthetic purposes, branding and cultural signalling. By establishing these distinctive aesthetics and distributing propaganda across these spaces, networks entrench a group identity and attract new recruits who may be drawn to these extreme aesthetics. After establishing initial contact, extorters often attempt to move their interactions to less public platforms, so they are conducive to secure one-to-one messaging, such

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forms of extreme criminality. The group 764 which is a more organised network of online groups that engage in sextortion and violence glorification that is increasingly linked to acts of real world violence, and the True Crime Community which is a looser fandom-driven subculture that obsesses over high profile killers and with some seeking to enact similar violence, especially school attackers.

As I said, there is no specific evidence that AR was involved in formalised online communities but this was the case of many other -- as is the case with many mass attackers that are often lionised within these very spaces, but it is an important dimension of the threat that is worth understanding nonetheless, that community dimension.

Finally, another element of the role of online environments is escalating violent activity. We see this grooming of individuals into violence based on notoriety, misanthropy and grievance with a crystallising rubric of escalation where there is a kind of active attempt within these communities to turn victims into perpetrators and a sort of play book for doing this, including manuals that are designed to inform people about how to encourage this transition.

You can see here the example on the bottom left of

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a pathway of escalation that was shared by one nihilistic group that encourages people to start with brickings, vandalism, arson, beatings, stabbings and murder and developing social media content as proof for this. This is part of a broader gamification of violence that in some ways emerged within far right online communities, in the context of things like the Christchurch attack, that really blurs the line between reality and incentivises things like high scores and community notoriety.

But members also closely follow tactics contained in manuals that are circulated among the group on how to threaten and exploit victims. They encourage members to target communities that are specifically focused on self-harm, eating disorders, suicide ideation and bipolar disorders, as members prize graphic images of self-harm as proof of their exploits. Of course, you see the use of memes, gaming motifs and coded language which lowers the barriers to entry in many of these communities. It normalises violence and helps to foster in-group identities, as well as providing plausible deniability and evading platform-moderation efforts through obfuscation.

So I want to come back to this idea of this spectrum to really dwell on some of the distinctions and

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challenging to identify.

In terms of some of the key distinctions between these, you see that notion of a kind of coherent ideological framework reduced to a violent aesthetic where violence and cruelty themselves become an organising principle for these subcultures. As a result you see a much lower barrier to entry. Ideology did perhaps feature as a kind of filter where you might have reading lists or ideological profiling. It's not to say that ideology was necessarily that advanced among those participating in online extremist ecosystems, but now the cost of entry within these more nihilistic communities is instead about producing horrific content for community consumption.

This may also -- and the evidence is kind of emerging around this -- shorten the timeline to violence as well, with this lack of ideological component, with aesthetics and memes spreading quicker than more complex ideological doctrine, and potentially providing fewer opportunities for intervention, as well as having the potential to present a qualitatively younger cohort of audience with this more subcultural-driven phenomenon.

One other emerging area, which is worthy of further study, is also about the sort of diversity of this community. So for example, we have noticed in the kind

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similarities between these phenomena and online extremist pathways.

Some of the key differences here to point to are really understanding that many acts of violence will sit somewhere on this spectrum but that ones that are more ideologically motivated, that framework will be geared towards a specific ideological goal, a process of political or social change with a supremacist underpinning, whereas nihilistic violence has a fundamentally misanthropic motivation framework. The targets of this will therefore reflect that ideological goal in some way, whereas the targets of this kind of violence will be more random or personal, or grievance motivated. The end goal, as mentioned in that definition, is really geared towards social and political change, whereas the end goal of nihilistic violence is more geared towards notoriety and clout within these online communities.

That therefore means some of the identifying features of harmful activity, of ideologically-motivated violence might be more narrative in nature, you might be looking for specific kind of extremist or violent narratives. Many of the identifying features in these nihilistic spaces are more aesthetic in nature; they are "know them when you see them", which makes it even more

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of hundreds of online cases of violence that we have referred on to law enforcement, a much more equal gender split within the True Crime Community, for example, of both women and men, or boys and girls, engaging in these spaces on online extremist communities.

Some of the similarities are about the overlapping communities that we see. There is often not a sharp line distinguishing extremist and nihilistic online dynamics. A recent attack in San Diego against an Islamic centre really showed the kind of blurring of extreme right wing accelerationist ideology, incel-related online activity, as well as more nihilistic activity that was lionising mass shooters that were not associated with a specific extremist movement.

Another key similarity is the sort of outward resemblance between extremist violence and nihilistic violence. Attackers often seek to emulate the tactics of extremist attackers across a broad ideological spectrum. You might have a nihilistic attacker borrowing elements of an Islamist or far right attack, in an almost agnostic way, despite lacking a parallel ideological motivation. Again, this example of the use of an Al-Qaeda training manual, the consumption of an Al-Qaeda training manual purely as violent content

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rather than a notable ideological influence I think speaks to this dynamic.

I am sure we will hear much more from other experts in the panel around some of the similar behavioural factors and vulnerabilities in children engaging in violent extremist activity and more nihilistic violence.

The next question I was asked to speak to was around specific indicators of concern which are visible online, and how reliably platforms, regulators and public agencies can interpret those indicators when assessing the risks posed by violence-fixated individuals.

I will say first of all these insights are based on analysis of hundreds of cases of nihilistic violence or plots that have been surfaced through ISD's threat detection and prevention work. So that has an inherent limitation in that it is people online who are threatening acts of violence that we are tracking and referring on, but aren't necessarily looking at those who have completed acts of violence or who have gone on to engage in violent acts, but I still think there are some relevant features draw out here around indicators.

A lot of this is drawn from an ISD resource, which has been shared with the Inquiry, on nihilistic violence which is geared specifically towards practitioners and care givers and draws on this analysis and splits these

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You see the claims around communication with mass killers through dreams or visions and believing they are in a relationship with a mass killer, as well as the use of services like character.ai and other AI chatbots to simulate conversations or relationships with specific mass killers. These are features we saw cropping up across these cases of those that were engaging with threats of violent activity online.

The second is the notion of accelerance. These are co-morbidities with this subcultural involvement that often presage violence in the cases that we have looked at. Here you see a number of different communities that are adjacent to these violent ones, and traits or conditions that are often shown by these participants but aren't necessarily indicative of their involvement with these subcultures described above.

So these aren't necessarily inherently harmful but it is worth pointing to the kind of propensity of expressions of desires for self-harm, suicidal ideation, eating disorders, psychosis, isolation. I don't want to say these are indicators per se of violent risk, but certainly we see, in combination with the indicators above, an increased likelihood of harm within these online communities.

Finally, the idea of triggers, which again is not

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indicators into a few different categories that can be understood as kind of highly inter-related. So these indicators might be signs that someone is part of a subculture of nihilistic violence, so not necessarily a sign that someone is a violent threat but nonetheless is highly immersed in these online environments.

This might include extreme interest in gore communities or in gore content, and express desire for online notoriety as well as obsessions with mass killers. Beyond obsession, another element that we see increasingly cropping up in the communities that we are looking at, is in fact, the development of parasocial relationships with mass killers, where participants in these online subcultures might discuss feelings for -- imagined relationships with mass killers that can border on delusional, mirroring traditional fandoms in which devotees obsess over musicians or actors.

Some within the True Crime Community, for example, truly believed they were in a relationship with, or even a reincarnation of, their preferred mass killer, and we have seen examples of this behaviour including speaking about dead attackers in the present tense or in the second person, using "you/your" language as if addressing them directly, displaying signs of disassociative identity disorder or even hallucinations.

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unique to nihilistic violent subcultures, those who are carrying out other acts of violence. Very often there were trigger events in their lives that were the kind of ultimate reason for, or were the catalyst for violent activity: destabilising events which can increase the risk of imminent harm to themselves or others. This might be sudden life changes, social stresses, financial crises and, as mentioned, this is not a unique phenomenon but certainly something we saw expressed over and over again in those cases of those who were threatening real world acts of violence. These range from social rejections or break-ups. It might be fights with friends or families, fears of being institutionalised, impending failure or crisis, as well as social, legal or financial stress.

One other element that we picked up in our analysis was understanding some of the intervention challenges that this comes with. So what are some of the conditions within these communities that reduce help-seeking behaviour? A propensity we saw there was around a lack of trust in authority figures, a very strong paranoia over surveillance within these online spaces; victim-perpetrator dynamics that reduced the likelihood of voluntary co-operation, as people are incredibly complex, abusive context online that make it

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very challenging to engage with these individuals.

So what does this tell us about the reliability of interpreting these kind of factors when assessing risk? The important thing to flag first of all is that interest in violence is not in itself a sign of risk. Beyond gore consumption, for example, it was much more likely we saw threats coming from those who were starting to directly empathise with mass killers, for example, or stockpiling weapons showing an action orientation.

The most common indicator across this, unsurprisingly, is saying they are going to do it. It doesn't necessarily mean they will, but the hardest part is finding where and when they have said it and, as I will talk about later in the presentation, there are obvious failings across social media platforms around being able to identify these kind of risks.

Many of those in nihilistic violent spaces exhibit paranoid thoughts about being stalked, surveilled or investigated by law enforcement. This is especially pronounced when a participant in a nihilistic subculture might be a perpetrator and a victim of the communities they are active in, which leaves them unwilling to seek help for extortion, report threats of violence or attempt to distance themselves from the groups. And

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outside the UK said it was clear that they had a problem kid who was engaging with these communities online; the question was: "What kind of problem kid we had". I think that kind of speaks to the fact that some of these references, some of these aesthetics, are very challenging to understand where the harm actually is and speaks to the challenge that we have to navigate in equipping those on the frontline with the necessary information and context.

Then the final challenge is that these indicators described here are very often fragmented across a very broad range of platforms. I use the example here of the attack earlier this year in Canada in Tumbler Ridge, where an attacker carried out a mass shooting at their school. If you look at the online profile of this attacker, on Reddit it was obvious the attacker was struggling with their mental health. On the gore platform, "Watch people die", you could see they were addicted to this kind of content through their profile there. They had a highly problematic relationship with AI chatbots, and indeed there has been a lot of controversy around failings by OpenAI and ChatGPT to understand those potential risk factors and desires to enact violence in plotting, using the service.

This obviously layers with offline risk, for example

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there is a dynamic relationship with violence within these communities it's important to flag as well. So a significant number of those engaging in violent nihilistic communities, these members, explicitly identify themselves as non-condoning of violence. So they might be immersed within these ecosystems but they might use the label "Does Not Condone" on their profile, for example.

It is quite a complex dynamic where some users might claim they do not glorify killers but can potentially still play an indirect role in enabling violence, and in some cases there is some self-policing within communities of would-be attackers. So it's important to note that there is not a kind of homogenous community of those who are on a pipeline to enacting violence, even if they are engaging with violent content online.

A couple of other things to flag in interpreting these indicators. The first is the earlier point I made around this being an aesthetic rather than a narrative-based threat, which makes it more challenging to explain what those risks are. It really is a kind of "know it when you see it" case, which is obviously very challenging for threat assessment and mitigation.

One conversation we had recently with a practitioner

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the security of this attacker's parent's gun collection which local law enforcement were very aware of and had been engaging proactively around. This means there is no single window on the threat, which makes it obviously particularly challenging for any kind of individual platform or practitioner or law enforcement agency to kind of have that unitary threat assessment.

So the final part of my presentation will focus on the question of responsibility, specifically where responsibility lies between platforms, regulators and public authorities in identifying disrupting and mitigating online pathways to serious violence.

In this context, some of the key questions that I was thinking about when establishing where that responsibility should lie include: in identification, where the greatest access to relevant insights is, including data access within those spaces. You know, how can we actually understand that online risk? And who has the most comprehensive window on that.

In terms of disruption, who has the power to disrupt these harmful networks and those individuals that are engaging with them, or to add friction to efforts to engage with harmful content in communities online, and are there any additional disruptive powers that can be adapted from other more established toolkits, for

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example countering violent extremism or efforts to counter child abuse rather than reinventing the wheel. And in mitigation, when you are thinking specifically about online spaces, who is best placed to mitigate these online pathways, including by providing timely targeted support to those at acute risk?

Those are some of the guiding questions that will cascade across the following slide.

I just say that here there is of course a spectrum of perspectives that exist around where the responsibility should lie between platforms versus governments or regulators, for example, in identifying and mitigating risk. You might have a very free speech oriented perspectives which really minimise the role of platforms, in particular in the United States the provisions around section 230 that really govern content moderation online are premised on the idea that platforms are not liable for the content they post, which is distinct from the kind of increasing regulatory context in Europe, which is looking to make platforms responsible for harmful content online; whereas you might have more child safety-orientated perspectives which really call for robust platform intervention. I just want to acknowledge that there are a range of legitimate perspectives to consider here.

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they currently exist, are sufficient to deal with the kind of harmful activity that we have been talking about previously.

Improved enforcement against existing terms of service is going to be necessary around existing rules on violence, hate, incitement and abuse, and this analysis shows that actually the vast majority of online behaviours and harms resulting from these subcultures is already within the scope of many platforms' community guidelines. These are platforms that were identified as playing a particularly important role within these subcultures.

So there is not necessarily a need to reinvent the wheel where rules exist. It is important to say that much of the content relevant to nihilistic violence is overtly violative and often illegal, which reduces the threshold decision-making burden for moderators and offers clear routes to recourse within existing policies. The question then, to our mind, is primarily one of effective enforcement.

It is very narrow to look at this purely through a content moderation lens. Yes, it is still far too simple to identify servers dedicated to nihilistic violence on platforms like Discord just through simple keyword searches, and there are clear opportunities to

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I'm going to start with the question of platforms and this is supposed to be indicative rather than readable. But what are platforms' responsibilities? The first thing to say is that, especially in the UK, there are a number of legal responsibilities that exist, both under digital regulation and broader safeguarding duties. Platforms are required to take proportionate measures to protect children from accessing harmful material, as well as protecting broader users from illegal content, including terrorism and child sexual exploitation and abuse content.

One thing I'll note at this point is that this requires robust risk assessment from platforms, and there is currently little sign of platforms doing robust risk assessments around these specific harmful communities. It is really important that the regulator should be able to ask questions about the specific risks that we see, as well as understanding the role each platform plays in this ecosystem which needs a nuanced risk assessment.

So I have this slide up here which is a screengrab from a report we published earlier this year that was analysing platform responses to these nihilistic online subcultures. The short version is that it is a bit of a mixed picture around whether platform policies, as

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prevent the dissemination of tactical guides and materials that could enable extortion or violent attacks. There is technology like hash-sharing, for example, that can identify and provide a digital footprint of specific content that has been used to identify and flag terrorist content that would be easily be applicable here, for example.

Similarly, there is much more that could likely be done to de-prioritise nihilistic content in how it is presented on platforms and how accessible it is, to ensure it is not recommended to individuals outside their immediate network.

But beyond content moderation we have been talking a lot about widening the toolkit of response to these kind of threats, which should really be widened to include the focused enforcement of existing child safety, cyber crime, coordinated inauthentic activity and sexual abuse policy areas. These are often very siloed within platforms and really at the heart of many of the threats we are talking about today, so this requires much greater coordination between these internal policy teams to align and coordinate on the intersection of these disparate harm areas.

There is also a lot of opportunity for increased network disruption, including information sharing

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between platforms to coordinate cross-platform takedowns, given the very broad platform ecosystem I pointed to earlier and to think about more collaborative frameworks for network disruption to really sort of disroot these harmful actors from platforms.

There is some more sharing happening. The EU Internet Forum has been providing a platform for sharing indicators and risks between platforms and member states, and there are examples of where network takedowns have been quite effective, including efforts led by Europol, action days that are designed to take by storm many of these online networks and leave them reeling, rather than engage in a "Whack a mole" moderation effort, to really disroot these online networks.

It is also important to really think about the quite advanced tactics that are used by these networks to avoid bans and to evade moderation. So to be upstream of these efforts that use burner phones, for example, or VPNs, and to have more sophisticated markers for response.

Further upstream there are even more opportunities for platforms to think about interventions and to mitigate the online pathways that individuals travel on

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key resources that exist already that could be much more systematically integrated by platforms into how they are providing support to those communities that are relevant to nihilistic violence.

A few points around the role of the regulator. As mentioned earlier, ISD has quite a strong digital policy focus and has worked closely with regulators such as Ofcom and relevant Government departments in the formulation of the Online Safety Act and digital policies related to that. So in this context, I think it is really important to stress that Ofcom's enforcement of the Online Safety Act provides a really important opportunity to ensure more systematic or systemic approaches, I should say, to platform regulation which are rooted in a few things: effective risk assessment, so platforms are mandated to assess these risks, and to mitigate them, as well as safety by design rather than mandating the removal of illegal or harmful content.

Nihilistic violence itself crosscuts some different elements of the Online Safety Act. You have child safety duties and the protection of children codes that require platforms to take proportionate measures to protect children from accessing harmful material, and you also have illegal content duties that require

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towards violence.

Enhancing platform-level safeguards and looking at opportunities for impactful safety interventions might include much more systematic provision of expert resources, for example, and taking a more proactive approach to community education campaigns around these threats on platforms. There is much more opportunity for empowering community-level interventions. These include equipping moderators in community-driven platforms like Reddit, for example, and Tumblr, with bystander intervention tools and off-ramping resources to really use community as well as the platform itself.

Innovative counter-communications in the counter-extremism domain, there's been a lot of consideration around what effective communication approaches might look like. Platforms have an opportunity themselves to help amplify some of the counter-speech that can engage with some of the subcultural dimensions of these online spaces, while avoiding more ideological de-radicalisation that is less likely to be suitable for this kind of threat; and also building bridges to support services and providing a wider range of safeguarding support within relevant communities and ensuring relevance to specific vulnerable subcultures. Examples here are some of the

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proportionate measures that protect users from materials such as terrorism and child exploitation and abuse content. These levers exist and they are both highly relevant to the threats that we are talking about today.

But a few things to think about include the prominence of alternative platforms within these ecosystems, which mean it is essential that Ofcom is effectively resourced to deal with the longer tail of smaller platforms that are essential to these communities, rather than just focusing on larger platforms. There are some positive initial signs from Ofcom, the standing up of a small but risky task force for example, but it is vital that such platforms are a key focus of Ofcom's efforts to enforce the OSA and the full range of powers that are applied to them, especially when they refuse to engage or co-operate fully.

One other area that I see as recommended to Ofcom is making changes to their approach to categorising contents that is legal but harmful to children, where they distinguish between priority content and primary priority content. Here we recommend upgraded violent content, which is defined quite narrowly within Ofcom's guidance, to include: content which encourages, promotes or provides instruction for an act of serious violence

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against a person from "primary content" to "primary priority content", and this would require services to treat that with equal severity as things like suicide and self-harm content, and actually put it on a par, for example, with pornography which is currently listed as primary priority content. So I think reflecting the harm of this kind of narrowly defined violent content.

A final thought for the regulator is also really considering how harmful content is often embedded within online aesthetics, memes and gaming culture, particularly in communities which are aimed at younger users. These online ecosystems can often lower the psychological barriers to engagements with harmful narratives, particularly for younger audiences. They might not necessarily depict real or realistic serious violence, that definition of violence here, as currently defined in the category but can still play an important role in normalising and inciting serious offline violence in the types of online ecosystems and communities relevant to the Inquiry.

So, as a result, we really recommend that services should also have to assess how design features, recommender systems and trends in aesthetics may inadvertently amplify such harmful content.

Finally, some of the roles for public authorities

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Lord Anderson, and recently the Children's Commissioner, we believe that broader violence prevention frameworks can respond more effectively, and we have proposed a response framework that's more geared towards the spectrum of different forms of extreme violence and their associated harms, which are often motivated and mobilised in similar online environments. This includes recommendations for how to triage threats in a more threat-agnostic manner, including how one might re-organise local structures, integrating multiagency safeguarding hubs with Channel boards, and thinking about where the opportunities are for linking the work of instruments like Prevent oversight boards, serious violence boards and Community Safety Partnerships which are delivering hyper-localised efforts that may be very well placed to coordinate effectively on catching and responding to these threats.

In this context, having a cross-Governmental approach is incredibly important. Especially between the Home Office, where much of this responsibility naturally sits but also engaging with the Department for Education. The case of AR speaks about the unique role that educational establishments have, certainly for addressing these risks among minors and the windows into threat they have as well. But also the Department of

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that emerge from this analysis. So you will hear, certainly throughout the course of this Inquiry, I am sure, the emphasis on the importance of a public health approach towards curbing extreme violence. An important stipulation is that an overly narrow counter-terrorism approach that focuses solely on ideological threats fails to reflect some of the dramatic threats we have seen in the landscape of extremism, adjacent violent threats we are talking about today.

The public health approach really focuses on behaviours, minimising risk factors, boosting protective factors, serving to strengthen individuals as well as communities holistically and build resilience and reduce the opportunities for violent actors to leverage grievances or social challenges. It also provides a sort of non-securitised, more ideology agnostic framework which offers much more flexibility to adapt to the kinds of emergent threats that we are discussing today.

Part of this is also the need for an updated architecture of prevention. Nihilistic violence and other hybridised threats have landed in Prevent's portfolio, not by design but due to the absence of other support services, resulting in overloading and inappropriate triage service. As argued by

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Health and Social Care, really understanding the common public health mission that is being endeavoured here, providing an efficient way to leverage existing programming rather than recreating prevention systems from the ground up.

Rather than seeking to expand counter-extremism to stretch across all parts of Government, such an effort would be framed around addressing the intrinsic interplay between healthier societies and violence reduction.

In terms of interventions themselves, it is really important that intervention provision reflects the diminishing role of formalised groups and increased prominence of harmful online communities in driving violence. Interventions aimed at curbing engagement with violent extremist ideology must adapt to more decentralised networks and self-initiated individuals, with practitioners empowered to understand evolving risk factors, proactively communicating these risk factors to caregivers and frontline professionals.

This includes more diverse touch points with perhaps underutilised parts of these systems. For example, where self-harm is an indicator of potentially risky trajectories, or animal abuse, we need to be engaging, for example, more systematically with veterinarians or

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1 family services in understanding what some of the risks
 2 are in frontline exposure.
 3 And as mentioned earlier, school age is especially
 4 key for identification and intervention where there is
 5 this kind of ticking clock of opportunity to engage with
 6 those who are in those institutional settings.
 7 More bespoke protective and safeguarding programming
 8 that is geared towards young people is also
 9 a fundamental part of the intervention architecture.
 10 Given some of the clear nexuses to neurodivergence,
 11 mental illness and social isolation, tailored
 12 interventions must focus on addressing underlying
 13 vulnerabilities. The strong linkages with grooming and
 14 other forms of manipulation really require some of the
 15 expert safeguarding support for the children involved
 16 that has been quite absent from the system to date. The
 17 spread of harms emanating from such networks demand this
 18 kind of strong multi-agency collaboration at both
 19 a national and local level, but also integrate expertise
 20 from other areas that have been underutilised, including
 21 anti-grooming, child abuse and the violence against
 22 women and girls sector where there are hugely relevant
 23 insights that could inform intervention and risk
 24 assessment.
 25 There is a question around strategic communications

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1 already the importance of tips from allies in flagging
 2 risk and the high level of connectivity in grooming and
 3 radicalisation that's happening between different
 4 country contexts.
 5 So inter-governmental communication will be vital to
 6 comprehensively address the transnational nature
 7 inherent to these kinds of emerging forms of threat.
 8 The tragedy of Southport perhaps provides an opportunity
 9 for the UK to drive the international conversation among
 10 European and (unclear) partners that are facing quite
 11 similar challenges, by sharing insights around what
 12 works in prevention, building collaborative strategies
 13 and developing more joined up countermeasures around
 14 shared emerging threats such as nihilistic violence.
 15 I will leave the presentation there but look forward
 16 to answering your questions.
 17 **MR MOSS:** Thank you very much.
 18 **SIR ADRIAN FULFORD:** Thank you very much indeed.
 19 **MR MOSS:** May we resume promptly please at 11.05 am.
 20 **SIR ADRIAN FULFORD:** Certainly. I will rise.
 21 **(10.55 am)**
 22 **(A short break)**
 23 **(11.05 am)**
 24 **SIR ADRIAN FULFORD:** Yes, Mr Moss.
 25 **MR MOSS:** Thank you, sir. Dr Ebner, please.

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1 and interventions in online spaces which I think is at
 2 a very early stage of development and there's relatively
 3 little evidence around what is effective in this area,
 4 but certainly this needs to be rooted in an up to date
 5 understanding of this contemporary online extremist
 6 landscape, and learn lessons from what has and hasn't
 7 worked with almost two decades now of campaigns and
 8 programmes that are aimed at behavioural and attitudinal
 9 change.
 10 Likely essential to this will be public awareness
 11 communications, both to at risk communities and their
 12 caregivers, focusing on identifying risks and first
 13 response routes. There is a good example of
 14 a March 2025 FBI communication which provides a really
 15 clear example of what some of the potential indicators
 16 and warning signs might look like, which might be
 17 packaged and communicated to key stakeholders through
 18 schools, informal community settings and parent groups
 19 as well as in social media.
 20 I will just end by talking about the transnational
 21 nature of this threat. It is incredibly important to
 22 get the systems right in the UK, whilst also recognising
 23 that these communities of nihilistic violence are
 24 incredibly transnational and really demand coordinated
 25 responses from Government partners. We have seen

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1 **Presentation by DR EBNER**
 2 **DR EBNER:** Thank you so much for the opportunity to give
 3 evidence to this important Inquiry. As Milo mentioned
 4 earlier, it is very much in the hope to prevent future
 5 attacks of this kind -- yes, to prevent future attacks.
 6 I will build on some of what my previous speaker,
 7 Milo Comerford mentioned and presented in his earlier
 8 presentation. I think there are a lot of commonalities
 9 and overlaps in the work that we have done. I'm also
 10 affiliated with the Institute for Strategic Dialogue,
 11 but I will also building on some of my academic work at
 12 the University of Oxford as well as some of my
 13 investigative analysis which I did for my books and
 14 which is based on my immersive work on the inside of
 15 extremists and violent extremist online communities.
 16 I will start by spending some time on the evolution
 17 of online extremist and nihilistic spaces where I think
 18 we see a very strong pattern that has developed over the
 19 last ten years. I started working on online extremism
 20 research and radicalisation research around 14 years
 21 ago -- no, 12 years ago -- and so I think in the
 22 meantime, I will just get the numbers right -- yes,
 23 ten years ago, sorry.
 24 So I will start by looking a little bit or taking
 25 a closer look at some of the trends that have built up

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on this threat that we are currently facing and some of the emerging trends that Milo mentioned already.

Here is the overview of some of the reports that ISD has done on this topic. I think what we can clearly see is that there is a very strong sense that this is in a way several different trends that we have been observing over the last decade coming together. The first trend I want to mention in this context is the trend of gamified terrorism and the gamification of violence and this desire to compete for higher scores in some of the online communities that pre-date the nihilistic.com networks or the True Crime Community or the 764 movement.

Let's take a quick look at this form of gamified violence or gamified terrorism, especially when it comes to these online communities. I first started monitoring the communities that were celebrating the Christchurch attack in 2019, and there was a really strong glorification of the attacker that happened at the time and I already -- even in the direct aftermath of that attack -- saw first hand how participants in that community and some of the sympathisers of that community started sharing calls for new attacks, and in a way called some of the previous attackers, like Anders Breivik, the Norwegian terrorist, called them saints and

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that's something I might come to towards the end of the presentation.

But first let me draw out some of the other emerging trends we have been observing over the last decade that -- yeah -- are coming together in this newer threat landscape.

Another trend worth mentioning, and I am sure some of the other speakers will deal with this more closely, but is the emergence of DIY terrorism and copycat attacks, and also taking inspiration from manuals such as the Al-Qaeda manual but also other self-improvised weapons manuals or in general just manuals on how to carry out an attack, and also the ease at which this is now possible and how this is also technologically facilitated. Especially now also in the age of AI there is a whole -- we also have to very closely follow the latest trends on this and see how LLMs can provide new ways of building your own weapons or using self-improvised weapons in attacks. So I think there is also a need to constantly monitor these emerging facilitators of self-improvised and DIY terrorism and violence.

Then there is of course also tactical inspiration, because on the internet a lot of these attackers' records and the stories, the biographies and the ways in

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glorified them in other ways. They also shared lists of different score boards, for example: how you would get higher scores for hitting different targets or for increasing the number of deaths in an attack. So there was this very strong emerging trend of gamifying violence but also of really glorifying violence and also painting the attackers and the perpetrators behind these attacks as saints or as role models.

So even after Christchurch, in the immediate aftermath we saw a copycat effect taking place with, for example, the attacker in Halle sharing -- before his attack sharing a manifesto that also outlined a list of achievements where he specifically gamified the act of violence and, for example, gave himself scores, before the attack, kind of outlined the types of scores that he could potentially achieve in the attack. It very much built on what already the Christchurch attacker had done in his manifesto and in his live-streamed attack with this online community. So it was really catering to this audience.

Now, the case here of AR is of course different in the sense that he wasn't embedded, as Milo mentioned, at least not formally to our knowledge not embedded in these online communities that glorify violence, but the underlying psychological dynamics might be similar, and

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which they carried out their attacks or planned their attacks stays alive. Even if the content is taken down, in many cases it still can be found and can be searched for. There is also the tactical inspiration effect that we need to monitor closely because we saw that previous attackers have often imitated or copied also the tactics that were used by other attackers, sometimes even drawing their names on the weapons they used.

Then the third trend, and Milo already covered this to some extent, is the emerging ecosystem in the online space, where you have a mix of different types of platforms -- the mainstream platforms -- but also the encrypted and alternative tech platforms, short "alt tech", where sometimes the first mobilisation or the first recruitment or even just inspiration or even just first sight of something that inspires someone to become sometimes fixated with violence or extremist ideologies, happens on some of the fringe platforms.

It can also happen on the larger platforms in particular now that the takedown measures are not being carried out to the same extent that they were, I would say, five years ago, because of the changes in how platforms, in particular X, approach takedowns of accounts or violence-inciting content. But there is this ecosystem that I think is really key to

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understanding how the threat landscape has evolved because of the strong cross-platform trends in how campaigns are being run by -- whether that's loose online communities or whether that's by the more traditionally organised groups and the more ideologically-driven groups.

So that's the third trend, and I will come back to the cross-platform threat later on.

But the fourth trend again in the build-up to what we are seeing now, with especially the rise in youth radicalisation and also the rise of nihilistic violence, is the youth-centred online landscape, in terms of campaigns, in terms of communication materials that are being produced that really tailor their content to young people, and in particular sometimes even minors or school-age children who are exposed to this type of content.

Again, this is a mix of tapping into online hobby communities, into gaming spaces, some of the ones that Milo showed on the screen but also sometimes even the fitness or combat sports communities or other types of hobby communities that are not inherently ideological spaces or that are not inherently violence spaces but are really just there for either for entertainment or for community and for identity and belonging. That's

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ideologies or other types of dangerous ideologies to young audiences through that social aspect of being part of a videogame community or playing a game, while you are actually playing for example on the side of the Nazis or where everyone uses usernames that signal something inherently extremist.

So this is Patriotic Alternative, for example, that hosted a Call of Duty competition. Most of these examples are clearly ideological. I want to show this because it is part of the wider -- I think of the wider evolution of what we see now, that it is still very much youth-centred and we see some of the same grooming tactics are used by the nihilistic movement. This means that some of what young people are exposed to is not necessarily any more driven by any one clearly organised movement or hierarchical organisation that follows a clear ideology, but they might be exposed to a complete mix of different types of ideologies, different types of violent materials which they sometimes can't clearly place into one category, and that leads to a more mixed, unstable and unclear threat landscape. In a way I do think that is part of the online architecture that a lot of young people, even just on Telegram, have different channels and you might be getting at the same time Satanist or sadistic type of

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I think one of the biggest dangers at the moment is that a lot of the extremist groups and also some of the looser movements have managed to hijack and really exploit some of these online hobby communities that were meant to be there for different purposes. That is also reflected in some of the propaganda campaigns that you can see here on the screen which shows again the evolution of this -- I mean this dates back already to ISIS, where ISIS used a lot of the gamified propaganda that was tailored at very young audiences. Even back ten years ago, ISIS did produce a lot of its propaganda kind of referencing video games such as Call of Duty, turning it into "Call of Jihad", to call for young people to join their fight in Syria and Iraq and to join their territory and become foreign fighters.

But then also the alt-right in the US copied that with using Pepe the Frog memes, in general memes and using satire. There has been a cross-inspiration again back to the Salafi jihadist networks where they have also now adopted some of these memes and tactics from the alt-right because it has been so effective in reaching young people.

Then there are other types of movements, like for example that even host their own video games and try to in a way bring their ideologies, sometimes racist

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content, as well as misogynistic content as well as perhaps even some Islamist-inspired of content in just one account. You could have in theory various channels you are subscribed to, and because of the ways in which this is transported across this entire ecosystem online, I do think that we have a very new way of needing to look at the threat landscape, which is a lot more comprehensive and a lot more complex as well.

This brings me to what is at the heart of all of these types of violence-fixated but also violent extremist actors. Is there anything that they share that they have in common? Is there something that we can learn from other types of violent extremism, and mass violence really, that has been studied for much longer than this emerging trend of nihilistic violence? I do believe that the answer is yes, but that it is very difficult at this stage to point the finger on exactly what it is.

It is clearly not ideologies and I think that's something that has come out quite strongly from some of the previous presentations and from also the Inquiry itself so far, that there is a sense that the ideological background of, in particular, AR is very unclear and it doesn't fit any of the traditional categories.

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1 But there might be something in the underlying
2 psychology that is worth at least taking a closer look
3 at. So I want to dive a bit deeper into some of the
4 research that my colleagues and I have done on what
5 drives individuals to commit mass atrocities, to commit
6 extreme forms of violence across various different parts
7 of whether it is ideological spectrum or it can also be
8 in a completely non-ideological context.

9 There is quite a lot of research, in particular in
10 the space of evolutionary and cognitive anthropology but
11 also borrowing from social psychology and other
12 disciplines that we are building on. My colleagues, for
13 example, have done different studies. I will show you
14 in a second in what types of contexts, but they have
15 found there is a pattern in how individuals who are
16 ready to go all the way to launching a big campaign,
17 a big violent campaign that might also come at -- in
18 a way it is also a self-sacrificial campaign because
19 most attackers know that they will either be imprisoned
20 for life or die in the process, and also their families,
21 it is also -- it comes at a very high cost to their own
22 lives and their own families.

23 So the question is why would anyone do that?
24 Different studies have shown that there is this
25 extremely strong form of "identity fusion", as it is

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1 football clubs with other communities, but that's on
2 a much more superficial level. We then identify perhaps
3 with perhaps these groups' norms or ideologies or
4 values, but we don't identify in the sense that we don't
5 become one with that group, in terms of our identities.

6 So that's why identity fusion is very different,
7 both in terms of where it comes from because also
8 identification comes from repeated low arousal rituals
9 with a group. For example, it is the typical -- in the
10 sense of if you think about ideological groups, it is
11 the typical form of ideological indoctrination,
12 repeatedly being exposed to some type of content or some
13 type ritual that can makes you identify with a group.
14 It can also take a positive form. But identity fusion
15 comes from these really deep potentially traumatic
16 events that you share with a community or with
17 an in-group.

18 So that's separate, and identity fusion has been
19 very strongly linked, especially when there is
20 a perceived threat from an out-group, has been very
21 strongly linked to a willingness to commit violence or
22 to engage in very high risk activities to supposedly
23 protect the threatened in-group from an out-group
24 threat.

25 So the question here is -- so it has been link to

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1 called, with -- it can be with an in-group. I will show
2 you in a second why it is not always with an in-group
3 but let's start with the in-group and why that's such
4 a strong form of intense group bonding or intense --
5 yeah, it can be an intense driver of violence.

6 So identity fusion is when your personal self
7 becomes one with an in-group. As I will show you in
8 a second, it can also be identity fusion with a concept,
9 with something more abstract potentially, or at least
10 with someone, with one person, with a role model, for
11 example, a violent leader or some kind of violent
12 perpetrator, but it could also be potentially with the
13 concept of violence itself.

14 But let's start with the identity fusion with
15 an in-group, because that's where most of the research
16 has been done previously. So usually the way to fusion
17 is through shared traumatic experiences with
18 an in-group. If you experience a really transformative
19 life event or some kind of traumatic event that you
20 share and reflect on with an in-group, that can produce
21 really intense forms of group bonding called identity
22 fusion. That's separate from another type of group
23 cohesion which is identification. We often talk about
24 how we identity with different groups and most of us do
25 identify with hobby communities with maybe local

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1 fight and die responses. The question here is can this
2 also happen not just fusion with an in-group but can it
3 also happen with something more abstract? And some of
4 the answers given by a couple of studies conducted
5 previously would say yes. There have been signs that
6 individuals could fuse with, for example, causes or with
7 ideas. For example, with the idea of the guns rights
8 movement for example, but guns rights, or anti-abortion
9 concepts.

10 So I think there is -- and this is still
11 hypothetical at this point but there is need for more
12 research into looking at if this really potent
13 phenomenon of identity fusion might also have an impact
14 on people's willingness to carry out an act of violence
15 if they become fixated with a specific issue or topic.

16 Of course in this case here of the Inquiry, the
17 question is: is it possible to become so fixated with
18 the concept of mass violence that your identity, your
19 self concept becomes one with it and you are more
20 willing to commit an act of violence for this concept in
21 a way, or as part of your identity?

22 We also -- there have been quite a lot of studies as
23 I said in various different contexts that show that this
24 phenomenon of identity fusion and its links to violence
25 is -- can be observed in various different geographies,

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also in different types of violent conflicts across -- football hooligans in the UK and Brazil, also revolutionary battalions in Libya as well as among Indonesian fundamentalists, as well as in Cameroon in herder and farmer conflicts. So this is a very strong shared psychological ground for committing extreme acts of violence.

We then link this in some of our previous papers to the idea of -- or to the concept of extreme overvalued beliefs which perhaps Professor Paul Gill is going to talk about a little bit because it is very strongly associated with cases of lone-actor grievance-fuelled violence, or it has been shown to play some role -- or let's say fixation overall, of which extreme overvalued beliefs can be seen as a type of fixation has been shown to play a strong role in many of the cases. I believe something like 80 per cent of violent cases that were analysed showed some form of -- where the attacker showed some form of fixation.

One question here is also is there a link between this extreme form of fixation or extreme overvalued beliefs and your own identities, or what impact do these extreme overvalued ideas or this fixation on something, on potentially on mass atrocities and violence as such, what link does that have to one's own identity? And is

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complement any types of automated or seemingly automated risk assessments that we can now do increasingly with AI and with large language models, always complement that with strong human oversight and manual investigations.

I did a lot of work for my doctoral studies on understanding common linguistic patterns but also the underlying psychological patterns in the communication materials of convicted terrorists. So I carried out a manifesto analysis and also analysed the chat logs of convicted terrorists and violent extremists of different ideological leanings, and we did find that there were really strong patterns in the language and there are also of course other studies that have taken very complementary approaches, and I will mention some of these in a second but I'm also some of the other speakers have covered other elements of what can be traced in language, so this is just one lens into it, but language really I think is, on so many levels, an important window into these deeper psychological risk factors but also onto operational leakage factors.

So this work focused more on understanding language as a window into someone's psychology, rather than into understanding the operational recurring patterns, of which there are many and of which I think the intelligence agencies are already more aware of than

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it possible to -- that fixation leads to a form of fusion of one's identity with that concept?

In that paper, we looked at some of the case studies and we argued that, yes, there is a very strong link between becoming fixated with something and then also one's identity really becoming one and becoming basically equivalent to that concept.

So for AR, could it have been that he was -- that his self concept was really strongly building on this idea of being inherently violent and that he consumed so much violent content, which perhaps in itself is also -- was also traumatising, that he actually fused with that violence and mass violence concept.

That's extremely important to understand further and to hopefully study further especially as we look into a future where there is potentially more of this type of content being shared, and in particular in some of these nihilistic communities where individuals are exposed to extremely traumatic types of content and might also have a family history of trauma or of -- in addition to that.

So the next question is whether we can spot some of the signs of these psychological phenomena in language and what that would mean for threat detection. I want to first start by saying that I think we need to be extremely cautious with that and need to always

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some of the underlying psychological factors.

So, first the operational leakage and the work that has been done in this space. There is already quite a lot of really significant and really important work on detecting online signals of violence mobilisation; in particular, logistical planning, of course also anything that points towards actual weapons being used, operational planning. But also some other patterns that have been observed in, for example, users' punctuation, the use of lots of exclamation marks and similar patterns, that were shown to be linked to mobilisation towards offline violence.

I am sure we will hear more from some of the other speakers about those ways of looking at language and at risk detection as well.

But as I said, the work that we have been doing through more of a psychological and anthropological lens has focused on understanding the psychological patterns that are inherent to language. We found that there has been -- there was a pattern that consisted of four ingredients. I'm actually going to jump to the next slide here -- which we call "the deadly cocktail of violent extremism" because it needs all four ingredients to some extent to be present for it to really have a high impact on the risk that an individual will commit

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an act of violence, at least based on the analysis and the limited samples that we have been able to analyse.

Of course also I have to say that manifestos, we first did the manifesto analysis and then we analysed the chat logs of violent extremist online communities, and there are limitations in terms of what we could analyse and also there are of course also limitations in terms of the signals that we analysed. We actually did analyse much more than these four ingredients but we analysed everything that we found in previous studies to be highlighted as important risk factors operating on a psychological or sociopsychological level.

So the recurring factors were, as I mentioned earlier, this phenomenon of identity fusion, this extremely strong sense of being fused with a group or with a concept for which you are willing to also commit an act of violence if needed, but also combined with an idea of existential threat or with a perceived existential threat, as well as in many cases out-group othering and violence-condoning norms or some kind of violence justification or even violence glorification.

I think a lot of this research has implications also for the AI case that we are looking at here, in particular because the violence glorification was very present and this idea potentially of fusion with the

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Hitler, for example, but now our current analysis buildings on that and includes over 100 authoritarian leaders from the last century to also look at how these factors might actually be similar and psychological similar, not just in non-state actors but also state actors who use extreme forms of violence against civilians.

So we then also had control groups of non-violent ideologically extreme individuals who published manifestos as well as of just average political manifestos but that are moderate or non-violent and non-extreme in terms of their content.

We then in a second step carried out the online analysis of movements and communities online that have been tied -- that have either been tied to offline violence or in our control group that have no or very limited relation or links to offline violence and we found -- again we found the same patterns also in those analyses on these online, more organic online chat logs and online communities.

So, one of the most recent studies, and this has not yet been published but this is a pre-print, is about the differences between some of the more -- some of the newer movements. So we analysed different Telegram communities, including the nihilistic Telegram groups

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concept of violence, that is something that I think needs to be explored further, but even with this cocktail I should also highlight this is something that showed up as significant across the cases that we examined but of course there is also room for potentially a completely separate pathway to extreme forms of violence.

Nonetheless, because it was so significant in our analysis, I do think it would be useful to further investigate to what extent some of these factors might have played a role and might be of relevance to the Southport Inquiry.

Here's an overview of the manifestos that we analysed. As you can see, we looked -- we did both qualitative and quantitative analysis and we coded the manifestos into the violent manifestos of convicted terrorists. We also analysed manifestos of heads of state, which we are now continuing in our ongoing work. We are actually looking at similar psychological patterns that can potentially be traced and early findings show that indeed they can be traced in violent heads of state and in leaders who carry out genocidal campaigns or campaigns of mass violence.

So here this was just the first case where we included some of these state actors. We also included

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from 764 as well as Terrorgram which was an accelerationist Neo-Nazi community on Telegram, as well as a white supremacist communities on Telegram. So we had these three different groups or communities on Telegram for comparison, and here we actually found there were no clear commonalities in the ideologies, they all had separate ideologies. The Neo-Nazi Terrogram of course had a few overlaps with the white supremacist channels in terms of racist and national -- white nationalist ideologies, but 764 had a very unclear ideological picture. As we would assume from previous studies, there was an incoherent ideological picture that was painted through the language analysis that we did and through some of the topic modelling that we did.

What we did, however, find is again that we had the presence of the same psychology markers, so the deadly cocktail model that I showed earlier, that actually did show up in all three communities and was also on a significantly higher level observable than in just average non-violent communities that we analysed in the control group.

So, again, the results here show that even in the nihilistic community, despite the absence of an ideological similarity with these more traditional violent extremist spaces, there was a similarity in the

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ideological make-up. So potentially something to investigate further because this was really just a first study which I believe I also shared with the Inquiry. So I'm also happy to share whatever our follow-up paper will show later on.

To conclude, I very strongly believe that we need to go beyond ideologically-based threat assessment and I also think that we need to go beyond the purely operational leakage-focused threat detection. I think those two have been the main pillars so far of a lot of the threat assessment work: either it is clear signs of very clearly isolated ideological pathways to extremism or to violent extremism, or it is that very strong operational leakage signs that individuals have been preparing for an act of violence.

I think both remain important but, in addition to that, I really believe that there is a stronger focus that's needed on psychological shared patterns that we have been able to find, and in particular also looking at language as a window into these psychological patterns. Especially now with the emerging and ongoing challenges of more possibilities for self-improvised weapons but also more possibilities for the sort of post-organisational mobilisation to violence and also a rise in lone-actors, in violent lone-actors, and also

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the use of satire, the use of gamification, and all of these elements, I think looking at the underlying psychological elements becomes all the more important, because it is agnostic in some form, in some ways, to the underlying ideology or the absence of ideology; it is also agnostic to any type of propaganda or attempt to camouflage an ideology. Even if you use satire or you use gamification, we would assume that there are still patterns and still markers of our psychological concepts that can be traced in the language of users.

Yes, I would hope that we can do more research into that and that also the future will give us more clarity on the underlying psychology of these terrible tragedies and give us, in a way, a better understanding of the threat landscape but also the power to prevent future attacks of this kind. Thank you.

MR MOSS: Thank you, Dr Ebner.

Sir, Dr Ebner's logistics mean that she will be departing shortly but will re-join us, joining remotely, for the plenary session later and we are most grateful to her for accommodating us in that way.

May we say, please, 11.55 am?

SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: Certainly. I will rise.

(11.40 am)

(A short break)

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(11.55 am)

SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: Yes, Mr Moss.

MR MOSS: Thank you, sir. Dr Whittaker, please.

Presentation by DR WHITTAKER

DR WHITTAKER: Good morning. I just want to start by echoing Milo and Julia's point, it is really a privilege to be able to help contribute to such an important Inquiry.

I'm going to talk a little bit about the kind of online space that violence fixated individuals are inhabiting and then also try and think about looking very specifically at case studies to try and understand whether some of the theoretical concerns that exist are actually playing out in practice.

So just as an overview of the questions that I was asked to cover within this talk. What the role of social media algorithms plays in engagement in niche communities and online anonymity play in escalation pathways? How the use of emerging technologies influences violence-fixated individuals, and then how specific platform features, private messaging, anonymity, live-streaming content sharing tools et cetera, how they can affect these pathways too. Rather than taking them one by one what I have tried to do is develop a bit of a methodology which hopefully

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will speak to all of them rather than just going one at a time.

As mentioned, part one of this will be looking at adjacent fields. There is not a lot of research on violence-fixated individuals. As Milo said, this is something that doesn't really exist as a terminology outside of the UK and it is certainly very recent as a field of study.

So I will look at adjacent fields, be that terrorism, mass murder and other things, to try and understand what the theoretical threats are, and then in the second part I have run a small sample case study analysis of 13 people that I deem to be violence-fixated individuals to try and understand if those theoretical research-led concerns are borne out in practice.

Before starting, I have alluded to this already, but as a concept violence-fixated individuals is still somewhat underdeveloped. What I think we will see, and I don't want to pre-empt what Paul will speak about next, is that a lot of these individuals, who have similar characteristics, may end up in different criminal populations. So a lot of big database studies of terrorism, including one that I was involved in, will end up having a lot of violence-fixated individuals for whom ideology is not the core driving factor.

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Similarly, a lot of individuals may commit one act -- a murder or something like that and then won't gain the notoriety and therefore it's not as easy to understand if they are violence-fixated individuals. Also some people may end up engaging in kind of -- I won't use the word lesser -- but non-murder crimes, GBH, ABH, things like that, and they still have that fixation with violence but again they don't show up in these big samples of individuals.

I think what I'm trying to say is this is by no means meant to be systematic because we will never truly understand the true scope of people who are violence-fixated, but my analysis is going to focus on some very well known case studies that have had large casualties and kind of high levels of media coverage.

Thinking about the existing research. The first question I was asked was about recommendation algorithms. So this is something which has really become central to all of our lives at this point, really. Anyone who is active on social media or a host of other online platforms will know that this is an activity which is primarily algorithmically driven, be it feed-based systems like Twitter, X or Facebook; be it content media like Netflix; be it Up Next type architecture like TikTok or YouTube shorts, it is very

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majority of studies were either thinking about ideological extremism, mis- and disinformation, be it Covid, Russia Ukraine, think the other kind of health stuff. They were almost all looking at YouTube. For some technical reasons I won't go into now, but almost all of the studies were focused on YouTube. We know very little about Facebook, Instagram, TikTok et cetera, and there is a very high prevalence towards English language too. So some really big gaps.

For example, we know very little and I will speak a little bit later about YouTube communities of school shooter glamourisation. That's not really showing up in the research as we see it today.

I think the main takeaway is that there is quite good evidence that these algorithms, particularly on YouTube, will promote and amplify legal but harmful content. So non-illegal extremist content and mis- and disinformation. It wasn't all of the studies. Some showed other things but for the most part, that's the main take away.

But, in terms of illegal content, there is very limited evidence that this is being amplified. It is possible -- I mean it is clearly the case that there is less illegal content on platforms like YouTube, Facebook, Instagram now than there was 15 years ago, but

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highly sophisticated algorithms that are driving this, and it is important to note as well that of all of the big mainstream platforms these are also driven by artificial intelligence machine learning. We don't really understand how they work. We have clues. Platforms have been forced, due to legislation like the Online Safety Act and the Digital Services Act to give some more transparency but we still don't really know quite how they work.

I have just completed a meta review on studies which look at whether these kind of algorithms promotes problematic content, not just extremism but a range of different things that we can kind of group together as online harms. This has been a long concern. Essentially since platforms started to personalise their systems with these kind of algorithms, people immediately started expressing concern that there was this filter bubble effect and people would become trapped in views in which they already disagreed with and they would not be shown any cross-cutting view points, particularly prescient with things like terrorism where it is assumed to play a very important role in radicalisation pathways amongst a lot of people.

So within this Meta of use, we looked at about 50 studies, and what we basically found was the vast

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again even a cursory look at these platforms it's very easy to find illegal content. As it stands, the main takeaway is: legal but harmful, good evidence to suggest it is being amplified; illegal content, not so much.

Linking this back to violence-fixated individuals, I think this probably means that it is possible that someone could become immersed in a very specific topic, focused on or around violence, perhaps weapons too. Social media algorithms can play a role in facilitating this but it's probably not illegal content, for example, like live-streaming of terrorist attacks and things like that too. It is probably things that would get around these AI filters that these platforms are using to moderate.

The second question was about niche communities. The first that I will mention is gore sites. Now, this is something which has been kind of a big concern for two or three years within the extremism space.

Gore content is incredibly easy to find on the internet. Some of the biggest platforms, there is several dozen platforms and they are relatively laxly moderated, if at all. I do note that the biggest player in this space did recently age-gate their content. This only happened in the last few months. But it is still very easy to get around and age assurance is not at

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1 a point where that can necessarily keep children out,
2 and it is still, yes, very easy to find this kind of
3 content.

4 Research done by some colleagues at VOX-Pol found
5 that these gore sites are used to host terrorist
6 propaganda, be that the Christchurch attack, be that the
7 Buffalo attack, assassination of Charlie Kirk, things
8 like that very highly prevalent there. It is also
9 important to note that these platforms, a lot of them
10 have functionality which means it is very easy to share
11 to social media, which then places an emphasis on the
12 social media platforms to proactively detect it.
13 Content can also be downloaded as well and then shared
14 from person to person.

15 We have also got Com networks. I won't do too much
16 on this because Milo has already done about 40 minutes
17 on these spaces, but simply to say that this has also
18 become a key policy concern within recent years. Groups
19 such as 764, No Lives Matter, essentially, a range of
20 different deviant online activity. Generally attempting
21 to recruit young people, usually girls between the age
22 of 11-15, through mainstream social media websites.
23 Milo had a good graphic for it, so think Discord,
24 Roblox, Instagram, TikTok, Snapchat. Then take them to
25 more protected parts of the internet where they can

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1 These communities exist on the dark corners of the
2 internet. So Telegram, Discord, but also on mainstream
3 parts too. You can log into YouTube and find people
4 glamourising this kind of content very easily, and X as
5 well. So that ISD research that Milo was speaking about
6 before, identified at least 18 school shootings or
7 disrupted attack plots since the beginning of 2024 that
8 were linked to the True Crime Community.

9 There are also extremist communities too. It is
10 worth highlighting there is quite a lot of overlapping
11 here as well. If you, for example, took Jihadist,
12 Islamist communities, there is obviously a long history
13 and big online library of extremely gory violent video
14 propaganda, execution videos, things like this.
15 Similarly, incel spaces often highlight extreme gore and
16 dehumanisation of women.

17 So going back to the study at the top on gore sites,
18 it is very common to find incel spaces on their forums
19 directing people to these kind of gore sites
20 particularly when the targets of the violence are women
21 and girls.

22 So I think just to try and link all this together,
23 it is very easy to see that someone who does have
24 a fascination with violence has several different places
25 that they could fulfil that kind of need to engage with

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1 engage them in sextortion, grooming and try and
2 incentivise them to self-harm on camera, or harm others
3 on camera.

4 Research is also only starting to come out on this
5 now, but this study was particularly important that came
6 out a couple of months ago. The researchers here, the
7 team at UCL, looked at the behaviours of 29 individuals
8 and they kind of grouped them into different pathways,
9 and importantly they found that fascination with
10 violence was prevalent in some pathways in quite
11 important ways, and that often went alongside mental
12 health and neurodevelopmental conditions.

13 We also have niche communities online that are
14 interested in school shooters, as well as a broader
15 interest in true crime too.

16 So, there has been an interest online in school
17 shooters, essentially immediately after the Columbine
18 attack in 1999. That attack, for a lot of these
19 communities it is really the central part -- the two
20 individuals who conducted that attack are glamourised,
21 lionised, people even dress like them, they're spoken
22 about in very positive terms. Research by ISD, which
23 Milo has already spoken about, has highlighted that this
24 has resulted in copycat incidents and people looking to
25 gain notoriety by conducting similar types of attacks.

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1 this kind of content and it doesn't necessarily exist in
2 the deepest darkest corners of the internet. These
3 often are relatively easy to find and are able to fill
4 kind of an individual's need if they do have
5 a fascination with violence.

6 These spaces can provide an almost unlimited,
7 unfiltered supply of violent gory material and they also
8 may dehumanise or call for violence against members of
9 the public too.

10 The next question is about online anonymity. I have
11 put this into two -- I think there are two major
12 concerns here when we are talking about anonymity. The
13 first is the effect on the individual. Research into
14 online radicalisation for the past 20/30 years has
15 regularly spoken about a concern that the anonymity
16 provided by the internet may cause people to act in
17 a different way than they normally. So, famously the
18 online disinhibition effect is essentially emboldened by
19 anonymity and, as the theory goes, it makes people act
20 in a more toxic, more confrontational, less inhibited
21 way. A cursory look at social media can lend some
22 support to that. People will say things online to each
23 other that they would never say face to face. There is
24 quite good evidence and quite a lot of research to
25 suggest that this does make online posting more toxic.

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But I think as research into radicalisation goes, we don't really have a lot of evidence to suggest that it plays a primary role in radicalisation pathways. Not to say it is not important but there has not been any major research that paints that firm link between the two.

I think the bigger concern is the security that can be provided using online anonymous software. We are now in a stage and technological innovation by malignant actors is always something of a cat and mouse game, but we are currently at a stage where the ability to remain anonymous to conduct devious activities online is extremely easy and it is very easy to mask your steps without potentially law enforcement or other stakeholders finding you.

So, for example, thinking about messaging apps that can be used, these are generally both anonymous and secure, backed up by end-to-end encryption and decentralisation. We have already heard about Telegram, Matrix, Rocket.Chat. These are all spaces used by terrorists and they have either minimal or no moderation at all. There are also online forums which people can post on, either completely anonymously, such as the Chan boards, or pseudo-anonymously where you have to make a username too. Again, those don't necessarily have the same level of security but do allow people to post

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good reason to think that they have quite a high degree of protection and can act anonymously in a lot of ways.

Then moving on to emerging technology. Obviously, we are hearing a lot at the moment about the concern of artificial intelligence. So within the terrorism space we are seeing it being used to either create propaganda or edit existing propaganda. That can be everything from kind of creating your own visuals to simply translating things into as many different languages as possible. It can also be creating deep fakes which are becoming more and more sophisticated. There is also a concern about chatbots and large language models. There is often a concern of chatbots radicalisation. We know they are programmed to agree with the person using it and tell them how brilliant and amazing they are.

People point to the Windsor Castle plot, at which an individual who had an AI partner, for lack of a better phrase, was said to play a big role in motivating that individual. I do note that these are very much the exception rather than the rule at this point. This is not something we are seeing in a widespread way within the terrorism space right now.

More presciently, we see chatbots being used for a facilitative role instead. It might be online reconnaissance. It might be perhaps in the context of

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completely anonymously. These forums also tend not to comply with court order requests if they believe illegal activity has been conducted.

There is also the dark web, which is both anonymous and secure. Again, using the onion router you can layer your IP address and your whereabouts to make it extremely difficult for anyone to trace you. These spaces obviously known for the buying and selling of drugs, weapons, child pornography and other kinds of deviant activities too.

Importantly too, everything I have just mentioned can be layered with additional technology. The best known of this is a VPN which masks your IP address, but there is also other software such as Tails which wipes your browser every time you close down the computer.

Again, we are currently in a stage where this level of technology is so easily and readily available that people have the ability to act online without concern or as much concern that they are going to be apprehended by law enforcement.

Again, to link it back to violence-fixated individuals, it is not really clear if the anonymity changes something inside them that makes them more likely to conduct an attack, but for those people who are already engaging in deviant spaces, there is I think

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a school shooter using it to find out what time children may be let out at lunchtime. Things like that, these facilitating roles rather than used in radicalisation, and trying to motivate an individual to act.

There are also concerns about 3D printing too. This again we are seeing slow but notable adoption of in the terrorism space. In 2025, there was a case in Portugal in which four individuals were arrested for planning an offence related to 3D printers. Again, similarly, it is becoming more prevalent and the barriers to entry to using this kind of software are becoming smaller but again it is not yet something which is really widespread within terrorism plots yet.

I think the same point for hostile drones well. Another one of the big concerns you hear stakeholders talking about when it comes to emerging technologies. The UN has highlighted it as something that can be used to support terrorism. We are seeing it being used now and again as used as part of terrorist attacks. We have seen cases in Venezuela and Iraq of people attaching bombs to hostile drones, but again, similarly to the chatbots, this is probably something which is used more for a facilitative role. For example, the Christchurch attacker used a drone beforehand with a camera on it, just a normal commercial drone, for reconnaissance-type

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purposes instead of attaching a bomb to it.

Then finally, it is worthwhile thinking a little bit about virtual assets. Not that emerging now but we can certainly see the use of crypto currencies which are used for the buying and selling of goods with far greater anonymity and reduced visibility. This is often used in conjunction with the dark net. There are online marketplaces where weapons can be bought and things like that. We know that, for example, terrorist groups try and use these assets to try and crowd fund. But again when you look at cases of terrorism, lone-actor terrorist or small cells, it is not that prevalent at this point yet, despite the anonymity advantages that it can give.

So I think just to try and summarise the emerging tech, in the terrorism space, although all of these things do offer reasons to be concerned and potential problems for us who are trying to counter these kinds of threats, we haven't really seen widespread adoption of any of them at this point.

So with that I will move on now to the behavioural analysis of the violence-fixated individuals. So, essentially, what I did was I built a very small directory of individuals who fit a definition of violence-fixated individuals that I created.

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which I am more than happy to talk about. Some people may be considered by some to leak into the terrorist space, some may not. But this is where I have drawn the line and then ended up with 13 individuals in the end for just a small qualitative sample.

I will go through this quite quickly. I basically created a codebook to try and answer the research questions as offered by the Inquiry. So whether internet was used to prepare for the attack; whether it was used for immersion within the fixation, try to identify which platforms were used; which niche communities were engaged with; whether the individuals who were engaging in content sharing, live streaming; whether they had to migrate across platforms; and importantly whether they leaked their plans before they did them.

Then a host of other kind of demographic and behavioural variables: that includes, age, gender, mental health and neurodiversity-related issues, as well as also if they had been engaging with Prevent as well. Then coded them mostly qualitatively.

Just to give a brief overview of the 13 individuals. They were all male, unsurprisingly, and they were young too. The average age was 17 and that spanned only between 15 and 22. There were ten of the 13 that had

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It is a bit difficult because it is quite an underdeveloped concept, and what I wanted to try and do was try to capture the essence or the frames of reference, for this Inquiry and the Southport attack, of individuals that were not -- where the ideology or any existing ideology or grievance wasn't necessarily the driving force. It existed in many cases but the individual also had a clear and identifiable fixation with violence.

So what I did was I started by creating a directory. I started with Jonathan Hall, the Independent Reviewer of Terror Legislation. He wrote a report which gave ten examples of individuals who had similar type attacks and biographies to the Southport attacker, and as well I used the named case studies in the Phase 2 of this report as well, as well as one or two other high-profile cases.

In the spirit of this Inquiry, I'm not going to name any of the individuals but I'm more than happy to pass my list on if that's of any use.

Then, as I mentioned, really what I wanted to do was make it clear that the core part of being included in this was where there was clear evidence of some kind of fascination or fixation with violence and ideology was not the core motivator. As always there are edge cases

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a confirmed diagnosis of autism spectrum disorder, as well as two with ADHD, and then there were other mental health issues prevalent too. Three of them had noted suicide attempts, OCD, ODD, and then two of them were noted as having a diagnosis but it wasn't mentioned which ones.

So I will move to the platforms, the kind of platforms you would expect were used for immersion and fixation. So YouTube, and again reflect a little bit on what I said at the front end, most of knowledge about recommendation algorithms is focused around YouTube. It is probably unsurprising that we can see individuals -- qualitatively I note that it was often spoken about in the court documents that people were spending hours and hours on YouTube, being recommended lots and lots of content which was related to their fixation.

It didn't really -- it didn't usually include hyper-violent content. YouTube again isn't carrying school shootings or live-streamed terrorist attacks, but rather communities that might glamourise them, as well as communities focused around weapons too. So there are quite a lot of gun communities on YouTube.

So given what we know about recommendation algorithms, I would argue that it is highly likely -- although without directly researching it and having

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access to users' watch history, difficult to know -- but it is highly likely that this kind of content is amplified and users are shown more and more of it. Again, I would urge a little bit of caution without having the direct ability to research that.

A lot of individuals engaged and shared their own content, as well as just engaging with other people's. So one of the individuals had a YouTube account in which he uploaded several videos which glorified school shooters, including Columbine as well as other known ones. Another posted content that was very in line with Incel-related ideology, another was fixated with guns and posted individuals of himself shooting as well.

I think it is really important that these people aren't just passive consumers of contents. These people who are performatively posting for a perceived audience, and because of the way these algorithms work is an audience who are very likely to be aligned with them, at least with their interests, if not ideology as well. So they can receive praise and social capital for the sorts of things they are posting.

Again, really interesting to look into those comments underneath and the networks they are involved in, but unfortunately platforms tend to remove the accounts after an individual has engaged in violent

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interactions with different kinds of niche communities. The most popular fixation was on school shooters. This came up time and time again within the sample. I noted about six, so slightly less than half of the sample had a demonstrable interest in school shooters. They lionised the Columbine shooters. Individuals were noted to be fascinated by the killers and engaged in communities views which glorified and glamourised them too. These communities, while they do exist on the darker sides of the internet, they are completely available on mainstream platforms at this point, and they were the motivation for several of the plots here. These attackers said explicitly they were trying to emulate these kinds of school shootings.

There was also relatedly a fixation with either serial killers or other kinds of mass killers. High levels of interest in Ted Bundy, BTK, Son of Sam. The sorts of serial killers who unfortunately, in my view, are glamourised on Netflix documentaries these days. Again, not content which is difficult to find. A 5.99 subscription to Netflix gives you a very, very large access of information which can help to fill that fixation in some ways, or even just a lot of individuals were spending a lot of time on Wikipedia reading about these individuals and that might syphon them off with

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crime.

In terms of cross-platform migration, there was really remarkably little evidence of this within my datasets. The violence-fixated individuals tended to use all of the mainstream platforms as noted here. There wasn't strong evidence that they were being booted from them, having to go to Telegram, having to go to high security spaces. A lot of the individuals posted on the mainstream platforms on the day of their attack. So they weren't necessarily being hit with high levels of content moderation; instead they had the ability to post remarkably easily. There was one individual who actually was banned from one of the gore sites for posting pro-paedophile comments, and that was the only evidence I could find of an individual being banned or losing an account.

It is worth noting that some individuals did go into other spaces that weren't available on mainstream platforms. I will come to it when discussing niche communities next, but the dark web, somewhat used forum, somewhat used. But for the most part the main takeaway is a lot of the content that fuelled their fixation was readily available on the surface web and not difficult to find.

Moving on to niche communities. There were several

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links to other spaces too. We're not talking about ultra-secure platforms that are difficult to find.

There was also engagement with incel communities. So three of the 13 had been browsing and posting on incel forums, on posting material that aligned with the kind of incel worldview. It is worth noting that as well as being kind of an ideologically extreme kind of movement, incel spaces contain a lot of highly toxic material. I mentioned earlier there is a lot of cross-posting between gore sites, particularly when the target of the violence on the gore sites are women and girls. It is a very common pipeline.

There was gun communities as well. I realise that's more niche in this country and in Europe than it is in the US. It is actually quite a big community on either YouTube or Reddit in the US, but there were two individuals who engaged quite heavily with gun communities and online forums as part of these communities.

There was also -- sorry, I think I have missed one. There was also interaction with either Satanists or cult communities as well. So there was one plot that was very heavily linked around this in which they were following an influencer on YouTube that gave them the motivation for conducting their attack.

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1 It is worthwhile just to reflect a little bit on
2 gore. A lot of the either journalistic content or the
3 criminal justice content doesn't specifically name
4 the gore platforms that are used, so it is difficult to
5 say there was one specific community. But just to make
6 clear that watching gore content was extremely prevalent
7 throughout the whole sample. Almost all of the
8 individuals were watching some kind of gore content, be
9 it terrorist live streams, be it assassinations and
10 murders, be it these kind of online forums which host
11 this kind of content.

12 In some cases it was on the surface web, like the
13 biggest platforms, in other cases it was on the dark web
14 too. But it is clear that gore is very, very prevalent
15 and I think for somewhat obvious reasons that with
16 a fixation on violence there is just an unlimited supply
17 of this kind of content which can help to allow people
18 to fulfill that fixation.

19 Moving on to anonymity. Individuals did spend --
20 took steps to remain anonymous. Nine of the individuals
21 used some kind of anonymity software. So, in some cases
22 this was things like end-to-end encrypted apps, in other
23 cases it was the dark web. For the dark web there were
24 kind of several reasons, as mentioned in the previous
25 slide, for some people it was viewing graphic content.

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1 number of days until this, mark 2(?). Obviously that
2 was the incident of telling the classmate, apologies.
3 In other instances it was slightly more vague, so people
4 saying: I feel like there's hardly any point in trying
5 now, I just want to massacre the place and I wouldn't
6 feel sorry to anyone. That was in a Facebook group chat
7 and which included people who weren't friends and
8 acquaintances. I think taken together, these things
9 paint quite an interesting picture.

10 There were clearly some steps that are being taken
11 and relatively sophisticated software that is being used
12 to remain anonymous online but, at the same time,
13 individuals are kind of recklessly leaking their plots
14 and waiving that anonymity. I think this paints quite
15 an important picture of what these pathways look like.
16 Because despite using this kind of software, it is
17 a social process for these individuals, expressing
18 themselves and posting online in a very performative way
19 is still important to these individuals.

20 Finally, thinking about emerging technologies. This
21 will be a relatively quick one because there was almost
22 no engagement with these kind of emerging technologies.
23 There was some use of the dark web and cryptocurrencies
24 but very little when it comes to AI, 3D printers,
25 drones, very little engagement there whatsoever.

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1 There was one individual who used it for researching
2 plots and another used it for buying weapons. In fact
3 there was one plot in which -- the plot was thwarted
4 because it was a purchase made on the dark web for
5 a weapon from the US which stopped -- which was flagged
6 at border security and was able to be stopped.

7 Individuals also used kind of slightly higher tech
8 software as well, things like there was one that used
9 Tails to clear their laptop after every time they used
10 it, and it is a very good way of using -- beefing up
11 operational security to make it very difficult to be
12 stopped.

13 However, there are also high signs of leakage
14 amongst the sample as well. So despite this very high
15 use of sometimes sophisticated software to try and cover
16 people's tracks, individuals often very recklessly
17 telegraphed explicitly or implicitly what they were
18 going to do to friends and family. This is something
19 which has been noted among lone-actor terrorists for
20 quite some time, including some research by Paul.

21 Some individuals, one who was planning on conducting
22 the attack at their school told a classmate that there
23 was an attack coming, and said "Don't worry, I'm not
24 going to target you." So very explicit. Another attack
25 was a potential copycat attack where they said a certain

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1 I think the key takeaway is that when this kind of
2 innovation to more sophisticated technology happens, it
3 is often forced because it is very difficult to operate
4 on mainstream platforms. However, as already noted, it
5 is remarkably easy for these individuals to immerse
6 themselves in these kind of ideologies in very easy to
7 find spaces online.

8 Julia mentioned earlier, in fact Milo did too, there
9 are some very easy to find documents online, that are
10 common amongst a lot of these cases, including
11 Southport, that are just coming up time and time again.
12 And again I won't name them as we are on live stream,
13 but about four or five documents that are instructional,
14 give people guidance into how to conduct attacks, be it
15 explosion, telling them how to use a knife in a deadly
16 way, vehicle-borne attacks. Again, these are totally
17 easy to find on the internet. Very common currency. So
18 the need to go on the dark web and use this kind of
19 software, not that necessary, if you are interested in
20 conducting a mass casualty attack.

21 So this is my last main slide. I realise that you
22 will have had people talk a little bit about
23 neurodiversity, but I think it is quite important to
24 reflect on it in the context of the internet, a little
25 bit. As I noted, ten of the individuals had an autism

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diagnosis. I think this is quite important when you consider the use of the internet.

So, I realise that this is a sensitive topic and in terms of where the research community is at now, I think the best way to think about autism and neurodiversity is it can play a contextual role in radicalisation. It is not in itself a risk factor but it can affect the environment within which someone can find themselves and change and shape their experiences.

For some people it may even provide some sort of resiliency factors, but for others it may end up creating some sort of perfect storm, as well as a few other factors occurring at the same time.

Thinking about some research done by Dr Zainab Al-Attar. She highlights six important facets of autism as it relates to violent extremism. The first is circumscribed as special interests in which an individual obsessively starts to think about something and it becomes the very important main aspect of their life. Also having a rich vivid fantasy, which again for some, not all, autistic people could potentially be violence and gore related. There is also a need for order, rules and routine which, if broken, can cause stress. Obsessionality, repetition and collecting, which again can help explain the large high

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important that whatever the mechanism for how we think about VFIs, violence-fixated individuals is, that it is very likely to miss individuals who have self-opted out of offline life. A lot of these individuals, even if they were children, weren't going to school, they weren't going to work, they had completely withdrawn from this. So it could potentially be a substantial blind spot.

So just to wrap up, I think given that I spoke first about the theoretical concerns, some of those theoretical concerns I think are warranted and justified at this point. So there clearly was a very high engagement with these niche communities online that were providing them with unfiltered supply of violence or violence-glorifying content. I would also say it is likely that recommendation algorithms played some kind of a role, although again not by explicitly putting violent content in front of them, and then technologies were used to stay anonymous.

On the other hand, some of these theoretical concerns were not necessarily met. So there really wasn't much use of emerging tech besides one or two with cryptocurrencies and anonymity software. There was really very little evidence of cross-platform migration.

Then just to wrap up, neurodiversity really runs

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levels of engagement within this kind of content online.

Autistic people also report they have communication difficulties, often with face to face interactions, which may push towards people to the internet where everything is written in black and white and they can take the conversations in their own time and space, as well as finally having different cognitive styles.

Thinking about these case studies and thinking about the role of the internet, I think a lot of these factors shine through here. All these individuals were fixated and had circumscribed interests in violence or weapons and most of them had withdrawn from day-to-day life, offline at least, and instead moved to an online space for communication and interaction which can be more comfortable and more predictable and these things can take place in their own time.

Many of the individuals kept diaries as well which revealed the extent of their rich vivid fantasies. It could sometimes include drawings of what they planned to do; sometimes it included lionisation of mass killers too.

I think it is important to reflect on when considering what's next for prevention, it has been argued by many that Prevent has a bit of a blind spot when it comes to the internet and I think it is quite

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through these cases and it affects the way people use the internet. Again, just to reiterate, not a risk factor in and of itself but can be something which should be borne in mind by people trying to engage in prevention.

So thank you.

SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: Thank you very much indeed.

MR MOSS: Thank you very much, Dr Whittaker. Sir, may we resume, please, at 12.50 pm for Professor Gill.

SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: I will rise.

(12.40 pm)

(A short break)

(12.50 pm)

SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: Yes, Mr Moss.

MR MOSS: Thank you, sir. Professor Gill please. Thank you.

Presentation by PROFESSOR GILL

PROFESSOR GILL: Good afternoon and thanks very much for the opportunity to contribute towards this very important event. I have been given four questions to work my way through. I have three or four points to make on each question. Before I delve into them I'm going to give a bit of background about why I have come to these conclusions and a bit about the work we have been doing over the last 15 years or so.

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Me and my team we have many different interests but one of our key research themes is trying to develop the evidence base for risk and protective factors for violent extremist outcomes or other forms of grievance-driven violence outcomes. The work has ebbed and flowed. Over the course of the years we have had various different focuses over that time.

In those very early days, originally funded by the Department of Homeland Security back in 2011/12, we were tasked with building a dataset of lone-actor terrorists to give a sense of what the prevalence rates were in their trajectory towards violence for a different risk factors and indicators that there might be some risk escalating. At that particular time lone-actor terrorism was becoming more frequent in terms of the caseload that various different intelligence agencies and policing authorities were having to deal with. There was next to no empirical research available at that particular time. What was available was the odd case study here or there of really, really famous cases and there was a sort of sense of, are they outliers, is that why they are so famous? How much policy and procedures can we develop off the back of these isolated cases?

So the instruction was to go build datasets to get

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but very little empirics underpinning these quite strongly asserted issues at the time.

We wrapped up that study in a year. We could tell you everything there was to know about that universe of lone-actors: there was no profile; they ranged in age and demographics; they ranged in terms of the behaviours, the speeds with which they went through the gears. There was no silver bullet explanation. Typically there was a kind of a crystallisation of different risk factors happening at the time, where they got exposed to some grievance or ideology and that sort of exacerbated that movement towards violence.

We were the first ones to put a number on how many had had a mental health disorder diagnosed prior to their offending. We talked about the sort of relatively high rates of criminal histories and violent histories, but none of these big risk factors were common to every single actor; no risk factor was common to more than 40/45 per cent of our data at that particular time.

The end point was multiple different pathways into this and some of them looked like it is not just ideology that's bubbling and getting over the line, quite a few of them have personal grievances also coming into their decision-making.

So we were happy describing it but the idea at the

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a bigger sense of what that universe of lone-actor terrorist offender looked like. When we started out to build a codebook and build that dataset, we did a deep dive into the existing theoretical literature that was out there. During my time as a PhD student you would show up at seminars and conferences, and every single talk was theoretical, conceptual and then three or four minutes in you would hear them say "Unfortunately we don't have data to test any of this." So it was a lot of conceptual debates.

At that time there was nothing that we could really draw on. Our expectations could be based on empirics. So we dove into the theoretical literature, found about 180 different risk factors or indicators that were being heavily theorised within the field. We could only find 119 lone-actor terrorists. So we had about 50 per cent more risk factors being suggested by the theoretical literature than individuals that crossed over the Rubicon into violence.

One of the reasons why I'm giving a lot of this background is I'm keen to make sure we don't make some of the same mistakes that were happening in a very, very close parallel fields back 15 years ago and we need to learn some of the lessons from that particular space.

A lot of theory, a lot of things being pushed out

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time was factors that happened quite common is what is defined as a risk factor.

Some of those findings were starting to be rolled out or leaned on to justify a variety of different counter-terrorism tactics or tools that might be used. For example, we were talking about the relatively high rates with which they told people about their plans or intentions.

Then some of the pushback started to come from questions about, well how much of these findings actually only apply to lone-actors? How much of this applies to group-based network defenders also? Which also had not been measured empirically at that particular time. So was our finding specific to the lone-actors or was it something that could be generalisable to people who held similar ideologies but offended as part of a group.

That sparked the next few years of research that we engaged upon to build similar, largely open-sourced databases of group offenders where we could identify differences in terms of the age ranges that we were seeing within our data. Lone-actors at that particular point in time, it was slightly skewed older than our group-based offenders. I think that dynamic has massively changed now. Also we talked about the

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1 elevated rates of mental health disorders amongst our
2 lone offenders versus our group-based offenders. That
3 finding has been replicated in a range of other
4 terrorism-related studies. It has been shown in
5 homicide, burglary, sexual violence -- a range of other
6 kind of crime types consistently show lone offenders
7 have different rates of mental health disorders presence
8 within them.

9 That made us start to think that maybe we shouldn't
10 necessarily be looking at this through an ideological or
11 terrorism lens; maybe there's pulling in findings from
12 wider criminological literature will also help us
13 explain why some of these guys cross over the Rubicon,
14 and not just look at it through a purely ideological
15 lens.

16 We were also interested in expanding our datasets
17 beyond terrorism to look at parallel types of offences,
18 that look and feel like terrorism but the stated
19 self-reported reasons for the violence were something
20 else. So we did a different study where we compared our
21 lone-actor terrorists with individuals who we labelled
22 mass murderers, so these were individuals who had killed
23 four or more people in a 24-hour space of time in
24 a public space, it had to be non-gang-related,
25 non-family-related violence and so on.

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1 looking at people who had made threatening
2 communications and then sat on their hands and didn't do
3 anything. So was there anything that we could discern
4 in their backgrounds, their previous criminal history,
5 their previous mental health records, to see the
6 difference between those who make a threat get out the
7 door and try and do something versus those who are just
8 making noise.

9 Again we could find some of the kind of classic risk
10 factors more prevalent amongst those who engaged in
11 those more risky behaviours.

12 Then we thought we were happy and we could go back
13 and start studying Northern Ireland's historical
14 conflict and violence over there, and more finer grained
15 questions started coming in off the back of that leg of
16 research. Those questions were largely focused upon
17 control groups which are really, really important. If
18 we are going to be talking about causation or putative
19 risk factors, we need a sense of base rates, control
20 groups, sort of measure how often these things happen
21 amongst those who never do anything despite having
22 experienced those things.

23 That meant we had to broaden our horizon beyond just
24 those who had committed terrorist -- or gone out and
25 done mass casualty attacks because what a control group

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1 When we compared these two sets of people, we could
2 see very little difference in terms of the genesis of
3 their grievances. In terms of the rates of underlying
4 risk factors that were present, there was very little to
5 discern between these two groups of people, other than
6 the stated reasons behind why they did what they did.

7 Really the only kind of major differences played out
8 when we started looking at attack planning differences,
9 with lone-actors being attracted more often than our
10 mass murderers towards sites that were outside of their
11 routine -- sorry, mass murderers were more likely to go
12 to educational settings they had attended or workplace
13 violence disputes and that kind of stuff. So that's
14 where they diverged in terms of their footprint but
15 overall really, really similar.

16 We are also interested in -- we started doing some
17 work with the Fixated Threat Assessment Centre who were
18 managing threats made to prominent members of
19 Parliament. That's sort of a small slice of what that
20 data was, and the vast majority of everybody else was
21 fixated or interested, making worrying approaches or
22 communications to the British Royal Family.

23 That afforded us a different type of research
24 opportunity because now we could move beyond just people
25 who we knew who had actualised violence. We were also

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1 looks like for them is really difficult, especially if
2 you are working in an academic environment; it might be
3 different in other buildings.

4 So we started engaging in a broad variety, and many
5 other research groups across the world started engaging
6 in lots of survey-based designs where instead of the
7 outcome of interest being did they do violence, it was
8 about their sort of attitudes towards violence. So can
9 they justify violence if X occurs? So if members of
10 their social group were attacked, could you justify
11 violence in return?

12 Instead of measuring behaviour what we were
13 measuring was sometimes intentions, sometimes attitudes,
14 sometimes beliefs.

15 So the theory of planned behaviour --

16 **MR MOSS:** Professor Gill, would you forgive me, I'm very
17 conscious there is a very distracting banging. The
18 material that you are addressing is extremely important.
19 Would you forgive me if I invite the Chair to rise just
20 for a few minutes while we get it resolved and it won't
21 eat into your time.

22 **SIR ADRIAN FULFORD:** I will rise.

23 (1.01 pm)

(A short break)

25 (1.07 pm)

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1 **SIR ADRIAN FULFORD:** Sorry Professor. Could you come back.

2 **PROFESSOR GILL:** You don't have to apologise. I'm just glad
3 other people could hear it, I just thought it was my
4 heart in my chest for most of that time.

5 So when we were trying to develop an understanding
6 of risk factors from a control group perspective, we had
7 to sort of change what the outcome of interest was that
8 they were interested in so we started doing larger scale
9 surveys, measuring people's attitudes, beliefs,
10 intentions around violent extremism.

11 Then, we could tell again the sort of classic risk
12 factors were there, much more prominent in amongst those
13 who were telling us they were being exposed to
14 radicalising materials, those who were telling us that
15 they had more extremist attitudes, aligned attitudes,
16 but one of the things that we sort of really made
17 a mistake with in the very early days, that started
18 becoming clear to us during the survey work was our lack
19 of focus on protective factors.

20 There were often the levers that we use to try and
21 manage risk downwards. They are the levers that you
22 might use to try and get somebody to be more responsive
23 to planned treatment and things like that. I think
24 again a lot of the focus right now is around risk
25 factors and risk indicators, but I think we also need to

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1 The first question: "What does the empirical
2 evidence tell us about the relationship between online
3 activity and offline behaviour in cases of lone-actor,
4 fixation-driven or grievance-driven violence?"

5 It is really simple: exposure to that kind of
6 material is near ubiquitous. In studies that exist that
7 kind of have really good access to closed source data
8 you can see the depth and variety of materials that are
9 being accessed for a variety of different reasons.
10 Different needs are being met through engaging with
11 those types of materials. Some people are doing it for
12 camaraderie, some are doing it more to learn more about
13 the ideology, some are doing it to gear up and get
14 better at using particular types of violence.

15 But exposure is near ubiquitous, and it tells us
16 what they did but it doesn't really help us distinguish
17 between the real actors who are driving concerns and the
18 other people that are just sort of online and perusing
19 and have never got off the couch to do anything.

20 Partially, this might be an issue related to data
21 quality. I think that higher quality data studies that
22 we have show a real high engagement with these types of
23 factors. The work of Donald Holbrook, he has done many
24 different bookshelf-style studies where he has looked at
25 the range and diversity of materials that are being

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1 look at the other side of the coin because that is often
2 what our intervention is going to be about. Ultimately
3 it gets more sign-on from the evidence base we have,
4 from intervention treatments from across the violence
5 reduction space.

6 So I will move to the four questions that were
7 posed. I will walk through some of the things that we
8 went in. That's essentially the foundation and layer
9 work. It is really, really complex how people get up to
10 this point in their lives. There is multiple different
11 pathways to that point. Two people that look identical,
12 will more than likely end up at two different end
13 outcomes. So principles of multifinality and
14 equifinality that others have spoken about last week
15 have absolutely always rang true of course across the
16 work that we have done.

17 Finally, the last kind of generation of that piece
18 of work is around thinking about what functional
19 relevance does that factor play in achieving that
20 particular outcome?

21 That there requires a variety of different types of
22 research methodologies, be it interviews, be it more
23 elaborated qualitative approaches. So we will talk
24 a little bit about that as well and the fourth question
25 that we have.

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1 looked at.

2 Within people that have engaged in terrorism, again
3 there is a diversity in terms of how many materials they
4 are looking at, how long they have been looking at them.
5 There is no one single silver bullet explanation.

6 More importantly for our understanding of the
7 influence of online activity, there are no control group
8 studies that are out there that are measuring terrorists
9 against some other phenomenon of interest that is
10 an apples versus apples comparison. The evidence base
11 does not exist. So in terms of talking about causation
12 really we are not at that stage. We have a good deal of
13 correlation but we don't have the higher end control
14 group-style communities with terrorists as one of the
15 outcomes of interests.

16 There has been work done in the Netherlands, there
17 has been work done in Scandinavia that have done
18 registry-based studies. They will have looked backwards
19 at the terrorist of interest and their nearest male
20 sibling to look at the difference in criminal offending
21 prior to their engagement with terrorism; to look at
22 whether they have been treated as an inpatient or
23 outpatient versus their brother and show these
24 significant differences. We don't have anything in that
25 similar space when we are thinking about online. Again

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1 we are a little bit more limited in this space than we
2 are in some of the other sort of more conventional risk
3 factors that are quite often kind of put out there as
4 being really of interest.

5 The closest thing we can get to it is in surveys of
6 the general population. So my colleague Caitlin Clemmow
7 led a piece of research developing a measurement tool
8 that can be used in surveys, that tries to measure the
9 degree to which individuals have been passive consumers
10 of extremist materials. So they haven't actively gone
11 out and looked for it, but it has been centred on
12 a variety of different messaging or email platforms, or
13 whatever the case may be, and also measures the degree
14 to which the individual is the active agent in that,
15 looking out for it.

16 So in one particular study we did, we looked at 1500
17 people living in the UK. So it is a survey of adults,
18 it was a representative study based on age, education
19 and ethnicity simplified, conducted online, variety of
20 different data-related checks. We could get a decent
21 number on people who would come forward and anonymously
22 tell us about their experiences of passively or actively
23 consuming this type of material. What it really shows
24 is even if only 2 per cent were saying they came into
25 contact with materials that told them how to use weapons

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1 time. It is just you are more likely than not to get to
2 that next stage if you don't have that.

3 Then, again, there is some really good research out
4 there using some fantastic data sources that talk about
5 the different pathways in. So a 2023 study that used
6 the extremism risk guidelines, psychological reports
7 that are done in HMPPS on TACT offenders. They are
8 coded across that rich seam of qualitative data has
9 showed that online-only pathways are the minority in
10 amongst that whole population of individuals that were
11 looked at in that particular time. It is about
12 12 per cent of the cases they had coded as being
13 primarily online; 40 per cent as primarily offline; and
14 the rest, 48 per cent are a combination of both. That
15 marries up with a lot of our lone-actor studies based on
16 open source, which showed that the dominant paradigm
17 was, it is neither online or offline radicalisation but
18 they are just getting different affordances from those
19 two different spaces. So they might be hanging out with
20 people similarly minded face to face, and then online
21 building weapons and capability for violence.

22 The sort of final point on that particular question
23 is the strongest evidence right now on the mechanism
24 between why the online environments might spark that
25 offline behaviour is case-based, not necessarily

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1 better or how to use everyday items as a weapon, that
2 still is a much, much greater number than will ever come
3 to concern as part of counter-terrorism investigations
4 and that type of thing.

5 But what we do know from those survey-related
6 studies, younger people are most likely to be telling us
7 that they are actively or passively coming into
8 engagement with that, and males are much more likely
9 telling us in those surveys that they are also coming
10 into that contact.

11 We have a variety of other work led by Sandy
12 Schumann has looked at whether there is a relationship
13 between engagement with those materials, is related to
14 violent extremist attitudes, so attitudes that are
15 supportive of those outcomes of interest, and shows that
16 it is those individuals that are basically doing
17 both: actively and incidentally getting exposed to this
18 material are the ones that are in those surveys scoring
19 significantly higher in terms of their expressive
20 attitudes.

21 Again we look at a lot of this through the theory of
22 planned behaviour. Your beliefs predict your attitudes
23 fairly well. Your attitudes predict your intentions
24 fairly well, and your intentions predict your behaviour
25 fairly well. But it is not 100 per cent every single

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1 statistical. So it is rich individual case studies
2 which trace that narrative about why then and there that
3 online exposure kind of helped. That's really, really
4 still very important and I think sometimes we got
5 a little bit too carried away looking for the high
6 statistics and high numbers when there are rich
7 causative stories that we can pull out of those case
8 studies.

9 Then even when we are looking more broadly at the
10 wider violence literature there is very little evidence
11 out there around exposure to violence online and
12 engaging in everyday normal violence. I could find one
13 study in my little search yesterday from last year.
14 Again, another Dutch study surveying 300 youths and
15 adolescents in the Netherlands asking them whether in
16 the last 12 months they had come into contact with
17 violent imagery or videos online, and then
18 self-reporting whether they had done violence themselves
19 and a heap of other control measures in there.

20 Yes, people who had told the research team that they
21 had been exposed to violent videos were more likely to
22 also have said they did violence. The videos accounted
23 for about 9 per cent of the variance. There were a lot
24 of other factors at play on top of it. Whether the
25 videos contained mates of theirs engaging in violence

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1 explained about 18 per cent of the variance. Again it
2 is a little bit about peer normalisation, socialisation,
3 as well as not just the simple indicator of "Did you see
4 violence or not?" It is about how these different
5 factors clash and collide together in time at that
6 moment when the individual is looking for something to
7 do.

8 Second question was: "How might exposure to violent,
9 graphic or extreme content interact with individual
10 vulnerabilities, grievances and decision-making
11 processes in the pathway towards serious violence?"

12 I think what we can see in the qualitative case
13 studies, and I will talk about my own interviews towards
14 the end, the mechanism is often explanatory; it isn't
15 necessarily about persuasion. It is not about
16 converting people down to that path, but it is
17 oftentimes about offering a causal account of a life
18 that already feels wronged in some way. So the message
19 lands with them they are already in a rendered state,
20 that they are looking for an explanation for how they
21 are at, where they are in their lives. So it resonates.

22 Emily Corner, one of my former PhD students, as part
23 of her PhD had done three interviews with individuals
24 who were involved in extremist movements, had recruited
25 individuals to join violent extremist movements, and

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1 has demonstrated that there is something going on there
2 in terms of those aspects.

3 But importantly it isn't just about the message
4 landing; it is about -- it often finds people who are in
5 a destabilised place in their life at that particular
6 time. Quite often there are multiple things bubbling
7 away that are disrupting and stressing their life at
8 that moment, and the ideology fits that gap or fits that
9 need for them.

10 There was reference in the previous presentation by
11 Joe about another piece of work by Caitlin Clemmow, led
12 by Caitlin looking at Com network cases. So looking at
13 formulations conducted by the Clinical Case Consultancy
14 Service. Richard Taylor was here last week. You could
15 see at the moment when these guys were engaging with
16 COM-related content, the formulations were also
17 mentioning individuals who were socially isolated,
18 suffering trauma, disrupted attachments, mental ill
19 health, neurodevelopmental conditions, violent
20 interests, looking for social reinforcement, looking for
21 belonging. 16 formulations and you had almost 16
22 different risk factors crystalising at the same time
23 when these guys are going down that pathway.

24 Third question: "How do online vulnerabilities
25 differ from ... safeguarding vulnerabilities, and what

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1 they all had very different views on where they wanted
2 the world to go in terms of what their ideology and goal
3 was, but they all gave really startlingly similar
4 accounts of what the kind of recruitment process looks
5 like. That idea that they get a sense of the individual
6 in front of them, find out what their needs are what
7 their drivers are, and then align the ideological
8 message to more closely resonate. It is not that they
9 would do the same pitch to 30 different potential
10 recruits; they were trying their best to figure out
11 which line of reasoning is going to be the one that
12 resonates.

13 That's instructive for us in terms of our response,
14 in terms of upstream prevention: a one size fits all
15 isn't going to work because different people are coming
16 to this outcome with very different needs that need to
17 be met. So we need to have equally as adaptive message
18 and options to work the risk downwards.

19 Quite often how people receive the messaging and
20 propaganda, it is describable from a cognitive
21 perspective. Julia's presentation touched upon a lot of
22 things around feeling powerless, believing one's life
23 has little value or impact, feeling threatened. There
24 is a range of cognitive cues which again the broader
25 survey-based design work in general population surveys

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1 implications does this have for identifying, assessing
2 and managing [VFI] ...?"

3 I think we can say from a lot of the work that has
4 been done on the ERG22 data led by Jonathan Kenyon and
5 others at CT Arc, the online radicalised profile is
6 measurably different. There are some significant
7 differences between those who only go down that online
8 space than those who have a combination of influences
9 offline and online. So one Kenyon study showed that
10 younger offenders were 2.6 times more likely to be
11 online-only radicalised versus having a combination.

12 Those who had prior offending were 2.55 times more
13 likely to be face to face recruited. Those who had
14 violence offending in their past histories were 3.6
15 times more likely to be only have been radicalised in
16 offline spaces, and those who were only online
17 radicalised were 6.23 times more likely to have a mental
18 health or personality disorder, either diagnosed or
19 suspected, versus those who were purely offline
20 radicalised.

21 It's nearly 20 years now, my old mentor, John
22 Horgan, wrote a sort of call to arms for us to move away
23 from thinking about profiles to thinking about pathways.
24 Now, as we are sort of gathering more and more evidence,
25 what we see is this interaction that different pathways

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1 have slightly different types of profiles more often
2 than other pathways, that there is an interaction effect
3 going on.

4 Again, we need to embrace this complexity. It feels
5 really, really difficult after 15 years of doing this
6 every day. The best answer I can give is, it depends.
7 That's not a failure of behavioural and social science;
8 it is the result of global research in this particular
9 space. It is a really complex phenomenon with multiple
10 different drivers, and if we embrace the complexity we
11 can be a lot more creative in the variety of responses
12 we can get in there.

13 Ultimately, to again make the point, vulnerability
14 is not risk. There are a lot of people who display
15 an awful lot of vulnerability and an awful lot of
16 different things who never countenance engaging in
17 violence, let alone rare events like terrorism and other
18 associated events. We need again need to get the
19 message through and clear that there is really no
20 evidence that any one single factor is causative. The
21 best evidence shows it is summative, it is multiple
22 different things at the time they are exposed to
23 an ideology.

24 Then finally, very briefly, the last question was
25 around how did my experience of prison interviews with

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1 of experiences across those interviews.

2 But when we did touch upon online engagement or
3 engagement with propaganda and online videos, or
4 whatever the case might be, that ranked through just as
5 much. So online exposure to different videos and
6 propaganda that they talked about elicited a range of
7 affective responses. Some people told us quite
8 viscerally about the kind of fear, anger and moral
9 outrage they felt off the back of witnesses certain
10 pieces of radicalising content. They were having an
11 emotional response to some form of felt injustice.

12 Others didn't talk about fear and anger and moral
13 outrage; they talked about the excitement and adrenaline
14 they felt, the physiological arousal they felt through
15 engaging with this content. Others didn't talk about
16 those two things at all; others talked about belonging,
17 identity, significance. It was a different sense,
18 affective response they were getting on it. Others
19 talked about how to engage with this type of material
20 led to a sense of desensitisation and moral
21 disengagement. It reduced their disgust they might have
22 felt at one point in their life towards violence in
23 response to the injustice they felt.

24 Across those 14 guys we had a range of different
25 responses to how they engaged with that material. There

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1 TACT offenders inform my understanding of the process of
2 radicalisation, how it might differ for other
3 individuals.

4 In 2024, I engaged in 13 interviews with individuals
5 who had been convicted under Terrorism Acts. Some had
6 successfully engaged in their terrorist act, the others
7 had been disrupted in the build-up, and then a few
8 months ago, just as we were finishing up and ready to
9 write up the results we did a 14th interview. At no
10 point in any of those interviews did I feel I had
11 reached a period of saturation where I had heard that
12 story previously. The 14 individuals had 14 very unique
13 stories. Even when two people might have looked similar
14 from the outside based on the open source reporting,
15 there was a breadth and variety in terms of their
16 behaviours, their engagement with materials, from case
17 to case to case.

18 Even when you had two individuals who had
19 experienced a really similar risk factor in their
20 build-up to their life, the meaning that that risk
21 factor had in terms of helping that push that person
22 along the line to terrorism was really, really
23 different.

24 The best we came out with those 14 interviews was to
25 say: it depends. There is a major variety in diversity

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1 was also a range and diversity of their behavioural
2 patterns in the online space. Some of them talked about
3 being very passive consumers of extremist content and
4 lurking in these spaces for a variety of their own
5 reasons. Others were very much at the forefront and
6 very, very active in pushing out material and
7 circulating material and so on.

8 They described a range of activity related to
9 searching and discovery. Some talked about migrating
10 around different platforms because they felt there was
11 different affordances could be taken from different
12 platforms. Others talked about how it was algorithmic
13 exposure that led them to be in those kind of spaces.
14 Others told their stories that it was very deliberate of
15 searching, going around the online space.

16 There was a range and diversity of their
17 security-related behaviours, from those who were super
18 security conscious to those that were just unwise to it
19 and/or wise and just completely unbothered and felt that
20 there was no deterrent in that particular space.

21 Also people talked about their immersion in these
22 online environments in really different ways: how it
23 intensified or whether they felt it intensified. Some
24 talked about it in fairly banal -- it was just sort of
25 a gradual process over time. Others talked about it as

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1 time investments, so "I spent X amount of hours in it
2 and then when I was a couple of months in it became
3 almost like a day job of spending so much time
4 doing it."

5 Others talked about it in terms of obsessive,
6 all-consuming engagements, sometimes to the detriment of
7 their social relationships, physical health, mental
8 health and so on. Others talked about it not as being
9 a linear pathway or acute pathway but that they dipped
10 into it, dipped out of it, went back in. It's sort of
11 engagement, disengagement, re-engagement-type process.

12 So across the 14 we have loads of different
13 responses in terms of affective, behavioural and in
14 terms of the degree to which they felt they were
15 immersed in it. I have no doubt if we had 14 VFIs in
16 front of us we would also see a range and diversity in
17 terms of what effective responses they had, their
18 behavioural footprint online and what their engagement
19 with the material looked like, because that's where the
20 best evidence suggests it should look like.

21 Then, finally, again the diversity means our
22 response needs to be equally as diverse and
23 multifaceted. Unfortunately there is no silver bullet
24 explanation for how people get up to this line. It is
25 really complex. There are multiple different pathways

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1 parasocial relationships with mass killers, chatbots
2 with mass killers and the like. I mean, obviously one
3 can conceive of a situation where some of that may not
4 need -- well, in fact with those it really does need
5 internet access and going to websites. So my
6 fundamental question with this is: in your assessment,
7 for most of the indicators of concern in most cases, are
8 we looking at what the individual is doing online?

9 Obviously, they can go into school and make
10 an announcement to their teachers or fellow pupils that
11 something is in their minds about what they are going to
12 do. But looking at the reality of the situation, as it
13 were, across the board, are we really looking at having
14 access to what they have been doing online so that you
15 can get an understanding of what the indicators of
16 concern are? Is that clear?

17 **MR COMERFORD:** Yes, thank you. Shall I take the second
18 question now or answer that one now?

19 **SIR ADRIAN FULFORD:** No, if you could deal with that first.

20 **MR COMERFORD:** Just to clarify, in the presentation I was
21 presenting these as indicators of concern of an
22 individual being involved in these online subcultures
23 rather than necessarily --

24 **SIR ADRIAN FULFORD:** True.

25 **MR COMERFORD:** -- of concern as a violent risk, as my fellow

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1 and we need a tiered structure to be able to generate
2 leads, prioritise leads, assess, manage and work our way
3 out of this problem. Thank you.

4 **MR MOSS:** Professor, thank you very much indeed.

5 Sir, with your permission could we stick to the
6 timetable please and start the plenary session at 2.45,
7 in part to allow Dr Ebner time to get to her remote
8 location?

9 **SIR ADRIAN FULFORD:** Certainly. Thank you very much.

10 **MR MOSS:** Thank you, sir.

11 (1.31 pm)

(The short adjournment)

13 (2.45 pm)

Plenary Session

15 **MR MOSS:** Thank you, sir.

16 As you can see, Dr Ebner now joins us online.
17 Before I turn to Counsel to the Inquiry's questions and
18 those informed by Core Participants, sir, do you have
19 any questions for the panel?

20 **SIR ADRIAN FULFORD:** I do, thank you very much. I have two
21 questions for Mr Comerford and then one question
22 generally.

23 Mr Comerford, my question is this. When you were
24 very helpfully addressing the complex issue of the
25 indicators of concern, you focused on such things as

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1 panelists talked about. So those kind of identifiable
2 factors and behaviour change, if you like, that you can
3 see online in terms of that expressed affinity with mass
4 attackers, those parasocial relationships. Those are
5 things that are identifiable and you know can help those
6 understand participation in those kind of communities.

7 But I would certainly agree that those online
8 indicators of concern are important to understand. As
9 I mentioned, I think that there are challenges in terms
10 of accessing that information when it is very much
11 spread across a broad landscape of services, platforms
12 and then I mentioned offline indicators in the case of
13 the Tumbler Ridge example, for example local police
14 having an awareness of an obsession with weapons.

15 So it is a sort of layered challenge. I think one
16 of the issues is it is very hard to piece all those
17 together in real time. We obviously have the power of
18 hindsight in some of these cases and we know that
19 an individual was expressing suicidal ideation on
20 a certain forum and engaging with gore content in
21 another space and so on. I think part of the challenge
22 is who has that set of windows on that full activity
23 before the terrible incident happens.

24 I'm under no illusion that's not an enormous
25 challenge for security services and law enforcement, let

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1 alone the platforms themselves, but I do think there's
2 more that can be done in platforms comparing the risk
3 signals they are seeing in looking at, for example,
4 someone's activity across multiple services rather than
5 very siloed approaches that look at small features of
6 the risk but aren't able to piece this together to
7 really produce a comprehensive risk assessment.

8 **SIR ADRIAN FULFORD:** Thank you. That's very helpful.

9 Second question then is this, and only get --
10 actually don't because we are using the scene for other
11 purposes -- I'm asking this question in the context of
12 your slide 17, and when presenting that slide you,
13 again, very helpfully indicated that really there needs
14 to be a consistent approach to the different platforms
15 and that there needs to be alignment and coordination in
16 addressing content that is being viewed and the sort of
17 interactions which individuals are having, in order to
18 understand what is harmful and to address it.

19 Would it be your view that, in those circumstances,
20 given the need for consistency, given the need for
21 alignment, given the need for coordination, that this
22 can't be left to individual big companies to make their
23 own decisions; this is something that requires at the
24 very least guidance centrally and in reality some form
25 of enforced regulation?

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1 moment there is very little indication that the risks
2 assessments are thorough enough or comprehensive enough,
3 especially regarding this kind of harmful content, that
4 they are understanding the role that they play, are
5 producing proportionate mitigations to address that
6 risk.

7 Joe earlier spoke about the accessibility of this
8 content online. This is not hard to find across
9 mainstream platforms, and I think that shows that there
10 is a huge amount more that can be done. Just in
11 enforcing the rules of these platforms themselves, which
12 is one of the requirements of the Online Safety Act is
13 essentially that platforms are doing what they say they
14 will, and that one of the ways that they mitigate risk
15 is by enforcing rules that they have. We need
16 independent accountability to understand that that is
17 happening effectively and that what the reporting that
18 platforms are doing of how effective their processes
19 are, is interrogable by researchers, by regulators, by
20 Government.

21 **SIR ADRIAN FULFORD:** So you need to get the obligation, as
22 it were, imposed by central Government, but you also
23 need to make sure that the obligations that you are
24 imposing are sufficient to properly address the
25 situation?

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1 **MR COMERFORD:** I would absolutely agree with the fact that
2 the status quo is not fit for purpose. I think the era
3 of platforms taking very individual, insular,
4 inward-looking approaches to understanding risk and harm
5 is -- has been shown to not be effective, not just for
6 this set of issues but for broader efforts to address
7 terrorist context. There have been similar failings in
8 the inability of platforms to look at how they are
9 situated within a wider ecosystem and understanding
10 their specific role in the trajectory of individuals
11 towards violence.

12 I think that's absolutely right. I think on the
13 question of guidance, I think there is absolutely a role
14 for much better interaction between subject matter
15 experts, these platforms themselves, law enforcement in
16 terms of the signals and signs which they are seeing
17 which are moving so quickly and really require
18 a community practice, if you like, that brings together
19 those who understand these issues and be able to use
20 those to inform operational responses.

21 Your point about regulation, that's really at the
22 heart of the Online Safety Act's approach is that
23 platforms have a responsibility to assess the risks that
24 their platforms pose and to mitigate those risks
25 proportionate to the risks they encounter, and at the

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1 **MR COMERFORD:** Yes, that is right.

2 **SIR ADRIAN FULFORD:** So last one from me. Professor Gill
3 made it absolutely clear that there's -- indeed in
4 different ways you all have -- that it is very difficult
5 to be definitive about much of this and I think, to use
6 Professor Gill's own expression, in a lot of areas "it
7 all depends", and in particular the fact that somebody
8 views in material isn't of itself sufficient for drawing
9 any kind of conclusion that they are necessarily going
10 to go on to do anything.

11 I want to turn that on its head. For those that do
12 carry out attacks of this kind, or look as though they
13 were at one stage absolutely intending to do so, is it
14 generally a feature that they will have been looking at
15 material of this kind and that they are steeped in gore
16 and all of the other extremely unattractive things that
17 we know are looked at?

18 So looking at it through the other end of the
19 telescope, can one say that -- not necessarily in every
20 days, but it is highly likely that that's the position?

21 **DR WHITTAKER:** Yes, as my small case study analysis
22 demonstrated, almost everyone was involved in some kind
23 of niche community that in some way promoted violence.
24 For most of them it was gore sites, but it could have
25 also been glamourisation of school shooters or other

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1 mass killers. So not always the same for all of them
2 but certainly -- I would caution a slight methodological
3 note is I filtered for people who I decided were fixated
4 on violence. So there is a bit of sampling the
5 dependent variables thing here. But I would expect,
6 again whether it's terrorists and ideological content,
7 whether it's violence-fixated individuals, as Paul said,
8 online engagement with this kind of content is very,
9 very prevalent; still neither necessary nor sufficient
10 but highly prevalent.

11 **SIR ADRIAN FULFORD:** Gentlemen, agreed?

12 **PROFESSOR GILL:** Not to sound too much like an academic
13 I think more research is needed before you can actually
14 definitively say this. Even what -- who falls into
15 scope within this category is debatable. I myself am
16 conflicted whether it is a category of people or whether
17 it is an indicator of multiple different outcomes that
18 could come to fruition. I would expect to find it in
19 those spaces if it was looked at in the same level of
20 robustness that it has been looked at in other places.

21 **SIR ADRIAN FULFORD:** But we need to check. Professor?
22 *(Pause).*

23 Professor Ebner, is there anything you want to say
24 on this?

25 **DR EBNER:** Yes, I'm happy to come in on this, to complement
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1 children and young persons' consumption of violent
2 online material and progression to real world
3 non-ideological violence?

4 Is it that there is a strong association between the
5 two but the nature and extent of any actual causation is
6 much less clear? Professor Gill, could I start with
7 you?

8 **PROFESSOR GILL:** Yes, absolutely. So I think there is
9 really good theoretical, developed, psychological
10 theory, criminological theory that could back that
11 position; empirically, I do not think it is there.
12 I don't think the evidence is there. I don't think it
13 has been tested. I think it is a massive gap in our
14 knowledge base. I think there are experimental studies
15 where they might expose somebody to violent imagery for
16 a very short dose of time and then measure their
17 attitudes straight after. There might be things like
18 that. But as far as I'm aware there are no studies that
19 are measuring what children are consuming in the online
20 space over time, longitudinally and measuring outcomes.

21 We used to be fairly good at that here in the UK in
22 terms of those longitudinal population-level studies.
23 It has been a long time since I have heard of a major
24 one being undertaken here that would capture the range
25 and diversity of what media outlets look like today.

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1 what has already been said, I do think -- definitely
2 I agree that there is a need for more research because
3 currently the evidence base is not strong enough, but
4 I would also say that the links to -- I think also the
5 engagement with violence and gore content can also vary
6 in its purpose. In some of the cases we see that it has
7 been used more for tactical inspiration and for ways of
8 inspiring the playbook and for more opportunistic -- in
9 a way more opportunistic purposes, and in other cases it
10 has been used because the violence as such, or the
11 perpetrators, are being glorified or, as I showed in my
12 research, are even becoming a part of the identity of
13 the potential violent extremists or attackers.

14 So I think there is also distinction how violent
15 content might be consumed for different purposes.

16 **SIR ADRIAN FULFORD:** That's very helpful. Thank you very
17 much. Thank you Mr Moss.

18 **MR MOSS:** Thank you, sir.

19 As with previous seminars, a number of different
20 topics and the first one is broadly online profile of
21 VFIs. In fact the first question picks up and overlaps
22 a little bit with the Chair's question a moment ago but
23 can I ask the panel this: from your various
24 presentations, does this panel have a jointly agreed
25 position on whether there is a relationship between
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1 It is not that there's no relationship, it is just
2 that it is un-investigated.

3 **MR MOSS:** Thank you. Professor Gill has articulated that
4 position. Do any of the panel take a different view or
5 a different nuance on that? Dr Ebner?

6 **DR EBNER:** I think one of the things that jumps out to me is
7 the use of especially what the hijacking of what violent
8 content or the merging of violent content with
9 politicised ideas where we have seen more anecdotal
10 evidence, I would say, but some of these video games
11 that have a clear dimension of extremism to it, like
12 where you play the mass shooter or you really
13 impersonate someone who carries out mass killings.
14 I think those manipulated forms of video games that
15 include violence, but that put you into the shoes of the
16 perpetrator, I think that is in particular something
17 where we would need more research into the impact of
18 that.

19 But even just the wider exposure to violent images,
20 I think the shared -- as I mentioned -- the shared
21 dysphoria and the shared potentially traumatic
22 experiences that children could be going through when
23 being exposed to these materials, especially in
24 an online community, I think that is also something that
25 can do something to their developing identities and that
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can actually create (a) those extremely strong group bonds within an extremist community, for example, but that can also potentially have an impact on how they perceive themselves, how they relate directly to that violence in potentially a positive sense.

So I think that is something that also needs closer investigation. But again I think there are several different ways in which there might be an impact and it is not only -- I think it is not as clear cut as to say, it is being exposed to violent content is per se a risk factor. I think it might be much more nuanced than that.

MR MOSS: Thank you. Mr Comerford, Dr Whittaker?

MR COMERFORD: Just one addition which is to say this question is slightly premised on the exposure to this material leading to some causal outcome of propensity to violence or progression to real world violence. One of the things I spoke about in my presentation was not just this through a content lens but rather some of the broader dynamics that online platforms create affordances for. Dr Ebner mentioned online communities that are really steeped in violence inherently that create incentive structures for reproducing and perpetuating acts of violence, that gamify violence and create these structures around them that can creates

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and then children, just in terms of a research perspective, adds unimaginable extra ethical issues to engage in this kind of research.

Even if we were able to, it would still be really hard to kind of give a causative answer in the way that this question is suggesting. For example, Paul mentioned when conducting surveys for these kind of experiments you have to use proxy variables because you can't actually measure whether someone is going to engage with violence which adds a degree of uncertainty, really difficult to add a longitudinal element, so it could be that engaging with violent content does increase aggression or hostility, but who knows if it does a week, a month, a year -- then it is really expensive and time consuming to run those kind of longitudinal studies.

Also, the laboratory can't replicate what this kind of experience is, which is multi-platforms, lots of different social networks and things like that. What these kind of experiments can do is they can sit someone, get them to watch some content and see what happens afterwards.

We could do so much more but even then there would still be some huge questions that would limit our ability to answer such questions.

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these perverse incentives for others to replicate these kind of attacks. Those are very different from just being someone who is interested in engaging in violent content and then going on to an enact themselves.

I pointed to this dynamic online community where violence plays this very varied role, where there is almost quite a lot of self-awareness of this very intangible notion of violence within these communities, some of whom stand afar and admire the problem, so to speak, and others who have a desire to engage and reproduce.

So I think that community dimension and the ways that platform architectures themselves can help exacerbate that is a really important factor. Again it is not sufficient and explanatory in itself but it is a big difference from simply encountering content and then going on to --

MR MOSS: It is a difference between passive consumption and community is, in a way, a modern form of incitement to violence?

MR COMERFORD: Yes, that is right.

MR MOSS: Thank you.

DR WHITTAKER: I would echo on what has already been said.

Just to make clear on the terms of the question, we don't have good data on this as it relates to adults,

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MR MOSS: In a sense several of you on the panel have predicted that aspects that I was going to ask about research, if I could ask you to be relatively brief, but given the ethical difficulties of doing things like prospective blind studies in this area to get top level research, in short pithy practical terms, what practical research that hasn't been done is urgent and could be done? Professor Gill?

PROFESSOR GILL: Pithy. So, I think we should be able to develop designs that test multifinality. So take a known outcome of interest, somebody who got to the end of the line and then work with the relevant stakeholders to see what did the rest of the caseload look like in that week, in that month, and work on the date from there to identify those kind of crucial turning points, the escalations in risk and whether it could have been identifiable in the midst of the risk of a caseload.

Sorry, I know you asked for pithy. I often think in anecdotes. My children used to play this game when we used to go to restaurants where you had a puzzle, and there'd be an end outcome, one end outcome where you got out and multiple starting points. What academics have typically done is started at the exit point and worked their way back and found this very neat entry point, whereas in reality what practitioners face is going from

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1 left to right, where there is five, six, seven different
2 people to be looked at and only one is going to get over
3 the line. It is a way of designing research where we
4 can try and do some of that work.

5 **MR MOSS:** Thank you. Dr Ebner?

6 **DR EBNER:** I do think a systematic analysis looking at
7 exposure, but for that we need complete data of course,
8 but as complete as we can get to where that exposure to
9 violent content from all the cases of extremists or
10 online users who went all the way to committing or
11 attempting to commit an act of violence. I think that
12 would be a useful exercise to start with.

13 I don't know of any study that has done that so far
14 but it would be I think even just embedded links in
15 their chat logs or embedded of course also in better
16 pictures, videos and in general violent language as
17 well, and looking at the amount of violent content, both
18 linguistic or text-based and also visual-based, as well
19 as media links that are embedded and looking at whether
20 there is any statistically significant relationship with
21 outcomes of violence when compared to a control group of
22 non-violent individuals online, consuming perhaps
23 similar visuals or similar content.

24 I think it might be interesting to also look at
25 reactions to that. So if there's anything in their

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1 **DR WHITTAKER:** So, again, I found about a dozen other people
2 who had some kind of similarity in terms of what their
3 pathways look like; heterogeneous pathways but some kind
4 of commonality. So it is certainly not unique in that
5 regard.

6 Again thinking about the other individuals, again
7 lots of them solitary consumers of violent content and
8 not specifically in a community, although being in
9 a community is a difficult thing to talk about because
10 a lot of these people who are passively consuming
11 content are going on to a forum or maybe watching stuff
12 on YouTube. It is difficult to really say what is in
13 a community and what isn't, particularly in this world
14 of parasocial relationships as well.

15 We certainly know from AR that he was engaging in
16 some spaces like that and doing research and -- I mean
17 to say it is not as cut and dried as not as in
18 a community, it is just communities look different to
19 different people.

20 But yes, I think there are other people that are
21 like this but it is clearly not as common as other kinds
22 of mass casualty attacks.

23 **MR MOSS:** Do any of the other panel want to come in on that?
24 Mr Comerford?

25 **MR COMERFORD:** I want to follow up on that exact idea of

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1 language, the ways in which they react to that type of
2 content that gives any clues about whether any cognitive
3 processes in response to that is different to the
4 cognitive responses to individuals who are not triggered
5 by that content.

6 **MR MOSS:** Thank you. Unless there's anything pressing I'm
7 going to move on.

8 **PROFESSOR GILL:** Sorry, I would also try and talk to them.
9 We are making a lot of assumptions based on remote
10 assessments of what they were doing and how they were
11 feeling at that moment.

12 **MR MOSS:** So the similar work to the 14 that you completed
13 for TACT offenders?

14 **PROFESSOR GILL:** Yes.

15 **MR MOSS:** Can I move on and ask this. Some of you touched
16 upon it in your presentations, the Inquiry only had
17 a partial picture of course of AR's online use but did
18 not find any evidence of community or forum mentor or
19 recruiter, and no manifesto.

20 Does someone like AR, if that is accurate as
21 a picture, fall into a different category altogether or
22 is he best seen as somebody who effectively
23 self-radicalised by his own consumption of violent
24 material?

25 Dr Whittaker?

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1 community and how we understand it online. I think we
2 have an offline conception of community that is very
3 participatory. I think there are parts of this
4 nihilistic spectrum that I pointed to that are very much
5 that way and people highly engaged in virtual
6 communities online. But I think there is an expansive
7 youth community where people feel part of a group of
8 like minded people without necessarily being very
9 actively involved. Maybe the false binary here is
10 around someone doing "research", quote unquote, and
11 being part of a community. I think it is very likely
12 that someone purely goes into the online space with
13 a kind of analyst's hat on and looks to find out about
14 genocidal violence or other forms of mass violence, and
15 that's very different from someone participating in
16 a community. I think there is an inherent community
17 dimension of this. Some of that would be very
18 formalised.

19 I mentioned groups like 764, the Com network, the
20 True Crime Community who are much more interactive. But
21 I would say that based on the cases that Joe mentioned
22 earlier, in some ways this case is a kind of median case
23 of someone being very actively involved in an online
24 community versus someone who was not as motivated by
25 online inspiration. So I don't think it is a kind of

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1 standalone case all that different from other cases we
 2 have seen presented.
 3 **MR MOSS:** Thank you. A different aspect of AR's online use.
 4 There were distinct signs of violence against women and
 5 girls in AR's digital footprint, amongst many other
 6 kinds of deviant and concerning material, but there was
 7 one element of that. He deliberately targeted an event
 8 involving, obviously and tragically, young girls with
 9 female session leaders.
 10 What is the panel's sense of the significance
 11 between any -- in any overlap between extreme violence
 12 and misogyny and violence against women and girls? And
 13 is any -- is there any evidence that specifically looks
 14 at that overlap? Professor Gill.

15 **PROFESSOR GILL:** We actually just put out a pre-print which
 16 is a systematic review and proportion net analysis on
 17 this very issue. So we disaggregated various different
 18 forms of domestic abuse and did a systematic search of
 19 the literature and reported the prevalence rates of "Is
 20 my partner violent?", sexual violence, emotional neglect
 21 and a range of an other domestic abuse indicators that
 22 have been found in studies of violent extremists.

23 So it is there. It's a meaningful number, but again
 24 in terms of looking at gold level evidence base, we are
 25 not at that stage. It is sort of creeping towards that

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1 that feature of violence against women and girls is
 2 present here given the evidence we have about the online
 3 trajectory of AR.

4 **MR MOSS:** Thank you.

5 **DR EBNER:** I would like to add to that, if I may jump in
 6 here.

7 I think one of the closest links have also been, at
 8 least from what we could observe in some of the cases
 9 between nihilism and misanthropic views and misogyny, I
 10 think we have now, as Milo said, really seen a lot of
 11 cases of cross-cutting misogyny across different types
 12 of ideologically-driven violent extremism, but also
 13 increasingly we see that misogyny often plays a role in
 14 cases of complete misanthropy or nihilistic forms of
 15 radicalisation.

16 I would even say that, for example, the Halle attack
 17 in Germany or also Jake Davison, the Plymouth attacker,
 18 where the ideological background was quite mixed and not
 19 very clear that there were also clear signs of misogyny.
 20 With Jake Davison of course he was at least loosely part
 21 of the incel community, but with the Halle attacker it
 22 was a little bit less clear, but there was also an
 23 underlying element of misogyny, as well as with the
 24 Munich attacker and with a few other attackers where we
 25 could see similar signs that misogyny is often either

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1 place but we can share that meta analysis. You can put
 2 a number and a confidence interval on it.

3 **MR MOSS:** Yes, thank you. Mr Comerford?

4 **MR COMERFORD:** Looking at this spectrum of extremism and
 5 extremist adjacent threats, I would point to the fact
 6 that misogyny is a cross-cutting feature across all
 7 forms of extremist ideology, from Islamist extremism to
 8 the far-right. It also increasingly manifests as its
 9 own form of extremism, if you like, based on the
 10 definition provided, a male supremacist vision that
 11 looks to effect political and social change in
 12 accordance with that ideology, and we have seen that
 13 with aspects of the incel movement, for example, heading
 14 in that category. It has been categorised as terrorism
 15 as such in some cases, including in Canada.

16 But I would say there is a very close relationship,
 17 if you like, between the misogyny that is part of many
 18 of these subcultures online that we have been talking
 19 about, and we saw earlier the adjacency to incel
 20 subcultures, to gore communities and so on. But I would
 21 say that people existing in these online ecosystems are
 22 very often exposed to misogynistic worldviews and
 23 content because of the adjacency of these online spaces
 24 to one another.

25 I think it is not necessarily a surprise at all that

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1 a gateway or a side product of the type of
 2 radicalisation towards violence.

3 **MR MOSS:** Thank you. Finally on this topic, should the
 4 Inquiry understand that those working with children and
 5 young people in this area need to be alert to the risks,
 6 in particular of them being -- of young people on gaming
 7 platforms and the vulnerabilities in gaming platforms,
 8 but also the significance of gore and animal abuse? Are
 9 those risk areas that perhaps are underestimated at the
 10 moment? Mr Comerford.

11 **MR COMERFORD:** So there has been a lot of research in
 12 general on gaming-related risks that is quite sort of
 13 generalised, two decades plus of research trying to
 14 understand that earlier question around exposure to
 15 violence, for example, does that lead to aggression or
 16 violent outcomes?

17 I think it is important to specify this question
 18 a little bit rather than the risks of gaming
 19 platforms --

20 **MR MOSS:** So I'm more interested in the risks of asking
 21 questions about those from deviant communities prying on
 22 children who are playing on gaming platforms than
 23 violent games per se.

24 **MR COMERFORD:** Precisely. I was going to say that I think
 25 that is one element is the use of gaming platforms

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themselves and the use of platforms like Roblox, for example, as hunting grounds for people within these communities, recognising the vulnerabilities of younger users there. There is also a set of gaming-adjacent platforms. We mentioned Discord a few times, for example, that are played, that are used in parallel to game and present unique risk factors, in some cases related to gaming, in some cases unrelated, but the platforms themselves are gaming-adjacent, as they are described.

As well as we have heard earlier from Julia about nihilistic games themselves, that part of the sort of creative content-producing process of many -- of the people in these communities is the development of games that are replicating mass shootings and so on. I think there is a spectrum of gaming-related activity that it is very important to understand where those risks are, and certainly that's something that caregivers and parents and others should be alert to.

But I think rather than it being a gaming bubble, being able to separate out whether it is gaming-related platforms, playing certain games or certain activities within games that are of concern, I think that would be very important.

MR MOSS: Thank you. I'm going to move on to the next topic

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be detected through those computational linguistic approaches, but that was already some years ago. We have now been training with LLM classifiers with higher reliability rates. Even there I think there is still a really cautious approach that's needed and it would only ever be useful to complement existing risk assessment frameworks and to use it in a way to allocate resources, not to find the needle in the haystack as such, or to have 100 per cent prediction certainty, but to help the security services and intelligence community allocate resources to the most high risk or identified areas, whether that's online communities, online spaces or whether that's individual users, that deserve more manual investigations because they show up as being on a higher risk level based on those linguistic patterns.

I think there is a real potential but it needs to be treated with extreme caution and I think it also needs a combined approach of looking at the different types of linguistic risk factors that different studies have shown to be relevant. So, not just the work that I have done on the psychological underlying patterns and psycholinguistic patterns, but also the work on operational leakage, where I know some of that work has also already informed threat assessment, as well as other potential markers that can be traced in language.

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of online detection of VFI's.

Could I start with you, Dr Ebner, if I may. Again I'm interested in practical real world terms of this. What's the prospect of the practical use of linguistic markers in a risk assessment tool? For example, if law enforcement and social care workers obtained access to a young person's devices, what is the prospect of triaging that content to have a meaningful risk evaluation? How far away are we from putting that into practice? And would we be right to think that that could only ever be part of a wider risk assessment?

DR EBNER: I would like to start by saying that I think there is real potential now to make use of the latest advances in LLMs and LM classifiers to help with threat assessment.

My work based on the manifesto analysis that I did, was already happening in the pre-LLM period where I used a lot of the more traditional approaches of computational linguistic analysis, I used (unclear) and I used keyboard based approaches. Here I would say that the rate of false positives is still very high and even though we found patterns, we still had to -- it is not as easy as to say: we can find the needle in the haystack.

I think it is overall a higher risk level that can

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So I think it is necessary to take a very much a combined approach. But, hopefully, language can be used also to further our understanding of the different pathways to violence and I also think there are different pathways and not just the ones that have been identified so far. Perhaps there is also more for us to learn in the future.

MR MOSS: Thank you. A slightly different aspect and this is one of the issues raised by some of the victims and their families; they are conscious that AR had a different type of digital footprint, in terms of his online purchasing, in that he had ordered effectively a small arsenal of weapons online.

Are the panel aware of any work that is in progress or any published work that looks at that different aspect of the protagonist's online purchasing patterns as opposed to their consumption of violent material?

DR WHITTAKER: You will forgive me for highlighting my own research, but I wrote an article a few years ago on a sample of Islamic State terrorists where I looked at the financial transactions and remarkably similar in terms of how easy it is to order weapons that can kill someone from the big players like Amazon and others.

Yes, I think it is, again, similarly within the 39 looked at, one of them was using quite sophisticated

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1 dark web methods but a lot of them were just either
2 using online retailers or walking into supermarkets and
3 being able to purchase.

4 **MR MOSS:** Without going into inappropriate detail, is
5 there -- obviously that's looking retrospectively after
6 the event -- is the panel aware of forward looking
7 processes to look at that as a means of detection in
8 advance or are the risks of it being across so many
9 different platforms so difficult that it is the
10 proverbial needle in a haystack?

11 **PROFESSOR GILL:** I have tried to supervise various PhD
12 dissertations that had a similar intent but perhaps a
13 different crime type, human trafficking in other places.
14 Getting that sort of baseline, noisy data from which
15 you could extract the signal from the banking industry
16 and other places, we always hit a wall.

17 **MR MOSS:** Thank you.

18 **DR EBNER:** I would like to highlight Olivia Brown and
19 I believe Laura Smith was already speaking to the
20 Inquiry earlier about some of her work. But Olivia
21 Brown and Laura Smith and a few other colleagues from
22 the University of Bath published a paper on: "online
23 Signals of Offline Violence" and I think that one is an
24 interesting one to look at when trying to understand
25 operational leakage and also the purchasing of weapons

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1 what are the worrying indicators that practitioners
2 should look out for to help distinguish cases where they
3 should be really worried from the "mere" consumer of
4 violent content who wouldn't go on to act out violence
5 in the real world? Professor Gill.

6 **PROFESSOR GILL:** I do not think it is as much about
7 indicators as thinking through about fundamental
8 principles of risk and threat assessments. The problem
9 with lots of people that get to the end of the line and
10 do the attack isn't that they weren't known, it was that
11 escalations in their patterns of behaviour weren't
12 observed, weren't noticed, weren't pulled together in
13 a timely manner.

14 So it is less about, like, what is the indicator?
15 But has there been a shift in x? Is there a change in
16 y? And having kind of theories of change about that
17 individual and their individual context that might make
18 you think, if that lever changes, escalation could go up
19 and what that lever is for that person might be
20 different for that person, might be different for this
21 person.

22 So it is about having that highly individualised
23 social professional style of judgement style approach.
24 You are not going to algorithm and number and predict
25 actuarially your way out of this.

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1 or discussions. This is again language based, but
2 discussions about operational preparations being made,
3 including weapon purchases or including specific weapons
4 that are being referenced.

5 Similarly, I would say that also ISD's work, the
6 Institute for Strategic Dialogue's work has done -- has
7 really made progress in understanding specific both open
8 source intelligence gathering approaches, but also
9 language based approaches of some of these operational
10 signals of someone purchasing weapons or someone
11 engaging in ideas about specific weapons. And there has
12 been a real impact also that ISD has had in helping the
13 international intelligence community predict or prevent
14 some of the violent extremist plotted or planned attacks
15 in the past. So I think that's also something where ISD
16 has actually added quite a lot to the picture.

17 **MR MOSS:** Thank you. The next area is really drawing the
18 strands together of something that you all have
19 addressed, but you have stated, in particular
20 Professor Gill, you have stated that exposure to
21 violence is near ubiquitous in the offender populations
22 in this area but beyond that it depends.

23 What would you each give, again, in practical brief
24 terms, as a sort of bullet point list, of worrying
25 indicators, beyond involvement in online violence --

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1 **MR MOSS:** No. And, presumably, and this might be something
2 that applied in AR's case, increasing social isolation
3 may itself be -- fit in that category; someone who is
4 regressing more and more into their bedroom, the online
5 world and refusing contact with services, could itself
6 be a very significant factor? Would you agree?

7 **PROFESSOR GILL:** Yes.

8 **MR MOSS:** Do others want to come in on that?

9 **PROFESSOR GILL:** Even from a harm prevention perspective, it
10 is important. It might not be indicative that he is
11 going to do what he ended up doing, but it is a sense
12 that somebody's life is going in the wrong direction and
13 that there is going to be some negative impacts from
14 increasing social isolation because we know the positive
15 mental health impacts from positive social interactions,
16 so yeah.

17 **MR COMERFORD:** Just to build on Paul's point that the
18 challenge is not necessarily about finding the
19 individuals in the first case and many of the case
20 studies of similar violence that we have seen, as well
21 as the focus of this Inquiry, the issue hasn't
22 necessarily been the individual being on the radar of
23 relevant authorities, but rather making sense of what
24 the risk is and understanding and in the case of
25 concerning online behaviours, which is the focus of

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1 today, what it is that we are looking at.

2 I mentioned that quote from the practitioner who
3 engaged with an individual who had a similar trajectory,
4 saying: we knew we had a problem kid, but we didn't know
5 what type of problem kid we had. And the question then
6 is: what are the kind of specifics features that can
7 help assess specific risks and understand what the kind
8 of required intervention is.

9 The way I presented it earlier was looking at that
10 interaction of those concerning indicators of behaviour,
11 of participating in online environments that are harmful
12 but also the sort of comorbidities that are present,
13 especially in some of these online ecosystems of
14 self-harm communities, of those involved in suicidal
15 ideation, eating disorders, et cetera.

16 Then, of course, ultimately, the signs are about
17 that kind of escalation towards action and we have heard
18 references to leakage and so on. But there are many
19 visible signs of someone talking more proactively about
20 carrying out an attack or engaging in violence. That's
21 not necessarily a predictor in itself, but that so often
22 is the kind of difference maker from those who are
23 engaging in these communities and those who are, in the
24 words of Robert Bowers, an attacker in the US: "Screw
25 your optics... I'm going to do something here." Those

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1 biological family as that becomes all encompassing; the
2 new in-group or the fixation.

3 And that is something that I would say is a serious
4 signal or a signal that should be taken seriously in
5 threat assessment, which has traditionally often focused
6 more on the types of superficial ideologies or the
7 operational leakage and planning activities, which are
8 not always -- sometimes now, as well -- I think in the
9 future or looking towards the future, it will need
10 a different type of threat assessment to even look at
11 these operational leakage cases. If someone, for
12 example, uses an LLM chatbot instead of posting into
13 a group or posting into a community what their plans
14 are, I think that is actually an additional -- perhaps,
15 an additional space I want to just open up, perhaps, for
16 later discussion, but I think looking into how we can
17 also use the data points from individuals'
18 communications, not just what they share in an online
19 community, but also what they potentially share with
20 their LLM chatbot will be really key looking forward.

21 But, yes, I think it is really necessary to also
22 look at identity changes and at behavioural changes that
23 might signal some type of changing in the way they
24 perceive themselves.

25 **MR MOSS:** Thank you. We will ask others later in the week

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1 are very discernible features of people's online
2 behaviours that might be much more concrete for
3 practitioners to look at than mere engagement in online
4 spaces.

5 **DR WHITTAKER:** With all the caveats about: this is complex
6 and no single pathways et cetera; the combination of
7 explicit leakage, you know, very specific language,
8 told -- that signals that they might be about to do
9 something; with previous violence in their history as
10 well -- again, kind of taking it back to first
11 principles -- demonstrates that they are thinking very
12 specifically about something like this and they have,
13 kind of, played around with violence before and it
14 didn't result in a bad enough outcome to stop them, to
15 disincentivise them from doing it again.

16 **MR MOSS:** Thank you. Dr Ebner, did you want to come in?

17 **DR EBNER:** Can I add one more point to it.

18 I would like to come back to the social isolation
19 point because I do think it is key in terms of
20 behavioural changes that can often -- not always of
21 course -- be observed.

22 One of the key issues here is also that sometimes,
23 whether it is an in-group or whether it is an issue that
24 someone becomes fixated on or an in-group that someone
25 fuses with, there's often a detachment from one's

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1 about this as well, but you are obviously all leaders in
2 your field and we know that there are centres of
3 expertise, the NCA, Counter Terrorism Police; but in
4 understanding what's on devices and device downloads, do
5 you have a sense from your own perspectives of whether
6 there is sufficient resource at a local and regional
7 level to understand the significance and seriousness of
8 what is on young people's devices when they are seized
9 at a lower level locally? Mr Comerford?

10 **MR COMERFORD:** I think there is a sort of established
11 understanding that it is really important to have very
12 localised responses to these kind of risks and threats,
13 not least because of the kind of better understanding
14 that local authorities might have of the context, of the
15 specific dynamics that are present and that was
16 certainly perhaps orthodoxy around some violent
17 extremism risks that were more networked, related to
18 specific social networks, family networks etc.

19 I think part of the challenge of the threats that we
20 are talking about today are that individuals are not
21 necessarily part of a localised context and they might
22 actually be being groomed by someone in a different
23 country, let alone in another part of the country.

24 In some ways I do think it is important to have
25 highly localised specialism, but in this case it is less

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relevant to have data about a specific, I don't know, local risk because when you are talking about people that are engaging in online spaces that are almost cut off from their local environments, it is a slightly different calculation.

I think it is still important to have the knowledge at a local level of what these harms look like and where the risks lie, but I think it is also very important with these kind of threats to have very clear opportunities for providing the deep dive insights on the violent aesthetics of these communities; on the specific changing composition of these online environments, where violent attackers are emanating from that is centralised. I do really think that, yes, having local -- an ability at a local level to understand where the risks might lie, but also having that backstop to very strong centralised support is going to be significant. Perhaps more so than "traditional" extremist threats, where I think the local dimension was more significant.

MR MOSS: Can I ask specifically about that. ISD has one of your publications which, as I understand it, is specifically meant to help ground level practitioners on what to look out for. I don't raise this critically at all of ISD, but do you have an understanding of what the

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interventions against non-ideological extreme violence online? Dr Whittaker?

DR WHITTAKER: The history of preventative interventions in the terrorism space is shaky at best and lacking any kind of underlying data to suggest that it works.

So we have been engaging in strategic communications for 15/20 years at this point and while there are -- actually, the last five or so years there has been some really good, high quality research, but still relatively small in number. We still don't really know if it is a productive endeavour.

What I will say is that some of the actors that are in this space, the intervention providers, quickly worked out that shifting away from ideological persuasion to a model of psychosocial support, does yield somewhat more productive results and that's probably where the VFI angle comes in to some extent.

There is a player in the field, (unclear) moonshots, who became very famous for what they called "the redirect method". So it would detect your keywords and if you have you had keywords associated with a terrorist ideology, it would give you a pop up ad.

In recent years, it has moved from telling them that their ideology is wrong to saying: would you like some psychosocial support? They would certainly say that

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practical reach of that is, whether it gets into the hands of educators and safeguarding leads in schools and so on?

MR COMERFORD: I would say that that specific resource was quite US geared and has been more focused on reaching practitioners at a local level, but I think it translates very well. Ultimately it is about embedding some of these insights within the regularised Prevent training. There was systematic training happening through the Commission for Counter Terrorism previously.

I think recognising this evolving threat landscape in the provision of training, using these kind of resources to provide some practical tools and also a list of the other resources available whether it is those that can help support the eating disorder components of this, the suicidal ideation components, and who to refer onto is very necessary and I would absolutely say that that hasn't been mainstreamed across the practitioner community.

MR MOSS: I'm conscious of time. Can I move on to online interventions. Can I ask the whole panel this: what, from earlier experience, perhaps in the areas of ideological terrorism, perhaps in the areas of child sexual abuse material, what has worked in those sort of areas that still needs to be carried across into

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that yielded much more positive results.

There is probably some learning there in terms of people are more likely to engage an offer for help than a challenge to their ideology.

MR MOSS: Thank you. Mr Comerford?

MR COMERFORD: There is another sort of genre of online interventions that isn't about counter speech or changing people's ideas or behaviour which is premised on inoculation theory, the idea that you expose populations to a kind of example of harmful content and explain the way that it is harmful. There has been -- proven to be relatively successful across a range of adjacent domains. An organisation called Peril in the US has recently put out research on the effectiveness of this in countering antisemitic attitudes online. They have also done similar things on far right extremism and what this really involves is showing people the ways that they might be being manipulated and reaching them beforehand and sometimes you can gamify this. Rather than just providing it as an informational interventional, there are ways you can bring this to life in online spaces in a way which might be more compelling to younger people.

I would be interested to see the extent to which inoculation based approaches might be effective,

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particularly given the nature of grooming, if you like, the sort of playbook that is mobilised by harmful actors online, showing examples of this, being able to provide upstream indicators of what manipulation and abuse looks like, so that people are able to respond when they see it, seems like a potentially promising avenue to be thinking about and potentially testing the efficacy of these kind of harms as well.

MR MOSS: Thank you. Mr Comerford, can I stick with you, because one of the issues, again that's been raised by the victims, is noting that one of your reports has indicated that most online harms resulting from nihilistic subcultures are already covered in community guidelines. Reference to your report "Beyond Extremism".

Are you really saying there that the problem lies in enforcement of the existing policies rather than the gaps in the policies for the most part? More generally, can I ask the panel, again, in sort of pithy bullet point terms, what more should social media companies actually be doing to improve safety on their platforms in this space?

MR COMERFORD: So when it comes to the content piece of this, yes, I think that is absolutely right. I think the majority of this is already captured by the existing

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Is that the sort of thing?

MR COMERFORD: I think that could be a very promising model to explore, especially in the context where victim and perpetrator is such a thin line in many of these communities; reaching people when they are being victimised and providing them with a route out, where they can be provided with the support they need.

There is much more that platforms could be doing in facilitating that. It is very hard to do it from an external perspective, having a service provider coming in without going with the grain of how platforms themselves are designed. I think that needs to be done in partnership rather than external forces trying to navigate online spaces that were there -- sort of interlopers.

MR MOSS: What about the rest of the panel? Dr Ebner, on an allied topic, you I think mentioned that you were concerned that take-down policy was worse now than it was five years ago. I think you mentioned X in that capacity. Do you want to expand on that and what your top issues would be for the platforms taking more effective action?

DR EBNER: Yes. It seems like we have been reversing in the last few years. A lot of the tech platforms, in particular X -- but a similar trend can be observed on

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rules on mainstream social media platforms. Smaller, alternative tech platforms have few to little rules and that's a different story. But certainly the kinds of platforms that this content is still so readily accessible on, those rules already exist and so it really is a matter of enforcing those more effectively.

In my presentation I spoke about beyond content alone and take-down and content moderation, which is actually a very narrow approach to dealing with these issues. There are a whole plethora of other platform interventions that might be thought about, that really get to the design level, that look at what are some of the harmful behaviours that people are engaging in; what are the ways that we can more effectively reach those at risk within harmful communities. And platforms can be much more hands on in making decisions that aren't just about whether the content stays up or goes down, but rather that they are creating safe environments that provide people with the support and services they might need.

MR MOSS: Does that include intervention with the victim? So if people seem to be being targeted online, that there should be separated from the community, the platform should have an involvement in partnership perhaps with positive interventions to help the victims?

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other tech platforms -- have almost gone backwards in terms of how much is being done about whether it is hateful content or ideologically extreme or violent inciting content. I think that is particularly pronounced in some of the data coming out of X or studies on X. But it can also be seen, as I said, on other platforms and I think that is overall concerning because of just the rapidly changing ecosystem and the new transnationally emerging movements that promote, whether it is ideologically extreme content or violent content as such, because they now no longer have to confine themselves to the very fringe platforms, where their reach is very limited, but they are also more confident in operating more widely across the entire online ecosystem, including on the mainstream platforms where they can reach new audiences and can also pull in children or young people, who might not otherwise find their way into some of the more radical fringe communities.

So I very much see that there is an urgent need for more to happen in that space. I just don't really know how -- what the best way forward is because a lot of these changes happened, of course, with the change in leadership, with the change both on a tech leadership, with Elon Musk taking over the platform of X, but also

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changes in the US presidency, as well as other changing forces that have given more freedoms to the tech companies to not remove content or accounts that previously would have been removed and, in general, enforcing even their own platform policies, where a lot of them are lagging behind their own guidelines. I think that is a really big issue.

I also briefly wanted to say something about the effectiveness of interventions. While I do agree that there is still a big gap in really understanding what has worked, what hasn't worked, there are some very limited studies that have shown that some interventions have performed better than others. But I think there is not enough evidence yet to -- in particular, when it comes to online interventions, which is also why I think we also should learn not just from the counter-terrorism and terrorism prevention or violent extremism prevention space, and what has been done in terms of interventions there, but also learn from other related spaces. In particular, the prevention of violence as such. Of criminal re-offence, for example, there are some studies, one study published in Nature by Martha Newson and Harvey Whitehouse about how -- this is more relating to offline interventions, but I think it is important to bridge that online/offline gap -- how, for example,

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enforce the Online Safety Act.

Most of the fines that they have levied have been pornography companies. There have been one or two that have related to the sort of online harms that we are discussing today. But the idea of these kinds of enforcement protocols is that, firstly, we start off with warnings and legal processes and then you move to fine and then, potentially, to IP blocking and criminal sanctions for executives.

It seems like there is a bit of a game of chicken that a lot of these platforms -- 4chan being one of them, for example, that was fined, just completely ignoring and the platform staying up and almost daring Ofcom to take the next step when it comes to IP blocking, which would obviously be a huge step in terms of freedom of expression and things like that. It actually mirrors a similar way in which a lot of television companies that dared Ofcom to do the same by flouting television broadcast rules. It is not an unknown playbook.

Fundamentally, Ofcom have to demonstrate that they will enforce the Act and that the things that they can do are enforceable. Again, there is no point IP blocking one of these problematic sites if a ten year old can get a VPN and access it immediately. A lot of

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sport based interventions, in particular football based interventions can reduce the risk of re-offending among prison inmates. This is now in collaboration being done -- a big programme called The Twinning Project in collaboration with the HM Prisons and Probation Service, where it really shows that it has a very strong effect on reducing re-offending rates.

I think there are lessons that can be drawn also from these related areas, where it is not necessarily just looking at what has worked in the counter-terrorism space, but also looking more widely, what has worked in terms of reducing crime rates, reducing violence as such. And, again, I do think it is important to also not just look at online interventions, but perhaps use online as a starting point to then take some of these interventions offline.

MR MOSS: I'm going to come back, if I may, to the offline.

Can I change tack and ask Professor Gill and Dr Whittaker about the regulators as opposed to the platforms. Similarly, what would be high on your list as urging for more intense or greater action from the regulators? Dr Whittaker?

DR WHITTAKER: We are still at a very early stage of enforcement of the Online Safety Act. It is difficult to know how willing Ofcom is to actually go to bat to

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these sites, by the way, who are geoblocked in the UK, put up a notice saying they are geoblocked and immediately under have: here is how you can download a VPN, which technically is in breach of the Online Safety Act as well. Ofcom having the teeth to enforce the Online Safety Act and, at the same time, the technical solutions actually doing something because right now it is not clear that they are.

MR MOSS: Professor Gill, is there anything you would add to that?

PROFESSOR GILL: No, I'm too far out of that space.

MR MOSS: Thank you. Can I turn to offline interventions then, please. Could I ask in general terms about two aspects; protective factors and measures towards disengagement but taking steps offline to encourage disengagement.

Professor Gill, can I start with you and invite you in particular on protective factors, which I think you said was a feature of your early research work and what the lessons are for VFIs on the most effective, protective factors that need to be exploited to mitigate the risk?

PROFESSOR GILL: Sure. A lot of the early research was only looking at risk factors, so we could only see risk.

A lot of the later research, where we were doing

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population level studies, we could see that the big differentiating factor between those who developed violent extremist attitudes or intentions versus other members of the community, who had a range of risk factors, was the presence of a strong, protective factor which must have added to their resilience or whatever the kind of case might be.

So we see them acting as a buffer, that when these kinds of factors and destabilising influences are popping up in their lives, the protective factor works as the thing that closes the door to stop them getting out to enable some sort of harm. Or the protective factors work in such a way that the individual doesn't find themselves, in the context of their lives, where they have a decision to make, whether to go further down that bad route or not. So it can lead them into different places or buffer them if they do get exposed to risk.

What they look like in the context of a VFI? I imagine they probably -- look, the work on protective factors is something that has popped up, especially in the youth justice space, over the last kind of decade. So it is an emergent space. Anything that falls into line with your good lives model -- we all have needs as go around our day-to-day functioning and our behaviours

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how can we help you do that in a pro-social, beneficial way? -- gets people in the door. Then you have got a chance.

MR MOSS: And relationships with trusted adults for children particularly?

PROFESSOR GILL: We are going through the final processes of evaluation of the Channel programme. This is what practitioners are saying a lot of the time, it is about relationships, relationships, relationships and the lack of them often leads people down these other paths, that they are finding other people, those relationships, in those kind of murky corners of the Internet or other kind of radicalising settings. It is about getting to them before or pulling them back from those spaces.

MR MOSS: And disengagement, obviously, there is a role for that in ideological terrorism, which is perhaps more well trodden and recognised; but how does that play across if it is nihilistic violence as opposed to ideologically-driven terrorism?

PROFESSOR GILL: This is where I get into problems of why we feel a need to put everybody in a certain bucket. I would say they are a pool of people that have found a calling within that grievance, that is sort of directing their day to day goal orientated behaviours. They are all individuals who are getting some sort of

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are an expression of those needs. What we do day to day is an expression of those needs. Some people find those needs in murky corners of the internet; some people find it amongst mates or at a football club or whatever the kind of case might be. Needs can be met through a variety of different ways. Again, it is about understanding -- not just taking it as an outcome of itself, right, he is violence fascinated -- what is that individual getting out of that consumption? Is it a sense of: I have been victimised, now others need to be victimised? Is it a sense of: that violence is against people that I also hate, so I like this? Is it just doom scrolling and then just going down those rabbit holes? Is it the case that they are hanging out with other people in these forums and getting a sense of camaraderie and getting a sense of, whatever the case may be?

All of those needs can be met through other things. So that is what the interventions need to be focused on. We talk a lot about risk and needs, we don't do enough chatting about responsivity. So, how can we get people signed onto interventions? The best available evidence is, you don't keep rapping them over the wrists and saying what they've done wrong and where their gaps are in their life. It is about: where do you want to go and

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needs met, be it ideological/non-ideological, through gore. So the principles of the intervention is the same. If it is ideology and you just tackle them on ideology, but they still have all those underlying needs not being met, there is still a likelihood that they are going to be hanging out in bad corners of the internet because they haven't learnt about the psychosocial process that brought them there in the first place.

So it is about working on individuals as individuals and getting an understanding of the context of their lives, to kind of help it be a more enriching intervention. So whether it is ideology, whether it is intimate partner violence, whether it is cyber crime, I think the same intervention principles hold. People are in it for a reason; understand the reason, figure out a different off-ramp(?) for them.

MR MOSS: I see in general nodding of heads from the panel. Do any of you want to add to that?

DR EBNER: Yes, perhaps immediately to jump in here, if I may.

I could not agree more with Professor Paul Gill's analysis of, in particular, the need to understand better the underlying needs because every fixation, every type of extremist mindset, has some kind of psychological need that we need to address -- well,

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1 first of all, understand better.

2 I completely agree there is no one fits all approach
3 to that, but that we need to develop specific
4 interventions that are tailored to these underlying
5 psychological needs.

6 Similarly, we have been seeing that with conspiracy
7 mindsets where a conspiracy fulfils a specific
8 psychological purpose or need. I do think one of the
9 key elements and key patterns that we do see across all
10 of these types of radicalisation, is the strong form of
11 out-group hostility or in some cases the out-group might
12 be the entire humanities of this really misanthropic
13 mindset, but in some cases it might be a more narrowly
14 defined out-group. But to find ways of engaging with
15 individuals that can break apart these strong feelings
16 of out-group or of hostility. And I think one of the
17 most effective ways so far, from what comes out of some
18 of the research that some of my colleagues have done in
19 terms of offline interventions, is shared experiences as
20 a way of fostering a shared sense of identity, a strong
21 global cohesion, with, potentially, including with
22 a defined enemy group or potentially with people who
23 might even have been previously on a target list. I do
24 think that is extremely relevant.

25 In the context -- even much more widely speaking of

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1 pathways to violence.

2 **MR MOSS:** I follow. Thank you. Dr Whittaker, finally, if
3 I may, can I come back to autism spectrum disorder. You
4 are right, of course, that we had views on that last
5 week from some of our medical experts.

6 But, looking at the high proportion in your case
7 studies of those who were autistic, I want to just seek
8 your assistance on what the practical message should be.
9 Avoiding, on the one hand, stigmatising those who are
10 autistic. Avoiding, on the other hand, overlooking any
11 risk because somebody is autistic and not dealing with
12 the risk that they may pose, but also ignoring or not
13 falling into the trap of simplistically thinking that
14 autism causes a security risk.

15 Looking at Al-Attar, what would be your practical
16 message to practitioners in terms of how they should
17 factor in autism spectrum disorder, when a child or
18 young person is also showing concerning features of
19 being fascinated with violence material?

20 **DR WHITTAKER:** I understand that people feel stigmatised.
21 It is a lot of media attention for, not even
22 a community, a set of communities. It is probably about
23 1-2 million autistic people in the UK and the vast,
24 vast majority of them never engage deviantly in
25 any way.

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1 conflict studies, there have been a few studies now --
2 in particular one that I want to highlight by Lucas
3 Reinhart and Harvey Whitehouse, where they showed that
4 out-group hostility could be reduced by exposing --
5 sorry, in the context of the Gaza conflict -- so, again,
6 conflict studies related but this might also relate to
7 radicalised individuals -- where a really strong sense
8 of out-group hostilities was there on both sides of
9 the -- more radical sides of the spectrum, on both sides
10 of the conflict and where you could see the out-group
11 hostility was drastically reduced by exposing each side
12 of the conflict to the suffering, to basically
13 experiences of the other side, that were very similar to
14 one's own suffering in terms of seeing civilians die on
15 the other side of the conflict.

16 I think that was something where -- of course the
17 online ecosystem often only exposes us to our own
18 grievances, to our own suffering. Whereas being exposed
19 to -- and that doesn't have to be negative dysphoric
20 experiences -- but in general having some kind of shared
21 experience, not just in terms of online exposure but
22 also having an intervention's approach that creates
23 shared experiences with either an out-group or humanity
24 at large, that could really help in countering some of
25 these very common patterns in the radicalisation

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1 However, we are seeing sometimes anecdotally --
2 I mean we had Jonathan Hall a couple of years ago
3 saying -- speaking to people in the Prevent system,
4 "staggeringly high" was the phrase used of the number of
5 autistic people. More research is showing correlation,
6 so not necessarily causation, overrepresentation. But
7 research, I think, quite clearly is stating that there
8 is no reason to think that it is causative and, again,
9 that phrase of -- it can contextualise an individual's
10 radicalisation is really key here.

11 Having autism does not make you more likely to
12 engage in this kind of violence, nor does it make you
13 more likely to engage in the collection and obsession
14 around it. It is that, plus a whole host of other
15 factors. Some of it is just entering the wrong online
16 community and then building that kind of identity point
17 and that filling the gratifications that Paul was
18 talking about.

19 We did a study on incels and again we found the rate
20 of autism via screener test was much higher than what
21 you would expect, given a random distribution. Our
22 analysis basically showed that it is this kind of
23 combination of personal predispositions, including
24 mental health and neurodiversity, with an ideology that
25 feeds that by saying: all of the things in your life

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1 that aren't working well for you, it is this person's
 2 fault, or it is women's fault, or it is feminism's
 3 fault; as well as an online community who also are
 4 posting incredibly toxic things that are kind of
 5 glorifying violence.
 6 So, seeing it as an important piece of context,
 7 which can be relevant, but right now the research
 8 doesn't suggest there's any reason to believe that it
 9 drives that process; it is just a part of it that can
 10 colour it either way and (unclear) makes the very
 11 clearly correct point that, in some instances, it can be
 12 a resilience factor as well.
 13 **MR MOSS:** Thank you. Sir, as always, I'm afraid there is
 14 simply not time to cover all of the questions. We do
 15 hope that that has been a fair selection.
 16 **SIR ADRIAN FULFORD:** It certainly has been. I want to
 17 express my considerable gratitude to the four of you for
 18 your assistance. It has been an extremely interesting
 19 and useful day and we are very grateful to you. Thank
 20 you very much indeed.
 21 I will rise now and we sit again I think at 10.00 am
 22 tomorrow morning.
 23 **MR MOSS:** Thank you, sir.
 24 **SIR ADRIAN FULFORD:** Thank you all very much.
 25 (4.02 pm)

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1 (The Inquiry adjourned until 10.00 am the following day)
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