



Southport Inquiry Phase 2

Views from Psychiatry, Psychology and Philosophy

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CTCCS – NHS & CT Police

- Detective Sergeant CT Police
- Forensic MH practitioners (social work & nursing)
- Clinical psychologist
- Forensic psychiatrist
- Vetted – Safe space for information sharing
- 1000 referrals Prevent (i.e., app.10% of all Prevent cases)
- 200 referrals from CTP
- Safeguarding mental health & safety of the subject
- Reduce the risk of ‘serious harm’ to the public
- Informing CT policing’s understanding of mental ill-health and its impact on individuals' behaviour



CCS - Where are we?

CCS covers the whole of England and Wales via three regional hubs – London, Manchester and Birmingham.

CCS hub – North

Covering:

- The North West
- The North East

CCS hub – Central


Covering:

- Wales
- The West Midlands
- The East Midlands

CCS hub – South

Covering:

- London
- The South West
- The South East
- The Eastern regions




Our mission is to support CT Policing in the management of risk through access to clinical mental health expertise, formulation and options for health intervention.



Our vision is to develop a world leading collaborative model of CT risk management between health and CT policing through greater understanding of mental ill-health and better information-sharing.

Case formulation - 'The Five Ps Model':





Information Sharing

In the interest of the subject's health, safety, and welfare, for safeguarding and to reduce the vulnerability of the subject to being drawn into extremism or terrorism.

To prevent serious harm, to a third party, in the public interest... to prevent a serious threat to life... national security... to prevent or detect serious crime.




Information Sharing

- European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) / Human Rights Act (1998):
- Article 8 (1): The Right to Respect for Private and Family Life, Home and Correspondence.
- Article 2: Everyone's right to life shall be protected by law.
- UK GDPR articles 6 and 9 and Data Protection Act (2018): Article 6 UK GDPR provides a lawful basis for processing health data.
- Counter Terrorism and Security Act (2015) 'the Prevent duty'
- The Care Act (2014)
- Common law
- Professional and NHS Guidance: The ICO guidance; NHS codes of practice, the Caldicott principles.
- Social Work England, General Medical Council, British Medical Association, Royal College of Psychiatrists, Nursing and Midwifery Council, HCPC.



CCS Referrals April 2024 - Jan 2026

1534 closed cases



Note: 0.2% of values missing

Fig 1: Age distribution




Figure 8: Proportion of CCS cases in each ideological category




Figure 11: Proportion of cases in each ideology category that are each age




Figure 16: Each condition as a % of all conditions present in the specified ideological category



Dr Zainab Al-Attar (2020)

Seven facets of ASD - functional links with push and pull factors

- **Facet 1:** Circumscribed interests
- **Facet 2:** Rich vivid fantasy & impaired social imagination
- **Facet 3:** Need for order, rules, rituals, routine and predictability
- **Facet 4:** Obsessionality, repetition and collecting
- **Facet 5:** Social interaction and communication difficulties
- **Facet 6:** Cognitive styles
- **Facet 7:** Sensory processing



PROBLEMS IDENTIFIED

Issues with services: 26%

- Waiting lists
- Thresholds for services
- Cliff edge of services
- Complications: merging notes, transferring to other services, mis-communications

Medication issues: 14%

- Struggling with routine
- Discontinued due to side effects, other medications, noncompliance, ineffectiveness
- Change to medication as a trigger

Disengagement/ noncompliance: 14%

- Non-attendance
- Noncompliance with medical checks
- Others e.g. location of services and ability to attend

Undiagnosed/suspected conditions: 47%

Refusing/declining support: 10%



- Hybrid harm online networks - Com engagement in CCS casework:
- 16 children and young people (2024-26)
- Aged 11-26, mean 16.6 - and majority female
- Victim-offender overlap throughout: 75% victims of extortion/grooming; 75% self-harm - yet 63% desire to hurt others; 31% idolise mass killers; 25% offline violence plans
- Implication: treat simultaneously as victims AND sources of risk - either half alone produces the wrong response



New initiatives

- UCL Dept of Crime Science & CTCSS research
- 130 FEVMCA cases
- Adolescent at Risk Service
- National FCAMHS network
- CCS ASD service



Risk Assessment vs Threat Assessment





- “No tool or method currently exists for psychiatrists to provide a risk assessment with any predictive validity” . Tools identify vulnerable groups “but cannot predict which specific individuals will perpetrate LAGFV” (RANZCP 2023, PS #113)
- Prevention without prediction: the public health approach
- Preventing harm and facilitating care
- Mental disorder is usually one element in a multifactorial pathway - rarely 'the cause' (Clemmow et al. 2025)



Question 3

What are the key signs of escalation from an initial obsession or grievance towards fixation and violence?




Some Definitions

- Obsession
- Ideation
- Fascination
- Grievance
- Fixation
- Preparation
- Hostile reconnaissance
- Attack

Conceptualising violence


Then:



Revised conceptualisation of lone-actor attacks



Behavioural pathway (Calhoun & Weston)





The eight warning behaviours (Meloy et al. 2012) – the proximal items of the TRAP-18:

1. Pathway (research, planning, preparation)
2. Fixation
3. Identification
4. Novel aggression
5. Energy burst
6. Leakage
7. Last resort
8. Directly communicated threat (making a threat vs posing a threat)



Leakage

- School attacks: in 81% at least one other person knew of the plan, most often a peer (Vossekuil et al. 2002, US Secret Service)
- Lone-actor terrorists: family or friends aware of the grievance or intent in a majority of cases; leakage in around two thirds (Gill, Horgan & Deckert 2014)



Conclusions