

Witness Name: MARK WINSTANLEY

Exhibits: MW/01 – MW/23

Dated: 26 August 2025

THE SOUTHPORT INQUIRY

FIRST WITNESS STATEMENT OF MARK WINSTANLEY

I, **MARK WINSTANLEY**, will say as follows: -

Introductory Matters

1. I am Assistant Chief Constable Mark Winstanley.
2. This witness statement is made to assist the Southport Inquiry (the “**Inquiry**”) with the matters set out in the Rule 9 Request dated 16 July 2025.
3. The witness statement is provided on behalf of Lancashire Constabulary.
4. I am the Assistant Chief Constable (Crime) for Lancashire Constabulary. I have held this post since March 2024. I have Chief Officer responsibility for the thematic areas of crime and specialist capabilities, investigations and protecting vulnerable people.
5. I have approaching 29 years’ service with Lancashire Constabulary, the last 12 years of which have been in strategic leadership positions. These roles have been across both uniform and detective portfolios, including the command and control of divisional resources, together with fulfilling force wide roles as Head of the Professional Standards Department (“PSD”) and Head of Investigations and Safeguarding. Prior to commencing my role as Assistant Chief Constable, I was the Divisional Commander for East Lancashire.

6. During my career, I have gained extensive experience of partnership working, specifically in the environment of protecting vulnerable people. Within my role as Assistant Chief Constable, I am the Delegated Safeguarding Partner ("DSP") for the Constabulary on the Lancashire Children's Safeguarding Assurance Partnership ("LCSAP"), working closely with partners to safeguard and promote the welfare of children in Lancashire.
7. I can confirm that I have remained in the same role and rank since the events of the 29 July 2024.
8. Between 2018 to date, I have conducted the following roles within Lancashire Constabulary:
 - (1) 22 September 2018 until 1 June 2020 – I was a Detective Superintendent in the role of Head of the PSD;
 - (2) 1 June 2020 until 1 September 2021 – I was a Detective Chief Superintendent in the role of Head of Investigations and Safeguarding;
 - (3) 1 September 2021 until 1 March 2024 – I was a Chief Superintendent in the role of Divisional Commander for East Basic Command Unit ("BCU");
 - (4) 1 March 2024 until current date – I am the Assistant Chief Constable with responsibility for Crime and Vulnerability.

Factual Narrative of Involvement

9. I have been asked to set out whether I had any direct involvement in Lancashire Constabulary's dealings with AR or his family, and if so, what that involvement was. I can confirm that prior to 29 July 2024, I did not have any involvement with AR or his family.
10. I should like to start by making some introductory comments.
11. Firstly, I find it is quite difficult to analyse with hindsight what officers and staff could or should have done prospectively at the time. This is because the enormity of the horrific events of 29 July 2024 inevitably distorts even the greatest effort to avoid hindsight reasoning.
12. Secondly, I wish to emphasise that my approach to this Inquiry and this statement is not to seek to "defend" Lancashire Constabulary or its officers and staff, but to assist this Inquiry to the best of my professional abilities. Self-evidently it is incumbent upon all public

services to take all reasonable steps to try to prevent such an outcome from ever occurring again. That is my mind-set in this statement. In making this statement I have kept uppermost in my mind the duties consequent upon the Charter for Families Bereaved through Public Tragedy.

13. Thirdly, when analysing what Lancashire Constabulary did or did not do, or could or should have done, in respect of each incident, I have tried to be realistic, having regard to resources and the context policing and other public services were operating in during the period October 2019 to March 2023, in particular concerning children suffering from mental health challenges. So, when I suggest that in respect of any particular incident, Lancashire Constabulary personnel acted reasonably on the facts and evidence presented, I do so with humility and without for one moment suggesting that we cannot improve for the future.
14. Following the attacks on 29 July 2024, and in my role as the DSP for Lancashire Constabulary, I was involved and attended meetings with LCSAP which resulted in the commissioning of a multi-agency rapid review. I did not attend the rapid review meeting on 27 August 2024.
15. I also made the decision, following the rapid review meeting, on behalf of Lancashire Constabulary to progress to a Child Safeguarding Practice Review ("CSPR").

Lancashire Constabulary Corporate Structure, Role & Responsibilities

16. Lancashire Constabulary has a Chief Officer Team which is made up of the Chief Constable, Deputy Chief Constable, three Assistant Chief Constables and a Chief Operating Officer.
17. The Deputy Chief Constable is responsible for the day-to-day running of the force and has responsibility for the PSD, Legal Services and Corporate Services.
18. The Assistant Chief Constable and Chief Operating Officer portfolios are as follows:
 - (1) Assistant Chief Constable (Crime) – Carries responsibility for all aspects of Crime, Specialist Capabilities, Vulnerability and has force responsibility for investigations;

- (2) Assistant Chief Constable (Territorial Operations) – Carries responsibility for Response Policing, Response Investigation Teams, Local Policing, Partnerships, Prevention and Media and Engagement;
 - (3) Assistant Chief Constable (Specialist Operations) – Carries responsibility for the Force Control Room (“FCR”), Criminal Justice, Custody and Operations;
 - (4) Chief Operating Officer – Carries responsibility for enabling departments including Data Protection, Estates and Facilities, ICT, Fleet, Human Resources, Learning and Development, Organisational Development as well as Finance and Procurement.
19. The force has three BCU's. The three BCU's are referred to as East BCU, South BCU and West BCU. For the purposes of this Inquiry, all the involvement and interactions with AR prior to 29 July 2024 took place in South BCU.
20. Each BCU is currently overseen by a Divisional Commander of Chief Superintendent rank. Divisional Commanders were re-introduced on 1 September 2021. Prior to this date, Chief Superintendents were not placed within the BCU's, and the highest ranking officer was a Superintendent. Until 1 September 2021, the Senior Leadership Team (“SLT”) structure within the BCU's comprised of three Superintendents (one detective and two uniform Superintendents) and six Chief Inspectors.
21. Currently within each BCU, the SLT comprises of a Chief Superintendent, three Superintendents and seven Chief Inspectors. One of the Superintendents is a Detective Superintendent, with responsibility for Crime and Vulnerability within that BCU; and three DCIs under the Det Supt for Child Vulnerability, Adult Vulnerability and Crime.
22. In addition to the three BCU Divisional Commanders, the other Chief Superintendent posts within Lancashire Constabulary are as follows:
- (1) Head of Digital and Contact (including the FCR);
 - (2) Head of Corporate Services;
 - (3) Head of Criminal Justice and Custody;
 - (4) Head of Specialist Operations;
 - (5) Head of Crime;
 - (6) Head of Vulnerability.

Force Control Room

23. The FCR is overseen by a Chief Superintendent. The SLT structure within the FCR comprises of a Superintendent, a Contact Centre Manager and three Operations Support Managers.
24. The FCR is made up of Police Control Room Operators ("PCRO") and Police Control Room Supervisors ("PCRS").
25. The key responsibilities of the PCROs are as follows:
 - (1) Receive, manage and risk assess incoming emergency and non-emergency calls, ensuring any contact received is dealt with in line with Lancashire Constabulary policies;
 - (2) Communicate effectively with members of the public, colleagues, and external bodies to obtain and provide accurate information with the aim of providing a high level of service and keeping people safe;
 - (3) Assess the most appropriate response to all contact by applying policy and using the National Decision Making Model and THRIVE (threat, harm, risk, investigation, vulnerability and engagement) risk assessment tool to prioritise the response accordingly;
 - (4) Deploy Police Officers to incidents utilising the Police radio and passing relevant information to officers;
 - (5) Escalate any matters that require the attention of more senior staff in line with policy.
26. In relation to the incident on **7 October 2019** where AR had contacted Childline stating he had been taking a knife into school, the FCR were involved with that incident as follows:
 - (1) On 7 October 2019 at 19:38, PCRO 14490 Whittaker took the call from the National Crime Agency ("NCA") where they reported that Childline had been talking to a young person online who said that they were being bullied at school, that they had been taking a knife into school and that they wanted to kill the person who was bullying them. PCRO Whittaker created an incident log and gave it a 'Grade 2' grading, meaning that officers should attend to deal with the incident within 1 hour;

- (2) At 20:15, PCRO 13381 Wright dealt with the email that the NCA had sent to the FCR in a follow up to the telephone call and created an incident log. This additional incident log was identified as a duplicate and closed by PCRO 14285 Charnley;
 - (3) At 20:19, the FCR informed the duty response Sergeant, PS 4274 Hadi, of the incident and deployed PC 4658 McNamee and PC 872 Wood to AR's home address;
 - (4) At 22:40, PCRO 13052 Livesey deferred the incident log until the morning of 8 October 2019 so the early turn Sergeant could contact the school and inform them of the incident;
 - (5) On 8 October 2019 at 07:19, the FCR advised PS 777 Horton of the incident log and once PS Horton had updated the incident log confirming he had contacted the school, PS 418 Hill from the FCR closed to the incident log;
 - (6) On 8 October 2019 at 14:37, PCRO 12566 Bell received a call from the Range High School passing further information on AR. PCRO Bell updated the incident log and sent an email to PC McNamee, asking him to contact the school;
 - (7) On 8 October 2019 at 16:00, the FCR received an email from the NCA asking for an update. The FCR responded to that email at 15:59 on 9 October 2019, providing a summary of Lancashire Constabulary's interactions with AR following their referral.
27. In relation to the incident on **11 December 2019** where AR had attended the Range High School with a knife and a hockey stick, the FCR were involved with that incident as follows:
- (1) On 11 December 2019 at 09:23, PCRO 12740 McMahon received a telephone call from Acorns School reporting that they had received information from AR's father that AR had taken a taxi to his previous school which they were concerned about. PCRO McMahon created an incident log and transferred it to Merseyside Police (owing to the Range High School being within the Merseyside Police boundary) and followed it up with a telephone call to them. Merseyside Police confirmed during the call that AR had already been arrested;
 - (2) On 11 December 2019 at 10:08, PCRS 11936 Cornwell provided advice to PCRO McMahon to follow the incident log electronic transfer up with a telephone call. PCRS Slater then closed the incident log once the call to Merseyside Police had been made;
 - (3) On 12 December 2019 at 11:30, the FCR received an email from Merseyside Police with a safeguarding referral form attached. At 12:06, the FCR forwarded that

safeguarding referral to Police representatives in the Multi-Agency Safeguarding Hub ("MASH").

28. In relation to the incident on **5 November 2021** where AR's parents contacted Police reporting that AR had been smashing the house up and throwing things around at home, the FCR were involved with that incident as follows:

- (1) On 5 November 2021 at 14:33, the FCR received the incident log when it was transferred from Merseyside Police. PCRO 10347 Cotgrave called AR's mother for an update at 17:33, where she reported that AR was calm and no damage had been caused;
- (2) At 23:31, PCRS 14229 Hopley closed the incident log and on closing, placed a vulnerable marker on AR's home address.

29. In relation to the incident on **30 November 2021** where AR's parents contacted Police reporting that AR had become angry and damaged a rental car, the FCR were involved with that incident as follows:

- (1) On 30 November 2021 at 18:47, the FCR received the incident log when it was transferred from Merseyside Police. At 19:39, the FCR informed the duty response sergeant, PS 3290 Byrne that it was likely to fail its 'Grade 2' status;
- (2) On 30 November 2021 at 20:29, PCRO 7888 Carrington called and spoke to AR's father and asked for an update where it was established that he was no longer causing problems, but the family reported ongoing issues with his behaviour. Once the update was obtained from AR's father, the FCR informed PS Byrne of the update;
- (3) PCRO 11319 Thomas closed the incident log at 01:17 on 1 December 2021.

30. In relation to the incident on **17 March 2022** where AR's parents reported AR missing from home and was subsequently found on a bus in possession of a knife, the FCR were involved with that incident as follows:

- (1) At 11:15, PCRO 12758 Regan received a call from AR's father reporting AR missing from home. PCRO Regan created an incident log and graded the log as a 'Grade 2', meaning that deployment should be made within the hour;
- (2) At 11:46, the FCR electronically broadcast the incident log to Merseyside Police to inform them that AR was missing and included his description, due to AR's home address being close to the border with Merseyside Police;

- (3) At 14:40, PCRO 10676 Moss received a call from Holmeswood Coaches reporting that a male (later identified as AR) was on one of their buses in Ormskirk and was upsetting other passengers. The FCR assisted in deploying PC 8620 Fairclough and PC 1719 Rhodes to the incident;
 - (4) At 15:03, PCRO 13464 Delaune called Holmeswood Coaches whilst the officers were attending the bus to obtain more information;
 - (5) At 15:08, PCRO 14533 Hepburn received a call from AR's mother asking whether AR had been found. PCRO Hepburn advised that the Police would contact her if AR was found, but then rang AR's mother back a couple of minutes later to advise that AR had been found on a bus;
 - (6) At 15:43, PCRO 12683 Birchall submitted the missing from home incident log for closure, and the incident log was closed by PCRS 11840 Collinson;
 - (7) At 16:40, PCRO 14469 Squires added a vulnerable marker on AR's home address.
31. In relation to the incident on **14 May 2022** where an abandoned 999 call was received from AR's parents, the FCR were involved with that incident as follows:
- (1) At 04:26, the FCR received the incident log when it was transferred from Merseyside Police. The FCR deployed PC 2669 Franzoni and PC 275 Andrews to the incident via the Police radio;
 - (2) At 04:34, PCRO 13944 Warhurst received a call from Cheshire Police passing details through of a misdirected 999 call. PCRO Warhurst took details of the call and created an incident log, before closing the log they had created as a duplicate;
 - (3) At 06:22, PCRO 12131 Jeffers submitted the incident log for closure and it was closed by PCRS 11319 Thomas. On closing, the FCR placed a vulnerable marker on AR's home address.
32. In relation to the incident on **21 March 2023** where a call was received from Presfield High School, the FCR were involved with that incident as follows:
- (1) On 21 March 2023 at 16:30, PCRO 11097 Correy received a telephone call from Presfield High School asking for a welfare check on AR as he had not been seen in school for ten months. Following taking the school through the Right Care Right Person ("RCRP") question set, PCRO Correy advised the caller that no Police deployment would be made;

- (2) At 16:40, PCRS 11803 Holden-Pyke closed the incident log after it had been submitted for closure by PCRO Correy.

Investigation Management Unit

33. The Investigation Management Unit ("IMU") was renamed the Crime Support Team ("CST") on 12 June 2023. Therefore, within the period that Lancashire Constabulary were involved with AR, the department was known as the IMU.
34. The IMU are responsible for quality assuring all investigations, both crime and non-crime, submitted by response officers across the force. The main function during the quality assurance is to ensure that all persons involved with that investigation are correctly linked (Persons, Objects, Locations and Events) and that all relevant criminal offences are recorded on that investigation, in line with the National Crime Recording Standards ("NCRS").
35. The IMU are also responsible for accepting closure of non-crime investigations. When an officer submits a non-crime investigation for closure, the IMU will ensure that all persons involved with that investigation are correctly linked and that any criminal offences are recorded on that investigation, in line with the NCRS.
36. In relation to the incident on **7 October 2019** where AR had contacted Childline stating he had been taking a knife into school, the IMU were involved with that incident as follows:
- (1) On 22 November 2019, Staff 10195 Griffiths quality assured the vulnerable child investigation submitted by PC 4658 McNamee and ensured that all relevant persons were linked to the investigation;
 - (2) On 9 December 2019 at 22:06, Staff 10326 Hirst requested filing of the vulnerable child investigation report submitted by PC McNamee;
 - (3) On 9 December 2019 at 23:01, Staff 13002 Smith closed the vulnerable child investigation report submitted by PC McNamee.
37. In relation to the incident on **5 November 2021** where AR's parents contacted Police reporting that AR had been smashing the house up and throwing things around at home, the IMU were involved with that incident as follows:

- (1) On 10 November 2021 at 19:14, Staff 14959 Houldsworth quality assured the vulnerable child investigation submitted by PC 2603 Williams and ensured that all relevant persons were linked to the investigation;
 - (2) On 8 December 2021 at 02:50, Staff 10520 Kershaw closed the vulnerable child investigation report submitted by PC Williams.
38. In relation to the incident on **30 November 2021** where AR's parents contacted Police reporting that AR had become angry and damaged a rental car, the IMU were involved with that incident as follows:
- (1) On 1 December 2021 at 23:33, PC 4077 Mahoney-Stack quality assured the vulnerable child investigation submitted by PC 3384 Ward and ensured that all relevant persons were linked to the investigation.
39. In relation to the incident on **17 March 2022** where AR's parents reported AR missing from home and he was subsequently found on a bus in possession of a knife, the IMU were involved with that incident as follows:
- (1) On 17 March 2022 at 13:37, Staff 14544 Cowell quality assured the missing from home investigation submitted by PC 8620 Fairclough and ensured that all relevant persons were linked to the investigation;
 - (2) On 20 March 2022 at 15:11, Staff 10030 Taylor closed the missing from home investigation report submitted by PC Fairclough;
 - (3) On 21 March 2022 at 10:55, Staff 7608 Dolphin quality assured the vulnerable child investigation submitted by PC 1719 Rhodes and ensured that all relevant persons were linked to the investigation;
 - (4) On 28 March 2022 at 13:48, Staff 14855 Grierson closed the vulnerable child investigation report submitted by PC Rhodes.
40. In relation to the incident on **14 May 2022** where an abandoned 999 call was received from AR's parents, the IMU were involved with that incident as follows:
- (1) On 19 May 2022 at 03:02, Staff 14573 Jordan quality assured the vulnerable child investigation submitted by PC 275 Andrews and ensured that all relevant persons were linked to the investigation. Once the quality assurance process was completed, Staff Jordan closed the investigation.

Protecting Vulnerable People Unit

41. I have been asked to identify key individuals from the Protecting Vulnerable People unit who were involved with AR. I can confirm that Lancashire Constabulary does not have a Protecting Vulnerable People unit (nor has it in living memory). However, it is possible that some officers will use the language of "PVP" when submitting investigations into the MASH because the referral form used to be called a "Protecting Vulnerable Persons" form. But since the inception of Connect in about December 2018 the form is now called the Vulnerable Child (or Adult) Investigation.

Child Protection Teams

42. I have been asked to identify key individuals from the Child Protection Teams who were involved with AR.
43. Lancashire Constabulary's Child Protection Teams are based in each BCU and are staffed by teams of Detectives. The primary purpose of the Child Protection Teams is to investigate offences committed against children in a family setting, as well as to investigate serious sexual offences committed against children.
44. Given the purpose of the Child Protection Teams, these teams did not have any involvement with AR in relation to the matters under investigation by the Inquiry.

Public Protection Unit

45. I have been asked to identify key individuals from the Public Protection Unit who were involved with AR.
46. The primary purpose of the Public Protection Unit is to provide strategic oversight of the Force performance across all areas of vulnerability, as well as to establish and maintain effective governance and accountability arrangements. The Public Protection Unit also provides clear and effective links both internally and externally with strategic partners by ensuring all parties are adhering to statutory requirements and providing the best possible service for those most vulnerable in our communities.
47. The Public Protection Unit underwent an internal Lancashire Constabulary review which commenced in 2023 and led to its renaming to the Vulnerability Governance Unit ("VGU") in September 2023. During this review, a Chief Superintendent was appointed to oversee

the PPU/VGU. The review was split into three phases, and the third phase is still in the process of being implemented.

48. Owing to the nature of the activities of the PPU / VGU, they were not involved with AR prior to the 29 July 2024.
49. Following the attacks on 29 July 2024, the VGU was involved in the multi-agency rapid review which took place on 27 August 2024. Detective Chief Superintendent Nicholas Connaughton, who was at the time the Head of the VGU, attended the rapid review to represent Lancashire Constabulary.

Violence Reduction Network

50. The Violence Reduction Network ("VRN") was established in 2019. The VRN exists to prevent and reduce serious violence across Lancashire by tackling its root causes. It brings together police, health, education, local authorities and communities to work in partnership using a public health approach. The focus is on early intervention, prevention, and supporting people and communities to feel and be safe.
51. The VRN is currently overseen by Chief Inspector Gemma Barr. However, throughout the time that Lancashire Constabulary were involved with AR, the VRN was overseen by Susannah Clarke.
52. In January 2020, a programme called Divert was established by the VRN which was based in custody offices across Lancashire and was aimed at those aged between 18 to 25 years old. Mentors from the Divert programme identified those from that age group who were involved in knife crime and attempted to work with them to address their offending. However, when the COVID pandemic hit in March 2020, mentors were unable to work in the custody offices and their work became based in the community.
53. The Divert programme extended its age range for young people to 10 to 25 year olds in April 2021.
54. In January 2023, Divert formally changed to the Champions programme. When the programme changed to Champions, agencies had the option to complete a referral form online and once that referral form was submitted, it would be reviewed by the Champions

co-ordinator to establish whether it met the criteria. If it did, it would be submitted to the relevant Community Football Trust for them to allocate a mentor to work with that person.

Lancashire Constabulary Policies, Procedures & Training

55. I have been asked to describe and, if not already disclosed, exhibit the relevant corporate policies, procedures and protocols in place at the time relating to the matters under investigation by the Inquiry. Where these policies have changed in the period under investigation, I provide all relevant versions and have set out clearly when each version applied.

Child Safeguarding

56. Lancashire Constabulary currently has (and had in place during the period October 2019 to March 2023) a Child Protection Policy. I exhibit the following policies:
- (1) Lancashire Constabulary Child Protection Policy from February 2017 until March 2023. I exhibit this policy as **MW/01 – LANC000168**;
 - (2) Lancashire Constabulary Child Protection Policy from March 2023 until current date. I exhibit this policy as **MW/02 – LANC000169**.
57. The policies outline that child protection is one of the most important aspects of Lancashire Constabulary's work and that the Force has a responsibility to identify children who might be at risk.
58. The policies make clear that Lancashire Constabulary officers are well placed to identify when a child's welfare is at risk and when a child might need protection from harm. The policies have adopted the Safeguarding, Investigation and Prevention ("SIP") principles.
59. The policies set out the priorities of Lancashire Constabulary when responding to incidents involving children.
60. Lancashire Constabulary also issues Child Safeguarding Help and Guidance. I exhibit the following guidance documents:
- (1) Lancashire Constabulary Child Safeguarding Help and Guidance from July 2020 until November 2022. I exhibit this guidance document as **MW/03 – LANC000170**;

(2) Lancashire Constabulary Child Safeguarding Help and Guidance from November 2022 until current date. I exhibit this guidance document as **MW/04 – LANC000171**.

61. The Child Safeguarding Help and Guidance documents are designed to guide Lancashire Constabulary officers and staff in safeguarding children and investigating child abuse cases. The guidance documents aim to ensure a consistent approach to child safeguarding, emphasise the importance of listening to children and recording concerns accurately, as well as working with other agencies.

Joint Working / Information Sharing with Other Agencies

62. Lancashire Constabulary does not have a specific policy or procedure which deals only and specifically with joint working / sharing information with other agencies. However, reference to working with other agencies and sharing information in the context of child safeguarding is contained within the Child Protection Help and Guidance documents exhibited above.
63. Lancashire Constabulary complies with the national document Working Together to Safeguard Children, the latest version having been issued in 2023. Lancashire Constabulary is one of the statutory safeguarding partners to which the guidance applies.
64. Working Together to Safeguard Children makes clear the importance of effective information sharing between practitioners, local organisations and agencies because to do so is “essential for early identification of need, assessment, and service provision to keep children safe”.
65. Lancashire Constabulary does have an Information Sharing Agreement between partner services within the MASH. This is covered within the witness statement of Detective Inspector Kelly.

Mental Health

66. Lancashire Constabulary has produced a Policing and Mental Health Operational Guidance document, which was issued in April 2023. I exhibit the Lancashire Constabulary Policing and Mental Health Operational Guidance from April 2023 until current date as **MW/05 – LANC000052**. Whilst prior to April 2023 Lancashire Constabulary did not have any such official guidance in place, the Force did provide training to its officers on dealing with Mental Health incidents.

67. The document covers the legislation and powers available to Police Officers where there is, or is likely to be, cross-over with Mental Health issues. The guidance includes detention under section 136 of the Mental Health Act 1983 and the assessment of capacity under the Mental Capacity Act 2005.
68. Lancashire Constabulary also has a mental health multi-agency procedure for detention under the Mental Health Act 1983, which the force has signed up to in conjunction with several other service partner agencies. The procedure clarifies roles and responsibilities of partner agencies to ensure a consistent and effective practice across the North West and includes a specific section relating to Lancashire Constabulary's responsibilities.
69. I exhibit the following procedure documents:
- (1) Section 135 and Section 136 Multi-Agency Mental Health Act 1983 Procedure from November 2021 until April 2024. I exhibit this procedure document as **MW/06 – LANC000008**;
 - (2) Section 135 and Section 136 Multi-Agency Mental Health Act 1983 Procedure from April 2024 until current date. I exhibit this procedure document as **MW/07 – LANC000053**.
70. The North West Region also has a Mental Capacity Act Protocol. The aim of the protocol is to ensure organisations work together, to ensure patients who lack capacity receive appropriate treatment and to ensure they are cared for. Whilst Lancashire Constabulary has included this protocol as a point of reference for this Inquiry, it is important to note that the Mental Capacity Act 2005 only applies to persons over the age of 16 years. Therefore, the Mental Capacity Act 2005 is not relevant to any in-person interactions that Lancashire Constabulary officers had with AR.
71. I exhibit the following protocols:
- (3) North West Regional Mental Capacity Act Joint Protocol from November 2018 until January 2023. I exhibit this protocol as **MW/08 – LANC000165**;
 - (4) North West Regional Mental Capacity Act Joint Protocol from January 2023 until current date. I exhibit this protocol as **MW/09 – LANC000051**.

Right Care Right Person

72. Lancashire Constabulary introduced its RCRP policy in January 2022. The policy was introduced to ensure that Police responses to a Concern for Welfare ("CFW") call are appropriate, proportionate, and legally justified. The policy seeks to ensure that police responses to CFW calls are in line with Lancashire Constabulary's legal duties and that the right person with the right skills, whether that be the Police or another agency, responds appropriately to welfare matters.
73. The policy provides clarity on when a CFW call will become a Police responsibility. It also makes clear that where Lancashire Constabulary are contacted by a partner agency and we do not accept responsibility to deploy Police Officers to conduct a check, the duty of care will remain with the partner agency who made the call.
74. The policy provides clear guidance to PCROs on how they should handle CFW calls and explains the process to be followed should they receive such a call. The policy outlines that, in line with all calls to Lancashire Constabulary, a risk assessment should be carried out for CFW calls.
75. I exhibit the following policies:
- (1) Lancashire Constabulary Right Care Right Person policy from January 2022 until October 2023. I exhibit this policy as **MW/10 – LANC000162**;
 - (2) Lancashire Constabulary Right Care Right Person policy from October 2023 until current date. I exhibit this policy as **MW/11 – LANC000163**.

Individuals in Possession of Weapons / Knives and/or Violent Individuals

76. Lancashire Constabulary does not have a specific policy or procedure on how to deal with individuals in possession of weapons or knives and/or violent individuals.
77. As is the case with all incidents that Lancashire Constabulary Police Officers attend, Lancashire Constabulary expects its officers to apply their professional judgement and to utilise the National Decision Model ("NDM") to aid them in making decisions on how to deal with the specific circumstances of each incident.
78. Lancashire Constabulary also provides training to its officers in relation to matters such as weapons and violence, which I address in the training section below.

Risk Assessment

79. As is the case with all incidents that Lancashire Constabulary Police Officers and staff deal with, the Force expects its officers to apply their professional judgement and utilise the NDM to aid them in making decisions on how to deal with the specific circumstances of each incident. The NDM is a national tool developed by the College of Policing.
80. Specifically in relation to the risk assessment for vulnerable children, Lancashire Constabulary has adopted the following risk gradings when officers are submitting Vulnerable Child Investigations:
- (1) Standard: Concerns for a person's general lifestyle, health or wellbeing;
 - (2) Medium: Suspicion that a person may or is likely to suffer significant harm;
 - (3) High: Evidence that a person is or has been subject to significant harm.
81. I will also describe the training undertaken by frontline and specialist officers, in relation to the following topics.

Child Safeguarding – Training

82. As part of officers' initial training, Lancashire Constabulary provides specific inputs to student officers relating to child safeguarding. The training broadly includes the following:
- (1) Student officers receive a comprehensive input on all aspects of safeguarding children and vulnerable adults. The safeguarding lesson includes an outline of section 11 Children Act 2004, the national document Working Together to Safeguard Children, Police responsibilities around safeguarding, information sharing and the submission of referrals to other agencies;
 - (2) Student officers receive an input from Lancashire County Council ("LCC") Children's Social Care ("CSC"). The training provides an overview of the responsibilities of the local authority, the key legislation and policy guidance on safeguarding children and the Police role in safeguarding children;
 - (3) Student officers receive an input on the welfare and treatment of detained persons. As part of this training, the National Custody Strategy is considered which makes clear that children should only be held in custody as a 'last resort';

- (4) Student officers receive an input from the Youth Offending Team (“YOT”) outlining the YOT’s work in reducing re-offending, diversionary activities, and their contribution to safeguarding of young persons and protection of the public.

Joint Working / Information Sharing with Other Agencies – Training

83. As part of officers’ initial training, Lancashire Constabulary provides specific inputs to student officers on joint working and information sharing with other agencies. The training broadly includes the following:
 - (1) Student officers receive an input on Data Protection. As part of this lesson, the importance of recording and sharing information is discussed and the powers and criteria for lawful sharing of information between agencies;
 - (2) As part of the safeguarding lesson, student officers are taught the importance of recording accurate information on Lancashire Constabulary systems, particularly so around vulnerability. The role of the MASH is also discussed;
 - (3) As part of the lesson on risk and vulnerability, student officers are reminded of the importance of multi-agency working, information sharing and the submission of safeguarding referrals through the MASH.

Mental Health – Training

84. As part of officers’ initial training, Lancashire Constabulary provides specific inputs to student officers relating to mental health. The training provided to officers broadly includes the following:
 - (1) Responding to incidents involving mental health;
 - (2) Communication skills;
 - (3) Powers and Protocols, including detaining an individual under Section 136 Mental Health Act 1983;
 - (4) Considerations for dealing with suspects who are mentally unwell, including when it is appropriate to arrest and the alternatives available;
 - (5) Assessment of an individual’s capacity. Student officers receive a specific input on Mental Capacity Act 2005 including the five principles of the Act and using real life practical examples.

Right Care Right Person – Training

85. When the RCRP policy was adopted in January 2022, Lancashire Constabulary undertook training with all PCROs to ensure that the new policy was fully understood by our staff. The training was delivered face-to-face over one day.
86. The training included the following:
- (1) The aims of the new policy and the expectations of PCROs;
 - (2) The powers and policies relating to RCRP and how they should be applied;
 - (3) Conducting risk assessments in relation to the RCRP policy, including the use of the NDM and THRIVE+;
 - (4) The Police system checks that should be conducted when a CFW call is received.
87. I exhibit as **MW/12 – LANC000287** the PowerPoint presentation (LC-212) that was delivered to Lancashire Constabulary's PCROs around the time that the RCRP policy was adopted in January 2022.

Individuals in Possession of Weapons / Knives – Training

88. As part of officers' initial training, Lancashire Constabulary provides a specific input to student officers on weapons offences. The training is classroom based and is part of a lesson outlining the legislation on offences relating to weapons and corrosive substances. The training outlines the specific offences of:
- (1) Possession of a Bladed Article, contrary to Section 139 Criminal Justice Act 1988;
 - (2) Possession of an Offensive Weapon, contrary to Section 1 Prevention of Crime Act 1953.
89. The training on these matters includes the specific offences and the available defences.

Risk Assessment – Training

90. As part of officers' initial training, Lancashire Constabulary provides specific inputs to student officers on concern for welfare investigations and safeguarding, and which includes how to conduct a risk assessment.

91. The risk assessment gradings for vulnerability investigations are standard, medium and high. The gradings, as defined in the MASH presentation to student officers, are as follows:
- (1) Standard: Concerns for a person's general lifestyle, health or wellbeing;
 - (2) Medium: Suspicion that a person may or is likely to suffer significant harm;
 - (3) High: Evidence that a person is or has been subject to significant harm.
92. Lancashire Constabulary also provides a specific input to its officers on the use of the NDM. This training outlines the NDM and how it can be used to support effective decision-making.

Lancashire Constabulary's Work with Other Agencies

National Crime Agency

93. In relation to AR, Lancashire Constabulary worked and / or shared information with the NCA between 7 and 9 October 2019. The work with the NCA broadly consisted of the following:
- (1) On 7 October 2019, Lancashire Constabulary FCR received a telephone call from the NCA sharing information about AR's online activity. The information included that AR had been talking to Childline online, had referenced taking a knife into school and that he wanted to harm another child, DPA
 - (2) Also on 7 October 2019, the NCA sent an email to Lancashire Constabulary with broadly the same information that was contained in the telephone call;
 - (3) On 8 October 2019, the NCA emailed Lancashire Constabulary asking for an update following the referral that they had made the previous day. The Lancashire Constabulary FCR emailed the NCA the following day in reply, advising that AR had admitted to taking a knife into school, that the knife had now been taken from him and words of advice had been provided to AR. The FCR also advised that the school had been contacted and made aware, and that a high risk vulnerable child investigation had been submitted by Lancashire Constabulary.
94. Following the email exchange on 8 October 2019, Lancashire Constabulary did not work with the NCA again in relation to AR.

95. There are no identified issues in respect of the working relationship between Lancashire Constabulary and the NCA. There is no specific working agreement, insofar as the Inquiry's terms of reference are concerned.
96. Lancashire Constabulary's assessment is that Lancashire Constabulary and the NCA worked well together in sharing information in respect of AR. The NCA took steps to report the matter to Lancashire Constabulary which were sufficient for the Force to act. Lancashire Constabulary kept the NCA updated with the actions taken.

Range High School

97. Lancashire Constabulary worked and / or shared information with the Range High School between 7 October 2019 and 5 December 2019. The work with the Range High School broadly consisted of the following:
- (1) On 7 October 2019, PC 4658 McNamee completed an online contact form to alert the Range High School of the incident involving AR and suggested steps that they may wish to take in respect of the incident;
 - (2) On the morning of 8 October 2019, PS 777 Horton contacted the Range High School by phone to ensure that they had received the online contact form. They confirmed that they had. The Range High School also emailed PC McNamee to confirm they had received the online contact form;
 - (3) In the afternoon of 8 October 2019, there was further contact when the Range High School shared further information with Lancashire Constabulary in respect of the risk AR posed;
 - (4) According to the statement of PC McNamee, on 5 December 2019, he contacted the Range High School by phone to ascertain whether they had reported the incident involving AR taking a knife to school to Merseyside Police.
98. Following the contact on 5 December 2019, Lancashire Constabulary did not work with the Range High School again in relation to AR.
99. There are no identified issues in respect of the working relationship between Lancashire Constabulary and the Range High School. Given the Range High School is not within the Lancashire Constabulary boundary, there is a limited working relationship between us. There is no specific working agreement between Lancashire Constabulary and Range High School.

100. The Force's assessment is that Lancashire Constabulary and the Range High School worked well together in sharing information in respect of AR. Lancashire Constabulary shared information with Range High School so that they could take steps to manage the safeguarding of other pupils, and the Range High School took steps to contact the officer involved to provide further information.
101. As part of the working between Lancashire Constabulary and Range High School, PC McNamee asked the school to contact Merseyside Police directly to report the fact that AR had brought a knife into school. Lancashire Constabulary agree with the observation made by PC McNamee (at paragraph 67 of his first statement), that rather than ask the Range High School to contact Merseyside Police, he on behalf of Lancashire Police should have reported the matter to Merseyside Police.
102. This section does not include any sharing of information or inter-agency working between Lancashire Constabulary and Range High School through the MASH, which is covered in a separate statement by Detective Inspector Kelly.

Acorns School

103. Lancashire Constabulary worked and / or shared information with the Acorns School between 3 December 2019 and 17 March 2022. The work with the Acorns School broadly consisted of the following:
- (1) On 3 December 2019, the Acorns School emailed PC 4658 McNamee with several concerns in respect of AR. The concerns were in relation to internet searches, references to killing and murder, as well as AR's apparent fascination with guns;
 - (2) On 4 December 2019, PC McNamee contacted Acorns School acknowledging their email and queried whether they had made the relevant referrals in respect of AR. The Acorns School responded setting out their efforts to try and make referrals for him;
 - (3) It is understood that PC McNamee and Joanne Hodson spoke on the phone following this email;
 - (4) Also on 4 December 2019, PC 554 Harrison emailed the Acorns School advising that he had been informed by Lucy Parkinson from the Child and Family Wellbeing Service of concerns in respect of AR. PC Harrison asked the Acorns School to refer the information to the MASH as a matter of urgency;

- (5) On 5 December 2019, Jan Lewis emailed PC Harrison advising that she had tried to refer AR to the MASH but had received no response and asked PC Harrison if he could offer any further advice. PC Harrison responded to Jan Lewis advising that he had forwarded her email to the MASH and advised that he had been advised not to attend a professionals meeting in respect of AR as it was 'of higher risk than community safety to deal with';
- (6) On 6 December 2019, PC Harrison emailed Jan Lewis asking if he could attend the school that morning to discuss AR. There is no evidence to suggest that any such meeting took place;
- (7) On 10 December 2019, PC Harrison emailed Jan Lewis asking if he could attend the school the following morning to discuss AR, to prepare himself for a meeting which was due to take place on 13 December 2019. There is nothing to indicate that PC Harrison ultimately attended the school in this capacity. It seems likely that was due to the events which took place on 11 December 2019;
- (8) On 11 December 2019, Acorns School contacted Lancashire Constabulary FCR advising that they believed AR had gone to his previous school, the Range High School. Due to the concerns raised by Acorns School, Lancashire Constabulary FCR informed Merseyside Police of Acorns School's concerns in order for them to deploy officers. When the FCR spoke to Merseyside Police, they confirmed that they were already aware, and that AR had already been arrested;
- (9) Also on 11 December 2019, the Acorns School contacted PC Harrison to advise him of the incident that had taken place involving AR. PC Harrison followed this up by contacting Counter Terrorism Policing North West ("CTPNW") and Merseyside Police (the detail of which is contained in other sections);
- (10) On 19 December 2019, Joanne Hodson sent an email to PC Harrison which contained a summary of the incidents of 7 October 2019 and 11 December 2019. Also attached to the email was a document compiled by the Acorns School containing a chronology and actions taken relating to AR between the dates of 5 October 2019 and 18 December 2019;
- (11) On 11 February 2020, PC Harrison obtained an update from Merseyside Police on the status of the police investigation for AR confirming that AR had recently been charged with assault, possession of an offensive weapon and possession of a bladed article. PC Harrison provided that update by email to Jan Lewis at the Acorns School;

- (12) On 1 December 2021, PC 3384 Ward sent an Op Encompass referral to Acorns School which outlined the incident attended by Lancashire Constabulary and that had taken place at AR's home address on 30 November 2021;
- (13) On 17 March 2022, PC 1719 Rhodes sent an Op Encompass referral to Acorns School which outlined the incident attended by Lancashire Constabulary where AR was reported as missing from home and was subsequently found in possession of a knife.
104. Following the Op Encompass referral on 17 March 2022, Lancashire Constabulary did not work with the Acorns School again in relation to AR.
105. There are no identified issues in respect of the working relationship between Lancashire Constabulary and the Acorns School. There is no specific working agreement between Lancashire Constabulary and Acorns School.
106. Lancashire Constabulary's assessment is that Lancashire Constabulary and the Acorns School worked well together in sharing information in respect of AR. The Acorns School shared information with Lancashire Constabulary around their concerns. Lancashire Constabulary assisted and supported the Acorns School in making referrals to the MASH and in obtaining updates from Merseyside Police in respect of the criminal investigation.
107. Lancashire Constabulary note that an Op Encompass referral had been sent to Acorns School on 17 March 2022, despite Lancashire Constabulary having been made aware on the same day that AR had transferred to Presfield High School. It is therefore recognised that the Op Encompass referral sent to Acorns School would have served no useful purpose and should have been sent to Presfield High School. However, Presfield High School should have still received the information when the referral was made through the MASH.
108. This section does not include any sharing of information or inter-agency working between Lancashire Constabulary and Acorns School through the MASH, which is covered in a separate statement by Detective Inspector Kelly.

Merseyside Police

109. Lancashire Constabulary worked and / or shared information with Merseyside Police between 27 November 2019 and 17 March 2022. The work with Merseyside Police broadly consisted of the following:

- (1) On 27 November 2019, PC McNamee emailed Merseyside Police with brief details of AR having attended Range High School (in Merseyside Police's jurisdiction) on multiple occasions in possession of a knife. PC McNamee queried whether the Range High School had reported the matter to them. Merseyside Police responded the same day confirming that the crime had not been reported to them;
- (2) On 11 December 2019, Lancashire Constabulary FCR received a call from Acorns School informing that they believed that AR had travelled to the Range High School. The Acorns School were concerned due to him having previously taken a knife to school there. Lancashire Constabulary FCR informed Merseyside Police of Acorns School's concerns in order for them to deploy officers. The FCR transferred the incident log electronically to Merseyside Police so that they could deal appropriately and followed it up with a call to them. When the FCR spoke to Merseyside Police, they confirmed that they were already aware, and that AR had already been arrested;
- (3) Also on 11 December 2019, PC Harrison emailed Merseyside Police with background information on AR, including details of AR's previous knife possession and concerning online activity. PC Harrison put Merseyside Police in touch with officers dealing from CTPNW, as well as requesting to be kept updated as to the outcome when AR was dealt with in custody;
- (4) On 12 December 2019, Merseyside Police shared with Lancashire Constabulary a safeguarding referral in respect of AR which was sent to the FCR. The FCR forwarded that safeguarding referral to the Police MASH, who in turn shared it with Lancashire County Council ("LCC") Children's Social Care;
- (5) Also on 12 December 2019, Lancashire Constabulary's Inspector 2323 Kanoun contacted Merseyside Police asking to be kept updated with the outcome from custody. Merseyside Police sent an email that evening to various Lancashire Constabulary officers advising that AR had been bailed on advice from the Crown Prosecution Service ("CPS");
- (6) On 11 February 2020, PC Harrison contacted Merseyside Police asking for an update on the criminal investigation in respect of AR. Merseyside Police confirmed that AR had recently been charged with assault, possession of an offensive weapon and

possession of a bladed article. They further advised that he had been bailed to appear at Merseyside Youth Court;

- (7) On 5 November 2021, Lancashire Constabulary received an electronic transfer of an incident log from AR's parents that had been misdirected to Merseyside Police. The reason the call had misdirected to Merseyside Police is due to AR's home address being close to the border between police forces;
 - (8) On 30 November 2021, Lancashire Constabulary received an electronic transfer of an incident log from AR's parents that had been misdirected to Merseyside Police. The reason the call had misdirected to Merseyside Police is due to AR's home address being close to the border between police forces;
 - (9) On 17 March 2022, whilst AR was missing from home, Lancashire Constabulary electronically transferred the incident log to Merseyside Police asking them to circulate AR's description to local officers. Lancashire Constabulary did so due to AR going missing close to the border with Merseyside Police;
 - (10) On 14 May 2022, Lancashire Constabulary received an electronic transfer of an incident log from AR's parents that had been misdirected to Merseyside Police. The reason the call had misdirected to Merseyside Police is due to AR's home address being close to the border between police forces.
110. Following the electronic transfer of the incident log on 14 May 2022, Lancashire Constabulary did not work with Merseyside Police again in relation to AR.
111. There are no identified issues in respect of the working relationship between Lancashire Constabulary and Merseyside Police. There is no specific working agreement between Lancashire Constabulary and Merseyside Police.
112. Lancashire Constabulary's assessment is that Lancashire Constabulary and Merseyside Police worked well together in sharing information in respect of AR. The information sharing between police forces was timely and appropriate.
113. Lancashire Constabulary recognises (as does the officer himself) that in relation to the email exchange with Merseyside Police on 27 November 2019, PC McNamee could have sent a further email and / or made efforts to ensure that Merseyside Police recorded the incident of 7 October 2019 appropriately on their systems.

Presfield High School

114. Lancashire Constabulary worked and / or shared information with Presfield High School on 21 March 2023. The work with Presfield High School broadly consisted of the following:

- (1) On 21 March 2023, Sheryl Smith from Presfield High School contacted Lancashire Constabulary requesting a welfare check on AR. Sheryl outlined that AR had not been seen in school since 25 May 2022 and that they were concerned about his wellbeing, although did not perceive any immediate risk. PCRO 11097 Correy took Sheryl Smith through the RCRP question set and determined that Lancashire Constabulary would not deploy a police response in relation to AR.

115. The call from Presfield High School on 21 March 2023 was the only occasion that Lancashire Constabulary worked with them.

116. There are no identified issues in respect of the working relationship between Lancashire Constabulary and Presfield High School. Given Presfield High School is not within the Lancashire Constabulary boundary, there is a limited working relationship between us. There is no specific working agreement between Lancashire Constabulary and Presfield High School.

Counter Terrorism Policing North West

117. Lancashire Constabulary worked and / or shared information with CTPNW between 11 December 2019 to 18 December 2019. The working with CTPNW broadly consisted of the following:

- (1) On 11 December 2019, PC Harrison emailed PC Thompson from CTPNW with background information on AR, having become aware that Acorns School had submitted a Prevent referral in respect of him. The background information included the fact he had been expelled from his previous school for carrying knives, details of internet searches, hatred towards teachers and details of the incident that had taken place at the Range High School that morning in which he had attacked another pupil;
- (2) Also on 11 December 2019, PC Harrison provided contact details for, and put CTPNW in touch with, the investigation team from Merseyside Police who were dealing with AR whilst he was in custody;
- (3) On 13 December 2019, Officer B from CTPNW input an intelligence entry onto Lancashire Constabulary systems which outlined the incident that had taken place at

the Range High School on 11 December 2019. The intelligence report also detailed that AR had been researching school shootings on the internet;

(4) On 17 December 2019, PC Thompson informed PC Harrison that she would be attending the Strategy Meeting in relation to AR and that AR would be “coming to Prevent”;

(5) On 18 December 2019, PC Thompson forwarded a report following the Strategy Meeting to PC Harrison.

118. Following the forwarding of the report on 18 December 2019, Lancashire Constabulary did not work with CTPNW again in relation to AR. Lancashire Constabulary has a working agreement with CTPNW, which is issued under Section 22a Police Act 1996 (LC-214). I exhibit a copy of this agreement as **MW/13 – LANC000289** I exhibit the appendices document which accompanies the Section 22a Police Act 1996 (LC-215) agreement as **MW/14 – LANC000288**

119. I have considered whether there are any issues in respect of the working relationship between Lancashire Constabulary and CTPNW. Whilst there is evidence of information being shared appropriately from Lancashire Constabulary to CTPNW, there appears to be a lack of information sharing back from CTPNW regarding the outcome of the Prevent referrals.

120. Lancashire Constabulary's assessment is that PC Harrison shared information well with CTPNW in relation to the risk that AR posed. The information shared by PC Harrison and the assistance he gave to CTPNW in putting them in touch with Merseyside Police was both timely and appropriate.

121. Lancashire Constabulary note that PC Harrison was informed on 17 December 2019 by PC Thompson that AR would be “coming to Prevent”, but it is understood that CTPNW did not later inform Lancashire Constabulary that they were not progressing AR.

122. Lancashire Constabulary were not informed of the latter two Prevent referrals, submitted by educational establishments on 1 February 2021 and 26 April 2021.

123. Had these latter two Prevent referrals and the fact that Prevent were not taking AR after the first referral to them been shared with Lancashire Constabulary, it may have better

informed Lancashire Constabulary officers when dealing with AR on subsequent occasions.

Lancashire County Council

124. Lancashire Constabulary worked and / or shared information with LCC between 7 October 2019 and 23 March 2022. The work with LCC broadly consisted of the following:

- (1) On 7 October 2019, PC McNamee submitted an Op Encompass referral to LCC outlining his involvement with AR on that evening. Whilst the referral should normally go directly to AR's school, due to the Range High School being outside of the Lancashire Constabulary boundary, the process dictated that the referral be sent directly to LCC;
- (2) On 13 December 2019, PC Harrison emailed Anna Jameson of LCC Children's Social Care, updating her on a visit that he had conducted at AR's home address;
- (3) Also on 13 December 2019, Anna Jameson sent Lancashire Constabulary an invite to a Strategy Meeting that was due to take place in respect of AR on 17 December 2019;
- (4) On 17 December 2019, LCC hosted a Strategy Meeting in respect of AR. PC Harrison and PS 135 Bramhall attended from Lancashire Constabulary. Several different agencies attended. Further actions were agreed at the meeting for a number of different agencies. There were no actions identified for Lancashire Constabulary to take forward following this meeting;
- (5) On 19 December 2019, Anna Jameson emailed PS Bramhall advising that a further Strategy Meeting had been scheduled for 6 January 2020 and that the invite for that meeting had not been sent to Lancashire Constabulary as there was no further role for the Force;
- (6) On 3 March 2020, Cheryl Hall from LCC sent the minutes of the 17 December 2019 Strategy Meeting to PS Bramhall;
- (7) On 5 November 2021, PC 2603 Williams sent an Op Encompass referral to LCC (rather than Acorns School) detailing the incident that had occurred that day when AR's parents reported AR had been smashing the house up and throwing things around;
- (8) On 17 March 2022, Lancashire Constabulary sent details of AR's missing from home report to LCC. An Op Encompass referral was also sent to LCC in respect of AR's missing from home report. Whilst it is normal that the Op Encompass referral would be

sent straight to AR's school, this did not happen due to his school being outside of the Lancashire Constabulary boundary;

- (9) On 18 March 2022, Lancashire Constabulary sent details of AR's return home report to LCC. This was followed up by Amanda Chapman from LCC forwarding a return home interview completed by LCC to Lancashire Constabulary on 23 March 2022.

125. Following the forwarding of the return home interview on 23 March 2022, Lancashire Constabulary did not work with LCC again in relation to AR.
126. There are no identified issues in respect of the working relationship between Lancashire Constabulary and LCC. Whilst there is no specific working agreement between Lancashire Constabulary and LCC, a lot of how we should work with LCC concerning child safeguarding is contained within the national document Working Together to Safeguard Children.
127. Lancashire Constabulary's assessment is that officers shared information well with LCC in relation to the risk that AR posed. The information shared by Lancashire Constabulary officers and from LCC was, in the majority, both timely and appropriate.
128. Lancashire Constabulary however note that an Op Encompass referral was sent to LCC on 5 November 2021, rather than Acorns School, despite the knowledge by Lancashire Constabulary that AR had transferred to Acorns School. It is recognised that the Op Encompass referral should have been sent directly to Acorns School and not to LCC as happened on this occasion, although Acorns School should have still received the information when the referral was made through the MASH.
129. Lancashire Constabulary also note that the Strategy Meeting minutes were sent by LCC to PS Bramhall on 3 March 2020, over 2 months after the 17 December 2019 meeting took place. It should be noted that it is not standard practice for Lancashire Constabulary to receive minutes of Strategy Meetings so long after a meeting takes place. It is unclear why a period of 2 months elapsed on this occasion.
130. This section does not include any sharing of information or inter-agency working between Lancashire Constabulary and LCC through the MASH, which is covered in a separate statement by Detective Inspector Kelly.

Lancashire Constabulary Decision Making

131. I have been asked to provide an account of key decisions, assessments, and actions taken by Lancashire Constabulary in relation to the matters under investigation by the Inquiry by reference to a number of topics and issues, emboldened for ease of reference below.
132. **Lancashire Constabulary's response to receipt of a referral about AR from Childline via the NCA on 7 October 2019, which concerned AR taking a knife into school and stating that he was 'pretty certain' he was willing to use it on an identified individual.**
133. At 19:39 on 7 October 2019, Lancashire Constabulary received a call from the NCA which provided the following information during the call:
- (1) The NCA had received a referral from Childline which they had classed as a threat to life. The referral centred around the fact that a young person had been speaking to Childline online;
 - (2) The child had been saying that they were being repeatedly bullied at school and that they wanted to kill the person who was bullying them;
 - (3) The child had taken a knife into school before and said that they will use it and that their anger escalates daily;
 - (4) The NCA had traced the IP address the child was talking to Childline from to 10 Old School Close, Southport, PR9 8SB.
134. Following the call, the NCA followed up with an email to the Lancashire Constabulary FCR which broadly contained the same information. Additionally, the NCA informed that the child had said that they would only use the knife if the person really annoyed them in the moment and when they see the person they just want to kill them.
135. The incident log was given a 'Grade 2' for deployment which means that the expectation is that officers attend the incident within 1 hour of the call having been received.
136. At 21:04, PC 4658 McNamee and PC 872 Wood arrived at AR's home address to deal with the incident. Following their attendance, PC McNamee created a vulnerable child report on the Connect system. PC McNamee completed a summary of the information obtained, including the following:

- (1) AR had been spoken to by the Police, and he admitted that he had taken a knife into school previously and believed he may use the knife if things escalated with the perceived bully, [DPA]
- (2) AR had been informed of the severity of the offence of carrying a knife and that he seemed to understand that and had become upset;
- (3) AR seemed genuinely frustrated about the bullying and that the school had taken some safeguarding steps but had not fully tackled the issues;
- (4) AR's mother was supportive and had already taken the knife from AR and had now hidden all the knives in the address;
- (5) AR may suffer with autism, but this was not diagnosed, and his brother was [DPA]
[DPA] in a wheelchair.

137. PC McNamee submitted the vulnerable child investigation as high risk. PC McNamee shared the vulnerable child investigation for assessment by the MASH. Within his risk assessment, PC McNamee noted his reasons for the high-risk grading which included, "[AR] has been bullied at school and has taken a knife to school. Though he hasn't used it or got it out of his bag this shows potential for huge escalation. Whilst [AR] did appear to understand the severity of the offence and potential repercussions the risk is high that he could again take a knife to school. The school are being made aware and are in Merseyside and [AR] mother has taken appropriate action with regards the knives. [AR] definitely needs support around the bullying issue but also intervention around carrying knives. He does have friends but I believe feels isolated and targeted as the bully only goes for him. The fact that he has told ChildLine and police that he believes he may use the knife in a bullying situation is obviously cause for serious concern".

138. PC McNamee also submitted an Op Encompass referral in relation to this incident. The Op Encompass referral included the information that "[AR] carries knife at school due to bullying from [DPA]". The Op Encompass referral was however not sent to AR's then current school but instead sent to LCC due to the Range High School being outside of the Lancashire Constabulary boundary.

139. That same evening (7 October 2019), PC McNamee completed an online contact form on the Range High School's website. On the contact form, PC McNamee outlined the incident that he had dealt with that evening and advised the school that they may want to take further safeguarding steps including searching AR and speaking to him. PC McNamee

also informed the school that he would complete a referral for AR so that interventions could be put in place. The school emailed PC McNamee the following morning to confirm that this had been received.

140. The incident log was deferred for the morning of 8 October 2019, so that a Sergeant on the early team could contact the school to ensure they had this information. That was completed. An update on the log at 09:06 confirmed that the school were already aware and were taking safeguarding actions within the school.

141. On 8 October 2019 at 09:00, the vulnerable child investigation submitted by PC McNamee was processed by a Police representative of the MASH. Following an assessment by the Police MASH, a safeguarding referral form was created and the information shared with Children's Social Care, Education and Health. The risk grading was not altered by the MASH.

142. Later that afternoon, David Cregeen from the Range High School contacted the FCR asking to speak to PC McNamee. Mr Cregeen provided information over the phone to the operator saying that, when asked about the knife, AR had said that he would use it to stab someone and had also made reference the week prior to 'teachers getting murdered'. The operator updated the incident log with the additional information and emailed PC McNamee asking him to contact Mr Cregeen.

143. PC McNamee contacted Mr Cregeen that same afternoon, 8 October 2019. Following the call, PC McNamee updated the vulnerable child investigation with the information provided by Mr Cregeen. The further information typed onto the vulnerable child investigation was not re-shared with the MASH.

144. On 28 October 2019, AR's father emailed PC McNamee asking for his assistance in making representations to the Range High School. The email from AR's father included the following information:

- (1) A meeting was due to take place at the Range High School on 5 November 2019 to decide upon AR's permanent exclusion from school;
- (2) AR's parents would like PC McNamee to attend with them as they felt that his presence would bring about positive change at the Range High School;
- (3) AR knew what he did was wrong but deserves credit for having reported himself for carrying the knife;

- (4) The school was relaxed about fighting and intimidation and that there was a real gang culture amongst students;
- (5) It was felt the school had reacted too quickly in expelling AR permanently and they were punishing AR, who they saw as a victim.
145. PC McNamee replied to the email declining to attend the school and “certainly not as an advocate for [AR]”. PC McNamee reiterated that AR had committed a serious offence of carrying a knife multiple times and that AR “did not seem to fully understand the possible repercussions, nor show any remorse”. PC McNamee ended by confirming that he had submitted referrals and stated that the school were now responsible for managing the risk AR posed.
146. On 24 November 2019, PS 3762 Carr reviewed the vulnerable child investigation to process it for closure. When he reviewed it, PS Carr rejected the closure and asked PC McNamee to contact Merseyside Police and ask them to complete a crime report for possession of a bladed article.
147. On 27 November 2019, PC McNamee emailed Merseyside Police FCR asking them whether the Range High School had already contacted them to report the crime. The Merseyside Police FCR responded the same day confirming that no such report had been received. PC McNamee did not send a follow up email to this.
148. Following the email to Merseyside Police on 27 November 2019, no further action was taken by Lancashire Constabulary in respect of this incident. The vulnerable child investigation was closed on Lancashire Constabulary systems on 9 December 2019.
149. The position of Lancashire Constabulary is that the response to the call from the NCA, the decision to submit a high-risk vulnerable child investigation, and the decision not to pursue a criminal investigation against AR was appropriate in the circumstances.
150. Lancashire Constabulary recognise that one of the alternative options available to PC McNamee would have been to arrest AR for the offence of possession of a bladed article and / or pursue a criminal justice outcome in respect of this. However, when considering the age of AR at the time of this incident (13 years old), the fact he had not been found in possession of the knife, the suggestion that AR may have had autism, and the safeguarding steps taken by PC McNamee and the school, the decision to instead submit

a vulnerable child investigation to refer to other agencies was I think reasonable and proportionate. The submission of a vulnerable child investigation was necessary to allow for other more appropriate agencies to receive the information and offer appropriate support and intervention to AR.

151. Lancashire Constabulary have identified three points of learning in respect of this incident.

152. The first point of learning relates to the further information that Mr Cregeen provided to PC McNamee on 8 October 2019. The further information provided and placed onto the vulnerable child investigation should have been re-shared with the MASH for further assessment and so that the further information could have been shared with other agencies.

153. The second point of learning relates to the contact PC McNamee had with Merseyside Police in asking them to complete a crime report for possession of a bladed article on 27 November 2019. Following Merseyside Police confirming that no record existed on their system, as PC McNamee has acknowledged at paragraph 76 of his first statement, he should have taken further steps to ensure the incident was recorded on Merseyside Police systems. To do so he could have sent a follow up email with full details requesting that Merseyside Police submit a crime report. PC McNamee has acknowledged he could have recorded the crime report on Lancashire Constabulary systems, transferred it to Merseyside Police then cancelled it off Lancashire systems; or he could have sent a copy of the vulnerable child investigation to Merseyside Police so that they had sufficient information to record it as a crime themselves.

154. The third point of learning relates to the threat posed to [DPA] Following PC McNamee and PC Wood's attendance at AR's home address and the comments made by AR around him having taken a knife into school and wanting to use it to hurt [DPA] the officers should have ensured that [DPA] and his parents knew about this information. It would have been appropriate for either the officers to have contacted [DPA] and his family themselves or equally agreed with the school that they would pass the information directly.

155. Lancashire Constabulary's responses to (1) the Acorns School raising safeguarding concerns about AR on 3 December 2019 and (2) the Child & Family Wellbeing Service raising concerns about AR's behaviour on 4 December 2019

156. On 3 December 2019, Joanne Hodson from the Acorns School emailed PC McNamee outlining some safeguarding concerns in respect of AR. The concerns set out by Joanne were as follows:

- (1) During a lesson, AR had been searching on the internet for school shootings in America. When AR was told by the teacher to stop, AR tried to engage in conversation about it;
- (2) During a lesson, AR was walking up and down and punching his hand hard. AR was asked about business ideas and AR said that starting a new business in the area would not be a good idea as people would think he would kill them and that people do not trust others in case they get murdered. He also punched a laminate from the ceiling hard;
- (3) During a lesson, and whilst painting 'Call of Duty' images, AR said, "Why can we have these with guns but can't look at guns on the internet". AR also asked for a picture of a severed head.

157. On 4 December 2019, PC McNamee responded to the email from Joanne stating that he had tried to call her and accepted that AR's behaviour 'seemed quite concerning'. PC McNamee stated that he had submitted necessary referrals when he dealt with AR and queried whether Joanne had made the relevant referrals with this further information.

158. On the same day, Joanne emailed PC McNamee confirming that AR's early help worker, Lucy Parkinson, was aware of the latest incidents but had been unable to contact his family. Joanne also confirmed that the Range High School had tried to refer AR to the Child and Adolescent Mental Health Services ("CAMHS") without success, but the Acorns School were making attempts to re-refer him through the MASH. Joanne queried with PC McNamee whether there was anything else the school should be doing with AR, as she was worried that AR would 'fall between the cracks'. It is understood (LC-15) that PC McNamee and Joanne spoke on the phone following this incident.

159. Also on 4 December 2019, PC Harrison emailed Acorns School stating that he had been made aware by Lucy Parkinson of the concerns relating to AR. PC Harrison asked the school to make a referral to the MASH as a matter of urgency.

160. On 5 December 2019, Jan Lewis from Acorns School emailed PC Harrison stating that she had already attempted to refer AR to the MASH on 3 December 2019 but had no

response. Jan Lewis asked PC Harrison for advice and also asked whether PC Harrison would be attending a meeting in relation to AR.

161. PC Harrison then forwarded the email he had received from Jan Lewis to Matthew Derbyshire from the MASH, asking him to direct the query from her to the right area. PC Harrison noted that it was 'high risk'. PC Harrison then emailed Jan Lewis to explain that he had already been in contact with the MASH and they could not find her referral, so he had forwarded her email asking that someone contact her. PC Harrison also outlined that he had been advised not to attend the meeting at the Acorns School as "on the face of it is of a higher risk than community safety to deal with".
162. In the afternoon of 5 December 2019, Matthew Derbyshire emailed PC Harrison and confirmed that he had forwarded his email onto the MASH education team.
163. On 6 December 2019, PC Harrison emailed Jan Lewis asking if he would be able to attend the school to discuss AR. This was followed up by another email from PC Harrison on 10 December 2019 asking to attend the school to discuss AR.
164. The position of Lancashire Constabulary in relation to the actions of PC McNamee and PC Harrison is that they both acted appropriately in the circumstances. PC McNamee and PC Harrison offered advice to the school and asserted that they should make the referral to the MASH themselves. Asking the school to make the referral themselves, as opposed to PC McNamee or PC Harrison completing that, is appropriate as it allows the agency with full and first-hand information to make the referral.
165. Lancashire Constabulary have identified one point of learning in respect of this incident.
166. Whilst it was appropriate for the school to make the referral to the MASH themselves, the officers should have recorded the additional information, including that relevant to the risk posed by AR, on Lancashire Constabulary systems as an intelligence entry. Recording this information on Lancashire Constabulary systems would have allowed other officers and staff who dealt with AR to have as much information as possible when they were making their decisions.
167. **Lancashire Constabulary's involvement in the response to AR's attendance at the Range School on 11 December 2019 when he assaulted a pupil with a hockey stick and was found in possession of a knife, including:**

- (1) the criminal justice response;**
- (2) the Strategy Meeting on 17 December 2019;**
- (3) liaison between different departments within Lancashire Constabulary, including PVP, the geographic inspector/place-based chief inspector, and the community safety team and neighbourhood meetings;**
- (4) liaison with CTPNW/Prevent;**
- (5) liaison with Merseyside Police;**
- (6) liaison with Lancashire County Council (including Children's Social Care and the Youth Offending Service/Team);**
- (7) liaison with Acorns School and any other educational institution.**

168. On 11 December 2019, Lancashire Constabulary FCR received a telephone call from Ashley Martindale from the Acorns School. Ashley outlined the following during the call:

- (1) That they had spoken to AR's father who believed that AR had gone to his previous school, the Range High School in Formby;
- (2) AR had been excluded from the Range High School due to him taking a knife into school, so he had now started at the Acorns School;
- (3) That AR was 'hell bent' on causing damage to the education system and that he had been very interested recently in a school shooting.

169. Due to the Range High School being within the Merseyside Police boundary, the Lancashire Constabulary operator transferred the log electronically to Merseyside Police. Following the electronic transfer of the log, the operator followed this up with a telephone call to Merseyside Police who confirmed that they had received the log, that they were already aware, and that AR had been arrested. Merseyside Police took primacy of this incident and investigation due to the offences occurring within the Merseyside Police boundary.

170. PC Harrison, who worked in the Community Safety Team ("CST"), identified through scanning of incident logs what had happened with AR and did so due to his dealings with the Acorns School in the days prior to this incident. PC Harrison liaised with the Acorns School, and, in the afternoon, contacted the investigation team within Merseyside Police to pass them some background information on AR.

171. The background information provided to Merseyside Police included the following:

- (1) AR had been accessing websites relating to mass school shootings, as well as talking about guns and beheadings. He was also reported to have a hatred of certain teachers;
 - (2) The Acorns School had submitted a Prevent referral, and CTPNW were in the process of conducting background checks and obtaining further details;
 - (3) PC Harrison had been given information by Acorns School to the effect that they believed he had gone to the Range High School that morning with the intention of killing a particular pupil with a hockey stick. AR had allegedly said that if the hockey stick did not work then he would have used a knife.
172. PC Harrison asked that this information be brought to the attention of the investigating officers. He also forwarded the email containing the information to PC Thompson (CTPNW) for her to be aware. PC Harrison included additional information in the email to PC Thompson, including the fact that AR had planned and prepared the attack by ordering a taxi the day before, and that he had adapted the hockey stick and the knife.
173. PC Harrison also had contact with Officer B (CTPNW) and put Officer B in touch with the investigation team at Merseyside Police.
174. On 12 December 2019, Lancashire Constabulary received a safeguarding referral from Merseyside Police in respect of AR. The safeguarding referral was sent into the FCR, which forwarded the referral onto Police representatives within the MASH. A police representative in the MASH then dealt with the safeguarding referral by forwarding it on to LCC Children's Social Care. No record of that referral was entered on Lancashire Constabulary systems.
175. Also on 12 December 2019, Inspector 2323 Kanoun liaised with DS Smith (Merseyside Police) asking for an update. In the evening, DS Smith sent an email to Inspector Kanoun, PS 253 Carr, PC Harrison, as well as other agencies including the following information:
- (1) AR had been arrested for possession of an offensive weapon, possession of a bladed article and assault. Further information had been received whilst AR was in custody that he had planned the attack;
 - (2) AR had been bailed from custody on 11 December 2019 to return on 12 December 2019. AR had returned on 12 December 2019 where he admitted to the assault and

possession of the knife, but said he had no intention of using the knife or to kill anyone. He also denied researching inappropriate material on the internet;

- (3) The CPS had received the case and instructed that AR to be bailed for a charging decision to be made. His bail conditions were included within the email;
- (4) The Emergency Duty Team had been kept updated and the Acorns School were unsure whether he could attend the school whilst they completed a risk assessment.

176. On 13 December 2019, PC Harrison went to AR's home address, having been tasked to do so by Chief Inspector 1473 Jones during the South BCU morning risk and threat meeting. PC Harrison reported that he had spoken to AR's mother who assured him that AR would be supervised at all times. PC Harrison advised AR's mother that she should call the police if AR left the address. PC Harrison reported that he believed that the family were in denial over the seriousness of the allegations. PC Harrison also updated Anna Jameson on his visit.

177. Also on 13 December 2019, an invite to a Strategy Meeting was sent by Anna Jameson. The Strategy Meeting was in relation to AR and was to take place on 17 December 2019. Included within the invite were several officers from Lancashire Constabulary. It was decided that PC Harrison and his supervisor, PS Bramhall, would attend the Strategy Meeting and represent Lancashire Constabulary.

178. On 17 December 2019, PC Harrison received an email from PC Thompson (CTPNW) confirming that she would be attending the Strategy Meeting and that AR 'will be coming to Prevent'.

179. At 10:00 on 17 December 2019, PC Harrison and PS Bramhall attended the Strategy Meeting. Also in attendance were several other agencies, including but not limited to, CTPNW, Merseyside Police, Children's Social Care, the Range High School and Mental Health Services.

180. At the conclusion of that Strategy Meeting, no actions were identified for Lancashire Constabulary. PC Harrison and PS Bramhall received an email from Anna Jameson on 19 December 2019 confirming that there was no further role for Lancashire Constabulary and they therefore were not invited to a follow up Strategy Meeting on 6 January 2020.

181. On 21 January 2020, Chief Inspector 1473 Jones exchanged emails with Anna Jameson. The meeting was in reference to a neighbourhood meeting that was due to take place that day, in which Anna explained that she was unable to attend. Anna provided an update for the meeting by email in which she referenced AR. She told Chief Inspector Jones that the criminal investigation remained ongoing and that she had been to see AR and that he 'definitely had ASD', and that CAMHS had also seen AR and they agreed with her assessment.
182. Chief Inspector Jones has been spoken to for the purpose of this statement in relation to this meeting. Chief Inspector Jones has explained that these neighbourhood meetings were either held weekly or bi-weekly and the Police and other partner agencies, including Children's Social Care, housing and representatives from the Community Safety Partnership would attend. Chief Inspector Jones does not remember this meeting or discussing AR and has confirmed that he believes no minutes of these meetings were taken.
183. On 11 February 2020, following a request to PC Harrison from Jan Lewis from the Acorns School, PC Harrison made enquiries with DC Murphy from Merseyside Police to obtain an update in relation to the investigation. DC Murphy informed PC Harrison that AR had been charged with assault, possession of a bladed article and possession of an offensive weapon. DC Murphy also confirmed that AR was due to appear at Merseyside Youth Court on 19 February 2020. PC Harrison forwarded the response received from DC Murphy to Jan Lewis.
184. The position of Lancashire Constabulary is that the response to the incident on 11 December 2019 at the Range High School was appropriate. Given that the incident was within the Merseyside Police boundary, the FCR acted in accordance with standard practice in referring the matter to Merseyside Police to take primacy.
185. PC Harrison took responsibility by liaising with the school, Merseyside Police, CTPNW and Children's Social Care in sharing information and ensuring relevant agencies were put in touch with one another.
186. Lancashire Constabulary were appropriately represented at the Strategy Meeting, and it was not necessary for Lancashire Constabulary to attend the follow up meeting, given Merseyside Police had primary responsibility for the criminal investigation and CTPNW had confirmed in an email that AR was being taken into Prevent. During the Strategy

Meeting, CTPNW confirmed that they would be completing an assessment for AR with a view to considering whether to refer him to the Channel programme.

187. Lancashire Constabulary have identified one point of learning in respect of this incident.

188. The learning relates to the recording of information in relation to information received and actions taken on Lancashire Constabulary systems. Officers involved in this matter received information in relation to AR and the actions taken by other agencies which should have been recorded on the Connect system. This would then have allowed for officers who dealt with AR in the future to be more fully informed.

189. Any involvement of Lancashire Constabulary with AR while he was subject to a referral order as a result of his offending on 11 December 2019

190. Following AR's conviction for assault, possession of an offensive weapon and possession of a bladed article, Lancashire Constabulary had no direct involvement with AR whilst he was subject to a 10 month referral order.

191. Lancashire Constabulary's response to incident LC-20211105-0868 on 5 November 2021

192. At 14:33 on 5 November 2021, Lancashire Constabulary received an electronic transfer of an incident log from Merseyside Police. Merseyside Police had received a call from AR's parents stating that AR had been smashing the house up and throwing things around. The parents indicated that AR had autism and during that call they changed their minds and asked the Police not to attend. Merseyside Police transferred the incident log to Lancashire Constabulary due to the incident being within the Force's boundary. The call misdirected to Merseyside Police due to AR's address being so close to the border between police forces.

193. At 17:08, an operator from the Lancashire Constabulary FCR contacted AR's mother and asked her for an update. AR's mother indicated that AR was calm, that no damage had been caused and she reported that the family were receiving help from several different agencies. AR's mother stated that police attendance at the address would upset AR.

194. A decision was taken, based on the information presented by AR's parents, not to attend the address. Instead, PC 2603 Williams was tasked to deal with the incident log and

contacted AR's parents by phone. PC Williams was shown as dealing with the incident log from 18:00.

195. Following PC Williams speaking with AR's parents, he created a vulnerable child investigation on the Connect system. PC Williams completed a summary of the information obtained from AR's parents, including the following:

- (1) AR had autism, lived at home with his parents and siblings and did not attend education;
- (2) AR did not like people coming to the house and does not like parents going outside. A stranger had knocked at the door which caused AR to become agitated and he had thrown things at a wall creating a mess;
- (3) AR had calmed down when he was aware police had been contacted, and AR's parents had stated police intervention was no longer required;
- (4) AR was calm when PC Williams contacted his parents, they did not want police attending the address and had already contacted Children's Social Care Early Help Support.

196. PC Williams submitted the vulnerable child investigation as medium risk. Within his risk assessment, PC Williams noted his reasons for the medium risk grading including the fact that AR had autism and had unpredictable outbursts, that he was harder to manage as he got older and stronger and presented as more of a threat during the outbursts.

197. PC Williams shared the vulnerable child investigation for assessment by the MASH. PC Williams also submitted an Op Encompass referral in relation to this incident. The Op Encompass referral included the information that "Child has autism and due to person knocking at front door, child has become agitated and has been throwing things at walls. Child calmed significantly on parent contacting police". The Op Encompass referral was however not sent to AR's then current school but instead sent to LCC.

198. When the FCR closed the incident log, a vulnerable marker was placed on AR's home address including information that "AR was throwing things around the house" and "has autism and had become agitated by a stranger knocking on the door, which he dislikes". A vulnerable marker is a flag on the STORM system to alert officers to any relevant information. This marker would have been available for staff to see when further logs against AR's address were created.

199. On 8 November 2021, the vulnerable child investigation submitted by PC Williams was processed by a police representative of the MASH. Following an assessment by the Police MASH, a safeguarding referral form was created and the information shared with Child and Family Wellbeing Service, Education and Health. The risk grading was not altered by the MASH.
200. Following the sharing of information by the Police MASH, no further action was taken by Lancashire Constabulary in respect of this incident.
201. The position of Lancashire Constabulary is that the response to the call from AR's parents and the decision taken to submit a medium risk vulnerable child investigation was appropriate in the circumstances.
202. Lancashire Constabulary also agree with the decision taken by PC Williams to deal with the incident via the telephone, considering AR's autism and the assertion by his parents that police attending the address would affect his autism.
203. Lancashire Constabulary recognise that an alternative option available to PC Williams would have been to attend the address in person. Attending in person has obvious benefits, including being able to physically see AR and assess the home and surroundings. However, with the suggestion of the effect police attendance would have on AR's behaviour in the context of his autism combined with the fact that no criminal offences had been reported, the decision to deal with the incident over the phone was reasonable given the reported circumstances.
204. The submission of a vulnerable child investigation was necessary to allow for other more appropriate services, whom the family had reported they had already made aware, to receive the information and offer appropriate support and intervention to AR and his family.
205. Lancashire Constabulary consider that the decision taken by the Police MASH to refer AR to the Child and Family Wellbeing Service, Education and Health was also appropriate. These three services were best placed to offer support to AR and his long-term needs around autism and lack of education.
206. Lancashire Constabulary has identified a point of learning in respect of this incident.

207. The point of learning concerns the submission of the Op Encompass referral. PC Williams selected 'Out of Force' as an option when the Acorns School was within the Lancashire boundary. Therefore, PC Williams could and should have selected the Acorns School within the Op Encompass referral which would have allowed for more timely information sharing with the school. However, it should be noted that the school would have received details of this incident when the information was shared through the MASH in any event.

208. Lancashire Constabulary's response to incident LC-20211130-1175 on 30 November 2021

209. At 18:47 on 30 November 2021, Lancashire Constabulary received an electronic transfer of an incident log from Merseyside Police. Merseyside Police had received a call from AR's father stating that AR had become angry at the food he had cooked him, that he had thrown a plate of food at and jumped on a rented vehicle. AR's father said that this was a pattern of behaviour for AR, that he had behavioural problems and autism.

210. Merseyside Police transferred the incident log to Lancashire Constabulary due to AR's home address and the incident being within the Lancashire Constabulary boundary. Again, the call misdirected to Merseyside Police due to AR's address being so close to the border between police forces.

211. At 20:29 on 30 November 2021, an operator from the FCR recalled and spoke to AR's father. During the phone call, AR's father outlined to the operator the following:

- (1) The family were having difficulties with AR's behaviour and his anger;
- (2) AR that night had started asking his father questions from the past. AR's father said that the argument escalated resulting in AR closing an internal door, but AR's father pulled it open, and AR kicked his father and punched him;
- (3) AR had picked up a boot cover from a vehicle they were renting and threw it to the floor before picking up some Lego and throwing it to the floor;
- (4) AR picked up a plate of food and threw it at their rented vehicle, causing damage to the front windscreen;
- (5) The family were scared of AR and faced issues with him on daily basis.

212. Following the call to AR's father, the operator updated the incident log, outlining that the family were having ongoing problems with AR's behaviour, that AR had kicked his father

that evening and that advice had been given to AR's father to call back should the situation escalate.

213. At 23:39, PC 3384 Ward and PC 6127 Hall arrived at AR's address to deal with the incident. Following their attendance, PC Ward created a crime report recording offences of assault without injury and criminal damage, as well as appending a vulnerable child report, on the Connect system.

214. PC Ward completed a summary of the information obtained from parents, including the following:

- (1) AR suffered with autism and by the time of Police attendance he had calmed down;
- (2) AR had kicked his father in the leg and thrown food at a rented vehicle causing a cracked windscreen;
- (3) AR's father did not support a criminal investigation for the offences committed by AR and instead wanted advice and support. It was noted that AR was already under CAMHS;
- (4) PC Ward supported the decision of AR's father not to pursue a criminal investigation as the offence was low level, and no injuries had been sustained.

215. PC Ward submitted the vulnerable child investigation as standard risk. Within his risk assessment, PC Ward noted his reasons for the standard risk grading, and stated: "S.39 assault, criminal damage to vehicle. MH". PC Ward shared the vulnerable child report for assessment by the MASH.

216. PC Ward also submitted an Op Encompass referral in relation to the incident which was sent to the Acorns School. The Op Encompass referral included the information that "Offender [AR] with MH issues (autism) during argument with victim (father) over what was cooked for tea, has kicked Father to leg causing no injury. Offender has then thrown plate at red Ford fiesta DPA parked outside on driveway, causing front window screen to crack. Police attended several hours after incident occurred and [AR] (suspect) had calmed down. Victim (father) does not want to support a prosecution against son and was after advice and support. Victim is aware that a referral will be submitted and consents for contact to be made".

217. On 4 December 2021, the vulnerable child report submitted by PC Ward was processed by a police representative of the MASH. Following an assessment by the Police MASH, a safeguarding referral form was created and the information shared with Child and Family Wellbeing Service. The risk grading was altered by the MASH and upgraded to medium. The rationale for upgrading the incident to medium was recorded as “raised to med risk – concerns re violence used by child”.
218. On 6 December 2021, PS 3945 Yahchouchi placed a supervisor review on the investigation. In my assessment, the supervisor review does not appear to make any reference to this specific investigation and appears to be more a ‘copy and paste’ from a template. The review appended by PS Yahchouchi did not include any details that might be considered capable of assisting or advancing the investigation.
219. Following the sharing of information by the Police MASH and the supervisor review documented by PS Yahchouchi, no further action was taken by Lancashire Constabulary in respect of this incident.
220. The position of Lancashire Constabulary is that the response to the call from AR’s father, the decision taken to submit a crime report for assault and criminal damage, the vulnerable child report and the decision not to pursue a criminal investigation against AR were all reasonable and proportionate in the circumstances.
221. Lancashire Constabulary recognise that an alternative option available to PCs Ward and Hall would have been to arrest AR and / or pursue a criminal justice outcome for the offences of assault and criminal damage. However, considering that AR was a child who had autism, and taking into account the wishes of his father (the notional victim), the decision to instead refer AR to other agencies was a reasonable and proportionate one.
222. Given the lack of support for a criminal investigation by AR’s father, it is unlikely that the investigation would have met either the evidential stage or public interest stage of the Full Code Test set out within the Code for Crown Prosecutors.
223. The submission of a vulnerable child report was necessary to allow for other agencies to receive the information and offer appropriate support and intervention to AR and his family.
224. Lancashire Constabulary have identified two points of learning in respect of this incident.

225. The first point of learning relates to the call that an operator within the FCR made to AR's father at 20:29. Within that call, a lot of information was shared by AR's father relating to how the family were struggling to cope with AR's behaviour and how the family feared him. Full information from this call was not typed onto the incident log. As a consequence, other members of staff and the officers attending the incident were not (and would not have been) aware of that information.
226. The second point of learning relates to the supervisor review by PS Yahchouchi. It is recognised that this review appears as a 'copy and paste' and bears no resemblance to the investigation. Given this was a crime investigation, PS Yahchouchi should have conducted a meaningful review of the investigation deciding on whether she concurred with the decisions of the attending officers and identifying any additional steps that needed to be taken. Developmental feedback has been given to PS Yahchouchi in respect of this matter.
- 227. Lancashire Constabulary's response to AR going missing from home on 17 March 2022, and subsequently being found on a bus in possession of a knife, saying that he wanted to stab people, and referring to poison**
228. At 11:15 on 17 March 2022, Lancashire Constabulary FCR received a call from AR's father reporting him missing from home. Within the call, AR's father provided the following information:
- (1) AR's father left the home address at 08:30 to take his other child to school and when he returned at 10:30, AR was not present;
 - (2) AR was in transition between schools and at 11:00 that day he was meant to attend his new school. AR's father had called the new school, but he was not there;
 - (3) AR's father had searched for him prior to calling the police and had rung local taxi companies who refused to provide any information to him;
 - (4) AR was on medication for anxiety and depression, and his anxiety made him very nervous, and he couldn't cope in public areas. He normally only went to a place with his case worker or a trusted person. AR was also reported to have autism;
 - (5) AR's father reported that this had happened previously when he left home in a taxi and went to a school in 2020.

229. Following the call made by AR's father, the operator who took the call undertook some checks on Lancashire Constabulary systems. These checks included the Police National Computer ("PNC") and a check on the Connect system. The operator noted on the log that there were three investigation reports recorded on Connect for AR, one of which involved him having been bullied resulting in him taking a knife into school. The operator gave the incident log a 'Grade 2' grading, which stipulates that an officer should arrive to deal with the incident within 1 hour of the call having been received.

230. At 12:22, PC 8620 Fairclough arrived at AR's home address to obtain details from AR's father to formally record AR as a Missing from Home ("MFH"). Following attendance at the address, PC Fairclough created a MFH investigation on the Connect system and recorded the following information:

- (1) AR had meant to start at Presfield High School the day he went missing and was due to meet his new teachers and have a tour of the school;
- (2) AR had autism and ADHD and due to his additional needs, he left mainstream education and had been awaiting to transfer to Presfield High School;
- (3) AR did not like crowded places and had been prescribed Sertraline to help with his mental health. AR had been missing previously but had been found within a short period of time at the Range High School;
- (4) A small knife was noted as missing from the kitchen and AR's parents believed that AR had this with him.

231. PC Fairclough, in consultation with the duty Sergeant, PS 8515 Clarke, made the decision to grade AR as a medium risk MFH. PC Fairclough completed the risk assessment on the Connect system to assist him in coming to this decision. On completing the MFH investigation, the details of the MFH were automatically emailed to LCC.

232. After AR was reported missing, PC Fairclough completed enquiries in an effort to locate AR. This included checking with local CCTV operators, an area search of the local area and circulating a description to local officers. PC 1719 Rhodes also assisted in the search for AR, as well as local Police Community Support Officers. PC Fairclough had 23 months' service and PC Rhodes' had 12 months service. Both were still student officers and in their probationary period.

233. At 14:40, a call was received into the FCR from a local bus company. The caller indicated that there was a young male on one of their buses who had 'begun to get stroppy', that he was refusing to get off the bus and hadn't paid his fare and that he was upsetting elderly passengers. A description of the male was passed by the bus company and added to the incident log.
234. PS Clarke reviewed the incident log and noted that there were similarities with the description of AR. PC Fairclough and PC Rhodes therefore deployed to the bus, which was parked outside the Hesketh Arms in Ormskirk.
235. At 15:05, PC Rhodes arrived at the bus and spoke to the male, before quickly confirming that it was AR. PC Fairclough arrived soon after. The officers spoke to AR and it was established that he was in possession of a knife. PC Fairclough then spoke to PS Clarke to discuss a course of action. The decision that was made between PC Fairclough and PS Clarke, was to return AR home and not to arrest him for the offence of possession of a bladed article.
236. According to his statement, PC Fairclough's rationale for not arresting AR included the following:
- (1) AR had not made any threats with the knife and was fully compliant with the officers;
 - (2) AR had autism and the information provided by AR's parents was that AR may suffer distress to change. AR was therefore afforded vulnerable person status;
 - (3) The incident appeared to PC Fairclough to be a mental health concern and PC Fairclough's belief was that mental health services were best placed to address the issues;
 - (4) AR was a child, and PC Fairclough did not feel that the custody environment would have been benefit to AR's mental health.
237. On the way back to AR's home address, PC Rhodes sat in the back of the police vehicle with AR and PC Fairclough drove the police vehicle. During that journey, AR referred to 'wanting to stab someone'. AR stated that he wanted what he perceived to be an embarrassing video deleted from social media and said that he had been told by his psychiatrist that if he committed a serious offence, his phone would be seized, and the Police would delete the video. AR also spoke to the officers about the fact he had thought about poisoning others and wanting to make poison.

238. AR was returned home to his parent's house and the officers returned the knife to AR's parents. PC Fairclough updated AR's mother on the circumstances of him being found and told her that AR had talked about wanting to make poison. PC Rhodes also gave AR's parents advice on locking knives away within the house. The officers also advised AR's parents to take him to hospital for a mental health assessment.

239. Following the officers dealing with the incident, PC Rhodes created a vulnerable child investigation on the Connect system. PC Rhodes completed a summary of the information obtained, including the following:

- (1) AR had been reported missing by his parents and when he was located, he was found in possession of a small kitchen knife;
- (2) AR was calm when speaking with officers but was withdrawn. He was compliant when located on the bus;
- (3) AR had disclosed that he was planning on stabbing someone with the knife and had previously tried to make poison;
- (4) AR suffered with ADHD and autism and did not seem to understand the seriousness of what had happened and did not think he had done anything wrong.

240. PC Rhodes submitted the vulnerable child investigation as high risk. Within her risk assessment, PC Rhodes noted her reasons for the high risk grading and stated: "[AR] HAS GONE MISSING AND HAS TAKEN A KNIFE WITH HIM WITH THE INTENTION TO CAUSE HARM. [AR] SUFFERS WITH SEVERE AUTISM AND ADHD". PC Rhodes shared the vulnerable child report for assessment by the MASH.

241. PC Rhodes also submitted an Op Encompass referral. The Op Encompass referral included that '[AR] WAS REPORTED MISSING BY HIS MOTHER ON THURS 17/03. HE LEFT THE ADDRESS WHILST PARENTS WEREN'T HOME. [AR] WAS LOCATED A FEW HOURS LATER TRYING TO CATCH A BUS BUT NOT PAYING FOR IT. MOTHER NOTICED A SMALL KITCHEN KNIFE WAS MISSING TOO. UPON POLICE ARRIVAL [AR] WAS CALM BUT WITHDRAWN. [AR] WAS COMPLIANT AND GOT OFF THE BUS WITH OFFICERS. [AR] ADMITTED HE HAD A KNIFE ON HIM AND WHEN SEARCHED A SMALL KITCHEN KNIFE WAS FOUND ON HIM. WHILST TAKING [AR] HOME HE DISCLOSED HE WAS PLANNING ON STABBING SOMEONE WITH THE KNIFE. [AR] SAID THAT HE WANTS HIS TIKTOK / INSTAGRAM ACCOUNT DELETING AS THERE

ARE EMBARRASSING VIDEOS ON THERE BUT CANT DO THIS HIMSELF AS HE DOESNT KNOW HIS LOG IN DETIALS. WHEN [AR] ASKED HIS PSYCHOLOGIST WHAT WAYS CAN HE GET THE ACCOUNT DELETED SHE SAID SOMETHING ABOUT HAVING TO COMMIT A CRIMINAL OFFENCE. THIS HAS GIVEN [AR] THE IDEA TO COMMIT AN OFFENCE SO THAT HE CAN GET POLICE TO DELETE THE ACCOUNTS. [AR] SAID HE WAS GOING TO USE THE KNIFE TO STAB SOMEONE FOR THIS REASON AND HAS PREVIOUSLY TRIED TO MAKE POISON FOR THE SAME REASON. [AR] SUFFERS WITH ADHD AND AUTISM AND IS BEING MOVED TO A SCHOOL THAT SPECIALISES FOR THIS AND IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THIS IS WHY HE HAS HAD A BAD MH EPISODE TODAY AS HE WAS DUE TO MEET HIS TEACHERS. [AR] DID NOT SEEM TO UNDERSTAND THE SERIOUSNESS OF THIS AND DID NOT THINK HE WAS DOING ANYTHING WRONG'.

242. The Op Encompass referral was not sent to Presfield but instead sent to AR's old school, Acorns School.

243. On 18 March 2022, the vulnerable child investigation submitted by PC Rhodes was processed by a police representative of the MASH. Following an assessment by the Police MASH, a safeguarding referral form was created and the information shared with Children's Social Care, Health and Education. The risk grading was not altered by the MASH and therefore remained as high risk.

244. On 18 March 2022, PC Fairclough completed a crime investigation on the Connect system for the offence of possession of a bladed article. Within the crime report summary, PC Fairclough noted that AR was a young boy who had severe autism and ADHD and had been reported missing. It was noted that when he had been found, he was in possession of a small kitchen knife with a blade length of 2 inches. It was further noted that AR was taken home and the knife returned to AR's mother, and she was advised to secure the knives.

245. PC Fairclough then requested that the crime investigation be closed without further investigation. PC Fairclough used the outcome, 'Prosecution Prevented-Named Suspect Identified But Is Too Ill (Physical Or Mental Health) To Prosecute'.

246. Within the closing report submitted by PC Fairclough, he supplied the following rationale, "[AR] was reported missing earlier in the day by his parents. They described this as out of character and thought it may be in relation to [AR] attending a new school in April, he was

due to meet his new teachers on the day on the incident. [AR] is highly autistic and his new school is to support those with extra needs as mainstream education could not provide the best care for him. [AR] was found on a bus a few hours after going missing, his parents had suggested he may have taken a knife from the home kitchen. When located, [AR] told officers he had this knife. He told officers he thought if he committed a serious crime, the police could help get his social media blocked. Despite a long conversation with [AR], he could not understand the consequences of this. [AR] was returned home and parents are taking him to hospital. A high risk VC was submitted for support. [AR] does not have capacity and prosecution is not appropriate in this instance”.

247. On 22 March 2022, PS 3290 Byrne reviewed the closure request on the crime investigation submitted by PC Fairclough and accepted the investigation for closure.

248. In relation to the decision taken by PC Fairclough not to arrest AR, the officer had a number of options available to him when making the decision on how to deal with AR including arrest and that which he took, namely non-arrest.

249. The actions PC Fairclough took fell within the range of reasonable options available to him. He provided a clear rationale, including that AR was a child, that AR had both mental health and neurodiverse conditions, the effect that a period of detention in custody could have on a vulnerable child, that AR had been cooperative and compliant, that AR had not produced the knife in public and had not threatened anyone with the knife, and that there were more appropriate agencies to deal with AR.

250. PC Fairclough did not rationalise why the stabbing and poisoning comments did not cause him to reflect a little more on possible outcomes. I note from PC Fairclough’s statement that he accepts that when AR made the comments about poison, he could have contacted either his Sergeant or a specially trained officer for advice.

251. I also note that PC Rhodes accepts in her statement that she should have asked more probing questions in relation to the poison from either AR or his parents.

252. I agree with the reflections of PC Fairclough and PC Rhodes, and they should have displayed a higher level of professional curiosity.

253. In my professional view, PC Fairclough or PC Rhodes should have spoken to PS Clarke to discuss the significance of AR’s comments in the car and to determine whether a new

decision needed to be made based on the new information, including in respect of arrest / taking AR to custody / a criminal justice outcome.

254. On 17 March 2022, I had over 25 years' service (compared to PC Fairclough and PC Rhodes who were still student officers and in their probationary period). Doing the best I can to avoid hindsight reasoning, I think I would have arrested AR once it was established that he had a knife in a public place.

255. Even if I have subconsciously been influenced in that proposition by hindsight knowledge as to what happened on 29 July 2024, I think the further revelation by AR in the police car about wanting to stab someone and reference to poison would have reinforced my view.

256. I would like to make it clear that I also think that PC Fairclough's decision not to arrest and criminalise AR was a reasonable one. Two officers faced with the same facts can reasonably come to different operational decisions. I also repeat that PC Fairclough is to be credited with having rationalised his position and characterised this as high risk in the vulnerable child investigation.

257. We encourage and support officers to make arrests where it is necessary, reasonable and proportionate to do so. However, we are also clear in our understanding of how the Government and the public expect us to police, and that the interests of children, and particularly children experiencing mental health difficulties, are not best served by taking them into custody. Consequently, Police Officers are required to use their discretion and professional judgement when making decisions on whether a child should be arrested, considering the individual circumstances of each incident and this overarching context.

258. I consider that it is important to note some further context in relation to the type of training and guidance that Lancashire Constabulary Officers are and were operating with at the time this incident occurred:

(1) The Lancashire Constabulary intranet article dated 3 February 2022 which I exhibit as **MW/15 – LANC000247**. This sets out that the law recognises that police cells are not a suitable place for children. The article quoted the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and said that custody should be "used only as a measure of last resort and for the shortest appropriate period of time";

(2) Lancashire Constabulary training given to student officers on the welfare and treatment of detained persons. I exhibit the PowerPoint presentation (LC-213) as

MW/16 – [LANC000281]. The training, on slide 2 of the PowerPoint presentation, makes clear that the National Custody Strategy issued by the National Police Chiefs' Council seeks to "ensure children are only held in custody as a last resort" and encourages "innovative but appropriate alternatives to custody".

(3) His Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Service inspection of Lancashire Constabulary custody suites in March 2023. Part of the inspection reviewed the detention of children in custody and whether Lancashire Constabulary were detaining children in custody only when absolutely necessary.

259. I note that PC Fairclough expresses the view that the custody officer would not have authorised detention and yet on the other hand we had a child who was armed with a knife and expressing the desire to stab someone. The foregoing merely emphasises the unenviable situation that PC Fairclough was facing.

260. Lancashire Constabulary have identified seven points of learning in relation to this incident.

261. The first area of learning relates to the amount of information PC Fairclough and PC Rhodes accessed when making the decision not to arrest AR. A key part of the NDM relates to gathering as much information as possible when making decisions. Therefore, it follows that whilst PC Fairclough did do some checks in relation to AR's history, more background checks could have been completed and/or information obtained via the FCR. For instance, I note from the statement of PC Fairclough that he considers he could have done further checks to establish the full circumstances of AR's previous conviction from 2020. I also note that PC Fairclough assumed that the vulnerable child investigation from October 2019 and the intelligence entry from December 2019 were one and the same, which, of course, they were not.

262. It should be noted, however, that a key piece of information, namely the three Prevent referrals, would not have been available to any officers within Lancashire Constabulary.

263. The second area of learning is around the number of questions that PC Fairclough and PC Rhodes asked of AR and his parents regarding AR's comments in the police car. Whilst PC Fairclough did ask some follow up questions in the car when they were driving AR home, more questions should have been asked around the topic of poison and the comments about wanting to stab someone. Those further questions should have been

asked of AR in the car and of AR's mother. The further questioning, and the possible information obtained from such questioning, might then have been used as part of the decision-making process.

264. The third area of learning relates to PC Fairclough and PC Rhodes discussing the matter initially with PS Clarke but not contacting the Sergeant again upon AR making concerning comments about poison and wanting to stab someone. Those comments, and any further information obtained through probing questions (as above) could have been discussed with the duty sergeant with a view to considering whether the decision not to arrest was still appropriate.

265. The fourth area of learning is around the fact a Prevent referral was not completed in respect of this incident. Based on the comments made by AR, especially about poison and his prior history, it might have been appropriate for a Prevent referral to have been completed. Submission of a Prevent referral within Lancashire Constabulary extends to the submission of an intelligence entry on the Connect system with the relevant information with the keyword 'KSENTINEL'. Submission of the intelligence entry would have allowed CTPNW to identify the information and make an assessment as to whether it met their criteria for acceptance. Communication has since been provided to all staff to remind them of this process. I exhibit the communication that has been provided to staff as follows:

- (1) Lancashire Constabulary intranet article on Prevent referrals dated 15 April 2024. I exhibit this article (LC-208) as **MW/17 – LANC000279**;
- (2) Lancashire Constabulary intranet article on Prevent dated 25 November 2024. I exhibit this article (LC-209) as **MW/18 – LANC000278**;
- (3) Lancashire Constabulary intranet article on Prevent referrals dated 22 May 2025. I exhibit this article (LC-207) as **MW/19 – LANC000280**;
- (4) Lancashire Constabulary 7 minute briefing on Prevent referrals. I exhibit this briefing document (LC-210) as **MW/20 – LANC000275**.

266. The fifth area of learning relates to involvement with other agencies. PC Fairclough and PC Rhodes deemed this to be a mental health episode and suggested to AR's parents that they should take him to hospital for a mental health assessment. Given the concerns around AR's mental health and the circumstances of the incident, the officers could have contacted mental health services or CAMHS directly for advice and more timely

intervention. Whilst the officers did submit a vulnerable child investigation which was sent to health services in the MASH, contacting mental health services from the scene may have allowed for more timely intervention and immediate support. That is particularly so in circumstances where it was subsequently recorded that AR 'does not have capacity' and that therefore the matter was not suitable for arrest, and that AR was 'too ill' for prosecution.

267. The sixth learning point is that police officers are not qualified to assess a subject's mental capacity in determining whether they are accountable for their offending actions which is the domain of appropriately qualified mental health professionals. Officers should instead use plain language to describe the facts of how the person is presenting to them and their subjective belief that they are not capable of understanding or controlling their actions. This features in the initial training for all newly recruited officers and has done for a number of years. Lancashire Constabulary has also issued a reminder to all staff on assessing capacity. I exhibit the intranet article on assessing capacity dated 26 August 2025 (LC-211) as **MW/21 – LANC000276**. The Force is currently conducting a series of refresher training to our front line officers on this matter.

268. The seventh point of learning relates to referring AR to the VRN. No referral was made to the VRN by the attending officers. The officers say that the reason they did not do this is because they did not know of the existence of the VRN, which may reflect the fact that both officers were student officers and / or that the VRN was relatively new (having been launched in 2019). A VRN referral could have been completed, but only if AR consented, which would have allowed his details to be shared with the VRN for further assessment and potential acceptance onto a violence reduction programme. Lancashire Constabulary have recently been engaged with a review of the structure and functions of the VRN, and briefings to all staff will be incorporated into the implementation plan.

269. With regards to the second and third points of learning referenced above (paragraphs 263 and 264), during the process of proofreading this statement, additional information was brought to my attention by Lancashire Constabulary disclosure officers responsible for reviewing documents disclosed to the Inquiry by other Core Participants.

270. I understand that documents indicate that in January 2022 AR purchased Ricinus seeds, alcohol, a mortar and pestle set, filter paper, conical flask, plastic funnel and a food storage container. It is my understanding that those are items that could be used to produce the poison ricin.

271. It therefore falls to me to further reflect on whether more detailed questioning by the officers regarding AR's comments might have elicited further relevant information. Additionally, whether such further information may have led the officers to re-contact their Sergeant and seek further advice on what course of action to take, and whether AR should be arrested.

272. Having reflected on this new information, and what I have said previously about the actions taken by PC Fairclough and PC Rhodes, I remain of the view that further questions should have been asked of AR and his parents. I find it impossible to say what would have happened with any certainty, including whether that would have resulted in any further police action, because that would depend upon the answers given and any further information that the officers received.

273. As I have mentioned, both PC Fairclough and PC Rhodes were relatively inexperienced officers at the time of this incident, and both were still in their probation period. Incidents involving making poison are highly unusual and exceptionally rare. PS Clarke states that in his 8 years' service as a police officer he had only had one involvement in any incident involving poison. Personally, I cannot recall ever having been involved in any incident relating to the production of poison throughout my own policing career. Had the officers elicited further information from AR that caused them to approach PS Clarke for additional advice, it is likely that he would have needed to seek specialist investigative advice to help inform a decision on what the most appropriate next course of action could be.

274. Lancashire Constabulary's response to incident 20220514-0226 on 14 May 2022

275. At 04:26 on 14 May 2022, Lancashire Constabulary received an electronic transfer of an incident log from Merseyside Police. Merseyside Police had received a 999 call in which a female was heard to ask for the police. However, the telephone call then ended. Checks against the reporting mobile number showed that previous calls had been received from AR's mother. Merseyside Police transferred the incident log to Lancashire Constabulary due to AR's home address and the incident being within the Force boundary.

276. Due to the fact the call had been abandoned and attempts by Merseyside Police to recontact had been unsuccessful, combined with the vulnerable markers from previous incidents on the address, officers attended the address 'Grade 1'. In effect, this means

that officers attending would do so with their emergency lights and sirens on their police vehicles activated.

277. PC 275 Andrews and PC 2669 Franzoni attended the incident. PC Franzoni arrived at the address at 04:54, with PC Andrews arriving two minutes later at 04:56. Following attendance at the address, PC Andrews created a vulnerable child investigation report on the Connect system. PC Andrews completed a summary of the incident and the information he had obtained when dealing with the incident, which included the following:

- (1) AR's father answered the door on police arrival and provided information that AR had been causing issues and had autism;
- (2) AR had suddenly awoken demanding a laptop computer, but he had been denied access due to it being the early hours of the morning;
- (3) AR had thrown food around the kitchen, locked himself in the bathroom and over filled the bath causing the electricity to short out;
- (4) AR refused to attend his educational establishment and had been refusing to take his prescribed medication for autism, which was having a profound effect on his wellbeing;
- (5) AR was getting older and stronger, and parents were struggling to cope with him.

278. PC Andrews made the decision to submit the vulnerable child investigation as high risk. Within his risk assessment, PC Andrews noted his reasons for the high risk grading, stating "Severe autism". PC Andrews shared the vulnerable child report for assessment by the MASH.

279. PC Andrews also submitted an Op Encompass referral in relation to this incident. The Op Encompass referral included the information that "He refuses to attend education". The Op Encompass referral was, however, not sent to AR's then current school but instead sent to LCC.

280. When the FCR closed the incident log, a vulnerable marker was placed on AR's home address with information that "[AR] who has not taken his medication for over a week and this morning has been throwing food and water all over his room looking for a laptop. Parents will be speaking to Camhs and GP for help and advice". This marker would have been available for staff to see when further logs against AR's address were created.

281. That same morning, the vulnerable child investigation submitted by PC Andrews was processed by a police representative of the MASH. Following an assessment by the Police MASH, a safeguarding referral form was created and the information shared with Early Help Hub, Education and Health. The risk grading was altered by the MASH and downgraded to medium. The rationale for downgrading the incident to medium was recorded as "Downgraded to medium vc as [AR] would benefit from intervention and support in being able to manage his behaviour. As well as advice and support for his family who are struggling to cope".
282. Following the sharing of information by the Police MASH, no further action was taken by Lancashire Constabulary in respect of this incident.
283. The position of Lancashire Constabulary is that the response to the abandoned 999 call, the decision to attend as an emergency and the decision to submit a vulnerable child report were all appropriate in the circumstances and in accordance with standard policing practice.
284. There were no alternative options available to PC Andrews and PC Franzoni since no criminal offences had been committed and the family stated they needed support in managing AR.
- 285. Lancashire Constabulary's response to incident LC-20230321-0958 on 21 March 2023**
286. At 16:30 on 21 March 2023, Lancashire Constabulary received a call from Presfield High School. The call was to request a welfare check for one of their students. The operator obtained details from the caller including her name and the school she was calling from, before taking the caller through a question set aimed at determining whether a Police deployment should be made in accordance with the RCRP policy.
287. On completing the question set, the operator PCRO 11097 Correy asked the caller whether there was an immediate risk to the student. The caller responded by saying that the child had not been seen since 25 May 2022 and that 'every time we try to go over to the house we are told his mental health needs ... we can't see him'. The caller also advised that CAMHS had seen the child in January but that the school had been concerned that they had not been able to check on his welfare at all.

288. During the question set, the caller also stated that the child had 'mental health needs' but when asked if she knew what those needs were, the caller responded, "I don't to be honest with you. Obviously there is anxiety there but other than that I don't know, I don't know the, the absolute details". The caller also outlined that the child's behaviours in the home 'can be difficult for parents'.
289. Based on the answers that the caller provided, the operator advised the caller that, "the incident doesn't meet the threshold for attendance and as a result the police will not be attending". The caller then asked the operator for his details and ended the call.
290. The operator completed a 'THRIVE+' assessment of the information that had been provided by the caller which was appended to the incident log.
291. Following the call ending, no further action was taken by Lancashire Constabulary in respect of this incident.
292. The position of Lancashire Constabulary is that further information should have been asked by PCRO Correy during the call which would have aided a better THRIVE+ assessment. For instance, PCRO Correy did not ask the name or age of the child, or probe further around the suggestion that the child suffered with mental health issues. In accordance with Lancashire Constabulary's RCRP policy in place at the time of the call, system checks looking at previous calls to the address and looking at markers on STORM would have been appropriate.
293. I have considered and understand PCRO Correy's rationale that such checks are to be conducted when 'necessary' and that because RCRP had indicated no police response, he did not regard such checks as being 'necessary'.
294. However, Lancashire Constabulary staff and officers should always seek to obtain as much information as possible in order to determine how best to deal with any incident.
295. Lancashire Constabulary have identified one area of learning in respect of this incident.
296. The learning relates to the amount of information PCRO Correy obtained during that call. PCRO Correy did not follow Lancashire Constabulary's RCRP policy or the training that he was provided with. For instance, he should have conducted basic checks on the

STORM system looking at previous calls to AR's address and any warning markers against the property, as well as asking for AR's full name and age. The further information should have been obtained to inform a proper THRIVE+ assessment.

297. I do not believe that police should have deployed to AR's home address on this occasion. He was not missing from home and the caller confirmed that there was no immediate risk to the student. Police are not the appropriate agency to deal with educational issues where there is no identified imminent risk of harm. This does not however mean that PCRO Correy should not have undertaken a more comprehensive approach and asked more questions to better inform his decision making.

298. I have been asked to provide details of Lancashire Constabulary's liaison/information-sharing in relation to AR with any other law enforcement organisation, LCC (including Children's Social Care and the Youth Offending Team), educational institutions, CAMHS and any other relevant agency. I believe I have covered these matters both in this section and the working with other agencies section.

299. I have been asked to identify any areas where I consider that those key decisions, assessments and actions were inconsistent with the relevant policies and appropriate practices. I believe I have covered each of those matters above.

300. I have been asked to identify why those policies and practices were not followed, if that was the case. I believe I have covered each of those matters above.

301. I have been asked whether consideration was given to referring AR to the Violence Reduction Network at any stage and, if so, why he was not referred, and, if not, why not. I believe I have covered each of those matters above.

Reflection on Events

302. Following the events of 29 July 2024, Lancashire Constabulary commissioned a review of any incidents in which Lancashire Constabulary had any involvement with AR. The review was conducted by our PSD and was coordinated by Detective Inspector Duncan and overseen by the then Head of the PSD, Detective Superintendent Mainey.

303. The main purposes of the review were to consider whether any misconduct was identified from our interactions, whether a referral to the Independent Office for Police Conduct

("IOPC") was necessary, and whether there was any immediate learning that needed to be addressed.

304. Whilst the review was coordinated by PSD, the opinion of subject matter experts was also sought. This included representatives from the FCR, MASH and our Mental Health Co-ordinator.

305. The review considered the following:

- (1) Lancashire Constabulary's response to the call from the NCA on 7 October 2019 including how the contact from the NCA was handled within the FCR, how the incident was dealt with and the actions taken by the attending officers and the MASH involvement with sharing information;
- (2) Lancashire Constabulary's response to the call from Acorns School on 11 December 2019 including how the contact from the Acorns School was handled in the FCR, the passing of the incident log to Merseyside Police and the intelligence entry submitted on Lancashire Constabulary systems on 13 December 2019;
- (3) Lancashire Constabulary's response to the incident log received from Merseyside Police on 5 November 2021 including how the log was dealt with in the FCR, the follow up call made by the FCR to AR's parents, the actions taken by the officer who dealt with the incident over the phone and the MASH involvement with sharing information;
- (4) Lancashire Constabulary's response to the incident log received from Merseyside Police on 30 November 2021 including how the log was dealt with in the FCR, the follow up call made by the FCR to AR's parents, the actions taken by the officer who attended the incident and the MASH involvement with sharing information;
- (5) Lancashire Constabulary's response to AR's father reporting AR missing from home on 17 March 2022 and AR subsequently being located on a bus in possession of a knife, including how the log was dealt with in the FCR, the initial call made by AR's father, the actions taken by the officers who attended the incident and the MASH involvement with sharing information;
- (6) Lancashire Constabulary's response to the incident log received from Merseyside Police on 14 May 2022 including how the log was dealt with in the FCR, the actions taken by the officer who attended the incident and the MASH involvement with sharing information;

- (7) Lancashire Constabulary's response to the call from Presfield High School on 21 March 2023 including how the call was dealt with in the FCR, the information obtained from the school and the application of the RCRP policy.

306. Upon completion of the review, a report was prepared by Det Insp Duncan, which I exhibit as **MW/22 – LANC000096**. Det Insp Duncan's report identified the following points:

- (1) Lancashire Constabulary had contact (either directly or indirectly) with AR on 7 occasions between 11 December 2019 and 21 March 2023;
- (2) There were 5 occasions where Lancashire Constabulary made referrals to other agencies through the MASH;
- (3) Each referral to other agencies had been dealt with appropriately and shared with appropriate agencies;
- (4) A referral to the VRN could have been considered due to risk around knife crime, however it was noted that AR would have to have consented to this. It was also noted that had such a referral been made, this may have generated further information sharing or a multi-agency meeting;
- (5) In relation to the incident on 17 March 2022, the officers dealing could have considered either arresting AR for possession a bladed article or detaining him under section 136 Mental Health Act 1983. It was noted that AR was already known to mental health services and that given his presentation, detention under the Mental Health Act 1983 was not a necessary course of action;
- (6) That further information should have been obtained during the call between the caller from Presfield School and Lancashire Constabulary on 21 March 2023.

307. Following the review, it was determined that no misconduct had been identified for any officer or staff member who had been involved with these incidents. It was determined that Lancashire Constabulary's involvement with AR did not meet the criteria for referral to the IOPC.

308. The PSD review considered information that was available on Lancashire Constabulary systems. Since some information was not available to PSD during that initial review (such as emails sent to / from Lancashire Constabulary staff and officers), the following contact was not considered as part of the PSD review:

- (1) Lancashire Constabulary's interaction with AR's father by email on 28 October 2019;

- (2) Lancashire Constabulary's response to the Acorns School raising safeguarding concerns about AR on 3 December 2019 and the Child and Family Wellbeing Service raising concerns about AR on 4 December 2019;
- (3) Lancashire Constabulary's information sharing and liaison with Merseyside Police, CTPNW, Children's Social Care and Acorns School after the incident at the Range High School on 11 December 2019;
- (4) Lancashire Constabulary's visit to AR's home address on 13 December 2019;
- (5) Lancashire Constabulary's attendance at a Strategy Meeting in relation to AR on 17 December 2019.

309. Whilst this information was not considered by Lancashire Constabulary's PSD at the time, having reviewed the materials and information now available, I have formed the view that it remains the position that there has been no misconduct for any officer or staff member who had been involved with these incidents and that no referral to the IOPC is or was required.

310. On 27 August 2024, Lancashire Constabulary took part in a multi-agency rapid review which was commissioned by the LCSAP. Detective Chief Superintendent Nicholas Connaughton attended to represent Lancashire Constabulary. Several agencies who had been involved with AR and his family attended this meeting, chaired by LCC.

311. During the meeting, Lancashire Constabulary acknowledged that information shared with other agencies regarding the incident on 17 March 2022 could potentially have been improved. Following the meeting, as part of the rapid review action plan, Lancashire Constabulary undertook some work to improve education with front line officers on Op Encompass, to emphasise why Op Encompass is important, and to highlight the need for high quality and detailed referrals. The specific actions have been detailed within the witness statement of Detective Inspector Marston and are not repeated in this statement.

312. The minutes of the rapid review meeting were circulated to agencies on 30 August 2024. I exhibit the minutes as **MW/23 – LANC000021**.

313. I have been asked to identify any lessons that Lancashire Constabulary have learned in relation to the matters under investigation by the Inquiry and the process(es) that the Force went through to identify and develop these.

314. Through the PSD review and rapid review meeting, the following learning was identified:

- (1) In relation to the incidents on 7 October 2019 and 17 March 2022, no referral was made by the officers to the VRN. The witness statements of the officers who attended these incidents have made clear that they had no knowledge of the VRN. Whilst the report highlighted that a referral to the VRN could have been made on both occasions, it has subsequently been identified that the option to refer to the VRN would have only been available for the incident on 17 March 2022. The Champions programme (referred to as Divert in 2019) would not have been an option in 2019 as it was only open to persons aged between 18 to 25 years old. Lancashire Constabulary recognise that the VRN is not covered in officers' initial training and this is being reviewed. Lancashire Constabulary therefore understands the need to improve knowledge to the front line on the VRN;
- (2) PCRO Correy could have asked more information on the call from Presfield High School on 21 March 2023. Following this learning being identified, PCRO Correy was provided with immediate feedback by his line managers;
- (3) The quality of Op Encompass referrals could be improved so that more information is shared with schools by Lancashire Constabulary Police Officers. Lancashire Constabulary is already undertaking work to improve this, which is covered within the witness statement of Det Insp Marston.

315. In relation to wider learning, Lancashire Constabulary agreed to take part in the multi-agency CSPR which was commissioned on 30 August 2024. However, following the announcement of the Southport Public Inquiry, on 27 March 2025 a multi-agency decision was taken to pause the CSPR. Lancashire Constabulary considers that any learning for the organisation will be best identified through this Inquiry process.

316. I have been asked to detail any changes made to policies, procedures or corporate structure as a result of the matters under investigation or as a result of reviews undertaken following the matters under investigation by the Inquiry. Lancashire Constabulary has implemented learning where issues have been identified during reviews undertaken relating to the matters under investigation by the Inquiry. However, this has not resulted in any major changes to policies, procedures or corporate structure. Lancashire Constabulary has however made significant changes to its operating model and associated policies and procedures since these events. These changes are described later within the Improvements section of this statement.

317. I have been asked whether I consider that prior to 29 July 2024, Lancashire Constabulary identified and addressed, adequately or at all, the risk that AR posed to others. I would like to answer this question in relation to each of the incidents that Lancashire Constabulary were involved with AR.
318. In relation to the first incident on **7 October 2019**, Lancashire Constabulary considers that the officers identified the risk that AR posed to others. The officers mitigated this risk by contacting AR's school by email on the night of the incident and following this up with a phone call the following morning. Those actions resulted in AR's immediate removal from the school and therefore afforded protection to other students. Lancashire Constabulary accepts, however, that [DPA] the child who AR named as wanting to hurt, should have either been spoken to directly by officers or confirmation obtained from the school that they had informed [DPA] and his parents of the threat.
319. In relation to the contact from the Acorns School on **3 December 2019** and the Child and Family Wellbeing Service on **4 December 2019**, Lancashire Constabulary considers that the officers identified the risk that AR posed to others. The officers mitigated this risk by contacting the school and offering advice to make referrals to the MASH and assisted them in doing so, as well as offering advice on the actions the school were taking and to call the Police immediately if they felt unsafe.
320. In relation to the second incident, on **11 December 2019**, Lancashire Constabulary considers that the officers identified the risk that AR posed to others. The officers ensured that relevant information was shared with CTPNW and Merseyside Police, who were dealing with him from a Prevent and criminal investigation perspective, respectively, so that they were fully informed on the risks and history of AR.
321. In relation to the third incident, on **5 November 2021**, Lancashire Constabulary considers that no information was provided to officers during this incident that would suggest that AR was a risk to others. The incident related to AR throwing things around his parents' house due to a stranger knocking on the door. The officer who dealt with the incident spoke to AR's family and submitted an appropriate vulnerable child investigation so other, more appropriate services could deal with issues within the family dynamic.
322. In relation to the fourth incident, on **30 November 2021**, Lancashire Constabulary considers that the officers identified the risk that AR posed to others. The incident resulted

in AR assaulting his father causing no injury and causing some minor property damage. There was some risk which appeared confined to the family setting and the officers provided a comprehensive rationale for not taking action to arrest AR or remove him from the home address. Officers submitted an appropriate vulnerable child investigation so that other, more appropriate, services could deal with issues within the family dynamic.

323. In relation to the fifth incident, on **17 March 2022**, Lancashire Constabulary considers that the officers took some steps to manage the immediate risk that AR posed to others. Those steps included removing the knife from his possession, taking AR home, discussing matters with AR's parents, asking the parents to keep their knives secure, and referring AR to MASH as high risk.

324. However, Lancashire Constabulary does consider that more could have been done to better assess the risk that AR posed, including the deployed officers obtaining more information on AR's history from Lancashire Constabulary systems, asking more information of AR and his parents in relation to AR's disclosures around wanting to hurt others and poison, and liaising with their supervision following the further concerning information coming to light during the journey in the police car to AR's home. This would have better informed the officers on the risks that AR posed which would have aided their decision making.

325. In relation to the sixth incident, on **14 May 2022**, Lancashire Constabulary considers that the officers identified the risk that AR posed to others. The incident resulted in AR locking himself in the bathroom and overflowing the bathtub because he had been denied access to his laptop in the middle of the night. There was some risk which appeared confined to the family setting. The officers submitted an appropriate vulnerable child investigation so other, more appropriate services, could deal with issues within the family dynamic.

326. In relation to the seventh and final Lancashire Constabulary incident, on **21 March 2023**, Lancashire Constabulary considers that no information was provided during this incident that would suggest that AR was a risk to others. Whilst Lancashire Constabulary accepts that more questions could have been asked to inform a better THRIVE+ assessment and/or more information obtained in order to make a better informed decision on whether to deploy Police Officers to AR's home address, the call was not an emergency and was not intended to address the risk AR posed to others but was instead concerned with the welfare of AR and it did not raise any immediate safeguarding concerns.

327. I have been asked, if I consider that it was not Lancashire Constabulary's responsibility (or sole responsibility) to identify and / or address the risk that AR posed, whose responsibility I consider it was.
328. I do consider that Lancashire Constabulary had responsibility to address the risk that AR posed through all the dealings with him. As I have outlined above, I believe that Lancashire Constabulary did take steps to address the risk. Whilst more could have been done on some of those occasions, as detailed above, whenever there was any direct contact with AR, information was always shared by Lancashire Constabulary with, or for, other agencies.
329. I have been asked whether I consider, with the benefit of hindsight if necessary, that Lancashire Constabulary could have done more or done things differently as regards to its involvement with AR. I believe I have answered this within the decision-making section of this statement, above.
330. I have been asked whether I consider the statutory powers, guidance, training and resources available to officers and staff within Lancashire Constabulary were adequate for the nature of the involvement they had in the events under investigation. Taking the facts of each incident at the time they were reported, it is my belief that the statutory powers, guidance, training and resources available to officers and staff were adequate to allow them to discharge their duties.
331. However, these events bring the current challenges faced by policing into stark focus. The volume and complexity of demand that police officers are required to deal with has both shifted and increased over time, extending far wider than dealing with the effects of crime and criminality. A significant proportion of people who our officers now deal with are children, many of them with complex mental health needs or neurodiverse conditions. Whilst policing may be the most appropriate public resource to deal with the immediate incident, there are other agencies who are better equipped to manage the longer term prevailing issues that are the root cause of these issues.

Improvements

332. I have been asked whether I am aware of relevant improvements that have been made by Lancashire Constabulary since these events. I would like to bring to the Inquiry's attention the following improvements:

- (1) **Training to all PCROs in the FCR on the THRIVE+ risk assessment between May 2023 to June 2023.** THRIVE+ is a structured triage process, risk assessment and accurate record of the incident. THRIVE+ allows the PCRO to accurately risk assess the call and determine the grade that they should apply to it. Training was provided to all PCROs.
- (2) **Implementation of the Lancashire Constabulary Target Operating Model (“TOM”) in June 2023.** The TOM looked at our operating model across the Force and, upon implementation, created Response Investigation Teams. The Response Investigation Teams are now staffed by teams of Police Officers who investigate volume crime. This allows our frontline response officers more time to respond and deal with incidents as they are reported. When the TOM was implemented, role bespoke training was provided to our officers.
- (3) **Implementation of the Investigation Management Policy in April 2024.** Lancashire Constabulary had previously recognised that the quality and frequency of supervisor reviews on crime investigations could be improved. To address this, Lancashire Constabulary implemented this policy to set expectations on how often reviews should be completed and the quality of the review expected. Training was given to our supervisors both through the release of an intranet article and through face-to-face training.
- (4) **Operation Encompass is now a key Force performance area which has been escalated to Force governance under the Deputy Chief Constable at Lancashire Constabulary’s Victim Focus Review Board.** Communication and training has been delivered to our officers on Operation Encompass, covered in more detail within the witness statement of Det Insp Marston.

333. Understanding that the Chair is tasked with making recommendations but ensuring, through engagement with relevant practitioners, the recommendations are practicable, I have been asked to set out any improvements that could be made relevant to Lancashire Constabulary’s involvement that would be practicable and make an effective difference.

334. Lancashire Constabulary remains committed to working together with partners to improve the response to issues highlighted during the review of matters under investigation by the Inquiry, specifically around the multi-agency response to children’s mental health and challenging behaviours. It is the Force’s view that the following improvements are fundamental to this:

- (1) Improved integration and information sharing between Counter Terrorism Policing/Prevent and mainstream public services involved with supporting children in Lancashire. Specifically, having an effective system in place to manage the risk and safeguarding for those cases that are de-escalated from Prevent;
- (2) Timely access to mental health services for children in Lancashire has been an enduring concern for a significant time. The provision of an effective urgent care pathway with the capacity to deal with children in mental health crises 24 hours a day, 7 days a week would be an improvement on the current system. The current system does not provide for children to get timely access to support and leaves our Police Officers with a dilemma when dealing with children who are in urgent need of support;
- (3) The development of community mental health service provision for children which is capable of effectively dealing with children and young people with a pre-disposition for violence. In Lancashire Constabulary's view, the Community Mental Health model needs to be sufficiently resourced to deal with this issue. Cases should not be closed simply when children stop engaging but instead escalated for further intervention.

Statement of Truth

I believe that the facts stated in this witness statement are true. I understand that proceedings may be brought against anyone who makes, or causes to be made, a false statement in a document verified by a statement of truth without an honest belief in its truth.

Signed: **Signature**

Dated: 26 August 2025

Index to the Witness Statement of Mark Winstanley

Exhibit No.	Inquiry reference No.	Document description
MW/01	LANC000168	Lancashire Constabulary Child Protection Policy from February 2017 until March 2023
MW/02	LANC000169	Lancashire Constabulary Child Protection Policy from March 2023 until current date
MW/03	LANC000170	Lancashire Constabulary Child Safeguarding Help and Guidance from July 2020 until November 2022
MW/04	LANC000171	Lancashire Constabulary Child Safeguarding Help and Guidance from November 2022 until current date
MW/05	LANC000052	Lancashire Constabulary Policing and Mental Health Operational Guidance from April 2023 until current date
MW/06	LANC000008	Section 135 and Section 136 Multi-Agency Mental Health Act 1983 Procedure from November 2021 until April 2024
MW/07	LANC000053	Section 135 and Section 136 Multi-Agency Mental Health Act 1983 Procedure from April 2024 until current date
MW/08	LANC000165	North West Regional Mental Capacity Act Joint Protocol from November 2018 until January 2023
MW/09	LANC000051	North West Regional Mental Capacity Act Joint Protocol from January 2023 until current date
MW/10	LANC000162	Lancashire Constabulary Right Care Right Person policy from January 2022 until October 2023
MW/11	LANC000163	Lancashire Constabulary Right Care Right Person policy from October 2023 until current date
MW/12	LANC000287	PowerPoint presentation that was delivered to Lancashire Constabulary's PCROs around the time that the RCRP policy was adopted in January 2022

MW/13	LANC000289	Lancashire Constabulary working agreement with CTPNW, issued under Section 22a Police Act 1996
MW/14	LANC000288	Appendices document which accompanies the Section 22a Police Act 1996 agreement
MW/15	LANC000247	Lancashire Constabulary intranet article on detention of youths dated 3 February 2022
MW/16	LANC000281	Lancashire Constabulary training given to student officers on the welfare and treatment of detained persons
MW/17	LANC000279	Lancashire Constabulary intranet article on Prevent referrals dated 15 April 2024
MW/18	LANC000278	Lancashire Constabulary intranet article on Prevent dated 25 November 2024
MW/19	LANC000280	Lancashire Constabulary intranet article on Prevent referrals dated 22 May 2025
MW/20	LANC000275	Lancashire Constabulary 7 minute briefing on Prevent referrals
MW/21	LANC000276	Lancashire Constabulary intranet article on assessing capacity dated 26 August 2025
MW/22	LANC000096	Professional Standards Department Review completed August 2024
MW/23	LANC000021	Rapid Review minutes dated 30 August 2024