

## IN THE INDEPENDENT SOUTHPORT INQUIRY

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### FIRST WITNESS STATEMENT OF DEPUTY ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER VICTORIA EVANS SENIOR NATIONAL COORDINATOR FOR PREVENT AND PURSUE

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1. I make this statement on behalf of the Counter Terrorism Policing Headquarters (CTPHQ) at the request of the Inquiry Legal Team.
2. At the outset, I wish to express my deepest condolences, and those of all my colleagues, to the loved ones of Elsie, Bebe and Alice, and to all those who bear the consequences of Axel Rudakubana's ('AR') horrific crimes.
3. In this statement, I set out:
  - (i) My career history and credentials for providing it;
  - (ii) An overview of the CTP Network;
  - (iii) An overview of Prevent and an introduction to the relevant policies;
  - (iv) An account of CTPHQ's involvement with this case;
  - (v) An update on how Prevent functions now as regards key themes identified in this case.

#### **My role and background**

4. Since 5 May 2024, I have been the Senior National Coordinator for Prevent and Pursue. I took over this role from former Deputy Assistant Commissioner ('DAC') Tim Jacques, who had been in post since July 2022. Prior to that the role was held by then DAC Dean Haydon since May 2018. I explain my role in further detail in

when describing the Counter Terrorism Policing (CTP) network in the section below.

5. Before joining CTP, I was an Assistant Chief Constable (ACC) for Cambridgeshire Constabulary for four years, and before that a temporary ACC within Dyfed-Powys Police. I have over 20 years of policing experience in a range of areas including response policing, serious and organised crime, and covert policing. Immediately prior to taking on my current role, I was the National Police Chief Council's lead on the implementation of the Volume Two (Emergency Response) recommendations of the Manchester Arena Inquiry.
6. I had no personal involvement in AR's case prior to the events of 29 July 2024 and only became aware of him when I was briefed about his attack later the same day. As I will outline in further detail within this statement, CTPHQ has no involvement in the management of his Prevent referrals and did not lead the subsequent criminal investigation into his actions. CTPHQ has, however, a key role in providing guidance to Prevent practitioners within CTP. In this case, we also provided specialist resources and expertise to support Merseyside police in their criminal investigation.

### **The CTP network**

7. The CTP network is a collaboration of specialist teams working within police forces across the country, in partnership with the UK Intelligence Community (UKIC), His Majesty's Government (HMG), local communities, His Majesty's Prison and Probation Service, and other partners, to deliver the UK Counter Terrorism Strategy, CONTEST. Simply stated, this strategy aims to reduce the threat of terrorism to the UK, its citizens, and its interests.
8. First developed in 2003, the CONTEST strategy has undergone numerous periodic reviews, most recently in 2023. It is structured around four main pillars, commonly referred to as "the four Ps", each with a particular focus and objective:
  - (i) **Prevent** - preventing individuals from becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism;

- (ii) **Pursue** - disrupting active terrorist plots, threats and activities;
  - (iii) **Protect** - strengthening the UK's defences against terrorist attacks; and
  - (iv) **Prepare** – mitigating the impact of any terrorist incidents.
9. To deliver the CONTEST strategy, officers and staff within the CTP network work collaboratively across nine regional Counter Terrorism Units (CTUs) and Counter Terrorism Intelligence Units (CTIUs) in England and Wales, with a headquarters function (CTPHQ) hosted by the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) in London. Regional units outside London are hosted by a “lead force” and operate under a collaboration agreement. In London, the MPS Counter Terrorism Command, SO15, fulfils the regional CTU role.
  10. The CTP collaboration agreement, established pursuant to section 22A Police Act 1996, establishes CTPHQ and underpins its national coordination responsibilities across England and Wales. CTP is therefore a legally established collaborative network rather than a single legal body, and CTPHQ is best understood as a coordinating feature of that network.
  11. Each CTU/CTIU is led by a detective chief superintendent, detective superintendent, or a suitably experienced member of police staff of equivalent seniority. The majority of Counter Terrorism Policing (CTP) operational resources are held within the regional CTUs, which are responsible and accountable for the day-to-day management of CT casework. CTIUs have a more narrow set of resources and work in coordination with neighbouring CTUs. In this instance, the relevant CTU was Counter Terrorism Policing North West (CTPNW), hosted by the lead force for the North West region, Greater Manchester Police.
  12. While CTPHQ is hosted by the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS), it consists of officers and staff from across the regions, including both permanent members and individuals seconded from their home forces. CTPHQ provides national oversight of the CTP network and operates under the command of the MPS Assistant Commissioner of Specialist Operations (ACSO) and the Director General of CTP.

13. Operational accountability lies with the Chief Constables of the relevant region. CTPHQ holds a strategic leadership and coordination role but does not possess directive powers, or take over operational command of a local investigation or response, except in a small number of defined circumstances.
14. CTPHQ supports regional CTUs and CTIUs in the implementation and assurance of common systems, policies, and procedures through effective communication and collaboration. In addition to its policy responsibilities, CTPHQ may facilitate the sharing of CTP resources across the network to provide additional capacity or specialist capability in regions experiencing heightened demand.
15. In my capacity as SNC for Prevent and Pursue, I lead on coordinating the CTP network's resources in these areas. My counterpart, DAC Jon Savell, leads the CTP network's response to the remaining CONTEST areas in his capacity as the SNC for Protect and Prepare.
16. In respect of all areas of the CONTEST strategy, CTPHQ continually seeks to enhance the network's capabilities to reduce the risk posed by terrorism. Learning is drawn from a variety of sources, including, but not limited to, academic research, internal and external reviews of major incidents, and relevant recommendations from assurance bodies, inquests and public inquiries.
17. By the time of AR's first referral in December 2019, the CTP Prevent Capability was firmly established, with well-defined policies and procedures applied across the various CTP region.

### **Overview of Prevent**

18. Prevent forms one of the four pillars of the Government's CONTEST strategy. The objective of Prevent is to stop people from becoming involved in terrorism. Prevent also extends to supporting the rehabilitation and disengagement of those already involved in terrorism. This is based on the identification, safeguarding, diversion and, where necessary, proportionate disruption of individuals identified as being susceptible to radicalisation (as per the extant Prevent Duty Guidance 2023 [CTPHQ000012] [VE/1]), and those vulnerable to being drawn into (or back into) any terrorism-

related offending, in accordance with the statutory requirements of the Counter Terrorism and Security Act 2015 (CTSA 2015).

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19. The Prevent Duty Guidance and the related Channel Duty Guidance [VE/2] are produced by the Homeland Security Group within the Home Office. They provide the strategic direction for Prevent and inform all Prevent-relevant training delivered to non-police Prevent statutory partners within Local Authorities.

### **Prevent Partners**

20. Under the provisions of the CTSA 2015, certain organisations, referred to as "specified authorities", are legally obligated to adhere to the Prevent duty. This requires them to have due regard to the need to prevent individuals from being drawn into terrorism. These organisations include:

- (i) Local Authorities;
- (ii) Criminal justice agencies (prisons, probation, and youth justice);
- (iii) Schools, education and childcare providers;
- (iv) Health and social care services;
- (v) Local police.

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21. The Government first published Prevent Duty Guidance in 2015 [VE/73]. Subsequently, chapters on higher education were replaced with dedicated sector-specific guidance.

22. This guidance, along with associated training, assists staff in specified authorities to recognise signs of radicalisation, understand associated risks, and respond appropriately, including making referrals to Prevent. As the threat of radicalisation has evolved, training has been updated to ensure that frontline professionals, including teachers, are equipped to identify and address these risks effectively.

23. The CTSA 2015 also made statutory provision for Channel panels. These panels, organised by local authorities, bring together professionals to assess individuals who may be vulnerable to radicalisation and to determine suitable support (section 36

CTSA 2015). To support this, the first Channel Duty Guidance was published by the Home Office in 2015 .

### **Local Authorities**

24. Local authorities play a central role in Prevent through their wide-ranging responsibilities and accountability to the public. Local authorities coordinate the programme at the local level, working with other partners to assess and respond to local risks. In areas with higher risks of radicalisation, local authorities may receive funding from the Home Office to employ dedicated Prevent teams. Additionally, all local authorities have access to support from Home Office Prevent advisers.

### **Lifecycle of Prevent Referrals**

25. Prevent referrals are intended to support individuals at risk of radicalisation by providing them with appropriate assistance to safeguard themselves and others.
26. Prevent referrals are received from a wide range of sources, including police, educational institutions, health and social care professionals, and members of the public. CTP is responsible for the triage and assessment of all Prevent referrals to determine whether Prevent intervention is appropriate and, if so, the most suitable case management approach for the individual concerned.
27. For friends, family members, and community members concerned that someone may be vulnerable to radicalisation, government-endorsed resources such as the Prevent GOV.UK page or the ACT Early website offer step-by-step guidance on when and how to make a referral.
28. Prevent referrals are typically submitted to the police using the Prevent National Referral Form [VE/4]. In most cases, this form is sent to the local CTP Unit for assessment. Before 2019, there was greater variation as to the document/mode by which Prevent referrals were made and I am not presently aware of the document/s used within the North West at that time. While [VE/4] is now the standard form, some organisations may still use alternative processes, such as internal referral

CTPHQ000033

systems, or Multi-Agency Safeguarding Hubs (MASH), which operate alongside the CTP Unit.

29. Once a referral is submitted, CTP conducts an initial review to determine whether there is any immediate threat to national security and whether the referral reveals “*reasonable grounds to believe that an individual is vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism*” per the criterion in section 36 of CTSA 2015. Referrals which meet this threshold are progressed beyond this stage into Channel. An alternative route of progression (known as Police-Led Partnership) is outlined in the next section of this statement.
30. If no evidence of radicalisation is found, then alternative support, such as mental health or social care services, may be recommended if appropriate. Police may request additional information from relevant partners to inform their assessment.
31. The Prevent process is outlined in further detail in the Counter Terrorism Case Officers' Guide [VE/5]. CTPHQ000034
32. At the time of all three referrals regarding AR in December 2019, February 2021 and April 2021 respectively, the CTP Prevent network was using the Prevent Policy version 2.0, released in May 2018, titled 'Policy for Prevent Practitioners: Management of CT/DE Risk within the Community' [VE/6]. A further version CTPHQ000014 was brought into effect on 28 August 2020. This updated version substantively reflected the 2018 Policy, save that it clarified some of the language used within it, removing the “CT/DE” (Counter Terrorism / Domestic Extremism) references. This followed feedback from the network that the guidance was sometimes interpreted as wrongly eliding “DE” with extreme right wing and white supremacy extremism *among British nationals*, and “CT” with mostly “international” (foreign national) Islamist extremism; thereby failing to address that all kinds of terrorism may be perpetrated domestically by British and foreign nationals alike. I exhibit this August 2020 update to the 2018 guidance as my exhibit [VE/7]. CTPHQ000017
33. In 2019, as now, when a Prevent referral is received by CTP, and before it is reviewed by a Prevent Counter Terrorism Case Officer (CTCO), the referral details are de-conflicted against ongoing CT investigations by a dedicated intelligence

management unit using secure systems that Prevent officers will not routinely access. This step is essential in CT risk management to establish whether the subject is already under active investigation or is known as a CT Subject of Interest (SOI).

34. After de-confliction, Prevent officers assess the referral information using a structured professional judgement risk assessment framework known as the "Police Gateway Assessment" (PGA). An initial decision is then made as to whether further enquiries are warranted. If so, additional information is sought from statutory partners to inform the decision on the case's suitability for Channel. Possible outcomes at this stage include referral to the overt and voluntary multi-agency Channel programme, management under Police-led Partnership (PLP) for cases unsuitable for Channel but requiring Prevent support or closure (often with signposting to other safeguarding mechanisms). I outline the PLP process in further detail in the following section.
35. As noted above, if the criteria under section 36 of the CTSA 2015 are met, the referral is forwarded to a Channel Panel for further consideration. Channel Panels are chaired by local authorities and may include representatives from the police, children's services, education, mental health, and social services. The panel determines whether the individual is at risk of radicalisation.
36. If the Channel Panel concludes that support is appropriate, the individual (or their parent/guardian if underage) must give consent to receive assistance through Channel. Participation in Channel is completely voluntary, and the support package is tailored to the individual's specific needs. This may include mentoring, educational support, or other interventions designed to reduce vulnerability to radicalisation.
37. At any stage, if Prevent is deemed unsuitable, or consent for Channel is not provided, alternative support options may be considered. These may include referrals to mental health services, children's social care or other relevant agencies. In cases where the individual poses a higher level of risk, such as being under investigation or charged with terrorism-related offences, they may instead be considered for the Police-led Partnership process.

## Police-Led Partnership

38. The Police-led Partnership (PLP) process concerns individuals who are not suitable for Channel but have been identified as presenting issues relevant to Prevent that require support or mitigation. These cases are managed by the police in collaboration with other agencies. I exhibit the current PLP terms of reference as my exhibit [VE/8]. In 2019-2021, guidance on the PLP was predominantly captured within the CTPHQ policy for Prevent practitioners 2018 ([VE/6], as above). CTPHQ000016 CTPHQ000014

39. Each regional CTU/CTIU manages the operational caseload of Prevent PLP referrals for their respective region, under the leadership of a Regional Prevent Coordinator. This senior leader is responsible for the strategic coordination and leadership of CTP Prevent services in their area. Regional Prevent Coordinators lead teams of CTCOs and supervisors who collaborate with local partners to manage cases, develop case management plans, and mitigate terrorism risks.

40. Coordination and support for the regions are provided by the CTPHQ Prevent policy team, whose responsibilities include:

- (i) Developing national CTP Prevent policies, processes, and guidance;
- (ii) Overseeing the tools used by regional Prevent teams, and
- (iii) Providing training content for the CTP Prevent network.

41. The PLP process is similar to Channel in many respects, with the key difference being that CTP Prevent leads on PLP, whereas the Local Authority leads on Channel. Channel remains the preferred route for all individuals within Prevent. Unlike Channel, which is voluntary, PLP does not, however, require the subject's consent for a case management plan to be implemented. Channel is an overt programme with a presumption of transparency regarding information about the subject, whereas PLP may involve stricter confidentiality measures.

42. As with all Prevent case management, operational work on PLP cases is handled by the relevant CTU or CTIU under the Regional Prevent Coordinator. CTPHQ provides coordination and support only.

## CTPHQ's involvement in AR's case

43. As would be expected in light of the above, CTPHQ had no involvement in or knowledge of the progression of any of the referrals of AR through the Prevent framework.
44. While AR's horrific violence on 29 July 2024 was undoubtedly extreme, there was no evidence that he engaged in this violence to advance a political, religious, racial or ideological cause. The incident was not therefore declared a terrorist incident, and the CTP network did not take over the ensuing criminal investigation, which remained with Merseyside police. If required in incidents of major violence or complexity, the CTP network supports forces with specialist resources and expertise, this support was provided to Merseyside Police to support their response and investigation.
45. As the SNC for Prevent and Pursue, I was routinely briefed on the progress of the police response and the ensuing criminal investigation. I had very regular updates in the early part of the response whilst we established the facts and considered if CTP should take the lead for the investigation or support. This engagement also helped us to consider what regional and national resources we could provide. As the investigation progressed, I continued to have updates and engaged with the CTPNW and Merseyside investigation teams to provide support wherever it was needed.
46. Additionally, in the aftermath of the attack, I was involved in the commissioning of two learning reviews regarding the referrals of AR to Prevent. Namely:
- (i) The **Independent Prevent Learning Review** (PLR) [VE/9]. This independent CTPHQ000055 report was commissioned by myself and my counterparts within the Home Office on 30 July 2024. . The purpose of this report was to provide a fast-time review and identification of any urgent learning arising from the tragic events in Southport to preserve life and public safety going forward. It should be noted that the PLR was necessarily subject to two limitations. Firstly, its urgency necessarily curtailed the time available for the reviewer's analysis and, more

importantly, the review had to be conducted *sub judice*, pending AR's prosecution, and it was therefore confined (in accordance with guidance from the Crown Prosecution Service) to a desktop review of immediately available papers.

- (ii) The **Dignate 2 Report** [VE/10]. Dignate reviews provide a mechanism within CTP to promote best practices and to ensure that any learning arising from incidents of this nature can be swiftly identified and promoted by way of practical recommendations to be implemented across the CTP network. The mechanism was introduced after March 2022, when the Home Office initiated Project DIGNATE, a review to identify individuals who had been referred to Prevent and who subsequently committed a terrorism offence, in order to improve risk assessment processes. The mechanism has now developed to facilitate not only improvements to risk identification, but also the effectiveness of interventions thereafter. While the initial focus of Project DIGNATE was on terrorist offending, other cases can be considered where they may provide valuable insights, e.g. where Prevent subjects go on to commit high-harm offences. I exhibit the Project DIGNATE2 terms of references as [VE/11].
- The report into AR's offending was finalised in February 2025.

47. Among other matters, both reviews identified the possibility that the referrals of AR to Prevent may have been prematurely closed as a result of over-emphasis on the uncertain presence of any particular ideology. I address this issue, and developments to relevant guidance, from paragraph [56] in the subsequent section of this statement.

#### **Developments in the Prevent framework since May 2021**

48. The following section provides an outline of key developments in the Prevent framework since the third and final referral of AR was made and resolved between April-May 2021.

## Overarching developments

49. In October 2022, the Government announced plans to update the CONTEST strategy to address emerging threats. The revised version, CONTEST 2023, was published in July 2023 [VE/12] and retained Prevent as a central component. CTPHQ000013
50. The Prevent objectives in CONTEST 2023 reflect a renewed approach to:
- (i) Tackling the ideological roots of terrorism.
  - (ii) Providing early intervention for those vulnerable to radicalisation.
  - (iii) Supporting individuals to disengage from terrorism and reintegrate into society.
51. Following an independent review of Prevent, conducted by Sir William Shawcross and published in February 2023, the Government pledged to implement all 34 of the resulting recommendations. The key themes of the recommendations concerned:
- (i) Underlining Prevent’s focus on addressing the ideological causes of terrorism.
  - (ii) Amending the CTSA 2015 to underline the duty of relevant bodies to prevent individuals from being drawn into terrorism (to discourage Prevent from being treated as synonymous with general Safeguarding principles and/or other duties local agencies have to protect subjects of referrals from harm and to address their vulnerabilities).
  - (iii) Updating Prevent Duty and Channel Duty Guidance accordingly.
52. In line with the review’s recommendations, a revised version of the Prevent Duty Guidance was published on 7 September 2023 CTPHQ000012 [VE/11]. It includes clearer instructions on referral procedures, featuring updated terminology under the “Notice, Check, Share” approach. A new Prevent Duty Toolkit was also introduced to provide practical support to local authorities and partner agencies. Revised Channel Duty Guidance was introduced on 7 April 2025.

## Information management

53. Between 2018 and May 2024, all Prevent referrals were recorded in the Police Case Management Tracker (PCMT), a system used to track referrals, police assessments,

and their outcomes. PCMT was managed solely by the police. Over the same period, all cases handled by Channel panels were recorded in the Case Management information System (CMIS). This system was owned and managed by the Home Office (albeit CTP case officers had access to update cases).

54. Since 13 May 2024, the systems were streamlined and brought together under a revised single system known as Prevent Case Management Tracker enhanced [CTPHQ000030] (PCMTe) [VE/13]. This means a Prevent referral can now be managed, from beginning to end, on one collaborative IT system. The PCMTe is designed to support and guide the user through the Prevent Case Management process to better ensure compliance with policy, management of risk and to reduce double keying of data. Whereas the old PCMT recorded data in a free-entry notes function, the PCMTe reflects the broader Prevent Case Management process, ensuring each element is considered and recorded before allowing the user to progress the case. This includes built in supervisory oversight.

### **Assessments**

55. Prior to the 2023 Prevent guidance, there had been two assessment frameworks, one for triaging Prevent referrals and managing cases outside of the Channel programme, and another for managing cases within Channel. This process has now been streamlined, with the frameworks merging into a single assessment process, coinciding with the delivery of enhanced training to increase the abilities of practitioners to complete assessments accurately and consistently identify individuals susceptible to radicalisation and vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism related offending, also screening out cases that do not present any Prevent-relevant vulnerability, risk or threat.

### **Fascination with extreme violence**

56. On 7 April 2025, CTPHQ introduced an interim policy addressing Prevent referrals indicating a subject's Fascination with Extreme Violence and Mass Casualty Attacks [VE/14]. [CTPNW000016]

57. This cohort of Prevent referrals is categorised under “*Fascination with extreme violence or mass-casualty attacks*”, wording agreed as a reformulated PCMT ideological category in early 2024.
58. Previously, however, and since July 2019, the Dynamic Investigation Framework (DIF), which forms part of the Prevent Policy and the CTCO Guide, had included “*fascination with mass-killings or school massacres*” [VE/15]. This formulation had persisted through to its formal replacement within the Prevent Assessment Framework in May 2024 [VE/16]. [CTPHQ000110] [CTPHQ000009]
59. In addition to the DIF guidance, and prior to all three of AR’s referrals to Prevent, on 25 June 2019, the Home Office and CTPHQ had issued a joint letter to all Police RPCs, Channel Panel Chairs, Local Authority Prevent Coordinators, Higher and Further Education Prevent Coordinators, Prevent Education Officers, and Health Prevent Coordinators. The letter (see Annex C to [VE/9]) [CTPHQ000055] set out a joint position on managing individuals with unclear, mixed or unstable ideologies within Prevent and underlined the increasing volume and complexity of such cases. In particular, the letter asked colleagues to bear carefully in mind the following matters:
- *Draw on the professional judgement and experience of your colleagues, and ensure those making decisions understand their specialist area in the context of CT risk. This is to ensure individual interventions are considered in the context of their impact on the overall risk;*
  - *do not restrict your preventative work only to individuals associated with the ideologies of formally proscribed organisations;*
  - *consider those individuals who appear to have an interest in multiple, concurrent, and even contradictory extremist ideologies or causes, or who seem to shift from one extremist ideology cause to another;*
  - *do not necessarily rely on vulnerable individuals to be able to identify, understand or describe with coherence their own ideological motivations as a measure of the risk of being vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism; and,*
  - *consider the possibility of an individual’s obsessive interest in public massacres of any kind as a possible signal of vulnerability.*

60. The 2025 interim policy serves to reiterate the position expressed in the June 2019 Home Office/CTPHQ joint letter and to provide guidance to practitioners around their decision-making when dealing with this cohort of subjects. It emphasises that a Prevent referral cannot be dismissed due solely to an apparent lack of connection to a specific extreme ideology. Practitioners are reminded to focus on the behaviour of a subject and their risk of potential escalation to extreme violence. The policy underlines the difference between “Prevent-relevance” (the term used to designate the issues that are of interest to CTP-Prevent officers) and the much narrower concept of “Pursue-relevance.” In particular, the policy reminds practitioners that, while “Prevent-relevance” captures all the concerns of Pursue-relevance around terrorism offending and its immediate precursors, it also encompasses concerns beginning far upstream of preparatory acts for the offences described in the Terrorism Act. It captures the various “push-and-pull” factors that may render individuals vulnerable to radicalisation.
61. Like the DIF before it, the 2025 interim policy also flags fascination with extreme and graphic imagery as an important warning sign for susceptibility to radicalisation, even in the absence of an identifiable associated ideology.

### **Multiple referrals**

62. On 10 March 2025, CTPHQ introduced an interim policy concerning Multiple CTPHQ000010 Referrals [VE/17]. This policy expressly emphasises the need to examine the cumulative impact of repeat referrals related to the same subject, even if the subject had been closed from Prevent previously at an early juncture without management or interventions.
63. In such cases, CTCOs and their supervisors are now required to obtain the authorisation from a senior officer (of the level of Inspector or above) before closing a “repeat referral” on the PCMTe. This change ensures that, in cases where CTP has been notified of a radicalisation risk more than once, an enhanced level of scrutiny is brought to bear before a case is resolved.

## **Radicalisation in children**

64. The changing profile of terrorism offending in recent years has brought a greater proportion of children and young people within CTP caseloads, often presenting with a complex risk profile and set of needs.
  
65. Considerable work has been undertaken by CTP and others in recent years on how to address the risk of radicalisation and terrorism in children. The National Police Chiefs' Council, in its Children and Young People Policing Strategy (updated October 2024), directs that policing should, as far as possible, seek to ensure that young people are not unnecessarily criminalised, and every opportunity is taken to divert them away from offending, with a range of case disposal options available to investigators when encountering children committing non-terrorism criminal offences. Across 2024, CTPHQ assisted in the development of a Child Centred Policing in CT Strategy to assist practitioners in preserving national security where duties to promote the best interests of a child are engaged [VE/18] CTPHQ000022

## **Continual learning**

66. The entire CTP network is committed to continual learning, together with our partners, to develop best practices and to strengthen our collective ability to prevent, react and mitigate extremist threats and to keep the public safe from harm. CTPHQ will continue to do all we can to assist this Inquiry and to ensure that all relevant lessons are learned.

## **STATEMENT OF TRUTH:**

I confirm the contents of this statement are true to the best of my knowledge and belief. I understand proceedings may be brought against anyone who makes, or causes to be made, a document verified by a statement of truth without an honest belief of its truth.

Signed: **Signature**

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Dated: 30/06/2025

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