

Witness Name: John Boumphrey

Statement No: Third

Exhibits: JB/45 – JB/58

Dated: 29 September 2025

## THE SOUTHPORT INQUIRY

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### Third Witness Statement of John Boumphrey

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I, John Boumphrey, Vice President, Amazon UK and Ireland Country Manager, will say as follows on behalf of Amazon EU S.a.r.l (“Amazon”):

1. I make this third witness statement to provide additional information to the Chair of the Southport Inquiry (the “Inquiry”) following my first statement of 14 August 2025 [AMA000081] and my second statement of 16 September 2025 [AMA000083].
2. This statement is true to the best of my knowledge, and is based on facts that I am either aware of or informed by others are true, and on documents with which I am familiar or which have been drawn to my attention by those who have assisted me.
3. To assist the Inquiry, I have set out below a summary of the contents of this statement:
  - 3.1 Section A: Updated version of exhibit JB/11 [AMA000056] to my first statement (paragraph 4); and
  - 3.2 Section B: Police requests for information (paragraph 5).

#### **Section A**

4. **Updated version of exhibit JB/11 [AMA000056]**
  - 4.1 During my preparation for attending to provide oral evidence to the Inquiry, I became aware that some of the information contained within exhibit **JB/11 [AMA000056]** to my first statement was incorrect.

- 4.2 The task of creating a spreadsheet containing AR's order history was a manual one, during which an error occurred when copying across the seller information from Amazon's system to the list exhibited to my first statement. The result of this error is that some of the sellers listed in column H on the version exhibited to my first statement are incorrect.
- 4.3 In addition, we have identified that the order status column, column G, of **JB/11 [AMA000056]** summarised the status of AR's purchase history by order rather than by individual item. This meant that if AR purchased multiple items in the same order and cancelled or refunded/returned only one of the items in such order, all items within the order were marked as 'cancelled' or 'complete', which was inaccurate.
- 4.4 I now exhibit **JB/45 [AMA000096]**, a corrected version of **JB/11 [AMA000056]**. **JB/45 [AMA000096]** contains the corrected seller information and reflects the order status broken down per item. The amended seller rows have been highlighted in red, and the text colour has been changed to grey to indicate which items were ultimately cancelled or refunded /returned. The rows in which the seller name is unchanged remain in green.
- 4.5 To clarify paragraph 15.3 of my first witness statement, I set out below the number of items AR ordered, cancelled, delivered and returned/refunded in 2022, 2023 and 2024. Note that the delivery column below indicates the number of items that were delivered and not returned/refunded.

Year	Ordered	Cancelled	Delivered	Returned/refunded
2022	48	16	25	7
2023	22	6	15	1
2024	5	2	3	0

- 4.6 In response to a Rule 9 request dated 3 July 2025, Amazon also provided a table to the Inquiry detailing the purchase history of AR and his family members **[AMA000049]**. I also attach an updated version of this spreadsheet as the above errors also appear in that spreadsheet **[JB/46 [AMA000097]]**.

## **Section B**

### **5. Police requests for information**

5.1 During the course of DCI Pye's evidence on Tuesday, 23 September 2025, DCI Pye stated that when Merseyside Police asked Amazon for evidence as to any age verification process at the point of purchase of the kitchen knives, Amazon indicated that it did not hold that information.

<i>CTI</i>	<i>Sir, just for you to note, we will come to evidence from Amazon that suggests that there was a form of age verification but that what AR was able to do was to use his father's details, which then tallied with the electoral roll, and that was sufficient, despite the fact that he was buying it in his name – entering his father's details was sufficient to pass the age verification at the point of purchase. But all of that, I think, is something that you didn't go into, perhaps there was no need to, for the purposes of the criminal investigation?</i>
<i>DCI Pye</i>	<i>No, we did request the information from Amazon. We were told by Amazon that they didn't have that information and also, in terms of delivery, it had been delivered by a third party called Condor. When we spoke to Condor they confirmed from the reference number that it would be a delivery they made but they didn't hold any data either, so we were not able to progress it any further.</i>
<i>Chair</i>	<i>So Amazon said to you that they didn't have the information that Mr Moss has just asked you about?</i>
<i>DCI Pye</i>	<i>Yes</i>
<i>Chair</i>	<i>Thank you</i>
<i>CTI</i>	<i>I think I do you a disservice: you asked those questions but you got a blank?</i>
<i>DCI Pye</i>	<i>Yes.</i>

5.2 Having considered the evidence provided by DCI Pye, it appears that Mr Moss KC ("CTI"), was asking about the online age verification ("OAV") process at the point of purchase, whereas the Police request DCI Pye referred to was in respect of the age verified delivery ("AVD") process. Amazon did not receive a Police request in respect

of the OAV process. With regards to the request DCI Pye was referring to, I believe it is the one dated 13 December 2024 (Exhibit JB/04 of my first statement), where the Police filled out the request form requesting driver details and, in the free text box, requested extra information including on 'Details of how the delivery was signed for and by whom, Details of how the age verification needed for delivery was satisfied, Copies of any documentation, photographs taken for delivery, identification and signatures recorded for the delivery'. The LER team member receiving this request treated it as a standard request relating to drivers and, in line with standard procedure, gave the Police the details of the DSP (as the entity who engaged the driver) (Exhibit JB/08 of my first statement). In hindsight, that request should have been escalated to the relevant Amazon team (being the 'last mile' team, which is responsible for managing the delivery of parcels to customers) who could have provided more detail on how the AVD process works if the DSP had not done so.

5.3 In order to confirm that Amazon had not received a Police request in respect of the OAV process, we conducted a further search on various databases, beyond where all LER's records should be stored. As a result of these broader searches, we found that Amazon received and responded to four additional requests from the Police in relation to AR's account and purchase history with Amazon. The additional requests are as set out below:

Date of request	Request	Date of response	Amazon Response
31 July 2024 <b>[Exhibit JB/47 AMA000098]</b> and followed-up on 1 August 2024 <b>[Exhibit JB/48 AMA000099]</b>	This application requested account and order details linked to 10 Old School Close for the period 29/4/2024 – 29/7/2024.	1 August 2024 <b>[Exhibit JB/49 AMA000100]</b>	Requested further detail as an account could not be located based solely on the address.
2 August 2024 <b>[Exhibit JB/50 AMA000101]</b>	This application was made up of two request forms requesting account	13 August 2024 <b>[Exhibit JB/53 AMA000104]</b>	An excel spreadsheet was provided to the

and <b>[Exhibit JB/51]</b> <b>AMA000102</b> and followed-up on 7 August 2024 <b>[Exhibit JB/52]</b> <b>AMA000103</b>	and order details for the period 1/11/2022 – 29/7/2024. The first request linked to AR's email address and to a payment card ending 2620 and the second request linked to a mobile phone number ending in 2306.		Police containing details requested.
11 September 2024 <b>[Exhibit JB/54]</b> <b>AMA000105</b>	This application requested transaction history linked to an account 'A R' with registered email address *****a7@yahoo.com. No time period for the transaction history was given until further prompted by Amazon <b>[Exhibit JB/55/AMA000106]</b> which was then provided on 22 September. After the request from Amazon, the time period was specified as 01/05/2021 - 31/10/2022.	30 October 2024 <b>[Exhibit JB/56]</b> <b>AMA000107</b>	An excel spreadsheet was provided to the Police containing details requested.
18 September 2024 <b>[Exhibit JB/57]</b> <b>AMA000108</b>	This application requested account and order details linked to a payment card ending 3073 for the period 1/1/2022 – 29/7/2024.	19 September 2024 <b>[Exhibit JB/58]</b> <b>AMA000109</b>	An excel spreadsheet was provided to the Police containing details requested.

5.4 I have been informed that the reason these additional four applications were not previously identified is that different reference numbers were used (both internally and

externally) and different databases were (incorrectly) used for filing the correspondence, such that the search done in preparation for the first statement did not locate these. This does not impact my first statement other than paragraph 29.4: the LER team were first notified that someone under-18 was able to purchase an age-restricted product on 31 July 2024 (not 13 December 2024). It remains accurate, however, that Amazon responded to all Police requests received and that I was only made aware of the fact that the knife used in the attack was purchased on Amazon.co.uk in January 2025. As set out in Section C of my first statement, the LER team has now introduced a more robust notification process to prevent this occurring again and will also be reviewing its record-keeping practices.

6. **Concluding remarks**

On behalf of Amazon, I can only apologise for the inevitable confusion caused as a result of providing inaccurate information to the Inquiry. Both the error with **JB/11 [AMA000056]** and the Police requests are human errors by team members moving at pace, and genuine mistakes which we have taken measures internally to address. I remain available to respond to any queries which may assist the Inquiry going forward.

**Statement of Truth**

**I believe that the facts stated in this witness statement are true.**

**Signed:**

**Signature**

**Dated:** 29 September 2025