Monday, 13 October 2025 1 range of other Government departments and policing to 1 2 2 (11.00 am) ensure we have the processes in place to spot the signs 3 3 **CATHRYN ELLSMORE (affirmed)** of radicalisation and to provide support to people that 4 Questioned by MR MOSS 4 require it. 5 SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: Thank you very much, Ms Ellsmore. Q. Thank you. So far as your own background is concerned, 5 6 Please have a seat. 6 you do not need to go into the fine detail but I think 7 Yes, Mr Moss. 7 you worked in the sphere of counter terrorism within the 8 8 Home Office since 2013? MR MOSS: Thank you, sir. 9 A. Yes. Just start by giving us your full name if you would? 9 10 A. Cathryn Ellsmore. 10 Q. You set out, and may I deal with it briefly as a matter Q. Thank you. Can we have on the screen, please, 11 of fairness to you that, effectively, this, your lengthy 11 12 HOM000078. I think you can confirm that this is your 12 and helpful statement is a corporate statement; is that 13 statement to the Inquiry. It's dated 25 September? 13 right? A. Yes. 14 A. Yes. it is. 14 Q. Are the contents of that statement true to the best of 15 Q. And where you speak to matters relating to Prevent, it's 15 16 your knowledge and belief? 16 an area that you are very familiar with, largely from 17 A. Yes, it is. 17 your own first hand knowledge? 18 Q. Thank you. You tell us in the start of your statement 18 A. Yes. 19 that you are the Director of Prevent in the Homeland 19 Q. But when we get into areas of online harms and some 20 Security Group within the Home Office; is that right? 20 issues about the policy concerning ricin, biological and 21 21 A. Yes. explosive weapons, and matters of that kind, I think you 22 22 Q. Thank you. Just give us a brief outline of what that have been reliant on assistance from colleagues in 23 role entails? 23 putting your statement together? 24 Α. So, I oversee the policy and strategy of the Prevent 24 Yes, that's right. 25 programme, so it's responsible for working with a large Q. If at any stage you get into a position where you say 1 that you can't assist, please just say so and we are 1 a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or 2 2 going to be hearing from your colleague, Mr Hunt, a section of the public, and action designed seriously 3 tomorrow in relation to the policy in relation to 3 to interfere with or seriously to interrupt 4 knives. So I'm not going to ask you any questions in 4 an electronic system." 5 relation to that. Do you follow? 5 Is that right? 6 A. Yes. 6 Α. 7 Q. Thank you. 7 Q. We will come onto cases of unclear or unstable ideology 8 8 and how that fits within that in due course. May we start then please with an overview of the 9 Government's CONTEST strategy and the role of Prevent 9 So far as AR is concerned, if we could have 10 10 within it. We should start, I think, please, and may we paragraph 13 of your statement at page 6 on the screen, 11 have on screen paragraph 10 of your statement, it's at 11 please. Should we understand that, relevant to AR and 12 page 5. You set out helpfully for us there that the 12 his activities, that the Home Secretary has, 13 definition of terrorism within the Terrorism Act 2000, 13 effectively, three areas of interest and responsibility: 14 14 the first for the overall coordination of the counter 15 "... 'the use or threat of action' that is 'designed 15 terrorism strategy, yes? 16 to influence the government or an international 16 A. 17 governmental organisation or to intimidate the public or 17 Q. So that is CONTEST but, within that, Prevent is part of 18 a section of the public' and is 'for the purpose of 18 that? 19 advancing a political, religious, racial or ideological 19 A. Yes, that's right. 20 cause'." 20 Q. Secondly, she has oversight of MI5, the security 21 Is that right? 21 service? 22 A. Yes. 22 A. Yes, that's right. 23 "The specific actions [that the Act speaks to] are 23 Q. And, thirdly, overall accountability for the activities 24 serious violence against a person, serious damage to 24 of the police service in England and Wales, including 25 property, endangering a person's life ... creating 25 Counter Terrorism Policing.

- 1 A. Yes.
- 2 Q. Dealing with the first of those on the previous page,
- 3 you gave the headlines of that Counter Terrorism
- 4 strategy, CONTEST, and its four core strands and the
- 5 Chair will be familiar but, just so that we have it from
- 6 you. Those four core strands are Prevent, to stop
- 7 people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism;
- 8 Pursue to stop terrorist attacks happening in this
- 9 country or against UK interests overseas; Protect,
- aiming to strengthen the UK's protection against
- 11 a terrorist attack; and Prepare, that is to say aiming
- to minimise the impact of an attack if one does happen.
- 13 Yes?
- 14 A. Yes.
- 15 Q. Within that then, those four strands, so far as Prevent
- is concerned, if we look at paragraph 15, we see the
- 17 strategic objectives at the time. They have changed
- 18 since because of the Shawcross report, as we may touch
- on, but at the time the Prevent strategic objectives:
- 20 "Tackle the causes of radicalisation and respond to 21 the ideological challenge of terrorism ..."
- 22 Just pausing there. That, on its face, is extremely
- 23 broad, would you agree?
- 24 A. Yes, I agree.
- 25 Q. Was that part of the later changes to give that
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- 1 councils?
- 2 **A.** Yes.
- 3 Q. Schools, colleges, universities --
- 4 A. Yes.
- 5 Q. -- health bodies as well?
- 6 A. Yes.
- 7 Q. As well as, obviously, the police?
- 8 A. Yes.
- 9 Q. Thank you. There is also a duty which we can take quite10 briefly for the local authorities to have in place:
- 11 Channel panels, yes?
- 12 A. Yes
- 13 Q. Those are effectively the panels that are set up to
- 14 decide upon the interventions that are most appropriate
- 15 for those who are referred into the Channel process to
- 16 try to give that sort of support or disruption to those
- 17 who may be at risk of being radicalised; is that a fair
- 18 summary at high level?
- 19 A. Yes, that's fair.
- 20 Q. Thank you. Again, I'm taking this fairly briefly
- 21 because we have seen much of it and the detail is in
- 22 your statement. But in pursuance of the Prevent duty,
- one of the things that the Home Office, I think,
- 24 published was the Prevent Duty Guidance. Can we just
- 25 have briefly on screen please, HOM000023. Can you just

- 1 a deliberately narrower focus?
- 2 A. It did narrow it down to focus a bit more heavily on the
- 3 ideological element but this objective is very much
 - around especially the work in communities that we do, to
- 5 try to spot radicalisation risk across the country.
- 6 Q. Then (b):

- 7 "Safeguard and support those most at risk of
- 8 radicalisation through early intervention, identifying
- 9 them and offering support ..."
- 10 Thirdly:
- 11 "Enable those who have already engaged in terrorism
- 12 to disengage and rehabilitate."
- 13 Is that right?
- 14 A. Yes
- 15 Q. So that's the overall aim of what Prevent was trying to
- 16 do?
- 17 A. Yes.
- 18 Q. In pursuance of that, as you set out in paragraph 17 of
- 19 your statement, the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act
- 20 2015, I think, imposed a statutory Prevent duty on what,
- 21 in technical terms, is referred to as specified
- 22 authorities?
- 23 A. Yes.
- 24 Q. For our purposes, what is of note is that specified
- 25 authorities included local authorities, so local

- 1 confirm for us, I don't need to go through the detail,
- 2 that this 2015-version of the Prevent Duty Guidance was
- 3 that which was in place at the time of AR's referrals?
- 4 A. Yes, it was.
- 5 MR MOSS: Sir, for your note, the 2023 updated version of
- 6 that is at HOM000014.
- 7 SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: Thank you.
- 8 MR MOSS: Turning then to having set out the broad strategy,
- 9 can I ask for your assistance on the role that the Home
- 10 Office plays within that. Does the Home Office have any
- 11 operational responsibility for individual referrals.
- 12 A. No, we do not see the referrals or have any case
- 13 management responsibilities.
- 14 Q. As we have seen perhaps in our evidence so far, the
- 15 operational responsibility for the individual case
- referrals rests, in the first instance, with the Counter
- 17 Terrorism Policing in each appropriate region?
- 18 A. Yes, that's right.
- 19 $\,$ **Q.** What the Home Office is, however, responsible for is the
- 20 broad policy, the oversight and the overall delivery of
- 21 the Prevent programme; would that be fair?
- 22 A. Yes, that's fair.

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- 23 $\,$ **Q.** If we look at paragraph 22 of your statement, if we can
- pick it up at the bottom of page 8.
 - So paragraph 22, HOM000078. In relation to the Home

1 Office's role in providing guidance what you say is that

- 2 the Prevent Directorate in the Home Office develops and
- 3 updates statutory guidance for specified authorities,
- 4 including the Prevent Duty Guidance, which I have just
- 5 shown on screen. But Counter Terrorism Policing sets
- 6 guidance and training for police, including issuing the
- 7 Counter Terrorism Case Officer guide and guidance on the
- 8 DIF, as we have heard it referred, the Dynamic
- 9 Investigation Framework. First of all, is that right?
- 10 A. Yes, that's right.
- 11 Q. Have any of the recent incidents, of which there have
- 12 been several, where Prevent has been scrutinised, given
- 13 cause to reconsider that as to whether the Home Office
- 14 should have a greater role in the guidance that's issued
- 15 by Counter Terrorism Policing?
- 16 A. Yes, so, we work really closely with CT police and have,
- 17 especially over the last two to three years, to work
- together on the operational -- not the operational
- delivery of Prevent but the policies and processes that
- are in place that govern that. So, the policies that
- 21 have been put in place over the last couple of years
- 22 have been done -- have been developed alongside my teams
- 23 working together and working together with CT police at
- 24 headquarters and then with the regions.
- 25 Q. Thank you. I'm going to come onto it in due course in

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- 1 my questions but you will be aware, of course, of the
- 2 joint letter that we looked at in evidence last week in
- 3 the summer of 2019. Insofar as there may be a concern
- 4 as to whether the lessons from that joint letter had
- 5 really hit home sufficiently, would it be fair to
- 6 suggest that that highlights the need for the Home
- 7 Office directorate to be less distanced from the Counter
- 8 Terrorism Policing guidance that's issued?
- 9 A. Yes, I mean, I think that there's a balance to be drawn
- 10 between police operational independence and also the
- 11 role that the Home Office has, in terms of that
- 12 overarching ownership of policy, guidance and strategy.
- So, yes, it's certainly a relationship that, over the
- last few years, has strengthened and got closer, as we
- 15 have got closer to the operational detail and the
- operational support that we provide to the police.
- 17 Q. Is the logical corollary to that that, before the last
- 18 two to three years, you think the Home Office was
- 19 perhaps a bit too distant from the very important
- 20 guidance issued by Counter Terrorism Policing in those
- 21 areas?
- 22 A. Yes, I think that is fair. I think part of that was the
- 23 Home Office taking a different approach and taking
- 24 a much more sort of strategic approach. I think it was
- 25 also CT police wanting to ensure that they had the

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- operational independence that is their right and responsibility.
- 3 Q. Thank you. I think, reflecting perhaps the areas we
- 4 have been looking at, in relation to training, at (c),
- 5 over the page, for the Home Office, no doubt because of
- 6 Counter Terrorism Policing's ability to deliver its own
- 7 training, but the Home Office involvement in training
- 8 seems to be in relation to the other specified
- 9 authorities. So, local authority sectors that are
 - subject to the Duty seem to be an area that the Home
- 11 Office provides and supports training for. But Counter
- 12 Terrorism Policing take care of their own training?
- 13 A. Yes, that's right. Police train police.

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- 14 Q. Thank you. Within this list of areas that the Home
- 15 Office is responsible for, you also, at 22(j), again
- 16 it's over the page, in terms of interventions, have
- 17 a role in ensuring the quality of the provision of
- 18 intervention services across Prevent. Could you just
- 19 explain how that works in reality?
- 20 A. Yes, certainly. We maintain a register of intervention
- 21 providers that will work alongside cases that are
- 22 managed through either the Channel programme or the
- 23 police-led partnerships progress. It is our role to
- 24 make sure that we identify the right quality of
- 25 individuals to support those cases, to train them and to

- 1 make sure we have a broad suite of interventions
- 2 available to meet the needs of those cases that are on
- 3 either Channel or police-led partnerships.
- 4 Q. Thank you. Then another area where the Home Office is
- 5 directly involved, you tell us at (k), is in "Online
- 6 material". What's the essence of the Home Office's
- 7 direct role there?
- 8 A. There we work closely with technology companies to
- 9 share -- we will share threat assessments with them
- 10 around how terrorists might be exploiting their
- 11 platforms. We work with international partners and we
- 12 collect evidence and the sort of expertise, I guess, on
- the way that terrorists use the internet to upskill
- 14 frontline practitioners and to upskill companies to take
- 15 action themselves.
- 16 Q. Thank you. At 22 (m) you have "Statistical evaluation".
- 17 Would that include looking at the breakdown of types of
- 18 cases that are referred, whether Islamist or right-wing
- 19 extremist, and so on?
- 20 A. Yes, that's a statistical analysis team, a team of
- 21 social researchers, they are responsible for both
- 22 compiling the data that is published annually but also
- 23 working closely with us to track trends through Prevent
- and to help us try to get ahead of them.

25 **Q.** Then, at the top of this page, at (g), Ms Ellsmore, no 12

doubt reflecting your attendance here today, your
 directorate is responsible for case reviews, inquests

and inquiries, ensuring the integration of appropriate

4 learning into policy?

- 5 A. Yes, absolutely.
- Q. Thank you. If we turn, then, to looking at how Prevent
 works in practice. Ms Ellsmore, much of this ground was
 covered last week with the relevant sergeants and,
 indeed, with the CTCO involved for AR.

But just to recap on the basics, I think anybody can raise a concern into Prevent that a member of the public is at risk or there is a concern about radicalisation?

- 13 A. Yes, that is right.
- 14 Q. So there are no limits of at that stage?
- 15 A. No limits.

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- 16 Q. That would include family members of the subject of the17 referral?
- A. Absolutely. Often the best referrals that we get come
 from family members, unfortunately. We would like to
 encourage more families to refer in and friends.
- Q. Thank you. Looking at that, if somebody has been takenon, in particular, in relation to Prevent, or even has
- 23 been referred to Prevent and it's under consideration,
- 24 what's the policy in terms of encouraging family members

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- 25 to share concerns? Obviously, any parent is likely to
- look at is incidents on 22 July where AR, on the
 evidence currently available, may have been intending to
 go to his old school armed, on the day that they broke
 up, and it is clear that that wasn't reported to the
 police or to Prevent, and I'm wondering if AR's case has
 caused reflection within the Home Office on whether more
 can be done to encourage family members to feel, even if

they don't want to go to their local police station,

- 9 that they can contact Prevent?
- 10 Α. Yes. So we do -- we have thought about this long and 11 hard. We do a range of communication and awareness 12 raising, trying to cut through some of the myths around 13 Prevent but, in particular, the fact that this is wider 14 safeguarding partners that do a lot of Prevent work. 15 But, yes, we would -- we really encourage family members 16 to -- if they spot a concern to refer in. We know from 17 previous experience that people that have gone on to 18 conduct terrorist attacks often give somebody, a close 19 family member or a friend, some sort of indication of 20 what they might be planning.
- Q. Thank you. You set out the detail in your statement but
 I think you can just confirm for us that education
 providers, so the education sector, are the area that
 generates the most referrals into Prevent?
- 25 A. Yes, that's right.

- 1 be worried about the trouble that their offspring may
- get into and there may be a delicate issue there about
- 3 not being able to give promises about lack of criminal
- 4 justice activity. How does the policy deal with that
- 5 delicate balance?
- A. We are at pains to point out that Prevent is not
 a punitive programme, it's there to support people away
 from harmful behaviours and that reporting those
- 9 concerns means that that multi-agency partnership will
- 10 come together to sequence activity and to try to help
- 11 that person away from those types of behaviours.
- 12 **Q.** Apart from discussion with family members, if it gets to the stage of an interview with the person of concern, is
- the stage of an interview with the person of concern, is anything actually given to family members, whether
- arrything actually given to lamily members, whethe
- 15 a leaflet with contact details of who to contact,
- 16 matters of that kind?
- 17 **A.** Yes. So we do hand out leaflets where we've had 18 referrals -- where we have -- often it's individuals
- that are referred into Prevent, we'll go, as part of the
- consent discussions, and share information and hand out
- 21 a leaflet at that point. Otherwise, we know that the
- 22 local authority works closely with communities and with
- 23 family members to promote how Prevent works and to try
- 24 to tackle any sort of misconceptions.
- 25 Q. Because one of the aspects that the Inquiry will have to

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- Q. People under 20 consistently account for the mostreferrals into Prevent as well?
- 3 A. Yes, that's right.
- 4 Q. Thank you. Obviously, the referrals that we've been
- 5 looking at are received and assessed by the Counter
- 6 Terrorism police and you have explained that the Home
- 7 Office doesn't have any direct operational role in that.
- 8 I think, subsequent to these events, or at least
- 9 subsequent to AR's referrals, is this right that the
- 10 Home Office has been more directly active in setting the
- 11 framework against which the assessment will be judged?
- 12 I think there is now a Prevent Assessment Framework, the
- 13 PAF, which was introduced from September 2024?
- 14 A. Yes, that's right and that's a reflection of the greater
- role that we have played over the last two or three
- 16 years in trying to strengthen operational practice.
- 17 Q. Thank you. We might come back to that when we look at18 changes.
- The issue of the communication between the FIMU and Prevent officers was a matter that we explored last week: is that something which sits within the Home
- 22 Office's role to give guidance in relation to the
- boundaries between what the FIMU should be doing andwhat Prevent officers should be doing?
- 25 **A.** Now that would be a police matter.

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Q. If we can have on screen, please, paragraph 31 of your statement, at page 14. You set out there, if we can just have paragraph 31 expanded, the different stages of which there are threshold decisions to be taken within the Prevent process.

Threshold 1 is just at the early stage of "notice, check, share", when the referral is made. Then you have the "counter-terrorism intelligence assessment and deconfliction". But then, at threshold 3, what I'm most interested in, for the purposes of these questions, is the "Prevent Gateway Assessment", yes?

12 A. Yes.

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- 13 Q. In relation to that, and it's set out in your
- statement -- sir, paragraph 42, for your note, we don't
- 15 have to go to it -- but the test at that stage is
- 16 whether there are reasonable grounds to suspect that
- 17 a person is susceptible to becoming a terrorist or
- 18 supporting terrorism, yes?
- 19 A. Yes, that's right.
- 20 Q. In broad terms, as it goes towards acceptance into
- 21 Channel, would it be right that the test gets stricter
- 22 or narrower?
- 23 A. Yes.
- 24 $\,$ Q. But at that stage, whether it should be referred into
- 25 the Channel process for information gathering, the test
- 1 suspicion" to "forms a reasonable belief"?
- 2 A. Yes, that's right.
- 3 Q. At the time of AR's first referral, 2019, and the
- 4 decision-making in relation to that right, at the end of
- 5 2019 and the start of 2020, are you able to help with
- 6 whether, viewed globally, the percentage of cases that
- 7 was being referred into the Channel process -- so
- 8 getting beyond the Prevent Gateway Assessment -- was
- 9 satisfactory and proportionate to the risk or was it
- 10 a matter of concern?
- 11 A. So we were concerned about the number of cases that were
- 12 referred to as mixed, unclear or unstable making it
- through into Channel case management. That was one of
- the reasons why we issued the joint letter in mid-2019.
- 15 Q. Thank you. So this was a known problem, that not enough
- of the mixed, unstable or unclear ideology cases were
- 17 getting through the PGA?
- 18 A. Yes, that's right.
- 19 Q. Thank you. In addition to this, the North West at the
- 20 time, as will be very familiar to you, was involved in
- 21 the Dovetail pilot, yes?
- 22 **A.** Yes.
- 23 Q. The key difference, if we've understood it correctly, is
- that the information gathering would have been done by
- 25 the local authority Channel coordinator -- is that

- 1 is a relatively low one, "reasonable grounds to
- 2 suspect", yes?
- 3 A. Yes.
- 4 $\,$ **Q.** Within your statement, you do set out that that low test
- 5 wasn't actually set out in the Prevent Duty Guidance or
- 6 in the Channel Duty Guidance, although you make clear
- 7 that it would have been set out in Counter Terrorism
- 8 Policing's operational guidance, perhaps for obvious
- 9 reasons. Is it, on reflection, somewhat surprising that
- 10 that test wasn't set out in the Home Office guidance?
- 11 A. I won't have expected it to have been set out in the
- 12 Prevent Duty Guidance, that was more around the types of
- 13 activities that we would expect statutory partners to
- 14 undertake to comply with the Prevent duty. So it is
- 15 aimed at education, health, and so on.
- Yes, on reflection, I am surprised that it is not set out in the Channel Duty Guidance but I recognise
- that it is set out in all of police guidance.

 19 **Q.** Thank you. Then, as we get towards the next stages, we
- 20 have seen that there would be information gathering and
- 20 Have seen that there would be information gathering at
- a decision whether to refer to Channel. I think, at
- that stage, paragraph 46 of your statement, but we don't
- 23 need to turn it up, the test becomes whether there is
- 24 a reasonable belief that the person is vulnerable. So
- 25 a slight tightening there from "reasonable grounds for
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- 1 right --
- 2 A. Yes, that's right.
- 3 Q. -- rather than by the police?
- 4 A. Yes
- 5 Q. But the decision on whether to refer to Channel, even
- 6 under Dovetail, would that have remained with the
- 7 Counter Terrorism police?
- 8 A. Yes, it did do initially. We then changed legislation
- 9 later on to enable the Channel coordinator to contribute
- 10 to that decision. But, even then, it required the
- 11 supervision and agreement of CT police.
- 12 Q. Thank you. Can we deal with this now, what was the13 purpose of the Dovetail pilot?
- 14 A. So, the purpose was to explore how -- making Channel
- a more wholly multi-agency, local authority led process,
- to see whether that helped to build support for Prevent,
- 17 whether it encouraged increasing numbers of people to
- 18 consent to Channel support and because we wanted to try
- 19 to take some of the administrative burden away from CT
- 20 police to enable them to spend more time investigating
- 20 police to enable them to spend more time investiga
- 21 cases of particular concern.
- 22 $\,$ **Q.** I think the pilot has now come to an end and it is not
- 23 being continued; is that right?
- 24 A. That's right.
- 25 Q. Why is that?

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- 1 A. I think a range of different reasons. We were running
- 2 at the time three different versions of Channel across
- 3 the country, so the regional Dovetail pilot in the North
- West; single-site pilots in different areas, which was
- 5 a single local authority, rather than a collection; and
- 6 then the usual police-led Channel. What we wanted to do
- 7 was to move it to one consistent model so that we can
- 8 increase consistency through the process. We selected
- 9 the police-led model because of concerns over --
- 10 concerns over resilience of Dovetail. So if one of the
- 11 Channel coordinators was off sick for instance, or got
- 12 a new job, it was a challenge getting people to fill
- 13 those roles swiftly. So the police model gave us more
- 14 resilience. But also it was very complicated to roll
- 15 out across different local authority boundaries and
- 16 different local authority constitutions, and also it was
- a more expensive model and we didn't think there was
- 18 sufficient value for money to prove that that model was
- 19 the most effective.
- TO THOSE CHOOLIVE
- 20 Q. Was there also some concern about tension between local
- 21 authorities and Counter Terrorism Policing under the
- Dovetail way of doing things, such that it may have led
- 23 to a disincentive to push cases through?
- ${\bf 24}~{\bf A.}~{\bf So}$ we heard, mainly through anecdotal reporting, that
- 25 there was friction in some of the Dovetail sites with
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- 1 a sort of nervousness from police to hand over the case
- 2 management but also a fear from local authorities that
- 3 they weren't aware of what was being referred into
 - Prevent. So that was anecdotal reporting and across the
- 5 range of Dovetail sites. I don't know to what extent
- 6 that was felt in the North West.
- 7 Q. You have anticipated my next question: you have twice
- 8 mentioned it was anecdotal but you don't know whether
- 9 that was a North West issue?
- 10 A. No, I can't say.
- 11 Q. But whether the area was in the Dovetail pilot or not,
 - once it is going through to the Channel process and
- someone is taken on with Channel, it's right, isn't it,
- 14 the Channel process is voluntary?
- 15 A. Yes, that's right.
- 16 Q. If the person or their parents -- for children --
- decline to be involved, the option then is to have
- 18 a police-led process, which is not dependent on the
- 19 subject's consent?
- 20 A. Yes, that's right.
- 21 $\,$ Q. $\,$ Thank you. I think you give some figures in your
- 22 statement -- sir, for your note, paragraph 55 --
- 23 SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: Thank you.
- 24 MR MOSS: -- that it's about 23 or 24 per cent, or was at
- 25 the time, where consent is not forthcoming.

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- 1 A. Yes, that's right.
- 2 **Q.** There's no need to go into inappropriate operational
- 3 detail but can you just give us the thumbnail sketch of
- 4 what that police-led process would involve where the
- 5 subject of the referral or their parents don't give
- 6 consent?
- 7 A. Yes, so it's very similar to Channel, in terms of it
- 8 being a multi-agency led -- a police-led process but
- 9 with multi-agency partners involved, looking at how they
- 10 could provide support to that individual but often
- 11 alongside wider risk-management measures. The challenge
- is that, because the individual hasn't consented, what
- we can't do is work with them on a one-to-one basis on
- 14 things like mentoring, for instance.
- 15 Q. So turning to that, I think, for somebody who does give
- 16 consent, you have intervention providers, yes, who can
- 17 give that sort of one-to-one mentoring and support?
- 18 A. Yes, that's right.
- 19 Q. They would have, in broad terms -- or there would within
- 20 intervention providers be a range of skillsets. So
- 21 there may be those who are good at dealing with Islamist

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- 22 extremism but would you also have some who have the
- 23 requisite skillset to try to deal with fascination with
- 24 violence
- 25 A. Yes, we have a broad range of skillsets within our

- intervention provider cohort. So we have mental health practitioners, we have individuals who have worked for
- a long period of time in things like special needs
- 4 schools, youth workers, social workers, so a really
- 5 broad range of expertise within that cohort.
- ${\bf 6}$ $\,$ $\,$ $\,$ $\,$ $\,$ $\,$ $\,$ $\,$ $\,$ Including those who are used to dealing with children,
- 7 it sounds like?
- 8 **A.** Yes, absolutely.
- 9 Q. So looking against that background, just briefly for
- 10 a moment, at AR's case. The potential -- in my inverted
- 11 commas -- "missed input" in his case, is this right, is
- that, had he been taken on, there would have been
- a forum in which the local authority, mental health
- providers, education would be working together with the police under the auspices of Prevent, to look at
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- 16 mitigating the risk of AR being drawn into extreme
- 17 violence; would you agree?
- 18 A. Yes, that's right.
- 19 Q. And, subject to consent, that could have included
- an intervention provider to work one-to-one, looking at
- 21 matters in relation to his interest in violence?
- 22 A. Yes, absolutely, and also other diversionary activities,
- 23 working with community partners.
- 24 Q. Thank you. Would you have expected that work to include
- establishing and dealing, where practicable, with what

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(6) Pages 21 - 24

1 AR was accessing online?

- 2 A. Yes, so we would often do that through the work of
- 3 intervention providers, so exploring with the individual
- 4 the type of content that they'd been viewing online and
- 5 helping them to understand what was appropriate and what
- 6 was inappropriate and some of the consequences of that
- 7 action.

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- 8 Q. Thank you.
 - If we look, please, at CTPNW000317, we have, within the Prevent case management process overview -- if we just turn to page 2, please -- on one view, one only
- 12 needs to look at that flow diagram to see the potential
- 13 complexity of the Prevent process.14 At a broad level, do you agree
- At a broad level, do you agree that, as a process, it is quite complex?
- 16 A. I think Prevent is a broad programme working with
- a range of partners and so, therefore, we need really
- 18 clear sort of processes guidance and training in place.
- 19 Yes, this picture of it does look complex but it is
- 20 something that everybody that's working within Prevent
- 21 is well trained and well schooled in.
- 22 **Q.** Including the understanding of the boundaries within
- 23 CTCOs and FIMU, do you think?
- 24 A. They should certainly be aware of that, yes.
- 25 **Q.** Obviously, it's very easy for me to put something like
 - 25
- 1 to that stage of being adopted into Channel, with
- 2 a variety of different tests, is that something which is
- 3 potentially ripe for consideration? Because you say you
- 4 want to have a broad open approach to get through the
- front door and, really, what I'm testing with you is
- 6 whether the narrowing is too much and all of these
- 7 threshold tests are getting tighter and tighter. Is
- 8 that just a resource issue or is there some other
- 9 explanation?
- 10 A. No, I think it is about trying to -- the people that
- should be in Prevent should be people that we believe to
- 12 be susceptible to radicalisation. You know, this is
- ultimately a counter-terrorism system. It just looks
 very far upstream of perhaps the terrorism definition
- very far upstream of perhaps the terrorism definition.
- So we do need to narrow. I do believe the threshold at
- 16 the Prevent Gateway Assessment is quite broad:
- 17 reasonable suspicion.
- 18 **Q.** Thank you. I want to turn briefly to repeat referrals
- 19 as they were at the time and, if we look at your
- 20 paragraph 47 on page 19 of your statement, you tell us
- 21 that, at the time of AR's referrals, there was no formal
- 22 Home Office or Counter Terrorism policy or guidance on
- 23 handling repeat referrals; is that right?
- 24 **A.** Yes, that's right.
- 25 $\,$ Q. Is that recognised now to have been a relative weakness

- 1 this on screen and say "It looks complicated, doesn't
- 2 it?", and your retort to that is that those within the
- 3 system understand it and, because it's a broad system,
- 4 it needs to have aspects of complications, and one
- 5 understands that. But, has consideration been given to
- 6 whether the complexities of the system are a downside,
- 7 the multiple stages of different thresholds that you
- 8 helpfully set out in your statement.
- 9 A. So I don't think we've really considered that. I think
 - we do work hard to try to make things as straightforward
- 11 as possible. I think what we -- the challenge, I think,
- that we have and something that we also encourage,
- 13 I guess, is that we want to receive a broad range of
- 14 referrals, so we want to encourage our frontline
- professionals to spot risk. They know these individuals
- 16 well. We want them to spot changes in behaviour and to
- 17 refer in. That does mean we get quite a broad range of
- 18 types of concern coming through the -- I guess the front
- 19 door of Prevent. That does mean that we need sort of
- 20 firm processes in place around then how you determine
- 21 what's within scope of Prevent, what's outside of the
- 22 scope of Prevent, I guess.
- 23 Q. The way in which -- and I haven't gone through the
- 24 latter stages because AR didn't reach them -- but the
- 25 ways in which the threshold test narrows, as you go up
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- 1 in the policy at the time?
- 2 A. The frequency of repeat referrals coming into Prevent
- 3 was not something that I was aware of until 2022 when it
- 4 came up in relation to another case. We moved quickly
- 5 at that point then to work with police on a policy that
- 6 was in draft 2022, and then complemented in 2023, and
- 7 then strengthened further in 2025.
- 8 Q. So is that recognised now to have been a relative
- 9 weakness in the policy at the time, before those
- 10 improvements were made?
- 11 A. Yes. So for the Home Office, we didn't have access to
- that data that would enable us to have spotted that.
- 13 I wished -- I do wish I'd asked questions about that
- 14 earlier.
- 15 Q. Thank you. We can come to the detail a little bit laterwith you and with DAC Evans perhaps tomorrow.
- 17 But you set out that in 2023, Counter Terrorism
- 18 Policing introduced a repeat referral policy and then
 - that was strengthened, again I think, in March 2025; is
- 20 that right?

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- 21 A. Yes, that is right.
- 22 Q. Sir, paragraph 47 for your note. Thank you.
- So, at the repeat referrals, as they were happening in 2019/2020/2021, at each stage, it was simply
- a question of applying that test to the repeat referral,

- 1 whether there were reasonable grounds to suspect that
- 2 a person is susceptible to becoming a terrorist or
- 3 supporting terrorism?
- 4 A. Yes, so the thresholds didn't change but what we were
- 5 encouraging was CTCOs to look at the cumulative risk
- 6 picture.
- 7 Q. But dealing with how it was at the time, there was no
- 8 guidance beyond the threshold test?
- 9 A. Yes.
- 10 Q. But you would expect, would you, for a repeat referral,
- CTCOs to be looking at the whole, to look again at the 11
- 12 subject in light of the further information not just
- 13 looking at the information as a sort of top up to see if
- 14 it makes a difference?
- A. Yes, absolutely. We want them to look at the cumulative 15
- 16 risk picture over time. We would want all the referrals
- 17 looked at together.
- 18 Q. I want to turn now to the role of ideology within the
- 19 Prevent process, and you set out in your statement -- we
- 20 don't need to have it up, it is paragraph 93 -- that in
- 21 2019 to 2021 there wasn't a distinct category of
- 22 singular fascination with violence; is that right?
- 23 A. Yes, that's right.
- 24 Q. So, for that timeframe, I don't think we would have
- 25 statistics gathered by the Home Office for how many fell
- 1 A. Yes.

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- 2 Q. But still, at that stage, I think not specifically
- 3 fascination with violence or mass casualty attack. That
- 4 came later?
- 5 A. Yes, that's right.
- 6 Q. Thank you. Then, at the bottom of the page, you say 7
 - "The potential overlap between the longer list of categories, the lack of clear guidance on types of concern at the time, and scope for different professional judgements means that the size of this cohort cannot be accurately determined from the data we
- 13 hold from this period." 14
 - Just in terms of what was being monitored at that stage, should we understand that what you are really
- 16 driving at there is that, because of the categorisations
- 17 that came in at that time and because Prevent referrals
- 18 could be judged to fall within one within the other,
- 19 it's very difficult now to look back to that time and
- 20 ask oneself how many would fall within the current
- 21 category of fascination with violence or a mass casualty
- 22 attack?
- 23 Α. Yes, that is right.
- 24 Q. Thank you. We know that AR's first Prevent referral was
- 25 categorised on the tracker as "MUU school massacre" and

- within that particular description? 1
- 2 A. No, that's right.
- 3 There was, however, the category that you have touched 4
 - on already of mixed, unstable or unclear ideology; is
- 5 that right?
- 6 A. Yes, that's right.
- 7 Q. What you tell us in paragraph 93 is that the proportion
- 8 of those who were referred into Prevent who had the MUU
- 9 category continued to increase at around that time?
- 10 A. Yes.
- 11 Q. If we could have paragraph 94 on screen, please, it's
- 12 page 30. Just the bottom third of the page,
- 13 paragraph 94. As I have understood it -- could we just
- 14 have 94 enlarged, just the bottom of that page, thank
- 15 you -- is this right that there started to be, from the
- 16 2021/22 year, things broken down a little bit more so it
- 17 became more granular, so there was a longer list,
- 18 I think, published and, at that stage, the categories
- 19 could include school massacre --
- 20 A. Yes.
- 21 Q. -- high counter-terrorism risk but no ideology
- 22 present -- yes --
- 23 **A**. Yes.
- 24 Q. -- and vulnerability present but no ideology or
- 25 counter-terrorism risk, yes?

- 1 on the new Prevent Case Management Tracker, that the
- 2 school massacre now has this modern category of
- 3 "fascination with extreme violence or mass casualty
- 4 attacks, where no other ideology is present"; is that
- 5 correct?
- 6 Α. Yes.
- 7 Q. So that's the current categorisation, yes?
- A. 8
- If we look at paragraph 98, so that's on to the 9
- 10 substance of page 31, you say there:
- 11 "Whilst the current and previous policy position,
- 12 underpinned by guidance, communications, training and
- 13 assessment tools, has permitted sufficient flexibility
- 14 for those with a fascination with extreme violence to be
- 15 referred and considered for Prevent support, I consider
- 16 that it is clearer now than it was at the time of AR's
- 17 referrals that, for Prevent purposes, an individual
- 18 showing fascination with extreme violence apparently
- 19 without an ideological driver could be considered for
- 20 Prevent support."
- 21 Yes?

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- 22 Yes, I think it is clearer now. A.
- 23 The way in which that is carefully set out in your
 - statement, may I suggest, without I hope discourtesy,
- 25 putting it as a positive, I consider that it is clearer

1	now than it was at the time. Again, the flip side of
2	that is that there was some degree of a problem
3	previously that that wasn't sufficiently clear; would
4	you accept?

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A. I think in 2019 we were still adapting to the -- this type of concern. We were seeing a large increase in mixed, unclear and unstable referrals coming in to the Prevent system. We were trying to understand what the risks, the vulnerabilities and the needs were within 10 that cohort and adapting at pace to try to do that. The 11 2019 letter is one way that we tried to do; embedding it 12 in guidance from 2020 was another way.

But certainly now, having done further research into this cohort, understanding what some of these drivers are, we certainly know more now and are clearer now and therefore our policy and guidance is also clearer too. Q. I will come back to that. Thank you.

If we look at paragraph 103, just to explore the scale of the potential problem, bottom of page 32. If we just have paragraph 103 enlarged, please, you say there that:

"Data from 2017/18 highlighted an increase in referrals which were categorised as MUU. In 2016/2017, 696 out of 6.093 Prevent referrals were classified as

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1 the Prevent duty. I think it is partly a reflection of 2 greater online radicalisation and the way that social 3 media works. 4 Q. So it's those two things, one shouldn't ascribe it

5 wholly to change in the threat and the online world 6 because there may have been greater willingness to 7 report, but you think those two things together are the 8 likely cause of the significant change in percentages?

9 A. Yes, that's what I would ascribe it -- those are the 10 things that come to my mind.

11 Q. But then, in terms of the scale of the difficulties of 12 how effectively Prevent was dealing with it at the time, 13 you say that the data also showed that:

> "... only 12 individuals for whom the referral was categorised as MUU received Channel support."

Yes?

17 A. Yes.

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Q. Of course, accepting that the overall percentage of those who get taken on by Channel may be itself necessarily relatively low, would you agree that that is a staggeringly low figure?

22 **A**. Yes.

23 What does it reflect that was going on at that time?

24 **A.** I think it reflected, at this particular time,

uncertainty over how to handle this new type of risk

1 Then you go on to say that for the following 2 accounting period:

3 "... 2017/2018, 1,982 out of 7,318 were classified 4 as MUU, representing an increase by 185% of the number 5 of MUU referrals ..."

Is that right?

7 Α. Yes

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Q. 8 That's a very striking statistic; would you agree?

9 A. Yes, I would agree.

10 Q. Can you help us with what the Home Office's assessment 11 is as to why that was occurring at that time? Prevent 12 wasn't new, and yet you have got a sudden up surge in

13 MUU referrals?

14 A. So, I think partly it was us embedding the Prevent duty 15 across sectors. So, whilst Prevent itself wasn't new, 16 the Prevent duty came in in 2015. That took time for 17 frontline sectors to become confident in, to understand 18 the processes and to trust, I think. So I think we 19 ended up in a space where, in this sort of period, we 20 are seeing teachers, for instance, saying, "I'm really 21 worried about the type of behaviours I'm now seeing in 22 this particular individual", and referring in for help, 23 for support and for help trying to understand the

So I think it is partly a reflection of embedding

different challenges that they were seeing.

1 that was being reported into the Prevent system. You 2 know we were adapting to a new type of threat and

3 putting -- strengthening guidance and training as we 4 went

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5 Q. But it reflects, does it not, not just uncertainty but 6 that, at that time, the process wasn't working 7 sufficiently well to push those cases through?

A. Yes. That's fair. 8

9 Q. Because there was a very much lower strike rate for MUU 10 cases getting adopted?

11 I think at this particular period it was.

12 Q. That then brings us, doesn't it, to HOM000048, the joint 13 letter. Was this co-signed by one of your predecessors?

14 A. Yes, that's right.

15 Q. Now, I'm not going to go through the totality of this 16 letter because we have read the majority of it into our 17 transcripts previously and you will be familiar with it. 18 I want to ask you about the assessment now of this 19

letter. What is the assessment now as to whether, first

20 of all, this letter was adequate as a means to

21 communicate and embed the change that was necessary?

22 **A**. So I think the letter was to reaffirm existing policy at

23 the time. So it wasn't changing policy, it was

24 reminding frontline practitioners that these sorts of 25 individuals were Prevent relevant. We took a range of

steps alongside this letter, including regular 2 communications, awareness sessions. I myself remember 3 hosting all Channel panel chairs and talking about some of these risks in November 2019.

> So it wasn't the letter alone. It was a range of training, guidance and consultation that went alongside

- Q. Looking back now, did that totality of the letter, together with the training that you are speaking about, 10 did that do enough to embed the necessary change, do you think?
- 12 Α. So I think it was one step on that process. It was 13 a reflection that this was a new type of risk that we 14 were seeing, encouraging frontline practitioners to 15 take -- to consider these cases for Channel but then it 16 was supported in 2020 by new Channel Duty Guidance and 17 by CT police updating the CTCO guidance.
- 18 Q. It is a careful answer, but did the totality of the 19 action at this stage, looking back, do enough to embed 20 the necessary change, do you think?
- 21 A. I think it was an important thing to do. I think now, 22 looking back at the position that we are in now, it was 23 important to get that down into published guidance, 24 I think, as swiftly as possible and supported by training. So, yes, I think this is -- I'm not someone 25

- who wants to do guidance by letter writing. It needs to 1 2 be set down in formal documentation.
- 3 Q. That the letter was driving in the right direction and, 4 no doubt, the training as well, were all positive things. It may be that few, if any, would dispute it. 5 6 But is it recognised now that there was a problem, in the 2019 to 2022 period, in that not enough was done to 7 8 challenge the under-uptake of MUU cases into Channel?
- A. I think there was an awful lot done to try to challenge 9 10 that. So from changing guidance, changing training and 11 this letter, of course, we have now gone further with 12 some of the policy changes that we have made that 13 almost -- that means that cases now that meet these 14 sorts of thresholds are almost automatically considered 15 for multi-agency information gathering.
- 16 Q. I'm not, for my part, suggesting that work was not done, 17 but my question was: is it recognised now that not 18 enough was done in this period to challenge the 19 under-uptake?
- 20 A. I would certainly have liked to have seen more of those 21 cases in Channel. 22 If we go over the page in the joint letter, please -- if
- 23 we can just go over the page again -- we see, don't we, 24 in the paragraph about four paragraphs down:

"This letter may raise the question of whether we

- are seeking to expand the remit of Prevent. We are not."
- 3 Yes?
- 4 A. Yes.

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- 5 Q. Can I seek your assistance on this, reflecting on 6 matters: it may be thought that this letter was trying 7 to ride two horses. On the one hand, it was trying to 8 encourage a greater willingness to accept cases through 9 the thresholds where there was no clear ideology, and 10 saying, "You don't have to have a clearly formed 11 terrorist ideology in order to be accepted onto
- 12 Prevent". Would you agree that that's one thing that it 13 was trying to do?
- 14 A. Yes.
- 15 Q. But, at the same time, in the paragraph that's been 16 flagged with a purple arrow, and indeed in what 17 followed, it was also trying to say, "But there is no 18 expansion of the meaning of terrorism and there is no 19 change in the remit of Prevent"; would you agree?
- 20 A. No, I think the letter says that there's no expansion to 21 the remit of Prevent. The Prevent sort of thresholds 22 and what's relevant for Prevent has always been very 23 different to what the definition of terrorism is and 24 what would be of concern to Pursue partners.
- 25 Q. What's your reflection on the fact that the letter had

- 1 to do those two things at the same time?
- A. So I think what the letter was saying was that 3 susceptibility to radicalisation or vulnerability to 4 radicalisation can be a really broad thing. It sweeps 5 up a whole range of different attitudes, behaviours, mindsets and that firm ideology may not always be 6 7 present. Indeed, if firm ideology is there, Prevent may 8 even be a little bit too late.
- 9 Q. Yes, because you would then be looking potentially more 10 along the Pursue lines and overt activity?
- 11 A. Yes, that's right.

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- 12 Q. Thank you. But was there not, at this stage, this 13 concern that those looking at a referral into Prevent 14 from the counter-terrorism stage, so at the 15 deconfliction stage and the FIMU work, would have this 16 focus on an assessment, if it be the case, that there is
 - 17 no counter terrorism/domestic extremism evidence here, 18 whereas those looking at it as CTCOs for the purposes of
- 19 assessing whether the case should be open to Prevent,
- 20 ought still to have been thinking, well, that's one
- 21 thing but that doesn't mean that this isn't a Prevent
- 22 case; it is still straddling that difficult duality,
- 23 isn't it?
- 24 **A**. Yes, I mean the FIMU officers and CTCOs would be 25 assessing to different thresholds, different relevance.

Q.

The FIMU is solely there to look at whether
an investigative lead needs to be opened up on that case
and it's working to pursue thresholds. CTCO should
always be working to Prevent thresholds and that is
about vulnerability to radicalisation. So therefore
when ideology is not necessarily clear or may be absent.

- Q. You'll forgive me, I hope, for perhaps simplifying it into layperson's simplistic terms, but isn't there a risk that the FIMU assessment of no counter terrorism/domestic extremism risk, might come across to the CTCOs as, "We don't need to be worried about this person because there's no terrorism intelligence"?
- A. Yes, I recognise that some of that terminology is loose and unhelpful. I know we have taken -- I know CT police have taken steps to change that. But even with the FIMU making that type of assessment, it is the role of the CTCO to assess Prevent relevance and that's what they should be thinking about and that's what they are trained to do and what their guidance suggests to them.
- trained to do and what their guidance suggests to them.

 Thank you. Appreciating again that whenever
 an improvement is made, the difficulty is always that
 some lawyer says, well, that's a weakness of things
 before the improvement was made. But, looking at it
 with candour, would you accept that that different role
 and those two things, the terrorism risk narrowly

6 A. Yes, I can see from all of the disclosure I have seen as
7 part of this Inquiry that that does -- it does seem to
8 be concerning. But CTCOs have got the training and the
9 guidance to know the thresholds that they are operating
10 within and the sorts of behaviours that they are looking
11 for. But, yes, I think it is frustrating.

defined in TACT terms and the wider Prevent role, that

in that difficult area between the FIMU and the CTCO,

there was, at the time, scope for CTCOs to be overly

influenced by a FIMU finding of a lack of counter

terrorism/domestic extremism intelligence?

between Prevent and mental health and neurodivergence.
 You tell us in your statement about Vulnerability
 Support Hubs and we explored that in AR's case last week
 in the evidence.

Thank you. I want to turn briefly to the intersection

If we look, please, at the most recent guidance in relation to this, or where it is touched upon at least, this is the end-to-end -- and we will come back to this later as well -- but this is the result of the end-to-end review of Prevent thresholds. HOM000090, please.

If we go to page 7, just familiarise yourself with the document. I know it's one you will be familiar with. But just go to page 7, please, and paragraph 16,

if that can be expanded, please. So in this very recent review what was being said was that:

"Mental ill health was one of the most significant factors which could affect and potentially skew decision-making. Some practitioners and frontline professionals were more likely to dismiss or not consider Prevent referrals when mental health concerns were a factor. Practitioners need to be clear that Prevent should work with safeguarding and mental health services, as none of them will assess terrorism risk, and consider both the harm from the person as well as to the person. It is particularly important that awareness of this is raised in the healthcare sector."

Now, for the Inquiry, this is obviously an important area and, after the first sentence, a lot of this appears to be directed at the need for healthcare providers to be aware that they shouldn't ignore the need for a Prevent referral, in my words, just because of the person has a mental health diagnosis or neurodivergence. But what is the significance of the reference to "mental ill health was one of the most significant factors which could affect and potentially skew decision-making"?

A. What we found as part of the Prevent threshold reviewwas that too often at both the early decision-making, so

the police decision-making stages, or sometimes at Channel actually, is that there was sometimes a reference to "Well, this is just a mental health risk, if we manage that risk, then there is no wider sort of -- there is no susceptibility to radicalisation".

What we were at pains to point out is that radicalisation risk and vulnerability can go hand in hand, that they need to be managed by potentially sort of both processes. So Channel can run alongside wider safeguarding.

- 11 Q. This is bringing things bang up to date because I thinkthis is within the last month or so, this review?
- **A.** Yes.
- **Q.** You have helpfully provided it within the disclosure. But we should understand that the fact that, within the last month or so, that the mental health considerations are being flagged as one of the most significant factors which could affect and potentially skew decision-making, that that reflects, does it, that at the Prevent gateway stage even now there is a concern that there may be under estimation of the radicalisation risk because, in layperson's terms, things are put down to a mental health diagnosis, rather than a focus on risk to others?
- 24 A. Yeah, I think that CTCOs have one of the most difficult
 25 jobs, looking at the types of different -- when mental

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ill health is present or a neurodiversity, sort of picking through that and the support that's required and the impact that that has on risk, I think is really significant.

You know -- but that's why we have got the Vulnerability Support Hub that has been in place, it's now been updated to the Clinical Consultancy Service, it's there to provide specialist support and advice to decision makers, whether that's at the police stages or as part of Channel.

- Q. So the importance there of the VHS, the Vulnerability 11 12 Support Hub. Will there be rapid thinking about what 13 more may need to change to emphasise this aspect, first 14 sentence of paragraph 16, in training and potentially in 15 policy as well?
- 16 A. Yes, that's right. In fact, two weeks ago, I think it 17 was, we circulated new comms and awareness raising to 18 all frontline practitioners, flagging this as a concern 19 and being really clear that Channel can work alongside 20 wider safeguarding concerns and we are very happy to 21 share that with the Inquiry, obviously.
- 22 Q. Thank you. I'm sure that would be helpful. When you 23 say to all frontline practitioners, I don't mean to 24 raise this critically of you or of the Counter Terrorism 25 police structures but I just want to understand the

these types of risks might present differently within this particular cohort and agreed that neurodiversity can be a risk factor but it can also be a protective factor and that's the challenge with assessing these types of cases.

6 Q. Thank you. HOM000084, please, and page 22 within it. 7 Could we just have the middle box, I think it is, 8 please, highlighted.

> I think within the context, this is the training, I think, that you were referring to?

11 A. Yes.

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Q. We can see one place where that is flagged up, on page 22, in that box. I won't read it out because it speaks for itself. If we look at page 24, I think we'll see another. So the top box, please. Although research indicates there is "no empirical evidence to link autism and terrorism", and that's what I was referring to earlier on about the need for care in making generalisations:

"... it is recognised that there are factors that can lead to increased vulnerability and risk."

Is that right?

23 A. Yes, that is right.

24 Q. "Jonathan Hall KC, independent reviewer of terrorism 25 legislation ... staggeringly high numbers of autistic

1 reality, does that go to the police officers who are 2 carrying out the CTCO role or do you leave that to the CTP? 3

4 A. So CT police will circulate that across CT Policing 5 structures, so to regions and to CTCOs. What we sent 6 out went to local authorities, to schools, safeguarding 7 leads, and so on, but also to CT police regional prevent 8 coordinators, so we would expect them to disseminate 9 that through their region and to talk about it.

10 Q. Thank you. You have referred to the mental health 11 diagnosis sometimes running hand in hand with risk to 12 others and, again, I must always be careful when raising 13 this issue not to fall into the trap of treating those 14 with autism as a single group because things can be very 15 individualised and you will be familiar with the 16 position in terms of general research about autism and 17 risk. But does that new guidance cover the fact that, 18 in some individual cases, those with autism may have, on 19 an individual basis, increased risk factors because of 20 the risk of becoming particularly fascinated with 21 certain types of material and interests? 22

A. Yes. I mean, we have -- and we have training as well. 23 So training that's delivered to Channel panels and 24 intervention providers, that's delivered by the National 25 Autistic Society, that helps people to understand how

people being referred into Prevent."

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So what I wanted -- having gone to that, because you're right to point out that that training is there, I think in your statement, you refer to this, have I understood it correctly, that this is going to Channel practitioners. Is the same type of training, to your knowledge, being provided to Counter Terrorism police who are at the frontline, as CTCOs and their sergeants?

A. I understand that CT police deliver their own specialist 9 training in this area, although I am sure the witnesses who follow me will have a more accurate reflection on

Q. Thank you. I want to turn to a different subject now, which is the Home Office's knowledge of AR as an individual and the involvement, to the extent that there was any, of MI5 in his case.

So, if we can start with paragraph 108, please, of your statement, which is at page 34, HOM000078. First of all, you make clear that AR was not individually known to the Home Office prior to the Southport attack; is that right?

In paragraph 109, you indicate that the only data that the Home Office did hold was in relation to a Prevent referral log, the type of statistics, as I've understood

- 1 it, that would be maintained for all Prevent referrals? 2 A. Yes, that's right. CT police send each year an annual 3 sort of log at this time and AR was one line upon many 4 in 2019. Since that point, we have not received those 5 sorts of spreadsheets from CT police.
- 6 Q. Thank you, and because that sort of correct but bare 7 statement, "AR was not individually known to the Home 8 Office prior to the Southport attack", is the sort of 9 thing that can be misunderstood or misconstrued, would 10 it be right that there is nothing wrong or surprising or concerning about that because the Home Office, in the 11 12 overwhelming majority of cases, just wouldn't get 13 involved in the operational handling of an individual 14 Prevent referral?
- A. That's right. We have no access to Prevent referrals or 15 16 case management and don't have a need for that access 17 either.
- 18 Thank you. Then, if we can just go to page 55 of your Q. 19 statement, please, paragraph 188. You were asked by the 20 Inquiry to assist us in relation to whether MI5 was 21 involved in AR's case and, if we look at paragraph 189, 22 you refer there to the Joint Assessment Team and, 23 24 about that team but it's right, isn't it, that that was 25

obviously, we have heard evidence now from DC Blundell a triage team consisting of both Counter Terrorism

police officers and MI5 officers? 1

2 A. Yes, that's right.

3 They provided an integrated means, as you have set out 4 in your statement, of triaging this type of new 5 referral, looking at a range of sources?

6 A. Yes.

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7 Q. We have heard, in relation to that -- and you have set 8 it out in your paragraph 190 -- that there was 9 discussion by the JAT of AR and the information I think 10 that resulted from that came in a joint assessment that 11 was explored with DC Blundell.

> Sir, I'm going to give a reference in a moment but can I ask, please, not to bring up the first page because it has a picture of AR.

So could we have page 3 of CTPNW000146. So if we go to the bottom of the JAT assessment. Can we just expand that so we capture the text on the right-hand side of the page, saying:

"Joint assessment in reference to internet research and fascination with US school shootings.

"There is no apparent ideology found and, from reporting any context into how extreme the research conducted in ICT was, it is not known if the school had firewall to inhibit any results being viewed.

"There seemed to be a common theme with regards

weapons and this has been acted out with his arrest for possession of weapon at school."

Over the page, please, on 11 December:

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"AR has various issues and has been previously referred to Social Services

"The intelligence and relevant research at present does not meet any lead or police threshold for investigation under CT/DE banner.

"However, consideration now that there is a local authority MASH-led intervention following arrest and previous history at both schools that preference would be for continuance and recommend Dovetail team and Channel panel are sighted with regards safeguarding and AR vulnerabilities going forward.

"Any new intelligence of CT/DE nature for reassessment."

So that reflects, does it not, the assessment that was done jointly between Counter Terrorism police and MI5 at that stage?

20 A. Yes, as I understand it, I think MI5 had not seen this 21 version of the document with the CT police assessment on 22

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23 Q. I was going to come onto that. That there is 24 an equivalent -- sir, for your note, it is HOM000178, 25 which is the Home Office equivalent of that, which

1 doesn't have the assessment at the bottom of the page.

2 But the reason why I'm showing you the Counter 3 Terrorism police one that does is that what we can take 4 from the nature of MI5's involvement was that working 5 with the Counter Terrorism police, looking at a variety 6 of sources, that was the assessment that they came up 7 with at this stage?

8 A. Yes. I mean, MI5 did not think it met their statutory 9 remit for a CT investigation. So, at that point, their 10 involvement in this case ends.

11 Q. Thank you. I was going to come onto that, that they 12 will have a different test as to whether their statutory 13 duty is engaged and, looking at this assessment, at that 14 stage, it didn't meet it, yes --

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. -- and there was no MI5 involvement thereafter?

17 Α.

18 Q. I think after, as you've set out in your statement, 19 after the attack, as one would perhaps expect, MI5 were 20 involved in looking at the position in relation to AR

21 and his activities, along with Counter Terrorism police;

22 is that right?

23 A. Yes. that's right.

24 Q. Again, with that input from both MI5 and the Counter 25 Terrorism police, this was a case in which the

- 1 Merseyside Police retained primacy of the investigation,
- 2 yes?
- 3 Yes. A.
- 4 Q. Because, in essence, although a careful eye was being
- 5 kept on the developing picture of what evidence was
- 6 obtained, that evidence never pointed towards AR having
- 7 a terrorist motivation, in the sense of an ideology in
- 8 the TACT sense that we looked at right at the start of
- 9 your evidence?
- 10 Α. Yes.
- Q. Is that a fair summary? 11
- Yes. 12 Α.
- 13 Q. Thank you. Can we turn then, please, to the assessment
- 14 of each of the Prevent referrals for AR. Obviously, the
- 15 learned Chair heard evidence about that last week.
- 16 I'm only going to ask you a relatively targeted
- 17 number of questions about this. I have asked you
- 18 already in general terms about that difficult interplay
- 19 between the FIMU and the CTCO. From your knowledge of
- 20 this case, looking at what was recorded at least on the
- 21 documents, would you agree that there are grounds for 22
- some concern about the emphasis on CT/DE in what was 23 recorded by the FIMU but also in terms of, at times, the
- 24 FIMU appearing to recommend, if not direct, that the
- 25 Prevent referrals could be closed?
- 1 decided that there should be a referral to the VSH, you
- 2 would have expected that to be completed and taken into
- 3 account before the referral was closed?
- 4 A.
- 5 Q. It is a matter for the Chair's assessment but, if and to
- 6 the extent that there were elements of the second and
- 7 the third referral being treated as a top-up, by which
- I am using that as shorthand to suggest that the new 8
- 9 information was looked at and the question was "Does
- 10 that add much?", I think you're clear that what should
- 11
- have been happening was a holistic assessment of the
- 12 risks that AR posed as a whole, looking afresh at the
- 13 whole case?
- A. Yes, absolutely. 14
- Q. You would have expected, would you not, although there 15
- 16 was no direct guidance on it at the time, appropriate
- 17 weight to be given to the fact that there were repeat
- 18 referrals, so by the end three referrals, all from
- 19 education providers?
- 20 A. Yes.
- 21 Q. To the extent that issues like the internet school
- 22 browser history not having been checked, the device
- 23 history not having been checked and the VSH referral not
- 24 having happened, would you have expected those to have
- 25 been picked up by the supervising sergeant who has to

- Yes. I have seen that as part of the disclosure. 1
- 2 Q. Thank you. In general terms, would you expect the FIMU
- to be careful not to overreach beyond their role in the 3
- 4 assessment of the intelligence because what they are
- 5 looking at is actually narrower in some ways than what
- 6 the CTCO needs to look at?
- 7 A. Yes
- 8 Q. The first referral was closed, without having considered
- 9 the school internet browsing history, and closed before
- 10 the product of the review of AR's devices that had been
- 11 seized in the criminal investigation was complete.
- 12 Would you agree, in general terms, that at the Prevent
- 13 Gateway Assessment stage, available opportunities to
- 14 understand online activity should be taken where
- 15 practicable before making the PGA assessment?
- 16 A. Yes, or certainly before exiting the case.
- 17 Q. Yes. Here, that would have meant ensuring that the
- 18 school internet browsing history was obtained and
- 19 carefully considered?
- 20 A.
- 21 Q. The Vulnerability Support Hub, there was an intention to
- 22 refer to them, which I think you would view as
- 23 appropriate and good practice here?
- 24 **A**. Yes
- 25 Q. But it didn't, in fact, happen and, again, having

- 1 endorse any recommendation for closure?
- 2 Α.
- 3 Q. Where the decision was, as we know it was, for closure,
- 4 without going on to information gathering for Channel,
- 5 was there any specific policy guidance at the time on
- 6 the need for the Prevent practitioners to ensure that
- 7 the most appropriate multi-agency approach was being
- 8 taken outside of Prevent?
- 9 A. So, I understand it was in -- it would have been in CTCO
- 10 guidance to -- if closing at this point -- to refer onto
- 11 other services. That has long been in guidance. But
- 12 I think that's it.
- 13 Q. Can you help us as to whether there was any specific
- 14 guidance or policy on ensuring that that included the
- 15 most appropriate police team because, in AR's case, one
- 16 of the areas of potential concern is that on the closure
- 17 of the first referral, whilst school and mental health
- 18 services were obviously involved, and the local
- 19 authority was involved, no police team re-engaged, so
- 20 the Early Action or Community Safety Team. Do you know
- 21 if there was any guidance about that at the time?
- 22 I don't know for sure. I mean, I would expect CT police 23 to be working closely with local policing. I don't know
- 24 how specific the guidance was at that point, in terms of
- 25 who should be informed and where that case should be

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referred on to 1

- 2 Q. Thank you. Putting aside what we now know and trying to 3 avoid the dangers of hindsight, with what was known at 4 the time about AR and what should have been known, by 5 which I'm referring to matters such as the school 6 internet browsing history, was his the type of case that 7 the system as a whole should have been putting through 8
- 9 A. Yes, I mean, I believe this case should have been in 10 Channel, and I note the findings, as well, of the three different reviews into this case. 11
- 12 Are you aware of the statement of the relevant official Q. 13 from the local authority -- sir, the reference is 14 LCC001928, page 13, paragraph 49, in the statement of 15 Ms Sakthi Karunanithi -- that the local authorities say 16 that, if AR had been referred onto Channel, that he 17 would have been accepted?
- 18 A. Yes, I have seen that.

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- 19 Q. If that had all happened, obviously, you can't know 20 whether or not there would have been consent from AR's 21 parents for involvement but would this be right, there 22 would either have been a police-led process if no 23 consent or there would have been an intervention 24 provider involved if there was consent?
- 25 Α. So, if there was consent, there would have been not just

an intervention provider but a full range of multi-agency support that then came into play around that particular individual, to try to manage those radicalisation risks and wider vulnerabilities.

Had consent not been given at that point, then it would have been a decision for the police to -- for CT police to say whether they thought that this particular case met the threshold for Prevent's -- for police-led partnerships. So if there was a concern over his radicalisation risk or violence, we would expect the case to be considered -- we would expect them to be considering that case on that basis.

- 13 Q. Thank you. It follows, I think, from the general 14 question that I asked you about the sort of measures 15 that are taken by that process, would you have expected 16 that to look very carefully at AR's online activity?
- 17 A. Yes, and all the wider vulnerabilities as well.
- 18 Q. Thank you. Whether that would have been successful in 19 mitigating the risk, changing AR's behaviour, or 20 alternatively exposing some of what his activity became, 21 particularly in the months and years following, I don't
- 22 suppose you are able really to say? There is a degree 23 of speculation involved in that; would you agree?
- 24 A. Yes, I agree. I think it is unknowable. We also don't 25 know the level -- even had his parents consented -- the

- 1 level of engagement he would have -- active 2 participation in the process that he went through. 3
 - Q. Thank you. I want to turn next, please, to some of the reviews and changes since the attack but also look at some of the changes that happened between the Prevent referrals and the attack.

So we should start, I think, here with the independent review of Prevent published by Sir William Shawcross

Sir, just for your note, I'm not going to bring up the full document, but the review is at HOM000071 and the HMG response at HOM000070.

If we go back to paragraph 16, page 6 of your statement. You set out at the bottom of the page that, following Sir William's report, there was that change in the Prevent strategic objectives, which we touched on earlier, to increase the focus on tackling the ideologies that underpin terrorism. So, under (a), the first of the Prevent strategic objectives became:

"Tackling the ideological causes of terrorism ..."

So a slightly narrower focus. Understanding, because you touched on it earlier, on why that was the case: is there some tension between the desire to focus on the expanding risk category of mixed, unstable or unclear ideology and the fact that the strategic

1 objectives narrowed down to say "Tackling the 2 ideological causes of terrorism"?

A. Yes. I think so. A lot of the work that was done on the tackling the ideological causes of terrorism was very much about working communities, work through civil society organisations and work to disrupt extremist groups at the local level. In terms of that sort of second objective of intervening early, we took Sir William Shawcross' advice to delineate that mixed, unclear or unstable category and to look at that more closely but we still made clear in all of the guidance and training that was done at the time that ideology was, of course, an important consideration but it was by no means the only consideration, and that there are a range of susceptibilities and vulnerabilities and behaviours that could show that somebody was on a pathway to radicalisation.

18 Q. Thank you. If we go to paragraph 118 of your statement 19 at page 37, we see that, between the referrals for AR 20 and the attack, the revised Prevent Duty Guidance was 21 issued, HOM000014. You have given us a useful summary 22 there and, if we look at 118(d), you say that, amongst 23 the changes was:

> "Emphasising that as Prevent is a counter-terrorism capability, the presence, or possible presence, of any

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(15) Pages 57 - 60

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terrorist or terrorism linked ideology will be an important consideration for frontline professionals in deciding whether to make a referral to Prevent (whilst recognising that there may be times where the precise ideological driver is not clear but that it is better to receive referrals that turn out not to be of concern than missing someone who genuinely needs support) ..."

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So the same issue really as in relation to the changes to the strategic objectives.

Was there some risk that this renewed emphasis or changed emphasis in the Prevent Duty Guidance was acting somewhat against what had tried to be achieved by the joint letter?

15 A. Yes, and I can see that it doesn't feel very clear. In 16 terms of both the Prevent Duty Guidance, as a sort of 17 whole document, and the training that went alongside it, 18 we were very clear that sometimes you won't -- with the 19 referrals that we deal with, sometimes ideology won't be 20 clear until much further down the line or it may not 21 become present at all. But it was about trying to spot 22 people early and that was often before they hit that 23 trajectory towards a clear ideology.

So, yes, it is challenging to set it out in --

25 **Q.** There is still a tension there, is there not?

- 1 **A.** Yes. It does -- it certainly is a tension and that is something that we have also heard from frontline practitioners, so we have to work quite hard to clarify that in training, in guidance and in all of the awareness raising work that we do.
- 6 Q. Thank you.

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One of the other changes that you deal with in helpful detail in your statement is the new Prevent Assessment Framework. If we just have on screen, please, paragraph 120 of your statement at page 38.

There's a whole section in your statement on this, so I just want to look at some of the key points. So, this was rolled out across the country to the regions in September 2024 and, as you've set out, it was bringing in learning from both the murder of Sir David Amess and the Forbury Gardens attack, also involving our learned Chair.

This is now, I think, the framework that would be used by the CTCO from the PGA stage and thereafter, to assess suitability for Channel; is that right?

- 21 A. Yes, that's right.
 - Q. Taking it at a high level, does it seek to give greater consistency by effectively directing the CTCO to have regard to a number of relevant considerations that are set out on the form, so that the CTCO has to apply their

mind directly to each of them?

- 2 A. Yes, that is right. It's a tool to help structure3 professional judgement.
- Q. So factors, such as the existence of mental health and complex needs, social isolation, I think, are directly on the form or in the framework that they have to address that as an issue?
- 8 A. Yes, absolutely.
- Q. Thank you. The indicators of concern, I think, are set
 out within that. Would it be fair to say that, if one
 was looking at AR's case, with the PAF in front of one,
 AR would have met a substantial number of the indicators of concern?
- 14 A. I haven't looked across -- I haven't mapped the Prevent
 15 Assessment Framework onto AR's case but, yes, certainly
 16 knowing what the Prevent Assessment Framework contains
 17 and some of the disclosure that we have seen as part of
 18 this Inquiry, then, yes, it feels clear that it would
 19 have made its way into Channel.
- 20 Q. Thank you.

21 Sir, solely for your note and not, please, to have 22 on screen the reference is CTPHQ000127, for the 23 currently used framework.

24 SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: Thank you.

25 $\,$ MR MOSS: $\,$ Could I ask you, in relation to this, you say that

1 it is used for the stages from the Prevent Gateway

Assessment, is it actually the framework that needs to be used to make the PGA?

4 A. Yes, absolutely. It replaces both the DIF and the
 5 vulnerability assessment framework. So the Prevent

6 Assessment Framework takes each referral all the way

7 through the process from initial referral in to exit

8 from Channel further down the line.

9 Q. So the PAF bites at an early stage, at the stage where
 the CTCO makes the decision as to whether it should go
 forward to information gathering?

12 A. Yes, that's right.

Q. I follow, thank you. Then, if we could have on screen,
 please, paragraph 157 of your statement, at page 47.
 There's new policy jointly agreed by the Home Office to
 strengthen consistency of decision-making on referrals
 where a fascination with extreme violence has been

18 identified; is that right?

19 A. Yes, that's right.

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Q. Sir, the reference for this but we may pick up the detail of this with DAC Evans tomorrow in her evidence, is CTPNW000016. Can you just confirm, for today's purposes, that one of the features of that is that, if the reason for the referral is fascination with extreme

violence, there needs to be a greater degree of scrutiny

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1 in the supervision stage, with a more senior officer

2 having to approve any closure of the referral?

- 3 A. Yes, that's right.
- 4 Q. Related to this in paragraph 158, you say that:

5 "Measures were introduced ... to strengthen6 assurance on repeat referrals."

So we have looked at strengthening measures forviolence-fascinated individuals. Now, on repeat

referrals, there has also been work done there; is that right?

10 right?

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11 A. Yes, that's right. Both policies put a strong

12 presumption that these cases should make it through the

13 Prevent Gateway Assessment and into multi-agency

14 information gathering.

15 Q. Thank you. Can we have on screen, first of all,

16 HOM000100. The date of this is 13 March this year and,

if we go over the page, please, and over the page again,

18 I think we see this letter has been sent out by you; is

Tullink we see this letter has been sent out by you, is

19 that right?

- 20 A. Yes.
- 21 Q. I'm not going to go through it because I'm wanting to
- 22 make progress with your evidence, but is this the means
- 23 by which some of the key messages were delivered by you
- 24 in relation to these strengthened changes in these two
- 25 areas?

1 A. Yes.

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- 2 Q. Your directorate would have been involved in
- 3 commissioning that?
- 4 A. Yes, that's right.
- 5 Q. We should note, in fairness to all concerned that, if we
- 6 have paragraph 152 of your statement, page 46, please --
- 7 top of the page, paragraph 152 -- just when we
- 8 consider -- I'm not going to go through it paragraph by
- 9 paragraph -- but when we consider the Prevent learning
 - review, first of all, you felt that it was important
- 11 that a swift review was undertaken. So it was done at
- 12 reasonable speed; would you agree?
- 13 A. Yes, that's right.
- 14 Q. Secondly and perhaps more significantly this: that
- 15 because it was done while the criminal process was still
- ongoing, none of those who were involved, whether as
- 17 CTCOs or as the supervising sergeants could be
- 18 interviewed, it was effectively a desktop review?
- 19 A. Yes, that's right.
- 20 $\,$ Q. $\,$ So there was not the opportunity to scrutinise the
- 21 rationale by asking questions in relation to that?
- 22 A. That's right.
- 23 Q. Equally, one should read that review as a matter of
- 24 fairness, recognising that the officers concerned had
- 25 not had the opportunity to give their explanations for

A. Yes, that's right.

Q. The multiple referrals, perhaps we should just look at
 briefly, CTPNW000067. Again, we can pick up the details

with others. If we go please to page 8. We see there

5 at the top of the page:

"... enhanced oversight for multiple referral

cases."

Do we see there that a police inspector needs to have oversight. They need to be informed of all multiple referral cases as soon as they are identified.

11 Must review the referrals. It also states at the

bottom:

"All multiple referral cases that have not been referred to Channel or PLP must be passed to the Prevent inspector for pre-closure review."

So there is a sort of -- my words not the words of this policy -- assumption in favour that it is going to go through and, if it's not, there now needs to be a more senior officer who checks, in what's called a pre-closure review, that it is appropriate to be closed, even though it is a multiple referral case?

22 A. Yes, that's right.

23 Q. Thank you. In terms of reports following the dreadful

24 attack. There was first, was there not, the Prevent

25 learning review?

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- it and explain, for example, why some things wererecorded in writing?
- Z recorded in writing
- 3 A. Yes, that's right.
- 4 Q. Thank you.

5 Sir, the reference for that is CTPHQ000055, for 6 a version of the review but obviously you're well 7 familiar with it?

8 SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: Thank you very much.

9 MR MOSS: If we look at paragraph 153, you say that:

10 "Key findings from the review indicated that,
11 overall, the reviewer considered there to have been
12 a high level of compliance by the Prevent officers with
13 process timescales, assessment completion and adherence
14 to policy that was in place at the time. However,
15 although processes and policies were largely followed

16 correctly, the reviewer identified several subjective

17 decision points where risk could have been assessed

differently, which may have led to the provision of

19 Prevent support."

20 Yes?

21 **A.** Yes

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- Q. Are those findings that the Home Office and the HomeSecretary accept?
- 24 **A.** Yes.
- 25 Q. Thank you. If we look at paragraph 162, you set out

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there that -- sorry, it is page 48 -- to address the areas identified in the Prevent Learning Review, the Home Secretary -- previous Home Secretary of course -on 17 December outlined reforms to further strengthen

"(a) Conducting an end-to-end review of Prevent thresholds ..."

Yes?

9 A. Yes.

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12 **Q**.

10 Q. That's the document that I took you to in relation to 11 that reference of mental health, do you --

12 A. Yes, that's right.

13 Q. Then on (b), (c) and (d), where (b) is, "Broadening the 14 interventions available to people supported by Channel":

> "(c) Undertaking a strategic policy review to identify and deliver improvements in how individuals referred into Prevent who are neurodivergent or suffer from mental ill health are supported and managed.

"(d) Strengthening the Home Office's approach to the monitoring and oversight of referrals that do not meet Prevent thresholds, by launching a pilot to test new approaches ..."

What you say in relation to those, I think other than (a), where the report has come in, is work is currently underway to implement all of the above, yes?

Yes, absolutely. 1 A.

2 Q. That is quite a broad catch all, "work is currently 3 underway to implement all of the above", can you give us 4 first of all a broad understanding of where that has 5

A. Yes, absolutely. So, the Prevent threshold review has been completed. I am currently working to get that published on GOV.UK, to make it really transparent. On broadening interventions available, we have now rolled out cyber interventions to individuals on Channel. This helps people to understand what -- the consequences of some of the content that they are viewing online and we have also extended practical mentoring to Channel subjects. So that helps people that don't have a strong ideology to help them overcome some of the different vulnerabilities and risks we might see as part of that.

On the strategic policy review into mental health and neurodivergence, we have completed the first stage of that and now have two other phases to go but are already starting to implement some of the recommendations from that. Then, on the final one, we have pilots in place in nine different local authority regions at the moment, and we have done since March, which is testing those cases that don't meet the threshold for Prevent, we are testing different

approaches for formalising handovers from Prevent into wider sort of statutory partners, including local policing. That has largely involved having almost mini Channel panels that are having a multi-agency discussion around these cases and then determining who the lead professional should be and what support should be provided in those cases. Those pilots started in the spring, they will run until the end of this financial year and will identify learning from that and determine whether this is something that we need to roll out more widely.

Thank you. I think you have been put on notice of the likelihood that I, through the Chair, might request this. Can I ask that you provide a formal written update to the Inquiry by the end of the calendar month of November, in relation to the progress that's been made in each of those areas and to include the timescales for completion of those that are still underway?

Could I please ask that it includes, for example, in relation to the pilots, any learning and early lessons that are coming out of it, even though it is part way through and, with apologies for the long list, could I please ask that you ensure that, by whatever way is most convenient to you and those working with you, that

1 you make clear in the written update anything that is so 2 sensitive that it should only be seen by the Inquiry 3 team, that which can be shared with the Core 4 Participants but shouldn't be published and what can be 5 published?

6 A. Yes, we can do. By then, we will also have the latest 7 annual statistics for Prevent this year. So we will also share the details of that and you will be able to 8 9 see how some of these policies have been implemented and 10 the impact on the ground.

11 Q. Thank you. Then paragraph 166 of your statement you set 12 out there Lord Anderson's publication of his report, 13 "Lessons for Prevent". Again, for reasons you will 14 understand, that's something which is very familiar to 15 the Chair.

You set out five themes there:

"Prevent referrals should be considered for people that have no fixed ideology but do present a fascination with extreme violence or mass casualty attacks;

"Prevent could function better if it was connected to a broader safeguarding and violence protection system;

"Prevent should rapidly adapt to the online world where so much radicalisation takes place;

"Public transparency about the structures, systems

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and statistics of Prevent should be the default;

"Information-sharing and engagement should be improved."

Again, in relation to those themes and the recommendations, you have not had long with that as a report, can you just give us the headlines of the position that's been reached in taking action in relation to them?

A. Yes, absolutely. So, we have started implementing many of these recommendations already. So, some of the policy changes that we have made to Prevent, in terms of fascination with extreme violence, is aimed at addressing (a).

We have pilots underway, looking at how we can better identify people online who are showing Prevent related behaviours and we are rolling out additional information -- additional means of opening Prevent up to the public, to critics and journalists, so that they can have better understanding of how it works and to increase that transparency.

I think it is fair to say that the area that we're really focused on at the moment and where we are working out a way forward is on recommendation (b), which there is lots of cross-Government work underway at the moment to try to identify how Prevent connects into that

broader safeguarding and violence protection system.

2 It's a very important recommendation and an equally

3 challenging one.

4 Q. That I think, as you indicated, has some cross-Whitehall
 5 implications; would that be right?

6 A. That's certainly right.

7 Q. You know that I'm going to ask, in relation to that, if8 your November update could cover those grounds to those

9 areas as well?

A. Yes. sure.

MR MOSS: Thank you. Sir, that brings us to nearly 1.00 and
I'm conscious we haven't had a mid-morning break. I'm

changing to a different topic now. I wonder if we could break for lunch but perhaps have a slightly shorter

15 break of perhaps 40 minutes?

16 SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: Certainly. We will sit again at17 1.40 pm.

(1.00 pm)

(The short adjournment)

20 (1.40 pm)

21 SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: Yes, Mr Moss.

22 MR MOSS: Thank you, sir.

Ms Ellsmore I just want to round off now on the topic of the potential need for more change in policy and practice, and you have a helpful reflection section

of your statement.

Could we look at one part of that. It is page 51 at paragraphs 173 to 174. You candidly say there that;

"There is also clear inconsistency around the application of Prevent thresholds where referrals and cases do not have a clear ideology. Ideology is only one of multiple considerations when assessing an individual's susceptibility to radicalisation.

Terrorists can hold a range of personal grievances and adopt ideas from different ideologies or subcultures.

For some individuals, fascination with extreme violence could be an early indicator that an individual is on a pathway to terrorism."

Then at 174, you say:

"The thresholds review ..."

That's the document that we've been looking at a little bit and I'm going to come back to:

"... found that the lack of a clear ideology was a significant factor in decision-making at each threshold. This often led to referrals not being made or not progressing through the Prevent system, with an overemphasis on ideology meaning that other markers for susceptibility to radicalisation could be missed. In my view, we must do more to clarify that a clear identifiable ideology is not mandatory to make or

progress a Prevent referral."

Now, those words, if I may say so, are admirably clear but it does mean that, even looking at this report from the last month, there is still a problem here in the fact that a clear ideology is not required for Prevent still not being fully understood and recognised; would you agree?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. So now, more than six years on from that joint letter,
10 still not enough has been done to deal with this
11 important area?

12 A. I think that what we have now is an inconsistency, so in
 13 some areas, I think this is being adopted and
 14 an effective approach. I think in some other areas, we
 15 have inconsistency in decision-making as those referrals
 16 come through into the system. We must do more to drive

out that inconsistency and we must do more in guidance,

training, and keeping on building awareness.

19 Q. If we look at paragraph 107 on page 34. You say in20 relation to AR that you:

"... have considered whether the Home Office would have expected AR to be referred to Channel ... had he been viewing similar material that was consistent with a single ideology. While professional judgement may vary, and there is a risk of over simplifying when

The Southport Inquiry

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applying counterfactuals, I consider it more likely that AR would have been referred to Channel in 2019 if the material he had been reviewing and comments he had been making had aligned with a single ideology. He would also have been more likely to have been adopted as a Channel case ..."

So what you were telling us was that the lack of a single clear ideology appears to have made a difference in AR's case back at the time, yes?

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- Q. In the two paragraphs that I have taken you to, at 173 11 12 and 174, although you say that improvements have been 13 made and, in some cases, the understanding is now good, 14 as the Director of Prevent in the Home Office, you still 15 don't have confidence that enough has been done to 16 ensure that the system is as rigorous and as clearly 17 understood as it needs to be?
- 18 A. Yes, I think there is a lot more to do.
- 19 Q. Thank you. If it were to be suggested that, given the 20 six years since the joint letter and other steps had 21 first started to deal with it, if it were to be 22 suggested that the Home Office has failed to act with 23 sufficient rigour and urgency in this area, what would 24 you say?
- 25 A. I think that, at the time of AR's referrals, it was in

policy and processes at the time and training that these sorts of cases could have made their way through to Channel. I think that the position now is even more clear than it was then but there is always more work for us to do. The different types of risk indicators that we see change over time and we have to keep adapting with that

Q. Within the thresholds review, if we look at HOM000090, and if we go to page 7, please, I don't want to take subsequent paragraphs out of context, could we start on page 7 with paragraph 14, "Key findings":

"This review found that Prevent thresholds were generally well understood by the Prevent practitioners who gave evidence to the review. Legislation, training, guidance and policies currently in place enable the Prevent system to identify and offer interventions to people who may be susceptible to radicalisation."

So that was the positives of the finding; would you agree?

- 20 A. Yes.
- 21 Q. But if we go down to paragraph 17:

22 "This review found that there may be too much focus, 23 among practitioners ..."

24 Who are practitioners in this context?

25 A. So it would have been both Prevent officers but it would 78

2 Q. "... on the presence of a terrorist ideology. Ideology 3 is an important consideration and practitioners, 4 especially those who make decisions on progressing 5 referrals such as Counter Terrorism Policing ... should 6 feel confident identifying it. However, as an early 7 intervention programme, Prevent must consider 8 susceptibility to terrorist ideology or involvement,

also include potentially those referring into Prevent.

rather than limiting Prevent to cases where a terrorist ideology has already taken hold." That clear indication in paragraph 17, that there

may be too much focus still on terrorist ideology, that must be a matter of concern to you?

- 14 A. It certainly is and that's why we have taken a range of 15 steps to try to address that.
- 16 **Q.** Over the page, please, if we may. Paragraph 18, please:

"Practitioners reported an overall increase in referrals to Prevent for violent, young men, who present with no ideology ..."

Then these words:

"... which has acutely accelerated since Southport."

22 Can you help us to understand what you assess the cause of that acceleration since Southport to be?

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24 A. Yes, and I think this is slightly unclearly worded 25 actually which I hadn't spotted before. But what we've

seen post-the Southport attack is a sharp increase in 2 referrals to Prevent, where there are concerns about violence fixation. We are -- so, yeah, a sharp increase 4 in concerns being flagged by Prevent duty partners.

What we are still determining is the extent to which this is the risk tolerance of other agencies having fallen, whether it is potentially an overreaction in some cases or whether this is a larger cohort than we would have initially thought.

10 Q. So whether that is a previous underestimator of the 11 cohort or a welcome improvement in referral rates is 12 difficult to assess; would you agree?

A. Yes, it is difficult to assess. I am pleased that we 13 14 are getting this increase and we have taken steps then 15 to ensure that these cases do receive multi-agency case 16 consideration.

17 Q. Thank you. Then paragraph 21, please:

> "The review found that both professionals and practitioners were sometimes unsure whether to refer or progress individuals fascinated with mass violence if they did not see a clear 'traditional' extremist ideology."

Now, the professionals who are unsure whether to refer, that seems to refer to outside professionals, such as mental health professionals or teachers?

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- A. Yes, absolutely and that's why the new guidance we 1 2 issued a few weeks ago was designed to be timed 3 alongside school INSET days, so that we could make sure
- that teachers were aware of this particular risk. 4
- 5 Q. I follow you. But the practitioners who were unsure 6 whether to progress individuals fascinated, is that 7 a reference to Counter Terrorism officers and those 8 involved in the Channel process?
- 9 A. Yes.

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- 10 Q. Again, the fact that now, in the autumn of 2025, this is 11 the finding of this review is plainly very concerning, 12 is it not?
- 13 Yes, it certainly is concerning. Α.
- 14 Q. Thank you. If we go back to your reflections, please, 15 page 51 of the statement, HOM000078, I have taken you 16 slightly out of turn to your paragraphs 173 and 174. In 17 172, again candidly, you say this:

"Strengthened training, guidance and resources is required to provide greater clarity to frontline and Channel panel members to support consistent decision-making. This should include resources on mental ill health, neurodiversity, and radicalisation risks, to ensure the professional judgement of

professionals considering making a referral, and to CTP practitioners is grounded in knowledge and expertise.

Q. If I've understood it correctly, it will allow the police to apply to the Youth or the Magistrates' Court for a Youth Diversion Order, the age limit being if an individual is aged 21 or under?

5 A. Yes, that's right.

Q. We should look, please, at paragraph 186. The requirements for this, if we can have the top of the page, please, page 55 -- could we just have the top of 9 page 55 expanded, please.

> The technical requirements for this will be twofold. So:

"Firstly, the court must be satisfied [to the civil standard of proof, not the criminal standard of proof], on the balance of probabilities, that the individual has committed a terrorism or terrorism-connected offence, or that the individual has been involved in conduct likely to facilitate such an offence by them or by another person.

"Secondly, the court must consider it necessary to make the YDO for the purpose of protecting the public from a risk of terrorism or other serious harm."

That's the two-pronged test, yes?

23 Α. Yes.

24 Q. I don't wish to be misunderstood and plainly that is 25 providing a further tool in the counter-terrorism

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It should also clearly stipulate that a case can be in Prevent, as well as in other safeguarding services, as Prevent is the only programme that has the remit to assess susceptibility to terrorism."

May I therefore invite you to include, in the end of November update, a full and detailed account of where has been reached in acting upon that, alongside the other matters that I asked you to deal with earlier in your evidence?

10 A. Yes, sure.

11 Q. Turning to a completely different topic now, please.

12 Could we have page 53 of your statement on screen and 13 paragraph 185. I'm turning to deal with youth diversion

14 orders. You tell us that youth diversion orders are one

15 of the measures that are being contemplated and due to

16 be introduced through the Crime and Policing Bill

17 2024/2025; is that right?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. They are designed to tackle and be another part of the 20 armoury for young people being drawn into terrorism, 21 specifically, is this right, to disrupt young people 22 involved in terrorist offending at an early stage and

23 try to divert them away from the criminal justice

24 system?

25 **A**. Yes.

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- 1 toolkit but, pausing for a moment, in a case such as
- 2 AR's, where there may be a fascination with violence but
- 3 there has not been or not yet been the commission of
- 4 a terrorism or terrorism-connected offence, the Youth
- 5 Diversion Order wouldn't bite, would it?
- A. No, it wouldn't. This is targeted at a slightly 6
- 7 different cohort. It is attached to the terrorism
- 8 definition so we would be looking at that sort of the
- 9 more traditional Pursue cohort.
- 10 Q. So those who are interested in violence because of
- a fascination, but without ideology, so not interested 11
- 12 in it for a terrorist ideology and therefore it's not
- 13 linked to a TACT offence, are simply not going to be
- 14 covered by these new orders?
- A. No, they won't be. 15
- 16 Q. One of the potential benefits, if we look, please, at
- 17 the next paragraph, 187, is that, amongst the things
- 18 that can be done in the granting of a YDO, would be
- 19 restricting the use of specific websites "or limiting
- 20 association with specific individuals or groups"; is
- 21 that right?
- 22 A. Yes, that's right.
- 23 Q. Does the Home Office have a view on how to tackle that 24 same area, the use of the internet by youths, if they
- 25 are violence-fascinated individuals, rather than

- traditional TACT offenders in the making? 1
- 2 A. Yes, and I think this is something that we recognise as
- 3 gap. We are doing some work at the moment, as
- 4 I understand it, to look at other civil orders and
- 5 whether there are additional changes that we need to
- 6 other mechanisms that are out there. But I think, as
- 7 far as Prevent is concerned, we do a range of sort of
- 8 softer work, I guess, to try to disrupt the type of
- 9 online activity that individuals might be involved in,
- 10 whether that's through cyber interventions, whether it's
- through online safety training to parents and whether it 11
- 12 is through intervention providers working closely with
- 13 individuals to help them understand the nature of their
- 14 online interests.
- So somebody like AR, if they consented or their parents 15 Q.
- 16 consented to the Prevent process and they were taken on
- 17 by Prevent, they would be receiving advice and
- 18 education, encouragement to see the potential
- 19 consequences of accessing this material online and
- 20 education around the risks, yes?
- 21 A. Yes.
- 22 There might be support to parents in how to oversee that
- 23 and prevent it and keep an eye on it, yes?
- 24 Yes A.
- 25 Q. And there might be steps taken with parents to encourage
- 1 So DSIT, I think, is another department that's involved;
- 2 is that right?
- 3 A. Yes.
- 4 Q. And Ofcom has an involvement as well, in terms of the
- 5 Online Safety Act. Can you just help to explain what
- 6 the Home Office's role is within this, in terms of
- 7 online harms?
- 8 A. Yes, so the Home Office has the policy responsibility
- 9 for harms -- for a lot of harms which have an online
- element. So that might be violence against women and 10
- 11 girls, child sexual exploitation, terrorism. So we look
- 12 at this issue around that sort of wider policy
- 13 responsibility.
- 14 Q. Does that include extending to the difficult policy
- 15 areas of whether more powers may be required to deal
- 16 with harmful content?
- 17 A. Yes. So, it is the Department for Science, Innovation
- 18 and Technology that are responsible for the Online
- 19 Safety Act and for the regulation of the internet, of
- 20 online content but, yes, we certainly have views on
- 21 this. We contribute to the thinking of it and there may
- 22 be certain measures that we would want to progress as
- 23 part of that.
- 24 Q. Thank you. You have set out in your statement work that
- 25 is done, including by Counter Terrorism police, so

- the sharing of information, the use of firewalls, and so 1
- 2 on, but there are no powers that can be exercised in
- 3 that situation, other than with the consent of the
- 4 parents?

- 5 Α. Yes, none that I know of. Yes.
- 6 **Q.** Obviously there's a significant policy question about
 - what might fill that gap and whether it's appropriate in
- 8 terms of civil liberties and a number of other factors
- 9 but, on the face of it, as I think you have recognised,
- 10 that is a gap?
- 11 A. Yes, it is a gap.
- 12 Q. Again, for the November update, I think you indicate
- 13 consideration is being given. I think the Inquiry's
- 14 interest for Phase 1 and Phase 1 reporting will be to
- 15 have the best information available to inform report
- 16 writing for Phase 1. So if that could be included in
- 17 your November update?
- 18 A. Yes.
- 19 Q. That takes us to online harms, which is a separate
- 20 section of your statement. Could we just look at
- 21 paragraph 151, please, on page 45.
- 22 I think this is an area in general terms where
- 23 a number of Government departments have an involvement;
- 24 is that right?
- 25 A. Yes, that is right.

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- 1 I think, at paragraph 321, you explain the Counter
- 2 Terrorism Internet Referral Unit, which plays
- 3 an important role in reporting unlawful content to tech
- 4 companies for their removal; is that right?
- 5 A. Yes, that's right.
- 6 Q. You have mentioned the Online Safety Act and DSIT's
- 7 role. As a result of that, if we look at paragraph 322,
- 8 please, page 89, so two aspects you have set out:
- 10 in place to identify and remove illegal content and to

"... online platforms must have systems and process

- 11 protect their users from the illegal content, including
- 12 terrorism content."
- 13 Under (b) from since 25 July this year, obviously it
- 14 got a lot of publicity, there's a requirement to
- "prevent children from accessing various categories of 15
- 16 harmful content", so that's harmful but not illegal,
- 17 which "includes serious violence content"; is that
- 18 right?

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- 19 A. Yes, that's right.
- 20 Q. Plainly, if the material crosses the threshold and
 - becomes something which is encouraging or inciting
- 22 terrorist activity, it is illegal and the Government has
- 23 powers to require its removal, yes?
- 24 Α. We can request social media companies to remove that
- 25 material. What we don't have is a take-down power.

- 1 Q. I think in relation to content that is terrorist related 2 and is illegal as terrorist related, is there not 3 a take-down power if it is in breach of terrorism 4 legislation?
- 5 We don't have a formal take-down power of any Α. 6 description.
- 7 Q. Aside from drawing it to the platform provider's 8 attention as harmful content, can we take a theoretical 9
- example: if there was something so grim as a beheading 10 video, which wasn't, as such, in the associated wording
- on a website, encouraging it, it wasn't relating it to 11 12 terrorism, it just showed the most graphic horrible act
- 13 of a beheading, is it right that that extreme violent
- 14 material, even in relation to that, there is no
- 15 Government power to require it to be taken down?
- 16 A. Yes, at the moment. Although that under the Online
- 17 Safety Act, that sort of content would be covered in the children's codes that came into -- that were launched in 18
- 19 July. But that would require -- that would mean no
- 20 access for under 18s, although there are ways of
- 21 circumventing that through things like virtual private
- 22 networks

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- 23 Q. So indirect action, is this right, could be taken in 24 relation to that, against the platform provider, if they
- 25 were breaching the protection of children aspects in

 - "... graphic bystander footage of the ... stabbing of Bishop Mari Emmanuel ... which it appears AR searched
- 4 To what extent has there been compliance with that 5 request?
- 6 So as I understand it, the Military Studies in the
- 7 Jihad, the AQ manual has been certainly taken down by 8 some companies but others have made the argument that
- 9 this is an academic study and so, therefore, it touches
- 10 into sort of freedom of expression, and on the graphic
- 11 bystander footage, some companies again have removed it
- 12 because they see it as being in line with their own
- 13 terms and conditions and other companies haven't.
- 14 Q. What have X done on the latter?
- A. They have maintained it and, in fact, they brought 15
- 16 a legal challenge against the Australian Government who
- 17 had required its removal and X won that legal challenge.
- 18 Q. So despite the fact that it shows what may be thought to
- 19 be an actual graphic bystander footage of a terrorist
- 20 stabbing, X won't remove it?
- 21 A. Yes.
- 22 Q. The British Government, so far as that being accessed in
- 23 the UK, has no power to require its removal?
- 24 Α. No, it doesn't, although we can, under the Children's
- 25 Code, it is captured there as being sort of violent

- relation to that, yes? 1
- 2 A. That's right. Ofcom have a role.
- 3 But no takedown, even for that very extreme but 4 non-terrorist, in a way, material?
- 5 A. No. We are not able to -- we can request that companies
- 6 remove content because it breaches their own terms of
- 7 service, and we can explain that it breaches TACT
- 8 definitions but we cannot compel the removal of
- 9 material
- 10 Q. If we look, please, at paragraph 338. You say -- it is 11 page 93:
- 12 "After the sentencing of AR, on 24 January 2025 the
- 13 Home Secretary and Secretary of State for Science,
- 14 Innovation and Technology, issued a joint letter to 15
 - major social media companies and industry leaders
- 16 repeating a request made earlier in November 2024 for
- 17 the removal of specific content accessed by AR as well
- 18 as other material that had formed the basis of
- 19 prosecutions under section 2 of the Terrorism Act
- 20 [including] a request to remove the document 'Military
- 21 Studies in the Jihad against the Tyrants: The Al-Qaeda
- 22 Training Manual' ..."
- 23 Is that right?
- 24 Α. Yes
- 25 Q. And the:

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- 1 graphic footage, so there should be protection for under 2 18s.
- 3 Q. Yes, unless the child is using a VPN?
- 4
- 5 Q. Is that a satisfactory state of affairs?
- 6 A.

- 7 Q. Thank you. Could I turn now briefly to deal with the
 - assistance you give in your statement around the
- 9 legislative framework for sale, purchase and possession 10 of certain other items.
- 11 Could we look at paragraph 303 on page 85, please.
- 12 The castor beans, which AR purchased: taking it shortly, 13 is the difficulty here that that plant is actually
- 14 fairly widely used for ornamental purposes and,
- 15 therefore, has a benign reasonably everyday gardening
- 16 use?
- 17 A. Yes
- 18 Q. Is it right that, as a result of that, the sale of the
- 19 seeds or the beans themselves is not in any way
- 20 regulated?
- 21 A. That's right.
- 22 You tell us in paragraph 304 that the Home Office is in
- 23 the early stages of working to consider the feasibility
- 24 and potential impacts and proportionality of further
- 25 regulation for that, as part of the ongoing efforts to

- 1 keep dangerous materials under review; is that right?
- 2 **A.** Yes.
- 3 Q. Are you able to give us a broad indication of the 4 position reached on that?
- 5 A. That's still underway at the moment, so we are engaging
- 6 with a wide range of trade organisations. We will be
- 7 engaging with online retailers as well but we are
- 8 basically mapping the supply chain of castor beans in
- 9 the UK, looking at things like packaging, the size of
- 10 packages and awareness of the risks of ricin among some
- 11 of their sellers. That is a study that is underway at
- 12 the moment. We expect it to conclude within the next
- 13 few months and then recommendations will go to ministers
- for looking at the broad sweep of what we can do against
- that from -- you know, all the way through from
- 16 regulation through to working with different suppliers
- 17 on a voluntary basis.
- 18 Q. Thank you. May I, through the Chair, please, just
- 19 invite you, not just in your November update but, by the
- 20 sounds of it, that work may be progressing as this
- 21 Inquiry will need to be working on the Phase 1 reports.
- 22 So would you keep the Inquiry closely informed of the
- 23 progress in that regard?
- 24 A. Yes.
- 25 **Q.** Don't go into inappropriate detail, as I know that you
- 1 Department for Business and Trade, but my understanding
- 2 is that there is a fireworks legislation that covers
- 3 this but, in relation to these particular smoke
- 4 grenades, it would have required the purchaser to be
- 5 over 18.
- 6 Q. So the purchaser was meant to be over 18 but not,
- 7 I think, is this right, a duty on online sellers to have
- 8 any particular age verification process?
- 9 A. Not that I'm aware of.
- 10 Q. Again, in relation to combinations of purchases, another
- 11 aspect was the purchase of glass bottles, a jerrycan and
- 12 we know that AR had matches affixed to them. You tell
- us in your statement, in the absence of an accelerant
- 14 like petrol, that wasn't in itself an offence; is that
- 15 right?
- 16 A. Yes, that's right.
- 17 Q. Does the work that you indicated in relation to ricin,
- would that also cover the potential use of algorithms to
- 19 do further work on concerning combinations of purchasers
- 20 such as that?
- 21 A. I am unsure but I can certainly take that away and
- 22 report back. I think the challenge with these
- 23 particular items is that they are such everyday items
- and it is the challenge of being able to put in place
- 25 constraints that are not easy for a determined attacker

- 1 won't, but will that also look at the potential for some
- 2 systems to be engaged that look at items bought in
- 3 combination, so you will be aware that, in the short
- 4 space of time, AR, through the same platform, Amazon,
- 5 bought not just the seeds but also various pieces of
- 6 chemical equipment and indeed the isopropyl alcohol that
- 7 was used to make the crude preparation of ricin. Will
- the review include algorithms that might be used to
- 9 detect those patterns of purchases alongside ricin
- 10 seeds?

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- 11 A. It will look at the full range of options that we have.
- 12 Q. Thank you.

aware.

Then, finally, in terms of other items that were purchased, we know, of course, that AR was involved in the purchase of a sledgehammer and that's obviously not an age-restricted product, but he was also involved in the purchase of some smoke emitting devices, smoke grenades, not in the military sense, as I know you are

To your understanding, what was the legislative position? I know this is not directly your area but, to your understanding, what was the broad legislative position in relation to those devices in terms of age requirements?

25 A. So my understanding, and this is a lead for the

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- 1 to work around.
- 2 Q. Because glass bottles in themselves and matches in
- themselves, matters of that kind, obviously have, again,
- 4 a benign everyday use?
- 5 A. Yes and what we don't want to do is to try to regulate
- 6 for something when an individual can just go to
- 7 a different hardware store or whatever. So there is
- 8 a sort of proportionality and a practicality challenge,
- 9 I think, with these particular items but I can provide10 further advice.
- 11 MR MOSS: I'm just looking to my left. There were three
- sets received, I don't know if there are any questions.
- 13 Questioned by MR CHAPMAN
- 14 MR CHAPMAN: If I may, sir.
- 15 Can I ask please just about the question of when two
- or more public authorities have a concern about
- 17 an individual, arising out of the same incident, for
- 18 example, that in their view justifies a referral to
- 19 Prevent, who should take the lead?
- 20 A. In terms of who --
- 21 Q. Making the referral.
- 22 A. So, it doesn't matter, either can, ideally we would want
- 23 them to work together to put together as full a referral
- as they can. Equally, both could refer.
- 25 Q. Presumably, the guidance is that there should be

- 1 a single referral in those circumstances?
- 2 A. So not necessarily. You know, CT police can receive
- 3 both referrals from different parties and then consider
- 4 that as a collective issue.
- 5 Q. If there is a single referral, presumably it is vital
- 6 that the authorities share all their relevant
- 7 information between them?
- 8 A. Yes, and that's -- because of the data protection
- 9 challenges and because different partners will have
- 10 looked at that particular incident from a different
- 11 perspective, you know, either way, we want that person
- 12 referred into Prevent so that we can take an assessment
- of them and hopefully offer them support.
- 14 Q. Because if that doesn't happen, there won't be
- 15 an effective referral?
- 16 A. Yes, absolutely.
- 17 Q. Where the concern arises out of police matters, so
- 18 criminality or suspected criminality, would it be the
- 19 expectation that the police would take the lead?
- 20 A. In terms of a referral into Prevent?
- 21 Q. Yes.
- 22 A. Yes. Police -- local policing refer into Prevent
- 23 frequently, so, yes, we would expect them to refer in
- and to work closely with CT police colleagues to share
- 25 their concerns.

- 1 I would imagine that is something that CT police
- 2 consider when they assess that referral.
- 3 Q. The other factor, I suppose, is that this is a referral
- 4 coming from colleagues who work like them?
- 5 A. Yes, I mean -- yes, potentially.
- 6 Q. New topic. You discussed briefly with counsel to the
- 7 Inquiry about engagement with Channel. Am I right in
- 8 saying that the level of engagement is around about
- 9 75 per cent?
- 10 A. So the level of consent is around 75 per cent, yes.
- 11 Q. On the face of it, quite a high level of consent for
- 12 people who are suspected of being radicalised or being
- 13 drawn into terrorism; would you agree?
- 14 A. Yes, I agree.
- 15 Q. No doubt you would wish it to be higher?
- 16 A. Yes, I would love it to be 100 per cent but we can't
- 17 have everything.
- 18 Q. But the officers on the ground are presumably quite
- 19 skilled in getting that consent?
- 20 A. So that consent will come from whoever is the most
- 21 appropriate professional to approach that individual.
- So that might be a local authority, it might be
- 23 a teacher or it might be a mental health practitioner
- or, indeed, it might be a police officer, but yes.
- ${\bf 25}~{\bf Q}.~{\bf When}$ it concerns a young child or a young teenager, the

- 1 Q. I say that because the police would have ready access to2 critical intelligence; is that right?
- 3 A. Yes, they might do.
- 4 Q. They are skilled at presenting and gathering evidence?
- 5 A. Yes, but, equally, teachers, healthcare practitioners,
- 6 anyone who is subject to the Prevent Duty should have
- 7 the skills they need to make an appropriate and
- 8 well-informed referral into Prevent.
- 9 Q. But does it follow though that when the police make
- a referral, for the reasons I have suggested, that that
- 11 will necessarily be a more weighty referral and be
- 12 received as such?
- 13 A. I'm not sure that CT police necessarily consider where
- the referral has originated. I think the key is making
- 15 sure that there is lots of information within that
- 16 referral and that it clearly sets out the risks. For
- us, we tend to find that the best referrals come in from
- 18 the person that knows that individual the best. That
- 19 can often be a teacher, it can often be a mental health
- 20 practitioner that's working with an individual or,
- 21 indeed, it could be a police officer.
- 22 Q. But typically a police-led referral would concern
- 23 criminal matters which, by its nature, is more weighty,
- 24 isn't it?
- 25 A. If there is a violence concern as part of that, then

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- 1 support of the parents is presumably vital to get that
- 2 consent?
- 3 A. Yes. We would require parental consent or guardian.
- 4 Q. But, overall, on a referral to Channel, your expectation
- 5 is more likely than not that they will engage and offer
- 6 their consent?
- 7 A. Yes, in my experience, they would consent and then
- 8 usually people engage.
- 9 Q. Failing that, I think the route is a police-led
- 10 partnership?
- 11 A. Yes, that is right. So if police consider the risk to
- 12 be too high for Channel or if they haven't got consent
- but police identify a concerning counter-terrorism risk,
- then, yes, they can be managed through police-led
- 15 partnerships.
- 16 Q. Presumably, when there has been a failure to consent or
- to a referral to a police-led partnership, the risk is
- 18 higher?
- 19 A. So, often. Often police will manage cases of the very
- 20 highest risk within police-led partnerships.
- 21 Q. Higher than, for example, if the route had been
- 22 immediately to a police-led partnership at an earlier
- 23 stage; is that right?
- 24 A. So, I think it just depends on the facts of the case and
- 25 the information that the police have in front of them.

- Q. In any event, the message would be passed back to the 1 2 police-led partnership, which is a multi-agency type of 3 arrangement, that "This has happened and this is our 4 view about the risk"?
- 5 A. Yes, so that is what would normally happen, if that case 6 had made it through the Prevent Gateway Assessment and 7 is then considered in more detail by police-led 8 partnerships, then, yes, there will be multi-agency 9 partners that are involved and sharing information on 10 that particular individual.
- MR CHAPMAN: Thank you. 11

12 Thank you, sir.

13 SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: Thank you very much.

14 MR MOSS: Ms Ellsmore, we've covered a lot of ground, is 15 there anything you wanted to add?

16 Α. No, thank you.

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Questioned by THE CHAIR

SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: Just one thing from me, Ms Ellsmore, if 18 19 I may. When Mr Moss was asking you about the potential 20 for other civil orders, and this was in the context, 21 I think you raised, of the particular involvement of the 22 Department for Science, Innovation and Technology, you 23 said in an entirely understandable way that there may be 24 certain measures that you would like to progress.

Can you, when you report back during November, be

rather more specific than that as to what it is in mind? 1

2 A. I will do

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SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: Can I make it clear in this context, which strays a bit outside your terms of reference, but undoubtedly touch on them, that I have a particular interest in and concern about those in AR's position, in relation to whom there are potentially strong grounds for believing that they have an interest in committing really serious violence but they have done nothing that constitutes a criminal offence for which they could be arrested, and in relation to which other powers could be exercised, such as search, and whether, in highly restricted circumstances, there are -- and when a high burden of proof, or a highish burden of proof has been satisfied -- whether there should be the opportunity for a court to impose certain restrictions on what that individual does and is permitted to do?

So, I would be very grateful if I could have some indication as to whether anything along those lines has been the subject of consideration, whether it is actively under consideration or whether it is one of the things that is being considered in the pipeline.

23 A. So we are looking at sort of civil orders. What we are 24 also looking at is the Jonathan Hall KC recommendation 25 of a new offence around the preparation of 102

1 a mass-casualty attack, that isn't connected under TACT 2 legislation. I wonder whether there's something there. 3 SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: I understand the recommendation by

Jonathan Hall. It is, although linked, very much separate from what I'm focusing on at the moment, which is not -- where a criminal offence hasn't been committed and where one isn't looking to create another criminal

offence, but you are looking at a member of our society who historically you may have the gravest concerns that

they are going to go out and commit an offence but they

haven't done anything that would justify their arrest 12

and prosecution. Now, historically, in this country, we have said we will do everything we can to stop the

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offence and we will keep our eyes on them. I am

interested in whether we ought to be thinking about, or not, having the ability to impose certain restrictions

17 that fall short of imprisoning that individual. Does

that make sense?

19 A. That makes sense. I'm not familiar with any work but 20 I will take that away.

21 SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: I would just be interested to know 22 whether, behind the scenes and beyond my purview, that 23 is being considered because, if it has been considered, 24 I would very much like to see what the fruits are of any 25 thought that's been given to that issue.

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A. I will revert.

SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: I'm very grateful for your assistance 2 3 Ms Ellsmore. You are now free to go. Thank you very 4 much.

5 (The witness withdrew)

6 MR MOSS: Sir, with your permission, my learned friend 7 Mr Boyle will call DCS Kenwright and we might take 8 20 minutes or so of her evidence before the 9 mid-afternoon break

SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: Certainly, Mr Moss. Thank you very 10 11 much.

12 DCS SARAH KENWRIGHT (affirmed) 13 Questioned by MR BOYLE

14 SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: Thank you very much. Please have 15

Can I ask please that, in future, when a witness is taking the oath, people aren't either coming into or leaving this room. It is entirely inappropriate.

Yes, Mr Boyle.

20 MR BOYLE: Detective Chief Superintendent, could you give 21 your full name, please.

22 Yes, Sarah Kenwright.

23 Q. Could we have up on screen, please, CTPNW000169, and if 24 we go over the page -- sorry, keep going through the 25 index. Do you recognise that document as your witness

- 1 statement?
- 2 **A.** I do, yes.
- 3 Q. Thank you. We saw the date was 8 August 2025?
- 4 **A.** Yes.
- 5 Q. Thank you. Is that true to the best of your knowledge
- 6 and belief?
- 7 A. It is.
- 8 Q. Could we also please have up CTPNW000047. This is
- 9 a chronology which was prepared not by you specifically
- 10 but by CTP North West. Again, are you able to confirm
- 11 that that's true to the best of your knowledge and
- 12 belief?
- 13 A. It is, yes.
- 14 Q. DCS Kenwright, I want to start by asking you about your
- 15 role and background. Is this right, you are
- 16 a Merseyside Police officer, seconded to Greater
- 17 Manchester Police in your role as head of CTP North
- 18 West?
- 19 A. Yes, that's correct.
- 20 Q. You started your policing career in August 2001 and have
- 21 conducted various roles in uniformed policing,
- 22 investigations and intelligence?
- 23 A. Yes.
- 24 Q. You were Detective Chief Inspector of Merseyside Special
- 25 Branch from January 2016 to November 2017 and Head of 105

- 1 Intelligence for CTPNW until January 2020, when you
- 2 returned to Merseyside Police; is that right?
- 3 A. That's correct.
- 4 Q. You have been Head of CTPNW since 5 December 2022.
- 5 Could you give us a short summary of what that role
- 6 entails?
- 7 A. Yes. So, as the Head of CT Policing North West, I am
- 8 responsible for delivering across the four Ps of,
- 9 Pursue, Prevent, Protect and Prepare, on behalf of the
- 10 chief constables within the North West region, which
- 11 constitutes Cumbria, Lancashire, Greater Manchester,
- 12 Merseyside and Cheshire.
- 13 Q. Thank you. You tell us that you are also the
- 14 Intelligence Capability Lead for CTP; what does that
- 15 involve?
- 16 A. Yes, so I chair the Intelligence Capability Board which
- 17 is where we consider a national level intelligence
- 18 process policy and procedure. We try and drive
- 19 consistency and deliver against organisational learning,
- and engage with other capabilities to ensure that we
- 21 have a joined up approach across CT Policing.
- 22 Q. Thank you. Just to come on now to the structure of CT
- 23 Policing, it is a network of operational units based in
- 24 separate regions around the UK, correct?
- 25 **A.** Yes.

- 1 Q. We will hear from DAC Evans that CTPHQ provides
- 2 coordination of governance over the regional CTP units;
- 3 is that right?
- 4 A. Yes.
- 5 Q. CTP North West was set up in 2007. What is its host
- 6 force?
- 7 A. Its host force is Greater Manchester.
- 8 Q. Thank you. I think you have set out the regions that
- 9 CTPNW works in but I think, for our purposes, that
- 10 includes Merseyside Police and Lancashire Constabulary,
- 11 correct?
- 12 A. It does, yes.
- 13 Q. Thank you. You mentioned the four Ps, so the four
- 14 strands of the CONTEST strategy. From the perspective
- of Pursue, in short, what is the work of CTP North West?
- 16 A. So the work of CTP North West in Pursue is mainly around
- 17 the investigative capacity and anything that meets the
- 18 CT threshold that I appreciate has been discussed by
- 19 previous witnesses. So that is a combination of
- 20 intelligence and investigative units.
- 21 Q. So investigative units and intelligence, does that
- 22 include the Fixed Intelligence Management Unit, or the
- 23 FIMU?
- 24 A. It does, yes.
- 25 **Q.** You tell us at your paragraph 2.22 that the FIMU is 107

- responsible for the receipt and assessment of all intelligence entering the CT network; is that right?
- 3 A. Yes.
- Q. In Lancashire the FIMU was co-located with Lancashire
 Prevent officers; is that right?
- 6 A. Yes, I believe so. I think many years ago they were
- 7 actually in different locations but they are now under
- 8 the same roof, yes.
- 9 Q. We will come onto the role of the FIMU in Prevent
 - referral shortly. But just moving to CTP North West and
- 11 Prevent in general terms. I think we have heard that
- there were three geographical hubs or locations to
- deliver Prevent in CTP North West, correct?
- 14 **A.** Yes.

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- 15 Q. Obviously, we have heard from PC Thompson as a CTCO and
- DS Treharne as a CTCO supervisor. Above them, there was
- a line management structure that went up to inspector;
- 18 is that right?
- 19 A. Yes, for the hub.
- 20 **Q.** Then there is a senior responsible officer as well; is
- 21 that correct?
- 22 A. Yes. There was a regional Prevent coordinator and a SRO
- 23 at superintendent level.
- 24 $\,$ Q. Thank you. In addition, there was the Vulnerability
- 25 Support Hub, which I think you tell us was located with

- 1 the Prevent team in Manchester and Leeds, at your
- 2 paragraph 2.15. Was that Support Hub part of CTP North
- 3 West?
- 4 A. We were part of a pilot, I believe, in relation to
- 5 vulnerability support hubs, certainly now, under its new
- 6 title as the Clinical Consultancy Service, it is
- 7 actually directed and controlled nationally through CT
- 8 Policing headquarters but they remain situated with us
- 9 in Manchester.
- 10 Q. Thank you. And that was a kind of clinical consultancy
- 11 service and mental health team; is that right?
- 12 Yes Α.
- 13 Q. Can I just go through the process of a Prevent referral
- 14 from the CTP perspective. We have heard evidence about
- 15 this but I just want to focus on one or two points.
- 16 I said I would pick up on the role of the FIMU in
- 17 Prevent. The first step after referral is made is that
- 18 it comes to the FIMU for deconfliction. Can you just
- 19 explain what deconfliction is?
- 20 A. Yes, it is basically just to ensure that an individual
- 21 isn't already part of a CT investigation.
- 22 Q. In those circumstances, you wouldn't want to be running
- 23 the normal Prevent structure, for risk of potentially
- 24 compromising the criminal investigation; is that right?
- 25 A. Yes. But if there were any prominent safeguarding

- concerns, we would still look to address those. 1
- 2 Q. In certain circumstances, we have heard that there would
- 3 be a consideration by the Joint Assessment Team or JAT
- 4 with MI5 officers at this stage; is that right?
- 5 A. Yes
- 6 Q. Thank you. Once that process is completed, a referral
- 7 will be assigned to a CTCO to make a Prevent Gateway
- 8 Assessment, correct?
- A. Correct. 9
- 10 Q. The test that they would be applying is reasonable
- 11 grounds to suspect that a person is susceptible to
- 12 becoming a terrorist or supporting terrorism; is that
- 13 correct?
- 14 A. To conduct the Prevent Gateway Assessment, yes. They
- 15 would then have to meet the section 36 decision
- 16 threshold, which would take them to reasonable grounds
- 17 to believe.
- 18 Q. Thank you. So taking this by steps. If that test was
- 19 satisfied, then the referral would progress to the
- 20 information gathering stage; is that right?
- 21 A. Yes.
- 22 Q. Sorry, the reasonable grounds to suspect test. If the
- 23 gateway assessment was passed, you would then move to
- 24 information gathering; is that right?
- 25 **A**. So, as I understand it, they would need reasonable

- 1 grounds to suspect, to conduct the Prevent Gateway 2
 - Assessment but when they got to the end of that Gateway
- 3 Assessment they would have to make the Section 36
- 4 decision and that threshold decision is reasonable
- 5 grounds to believe. They would then have to then make
- 6 a decision in terms of whether Channel or PLP was the
- 7 most appropriate route for that case and why.
- 8 Q. But I think before getting to the reasonable grounds to
- 9 believe, would there not have been an information
- 10 gathering stage where a Channel coordinator would carry
- 11 out information gathering?
- 12 A. It would go to information gathering post, that
- 13 Section 36 decision.
- 14 Q. I think we have seen some diagrams which would seem to
- show that the reasonable grounds to suspect decision 15
- 16 comes first. The case then goes to the information
- 17 gathering, which in Dovetail would be determined by
- 18 a Channel coordinator. Then, after that, the Section 36
- 19 decision would be made. Are you able to help on that?
- 20 A. The Section 36 decision lies with the CTCO. So, they
- 21 have to make that decision in terms of whether they
- 22 believe it is suitable for Channel.
- 23 Q. So I think my understanding and the evidence we have
- 24 heard is that, where Dovetail is in place, the
- 25 reasonable grounds to suspect decision would be made, if 111

- 1 that was found to be met, the case would then go to 2 information gathering with a Channel coordinator and
- 3 then, after that, it would go back to the CTCO to make
- 4 the Section 36 decision of a reasonable belief that
- 5 a person is vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism.
- 6 Does that sound correct?
- 7 A. Would it help if I looked at the diagram?
- 8 Q. Yes, I think we are getting it. It is CTPHQ000117. We
- 9 are looking at page 38. If we could zoom in on the
- 10 middle box of that screen, the box above the beige and
- 11 the three boxes below it. Just zoom to the centre of
- 12 that page, please.
- 13 Above the beige area, do you see we have the Gateway
- 14 Assessment?
- A. I see, yes. 15
- 16 Q. Then below that, we have "Information gathering". So:
- 17 "Ensure legal grounds for sharing are met. Then
- 18 conduct sharing or information gathering."
- 19 Then do you see below there it says:
- 20 "Within 20 working days Section 36."
- 21 A. I do. ves.
- 22 So I think within Dovetail, that information gathering
- 23 stage was done by a Channel coordinator; is that right?
- 24 A. In Dovetail it was, yes.
- 25 Q. After that Section 36 decision of whether there's

- 1 a reasonable belief that the person is vulnerable to
- 2 being drawn into terrorism, the case then goes to the
- 3 Channel panel and, is this right, the Channel panel then
- decides whether or not to accept the referral. 4
- 5 A. Yes, they do.
- 6 Q. Thank you. Could we have up, please, CTPHQ000045,
- 7 page 8. If we could just enlarge that. We have the
- 8 Dovetail diagram here. Do you see in the bottom left we
- 9 have the police conduct initial screening and assessment
- 10 of the case?
- A. I do, yes. 11
- 12 Q. "Passes initial screening and police have suspicion of
- 13 a vulnerability to radicalisation which retires further
- 14 consideration by a multi-agency Channel."
- 15 A. Yes.

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- 16 Q. Then we see it moves across under a "Yes", to "Dovetail
- 17 cases under [local authority]", I think that must be.
- 18 Then the second box on the right-hand side:

"[Local authority gathers information from all

"Sufficient information for consideration to be adopted by panel."

The Section 36 decision comes below that and that's made by the police; is that right?

25 A. Yes, the Section 36 decision always lies with the CTCO,

- 1 relation to that, in terms of taking on her prior
- 2 experience and how she would utilise her peers and her
- 3 supervision to help her make the right decision.
- 4 Q. We have got this added sort of switch of the case or
- 5 passing of the case from the CTCO to the local
- 6 authority, and then back again, between the Gateway
- 7 Assessment and the Section 36 decision. It has been
- 8 suggested in reviews that that might have added a level
- 9 of friction or there might have been a reluctance from
 - CTP perspective to move to information gathering and
- 11 pass the case onto the Channel coordinator. Were you
- 12 aware of that at any time?
- 13 A. No, I wasn't and I think from listening to the CT
- 14 Policing North West witnesses, I think they have
- 15 described that it didn't -- that that friction, I don't
- 16 think, was there, from their perspective, and there is 17
- some evidence that points to it working quite well in
- 18 the North West and that the pilot went very well. There
- 19 were some really good aspects to it and Lord Anderson
- 20
- actually makes reference to the North West putting the
- 21 highest number of mixed, unclear or unstable ideology
- 22 cases through to Channel, whilst that Dovetail pilot was
- 23 in place. So there were some really good aspects to it.
- 24 Q. Thank you. I think at your paragraph 8.59 -- we don't

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25 need to bring it up -- but you say a substantial

- 1 whether that was in Dovetail or not.
- 2 Q. But is it right that in Dovetail there was a sort of
- 3 intermediate stage, where the case went to the local
- 4 authority to carry out information gathering?
- 5 A. I believe so, yes.
- 6 **Q.** We can see that these diagrams are reasonably
 - complicated and have quite a lot of stages. Do I take
- 8 from your answer there is a little bit of uncertainty
- 9 about the information gathering stage in Dovetail
- 10 pilots?

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- A. Well, I was never a CTCO at the time, so I am referring 11
- 12 to the documents as you are in terms of trying to work
- 13 through those cases, but, yes, they are complex in terms
- 14 of the number of steps that there are.
- 15 Q. Having had to work through those documents, as we just
- 16 have, do you agree that it is quite difficult to keep
- 17 track of the many decision points that a referral needs
- 18 to go through?
- 19 A. Yes, I think CTCOs have a difficult job to navigate
- 20
- 21 Q. Well, that was my next question. Did you have
- 22 experience of CTCOs having difficulty with it?
- 23 A. I won't say difficulty. I think that their experience
- 24 and professional judgement is critical in terms of their
- 25 decision-making and I think we heard from PC Thompson in
 - 114
- 1 proportion of cases were being referred to Channel
- 2 through the Dovetail process, so you don't view that as
- 3 a kind of barrier, at least in the North West?
- 4 A. No, I think it was just a change in who was responsible
 - for a certain aspect of that process. I don't think it
- 6 necessarily caused friction, as such.
- 7 Q. We might just come back to this in the context of the
- 8 visit but I will leave that to the chronology.
- 9 Next policies and training. CTCOs and I think CTCO
- 10 supervisors were required to complete the National
- 11 Prevent Foundation Course, which was a week long
- 12 national course; is that right?
- 13 A. Yes.

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- 14 Q. I think the expectation was that it would be undertaken
- 15 within six months of starting the role; is that correct?
- 16 A. I believe so, yes.
- 17 We heard, I think, from both PC Thompson and DS Treharne
- 18 that it took them a bit of time to undertake the course.
- 19 Given it's a week-long course, I assume that it can only
- 20 be run on a set number of dates. But have you ever had
- 21 any cause for concern that there are CTCOs working
- 22 before they have completed the course?
- 23 A. Certainly not now. It's my experience and understanding
 - now that CTCOs have to complete a series of modules of

(29) Pages 113 - 116

25 training and an assessment before they are able to carry

- 1 live casework, appreciating that it was different at the 2 relevant time but that is certainly an improvement that
- 3 has been made since.
- 4 Q. Moving to the FIMU staff: is this right, they are
- 5 trained on the National Standards for Intelligence
- 6 Management?
- 7 A. NSIM, yes, they are.
- 8 Q. That, as the name suggests, I assume is a national
- 9 training module; is that right?
- 10 Α. Yes. it is.
- 11 Q. That involved an element of training about Prevent; is
- 12 that right?
- 13 A. Yes.
- 14 Q. I think we heard from Officer B that he couldn't recall
- 15 receiving specific training on Prevent and he accepted,
- 16 I think, that he didn't have a deep knowledge of how
- 17 Prevent functioned, and I think DC Blundell's evidence
- 18 was he was basically trained on Pursue and not Prevent.
- 19 Their evidence might suggest that, at least back in 2019
- 20 to 2022, FIMU officers weren't sufficiently trained in
- 21 understanding Prevent; do you agree?
- 22 A. Not entirely, no, because I think that the training that
- 23 they did get allowed them to have an understanding of
- 24 what Prevent were there to do and that might not have
- 25 given them a deep knowledge of the role but I think they

 - because of her past experience that that wasn't
- 2 necessary. What I would say is that supervisors, or
- 3 anybody that has got a promotion through policing, will
- 4 be part of wider leadership programmes through their
- 5 home force, as well, to help them adjust to the new
- 6

- 7 **Q.** It doesn't seem that that had happened for DS Treharne.
- 8 Are there systems in the CTP North West Prevent
- 9 structure to ensure that supervisors are trained and
- 10 inducted?
- 11 A. Yes, absolutely, we need to make sure that we give our
- 12 officers and staff the skills to do their job, and
- 13 I think DS Treharne had some background which meant that
- 14 she didn't get some of that straightaway. She did have
- 15 the ability to reach in to her supervisors and to her
- 16 peers while she was awaiting those courses but,
- 17 certainly, she may have had some of that training in
- 18 relation to being a sergeant from her home force.
- 19 Q. So she might have had a level of training about
- 20 supervision and line management?
- 21 Α.
- 22 What role does CTP North West have in the setting of Q.
- 23 policies for Prevent?
- 24 **A**. We don't set the policies, as such, because it's really
- important that, from a CT Policing perspective, we have 25
- 119

- 1 understood the Prevent function and I think some of that
- 2 came across in their evidence, in terms of their
- 3 understanding of the different threshold as well.
- 4 Q. We might come back to that. What about local training.
- 5 Was CTP North West delivering its own training to CTCOs
- 6 and also on the FIMU side?
- 7 A. CT Policing North West would effectively ensure that
- 8 officers and staff received the relevant essential
 - training for individuals to conduct their roles but that
- 10 essential training would be national product. We would
- 11 deliver other training in CPD alongside that. So, for
- 12 instance, when an individual starts within CT Policing
- 13 North West, they would have an Introduction to CT
- 14 course, which teaches them the basics about CT, the
- 15 network, the four P's and what our responsibilities are.
- 16 So it was a blended approach between the national
- 17 courses from the ODU, the Organisational Development
- 18 Unit, and added extras, if you like, that CT Policing
- 19 North West would do to help people settle within their
- 20

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- 21 **Q.** We heard from DS Treharne that she hadn't had an
- 22 induction as a supervisor. Do you agree that that
- 23 should have been in place at the time that she started?
- 24 A. I think that an induction process is always useful.
- 25 I don't know whether there has been any assumption that
 - 118
- 1 that consistency across the network, so that there's
- 2 not, effectively, a postcode lottery, if you like, of
- 3 how we are delivering. So the policies are national.
- 4 Q. Does CTP North West input into the policies that are set
- 5 by the Home Office and CTPHQ?
- A. CTPHQ certainly engages regularly in terms of the 6
- 7 consultation process when policies are changing, so that
- 8 we're able to feedback, yes.
- Q. Presumably, CTP North West has the experience of how the 9
- 10 CTCOs are applying the policies and so you have that
- 11 expertise to assist in the consultation; is that right?
- 12 We try but we utilise the practitioners to contribute to
- 13 that as well. It is important that whatever policies
- 14 are being introduced that they work at a practical level
- 15 for CTCOs and others.
- 16 Q. Thank you. Could we have your statement up at page 10,
- 17 paragraph 3.3. You have helpfully set out in your
- 18 statement the policies and guidelines that applied
- 19 and/or were updated in the relevant period. The first
- 20 was the Prevent Practitioners Policy.
- 21 Can we go over the page, please. We then have the 22 Prevent Policy, which was updated in 2020 to reflect
- 23 changes since 2018. We have had the CTCO Guide, used in
- 24 conjunction with the Prevent Policy. When was that 25 published, do you know?

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- A. I think the CTCO Guide was 2020 as well. 1
- 2 Q. Below that, we will have the Channel Duty Guidance. Is
- 3 this right: that's aimed at a slightly different
- 4 audience and it's focused to the members of Channel
- 5 panel and partners of local panels, correct --
- 6 A. Yes, I believe so.
- 7 Q. -- whereas the first three would have been aimed at
- 8 CTCOs in particular --
- 9 A. Yes.
- 10 Q. -- and their supervisors?
- 11 A. Yes.
- 12 The Prevent Gateway Assessment Guidance, that would be Q.
- 13 guidance to assist a CTCO; is that right?
- 14 Α.
- 15 Q. The same is true of the Dynamic Investigation Framework
- 16 2019?
- 17 A. Yes.
- 18 Q. How did all these policies fit together for a CTCO?
- 19 A. I think when you see it all laid out on a page like
- 20 that, it is a lot. But I think that they worked as
- 21 a team to navigate that in a professional way to make
- 22 sure that they directed individuals through the system
- 23 to the right relevant outcome.
- 24 We see quite a few policies on the page. Is it right Q.
- 25 that some of these were quite frequently updated?
- 1 A. So, we can look at it from a supervision perspective.
- 2 So, as a CT head, I'm reliant upon the supervisors and
- 3 managers within Prevent to dip sample and quality assure
- 4 the work that goes on within that area of business to
- 5 both support the CTCOs but to ensure that we are
- 6 adhering to policy and process.
- 7 Q. I want to move on, please, to the first Prevent referral
- 8 and I'm going to try to do it in themes, rather than
- 9 chronologically.
 - The first theme is the role of the FIMU and the JAT
- 11 and how they work together with Prevent officers. We
- 12 will come on to ideology and the joint letter but can
- 13 I summarise it in this way: that the joint letter
- 14 effectively cast the net wider for Prevent, in terms of
- 15 what was relevant to them than was relevant for the
- 16 FIMU?

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- 17 A. Yes. That's correct.
- 18 **Q.** So the scope of Prevent relevant was wider than matters
- 19 that the FIMU would be looking at for their own
- 20 assessment?
- 21 A. I think that wasn't just down to the joint letter,
- 22 I think that was articulated in policy too.
- 23 Q. Yes, so I think we heard from Ms Ellsmore that the joint
- 24 letter wasn't the start of this but it was perhaps one
- 25 example. Just to break that down. School massacre 123

- A. Yes, I believe so. 1
- 2 MR BOYLE: Just to give an example for your note, sir, the
- 3 policy for Prevent practitioners in August 2020, which
 - was CTPHQ000117 was version 3.5, and the Counter
- 5 Terrorism Case Officer's Guide, dated 7 December 2020
- was version 3.7 at CTPHQ000115? 6
- 7 SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: Thank you.
- 8 MR BOYLE: Were some of these policies -- so, for example,
- 9 the CTCO Guide, the Prevent Policy and the Prevent
- 10 Practitioners Policy -- overlapping.
- A. I think they were meant to complement each other. So 11
 - I believe the CTCO Guide was to complement the Prevent
- 13 policy and to be used, I think, as a toolkit,
- 14 effectively, of how the CTCO was meant to apply the
- 15 Prevent Policy.
- 16 Q. Was it difficult for CTCO to try and keep up with all of
- 17 these policies?
- 18 Again, I feel like I'm speaking for them here because
- 19 I wasn't a CTCO at the time but I think, when you look
- 20 at it holistically, it does look like a lot and we would
- 21 be very reliant upon CTPHQ, as well as the managers we
- 22 have within Prevent, to help staff understand and embed
- 23 those changes.
- 24 Q. What could CTP North West itself do to ensure that CTCOs
- 25 could keep up with all of this policy?

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- 1 ideology, for example, was Prevent relevant but it
- 2 wouldn't have been the sort of political or religious
- 3 ideology that would have sustained a prosecution under
- 4 terrorism legislation; is that right?
- 5 A. That's correct, yes.
- 6 Q. The same would be true for violence fascination; is that
- 7 right?
- 8 A. Yes, that's correct.
- 9 Q. Could we have on screen, please, CTPHQ000042. We see
 - here, I think, an annex to the NSIM that we've covered
- 11 before, which was the FIMU guidance, correct?
- 12 A. Yes.

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- 13 Q. Can we have, please, page 3, and could we enlarge
- 14 section 4. In the "Important" box, we see:
- 15 "Case reviews have identified multiple occasions in
- 16 which cases suitable for Prevent have not reached local
- teams due to a RADO 6 outcome (no CT/DE relevance) 18 during IMU assessment. Where intelligence has been
- 19
- submitted directly to an IMU or come through a route in
- 20 which the local Prevent team were unsighted they have
- 21 been left unaware of such cases."
- 22 Is what is being addressed here the failure of FIMU 23 to pass on a case to Prevent?
- 24 **A**. That is how it reads and they have assessed on CT/DE 25

relevance but it appears they haven't taken into

1 consideration the different Prevent threshold and this 2 document was to enforce them considering the different 3 Prevent threshold.

- Q. So, is perhaps a slightly different issue than the one
 that we've seen and the evidence that we've had heard,
 this is intelligence that has come in that is not
 a Prevent referral, has been analysed by the FIMU and
 the FIMU hasn't appreciated that it ought to be passed
 onto Prevent where it is RADO 6; is that right?
- A. It sounds like from case review, so there's either been
 an audit process or potentially through organisational
 learning that's taken place from other reviews or
 enquiries that there may have been some missed
 opportunities. I believe that section has been put in
 this document to reinforce the different relevancy
 thresholds that the FIMU and the Prevent teams work to.
- 17 Q. Perhaps if we look at the last paragraph, we see that
 18 there most clearly. Cases assessed as RADO 6, so that's
 19 no CT/DE relevance:

"Local Prevent teams may consider cases assessed as RADO 6 ... as CT/DE relevant for the purpose of Prevent and such cases may still be managed with that team."

Looking at this now, is this language, do you think, straightforward for FIMU officers to understand?

25 **A.** I think they understand it but I would say that we're at 125

1 the point where we recognise that it needs updating. So

2 CT/DE relevance has been -- it's a legacy term, I would

say, within CT Policing, that we've been used to fora long time. I know you want to touch upon what has

5 changed and what recommendations will come as part of

6 this Inquiry but NSIM is already under review and that

will look at the language utilised within it around that
 relevancy, the RADO outcomes and updating CT/DE

9 relevance.

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Q. So the confusing thing about this might be the idea that
"CT/DE relevant" means something different to FIMU
officers and Prevent officers?

A. I don't think it means something different. I think
 they both understand what that CT/DE relevance is and
 they recognise that that is the Pursue threshold, they
 understand that. I think this document has just been

enforcing with intelligence assessors that they
 understand that that isn't the only relevancy threshold
 that they need to apply to a case and that RADO 6 can

Q. The use here of the phrase, in the second line of the
 last paragraph, "CT/DE relevant for the purpose of
 Prevent", isn't that likely to cause confusion?

have an interest for Prevent teams still.

24 A. Yes. I accept that and, as I say, the NSIM document in
 its entirety is being reviewed. So it's not about CT/DE

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relevancy for the purposes of Prevent. It is relevancyfor the purposes of Prevent, I would suggest.

Q. I just want to come on to some examples of, first,
 I think we heard, in the evidence of DS Treharne, that
 she said that she'd effectively taken issue with FIMU
 staff overreaching into Prevent's decisions. Did you
 hear that evidence?

8 A. I did, yes.

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Q. Thank you. Could we have up on screen, please
 LANC000175, and page 137. This was the email from
 Officer B, of the FIMU, to the CTCOs following the JAT
 assessment, and the second line of that is:

"This has been returned [I think that should be 'from'] the JAT for a Prevent referral to be inputted onto the PCM Tracker and referral to Channel/Dovetail ..."

The root of this, I think, was the JAT assessment by DC Blundell himself. I think he accepted that his reasoning could have been better worded but I don't think he was intending to mandate an outcome, that was his evidence, wasn't it?

22 A. Yes, that's correct, he wasn't intending that.

Q. The way Officer B has translated this does read, doesn't
 it, of a FIMU officer trying to decide the outcome of
 the Gateway Assessment?

A. I appreciate that it could be read like that but from - the evidence, both from the Prevent officers and from

3 the FIMU officers, I think showed that they understood

that Prevent would conduct their own assessment, that that was their decision to make.

Q. So that was the evidence that was given now, but on
 a plain reading of the email, doesn't it seem to mandate
 the requirement?

9 A. I don't think it seems to mandate it. I think it's the
10 way it reads, which I appreciate isn't ideal. But
11 I don't think there was ever any intention either by the
12 FIMU to mandate that on behalf of Prevent or that

13 Prevent felt that they had to do that. They understood

that the decision was theirs.

15 **Q.** Is referral to Channel/Dovetail open to interpretation?

A. It is objectively, yes, when you sit and read it without
 the rationale that is given by the officers that had
 involvement in the case.

MR BOYLE: Sir, there are a few more examples of this but
 I think now is probably a good moment to take a break.

21 SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: 10/15 minutes, Mr Boyle?

MR BOYLE: 15 minutes, please. We will sit again at3.25 pm.

24 (3.10 pm)

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(A short break) 128

1 (3.38 pm)

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SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: Yes, Mr Boyle. 2

3 MR BOYLE: Thank you. Sir, thank you we had some technical 4 teething problems.

> DCS Kenwright, we were going through the FIMU language and the role of the FIMU. Can we have up another document to look at this, please, which is CTPHQ000087.

So, this is, I think, an action report from the system NCIA; is that right?

- Yes, that's correct. 11 Α.
- 12 Q. When we look at the middle of the page and we see 13 "Title" and then "Text", does that text, "Prevent 14 officer attend the emergency child protection 15 conference, et cetera", is that the action in question?
- 16 A. Yes.
- 17 Q. So the action is attend the conference, JAT assessment to link in, consideration for Channel/Dovetail and 18 19 recording on PCM Tracker, establish why AR has been 20 searching school shootings.

If we then, please, look down to about six lines from the bottom of the penultimate box:

"Please can you advise if this can now be closed to Prevent. Many thanks."

I think that's a note from PC Thompson. I think

- 1 PC Thompson said that she understood the distinction
- 2 between the roles of the FIMU and Prevent and her here,
- 3 and I think she was referring to "Could the action be 4 closed", is that right?
- 5 A. Yes

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- 6 Q. Do you accept that "closed to Prevent" could be 7 confusing on a plain reading of that language?
- 8 A. Potentially, but it is on the action itself and is being 9 recorded as an action result. But I understand that it 10 could be perceived differently.
- Q. Yes. So we see Officer B's response below: 11

"The above has been reviewed and can now be closed in relation to the incidents at school, this is being dealt with by Merseyside Police, who have taken the matter to CPS and the subject is excluded from school and is open to Social Services."

Officer B says "The above has been reviewed and can now be closed", but provides quite a lot of further rationale for that which might be thought to relate more generally to the Prevent referral; do you agree?

21 A. I would suggest not because it's on the NCIA system, so 22 if it was on the Prevent case management system, I would 23 agree with you but this is on NCIA, in terms of the FIMU 24 tracking that referral and the action through the 25 system, if you like.

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- Q. Would you agree that, again, on a plain reading of the 2 wording, it looks as if Officer B is directing for the
- 3 Prevent referral to be closed?
- 4 A. I don't believe he is and I don't believe he said he was 5 in his evidence either.
- 6 Q. Yes, that's right, although I think that was tested in 7 questioning as to whether on a plain reading that is 8 what this actually showed, regardless as to what he said
- 9 his understanding was at the time he gave evidence.
- 10 A. He's reviewing the action and assessing whether the 11 action can be closed, but he is not saying close the 12 case on PCMT.
- Q. Do you accept that the language here could have been 13 14 clearer?
- A. I think that it was understood by the FIMU officer and 15 16 by the Prevent officer in terms of they were trying to 17 deal with the action that was sat on NCIA and for that 18 action to be resulted in terms of what it said in the 19 action box. I don't believe that they were trying to 20 direct what happened on PCMT, as such.
- 21 Q. Can we take things slightly out of order and just look 22 at some messages around the second referral,
- 23 CTPNW000140. We have here. I think. Officer A's
- 24 assessment of the second referral and I think, if we go
- 25 to page 2, and if we could enlarge the writing in red.

1 We see the analysis at the bottom of the page about the 2 referral, and then:

> "As such, I do not believe this new intelligence is worthy of a new Prevent referral as I do not assess it would meet the thresholds for adoption [I think it should be 'at'] Channel and the content does not suggest he holds any extremist ideology but rather an opposing opinion on ... Gaddafi's Libyan regime."

Do you agree that Officer A overreaches his role as a FIMU officer in the analysis that's been given here? A. I appreciate that it can be perceived as that but

12 I would go back to the officer's evidence both from the 13 FIMU and the Prevent perspective, in terms of them

14 understanding the different thresholds that they are 15 working to. There is an expectation that FIMU officers

16 understand Prevent work and, whilst they are making some

17 commentary in relation to Prevent, that they still

18 understand that Prevent, in their own right, have to 19 make a decision in terms of their own threshold.

20 Q. I mean, we've got a statement from Officer A -- we

21 haven't heard him give evidence -- and I think you are 22 right, in the statement he says that he understands the

23 distinction. But, it is quite clear on the plain 24 language used here that he doesn't, isn't it?

25 I don't think it says that he doesn't. He is trying to

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A. Yes.

- 1 express a view and, even in the CTCO guidance, it makes 2 reference to the point that FIMU officers have to have 3 an understanding and to be able to express an opinion in 4 terms of Prevent but that the decision is not theirs, 5 that it's the CTCOs.
- 6 Q. But he doesn't just say new intelligence isn't worthy of 7 a Prevent referral, he goes on to say he wouldn't meet 8 the threshold for an adoption at Channel; that's purely 9 a decision for the CTCO, isn't it?
- 10 A. Absolutely, yes.
- So this is then an overreach, isn't it? 11
- 12 A. It could be perceived as that and, if there's any 13 learning that can be taken in terms of how FIMU officers 14 are expressing themselves on records, we'll absolutely 15 take it. I think the importance is that the CTCO still 16 understood that they had that decision in their own 17 right and the FIMU expected them to do that as well.
- 18 So, I understand, DCS Kenwright, the understanding and Q. 19 the expectation on the officers but don't these 20 documents, or at least this document, show that that 21 understanding and expectation wasn't actually there?
- 22 A. I think the understanding was there. I accept that 23 maybe it can be worded more clearly in terms of the 24 recommendation to Prevent but I think the understanding 25 was there.

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previous reference to the PowerPoint slides that FIMU officers -- that intelligence assessors now get, which is guite detailed in relation to that role of Prevent.

terms of them understanding how they work best together and how they complement each other. I don't think it affects the decision-making but I think if there is anything that we can take from this, in relation to how they are wording it, so that it is absolutely clear in terms of that handover of responsibility, then we will. Q. Moving on, please, to the school browsing history. We have heard evidence about liaison between The Acorns School and the FIMU in relation to this. I'm going to

and statements. Tell me if this is not a fair summary. We cannot be sure exactly what was sent by the school alongside the referral form on 5 December 2019 because the way the emails have been retrieved means we

try and summarise it without pulling up the documents

20 were sent; do you agree?

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- 22 The attachments that can be identified do not include Q. 23 the school browsing history, correct?
- 24 **A**.
- 25 Q. Officer A referred to a large dump of data being 135

Q. Could we have up page 36 of your statement, paragraph 8.5. So you are addressing, I think, in response to issues being taken with the language used by the FIMU, and you have done an analysis of the matters that have been raised in the review, and you say at 8.5: "... I agree the use of language by FIMU assessors

is a point of concern and will be taking this forward to ensure consistent practice across the team."

9 Is it your analysis that this was just an issue of 10 language and not one of understanding?

- 11 Yes, I believe it is an issue of language because it 12 didn't impact on the CTCO's decision-making.
- 13 Q. But I'm actually talking about the understanding of the 14 FIMU officers and how familiar they were with Prevent. 15 Would you agree that there's a number of examples that
- 16 we've seen of what might be said to be unclear language?
- 17 A. I accept that there are some contentious points in 18 relation to how that language is utilised and how it can 19 be perceived when it is taken out of context and without 20 the explanation, I suppose, of the relevant officers. 21
- I think it is important for them to understand how it 22 can be perceived and to take learning from what this 23 Inquiry is drawing out in relation to that, absolutely.
- 24 I think training from a FIMU perspective has developed 25 and improved over time and I know that you have made 134

asked for specific concerns to be identified?

Q. Later requests were made by Officer B for the school

time, that he did not think that it had been received?

Q. Officer B recorded a response from The Acorns School to

that which wasn't, "It's already been sent", but instead

"We'll be contacting the school IT provider to obtain

this information if it is still available"?

browsing history. So it is clear, I think, at that

received and Officer B made contact with the school and

So, it has been an evolution over time, I think, in

can't see how many were sent or cannot be sure how many

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by her; is that right?

A. Yes, that's correct.

12 A. Yes, that's correct.

14 PC Thompson accepted that, between the FIMU, herself and 15 the school, it should have been obtained and considered 16 I think it would have been useful before the case was

Q. Thank you. Regardless as to whether that was sent,

18 closed for PC Thompson to have tried to obtain anything 19 that was available, yes.

20 Q. So, if the school hadn't provided it, it should have 21 been chased, shouldn't it?

22 A. Yes, ideally, and I appreciate that DC Murphy was also 23 trying to get hold of that information from the

24 Merseyside Police perspective as well.

25 Q. PC Thompson said that the fact that AR, who I think was 136

(34) Pages 133 - 136

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- 1 13 years old at this stage, was searching for images of 2 gory and unpleasant degloving injuries raised the level 3 of concern significantly and would have led to a referral to Channel; did you hear that evidence? 4
- 5 A. I did hear her say that, yes.
- 6 Q. She says that was on the basis that it was consistent 7 with a fascination with unpleasant injury and it also 8 would have impacted on the reliability of what AR was 9 saying. We'll come back to that latter point. It might 10 be added that it would be concerning that he was doing 11 this at school and raised a question as to what he be 12 viewing in the privacy of his own home; do you agree?
- 13 A. Potentially, yes.
- 14 Q. You mentioned DC Murphy. PC Thompson knew that AR's 15 devices had been seized by the Merseyside Police 16 criminal investigation, correct?
- 17 A. Yes.

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- Q. In those circumstances, she could have linked in with 18 19 the criminal investigation to discuss the review of 20 those devices, couldn't she?
- A. She could have, although DC Murphy, I believe, said that 21 22 she was going to let us know if there was anything that 23 was pertinent, in relation to those device downloads, 24 but I accept that, again, a followup in relation to that 25 outstanding action would have been useful.

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up approach between different teams carrying out different functions. This is particularly true where an investigation runs alongside a referral."

Is this, in fact, a little bit more than just roles and responsibilities because shouldn't the Prevent officer have had the professional curiosity to consider what was actually being searched for and inputted into that process?

- 9 A. The Prevent officer wasn't in charge of the criminal 10 investigation, so the digital strategy was down to the 11 officer in charge of the case and AR wasn't being 12 investigated for any sort of terrorism offences. If he 13 was, he would be sat in the Pursue space. PC Thompson 14 isn't an investigator. She is sitting there as 15 a Prevent officer with a very bespoke remit. So, I have 16 to be fair to her and ensure that that primacy, in terms 17 of that investigative strategy, is clear as well.
- 18 Q. So I understand you want to be fair to PC Thompson but 19 I think it's her own evidence that she could have linked
- 20 in and that she should have linked in at this stage. 21 A. I think she should have got the outcome of those digital 22 device examinations and to have understood it. I would 23 like to highlight that we regularly receive referrals 24 through from digital forensic units in forces where they

25 will be investigating a completely unrelated offence, MR BOYLE: Sir, I don't think I've given a reference for

2 this but we have the forensics report of the devices, 3 which is now on our workspace. It's MERP008359 and, at

page 115, we can see searches were done for the name of

5 the victim, teachers, the name of the school, as well as

6 the words "shooting" and "beheading". So I don't 7 propose to pull that up.

- 8 SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: Thank you very much.
- 9 MR BOYLE: The referral was closed without knowing the 10 outcome of that review or the scope of the review; 11 that's right, isn't it?
- 12 A. I believe so, yes, I don't think PC Thompson was aware 13 of the scope.
- 14 Q. Could we have up, please, page 42 of your statement, at 15 8.29. So I think you are discussing the examinations of 16 the devices here:
 - "... if there had been anything pertinent to the referral arising in the course of those examinations, then it would have been shared with the relevant officer in Prevent, given how closely the different teams engaged in different aspects of the multi-agency approach in this case worked. I accept this may be an area in which lessons can be learnt with regard to proactive information sharing, to ensure roles and responsibilities are clear, and to ensure a clear joined 138

1 nothing to do with terrorism at all, but they will come 2

- across material of concern that they think needs to be 3 brought to the attention of CT Policing. They link in 4 with us on that basis, on a fairly regular basis, and we 5 can then look to see whether there is anything of 6 concern in the downloads that they have managed to 7 obtain. So we do work closely with DFUs on that regard 8 and they are very good at looking at other content that
- 9 might constitute offences. 10 Q. So, there was perhaps oversight to follow up on these 11 points but, in particular, the referral was closed
- 12 whilst the actions were outstanding. So, one might say 13 the evidence pointed to individual error but also one
- 14 might -- it might be suggested that there was a lack of
- 15 supervision to catch these points or a lack of process
- 16 to ensure appropriate checks were done before closure or
- 17 a lack of understanding by Prevent officers of the
- 18 potential importance of this information or,
- 19 alternatively, that it fell between two stalls, between 20 the FIMU and the Prevent. Would you agree with any or
- 21 all of those?
- 22 A. There was quite a lot in what you have just raised to 23 me. sir. so ...
- 24 **Q**. I will break it down. Supervision?
- 25 Yes, the supervision should quality assure that case and 140

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- 1 make sure that it is suitable for closure, I accept.
- 2 Q. What about checks at the point of closure, apart from 3 supervision?
- 4 A. How do you mean, sir? Sorry.
- 5 Q. Is there a process where a referral is closed to ensure 6 that all information has been gathered?
- 7 A. That would be the supervisor's responsibility.
- 8 Q. Built within this, is there any concern that there was
- 9 a lack of understanding by Prevent officers of the
- 10 potential importance of this information?
- A. I don't believe they underestimated the potential 11
- 12 importance. I believe that they understood that AR was
- 13 under investigation for criminal offences, that that
- 14 digital strategy was not theirs but that, if anything
 - came to light that was relevant, they thought that that
- 16 would be referred back into them, but I do accept that
- 17 they should have checked that prior to closure.
- 18 Q. Where this was information that was being sought by the
- 19 FIMU, that was also relevant to Prevent officers, was
- 20 there a risk that it fell between two stalls?
- 21 A. No, I don't believe so because that case had been passed
- 22 to Prevent at that point, so Prevent had ownership of
- 23 progressing that.

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- 24 Q. Thank you. I will move on to the strategy meeting which
- 25 was on 17 December 2019, and it was attended by social 141
 - Q. If we could have the bottom third of the page enlarged.
- 2 We see there under "Complex needs", there is quite
- 3 a lengthy explanation of the complex needs that -- there
- 4 is a paragraph of explanation of the complex needs that
- 5 AR had. Then under "Comments or further enquiries?":

"The school has referred the subject to CAMHS,

forensic CAMHS and for ASD assessment. A referral to

8 the vulnerability hub to be submitted by Prevent."

> We know that no such referral was made. Could we have now, please, on screen page 50 of your statement at

11 paragraph 8.53. So you address this here. Just before

- 12 we look at that, the role of the Vulnerability Support
- 13 Hub was at least twofold, wasn't it? On the one hand,
- 14 they might be able to direct a subject to appropriate
- 15 treatment or help a CTCO to direct them to appropriate
- 16 treatment?
- 17 A. Yes, they could help the CTCO to navigate how that
- 18 individual is engaged with mental health services.
- To find their way through what can be quite 19 Q.
- 20 a complicated series of teams in the community for
- 21 mental health?
- 22 A. Yes.
- 23 But they are also a consultancy service, aren't they?
- So they are able to guide the CTCO on how to handle 24
- 25 subjects who have mental health issues or

- 1 care, mental health practitioners, investigating officer
- 2 from Merseyside Police, the Community Safety Team and
- 3 education.

4 Would you agree that was an example of good practice 5 and a wealth of information was gathered by the Prevent

- 6 officer in attending?
- A. Yes, absolutely. 8 Q. Is it common practice for Prevent officers to attend
- 9 meetings like that, where a referral has been made?
- Yes, they are regularly invited to strategy meetings 10 Α. 11 where required.
- Are there systems in place to ensure that that actually 12 Q.
- 13 happens?
- 14 A. They would be invited directly but there is good
 - multi-agency engagement and, if there are any concerns
- 16 in relation to an out of office, for instance, on that
- 17 email, I'm comfortable that they would have the relevant
- 18 contact details to be able to make sure that somebody
- 19 attended.
- 20 Q. Moving on to the Vulnerability Support Hub referral.
- 21 Could we have up on screen, please, CTPNW000122.
- 22 If we could have page 24, please. So we will see in
- 23 the top left here, dated 23 December 2019, that this was
- 24 the PCMP, is that the Police Case Management Plan?
- 25 **A**. Yes, that's correct.

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- 1 neurodiversity?
- 2 A. They can do, yes.
- 3 So at your paragraph 8.53 you say:
- 4 "I am not able to confirm whether this referral took
- place, and the reasons why it might not have occurred. 5
- 6 I do note ('as the CTCO did') that the support AR needed
- 7 from other agencies for his vulnerabilities was already
- 8 in place."

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- But would you accept that that was actually only
- 10 part of the role that the Vulnerability Support Hub
- 11 could have played here?
- 12 A. The Vulnerability Support Hub and the CCS, as it is now,
- 13 operate alongside the police-led partnership space more
- 14 so because they are there to guide Prevent officers when
- 15 potentially there isn't that mainstream mental health
- 16 safeguarding already in place. So, they are but they
- 17 would have to be formally tasked in relation to post
- 18 PGA, that case being adopted and then the Clinical
- 19 Consultancy Service or the SH, as it was then conducting
- 20 any specific relevant enquiries that were required to
- 21 assist the CTCO.
- 22 Q. But PC Thompson wrote that she was intending to make the
- 23 referral to the Vulnerability Support Hub at this stage
- 24 that we have just seen, didn't she?
 - 25 Yes, she did write that, yes.

- 1 $\,$ Q. So the Vulnerability Support Hub could have assisted at
- 2 this time, not just in identifying agencies for his
- 3 vulnerabilities but also in guiding PC Thompson on how
- 4 to deal with those vulnerabilities and assess them; is
- 5 that right?
- 6 A. I think PC Thompson mentioned in her evidence that she
- 7 felt there were other mental health arrangements already
- 8 in place in relation to AR, including CAMHS and FCAMHS
- 9 and that he was waiting for an autism assessment,
- 10 I believe, back at the first referral stage. So there
- 11 was a lot already ongoing there and mainstream
- 12 safeguarding was what PC Thompson was reliant upon in
- order for AR to get the relevant help that he needed.
- 14 Q. Forgive me, I'm not asking about that. Can I give
- an example: so PC Thompson says that she attributed some
- of the things that AR said to his autism and the
- 17 implication of that might be that his autism was
- an explanation for his comments, rather than
- an indication that he presented an increased risk; do
- 20 you understand that distinction?
- 21 A. Yes.
- 22 Q. There is a problem with analysing AR as someone who
- either has mental health issues or is a risk; do you
- 24 agree?
- 25 A. Yes, the two can intersect.

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- 1 concerns in that provision, then yes she could have gone
- 2 into the Vulnerability Support Hub but there are a lot
- 3 of other mental health services engaged with him at that
- 4 time.
- 5 Q. DCS Kenwright, I'm not asking about provision. I'm
- 6 asking about the VSH guidance to PC Thompson about how
- 7 to assess AR and his autism; do you understand that?
- 8 A. Yes, I understand that, yes.
- 9 Q. In terms of picking this up at the point the decision
- 10 was closed, should this have been picked up by
- 11 a supervisor?
- 12 A. Ideally, yes.
- 13 Q. Would you have expected PC Thompson to have had --
- sorry, were there any processes on closure, other than
- the supervisor, to ensure that actions of this nature
- 16 weren't outstanding?
- 17 A. I don't believe so. I don't think PCMT is structured in
- the same way as NCIA is, where you saw that individual
- 19 action earlier on, so you get an action, an action
- 20 result and an action closure. I think it might be
- 21 slightly different.
- 22 Q. So if you could have set an action on the PCMT, might
- 23 that have precluded you from closing the case because it
- 24 would have been highlighted to you that there was
- 25 an action outstanding?

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- 1 $\,$ Q. Thank you. So the position may have been that, in AR's
- 2 case, his autism actually increased his risk?
- 3 A. I think it was touched on before that autism can either
 - be a protective factor or a risk factor and it's very
- 5 much on an individual basis.
- 6 $\,$ $\,$ $\,$ Q. $\,$ And the Vulnerability Support Hub could have assisted
- 7 PC Thompson with that question, correct?
- 8 A. They could have, potentially.
- 9 Q. On the one hand, there is a level of human error in not
- 10 making the referral, which should have been made but
- again, is this something that ought really to have been
- 12 picked up at closure, that important input was missing?
- 13 A. I think there should have been probably clarity given at
- that point, in terms of if PC Thompson felt that the
- 15 mainstream mental health services that were already
- 16 engaged around AR were sufficient, that that probably
- 17 should have been clarified, so it didn't read like it
- does now, like it's an outstanding action, yes.
- 19 Q. But, again, is that not missing the point that the
- 20 Vulnerability Support Hub could have given guidance to
- 21 PC Thompson on how to assess AR's autism?
- 22 A. Potentially but, at that point, he still wasn't formally
- 23 diagnosed, he was awaiting that formal diagnosis and he
- 24 had multiple mental health services engaged around him.
- 25 I think if PC Thompson felt that there were gaps or

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- A. I think that sort of structure would be helpful on the
- 2 system, yes.
- 3 Q. Thank you. I don't know, are you able to help from your
- 4 perspective as to the reasons why this might have been
- 5 missed, could it have been a lack of understanding of
- 6 the importance of the Vulnerability Support Hub, do you
- 7 think?
- 8 A. No, I don't believe so. I think there was excellent
- 9 engagement and relationships between the Vulnerability
- 10 Support Hub and the CTCOs and they could recognise the
- 11 benefit that they could bring them in relation to adding
- 12 value to cases where required. So I don't think it is
- 13 a lack of understanding per se, no.
- 14 Q. Thank you. I want to move on to the visits to AR. So,
- 15 PC Thompson visited AR to carry out a risk assessment
- and determine what to do thereafter. It appears that
- AR's case was moved to a police-led partnership to allow
- that to happen. Did you hear the evidence about that?
- 19 A. I saw that, yes.
- 20 Q. It's right, isn't it, that AR didn't actually need to be
- 21 moved to a PLP for a visit to take place?
- 22 A. I believe that to be the case. I think the policy
- 23 states that, ideally, a visit wouldn't need to be
- conducted at PGA stage and should only be done in
 exceptional circumstances, with some supervisory

exceptional circumstances, with some supervisory 148

oversight in relation to that decision. Carmen discussed this with her supervisor and, on her supervisor's recommendation, it has been moved to PLP to enable a visit. So I don't know whether that is just a misinterpretation of the policy as it stood at the time.

Q. Thank you. I just want to explore, please, the question of disguised compliance within the outcome of that visit. Could we have up on screen, please, CTPNW000135 -- thank you -- and just looking at the top of that page, third paragraph:

"The subject stated that he felt the school had taken things out of context in relation to his behaviour and online activity. When he was asked about researching the internet for school shootings he [said] that he had seen a news article on Yahoo and he had clicked onto the article, as he was interested in it, he told officers that he had not actively searched for this

"The subject then told officers that he had looked on the internet for [nunchucks] on the school internet; he said this was research for a lesson where they had been building things. The subject said that he had explained to the teachers the reasons why he had looked at these things on the internet but that they still

wrote it down anyway, he said that he felt they were always writing things down about him to get him into trouble."

Can we just, please, look now at the referral form, which is CTPNW000154. Thank you. If we could go to page 3, we have some of the complaints that were made at the time the referral was made. Looking at the first substantive paragraph, after the date "15/11/2019", we see the report from the teacher:

"During the ICT lesson today I found AR searching school shootings in America. When I told him to stop and get on with his work he tried to engage in a conversation about the subject but was told this is not going to happen. I have been told that we can no longer log student web history."

Then if we look halfway down the next paragraph, so there is some information, under "Action by Sharon Evans form tutor for [AR]", some information about discussion with AR's father. In the middle of that paragraph:

"Dad returned call a few minutes later, informing SE that [AR] said he had only copied behaviour of another student, and that he had clicked on a hyperlink to a news story."

Then:

"... need a few days to get a copy of [AR's] browser 150

history."

We see that.

Can we look, please, then, zoom out and look at the bottom paragraph, 3 December 2019:

"Within art lesson, working with oil pastels, colouring in Call of Duty images, [AR] commented saying 'Why can we have these with guns but can't look at guns on the internet' and then said 'Can we have a picture of a severed head then', Mr Baker replied this is not appropriate and changed the subject", et cetera.

Then if we look at the next entry also on 3 December:

"In workshop [AR] was discussing different YouTubers and YouTube videos. I couldn't concentrate on exactly what he was talking about or who but I think he was discussing with another pupil videos of people hurting themselves. He also made a comment about if a drill bit broke it could fly off and kill someone, he was quite graphic."

Then, of course, we know in the meeting we saw the discussion of nunchucks. We see here don't we a variety of reports that AR was looking at violent imagery online or was seeking out violent imagery online; would you agree?

A. Yes, it appears that way in terms of what the teachers 151

1 have written, yes.

2 Q. School shootings was part of that reporting, wasn't it?

A. I believe it was, as has been described, a news article,
 a single news article of -- a Daily Mail article of

5 a school shooting that had happened the day before.

Q. So I think that's what we know now with the school
 browsing that has been received but that wasn't known to
 PC Thompson at the time, was it?

9 A. It wasn't but it's as has been described by his father
 10 in terms of him clicking on a news link at that point.

Q. So PC Thompson said that she thought that AR's account at the meeting, which I think we can have back up
 again -- it's CTPNW000135 -- that things had been taken out of context in relation to his behaviour and school activity, and he had only clicked on a Yahoo article.
 I mean, would you agree that there was other evidence to

suggest that he was doing more than simply clicking on

news articles on Yahoo, based on the referral form?

A. He is looking at potentially other violent content but
 you have to remember, at that point in time, even with
 the 2019 letter, that VFI, that violent fixation, wasn't

part of Prevent remit. The school massacre ideology
 absolutely was and that's recognised by PC Thompson but

24 the fascination with violence was not part of Prevent

25 remit at that point in time. I don't say it's not

- 1 concerning. I absolutely accept that it is but I have 2 to consider this in terms of Prevent remit too.
- 3 Q. So I'm actually not asking about that, really. I'm more 4 asking --
- 5 **SIR ADRIAN FULFORD:** You are answering a different question.
- 6 THE WITNESS: Okay, sorry.
- 7 SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: So the question simply was whether he
- 8 was doing more than simply clicking on news articles on
- 9 Yahoo, based on the referral form. So a simple
- 10 straightforward question.
- THE WITNESS: Yes, sir, he is doing more. 11
- 12 MR BOYLE: Can we see then that the account given, there was
- 13 certainly reason to doubt AR's account that things had
- 14 been taken out of context in relation to his behaviour
- 15 and online activity?

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- 16 A. In what element, sorry?
- 17 Q. Well, he is saying that things have been taken out of
- 18 context in relation to behavioural activity, when he was
- 19 asked about researching the internet on the school
- 20 shootings, he'd seen a news articles on Yahoo. But on
- 21 the other side, the teachers seem to be recording that
- 22 on more than one occasion, indeed a number, he has
 - either accessed material of concern or he has said, "Why
- 24 can't we have access to images of guns", which might
- 25 suggest he was trying to get to them and failing, and
 - in the conversation he was having with PC Thompson with his parents present, I don't know.
 - **Q.** Could we look, please, then at the middle paragraph:
 - "When the subject was asked about the recent incident he had been arrested for, he said he ..."
 - He said he carried out the attack because he was "bullied for a number of months, he had told the
 - teachers and they had not done anything about it." He goes on to say:
 - "The officer asked the subject why he thought he had been bullied and he said that he thought that the individual that was bullying him was jealous of him because everyone at his previous school liked him."
 - Can we have up, please, the daybook, which are the notes PC Thompson made at CTPNW000157, page 13. The middle of the page, there is a paragraph starting:
 - "Stated boys picking on him, this was not the case they were trying to engage, made comments about the staff, saying they were evil, bizarre behaviour."
 - So I think this is a report from a teacher at the school, at the strategy meeting, about AR's report that he was being bullied. Again, do you see here the information from the teachers calls into question AR's account that he was being bullied?
- Yes, well, he's consistent in his account that he 25 A.

- 1 asking for pictures of severed heads. That rather calls 2 into question that the school had taken things out of 3 context in relation to his behaviour and online
- 4 activity, doesn't it?
- 5 A. I don't think the school have taken things out of
- 6 context, no. I think that the school were absolutely
- 7 right to raise the concerns that they did. I think, in
- 8 relation to AR's activity and what is articulated in
- q PC Thompson's action result there, she has tried to
- 10 address the elements that she felt, I guess, were
- 11 relevant from a Prevent perspective but I accept that
- 12 there is more that's contained in the original referral
- 13 document.

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- 14 Q. Thank you. Can we zoom out, please, just to that page 15 as a whole.
 - I think that what this is being played against is evidence that PC Thompson gave in her oral evidence that she considered disguised compliance and discounted it.
- 19 On the basis of that issue, and we will come on to some
- 20 more, don't you agree that there was evidence of 21 disguised compliance?
- 22 Α. There is a mixture there, in terms of what AR has said.
- 23 So, he has mentioned about the news article but then he
- 24 hasn't mentioned any of those other elements that the
- 25 teachers have made reference to. Whether that was clear 154
- 1
- perceives that he's being bullied but I concede that the 2 teachers have investigated that and found no evidence of 3
- 4 Q. Just finally, back to the note of the Prevent visit, 5 CTPNW000135 -- thank you -- and the bottom of page 2.
- 6 Sorry, actually I think we need to start at page 1. The
- 7 bottom of page 1, the last sentence that goes over the 8 page:
 - "He has no grievances against any specific groups, the recent assault was aimed towards a pupil that was bullying him, however an innocent person who had not been involved ended up being assaulted."
 - Then if we could go back, again, please, to the daybook -- sorry to jump around -- CTPNW000157, and page 9. If we look at the middle there, it says:
 - "Stated he didn't attempt to kill him. Teachers were chasing him so he assaulted [then we have the name of the victim] as he didn't want to get into trouble for nothing."
 - Do you see that there?
- 21 A. I do, yes.
- 22 Q. Again, we see, don't we, a contradiction of the account 23 given at the meeting and the account that was given by 24 teachers at the strategy meeting; do you agree?
 - The initial account was that an innocent person who 156

- 1 had not been involved ended up being assaulted.
- 2 **A.** Yes.
- 3 Q. But the information given here is that he assaulted
- 4 someone else because he didn't want to get into trouble
- 5 for nothing. That's a slightly different picture, isn't
- 6 it?
- 7 A. Yes, it appears like he has lashed out at somebody who8 was nearby. Yes.
- 9 Q. Would you agree that the fact that the person that was
- attacked was a random pupil was concerning information
- 11 when assessing AR for the purposes of Prevent?
- 12 A. It is concerning information overall, I think, for the
- 13 purposes of setting him across that multi-agency setting
- 14 and how his behaviour is subsequently dealt with.
- 15 **Q.** Yes. You talked about how a visit should be used only
- 16 in exceptional circumstances.
- 17 A. Yes
- 18 Q. I think we can also, please, pull up your statement at
- page 40. Looking at the bottom, 8.24, and just looking
- 20 at the bottom final sentence:
- 21 "The possibility of ASD, the history of bullying,
- 22 and those evident traits, were also taken into account
- 23 in the CTCO's interactions with AR and was factored in
- 24 in considering whether he appeared to hold an obsession
- 25 with school shootings. The conclusion was reached that
 - 157
- of autism on the things that were being said at that meeting?
- 3 A. Potentially, yes.
- 4 Q. Secondly, looking at the examples of the difference in
- 5 the accounts that were given, would you agree that the
- 6 possibility of disguise compliance should have been
- 7 given more consideration?
- 8 A. That's a difficult one for me to answer because it is
- 9 Carmen and her colleague who were in that situation.
- 10 She was with an experienced colleague as well. So
- 11 I have to rely upon their professional judgement, the
- 12 fact that they acknowledge that they understood that
- 13 disguised compliance could be the case, they know that
- 14 children might lie and that parents might want to create
- 15 a perception of their children that is good, they are
- aware of those things, and they had to consider that in
- the balance along with the other information that they
- had available to them, at the time.
- 19 Q. Let me put the question in a slightly different way.
- 20 I think PC Thompson accepted in hindsight that that was
- 21 something that ought to have been given more weight.
- 22 How does CTPNW ensure that CTCOs are able to take into
- 23 account these issues and do give appropriate weight to
- 24 them?
- 25 A. They are taught to consider disguised compliance as part

- 1 while he may have had an interest in such things, his
- 2 behaviours at the home visit did not indicate fixation.
- This reinforces the utility of in-person visits with the subject."
- 5 Do you see that there?
- 6 A. Yes, I do, yes.
- 7 **Q**. We don't need to bring up the picture but AR was very
- 8 young looking at the time this visit took place, wasn't
- 9 he?
- 10 A. He was, yes.
- 11 Q. Is it right that referrals for young children are sadly
- 12 common within the context of Prevent?
- 13 A. Yes.
- 14 $\,$ Q. Are CTCOs trained on how to deal with referrals from
- 15 young children?
- 16 A. Yes, it is commonplace, as you say, in their case work
- and they will be taught about that within their CTCO
- 18 training.
- 19 Q. In this case, I think PC Thompson says that she
- 20 considered the concerning comments that AR made but put
- 21 them down to his autism --
- 22 A. Yes.
- 23 Q. -- and therefore discounted disguised compliance. Two
- 24 points out of that, is that again something where the
- VSH could have assisted in terms of analysing the impact
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- 1 of their training and it is very much every case on its
- 2 merits. They rely upon their own experiences of case
- 3 management, they rely upon their peers and they upon
- 4 their supervisors as, I think, was described really by
- 5 Carmen and her colleagues in terms of that real team
- 6 approach to try and get the right outcome.
- 7 MR BOYLE: Thank you. Sir, I'm conscious of the time. We
- 8 started slightly late, so I might ask for your patience
- 9 to continue?
- 10 SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: Most certainly, Mr Boyle.
- 11 MR BOYLE: I will ask that, if the stenographer has any
- 12 issues, that a message is passed my way.
- 13 SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: Certainly.
- 14 MR BOYLE: DCS Kenwright, moving on then please to the
- 15 decision to close the first referral. I think we have
- 16 touched on this and the issues of ideology and we have
- 17 also looked at some of the language that was used by the
- 18 FIMU to Prevent officers.
- 19 Were you able to listen to the evidence of
- 20 PC Thompson and some of the language that was used by
 - Prevent officers in referring to AR's case?
- 22 **A.** Yes.

- Q. So can I just give some examples, that that home visitsavs:
 - "Subject did not display any extreme views of CT/DE 160

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ideology. During the conversation he has no interest in politics or religion."

The record setting up that meeting -- and sorry to take this slightly out of order -- but on 23 December 2019, said that AR needed to be spoken in order to clarify his ideology.

A record on 8 January 2020 said that the FIMU assessed that the case can now be closed to Prevent as there are no new CT/DE concerns present at this stage.

Sir, just for your reference, the first is from the visit action which was CTPNW000135 and the others are on the PCMT which is CTPNW000122.

I think you accept in your statement that the terminology used in this context was ambiguous; do you agree?

- 16 A. In relation to the "close to Prevent" comment?
- 17 Q. Yes, exactly. We talked about the FIMU side of contact.
- 18 I'm now asking you about the wording used by Prevent
- 19 officers. So perhaps if we have up your statement at
- 20 page 37, and paragraph 8.10. You are perhaps slightly
- 21 more narrowly in the context of the NCIA action there
- 22 but saying that the terminology "closed to Prevent" is
 - ambiguous. Is that more specifically the NCIA action
- 24 that you're referring to here?
- 25 A. It could be ambiguous in either setting, I think, taken

- 3 Q. So it's perhaps another side of the same coin we have
- 4 been talking about. But saying, for example, no CT/DE

out of context and without the rationale of the officers

- concerns or no ideology might be confusing if used by 5
- 6 a Prevent practitioner?

that have written it.

- 7 A. Not necessarily because they will be considering school
- 8 shootings mass casualty events, as part of that ideology
- 9 assessment and mixed, unclear or unstable ideologies as
- 10 well. So whilst it is not a clear, single ideology
- 11 per se, they are describing them as a collective of
- 12 ideologies, if that makes sense.
- 13 Q. So your view is this is a language issue but to the
- 14 Prevent officers they would have understood what was
- 15 being meant, they were referring to Prevent relevant; is
- 16 that right?
- 17 A. Absolutely, yes.
- 18 Q. Thank you. To the extent that that wider Prevent
- 19 relevant question, thanks to, as you've said, the joint
- 20 letter, that included the issues of school massacres and
- 21 mass violence; is that right?
- 22 A.
- 23 Q. Just putting to one side the process issues about the
- 24 school browsing issue, the Vulnerability Support Hub and
- 25 the disguised compliance: can I just ask you about
- 1 things that were known to PC Thompson at the time she
- 2 dealt with the referral in relation to school massacre
- 3 ideology.
- 4 A. Yes.

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- 5 Q. So, first of all, on the PCMT, school massacre ideology
- 6 had been entered but I think PC Thompson didn't think it
- 7 was by her; is that right?
- 8 A. I don't know if it was entered by her or somebody else
- 9
- Q. Yes, that was the evidence. That is CTPNW000122, 10
- 11 page 7. AR had also been researching school shootings
- 12 in America during class, or at least we knew he had
- 13
- A. He had looked at one article, I believe, yes. 14
- 16 see on the referral form, correct?
- 17 A.
- 18 Q. Did you hear the evidence that PC Paul Harrison had
- 19
- 20 of teachers in particular?
- 21 A. Yes.
- 22 Q. Sir, that's LANC000175, page 77. PC Thompson knew that
- 23 AR had been temporarily excluded for assaulting a fellow
- 25 Α. Which referral are we --

- but it certainly featured on that.
- clicked on one article, correct?
- Q. He had made comments about teachers getting murdered, we 15

- emailed PC Thompson saying that AR had a certain hatred

- 24 pupil in class; is that right?
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- Q. The first referral. Are you aware of whether she would 2 have known that or not?
- Been excluded for assault on a pupil in class? 3 Δ.
- 4 Q. Yes.
- 5 A. I don't know if she was aware of that or not.
- We will move on perhaps to the more obvious ones. He 6
- 7 had taken knives into school?
- 8 A. Yes.
- 9 Q. That he said he hated his school, that he was bullied
- 10 and felt teachers were picking on him?
- 11 A. Yes.
- 12 Q. That he had returned to his school, despite the
- 13 exclusion, with a knife and adapted hockey stick, and
- 14 struck a pupil, not the alleged bully, with that hockey
- 15 stick?
- 16 Yes A.
- 17 Q. That he said he would have used the knife, correct?
- 18 A.
- 19 Q. If school massacres are an ideology, then to Prevent's
- 20 eyes, couldn't that have been classed as
- 21 an unsophisticated form of attack?
- 22 A. I don't believe so, no.
- 23 DC Blundell. I think, said that AR had acted out his
- 24 fascination; did you hear that evidence?
- 25 **A**. I'm not sure that I did, no.

- 1 Q. That was all wrapped up in an apparent interest in
- violence, I think you've said that wasn't part of the
- 3 joint letter but would you agree that it was concerning,
- 4 things like asking for pictures of a severed head in
- 5 class?
- 6 A. Yes, it is concerning.
- 7 Q. PC Thompson said that she had considered these issues
- 8 and considered the issue of school massacre ideology and
- 9 didn't consider that a referral should be made. With
- 10 your knowledge, wouldn't you agree that it might be said
- 11 that there was enough here to establish simply
- 12 reasonable grounds to suspect that AR was susceptible to
- 13 becoming a terrorist or supporting terrorism?
- 14 A. I don't believe that he's met that threshold. I can
- 15 understand why Carmen made that decision.
- 16 Q. You made the point that it is a subjective decision?
- 17 A. Absolutely.
- 18 Q. But it's right, isn't it, that all of the three
- 19 post-attack reviews, so the Lord Anderson review, the
- 20 Prevent learning review, and the Dignate report, take
- 21 the view that AR's Prevent referrals may have been
- 22 prematurely closed as a result of the overemphasis on
- 23 the absence of a particular ideology?
- 24 A. They do say that but Carmen has stated that she had
- 25 taken into consideration that school massacre ideology 165
- 1 of AR, it would be useful to use that onward referral
- 2 mechanism, if you like, to notify them as well.
- 3 Q. When you say "onward referral mechanism", that would
- 4 simply be a matter of making contact and telling them,
- 5 wouldn't it?
- 6 A. Yes.
- 7 Q. In what circumstances should a marker be put to say that
- 8 someone has been referred to Prevent on police systems?
- 9 A. That has to be when the case is formally adopted.
- 10 Q. So you wouldn't expect a marker to be put down where
- 11 someone has been referred but not adopted; is that
- 12 right?
- 13 A. That's correct.
- 14 Q. Thank you. Moving on to the second referral. I think
- you were able to see the evidence of DS Treharne; is
- 16 that right?
- 17 A. Yes.
- 18 Q. Are you aware that the PGA refers to the issue of
- 19 internet usage, which was consistent with the referral,
- 20 ie there were pictures of Colonel Gaddafi; did you see
- 21 that?
- 22 A. I'm not sure I did, no.
- 23 $\,$ **Q**. Perhaps you will take it from me that the internet
- 24 access section of the PGA was filled in?
- 25 **A.** Yes.
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- 1 and didn't believe it was made out.
- Q. You heard the evidence of Ms Ellsmore that she would
 have expected the case to be taken to Channel as well?
- 4 A. I did hear that, yes.
- 5 Q. After that referral was closed, are you aware that
- 6 information wasn't passed onto the Lancashire Police
- 7 Community Safety Team to say that it had been closed?
- 8 A. Yes, I am aware of that.
- 9 Q. The sergeant from that team considered that Prevent was
- 10 still holding AR's risk, if I can put it that way, and
- 11 that Prevent was the lead agency when looking at AR's
- 12 case. Do you think that was a fair characterisation of
- the position at that stage: is Prevent the lead agency
- 14 at the time a referral has been made?
- 15 A. I don't believe we are, at that point in time.
- 16 Q. How do you see the different agencies fitting together?
- 17 A. So, firstly, there's a criminal investigation ongoing in
- 18 relation to AR's activity at the school. But there is
- 19 a collective responsibility, a shared responsibility, in
- 20 terms of how AR is managed through those multi-agency
- 21 arrangements.
- 22 **Q.** Would you agree that that police Community Safety Team
- 23 should have been told that the referral had been closed?
- 24 A. I think if we felt that there was something that the
- 25 Community Safety Team could have assisted with, in terms
- 1 **Q.** But other sections, such as ideology and grievance, said
- 2 "non evident at this stage"; is that familiar to you?
- 3 A. I think so, yes.
- 4 Q. If you want me to pull up the document, I can. Is that
- 5 a --
- 6 A. I will see how the questioning goes.
- 7 Q. Sir, just for your note, the reference is CTPNW000124,
- 8 and it is pages 14 onwards to 18.
- 9 DS Treharne's supervisor comment referred to being
- 10 unable to see the previous referral. Would you agree
- when a repeat referral is received, the exercise remains
- 12 the same. It was to carry out the PGA and just to
- 13 assess whether someone was vulnerable to being drawn
- 14 into terrorism?
- 15 A. Yes, if they felt that it had met that suspicion
- 16 threshold at that point.
- 17 Q. So they were carrying out the same test, effectively, on
- 18 a repeat referral, correct?
- 19 A. I believe so, yes.
- 20 Q. Would you agree that to do that one has to see the first
- 21 referral?
- 22 **A.** Yes.
- 23 Q. So, I mean, I think DS Treharne accepted that they
- 24 should have had view of that. Her approach might show
- 25 that this referral was taken and analysed against

- 1 a closed referral, rather than being analysed -- rather
- 2 than AR being analysed afresh. Can you follow that?
- 3 A. I understand what you mean but there was certainly
- 4 a cross-reference on the PGA to the first referral that
- 5 the CTCO had ensured, that there was consideration given
- 6 to that first referral still.
- 7 Q. So PC Thompson had given a summary of the first referral
- 8 but would you agree it was quite a brief one and it
- 9 didn't, for example, refer to an assault actually having
- 10 taken place at the Range?
- 11 A. Yes, it was a summary, in effect.
- 12 Q. Do you agree that repeat referrals should be analysed
- 13 holistically so, in other words, there should have been
- 14 a re-analysis of AR as a whole rather than simply
- 15 analysis of the post that had been made?
- 16 **A.** Yes, I think information has to be taken in the round,
- 17 including that previous Prevent referral.
- 18 Q. It's true, isn't it, that the same approach, at least in
- 19 terms of the full setting out of information in the
- 20 Prevent Gateway Assessment, was taken to the third
- 21 referral; do you agree?
- 22 A. Yes
- 23 Q. So I think do we see again that the reality referral was
- treated as an addition, rather than a full analysis of
- 25 AR as a whole?

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- an element of subjectivity to the decisions taken, which are made on a case-by-case basis based on the
- 3 intelligence available and a number of potentially
- 4 reasonable decisions in any given case."
- 5 I think we have covered that already, haven't we,
- 6 the subjective element to the decision?
- 7 **A.** Yes.
- 8 Q. I think it is your view, is this right, that,
- 9 subjectively, PC Thompson took into account the relevant
- 10 considerations?
- 11 A. Yes, I believe she did.
- 12 Q. "As reflected in the PLR, the teams dealing with these
- 13 referrals operated in accordance with the policies in
- 14 place."
- 15 That was your view at the time you wrote this
- 16 statement. Having heard the oral evidence, does that
- 17 remain still accurate?
- 18 A. I stand by that. I do accept that things could have
- 19 been done better in terms of some of the use of language
- 20 that we have touched upon and some of the closure of
- 21 outstanding enquiries, that they should have been
- 22 followed up.
- 23 $\,$ Q. So if we were to change that wording from "in accordance
- 24 with the policies in place", to "in accordance with the
- 25 expectations on the CTCO", for example, would your 171

- A. I believe that PC Thompson has considered the three
- 2 referrals together and has made reference to them, if
- 3 you like.
- 4 $\,$ **Q.** There was, I think, at this stage, no policy on how to
- 5 deal with repeat referrals, so in 2021; is that right?
- 6 A. Yes, I think it came in, in 2023.
- 7 Q. Were you aware of that causing difficulty or any
- 8 challenges for CTCOs?
- 9 A. Not that I'm aware of. I think they would utilise what
- 10 information they had available to them.
- 11 $\,$ **Q.** Thank you. Could we have up, please, your statement at
- page 33. I'm looking at paragraph 7.17, and just asking
- 13 for your overall reflections. You said:
- 14 "Overall, the PLR concluded that there had been
- 'a high level of compliance' by Prevent officers interms of process, timescales, completion of assessn
- terms of process, timescales, completion of assessmentsand general adherence to policies in place at the
- 18 relevant time. I recognise however that the authors ...
- do not agree with the decision to close these referrals.
- 20 For context, I should reiterate that there is no
- 21 specific or fixed threshold for referral to Channel --
- 22 officers conducting necessary assessments will take
- 23 an overall view on the risks attaching to the individual
- case, and the person's susceptibility to being drawn
- 25 into terrorism or being radicalised. As such, there is
 - 17
 - answer be the same?
- 2 A. I think the CTCOs -- certainly Carmen has stated that it
- 3 would have been better that she followed up those
- 4 enquiries prior to closure, and I think there would be
- 5 an expectation both from me and from the supervisors
- 6 that that took place.
- 7 Q. Thank you. If AR had been referred, that would have
- 8 been a question of consent; it would have been
- 9 a question about whether his parents consented, correct?
- 10 A. Correct, yes.
- 11 Q. I think we've heard from Ms Ellsmore about what could
- 12 have happened if AR had consented to interventions, such
- as mentoring or an intervention provider; is that right?
- 14 A. Yes.

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- 15 Q. Did you hear that evidence?
- 16 A. I did, yes. I just don't know if there was the breadth
- of intervention providers that we have available to us
- now. So they were very ideology based, traditional
- 19 ideology based at the relevant time.
- 20 Q. But this is right, isn't it, that would there have been
- 21 the availability of mentoring at that time?
- 22 A. I would have to double check but I think the mentoring
- 23 was more around like intervention provision, and that
- 24 being about very much around sort of religious
- 25 ideologies and giving an alternative, more moderate view

to individuals, who were potentially interpretingreligion in a certain way.

I think we have got a much better breadth of intervention providers now that would assist CTCOs with both the sort of school massacre ideologies and the violent fixation elements that we see in the case work.

- Q. Obviously, if consent hadn't been given, AR -- if we run
 the hypothetical forward -- would have been run under
 a police-led partnership?
- 10 A. He could have been, yes.
- 11 Q. I think we heard from Ms Ellsmore, that would have12 included an element of risk management?
- 13 A. Yes.

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- Q. Presumably, it would have raised concern if AR had
 refused to consent or refused his parents had refused to
 consent or he had refused to engage with measures that
 might have been put in place; do you agree?
- 18 A. Yes, you would hope that individuals and families would
 19 take those opportunities.
- 20 MR BOYLE: Sir, I note the time. I am moving on to changes
 21 and improvements, which I will seek to go through very
 22 quickly --
- 23 SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: Certainly Mr Boyle.
- 24 MR BOYLE: -- I think in the next 10 minutes. Obviously,
 it's important evidence.

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- Q. But they're dealing now with an increased caseload; isthat right?
- 3 **A.** Yes.
- Q. In terms of picking up outstanding information, again we
 have touched on this, but I think you suggested that it
 would help if the PCMT had a way to pick up outstanding
 actions; is that right?
- 8 A. Yes, I think we always need to try and make best use of
 9 technology and whether that is mandatory boxes that need
 10 filling in or actions that need to be resulted, that all
 11 helps give some structure, I think, to how an individual
- 12 can manage their casework.
- 13 Q. There is, I think, a new system called the --
- 14 **A.** PCMTE.
- 15 Q. Are you familiar with how that works?
- 16 A. I'm not a practitioner, so not to that level but I know
 17 it has made some improvements, I believe, in terms of
 18 the case management system.
- 19 Q. The policies about multiple referrals and ideology,20 I think we've picked up with other witnesses.
- I think, is this right, that there was a CTP North
 West review or look back at cases which were said to
 have had school massacre ideology or fascination with
 extreme violence?
- 25 A. Yes.

1 I think we have touched on this, DCS Kenwright, but

2 in terms of the FIMU work and that language, is this

3 right, that there is now a new referral form and also

4 revised NSIM guidance on the language that should be 5 used and how they should be working with Prevent

6 officers?

- 7 A. Yes.
- Q. Thank you. Are you satisfied that the issues about lack
 of clarity of language and if there is any issue about
 understanding, that those are now improved?
- A. I think that the ongoing NSIM review will help to
 strengthen that and that will subsequently be reflected
 in training as well.
- 14 Q. In terms of resourcing of Prevent, I think the evidence
 15 we heard was that Prevent was well resourced at the
 16 relevant time. Has the resourcing of Prevent changed
 17 since 2019 and 2022?
- A. I don't think it has substantially changed in terms of
 the numbers of people that we have working within
 Prevent and they are exceptionally busy right now. As
- we heard Cathryn Ellsmore state, the number of referrals has increased significantly and it has placed
- 23 a significant pressure upon Prevent teams.
- 24 $\,$ Q. So there are similar numbers of CTCOs, are there?
- 25 **A.** Yes.

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- 1 **Q.** I think that review found that there had been 33 cases over the year, 15 not compliant. I think the majority
- 3 of those were due to lack of III checks. Could you just
- 4 explain what that is and what the issue was?
- 5 A. Yes, III is Internet Intelligence Investigations. So,
- 6 this is about online checks, if you like. So, there has
- 7 been work done between the intelligence unit and Prevent
- 8 to ensure that there is real clarity now in that
- 9 handover process, so that Prevent officers understand
- 10 what an intelligence assessor has done around III checks
- 11 because, if there are identifiers, social media handles,
- 12 et cetera, that are included in an initial referral,
- then the FIMU assessor will check those themselves. It
- would only be if there were certain checks that weren't
- done or if a CTCO became aware of other identifiers,
- that they would subsequently get those other internet
- 17 checks completed.
- 18 Q. I think there were two referrals that were reopened; isthat right?
- 20 A. Yes, I believe so.
- Q. Did that review cause you any concerns about how
 historic cases of school massacre were being handled in
 general by CTPNW?
- A. I think that III aspect is really important for us to
 get right and I know there is some national work

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- 1 ongoing, looking at that as well, because there is
- 2 a necessity just to make sure that we aren't
- 3 duplicating, both in terms of effort but also around our
- 4 legality and proportionality of what we do. I think
- 5 that would be a really useful piece of work to help
- 6 shape how we move forward but I think we are in a much
- 7 better position now.
- 8 Q. Is that something that you would look for a policy from
- 9 CTPHQ to address?
- 10 A. Yes, I believe that is what they are doing. So there is
- 11 mention within the current policies around III checks
- 12 but there is further work ongoing in relation to that
- 13 relationship between intelligence checks and then what
- 14 the Prevent officers are expected to do as well.
- 15 Q. You also state at your paragraph 8.1 about the CTPNW
- 16 Change team being commissioned to review Prevent
- 17 processes and I think that was due to report this month.
- 18 Has the report been received yet?
- 19 A. No, not just yet but I can certainly provide any
- 20 recommendations that come out to the Inquiry.
- 21 **Q.** Please do, thank you. Just final questions, please.
- 22 Could we have up, please, page 41, paragraph 8.26. You
- 23 grapple here with the kind of wider philosophical
- 24 question of what the appropriate delineation of
- 25 responsibilities is between Prevent and other bodies to
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- 1 deal with violence-fixated individuals and similar
- 2 issues; is that right?
- 3 A.
- 4 Q. From your perspective, is the current position in
- 5 relation to ideology and violent fixated individuals
- 6 appropriate and sustainable?
- 7 A. I would say that some individuals within the VFI cohort
- 8 are susceptible to being drawn into terrorism. But
- 9 there are others within -- that you could classify as
- 10 VFI, that aren't. I think the thing that we have got to
- 11 try and tackle across agencies is how we approach the
- 12 underlying issues that are causing multiple
- 13 vulnerabilities. So, a susceptibility to being drawn
- 14 into terrorism is just one of 14 vulnerabilities that
- 15 policing looks at. It is complex but those
- 16 vulnerabilities are effectively starting to become
- 17 behaviours that are caused as a result of underlying
- 18 issues, whether that's adverse childhood experiences,
- 19 whether that is an autism spectrum condition or
- 20 neurodiversity that is making them more susceptible to
- 21 what other people tell them. So it is a really
- 22 difficult and complex field.
- 23 Q. Do I take from that that you think that -- might you be
- 24 suggesting that some of this work might be for other
- 25 elements of policing than CTP North West, or CTP in

- 1 general?
- 3 because we certainly don't have all of the tools in the
- 4 box or the professional knowledge, from a policing
- 5 perspective, to tackle them all on our own.
- Q. Do you think there are appropriate pre-crime mechanisms
- 7 for violence-fixated individuals, for example?
- 8 A. I feel like there may be a gap there. I think that
- 9 there are statutory multi-agency arrangements that
 - exist, so you have got MAPPA, for instance, but it very
- 11 much talks about offenders. You've got MASH
- 12 arrangements but they are very much focusing on the
- 13 information sharing and coordination of agency activity
- 14 around safeguarding and I think there's got to be
- 15 something in the middle that isn't just around terrorism
- 16 but is around that wider harm that a person may present.
- 17 Q. Perhaps just slightly following on from this to
- 18 a counterfactual: if AR's home had been searched in
- 19
- 20 and ricin seeds had been found, would there have been
- 21 any role for CTP North West in that scenario?
- 22 A. Potentially, yes. I would be having that assessed to
- 24 that was required. So it would be assessed from
 - a Pursue perspective.

- 2 A. For other policing and for other agencies as well
- 6

- - March 2022, after he was found with a knife on the bus,
- 23 see whether there was actually a Pursue investigation
- 25
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Q. So you would be looking for ideology in the FIMU Pursue 2 sense?

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- 3 A. Yes, and through my investigation team as well. I would
- 4 probably have a CTSIO, a Senior Investigating Officer,
- 5 look at the circumstances to see whether it met any
- 6 specific TACT offences.
- 7 Q. So, for example, the Al-Qaeda Training Manual that had
- 8 been found on the devices?
- 9 Α.
- 10 Q. Those are my questions. I will just give the
- 11 opportunity: is there anything else that I would like to
- 12

- A. Just to reiterate what I said in my corporate witness 13
- 14 statement, in terms of passing on my condolences to the
- 15 families, that I think you have probably seen that the
- 16 officers from CTPNW come into work every day to try
- 17 their best to help protect people from terrorism and we
- 18 will do whatever we can to engage with the Inquiry in terms of Phase 2 and contributing to any
- 20 recommendations.
- 21 MR BOYLE: Thank you. I will just look to see if there are 22 any other questions. I don't see any.
- 23 SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: It has been a long afternoon. Thank 24 you very much, indeed, Detective Chief Superintendent,
- 25 you are now free to go

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4	SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: Sitting at 10.00 am?	Questioned by MR MOSS	1
5	MR BOYLE: Yes.	Questioned by MR CHAPMAN	96
6	SIR ADRIAN FULFORD: I'll sit then.	Questioned by THE CHAIR	10
7	(5.04 pm)	DCS SARAH KENWRIGHT (affirmed)	10
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