

Seminar Southport Inquiry - Phase 2
*Violence Fixated Individuals: Lessons from other
threat management and multi-agency processes
other than Prevent*

Care and Safety Houses in the Netherlands

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UNIVERSITY
OF AMSTERDAM

Care & Safety
House (C&SH)

Radicalisation,
Extremism and
Terrorism

Advantages

Concerns

Conclusions

Three questions:

How does the Dutch Care and Safety House model identify, assess, and manage individuals who present a serious risk of violence but do not fit a clear criminal, ideological, or mental health profile?

How do partners within the Dutch Care and Safety House system work together to share information, assess risk, coordinate interventions, and maintain accountability for individuals of concern?

To what extent does the Dutch approach focus on unmet needs, vulnerability, and trauma rather than ideology, and what lessons might this offer for managing violence-fixated individuals in the UK?

Care & Safety House (C&SH)	Description
Radicalisation, Extremism and Terrorism	Origin
	Criteria
Advantages	Network
Concerns	Process
Conclusions	Legislation
	Specials

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Specials

What is a Care and Safety House?

A. Structural collaboration between network partners in complex cases with a potential safety risk

B. Support bureau

- A. Process (case) management
- B. Knowledge and information hub
- C. Trend spotting and analysis
- D. Regional network coordination

- Currently 31 regional C&SHs
- Vision: 'Safety and Care are shared responsibilities'

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

Network

Process

Legislation

Specials

- <1990
 - L&O managed by police & CPS
- 1990's
 - Security domain noted increase in habitual offenders public safety
 - Start regional 'Safety Houses (SH)'
- 2006
 - Nationwide network but very diverse
- 2015
 - Focus shifted to 'persons with disturbed behaviour'
 - SH → C&SH
 - National framework C&SH



■ Safety ■ Care ■ Finance ■ Housing

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
Process

Legislation

Specials

‘Complex Case’

1. Individual or family-related problems
2. Problems in multiple areas and criminogenic factors
3. Objective facts (or likelihood) of crime, violence or public disturbance
4. Multi-domain collaboration is deemed mandatory for addressing the problems
5. (Additional criteria optional)



■ Domestic Violence ■ Mental Health
■ Finance ■ Housing

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
Process

Legislation

Specials


• Safety Domain

- Public Prosecutor ('CPS')
- Police
- Probation Service
- Prison Services
- Family Safeguarding
- Council for Child Protection




• Care Domain

- (Forensic) Mental Health Care
- GP
- Addiction support services



• Municipality

- Housing agencies
- Social welfare
- Employment agency



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
Criteria

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Specials

- Medical Confidentiality
 - Sharing patient details with others without explicit consent is a crime
 - Breach permitted without patient consent
 - To avert imminent danger
 - Conflict of duties
- 2025: Law on Information Sharing in Collaborations
 - C&SH, Fraud, Criminal Undermining
 - ‘Legal base for sharing personal information
 - ‘Duty To Share’ principle
 - Medical professions are exempted
 - Formalizes criteria for C&SH referrals

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Specials

- Specialized C&SH ‘tables’
 - Domestic violence
 - Child (sexual) abuse
 - ‘Persons with disturbed behaviour’
 - Reintegration after prison sentence
 - Life-span approach program
 - Dangerous and disruptive behaviour (risk) resulting from mental health problem, intellectual impairment or acquired brain damage
 - Recurrent problems in multiple domains
 - Difficult management in (forensic) mental health
 - Need for prolonged, close coordination to avert dangerous behaviour
- ‘Plus Tasks’
 - Reporting point ‘need for compulsory care’
 - Neighbourhood justice
 - Radicalisation, extremism and terrorism

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Outline CT-
strategy

Person
Centered
Approach

Process

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Specials

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Specials

- National Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism and Security (NCTV)
 - Extremism and Terrorism defined as *ideologically motivated* behaviour
- Local Approach to Counter-Terrorism
 - Knowledge and skills
 - Network
 - Interventions in 3 phases
 - Prevention
 - Person-centered approach
 - Detention and reintegration

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**Person
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Specials

- **Person-Centered Approach**
(*Persoonsgebonden aanpak - PGA*)
 - Multi-disciplinary case consultation
 - Mix of criminal law, administrative measures, care and other interventions
- **Four phases**
 1. Reporting to municipality
 2. Assessment by municipality, police and CPS
 - Intention to use violence
 - Expression of extremist views
 - Social network
 - Identification with extremist group or ideology
 - Self-support
 3. Case Consultation
 4. Monitoring and finalising



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
Person
Centered
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Specials

- Phase 3: case consultation process
 - Chaired by municipality
 - Permanent and invited participants
 - Notification of subjects in 'person centered approach'
- Guideline Professional Judgement – *working model case consultation radicalisation and extremism*



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Seperate law for information sharing in
collaborations about radicalized individuals *

- Legal base of the ‘local approach’
- Legal base of the ‘person centered approach’
- Mayor is responsible
- Infrastructure of C&SH can be used
- Health Care professionals are exempted from sharing medical information

* *Wet gegevensverwerking persoonsgerichte aanpak
radicalisering en terroristische activiteiten – [Wet PARTA](#)*

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
Process

Legislation

Specials

- Intensive Person-Centered Approach
Radicalisation (i-PGA-R) (*Amsterdam*)

- Criteria: Care **and** Ideology-related Violence
- First contact is with subject himself or family
- Hinges on building trust
- Case-manager aims for cooperation
- Phases:
 - Connect and motivate
 - Create momentum
 - Finalise



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
Person-centered

Clear line of responsibility

Smooth case transfer

Building and maintaining cross-domain alliances

Inter-regional cooperation



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
Effectiveness
unknown

Medical
confidentiality

Quality control

Post-detention
process

‘label-myopia’



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**Answers to
the 3
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However ...

How does the Dutch Care and Safety House model identify, assess, and manage individuals who present a serious risk of violence but do not fit a clear criminal, ideological, or mental health profile?

- Identification by public, police, education, etc.
 - Referrals directed to the municipality as a general 'complex case' or a 'possible CT-case'
- Referral assessment in small committee:
 - triaged for routing to a C&SH 'table' depending on priority
 - Possibility to refer to another 'table' in same C&SH
- Management:
 - *Shared responsibility and joined Plan of Action*
 - *Plan Do Act Check (PDCA)* procedure
- A '*best-fit*' is good enough

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However ...

How do partners within the Dutch Care and Safety House system work together to share information, assess risk, coordinate interventions, and maintain accountability for individuals of concern?

- Firm legal basis for information sharing
- Risk assessment:
 - *Working model case consultation (..)*
 - *Structured Professional Judgement*
- Interventions are coordinated
 - During C&SH meetings
 - In dedicated secure mail-groups
- Accountability for individuals of concern
 - Notification duty
 - Oversight committee routinely reviews process

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**Answers to
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However ...

To what extent does the Dutch approach focus on unmet needs, vulnerability, and trauma rather than ideology, and what lessons might this offer for managing violence-fixated individuals in the UK?

- Focus
 - Working model is based on holistic causality
 - Ideology is 'a' factor, but may direct 'table'-choice
- Food for thought
 - Collaboration is an attitude, not just a skill
 - Alternatives for cases not meeting Prevent criteria



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
Conclusions

Answers to the
3 Questions

However ...

C&SH-construction is not fool-proof

- Erasmus Bridge stabbing September 2025
 - Signs of psychosis missed in holiday season
 - Ideology twice assessed to be absent
- Triple murder by 'incel' September 2023
 - Premature closure of case by multiple partners
 - Calculating perpetrator
 - No OSINT
- Tram attack Utrecht March 2019
 - Poor information sharing after prison sentence
 - no C&SH referral

The background image shows a city waterfront scene. In the foreground, there is a paved area with a large, dark, angular sculpture. Two pigeons are standing on the pavement. To the right, there is a small potted plant with white flowers and some loose flowers on the ground. In the background, a large cable-stayed bridge with a blue pylon is visible, along with several tall skyscrapers in the city skyline. A person is walking on a path to the left, and a bicycle is parked nearby.

Thank you for your attention

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