

[336486] Southport - sale and delivery of age-restricted bladed items in the UK -

Published - Action items complete Secure

Incident date (UTC): 2025/01/21 (7 months ago) | Published date (UTC): 2025/02/07 (7 months ago)

COE content

- 1
- Summary
- 2
- On 29 July 2024, a mass stabbing occurred at a dance class in Southport, UK. Three children were murdered alongside the attempted murder of ten others. A 17-year-old named Axel Rudakubana was arrested and later charged. As part of the investigation, it was determined that Rudakubana had purchased the knife used in the killings from Amazon.
- 3
- The attack drew significant reaction from the public with protests and riots taking place nationwide. On 20 January 2025 Rudakubana pleaded guilty to all charges as his trial began. On 21 January 2025, news of the Amazon purchase was first publicised in the media. Multiple Tier 1 media outlets picked up on the story with headlines such as “The Amazon Killer” featuring as front-page coverage. The Home Secretary pronounced it a “total disgrace” that Rudakubana was able to purchase a knife from Amazon at the age of 17.
- 4
- An internal investigation was launched and found that Rudakubana opened an Amazon account in the name of “A R” on 27th October 2021 aged 15 years old. On 13 July 2024, he purchased a 20cm kitchen knife to be delivered to “Ax Rud” which he later went on to use in the mass stabbing. He was able to navigate beyond the Online Age Verification process by entering his father’s name, date of birth and the address at which they both lived. These details were verified through the outsourced Experian identification check. The payment card used was that of Rudakubana, not his father. On 15 July 2024, the product was delivered to Rudakubana’s address. The recipient’s year of birth was recorded as “1978” with the Driver recording that the recipient appeared over the age of 25.
- 5
- This COE reports on the impact of this case and seeks to conclude what happened, why and what lessons have been learned.
- 6
- Customer Impact
- 7
- Outside the tragic results of Rudakubana’s actions for his victims and their families, customer impact is focused on the negative impact on customer trust / Amazon’s reputation.
- 8
- At the height of the crisis (21-24 January 2025) Amazon was mentioned negatively in 154 national media articles, with the story leading the broadcast television and broadcast bulletins for three days, alongside more than 21,000 X mentions of Amazon on this issue. This included three front page newspaper stories on 22 January 2025 ([The Times](#), [The Sun](#), and [The Mirror](#)) following the Home Secretary’s [comments](#) on Amazon in the House of Commons the previous day, with The Sun branding the offender the “Amazon Killer” and featuring an Op-Ed by Prime Minister, Sir Keir Starmer, calling Rudakubana the “two-click killer”. This resulted in 7 critical mentions by policymakers of Amazon. By 24 January 2025, we saw increased push back against the Government narrative, with

commentators branding it a “distraction” from authority failings around this case, including 14 supportive statements by policymakers (including Dominic Cummings and Nigel Farage).

While scrutiny was overwhelmingly focused on the knife purchase, some reporters picked up on police guidance and statements in court related to other ‘problematic’ products ordered by the offender, as well as the combination of products ordered relating to the manufacture of ricin. Most prominently, Chief Reporter of the Times, Fiona Hamilton, published a piece entitled [‘Why Amazon has questions to answer over sales of terror materials’](#) on 22 January 2025. It notes a number of terrorist incidents in the UK, where the offenders purchased materials for bomb-making on Amazon.

While the story has since moved on, with Amazon mentions largely factual, we remain mindful of the announced public inquiry and any potential Select Committee scrutiny. This case also risks colouring future policy engagement, and we would expect it to be raised as part of future policy changes. Depending on the scale of these changes, we anticipate future impact on Customer Experience.

What Went Well

1. Age verification processes, both at point of purchase and delivery, activated as expected. Specifically:

- The product ASIN had the correct Age Verification (AV) attributes and surfaced AV messaging on the website
- The Online Age Verification (OAV) process was triggered and correctly identified that the details entered were of someone aged 18+.
- The correct age verified workflow surfaced in the delivery app
- The Driver entered a Year of Birth (YOB) consistent with someone aged 25+, and confirmed that the recipient appeared to be over the age of 25.

Incident Response Analysis

How was the event detected (e.g. our alarm, another team’s alarm, manual)?

- Initial contact was made by the Police through the Law Enforcement Response Team (LER) in July, August and December 2024. Whilst July and August's contact was generic, in December the Police specifically mentioned the Southport case. No escalations were made at the time.
- On 20 January 2025, The Liverpool Echo contacted Public Relations (PR) citing knowledge that the offender had purchased the murder weapon on Amazon as a 17-year-old. This was immediately escalated to the appropriate teams. Public Policy (PP) were made aware in advance of the Home Secretary’s statement to the House of Commons on 21 January 2025.

How long did it take to mitigate the issue? How could time to mitigation be improved? As a thought exercise, how would you have cut the time in half?

- Opportunities were missed to make PR / PP / Legal aware of the December Police request. While we do not believe this would have mitigated the media response, it would have provided an opportunity to devise a response, review the case and act before having to respond to external interest in the matter.

How did you reach the point where you knew how to mitigate the impact?

- Initial investigation was broken down by process point. By 14:00 on 21 January 2025, we had established the date the account was opened, had reviewed the ASIN for the purchase in question, collected OAV details and ascertained the data entered during delivery. This enabled the start of the COE and the issue of our first media statement

How did you confirm that your system was fully recovered?

- The system worked as designed. The ASIN was tagged as Age Restricted and triggered the OAV and the AVD workflow. Rudakubana was able to circumvent them using the information of his father and the product being received by an adult.

- 27 1) Immediate action was taken to audit each part of the process:
- 28 · Website audits were conducted across 36K ASINs of bladed products to ensure they have the correct attributes to trigger AV controls. 0.6% ASINs were found to be undetected (vs. 2% average for non-AV controls by Restricted Products). We consequently refined our classifiers and are onboarding new image recognition technology to further reduce non-detections.
- 29 · Communication reinforcing AVD requirements was sent to all Delivery Service Providers (DSPs), DSP Drivers (via Voltron notifications to the delivery app) and Flex Delivery Partners.
- 30 · AVD audits were increased by 25% through our third-party supplier to monitor compliance.
- 31 2) PP proactively contacted No10, Home Office, advisors to the Leaders of the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats, and the Police. Public statements were agreed and both media and political reaction monitored until coverage reduced.

32 Timeline

33 2021-2024

- 34 · 27 October 2021 – Rudakubana creates Amazon account. Between 21 Oct and 21 Jun, he places 44 orders, some of which include multiple items and 13 of which are subsequently cancelled by him. Items ordered included a sledge hammer, duct tape, matches, motor oil, lighters, smoke grenades and hunting bow and arrows.
- 35 · 13 July 2024 – Rudakubana orders the knife.
- 36 · 15 July 2024 – The knife is delivered.
- 37 · 29 July 2024 – Rudakubana carries out the Southport attack.
- 38 · 30 July 2024 – Police contact LER to request account information and order history between 01/07/23 and 30/07/24, providing case background: *This is an ongoing terrorism investigation where it is suspected that individual subject of this investigation may be involved in terrorist activity and as such, we require subscriber information along with details of any items purchased through Amazon. This information will be used to determine whether the individual subject of this investigation is engaged in extremist activity and to prove or disprove their involvement in any terrorist activity.*
- 39 · 1 August 2024 - Police contact LER to request account information and order history between 01/01/2019 to 01/07/2023, providing case background: *: This is an ongoing terrorism investigation where it is suspected that individual subject of this investigation may be involved in terrorist activity and as such, we require subscriber information along with details of any items purchased through Amazon. This information will be used to determine whether the individual subject of this investigation is engaged in extremist activity and to prove or disprove their involvement in any terrorist activity.*
- 40 · 13 December 2024 – LER receive a request for Driver and DSP information as well as general information about the purchase of age verified products, providing case background: *Operation Greenbank - this is the investigation into the murder of three children in Southport on 29/07/2024, and the attempted murder of further children and adults.*

41 2025

- 42 · Monday 20 January - Liverpool Echo contacts UK issues team claiming Police had issued guidance about the offender purchasing the murder weapon on Amazon as a 17-year-old.
- 43 · Tuesday 21 January - Home Secretary statement to the House of Commons leading to broadcast and digital news and generating multiple media queries. PP immediately contact No10 business relations, Home Office and Department for Science, Innovation and Technology (DSIT) civil servants, Leader of

the Opposition and Leader of the Liberal Democrats to open lines of communication and the Police. PR issue our first statement.

· Wednesday 22 January – Main news cycle day. Key events:

(i) Home Secretary comments led to three national front pages, with the The Sun, leading with headline: “The Amazon Killer”.

(ii) Prime Minister pens an Op-Ed in The Sun calling for tighter verification process for sales of online knives. He doesn’t mention Amazon but references “the two-click killer”. Comments and proposed legislation prompt additional round of broadcast and digital coverage.

(iii) Monitored Prime Ministers Questions – one backbench MP question of relevance, with PM reiterating his position, but no mention of Amazon.

· Thursday 23 January - PR story begins to dissipate, with commentators increasingly calling criticism of Amazon a “distraction”. Indeed, Leader of the Opposition, Kemi Badenoch, said in a [statement](#): “*It is absurd that we are debating online knife sales more than we are integration and how we safeguard our society from extreme ideologies and violence.*”

· Sunday 26 January - Sunday papers/media shows are monitored – debate had moved on to Online Safety/content.

· Tuesday 28 January - Sent letter to Home Secretary outlining policy and offering meeting.

Deep Dive

Why was a 15-year-old able to open an Amazon account?

Although our Conditions of Use state that under 18s may not purchase products or use services without involvement from an adult, we do not explicitly state that under 18’s cannot create an Amazon account. Customers are also not required to confirm or prove they are aged 18+ at point of account set up.

Why was a 17-year-old able to order an age restricted product?

Our Conditions of Use state that customers must be aged 18+ in order to purchase age restricted products. The product in question was correctly listed as age restricted and, at the point of purchase, the Online Age Verification process began as this was his first purchase of a bladed product. This prompted Rudakubana to enter a date of birth (DOB), legal name and place of residence. He entered the name and date of birth of his father, who lived at the same address. OAV checks are outsourced to Experian, who validate the information entered against their database to confirm that the name and DOB match a person at that address and that the details entered are those of someone aged 18+. The sale went through because (i) Experian found a match for the details entered for Rudakubana’s father, (ii) our process does not require the name on the order to match the name on the account or details from the payment card used, and (iii) there is no requirement to upload proof of identification at the point of purchase.

Why was a 17-year-old able to have an age verified product delivered?

AV products are delivered through the AVD process. Age Verified Deliveries can be delivered to any adult at the delivery address, providing the “Challenge 25+” (C25+) process is correctly followed by the person making the delivery. AV packages cannot be left unattended, delivered to a neighbour or delivered through a mail slot. C25+ requires Drivers to see a valid, government issued, photographic ID of the recipient before they hand over the package, providing the recipient appears aged 25 or over. The process is surfaced to Drivers in the delivery app and must be followed in order for the Driver to be able to mark the package as delivered. The process initially prompts the Driver to ask for YOB which needs to be entered into the delivery app. If the YOB reflects that the recipient is over 25, the Driver will be asked to confirm that the recipient appears to be aged 25+, and will then be directed to deliver the package. If the YOB indicates the recipient is under 18, they will be instructed not to deliver the package. We do not specify that the recipient of the package needs to be the person whose details were used for OAV, the person whose name is on the package, or the person whose name is on the ordering account.

In this case, the Driver entered the YOB as “1978” and confirmed that the recipient appeared over the age of 25. They were therefore not required to ask the recipient for ID. As the recipient does not need to match the details used for OAV, no flag was received for the variation in YOB entered at the point of purchase

and point of delivery.

Why was there no flag that the Account, Delivery Name, Payment Card and OAV details were not in the same name?

There is no system requirement for any of the above to be the same. Customers are able to add multiple Recipient / Delivery Addresses in their address book. The OAV process is not linked to any other data held by Amazon, it is only designed to provide a third-party check that the name, DOB and address provided by the customer are those of an entry in their database. Recipient names are not captured at the point of delivery, nor are they required to be the same person that either placed the order or passed OAV.

Why was there no flag on this account based on the order history?

With the exception of the knife, none of the other products ordered on this account required age verification. Crossbows are classified as sporting goods and are non-restricted. There are also no restrictions on the purchase of mallets, smoke grenades or sledgehammers. Ricin seeds are non-restricted and widely available in the market and there is no flag on the combination of products ordered at the same time these were purchased. In agreement with the Home Office, Explosive Precursors (ECPs) are reportable: I&S

Lessons Learned

While all processes were deployed as expected, this incident has highlighted areas where we could look to strengthen processes in: (1) Age verification at point of account set up, (2) Age verification at point of purchase, (3) Process for delivering age verified products (4) The sale of age restricted products (5) Law Enforcement escalations

1) Age verification at point of account set up - Owner: Tom Gorrard-Smith

2) Age verification at point of order - Owner: David Vivanco

2.1 How do we fare against competitors in this area?

We have audited 19 competitors and found that a large number of UK retailers either do not allow the online sale of bladed products (Tesco, M&S, Sainsburys) or only authorize such products to be picked up in physical stores, where they perform the verification (Argos). Regarding online stores, we have identified some (1) not performing any verification for bladed products (Shein, Temu, Selfridges), or (2) performing actual Age Validation through external providers, like Amazon (Ninja Kitchen, Lakeland, ProCook). We have identified a UK retailer (John Lewis) who has recently launched an OAV experience for bladed products using facial age and ID verification.

2.2 Should OAV match the Account Holder name?

No, requiring the OAV to be done on Account Holder name is insufficient to verify that the buyer is 18+ as the minor can use the household account for their purchases; and enter the Account Holder's information at the time of OAV (the OAV will return that the buyer is an adult). In addition, requiring OAV to match the Account Holder name would drive a negative CX when the adult buying the product is not the Account Holder (for households with multiple adults sharing a single Amazon account). The current approach mirrors the AVD experience which does not require the product to be delivered to the account holder, but to any

adult. However, we acknowledge that the current experience, where the buyer can insert the information of any adult (including those for which address and age information is public), can be circumvented.

Recommendation: We do not recommend requiring the OAV to match the Account Holder, as it fails to prevent minors from easily circumventing this check by leveraging their parent's information and creates additional, unnecessary customer friction.

2.3 Should payment details match the OAV entry?

Requiring that the payment details match the information provided in the OAV would prevent minors from purchasing bladed products with their own card. However, it would be insufficient if the minor uses the card of an adult. To cover this gap, we are exploring triggering a systematic request for approval of the payment by the cardholder via direct banking notification via SMS. This ensures the order is not processed without the knowledge of the adult. We are scoping the tech effort (ETA 14/2) to 1) consume or force match OAV with billing information prior to the Experian verification and 2) trigger a notification to bank of the credit card being used after Experian verification, prompting the the credit card holder to verify the purchase using a One Time Password (OTP). On the downside, a purchase verification will also create additional customer friction for households with multiple adults sharing a single Amazon account and a single payment method.

Recommendation: We recommend waiting until tech scoping is complete to move forward. If the tech work is lightweight (<4 weeks), this serves as a stop-gap to reduce risk. If the tech work takes additional time, we recommend focusing our tech effort in developing the final solution, which could be this one or the one presented in 2.4 depending on the new law.

2.4 Should we use facial age assessment tools?

Matching a live selfie against a valid ID is the only way to accurately confirm the Buyer's identity and age at the point of sale. This process is longer and more intrusive; and might be considered excessive by customers thus resulting in business impact. We are scoping the tech effort to launch a live selfie+gov ID experience (ETA 14/2) with options to complete this verification at every purchase or as a one-time experience per customer. This solution would eliminate the need for the OAV using billing information (see 2.3).

Recommendation: We recommend waiting on legislation/legal guidance to ensure the solution fully addresses new updates to the laws governing sales of bladed items.

3) Age verification during delivery – Owner: Sarah Wenman

3.1 Should we make ID a requirement for every AV delivery?

From 2019 – 2021, UK AMZL operated a Challenge 100 (C100) policy. Identification was required for every AV delivery with a need for the Driver to see the recipient's photo ID and enter their DOB in to the delivery app. C100 made us an outlier with all other retailers operating Challenge 21+ / 25+. As the demand for photo ID is less prevalent in UK than NA, friction appeared swiftly with Customers either not possessing the right level of ID or not being comfortable sharing this during delivery. This led to an increase in aggression towards Drivers resulting in reduced AVD compliance (C100 75% v C25+ 81%). An Amazon specific data breach in 2020 and an increase in customer complaints to the Information Commissioner's Office (ICO) added further complexity with a decision taken in July 2021 to move to C25+. In 2025 the position remains largely unchanged. The market standard remains C25, there has been no material change in the requirement to have photo ID and the risk of data breaches remains.

To help inform our decision, we requested a competitor analysis from our external audit supplier. They shared an analysis conducted in Q4 2024 measuring compliance at point of purchase and upon receipt for home delivery. 7 competitors were audited in total; 5 retailers offering in-store and home delivery services, 1 online retailer and 1 3rd party home delivery grocery service. The study concluded that Amazon's overall compliance was twice as high as competitors, with Amazon achieving 85% vs. competitor average 42% (highest competitor achieving 50%). 85% of product purchases were online/home delivery and 15% were

in-store. Whilst we are encouraged by these results, a broader competitor benchmarking exercise has been commissioned through an additional supplier, to compare age verification policies, controls and compliance of 28 companies (online retailers, physical stores, rapid delivery companies and logistics companies) at both point of sale and point of delivery. Results are expected in WK11.

Recommendation: Unless there is a change in legislation, we recommend maintaining the existing C25+ policy. Customer Experience and compliance risks increase with C100 and we do not envisage these being offset through an improvement in performance.

3.2 Should we introduce an ID scan at point of delivery?

The absence of a tech mechanism to capture or validate ID in both C25+ and C100 leaves potential for the Driver to (i) enter a fabricated DOB rather than viewing ID and (ii) accept an invalid or fake ID. In NA, Optical Character Recognition (OCR) technology is used during every AVD and is a key driver in achieving 96% AVD compliance. However, this is standard for US retailers and delivery companies so customers are used to it and carry ID with them, unlike in the UK. NA have an option for drivers to manually override OCR, so to launch effectively in the UK, this option would need to be removed. We're not aware of any retailers or delivery companies currently using the technology in the UK and therefore this would make us an outlier, increase customer privacy concerns and likely increase aggression towards Drivers.

Recommendation: Unless there is a change in legislation, we do not recommend implementing this in UK due to the risks outlined. ID scan at point of delivery has not yet been mentioned within the new legislation expected in Spring so this is not anticipated to be added as a requirement.

3.3 Should delivery only be permitted to the person named on the package?

The decision to allow any adult at the delivery address to receive an AVD was made to limit friction in the process and increase both speed and successful delivery rates for the Customer. An initial review of our competitors confirms we are aligned on this stance however extensive competitor benchmarking is underway for a comprehensive comparison.

Recommendation: Unless there is a change in legislation, we recommend maintaining our current approach. ID would need to be provided for every delivery to verify the identity of the recipient against the name on the order, effectively employing C100. As a result, we do not recommend due to the reasons outlined in 3.1.

3.4 Do we have sufficient training, audit and enforcement to maximise compliance by our Delivery Service Providers, Delivery Partners and 3P Carriers?

- **Delivery Service Providers (DSP)** – AVD content is featured in the externally provided Amazon Information Sessions with facilitation quality audited once per quarter per site. Content is subject to review via an annual continuous improvement cycle. An AVD training module is also available to Drivers through a 3P app and DSPs can assign to the Drivers they engage at any time. DSP Drivers who fail mystery shopper audits are T1 offboarded and lose the ability to deliver Amazon packages for any DSP. Drivers who partially pass (request YOB and DOB but not ID), must complete retraining via the app within 7 days to avoid being made inactive. If a Driver has a second partial pass within 12 months of retraining, they will be permanently offboarded. There is currently no formal performance mechanism at DSP level. This is caused by (i) a lack of parity in the number of audits DSPs receive and (ii) there are no AV deliveries in Ireland, impacting our ability to apply financial friction through the DSP scorecard. A review has been conducted in to the lack of parity in audit numbers and found that in 2024, 2% of DSP pairs were not audited at all, 18% less than 4 times and 67% more than 15 times. This is caused by the limited ability to assign an auditor to a specific DSP. We believe there is scope for improvement here and will work with our suppliers to ensure every DSP is audited at least once per quarter.

Recommendation: To ensure DSP accountability for AVD compliance, we need to introduce a Monitoring Enforcement Plan (MEP) as a formal mechanism to address poor compliance. We will focus on equalising spread of audits across DSP pairs by re-establishing geographical requirements with our audit supplier.

This MEP will be scoped for Q2 2025 to allow for new legislation to be announced.

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- **Delivery Partners (Flex)** – Amazon Flex Delivery Partners (DPs) are currently required to watch ~30mins of training videos when they onboard, including a module on the AVD process. However, the mandated completion of all training videos is under review. Following onboarding, DPs receive ongoing AVD messaging through multiple channels. DPs who fail mystery shopper audits receive an SLS alert following the first instance of either not verifying the recipient's year of birth or failing to check ID. A second audit failure leads to permanent offboarding from the program. Additionally, DPs face immediate offboarding under a one-strike policy if they either receive a customer complaint about AVD non-compliance or leave an age-restricted delivery unattended.

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Recommendation: Flex UK and SLS recommend maintaining the current 2-strike threshold as data indicates that changing to 1-strike offboarding would not meaningfully improve overall pool compliance. With 72% of DPs successfully passing their follow-up audit after an initial failure – a rate only marginally higher than our overall compliance rate of 71% – a stricter enforcement approach would likely only succeed in increasing DP offboarding without improving compliance rates. Flex UK recommends improving AVD compliance by focusing efforts on the design of the in-app workflow, enhancing DP education through improved learning content, launching refresher training for tenured DPs, and better tracking of training completion.

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- **3P Carriers** – We currently use Royal Mail and UPS for AVD, but Royal Mail have not delivered bladed products for Amazon since early 2024 at their request. Royal Mail follow C25+ and engage their own mystery shoppers to audit compliance. If a delivery person fails an audit, then a coaching conversation will take place. Repeat non-compliance will result in disciplinary action being taken. In 2024, 2,009 audits were completed on Royal Mail delivered Amazon packages with a compliance rate of 57%. UPS request a signature and ID during every AVD and have an enforcement process for when this is not followed. Only 2 UPS deliveries of Amazon packages were audited via our audit supplier in 2024, but both passed.

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Recommendation: This review has found that there are multiple variations across EU in the transporter type used for AVD, the training provided, auditing and the enforcement of the policy. Our immediate recommendation is to strengthen the UK position by adding a MEP in for DSP level performance by Q2. Our longer-term recommendation is to review AVD policies across EU, determine best practice and apply across all countries as standard.

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4) The sale of age restricted products - Owner: Fazia Khan

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4.1 Will we continue to sell knives in UK?

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[REDACTED] we will continue to offer UK customers access to selection from the bladed category [REDACTED] I&S ensuring we meet our customer commitment to provide access/flexibility to key selection whilst maintaining high safety standards. We recognise that despite the changes, processes could still be bypassed - even at 95% AVD compliance there is a 5% risk that a bladed item still gets into the hands of an underage person. Thus, business teams will continue to input into development of the tech enhancements ensuring we balance between CX and safety (e.g. should we implement checks every time a bladed product is purchased). We will also remain close to the broader UK narrative on bladed products and if the PP/Legal advice changes unexpectedly, are able to remove sales of bladed products within 24 hours, leveraging manual tools. There will also be further consideration needed, once legislative requirements are clearer, around the impact this could have across a broader set of categories beyond bladed products.

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5) Law enforcement escalations – Owner: Teresa Rodelo

102	5.1 Should the initial Law Enforcement contact have been escalated?
103	Initial Police requests in July and August were for account information and order history in relation to an individual's suspected involvement in terrorist activity. Due to the frequency of requests citing this as case background, LER do not escalate requests of this nature to additional stakeholders. The request in December cited case background being the investigation into the murder of 3 children in Southport and therefore this should have been flagged due to the reference of (i) mass murder (ii) an event that may trigger media coverage and require a large law enforcement response.
104	5.2 What learning's have we taken from this case?
105	Although a framework for escalation exists, this currently relies too heavily on individual team members' assessment and judgement of the situation. LER is updating the policy and re-establishing a more structured and comprehensive approach to the notification process. The updates to the policy aim to create a better training mechanism that will serve as a guide for decision-making processes, eliminate ambiguity and ensure consistent notifications. The policy will specify who needs to be notified in various scenarios, the time frames for such notifications, and the specific information that must be communicated. Periodic audits will take place to measure effectiveness.
106	New Legislation
107	A Home Office Press Release was published on the 28 January stating that stricter age verification checks and a ban on doorstep drops will be introduced to greater protect young people from knife crime.
108	The statement included indications of two key measures;
109	1. A stringent 2-step system will be mandated for all retailers selling knives online requiring customers to submit photo ID at point of sale and again on delivery. In addition, delivery companies will only be able to deliver a bladed article to the same person who purchased it.
110	2. Under the new measures a person may need to submit a copy of a photo ID such as driving licence or passport, as well as proof of address such as a utility bill, before showing ID again when the package is delivered. This could also include a person submitting a current photo or video of themselves to an online retailer alongside their ID.
111	Recommendation: New legislation is expected to be announced in Spring 2025, however it's likely to be two years from now before regulations are live as the bill will need to be passed in Parliament and we anticipate that companies will be given around a year to implement the changes required.

Action items (0)						
Action item ID	Priority	Title	Status	Due date (UTC)	Owner	Closure comment
No action items						

Metadata

Keywords

-

Labels

-

Related items (0)

URL

Description

No related items



Details

Status

 Published - Action items complete

Individual owner

[reidambe](#)

Group owner

[southport-avd-coe](#)

Template

Amazon Default Policy

Incident date (UTC)

2025/01/21

Due date (UTC)

2025/02/11

Access and permissions

Is this a secure COE?

Yes

Is this a team-only COE?

No

Reviewer - Round 1

[Automated Reviewer \(keywords\)](#)

Reviewer - Round 2

[Automated Reviewer \(secure\)](#)

Reviewer - Round 3

[wenms](#)

Additional author(s)

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Email followers

-

User/Group followers

-

▶ **Amazon Resource Names (ARNs)**