

Witness Name: Philip Mark Blundell

Exhibits: PB/01 – PB/10

Dated: 19 August 2025

**THE SOUTHPORT INQUIRY**

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**FIRST WITNESS STATEMENT OF**

**PHILIP MARK BLUNDELL**

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I, PHILIP MARK BLUNDELL will say as follows:

## **Section 1: Introductory matters**

### *Preliminary matters*

1. I am a Police Constable within the Greater Manchester Police Fixed Intelligence Management Unit ('**FIMU**') of Counter Terrorism Policing North West ('**CTPNW**').
2. I make this statement in response to a Rule 9 request received from the Southport Public Inquiry ('**the Inquiry**') dated 29 July 2025. This is the first witness statement I have provided to the Inquiry. I also provided input to inform the preparation of the corporate witness statement made on behalf of CTPNW by DCS Sarah Kenwright ('**the CTPNW corporate statement**'), dated 8 August 2025.
3. May I first pass on my condolences to the families of the little girls who were murdered and injured that day, and to all those from the public and first responders that assisted. As a police officer you hope the day never comes when an incident like this happens, and I was truly shocked when I watched the news report from Southport and remembered my involvement in AR's referral. Given the terrible events of that day I have carefully reflected on my role and sought to explain my judgment and considerations below.
4. This statement addresses the matters raised in the Rule 9 request pertaining to the Inquiry's Terms of Reference, insofar as they relate to my involvement in AR's case, my reflections on those events, and any improvements that have been made or could be made to practices and ways of working in my area of work.
5. It would be helpful to note at this stage that during my long career as a police officer, and in my role within the FIMU, I have dealt with a high-volume caseload. I consider my recollection of my involvement in AR's case to be strong, however I recognise that AR's first referral took place nearly 6 years' ago. With that in mind, and with a view to being as helpful as possible to the Inquiry, I have refreshed my recollection by reviewing the relevant contemporaneous documents. Where I rely on any documents versus my own direct memory, I try to make that as clear as possible.

*My background, qualifications and experience*

6. I have 22 years' police service, having joined the Greater Manchester Police force in 2003. When I joined the force, I worked in a range of roles including as an immediate response officer and neighbourhood policing in Sale and Altrincham. I then moved into a role in licensing in respect of the nighttime economy. In May 2009, I transferred to the North West Counter Terrorism Border Policing Unit at Manchester Airport (formerly Special Branch), where I held a position within the Border Intelligence team from 2010 until 2018. My role in the intelligence unit was to review, research and assess individual pieces of intelligence with regards the travel around International Counter Terrorism, Northern Ireland Related Terrorism and the movement of freight at Manchester Airport.
7. In September 2018, I moved to CTPNW HQ to join the FIMU as a FIMU Assessor. On 1 July 2019, I transferred into the CTPNW Joint Assessment Team ('**JAT**') as an Intelligence Management Officer, and I remain in that role.

*JAT Team Structure and role*

8. By way of background, the JAT team commenced as a pilot in the North West region in December 2017, set up as a bespoke team within FIMU, formed of staff from CTPNW and MI5 working together to assess intelligence under the Intelligence Handling Model (**IHM**). This joint working model has subsequently been rolled out across the UK. The teams differ slightly in their approach and resourcing models, but the purpose is broadly consistent. When I refer to the JAT in this statement, I am specifically referring to the CTPNW JAT team.
9. The JAT team covers the three North West regions (Cheshire and Merseyside, Lancashire and Cumbria, and Manchester), receiving referrals from the FIMU hubs across those regions. CTP Officers and staff are all based in Manchester and work with Partners to ensure a collaborative and streamlined working approach.
10. At the time of AR's first referral, there was 1 FIMU Police Sergeant, DS Dave Bird, overseeing the JAT team and 5-6 police officers and staff working full-time on JAT referrals. MI5 had officers working with the team.

## *My Role*

11. Within the JAT my role was to assess intelligence submitted to the JAT from a range of sources, and to determine the outcome for that intelligence in line with the IHM, a joint process agreed by MI5 and Counter Terrorism Policing.
12. In my role, I would assess if the person or intelligence held any threat considering factors such as intent and capability, as well as credibility of the source of the intelligence. As a result of that assessment, I would consider whether further investigation or action were required to supplement the intelligence. If not, I would then assess any safeguarding risks, and whether the intelligence suggested any vulnerabilities that I should share with other agencies.
13. I think it is important to be clear that FIMU, and the JAT, are separate from Prevent and the focus of our assessment differs. The function of the FIMU is to receive information and to assess it in line with the 'Receive, Assess, Decide & Outcome' ('**RADO**') principles [**PB/01 – CTPHQ000047**], the IHM and the National Standards for Intelligence Management ('**NSIM**') guidance. I exhibit the relevant sections of NSIM which set out the IMU assessment and configuration model [**PB/01 - CTPHQ000047; PB/02 – CTPNW000271**].
14. That intelligence could come into the FIMU from a range of sources, with Prevent referrals making up one aspect of the intelligence considered by the FIMU. With any piece of intelligence, this could lead to a range of outcomes which would either become an investigation, lead to further intelligence enhancement, or to no further development in the intelligence sphere.
15. These outcomes are not directly linked to Prevent referrals. However, if the decision was that no further development was required in respect of the referral Prevent referrals would be sent back to FIMU with a recommendation to pass onto Prevent. The outcome would note that the intelligence had been assessed as either CT relevant (RADO 5) or not CT relevant (RADO 6). In those cases, despite there being no CT relevance for FIMU purposes, Prevent would still assess the matter further through the Prevent Gateway Assessment and may choose to progress the referral and treat it as CT/DE relevant for Prevent purposes.

16. I am not aware of any role profile that would have existed at the time of AR's first referral to set out the main responsibilities of a JAT assessor. However, I remained a FIMU officer, supervised by a sergeant within FIMU, and my role and responsibilities closely aligned with the FIMU role profile [PB/03 – CTPNW000346]. The unique aspect of my role within the JAT is the close working with MI5, who also review each referral to assess the National Security ('NS') picture.

### *Training*

17. This section sets out the training I have received which is relevant to my role. I have concentrated on the training I had completed by the time of AR's first Prevent referral.

18. It is fair to say that at the time of AR's first referral, I was relatively new to the JAT having joined in July 2019. However, I had extensive experience in intelligence and CT policing having spent a number of years in intelligence roles, and over 12 months within the FIMU. There is extensive overlap between the skills and knowledge used in my role and the wider FIMU team. We are all trained to the same capabilities, I provide further details on my training below.

19. I have exhibited a copy of my Police Training Record which sets out the training I had completed prior to 10 December 2019 in full [PB/04 – CTPNW000347]. I set out below, in chronological order, the courses completed by the time of AR's first referral which I consider most relevant to my role in the JAT:

- a. **Introduction to CT:** I completed this course in June 2009 when I first joined CT Policing. As the title suggests, the course provided an overview of the role of law enforcement in preventing and responding to terrorist activity and incidents and is a mandatory course for all officers moving into a CT role
- b. **Major Covert Intelligence course:** I completed this training in 2010. This course enabled the review of source protection, the need for disclosure, assessment and development of different types of Covert Intelligence.
- c. **Intelligence Handling Model ('IHM') course:** I completed this training in October 2011. This course was a National Accreditation and enabled access to CTP systems upon completion. The course provided training on assessment, analysis

and expectations when dealing with CT related intelligence, how we would process and respond to individual intelligence, and developed an understanding of threat and risk

- d. **CT de-briefing course:** I completed this training in 2014. At the conclusion of an investigation certain aspects would require debriefing to assist with future learning. This training was to support my work preparing those debriefs, including the learning principles along with report writing to assist the members of the senior leadership team to write up their recommendations.
- e. **National Common Intelligence Application ('NCIA') Assessors course:** I first completed this training in June 2016 whilst working in the Borders intelligence team. I later refreshed the training in 2018 when I transferred to CTPNW headquarters. Although this was not a strict requirement, I was keen to refresh my training for the new role in FIMU. The NCIA is a database used by UK police forces for CT investigations. All intelligence assessors are subject to mandatory training before being authorised to assess intelligence, including the National Common Intelligence Application Core course and NCIA Assessor course, developed by Counter Terrorism Policing HQ's National Operational Development Unit ('ODU') and delivered by locally based trainers in CTPNW. This was a 3-day course held in person. This training is refreshed every 2 years, and I completed refresher training in June 2018, before AR's first referral.
- f. **NSIM Assessor course** – in addition to the NCIA Assessors Course, I completed the mandatory NSIM Assessors court in June 2018. The National Standard of Intelligence Management was there to assist the development of intelligence officer to a uniform standard, from how the intelligence is received, how formatting would assist in the indexing of the core parts of intelligence along with creating, receiving and assessing around action management and initial investigations.
- g. **Insight into CT Investigation:** This was a 5-day course which I completed in July 2018. This course enables the attendee to fully understand the process from receipt of intelligence, assessment, review, and the part agencies play from intelligence to investigation, disruption to arrest and the case building requirements.

20. I have continued my professional development since 2019, and in 2021 I received accreditation from the College of Policing called the Intelligence Professionals Portfolio (IPP). The course was completed through an e-learning platform, and I was required to

produce a number of assignments demonstrating how I assess and respond to intelligence. This accreditation lasted for 3 years. Since 2018 I have kept my IPP in date. My re-accreditation date is in October 2025 and I have continued to add to my portfolio. However, I am due to retire on 30 September 2025 before I complete the formal re-accreditation.

21. I have been specifically asked about my awareness of the Dynamic Investigative Framework ('DIF') [PB/05 – CTPHQ000040]. The DIF was, and remains, a Prevent tool which is not directly used by the JAT team during our assessment. I was aware of the DIF at the time of AR's first referral as I sought where possible to understand the processes followed by the various teams working in the lifecycle of a Prevent referral, but we were not required to follow the structure of the DIF in JAT assessments.

## **Section 2: Factual narrative of involvement**

### *Introduction*

22. I set out below a factual narrative of my involvement in AR's first referral. Any specific issues or themes arising from this narrative will be addressed in further detail within Section 4 of this statement.

### *Acorns School referral*

23. I understand that the first referral was submitted by Janet Lewis, the Designated Safeguarding Lead ('DSL') at Acorns School in Lancashire and was received by Lancashire FIMU on 10 December 2019 [PB/06 – CTPNW000154].

24. The referral form explained that AR had started attending Acorns School from 17 October 2019, following his permanent exclusion from Range High School in Sefton after taking a knife to school to injure a fellow student.

25. The referral set out accounts from various staff members detailing numerous incidents involving AR dating from 7 October 2019 to 4 December 2019. I set out some examples of these below:

- a. 15 November 2019 *"During ICT lesson today I found AR searching school shootings in America. When I told him to stop and get on with his work he tried to engage in a conversation about the subject but was told this was not going to happen. I have been told that we can no longer log student web history."* **[PB/06 – CTPNW000154/3]**
- b. On 29 November 2019, *"SM was trying to give him ideas how to promote his business and one suggestion was to tell people that his business was new to the area. He insisted that this would not be good because people would think he would kill them as they did not know him. He said that people don't trust others they don't know in case they get murdered."* **[PB/06 - CTPNW000154/3]**
- c. On 3 December 2019, while in art class, *"AR was discussing different YouTubers and YouTube videos. I couldn't concentrate on exactly what he was talking about or who but I think he was discussing with another pupil videos of people hurting themselves. He also made a comment about if a drill bit broke it could fly off and kill someone, he was quite graphic."* **[PB/06 - CTPNW000154/4]**

26. Within the referral form, the DSL also included:

- a. Transcripts of email correspondence confirming she had tried to refer AR to a Multi-Agency Safeguarding Hub ('**MASH**'). Although there had been some delay, on 5 December 2019 PC Paul Harrison, West Lancashire Police Community Safety Officer, confirmed that he had forwarded the DSL's email to a contact at MASH; **[PB/06 - CTPNW000154/4-5]** and
- b. Correspondence with PC Harrison about a meeting to discuss AR, due to take place at Acorns School on 5 December 2019 **[PB/06 - CTPNW000154/4-5]**.

#### *Initial contact with AR's case*

27. On 11 December 2019, Officer B, FIMU, referred the case to JAT for further assessment. Having reviewed the emails, I understand I was allocated the referral on 12 December 2019 **[PB/07 – CTPNW000349]**. Officer B sent the following documents with his referral:
- a. AR's referral form, summarised above **[PB/06 - CTPNW000154]**;
  - b. FIMU Intelligence Report ('**IR**') dated 11 December 2019 **[PB/08 – CTPNW000145]**: the IR typically contained 'sanitised' information on the referral, with a 'P' rating so it could be shared with other enforcement agencies. The IR noted the intelligence was "Known Indirectly To The Source But Corroborated" with

a very brief summary of the intelligence noting AR had “*taken a knife into school due to bullying, whilst at school he has been researching school shootings in America*”; and

- c. JAT research form completed by Officer B [PB/09 – CTPNW000146]: This research document was a standardised template completed by all FIMU officers when referrals were sent to JAT.

28. The JAT research report summarised the incidents set out in the referral. It confirmed the FIMU had conducted the suggested minimum standard checks outlined in NSIM, checking NCIA, PNC, PND. FIMU had checked Lancashire Police systems ‘Connect’ with no trace other than the arrest on 11 December 2019, referenced above.

29. Officer B had also updated the report to note after the referral had been received by the FIMU, Merseyside police had made contact to confirm that AR had been arrested as he had pre booked a taxi the previous day and travelled to The Range School with a hockey stick and a large knife in his bag.

30. Some open-source research had been conducted with no trace of AR on the internet, although no detail was included in the report as to which open-source checks had been conducted.

*My assessment of the referral*

31. On receipt of the referral, I reviewed the forms and report sent to me by Officer B, quality assessed them to ensure the document was correctly titled, the intelligence grading met the required standard, and there was no research missing before sharing with MI5. I then sent the documents onto to the MI5 Officer the same day.

32. We then jointly discussed the contents of the reports to determine whether the intelligence was CT/DE relevant, and whether there was a risk to national security (**‘NS’**). We ultimately determined that there was no threat or risk to NS, and I explain my rationale for this decision in further detail below. I did however note that there were issues in the referral which caused safeguarding concerns including the problems at school, and discussions of adult themes with violence at the core including school shootings and severed heads. I recall we discussed the father’s response to the issues raised by the school in respect of

AR viewing material online and took the view that as this appeared to be a one off (as opposed to a recurring theme) his account should be taken at face value.

33. There is no formal readout or minutes from this discussion. However, on 13 December 2019, I completed the JAT outcome section of the research report and returned it to Officer B [PB/09 – CTPNW000146].

34. I recorded the following outcome:

*“Joint assessment in reference to internet research and fascination with US school shootings...*

*There is no apparent ideology found and from reporting any context into how extreme the research conducted in ICT was. It is not known if the school had firewall to inhibit any results being viewed.*

*There seemed to be a common theme with regards weapons and this has been acted out with his arrest for possession of weapon at school on 11/12/2019.*

*AR has various issues and has been previously referred to Social Services.*

*The intelligence and relevant research at present does not meet any Lead or Police threshold for investigation under CT/DE banner.*

*However, consideration now that there is a Local Authority MASH led intervention following arrest and previous history at both schools that preference would be for continuance and recommend Dovetail team and Channel Panel are sighted with regards safe-guarding and AR vulnerabilities going forward.*

*Any new intelligence of CTDE nature for re-assessment.”*

35. Whilst I completed the outcome, it was intended to reflect a joint decision on CT relevance following discussion with the MI5 officer. Our joint assessment was therefore that *“The intelligence and relevant research at present does not meet any Lead or Police threshold for investigation under CT/DE banner.”* As such, no further action was required in the FIMU space. This is the RADO 6 outcome

36. I then set out in further detail my considerations on safeguarding for Prevent to consider, including the involvement of the Local Authority MASH, Dovetail and Channel. Although a discussion would have taken place with MI5 on these aspects of the referral, this part of the 'outcome' in the JAT research report was for CTP only.
37. I explained that any new intelligence of a CT/DE nature could be submitted to the JAT for re-assessment of the case. This is standard wording that I would include in all JAT reports to reassure the FIMU Officer they could send through further referrals if the intelligence picture changed. I am not aware of any subsequent submissions for re-assessment for this referral and I had no further involvement in AR's case.
38. My assessment would have been uploaded to NCIA and have been available to the FIMU officers dealing with AR's second and third referrals to assist with subsequent assessments.

### **Section 3: Particular issues relevant to my involvement**

39. This section considers particular themes and issues arising from my involvement in AR's first referral, expanding upon the factual narrative I have set out above.

#### *Consideration of AR's ideology*

40. As set out in my report to FIMU, based on the information available to me at the time I did not consider AR presented with any particular ideology. My understanding of ideology was, and remains, a set of beliefs or opinions held by a single person or group of people where there is a political or religious outcome. Extremist ideology is then an advancement of that ideology based on hatred and intolerance. When reviewing intelligence, including Prevent referrals, I would follow this two-stage process, considering whether there was the presence of an ideology first, then whether there was evidence of an extremist ideology.
41. In AR's case I assessed all the incidents set out in the referral, taking into full consideration the detail on the referral form [PB/06 – CTPNW000154] including that:
- a. During an art lesson, AR had asked his teacher if he could draw a picture of a severed head;

- b. AR made comparisons between Call of Duty images and viewing guns on the internet;
- c. AR had spoken to another pupil about watching videos of people harming themselves, and
- d. He had made a comment about if a drill bit broke, it could fly off and kill someone.

42. These are undoubtedly concerning incidents, and I recognised that AR had a fascination with gore and violence. Although it may not be typical for all children of this age to talk about horror and gore, in my professional experience it was not entirely unusual for children to view and share videos depicting violence and gore. These appeared to be accessible on the internet and were relatively easy to find. I realised that AR had a history with knives so I understood why the teachers' concerns had led to the Prevent referral, however in my view these behaviours, even when considered together, did not amount to an ideology such that the intelligence would be classed as CT/DE relevant.

43. The Inquiry have asked about my awareness of a Letter from the Home Office and Counter Terrorism Policing on Unclear, Mixed or Unstable Ideologies, dated 25 June 2019 ("**Joint Letter**") [PB/10 – CTPHW000134]. Although I have not been able to find a document or email correspondence to confirm when this letter was shared with my team, my clear recollection is that I was made aware of the Joint Letter prior to AR's first referral. More broadly, I was aware of the increasing trend in cases of a fascination with violence, particularly in the US. Based on the records available to me, I cannot say the extent to which this letter directly informed my thinking and decision making when I conducted the JAT assessment for this referral. However, in my view the fact that AR was looking at school shootings did not mean he possessed a CT/DE ideology or an obsession with violence that would meet the relevant threshold. Having reviewed the papers, my assessment was that he was a troubled 13-year-old with clear vulnerabilities. As a result of those concerns, I recommended a Prevent referral for them to conduct a full assessment of the matter and make their own decision on the next steps.

*Referral to Channel/Dovetail*

44. I have been asked by the Inquiry to explain the rationale behind the following wording which I included in my JAT outcome:

*“...preference would be for continuance and recommend Dovetail team and Channel Panel are sighted with regards safe-guarding and AR vulnerabilities going forward.”*  
**[PB/09 – CTPNW000146].**

45. As set out above, my overall assessment was that this intelligence was not CT/DE relevant, and no further action was required by FIMU to develop the intelligence before the referral was passed onto Prevent. However, I noted there was a Local Authority MASH led intervention in place following AR's arrest on 11 December 2019 and felt it was important this work progressed, noting my *“preference for continuance”* so that a full assessment could be made. In addition to this, I recommended Channel and Dovetail were made aware of AR's case so steps could be taken to address any vulnerabilities and safeguarding risks.
46. I did not intend to instruct Prevent to make a referral to Channel or Dovetail, as this is not within my role. When writing outcomes, I would often make considerations for the reporting officer to develop further, in this case that Dovetail and Channel be sighted.
47. Having reflected on my assessment, I am not sure if this was how Prevent operated and whether there was in fact a process in place for Channel and Dovetail to be 'sighted' without a full referral taking place. I was aware that there was a threshold for a Prevent to make a full referral to Channel, but did not know the detail of those thresholds as this would have been a matter for Prevent. I accept I should have written more within my outcome rationale to set out the detail of my discussion and the matters we had considered, and to ensure the recommendations were clear for anyone reviewing in the future. In the external reviews that have been undertaken on AR's case, this seems to have been construed as a direct instruction for Prevent which would never have been part of my thinking. In hindsight, if I could review my wording it would have been better to say *“For consideration”* that Dovetail and Channel are sighted on this document.
48. As I have set out below, there have been significant changes to the JAT processes since this first referral, and JAT now lead on the structure and content of the reports, following a more prescribed and detailed template to ensure consistency and clarity.

#### *AR's internet use*

49. I note that within the JAT assessment outcome, I stated: *“...and from reporting any context into how extreme the research conducted in ICT was. It is not known if the school had a*

*firewall to inhibit any results being viewed.” [PB/09 - CTPNW000146].* The Inquiry has asked whether I considered seeking further information in relation to AR’s internet use at school. As I understood it at the time, Merseyside Police were tasked with checking AR’s internet history following his arrest on 11 December 2019. It was therefore my belief this action was already being taken forward and I would not have considered it necessary or proportionate to repeat those checks or conduct further open-source searches.

50. There was no requirement for FIMU, or Prevent, to report the outcome of any searches undertaken by Merseyside Police back to the JAT unless the results escalated or changed the overall intelligence picture. In such a case, I would have expected a further referral to be made.

#### *Vulnerability Support Hub*

51. The Inquiry has asked whether I considered that AR’s case should have been referred to the Vulnerability Support Hub (**VSH**), a clinical consultancy service and mental health team which provided dedicated support to the CTPNW Prevent team for subjects who might be vulnerable. It is important to clarify that a referral to VSH would have been made by Prevent, and it was not my role or responsibility to make such a referral. Unless further CT development was required, I would not take direction action or contact other agencies in this way.

52. Having reviewed the relevant documents again, I do not think I would have included the VSH as a point for Prevent to consider because of the multi-agency interventions already in place. The multi-agency support hub (**MASH**) had access to mental health professionals, as well as wider support from the school and social services. However, this would ultimately have been a decision for Prevent.

#### **Section 4: Reflection on events**

53. Given the terrible events that occurred in July 2024, I have carefully considered my involvement in this matter, and my assessment of AR’s referral. Overall, I consider I adhered to the policies and processes in place at the time, and if I was presented with the same information again, I think I would take the same decision.

54. I do however acknowledge that the decision outcome in the JAT report is very brief and does not fully explain the steps taken, or my rationale on threat, risk and safeguarding. I explain below some of the improvements that have been made to the JAT ways of working since 2019, improving record keeping and ensuring we now complete the assessment in a comprehensive and consistent way. At the time of AR's first referral the JAT was still relatively new, having been piloted in 2017. As with all new initiatives, it has developed over time and I would hope that for any future referrals the rationale for the JAT decision would be very clear for Prevent, and any other agencies involved in a case.

*Things the organisation could have done differently*

55. The Inquiry has asked me to consider whether I, or CTPNW, could have done things differently, and particularly if the guidance, training and resources available to me were adequate for my role. I have also been asked whether I have personal reflections to make on the issues identified in the recent reviews of AR's Prevent referrals. I have had the opportunity to review those reports, and the relevant recommendations made by the Prevent Learning Review, the Dignate Review, and Lord Anderson's Review. I have sought to address the observations made in respect of my recommendation to sight Channel and Dovetail on this matter at paragraph 44 above.

56. I do not wish to comment on aspects of policy, or individual decisions taken by others in CTPNW, where that falls outside my role and expertise. As I have set out below, some of the matters raised in these reports have hopefully been addressed with recent changes within CTPNW, and I am sure this work will continue.

57. As a result of the Inquiry process, I am now aware that AR was referred to CTPNW Prevent on two further occasions in February and April 2021. These Prevent referrals were not sent to JAT for further assessment so I had no direct involvement in them, and of course can now only review with the benefit of hindsight.

58. Each referral is dealt with on its own merits, and the FIMU Officer would have made their own assessment of risk at the time, considering the threshold for CT relevance. However, having reviewed the material that has been made available to me in respect of the second and third referrals, on balance, I would have expected those referrals to have been sent

to JAT for further consideration. Of note, the third referral refers to the London Bridge attack which may be viewed as an escalation.

59. However, I have considered the impact this might have had on the steps taken, and I think if the referrals had been sent to the JAT they would still have been sent onto Prevent, as they were at the time. It may have given the CTP Officer in the JAT the opportunity to speak to the Prevent team to discuss the safeguarding issues and vulnerabilities, and to request further information on any actions taken by Prevent to review AR's social media accounts and online viewing. However, these matters would ultimately be for Prevent.

### **Section 5: Improvements**

60. Since the first referral in 2019, there has been considerable work undertaken within CT policing at both a national and regional level to professionalise the FIMU and wider Prevent work. In this statement I have outlined those changes which relate to the JAT, and our engagement with both FIMU and Prevent.

#### *Relationship between FIMU/JAT and Prevent*

61. There is now a closer working relationship between FIMU and Prevent, with CPD training provided by Prevent officers to explain their role and how the assessment fits into FIMU's work. Several officers from FIMU, including myself, now have access to the Prevent Case Management Tracker (**PCMT**) and can therefore review the Prevent records for any repeat referrals and see the actions that have already been taken. This access also allows us to get a better understanding of the type of assessment Prevent are having to make, and the various factors they work through in the Prevent Gateway Assessment.

62. I work closely with the Prevent team and regularly go to them to discuss cases. This gives me the opportunity to explain my thought process and get a sense from the Prevent supervisors what options they would have once a case is referred into them, and to check if more work needs to be done on the FIMU side before a referral gets to them.

63. In early 2020 I was asked by the senior leadership team to create a FIMU guidance manual to consolidate various aspects of guidance and training, including Prevent guidance, to act as a comprehensive guide for anyone working in the IMU. This a regional manual which has been circulated to all FIMU and OIMU teams across the NW region and is used as an

aide memoire to support new joiners' induction as well as ongoing decision making for more experienced officers. CTPHQ have operating instructions available at a national level, but this guidance document includes further practical information which is tailored to the NW region. It includes departmental templates to assist officers, and gives an overview of each department in the region and how they can help

#### *Changes to JAT referral process*

64. There have also been recent changes to the process and documents used for sharing intelligence between FIMU, JAT and Prevent to improve the quality of information sent to the JAT and ensure consistency across JAT reports.
65. At the time of AR's referrals, the JAT research form was largely prepared by FIMU, with the JAT CTP Officers populating the final outcome section. This form has changed several times over the years, but the latest version was developed earlier this year. The onus is now on the JAT to prepare a detailed report in line with a standardised template.
66. Our reports now include summaries on intelligence, a full assessment on CTP Relevance, police traces and any communications of note. This information is sent to the MI5 officer, and any discussions which take place are recorded on the JAT document. In my own practice, I have started putting direct comments from the MI5 Intelligence Manager into the JAT document.
67. The JAT CTP Intelligence Manager therefore lead on the process, encouraging a standardised approach for those Prevent referrals that come into the team. The new form requires supervisor sign off before any referrals can be closed for no further development. The JAT team currently has 3 CTP Officers working in it, and this standardised approach has meant we all have a good understanding of the process and are able to manage the workload despite the reduction in team size.
68. A new referral form has also been developed for FIMU, which encourages them to conduct further "pre JAT" work before submitting Prevent referrals. This may include reviewing finances, social media, or discussing the matter with their supervisor before submitting to JAT. If a referral comes into the JAT and does not have enough information, we have the option to suggest "post JAT" actions to FIMU to conduct further checks or put measures in place such as adding someone to a port circulation checklist.

**Section 6: Other matters**

69. I have nothing further to draw to the Chair's attention, beyond what is contained in this statement.

**Statement of Truth**

I believe that the facts stated in this witness statement are true. I understand that proceedings may be brought against anyone who makes, or causes to be made, a false statement in a document verified by a statement of truth without an honest belief of its truth.

Signed: **Signature** \_\_\_\_\_

Dated: 19/08/2025